Remodeling the Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA)

The intelligence community and the law enforcement sector are supposed to be working closely to keep us all safe from terrorists and other dangers. The benefits of this cooperation should not be frittered away by unnecessary burdens in trying suspected terrorists in civilian courts. If the executive branch is to be kept away from the dark side of counterterrorism, the courts, Congress, or a combination of the two should modernize their approach to alignment, to Section 6 of Classified Information Procedures Act, and to closed portions of trials. First, a prosecutor’s discovery obligations should apply to the intelligence community only when spymasters have most actively participated in the investigation. When defining “most actively” and in determining who falls within the prosecution unit, all three branches of government should err toward non-alignment. The recent creep toward conceding alignment on all cases since 9/11 should stop. Second, courts should be less inclined to admit top-secret information into trial than information at a lower level of classification. The more sensitive the information, the more leeway courts should give prosecutors in proposing substitutions and summaries. The common sense that probably fills the gaps of CIPA practice, squeezing around cases and the statute, should be formalized by an update of CIPA. Third, it should be possible to close portions of trials to all but the judge, jury, and the parties to the case when especially sensitive information is being presented. These limited closures will allow courts, as a compensating benefit, to lean toward defendants on Section 6 decisions as to the use of classified information at trial. By this compensation, the either/or of full disclosure versus complete suppression is traded for a range of options. CIPA is showing its age. Even so, because its foundation is solid, it does not require a tear down as much as a remodeling. In at least three areas – alignment, Section 6, and closed portions of trials – our nation deserves a better resolution between the conflicting interests of prosecutors and spymasters

The Classified Information Procedures Act in the Age of Terrorism: Remodeling CIPA in an Offense-Specific Manner

The Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA) sets the balancing point between the government’s interest in preventing disclosure of classified information with a criminal defendant’s right to exculpatory material. Although CIPA was originally drafted with espionage cases in mind, the statute has become more commonly associated with terrorism prosecutions. This contextual shift has disrupted CIPA’s interest-balancing formulation by altering the governmental interests at stake. CIPA’s discovery burdens on the defendant are ordinarily constitutionally justified by the strong countervailing state interest in preserving vital national-security information. This concern is less salient with terrorism defendants, who are unlikely to possess state secrets. Accordingly, those defendants may require further reciprocity in discovery procedures to keep the statute within constitutional parameters. This Note examines the ill effects of CIPA’s contextual shift and proposes a set of amendments to alleviate those concerns. Chiefly, this Note suggests an offense-specific CIPA, whereby the procedural mechanisms of the statute are tailored to the offense charged. The three core recommendations of this Note are (1) inclusion of defense counsel in the discovery process and clearer standards to govern discoverability; (2) a limited and qualified declassification requirement in select Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act cases; and (3) bifurcation of admissibility hearings

Spartan Daily, March 2, 1976

Volume 66, Issue 19https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/spartandaily/6050/thumbnail.jp

Digital Innocence

Recent revelations have shown that almost all online activity and increasing amounts of offline activity are tracked using Big Data and data mining technologies. The ensuing debate has largely failed to consider an important consequence of mass surveillance: the obligation to provide access to information that might exonerate a criminal defendant. Although information technology can establish innocence—an ability that will only improve with technological advance—the fruits of mass surveillance have been used almost exclusively to convict. To address the imbalance and inform public dialogue, this Article develops the concept of “digital innocence” as a means of leveraging the tools of Big Data, data mining, ubiquitous consumer tracking, and digital forensics to prevent wrongful convictions and to provide hard proof of actual innocence for those already convicted

Digital Innocence

Recent revelations have shown that almost all online activity and increasing amounts of offline activity are tracked using Big Data and data mining technologies. The ensuing debate has largely failed to consider an important consequence of mass surveillance: the obligation to provide access to information that might exonerate a criminal defendant. Although information technology can establish innocence—an ability that will only improve with technological advance—the fruits of mass surveillance have been used almost exclusively to convict. To address the imbalance and inform public dialogue, this Article develops the concept of “digital innocence” as a means of leveraging the tools of Big Data, data mining, ubiquitous consumer tracking, and digital forensics to prevent wrongful convictions and to provide hard proof of actual innocence for those already convicted