Investment and Capital Constraints: Repatriations Under the American Jobs Creation Act

The American Jobs Creation Act (AJCA) significantly lowered US firms' tax cost when accessing their unrepatriated foreign earnings. Using this temporary shock to the cost of internal financing, we examine the role of capital constraints in firms' investment decisions. Controlling for the capacity to repatriate foreign earnings under the AJCA, we find that a majority of the funds repatriated by capital constrained firms were allocated to approved domestic investment. While unconstrained firms account for a majority of repatriated funds, no increase in investment resulted. Contrary to other examinations of the AJCA, we find little change in leverage and equity payouts.

Why do firms hold so much cash? A tax-based explanation

U.S. corporations hold significant amounts of cash on their balance sheets, and these cash holdings have been justified in the existing empirical literature by transaction costs and precautionary motives. An additional explanation, considered in this study, is that U.S. multinational firms hold cash in their foreign subsidiaries because of the tax costs associated with repatriating foreign income. Consistent with this hypothesis, firms that face higher repatriation tax burdens hold higher levels of cash, hold this cash abroad, and hold this cash in affiliates that trigger high tax costs when repatriating earnings. Estimates indicate that a one standard deviation increase in the tax burden from repatriating foreign income is associated with a 7.9% increase in the ratio of cash to net assets. In addition, certain firms, specifically those that are less financially constrained domestically and those that are more technology intensive, exhibit a higher sensitivity of affiliate cash holdings to repatriation tax burdens.

Two Essays on the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004

This dissertation contains two essays. The American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 was intended to stimulate the economy by expediting the repatriation of foreign earnings and requiring that those repatriations be invested in domestic operations. The first essay investigates (1) who repatriated foreign earnings under the provisions of the Act, (2) why firms repatriated and (3) what the firms did with the repatriated funds. The first essay identifies 364 firms that repatriated approximately $283 billion under the Act. The only significant increase in expenditures for the repatriating firms was for stock repurchases, an expenditure specifically prohibited under the Act. Firms appear to have repatriated foreign earnings to take advantage of the tax savings without achieving the Act‟s intended objective of increasing domestic investment. The second essay builds on recent research that evaluates the lock-out effect of the U.S. international tax system. The second essay studies the factors associated with the lock-out effect of the U.S. international tax system. Recent evidence suggests that firms that have reached their optimal level of investment in foreign operations will accumulate foreign earnings abroad in financial assets to avoid recording the associated U.S. tax liability. However, prior research has not disentangled the difference between firms that permanently reinvest their foreign earnings for reinvest into operations versus firms that classify their foreign earnings as permanently reinvest to indefinitely defer the recognition of the associated U.S. tax liability. Using a hand-collected sample of firms that repatriated under the one-time tax holiday, I find that the firms were classifying their foreign earnings as permanently reinvested to avoid recognizing the associated U.S. liability before and after the one-time tax holiday. Also, during the tax holiday firms brought back significant amounts of cash previously classified as permanently reinvested foreign earnings suggesting that the earnings were not retained abroad for foreign reinvestment. The results of essay two are consistent with theoretical predictions that firms repatriating under the Act classified their foreign earnings as permanently reinvested to avoid recognizing the associated U.S. tax liability

Do Some Stakeholders in Publicly Traded Firms Benefit at the Expense of Others as a Result of Corporate Inversions?

This report examines corporate inversions to determine whether this practice benefits the majority of stakeholders or merely a select few. A sample of firms previously incorporated in the United States that have since undergone inversions is examined to answer this question. Annual stock price returns, stock price volatility, and earnings per share changes from the sample of inversion firms are the main sources of data examined. These results are compared to the S&P 500 and peer firms to determine whether the changes can be attributed to the inversions, or are merely a result of general economic conditions. Supporting topics addressed in this paper include an overview of legislation related to inversions and suggestions to mitigate the negative consequences of inversions. This study shows that there are no observable benefits to shareholder wealth arising from corporate inversions. While there were changes in the data from pre to post inversion, they were not unique to the inversion firms as the same changes were observed in the peer firms. However, the study showed that there is a fundamental difference between inversion firms when compared to the S&P 500

Stateless Income

This paper and its companion, The Lessons of Stateless Income, together comprehensively analyze the tax consequences and policy implications of the phenomenon of “stateless income.” Stateless income comprises income derived for tax purposes by a multinational group from business activities in a country other than the domicile of the group’s ultimate parent company, but which is subject to tax only in a jurisdiction that is not the location of the customers or the factors of production through which the income was derived, and is not the domicile of the group’s parent company. Google Inc.’s “Double Irish Dutch Sandwich” structure is one example of stateless income tax planning in operation. This paper focuses on the consequences to current tax policies of stateless income tax planning. The companion paper extends the analysis along two margins, by considering the implications of stateless income tax planning for the reliability of standard efficiency benchmarks relating to foreign direct investment, and by considering in detail the phenomenon’s implications for the design of future U.S. tax policy in this area, whether couched as the adoption of a territorial tax regime or a genuine worldwide tax consolidation system. This paper first demonstrates that the current U.S. tax rules governing income from foreign direct investments often are misapprehended: in practice the U.S. tax rules do not operate as a “worldwide” system of taxation, but rather as an ersatz variant on territorial systems, with hidden benefits and costs when compared to standard territorial regimes. This claim holds whether one analyzes these rules as a cash tax matter, or through the lens of financial accounting standards. This paper rejects as inconsistent with the data any suggestion that current law disadvantages U.S. multinational firms in respect of the effective foreign tax rates they suffer, when compared with their territorial-based competitors. This paper’s fundamental thesis is that the pervasive presence of stateless income tax planning changes everything. Stateless income privileges multinational firms over domestic ones by offering the former the prospect of capturing “tax rents” — low-risk inframarginal returns derived by moving income from high-tax foreign countries to low-tax ones. Other important implications of stateless income include the dissolution of any coherence to the concept of geographic source, the systematic bias towards offshore rather than domestic investment, the more surprising bias in favor of investment in high-tax foreign countries to provide the raw feedstock for the generation of low-tax foreign income in other countries, the erosion of the U.S. domestic tax base through debt-financed tax arbitrage, many instances of deadweight loss, and — essentially uniquely to the United States — the exacerbation of the lock-out phenomenon, under which the price that U.S. firms pay to enjoy the benefits of dramatically low foreign tax rates is the accumulation of extraordinary amounts of earnings (about $1.4 trillion, by the most recent estimates) and cash outside the United States. Stateless income tax planning as applied in practice to current U.S. law’s ersatz territorial tax system means that the lock-out effect now operates in fact as a kind of lock-in effect: firms retain more overseas earnings than they profitably can redeploy, to the great frustration of their shareholders, who would prefer that the cash be distributed to them. This tension between shareholders and management likely lies at the heart of current demands by U.S.-based multinational firms that the United States adopt a territorial tax system. The firms themselves are not greatly disadvantaged by the current U.S. tax system, but shareholders are. The ultimate reward of successful stateless income tax planning from this perspective should be massive stock repurchases, but instead shareholders are tantalized by glimpses of enormous cash hoards just out of their reach

Barriers to Mobility: The Lockout Effect of U.S. Taxation of Worldwide Corporate Profits

Using data from a survey of tax executives, we examine the corporate response to the one-time dividends received deduction in the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004. We describe the firms’ reported sources and uses of the cash repatriated and we also examine non-tax costs companies incurred to avoid the repatriation tax prior to the Act. Finally, we examine whether firms would repatriate cash again if a similar Act were to occur in the future. Overall, the evidence is consistent with a substantial lockout effect resulting from the current U.S. policy of taxing the worldwide profits of U.S. multinationals.Fuqua School of Business (Duke University)Michigan Ross School of Business (Paton Accounting Fund)University of Washington (Paul Pigott/PACCAR Professorship

Watch What I Do, Not What I Say: The Unintended Consequences of the Homeland Investment Act

This paper analyzes the impact on firm behavior of the Homeland Investment Act of 2004, which provided a one-time tax holiday for the repatriation of foreign earnings by U.S. multinationals. The analysis controls for endogeneity and omitted variable bias by using instruments that identify the firms likely to receive the largest tax benefits from the holiday. Repatriations did not lead to an increase in domestic investment, employment or R&D—even for the firms that lobbied for the tax holiday stating these intentions and for firms that appeared to be financially constrained. Instead, a $1 increase in repatriations was associated with an increase of almost$1 in payouts to shareholders. These results suggest that the domestic operations of U.S. multinationals were not financially constrained and that these firms were reasonably well-governed. The results have important implications for understanding the impact of U.S. corporate tax policy on multinational firms.Foley thanks the Division of Research of the Harvard Business School for financial support

Bringing It Home: A Study of the Incentives Surrounding the Repatriation of Foreign Earnings Under the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004

The American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 (the Act) creates a temporary tax holiday that effectively reduces the U.S. tax rate on repatriations from foreign subsidiaries from 35% to 5.25%. Firms receive the reduced tax rate by electing to take an 85% dividends received deduction on repatriations in 2004 or 2005. This paper investigates the characteristics of firms that repatriate under the Act and how they use the repatriated funds. We find that firms that repatriate under the Act have lower investment opportunities and higher free cash flows than nonrepatriating firms. Further, we find that repatriating firms increase share repurchases during 2005 by approximately $60 billion more than nonrepatriating firms, an amount that cannot be explained by differences in earnings between the two groups of firms. This increase represents about 20$291.6 billion repatriated by our sample firms under the Act

Repatriation Taxes and the Value of Cash Holdings

U.S.-domiciled multinational firms are taxed on a worldwide basis under a credit and deferral system. Consequently, multinationals earning profits from low-tax foreign countries have incentives to delay the repatriation of foreign earnings, resulting in high levels of offshore cash holdings. I hypothesize and find that investors’ valuation of multinationals’ total cash holdings is negatively associated with firm-specific tax costs of repatriation. Using a hand-collected sample of firms that disclose their foreign and domestic cash holdings separately, I find that the documented effect is driven by firms that hold a majority of cash overseas. I propose three explanations for my main finding: (1) repatriation taxes contribute to the buildup of foreign cash that can be subject to agency problems; (2) repatriation taxes make foreign funds less accessible, thereby increasing internal financing frictions; (3) repatriation taxes motivate excessive investments in financial assets, for which the rate of return is usually lower than firms’ cost of capital. Cross-sectional results are consistent with all three explanations. Overall, this study provides new insights into the non-tax costs of multinationals’ sensitivity to taxation

International taxation and M&A prices

We show that corporate taxation systems regarding foreign dividends and capital gains across 49 countries differ in many aspects, contradicting the requirements for capital ownership neutrality and indicating that ownership patterns are distorted. Consequently, a national tax policy maker may ask which taxation system improves the position of its multinational entreprises in bidding for foreign targets. To address this question, we develop a theoretical model on the impact of foreign dividends and capital gains taxation on cross-border M&A prices from the acquirer’s perspective and theoretically compare different taxation systems. In a next step, we empirically validate our model in a regression analysis on a large cross-border M&A data set. Based on this analysis, we find that foreign dividends taxation rather than capital gains taxation impacts M&A prices. Finally, we provide tax policy suggestions