Cognitive penetrability and ethical perception

In recent years there has been renewed philosophical interest in the thesis that perceptual experience is cognitively penetrable, i.e., roughly, the view that the contents and/or character of a subject's perceptual experience can be modified by what a subject believes and desires. As has been widely noted, it is plausible that cognitive penetration has implications for perception's epistemic role. On the one hand, penetration could make agents insensitive to the world in a way which epistemically 'downgrades' their experience. On the other hand, cognitive penetration may sometimes be epistemically beneficial by making agents more sensitive to the way the world is, i.e., by enabling them to see things that others cannot. For example, penetration could ground a 'high-level' view of perceptual content, according to which agents can have experiences as of 'complex' properties, e.g., natural kind and aesthetic properties. Relatedly, it could elucidate the view that agents can gain perceptual expertise by learning. A type of sophisticated perception (and associated 'perceptual expertise') which has hitherto received little attention in relation to cognitive penetration is ethical perception. In this paper I examine the significance of cognitive penetration for 'Perceptualist' views in ethics which appeal to a notion of 'ethical perception'. Although cognitive penetration could ground a literalist model of Ethical Perception according to which agents can have perceptual experiences of the instantiation of ethical properties, the results are otherwise somewhat mixed: cognitive penetrability does not support Perceptual Intuitionism, although it may provide some limited support for Virtue Ethics and Cornell Realism. However, as I stress, the significance of cognitive penetration for Perceptualism should not be overstated

Theorising Masculinities and Crime: A Genetic-Social Approach

This paper examines competing notions of ‘masculinities’ in relation to crime, and the global nature of gendered inequalities. It is the contention here that social constructionist theories of male sexualities contain certain theoretical deficits. It is suggested that a post-Postmodern analysis of ‘masculinities’ might incorporate some of the insights from Owen’s Genetic-Social meta-theoretical framework. Owen’s ‘sensitising’ framework has been ‘applied’ to the sociological study of human biotechnology, ageing, ‘trust’ and professional power and crime in recent times. Owen’s notion of the biological variable, in particular, might be incorporated into an analysis of ‘masculinities’ in relation to violence and crime. Additionally, it is recommended that these notions are combined with Layder’s concept of Psychobiography in order to theorise ‘masculinities’ and crime in the post-Genome age

Delegated causality of complex systems

A notion of delegated causality is introduced here. This subtle kind of causality is dual to interventional causality. Delegated causality elucidates the causal role of dynamical systems at the “edge of chaos”, explicates evident cases of downward causation, and relates emergent phenomena to Gödel’s incompleteness theorem. Apparently rich implications are noticed in biology and Chinese philosophy. The perspective of delegated causality supports cognitive interpretations of self-organization and evolution

Hermann Lotze on the mind-body problem and the 19th century philosophy and psychology : with special attention to William James

In den 30er und 40er Jahren des 19. Jahrhunderts beschäftigten sich Philosophen, Psychologen und Wissenschaftler intensiv mit dem wissenschaftlichen Status der Psychologie. In diesen Jahren nahmen die Mathematik und die Naturwissenschaften Physik, Physiologie und Chemie eine sehr schnelle Entwicklung. Die Philosophie, verstanden als Erkenntnistheorie, und die Naturwissenschaften beschäftigten sich mit den Problemen des psychischen Phänomens. Die menschliche Empfindung und Wahrnehmung sind, von einem ausschließlich philosophischen Problem, auch zu einem Gebiet der physiologischen Forschung geworden. Durch die Beschäftigung mit dem Thema, das in der Zeit zwischen Anfang des 19. Jahrhunderts und dem Jahr 1874 dem Jahr, in dem "Grundzüge der physiologischen Psychologie" von Wilhelm Wundt und "Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt" von Franz Brentano veröffentlicht wurden diskutiert wurde, entwickelte sich der Gedanke einer Reduzierung des menschlichen psychischen Lebens auf physiologische Ereignisse, weil nur das physiologische Ereignis durch experimentelle Daten wissenschaftlich untersucht werden kann. Die Probleme der Reduktion und die Art der Wissenschaft, die die Psychologie in ihrer Forschung verwenden sollte, waren die grundlegenden Themen für die Entwicklung der wissenschaftlichen Psychologie. Der Zweck meiner Dissertation ist es, die Rolle Lotzes "Medicinische Psychologie, oder Physiologie der Seele" in dieser Debatte zu untersuchen.Between the 1830s and 1840s, philosophers, psychologists and other researchers had questioned intensively the scientific status of psychology. In these years, mathematics and natural sciencesphysics, physiology and chemistryhad experienced a rapid development. Philosophy, understood as epistemology, and natural sciences had addressed the problem of mental phenomena; the human sensory-perceptive activity was no more considered as a purely philosophical problem and gradually became of interest to the physiological research. Between the early 1800s and 1874the year of publication of both "Gründzuge der physiologischen Psychologie" by Wilhelm Wundt and "Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt" by Franz Brentanothe main debate focused on whether human mental life could be reduced to merely physical events and, as in consequence, whether it could be scientifically explained on the basis of experimental data alone. Both the question on the reduction of mental life to physiology and that regarding what kind of science can be used legitimately in psychological research were fundamental for the development of scientific psychology. The objective of the present doctoral dissertation is the analysis of the role Rudolph Hermann Lotze's "Medicinische Psychologie, oder Physiologie der Seele" played in this debate.Michele Vagnetti ; Supervisors: Prof. Alessandro Pagnini, Apl. Prof. Dr. Nikolay MilkovTag der Verteidigung: 24.04.2020Universität Paderborn, Dissertation, 202

Experience and Content: Consequences of a Continuum Theory

This thesis is about experiential content: what it is; what kind of account can be given of it. I am concerned with identifying and attacking one main view - I call it the inferentialist proposal. This account is central to the philosophy of mind, epistemology and philosophy of science and perception. I claim, however, that it needs to be recast into something far more subtle and enriched, and I attempt to provide a better alternative in these pages. The inferentialist proposal holds that experiential content is necessarily under¬pinned by sophisticated cognitive influences. My alternative, the continuum theory, holds that these influences are relevant to experience only at certain levels of organisation and that at other levels there are contents which such features do not capture at all. Central to my account is that there are degrees to which cognitive influences affect experiential content; indeed, for the most part, experience is an amalgam of both inferential and non-inferential features. I claim that the inferentialist proposal is fundamentally flawed and deserves replacement, and I argue that my alternative fills the hollow that remains. The thesis is divided into four sections. In Part I, Chapter 1, I introduce two traditionally rival views of experiential content. In Chapter 2, I develop my continuum alternative. Chapter 3 assesses the relationship between experience and language, while Chapter 4 explores the relationship between beliefs and experience. The overall argument is that it has been a mistake to understand experience simply in inferential or non-inferential terms. In Part II, I examine the structure of mental content. Chapter 5 is concerned with the kinds of experiences which escape the inferentialist analysis. Chapter 6 considers Kant’s metaphysic of experience counterpointed to Lorenz’s reading of his work in the light of evolutionary biology. Chapter 7 treats animal experience in relation to the continuum view I am developing, while Chapter 8 reviews Fodor’s contribution to perceptual psychology. It is argued that the view of experiential content being developed is both consistent with empirical data on informationally local perceptual sub-systems, but also accords well with evolutionary theory and a naturalist interpretation of Kant’s taxonomy. Part III deals with inferentialism in the philosophy of science. In Chapter 9, I assess the theory dependence of observation thesis as it is advanced by Paul Feyerabend. I bring out of his account a subtle confusion concerning the importance of inference in the context of scientific inquiry. Part IV deals with the issue of experience in the philosophy of mind. In Chapter 10, I look at Wilfred Sellars’s attack on sense data theories. Chapter 11 confronts Paul Churchland’s treatment of ‘folk psychology’ while Chapter 12 isolates the issue of experiential qualia and the position of property dualism. I offer a critical review of Thomas Nagel’s work in this chapter and claim that his position can be read in a way which is consistent with the continuum account I am developing. I conclude the thesis in the usual fashion with a summary of the central claims

A Companion to Naturalism

Offering a engaging and accessible portrait of the current state of the field, A Companion to Naturaslim shows students how to think about the relation between Philosophy and Science, and why is both essencial and fascinating to do so. All the authors in this collection reconsider the core questions in Philosophical Naturalism in light of the challenges raised in Contemporary Philosophy. They explore how philosophical questions are connected to vigorous current debates - including complex questions about metaphysics, semantics, religion, intentionality, pragmatism, reductionism, ontology, metaethics, mind, science, belief and delusion, among others – showing how these issues, and philosopher’s attempts to answer them, matter in the Philosophy. In this sense, this collection is also compelling and illuminating reading for philosophers, philosophy students, and anyone interested in Naturalism and their place in current discussions

Selves and Communities in the Work of William James

This paper suggests that James’s account of the self developed in tandem with his social vision. The Jamesian self promoted social transformation and the creation of a strong and virtuous citizenry that could participate in political action and initiate effective social change in a pluralistic, democratic society. The paper also argues that James’s account of the self represented an attempt to rethink the relationship between individual and society in a way that would allow both for pluralism and for community