Explaining Machine Learning Classifiers through Diverse Counterfactual Explanations

Post-hoc explanations of machine learning models are crucial for people to understand and act on algorithmic predictions. An intriguing class of explanations is through counterfactuals, hypothetical examples that show people how to obtain a different prediction. We posit that effective counterfactual explanations should satisfy two properties: feasibility of the counterfactual actions given user context and constraints, and diversity among the counterfactuals presented. To this end, we propose a framework for generating and evaluating a diverse set of counterfactual explanations based on determinantal point processes. To evaluate the actionability of counterfactuals, we provide metrics that enable comparison of counterfactual-based methods to other local explanation methods. We further address necessary tradeoffs and point to causal implications in optimizing for counterfactuals. Our experiments on four real-world datasets show that our framework can generate a set of counterfactuals that are diverse and well approximate local decision boundaries, outperforming prior approaches to generating diverse counterfactuals. We provide an implementation of the framework at https://github.com/microsoft/DiCE.Comment: 13 page

The Common-Core/Diversity Dilemma: Revisions of Humean thought, New Empirical Research, and the Limits of Rational Religious Belief

This paper is the product of an interdisciplinary, interreligious dialogue aiming to outline some of the possibilities and rational limits of supernatural religious belief, in the light of a critique of David Hume’s familiar sceptical arguments -- including a rejection of his famous Maxim on miracles -- combined with a range of striking recent empirical research. The Humean nexus leads us to the formulation of a new ”Common-Core/Diversity Dilemma’, which suggests that the contradictions between different religious belief systems, in conjunction with new understandings of the cognitive forces that shape their common features, persuasively challenge the rationality of most kinds of supernatural belief. In support of this conclusion, we survey empirical research concerning intercessory prayer, religious experience, near-death experience, and various cognitive biases. But we then go on to consider evidence that supernaturalism -- even when rationally unwarranted -- has significant beneficial individual and social effects, despite others that are far less desirable. This prompts the formulation of a ”Normal/Objective Dilemma’, identifying important trade-offs to be found in the choice between our humanly evolved ”normal’ outlook on the world, and one that is more rational and ”objective’. Can we retain the pragmatic benefits of supernatural belief while avoiding irrationality and intergroup conflict? It may well seem that rationality is incompatible with any wilful sacrifice of objectivity. But in a situation of uncertainty, an attractive compromise may be available by moving from the competing factions and mutual contradictions of ”first-order’ supernaturalism to a more abstract and tolerant ”second-order’ view, which itself can be given some distinctive intellectual support through the increasingly popular Fine Tuning Argument. We end by proposing a ”Maxim of the Moon’ to express the undogmatic spirit of this second-order religiosity, providing a cautionary metaphor to counter the pervasive bias endemic to the human condition, and offering a more cooperation- and humility-enhancing understanding of religious diversity in a tense and precarious globalised age

Building a Science of Animal Minds: Lloyd Morgan, Experimentation, and Morgan’s Canon

Conwy Lloyd Morgan (1852–1936) is widely regarded as the father of modern comparative psychology. Yet, Morgan initially had significant doubts about whether a genuine science of comparative psychology was even possible, only later becoming more optimistic about our ability to make reliable inferences about the mental capacities of non-human animals. There has been a fair amount of disagreement amongst scholars of Morgan’s work about the nature, timing, and causes of this shift in Morgan’s thinking. We argue that Morgan underwent two quite different shifts of attitude towards the proper practice of comparative psychology. The first was a qualified acceptance of the Romanesian approach to comparative psychology that he had initially criticized. The second was a shift away from Romanes’ reliance on systematizing anecdotal evidence of animal intelligence towards an experimental approach, focused on studying the development of behaviour. We emphasize the role of Morgan’s evolving epistemological views in bringing about the first shift – in particular, his philosophy of science. We emphasize the role of an intriguing but overlooked figure in the history of comparative psychology in explaining the second shift, T. Mann Jones, whose correspondence with Morgan provided an important catalyst for Morgan’s experimental turn, particularly the special focus on development. We also shed light on the intended function of Morgan’s Canon, the methodological principle for which Morgan is now mostly known. The Canon can only be properly understood by seeing it in the context of Morgan’s own unique experimental vision for comparative psychology

Human Factors Standards and the Hard Human Factor Problems: Observations on Medical Usability Standards

With increasing variety and sophistication of computer-based medical devices, and more diverse users and use environments, usability is essential, especially to ensure safety. Usability standards and guidelines play an important role. We reviewed several, focusing on the IEC 62366 and 60601 sets. It is plausible that these standards have reduced risks for patients, but we raise concerns regarding: (1) complex design trade-offs that are not addressed, (2) a focus on user interface design (e.g., making alarms audible) to the detriment of other human factors (e.g., ensuring users actually act upon alarms they hear), and (3) some definitions and scope restrictions that may create “blind spots”. We highlight potential related risks, e.g. that clear directives on “easier to understand” risks, though useful, may preclude mitigating other, more “difficult” ones; but ask to what extent these negative effects can be avoided by standard writers, given objective constraints. Our critique is motivated by current research and incident reports, and considers standards from other domains and countries. It is meant to highlight problems, relevant to designers, standards committees, and human factors researchers, and to trigger discussion about the potential and limits of standards

Organizational Misconduct: Beyond the Principal-Agent Model

This article demonstrates that, at least since the adoption of the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines in 1991, the United States legal regime has been moving away from a system of strict vicarious liability toward a system of duty-based organizational liability. Under this system, organizational liability for agent misconduct is dependant on whether or not the organization has exercised due care to avoid the harm in question, rather than under traditional agency principles of respondeat superior. Courts and agencies typically evaluate the level of care exercised by the organization by inquiring whether the organization had in place internal compliance structures ostensibly designed to detect and discourage such conduct. I argue, however, that any internal compliance-based organizational liability regime is likely to fail because courts and agencies lack sufficient information about the effectiveness of such structures. As a result, an internal compliance-based liability system encourages the implementation of largely cosmetic internal compliance structures that reduce legal liability without reducing the incidence of organizational misconduct. Furthermore, a review of the empirical literature on the effectiveness of internal compliance structures suggests that many organizations have adopted precisely this cosmetic approach to internal compliance. This leads to two potential problems: first, an underdeterrence of organizational misconduct and, second, a proliferation of costly but ineffective internal compliance structures

Hemispheric asymmetries in biodiversity: a serious matter for ecology

[FIRST PARAGRAPH] Penguins have been receiving a lot of bad press lately. They are considered somehow counter, spare, strange. Unlike most plant and animal groups, they do not show a peak of species richness towards the equator and a decline towards the poles. This more conventional spatial pattern is conveniently known as the latitudinal diversity gradient because of the strong covariance of richness and other measures of biodiversity that it describes. It is one of the most venerable, well-documented, and controversial large-scale patterns in macroecology (Willig et al. 2003). Equatorial peaks in species richness have characterised the planet since the Devonian (408–362 million years ago) (Crame 2001) and are typical of a wide range of both terrestrial and marine plants and animals (Gaston 1996; Willig et al. 2003). Despite the fact that this pattern has been documented since the late 1700s, sustained interest in both the regularity of the pattern and its likely underlying mechanisms is relatively modern. The realisation that human activity is posing substantial threats to biodiversity has quickened the pace of this interest (Willig et al. 2003). Where the peaks in richness lie (biodiversity hotspots), how these peaks relate to centres of endemism (areas that support large numbers of species that occur nowhere else), and how these patterns are likely to change through time, especially in the face of major environmental change, are major concerns. Without such knowledge, conservation is unlikely to succeed

Reduction

Reduction and reductionism have been central philosophical topics in analytic philosophy of science for more than six decades. Together they encompass a diversity of issues from metaphysics and epistemology. This article provides an introduction to the topic that illuminates how contemporary epistemological discussions took their shape historically and limns the contours of concrete cases of reduction in specific natural sciences. The unity of science and the impulse to accomplish compositional reduction in accord with a layer-cake vision of the sciences, the seminal contributions of Ernest Nagel on theory reduction and how they strongly conditioned subsequent philosophical discussions, and the detailed issues pertaining to different accounts of reduction that arise in both physical and biological science (e.g., limit-case and part-whole reduction in physics, the difference-making principle in genetics, and mechanisms in molecular biology) are explored. The conclusion argues that the epistemological heterogeneity and patchwork organization of the natural sciences encourages a pluralist stance about reduction

HUMAN NATURE OR HUMANITY: BETWEEN GENES AND VALUES

We are within nature and culture, conditioned simultaneously by genes and meanings. This form of our self-understanding is the result of fundamental modifications that happened in modern philosophical anthropology and of the impact of the natural Science. In modern philosophy three types of approaches to the human situation were constituted at different times: the idealist, the naturalist, and the culturalist, and the problem of whether humanity is natural (biological) or cultural has begun to take precedence over the issue of human supernatural roots. Both approaches are presented, their presuppositions discussed, and arguments in favor of a version of the culturalist approach. Only the culturalist approach allows us to understand our own self-constitution and, in particular, our self-reflectivity, as well as the naturalist attempts to ignore them and immerse ourselves in nature