The Hidden Love of God and the Imaging Defense

J. L. Schellenberg has recently argued that there is a logical incompatibility between God’s being perfectly loving and there being non-resistant nonbelievers in the proposition that God exists. In this paper I highlight the parallel between this claim and the claim made by the logical problem of evil. Following Plantinga’s strategy in undermining the logical problem of evil, I argue that all that is needed to undermine the alleged incompatibility of divine love with non-resistant non-belief is a counterexample showing how the two might possibly co-exist. But whereas most attempts to show this have been grounded anthropologically, by drawing on forms of love-relationship that God and humans have in common, I offer a defense of the compatibility of perfect divine love with human non-resistant non-belief in God’s existence grounded theologically, in the unique sort of love relationship that God wants with us, which is the relationship of “imaging.

Flirting with Conversion: Negotiating Researcher Non-Belief with Missionaries

This article discusses Crane’s research in a Taiwanese Buddhist monastery. Crane came to the field as a former Catholic, which provided a particular lens through which to perceive the phenomena she researched. Beyond the difficulties of having one\u27s research interests misinterpreted by the community one is researching and the ambiguities that result from remaining open to conversion when studying religious communities, Crane examines the further difficulty confronted when researching religious personnel who have an interest in representing their religious ideals both to and through the researcher. The article examines Crane’s time in the Buddhist monastery and explores her personal ambivalence about her own religious sentiments while in the field. She argues that fieldwork conducted among missionaries is laden with unique difficulties and ethical ambiguities that highlight and exaggerate issues that arise in a variety of fieldwork contexts

Divine Hiddenness in the Christian Tradition

A critique of J. L. Schellenberg's argument from Divine Hiddenness: Schellenberg's conclusion that since apparently there are 'capable inculpable non-believers in God' the cognitive problem of divine hiddenness is actually an argument for the non-existence of God. Schellenberg's conclusion seems at least partly based on his misunderstanding or disregard of significant aspects of the Judeo-Christian tradition and certain assumptions, especially regarding nature of religious belief as well as primacy and instrumentality of reason. I suggest that given the kind of God proposed by the Judeo-Christian tradition it is not necessary that reasonable non-belief in His existence be impossible; moreover it may even be the case that possibility of reasonable non-belief is necessary given the nature and purposes of God as proposed by the Judeo-Christian tradition

Wagering Against Divine Hiddenness

J.L. Schellenberg argues that divine hiddenness provides an argument for the conclusion that God does not exist, for if God existed he would not allow non-resistant non-belief to occur, but non-resistant non-belief does occur, so God does not exist. In this paper, I argue that the stakes involved in theistic considerations put pressure on Schellenberg’s premise that non-resistant non-belief occurs. First, I specify conditions for someone’s being a resistant non-believer. Then, I argue that many people fulfill these conditions because, given some plausible assumptions, there is a very good pragmatic reason to be a theist rather than an atheist. I assume it is more likely that theists go to heaven than atheists, and I argue there is a non-zero probability that one can receive infinite utility and a method of comparing outcomes with infinite utilities in which the probability of each outcome affects the final expected values. Then, I show how this argument entails there is no good reason to think that there are very many non-resistant non-believers

Closure, credence and rationality: a problem for non-belief hinge epistemology

Duncan Pritchard’s Epistemic Angst promises a novel solution to the closure-based sceptical problem that, unlike more traditional solutions, does not entail revising our fundamental epistemological commitments. In order to do this, it appeals to a Wittgensteinian account of rational evaluation, the overarching theme of which is that it neither makes sense to doubt nor to believe in our anti-sceptical hinge commitments. The purpose of this paper is to show that the argument for the claim that there can be no rational basis to believe our anti-sceptical hinge commitments relies upon an implicit assumption about rational support that I label The Pritchensteinian Rational Grounds Principle. I argue that, insofar as this principle is intended to apply to closure-style inferences, it leads to irrational doxastic attitudes. I consider a seemingly plausible modification of the principle that would avoid this result but show that this modified principle faces serious problems of its own

Religious Experience without Belief? Toward an Imaginative Account of Religious Engagement

It is commonly supposed that a certain kind of belief is necessary for religious experience. Yet it is not clear that this must be so. In this article, I defend the possibility that a subject could have a genuine emotional religious experience without thereby necessarily believing that the purported object of her experience corresponds to reality and/or is the cause of her experience. Imaginative engagement, I argue, may evoke emotional religious experiences that may be said to be both genuine and appropriate, despite not necessarily including beliefs of the aforementioned kind.I go on to maintain that such religious engagement is compatible not only with non-belief but also with disbelief

Fermions and Loops on Graphs. II. Monomer-Dimer Model as Series of Determinants

We continue the discussion of the fermion models on graphs that started in the first paper of the series. Here we introduce a Graphical Gauge Model (GGM) and show that : (a) it can be stated as an average/sum of a determinant defined on the graph over $\mathbb{Z}_{2}$ (binary) gauge field; (b) it is equivalent to the Monomer-Dimer (MD) model on the graph; (c) the partition function of the model allows an explicit expression in terms of a series over disjoint directed cycles, where each term is a product of local contributions along the cycle and the determinant of a matrix defined on the remainder of the graph (excluding the cycle). We also establish a relation between the MD model on the graph and the determinant series, discussed in the first paper, however, considered using simple non-Belief-Propagation choice of the gauge. We conclude with a discussion of possible analytic and algorithmic consequences of these results, as well as related questions and challenges.Comment: 11 pages, 2 figures; misprints correcte

Nonbelief: An Islamic Perspective

Psychology of religion research is typically conducted with Protestant populations living in the West. Only recently has non-belief in God become a central topic in the field. And while it remains an open question whether or not the research assumptions and theoretical frameworks designed for Western populations of Protestants can be applied to non-believers, exploring non-belief in the Islamic context may pose additional problems. For example, do Western concepts and terms such as “church attendance” or “atheist” have equivalent meaning in the Muslim world? Are there any structural differences within Islam and Christianity that may contribute to the uneven number of self-reported non-believers within these cultures? In this article, we argue that a cultural psychological approach can provide a useful perspective for researching non-belief in the Muslim cultural context

Belief-Invariant and Quantum Equilibria in Games of Incomplete Information

Drawing on ideas from game theory and quantum physics, we investigate nonlocal correlations from the point of view of equilibria in games of incomplete information. These equilibria can be classified in decreasing power as general communication equilibria, belief-invariant equilibria and correlated equilibria, all of which contain the familiar Nash equilibria. The notion of belief-invariant equilibrium has appeared in game theory before, in the 1990s. However, the class of non-signalling correlations associated to belief-invariance arose naturally already in the 1980s in the foundations of quantum mechanics. Here, we explain and unify these two origins of the idea and study the above classes of equilibria, and furthermore quantum correlated equilibria, using tools from quantum information but the language of game theory. We present a general framework of belief-invariant communication equilibria, which contains (quantum) correlated equilibria as special cases. It also contains the theory of Bell inequalities, a question of intense interest in quantum mechanics, and quantum games where players have conflicting interests, a recent topic in physics. We then use our framework to show new results related to social welfare. Namely, we exhibit a game where belief-invariance is socially better than correlated equilibria, and one where all non-belief-invariant equilibria are socially suboptimal. Then, we show that in some cases optimal social welfare is achieved by quantum correlations, which do not need an informed mediator to be implemented. Furthermore, we illustrate potential practical applications: for instance, situations where competing companies can correlate without exposing their trade secrets, or where privacy-preserving advice reduces congestion in a network. Along the way, we highlight open questions on the interplay between quantum information, cryptography, and game theory

The Power of Belief? Review of the Evidence on Religion or Belief and Equalities in Great Britain.

yesA new legal framework has been developed in Great Britain over the last ten years which protects individuals against unfair treatment on the grounds of their religion or belief. This framework regards all the major faith groups, secular belief systems (such as Humanism or Atheism), and non-belief on formally equal terms. There has also been a rapid growth of research interest in religion/belief in contemporary scholarship on equalities. This report provides a critical overview of this extensive research base relating mainly to England, Scotland and Wales up until 2008