Horizontal and vertical spill-over in multilevel electoral systems

A multilevel electoral system perspective reveals several ways in which electoral spill-over may occur. Vertical spill-over may be top-down from the national to the regional level or can be bottom-up from the regional to the national electoral arena. Horizontal spill-over happens when developments in one regional electoral arena impact electoral outcomes in another regional electoral arena. The literature on regional elections has mainly focused on vertical top-down spill-over. In this introduction, we discuss two main insights in relation to spill-over between electoral arenas that surface when considering the collection of articles and reports presented in this fourth annual review of regional elections. First, we discuss how horizontal spill-over can be identified and differentiated from diffusion of electoral developments driven by territorial cleavages. Second, we discuss several institutions that impact vertical spill-over. We conclude by considering a wider research agenda for the study of spill-over in multilevel electoral systems.publishedVersio

Moving beyond the second-order election model?: Three generations of regional election research

In this introduction to the sixth annual review of regional elections we identify three generations of regional election studies that have applied the second-order election (SOE) model. First-generation literature finds that regional authority, territorial cleavages, and election (non-)simultaneity explain territorial heterogeneity in SOE-effects because they affect ‘what is at stake’ in a regional election. A ‘stake-based’ approach also underlies a second-generation literature that finds that voters with strong regional identities and who find regional government important are more likely to make distinct party choices in the regional electoral arena. Third-generation research adopts a multilevel electoral system perspective and considers the impact of political-institutional variables on the extent of horizontal and vertical top-down and bottom-up spill-over between regional and national electoral arenas. Four election articles and four election reports make important contributions to the three generations of literature and thereby reveal that these generations of regional election scholarship remain highly relevant.publishedVersio

The new EU economic governance: vertical and horizontal power shifts

The euro crisis made visible the omitted stage in the European integration process. The EU jumped from the common market straight to the monetary union, neglecting the formation of the economic union. The new EU economic governance is a combination of a vertical shift of competences, i.e. from one level of government to another level, and a horizontal shift of powers and competences, i.e. from elected governments to unelected government bodies entrusted with (parts of) government policies, from discretionary policy towards rules. In both types there is a risk of accountability problems, although of a different kind. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the new EU economic governance within the conceptual framework of these vertical and horizontal shifts. This two-dimensional approach offers a better analytical tool than the more traditional one-dimensional fiscal federalism approach. In the first part of the paper the focus is on the policy domains that are the objects in the shifting process. Budgetary policy mainly is at stake, but also banking regulation and monetary policy are partly involved. The second part of the paper deals with the relevant aspects of the theories on the division of powers along vertical and horizontal lines. The fiscal federalism approach to vertical separation and the time consistency theory on the horizontal distribution of power are briefly exposed. In the third part the power shifts occurring within the new EU economic governance are presented and defined in terms of our framework of vertical and horizontal power shifts. Finally the accountability problems of these shifts are analyzed

Voters frequently misjudge the positions of parties in European Parliament elections on the basis of non-political factors

Voters are generally assumed to support parties in elections on the basis of their policy positions, but what factors affect how accurately voters can judge these positions? Peter Grand and Guido Tiemann assess the influence of so called ‘projection effects’ in European Parliament elections, whereby voters who like a particular party for non-political reasons are more likely to assume that the party is closer to their political views than may be the case in reality (and vice versa). Using data from the 2009 European Parliament elections, they illustrate that this phenomenon can play a significant role in voters’ judgement of parties

Regionalist Party Spillover from Regional into National and European Elections: The Impact of the Multilevel Electoral System on Vertical Bottom-up Spillover

This thesis explores how the permissiveness of the electoral system impacts regionalist parties’ vertical bottom-up electoral spillover effects from the regional electoral arena into the national and European electoral arenas in Western Europe. Over the last decades, regionalist parties have gained importance at the regional level and sought to enhance and protect regional autonomy in various regions across Europe. Additionally, this party family competes in national and European elections to voice their territorial demands. This thesis seeks to explain the extent to which the electoral system impacts regionalist parties’ spillover from the regional electoral arena. Previous research has indicated that the electoral system is a contributing factor in explaining spillover effects, however, the electoral system has mostly been used as a control variable distinguishing between majoritarian, proportional, and mixed systems. The issue with such crude measurements is that one may overlook how the electoral system plays out in different regions. The main argument of the thesis is that the permissiveness of the electoral system as measured through the number of additional votes needed to win a seat in a national or European parliament compared to a regional parliament, can explain the extent to which regionalist parties spill over their regional electoral strength into national and European elections. Multilevel mixed-effects linear regression modes were applied to a new dataset of regionalist parties’ electoral strength in regional, national, and European elections from 1950 until 2019. The results indicate that the number of additional votes needed to win a national or European arena impact the extent to which regionalist parties’ regional electoral strength spill over into national and European elections. Whilst the effects are more robust for spillover into European elections than national elections, the results indicate that the more additional votes regionalist parties need to win a national or European seat, the less likely they are to have a strong regional vote share at the national or European level. Overall, the thesis demonstrates how the permissiveness of the electoral system matters in explaining vertical bottom-up electoral spillover.MasteroppgaveSAMPOL350MASV-SAP

Going Regional: Regional and Multilevel Electoral Democracy in Western Europe in Times of Decentralization (1945-2019)

I vest-europeiske land har regionalforvaltning opplevd en betydelig forandring siden andre verdenskrig. Denne forandringen involverer etableringen av nye regioner, forsterkning av mange eksisterende regioner og innføringen av direkte valgte regionale parlamenter. Til tross for den økende betydningen av regioner og regionale valg, er vår forståelse av regionalt demokrati fortsatt begrenset. Denne begrensningen kan også innskrenke vår forståelse av virkningen av politikk på nasjonalt nivå. Målet med denne avhandlingen er å forbedre vår kunnskap om regionalt og flernivådemokrati i 305 regioner i 15 vest-europeiske land. Eksisterende studier har satt søkelys på hvordan institusjoner som regional makt, regionale identiteter og tidspunktet til regionale valg kan påvirke regionale valg og regionale regjeringsdannelser. Denne avhandlingen bidrar til litteraturen ved å studere hvordan regionale valgsystemer og regionale politiske styreformer påvirker regionale valg, regionale regjeringsdannelser og nasjonale valg. Avhandlingen består av fem studier som fokuserer på ulike aspekter av regionalt og flernivådemokrati. I studie 1 kartlegges mønstre av regionalt demokrati langs to dimensjoner: den horisontale dimensjonen (dvs. maktkonsentrasjon innenfor en region) og den vertikale dimensjonen (dvs. maktspredning mellom regionalt og nasjonalt nivå). For begge dimensjonene skilles det mellom outputindikatorer (velgere, parlamenter og regjeringer) og inputindikatorer (dvs. institusjonene som kobler sammen outputene, som valgsystemer og relasjonene mellom lovgivende og utøvende instanser). Studien viser at det er enorm variasjon både mellom og innenfor land når det gjelder input- og outputindikatorer. Dessuten er noen regioner mer lik regioner i andre land enn regioner i sitt eget land. De fire andre studiene utforsker hvordan disse institusjonelle inputene påvirker outputene. Studie 2 viser at regionale og flernivå valgsystem påvirker hvor mye regionale valg avviker fra valgresultater i andre regioner og hvor mye regionale og nasjonale valgresultater ligner hverandre. Dette er i tillegg til effekten av de ofte studerte variablene for regional makt og identitet. Studie 3 utforsker hvordan relasjonene mellom lovgivende og utøvende instanser kan påvirke regionale valg. Second-order valgmodellen forutsetter at velgere bruker regionale valg til å straffe partier i nasjonal regjering, spesielt hvis det er lite på spill i regionale valg. Betydningen av regionale valg kan øke hvis en region utøver mer politisk makt, hvis en region har en distinkt identitet, eller hvis velgerne har mer innflytelse på utvelgelsen av regjeringen. Dette siste aspektet har imidlertid ikke blitt testet empirisk. Denne studien viser at hvis velgerne har flere insentiver til å påvirke sammensetningen av den regionale regjeringen, påvirker dette i hvilken grad regionale valg er second-order. Regionale valg blir mer second-order hvis det er en sterk regional utøvende maktinstans med få politiske kompetanser, men de blir mer first-order hvis det er en sterk utøvende maktinstans som også anvender betydelig politisk makt. Mens studie 3 vurderer hvordan relasjonene mellom lovgivende og utøvende instanser påvirker i hvilken grad regionale valgresultater er second-order, utforsker studie 4 hvordan disse second-order valgeffektene påvirker hvilke partier som kommer inn i regional regjering og hvordan dette kan være avhengig av regionale politiske styreformer. Studien viser at i «consociational» systemer er det ingen negativ effekt av å være i nasjonal regjering. I parlamentariske og monokratiske systemer er det mindre sannsynlig at partier som er i nasjonal regjering kommer inn i regional regjering, spesielt hvis et regionalt valg holdes i midten av den nasjonale valgsyklusen. Second-order valg kan dermed også produsere second-order regjeringer. Til slutt viser studie 5 at innføringen av regionale og europeiske valg også har implikasjoner for nasjonale valg. Regionale og europeiske valgarenaer kan fungere som grobunn for nye partier. Fordi terskelen for inngang i regionale valg er lavere, det er flere ressurser tilgjengelige og nye partier er mer synlige sammenlignet med den europeiske arenaen, forventes det at regionale valg har større betydning enn europeiske valg. Studien viser at partier som deltar og gjør det bra i europeiske, men spesielt i regionale valg, har høyere sannsynlighet for å overleve i nasjonale valg og i tillegg oppnå bedre valgresultater. Suksessen til nye partier og den relaterte velgervandringen i nasjonale valg kan dermed delvis tilskrives innføringen av flernivådemokrati, spesielt på regionalt nivå.In Western European countries, regional governance has experienced a major transformation since the Second World War. This transformation involves the establishment of new levels of regional government, the empowerment of many existing regions, and the introduction of directly elected regional parliaments. Despite the increasing importance of regional governments and regional elections, our understanding of regional electoral democracy remains limited. This limitation may also inhibit our understanding of political outcomes at the national level. The aim of this thesis is to enhance our knowledge of regional and multilevel electoral democracy in 305 regions across 15 Western European countries. Existing studies have focused on how institutions such as regional authority, regional identities, and the timing of regional elections can influence regional election outcomes and regional government formations. This thesis adds to the literature by studying how regional electoral systems and regional parliamentary-executive relations influence regional election outcomes, regional government formations, and ultimately, national election outcomes. The thesis is composed of five studies that focus on different aspects of regional and multilevel electoral democracy. In Study 1, patterns of regional democracy are mapped along two dimensions: the horizontal dimension (i.e., power concentration within a region) and the vertical dimension (i.e., power dispersion between the regional and the national level). For both dimensions output indicators (voters, parliaments, and governments) and input indicators (i.e., the institutions that link the outputs, such as electoral systems and parliamentary-executive relations) are differentiated. The study reveals that there is enormous variation both between and within countries in terms of inputs and outputs. Moreover, some regions are more similar to regions in other countries than to regions within their own country. The four other studies explore how these institutional inputs impact outputs. Study 2 reveals that, in addition to the commonly studied variables of regional authority and identity, the regional electoral system and the multilevel electoral system impacts the extent to which regional election results diverge from those in other regions and the extent to which regional and national election results are similar. Study 3 explores how parliamentary-executive relations can impact regional election results. The second-order election model expects that voters use regional elections to punish parties in national government especially if there is little at stake in regional elections. These stakes can increase if a region exercises more policy powers, if there is a distinct identity, or if voters have more influence on the selection of the executive. However, this last aspect has not been tested empirically. This study shows that if voters have more incentives to influence the composition of the regional government influences the extent to which regional elections are second-order. Regional elections become more second-order if there is a strong regional executive with few policy competences, but they become more first-order if there is a strong regional executive that also exercises substantial policy competences. While Study 3 assesses how parliamentary-executive relations influence the extent to which regional election outcomes are second-order, Study 4 explores how these second-order election effects influence which parties enter regional government and how this may be conditional on regional parliamentary-executive relations. The study reveals that in consociational systems, there is no negative effect of being in national government. Meanwhile, in parliamentary and monocratic systems, parties that are in national government are less likely to enter regional government, especially if a regional election is held at the mid-term of the national election cycle. Second-order elections thus may also produce second-order governments. Finally, Study 5 shows that the introduction of regional and European elections also has implications for national elections. Regional and European electoral arenas can function as breeding grounds for new parties. Given that in regional elections the entry barriers are lower, more resources are available, and new parties are more visible compared to the European arena, it is expected that regional elections matter more than European elections. The study shows that parties that participate and do well in European, but especially in regional elections, are more likely to survive in national elections and perform better electorally. New party success and the related volatility in national elections can thus partly be ascribed to the introduction of multilevel democracy, particularly at the regional level.Doktorgradsavhandlin

Regional assemblies and executives, regional authority, and the strategic manipulation of regional elections in electoral autocracies

In this introduction, we set out to analyse the relationship between regional elections and regional authority and the extent to which regional elections are held free and fair. We hypothesize that the incentives to interfere increase when regions exercise more authority but the possibilities to interfere decline when the regional executive is elected. A quantitative analysis confirms that directly elected and stronger regional bodies make them more attractive for central meddling, but the presence of elected executives makes central interference less likely. We zoom-in on nine electoral autocracies that have featured in the past five annual reviews of regional elections to explore how regional elections become less free and fair. We identify six strategies to manipulate regional elections which are applied in at least two electoral autocracies: simultaneity between regional and national elections, limiting party entry, gerrymandering, nationalizing regional election campaigns, party switching, and centralization of authority.publishedVersio

Federalism and fiscal reform in India.

This paper attempts to analyse the experience of incentivising economic reforms at the state level through central transfers to states. It reviews the experiences of the central government introducing incentives for reform directly through various specific purpose transfers as well as the incentive schemes recommended by various Finance Commissions. The incentive schemes directly introduced by the central government include, accelerated irrigation benefit programme, accelerated power development and reform programme, Jawaharlal Nehru Urban Renewal Mission, education and health sector reforms. The reforms recommended by the Finance Commissions include incentivising tax reforms and fiscal restructuring and consolidation. The review of the experiences of Indian fiscal federalism shows that the incentivising reforms have neither been an unqualified success nor have they been a total failure. There are interesting lessons to be learnt from the experiences for both designing the incentive schemes and implementing them. The paper summarises the lessons of experience. While incorporating these in designing and implementing incentive schemes can be useful in the short and medium term, what matters in the long run is the political incentive for reforms.

Democracy and Legitimacy in the European Union Revisited - Input, Output and Throughput

Whether their analytic frameworks focus on institutional form and practices or on its interactive construction, scholars have analyzed the EU’s democratic legitimacy mainly in terms of the trade-offs between the output effectiveness of EU’s policies outcomes for the people and the input participation by and representation of the people. Missing is theorization of the throughput efficiency, accountability, transparency, and openness to consultation with the people of the EU’s internal governance processes. The paper argues that adding this analytic category facilitates assessment of these legitimizing mechanisms’ interdependencies and facilitates consideration of reforms that could turn this democratic trilemma into a virtuous circle.democracy; legitimacy; Europeanization; Europeanization