69,040 research outputs found

    Best Responding to What? A Behavioral Approach to One Shot Play in 2x2 Games

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    We introduce a simple procedure to be used for selecting the strategies most likely to be played by inexperienced agents who interact in one shot 2x2 games. We start with an axiomatic description of a function that may capture players' beliefs. Various proposals connected with the concept of mixed strategy Nash equilibrium do not match this description. On the other hand minimax regret obeys all the axioms. Therefore we use minimax regret to approximate players' beliefs and we let players best respond to these conjectured beliefs. When compared with existing experimental evidences about one shot matching pennies games, this procedure correctly indicates the choices of the vast majority of the players. Applications to other classes of games are also explored

    Book Review: "Islamic Wealth Management: Theory and Practice" edited by Mohamed Ariff and Shamser Mohammad

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    This is a book review published in Economic Affairs, the journal of the Institute of Economic Affairs, of "Islamic Wealth Management: Theory and Practice", by Mohamed Ariff and Shamser Mohammad (Eds), Edward Elgar Publishing (2017), 398 pp ISBN: 978-1786439383 (hb, ÂŁ110.00); 978-1786439390 (eBook, ÂŁ99.00)

    The Topology-Free Construction of the Universal Type Structure for Conditional Probability Systems

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    We construct the universal type structure for conditional probability systems without any topological assumption, namely a type structure that is terminal, belief-complete, and non-redundant. In particular, in order to obtain the belief-completeness in a constructive way, we extend the work of Meier [An Infinitary Probability Logic for Type Spaces. Israel Journal of Mathematics, 192, 1-58] by proving strong soundness and strong completeness of an infinitary conditional probability logic with truthful and non-epistemic conditioning events.Comment: In Proceedings TARK 2017, arXiv:1707.0825
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