Three Ways of Resisting Racism

Two widespread strategies of resisting racism are the following. The first one is to deny the existence of races and thus block even the possibility of racist claims. The second one is to grant that races exist but insist that racial differences do not imply value differences. The aim of this paper is to outline a strategy of resisting racism that is weaker than the first but stronger than the second strategy: even if we accept that races exist, we can still deny that there are projectible racial differences. And this is enough to block the possibility of racist claims without appealing to the slippery topic of value differences. I use some considerations from philosophy of biology in order to argue for this claim

A Developmental Systems Account of Human Nature

It is now widely accepted that a scientifically credible conception of human nature must reject the folkbiological idea of a fixed, inner essence that makes us human. We argue here that to understand human nature is to understand the plastic process of human development and the diversity it produces. Drawing on the framework of developmental systems theory and the idea of developmental niche construction we argue that human nature is not embodied in only one input to development, such as the genome, and that it should not be confined to universal or typical human characteristics. Both similarities and certain classes of differences are explained by a human developmental system that reaches well out into the 'environment'. We point to a significant overlap between our account and the ‘Life History Trait Cluster’ account of Grant Ramsey, and defend the developmental systems account against the accusation that trying to encompass developmental plasticity and human diversity leads to an unmanageably complex account of human nature

Gender Is a Natural Kind with a Historical Essence

Traditional debate on the metaphysics of gender has been a contrast of essentialist and social-constructionist positions. The standard reaction to this opposition is that neither position alone has the theoretical resources required to satisfy an equitable politics. This has caused a number of theorists to suggest ways in which gender is unified on the basis of social rather than biological characteristics but is “real” or “objective” nonetheless – a position I term social objectivism. This essay begins by making explicit the motivations for, and central assumptions of, social objectivism. I then propose that gender is better understood as a real kind with a historical essence, analogous to the biologist’s claim that species are historical entities. I argue that this proposal achieves a better solution to the problems that motivate social objectivism. Moreover, the account is consistent with a post-positivist understanding of the classificatory practices employed within the natural and social sciences

An Aristotelian Account of Evolution and the Contemporary Philosophy of Biology

The anti-reductionist character of the recent philosophy of biology and the dynamic development of the science of emergent properties prove that the time is ripe to reintroduce the thought of Aristotle, the first advocate of a “top-down” approach in life-sciences, back into the science/philosophy debate. His philosophy of nature provides profound insights particularly in the context of the contemporary science of evolution, which is still struggling with the questions of form, teleology, and the role of chance in evolutionary processes. However, although Aristotle is referenced in the evolutionary debate, a thorough analysis of his theory of hylomorphism and the classical principle of causality which he proposes is still needed in this exchange. Such is the main concern of the first part of the present article which shows Aristotle’s metaphysics of substance as an open system, ready to incorporate new hypothesis of modern and contemporary science. The second part begins with the historical exploration of the trajectory from Darwin to Darwinism regarded as a metaphysical position. This exploration leads to an inquiry into the central topics of the present debate in the philosophy of evolutionary biology. It shows that Aristotle’s understanding of species, teleology, and chance – in the context of his fourfold notion of causality – has a considerable explanatory power which may enhance our understanding of the nature of evolutionary processes. This fact may inspire, in turn, a retrieval of the classical theology of divine action, based on Aristotelian metaphysics, in the science/theology dialogue. The aim of the present article is to prepare a philosophical ground for such project

Transgressive technologies? Strategies of discursive containment in the representation and regulation of assisted reproductive technologies in Aotearoa/New Zealand

Drawing on a case study of the contemporary representation and regulation of assisted reproductive technologies (ARTs) in Aotearoa/New Zealand, this article traces the cultural anxieties evident in public, political, and media discussion and debate around the provision and use of ART, with a specific focus on the use of donor insemination and IVF by single women and lesbian couples. It documents the operation of various narrative mechanisms, normative assumptions, and discursive strategies that work to identify the legitimate uses and users of such technologies whilst simultaneously affirming conventional understandings of "gender", "motherhood", and "the family", and concludes that contemporary anxieties and ethical dilemmas provoked by women's transgressive uses of ART have been addressed through legislative changes that target certain groups of women for official surveillance and control while also effectively limiting their reproductive options

Kinship Past, Kinship Present: Bio-Essentialism in the Study of Kinship

In this article, I reconsider bio-essentialism in the study of kinship, centering on David Schneider’s influential critique that concluded that kinship was “a non-subject” (1972:51). Schneider’s critique is often taken to have shown the limitations of and problems with past views of kinship based on biology, genealogy, and reproduction, a critique that subsequently led those reworking kinship as relatedness in the new kinship studies to view their enterprise as divorced from such bio-essentialist studies. Beginning with an alternative narrative connecting kinship past and present and concluding by introducing a novel way of thinking about kinship, I have three constituent aims in this research article: (1) to reconceptualize the relationship between kinship past and kinship present; (2) to reevaluate Schneider’s critique of bio-essentialism and what this implies for the contemporary study of kinship; and (3) subsequently to redirect theoretical discussion of what kinship is. This concluding discussion introduces a general view, the homeostatic property cluster (HPC) view of kinds, into anthropology, providing a theoretical framework that facilitates realization of the often-touted desideratum of the integration of biological and social features of kinship. [bio-essentialism, kinship studies, homeostatic property cluster kinds, Schneider, genealogy

Considering Convergence: A Policy Dialogue About Behavioral Genetics, Neuroscience, and Law

Garland and Frankel issue a call for scientists, lawyers, courts and lawmakers to begin a critical dialogue about the implications of scientific discoveries and technological advances in criminal law, behavioral genetics and neuroscience

Nature or Nurture? The Concentration of African Americans in Specific Sports

The prevalence of African Americans in certain American professional sports is certainly evident. Their prevalence is particularly pertinent and commonly associated with sports such as basketball, football, and track. The percentage of the players in the National Basketball AssociatIon (NBA) that were African American in the 2017-2018 season was 73.9% (Lapchik, 2018). Additionally, the percentage of players that were African American in the National Football League (NFL) during the 2016-2017 season was 69.7% (Lapchik, 2018). These statistics however differ from proportions of African Americans representing these respective sports at the Division I college level. The percentage of African Americans at the Division I college level in basketball is 53% and 44.2% in football (Lapchik, 2017). These statistics clearly show that African Americans represent the majority of the players in these respective sports at a professional level, a subject that is often discussed and debated. Often times these discussions extend further as to why African Americans represent the majority of these leagues. There are two prominent theories as to why African Americans represent the majority of players in certain sports, such as football and basketball; one attributing it to their genetics and other attributing to their environment. This paper will articulate on the two prominent theories that offer explanations as why African Americans constitute the majority in specific sports. Furthermore, this paper will analyze the theory that suggests that their athletic abilities and prevalence in certain sports is attributed to genetic differences; and use research to discredit such claims. Additionally, this paper will offer explanations as to how this notion has come into existence and how has sustained. Ultimately, this paper will illustrate the importance of the environment when analyzing the representation of African Americans in certain sports, and how these different atmospheres interact with one another

Three ways of resisting essentialism about natural kinds

Essentialism about natural kinds has three tenets. The first tenet is that all and only members of a natural kind has some essential properties. The second tenet is that these essential properties play a causal role. The third tenet is that they are explanatorily relevant. I examine the prospects of questioning these tenets and point out that arguing against the first and the second tenets of kind-essentialism would involve taking parts in some of the grand debates of philosophy. But, at least if we restrict the scope of the discussion to the biological domain, the third tenet of kind-essentialism could be questioned more successfully