Proces demokratyzacji i jego determinanty : analiza na przykładzie Republiki Czeskiej i Węgierskiej (1990-2016)

Today democracy means that almost all adult citizens participate in the exercising of power. In substantive terms, democracy relies on freedom, equality, and majority rule. At the same time, it is also a regime that rests on specific principles and procedures (the procedural perspective). The process of consolidating democratic values and procedures goes through various stages. First, the erosion of a non-democratic regime involves the transfer of power from former elites to new political actors. Next, during the transition stage, the democratic institutional design is introduced into the political system. Finally, during the consolidation stage, the democratic principles of political life become well-established and democratic values accepted and internalised by the society. The most important determinants of the stage of erosion include: the heritage of the past and the influence of the surroundings. The transition is determined by: the structure of the state, national identity, political elites’ work on the constitution, the relationship between the organs of government, the party system, the electoral system, lustration, decentralisation of power to a system of local authorities, and external factors. The consolidation stage depends on institutional factors on the one hand. such as the final design of the constitution, a stable model of relations between the organs of government, the development of a pluralistic party system, and solidification of the electoral system, and on behavioural factors on the other, such as acceptance and internalisation of democratic values by the society. The process of democratisation can be analysed and evaluated with the use of quantitative and qualitative indicators. This study employs indices used by Freedom House, The Economist Intelligence Unit, and The Bertelsmann Foundation. [fragm. tekstu

Polityka z twarzą : personalizacja parlamentarnych kampanii wyborczych w Polsce w latach 1993-2011

The main goal of this study is the verification of a hypothesis/idea of centralized personalization during Polish electoral campaigns. Because of its goal and implemented methodology, such research project is unique among research presented in scientific literature thus far. The work has a descriptive character; it is congruent with treatments from the field of political communication, combining approaches of communicology and political science, in that it expresses an attempt to include in the analysis the circumstances of election campaign personalization and factors specific to mediacentric and political -scientific perspectives, as well as because of the fact of recognizing media content in political party communication. Election communication research includes six Polish parliamentary elections from the years 1993—2001. Along with an analysis of communiqué contents, published in information media, as well as communiqué prepared by political subjects contending in the elections, basic analysis methods within the study are historical-comparative and statistical data analyses. The specific objectives of the treatment are: — Description of circumstances of the political communication personalization thesis on the level of mediatization of politics and political campaign professionalization theories; — Analysis of the trend occurrence and characteristics of the electoral campaign personalization trend based on empirical research conducted in western-European parliamentary democracies; — Recognition of conditions of electoral campaign personalization in parliamentary elections in Poland; — Analysis of the trend occurrence and characteristics of media personalization in Polish electoral campaigns based on opinion-forming press research; — Analysis of the trend occurrence and characteristics of strategic personalization in Polish electoral campaigns based on political TV advertisement research

Komunikacyjne determinanty zmian organizacyjnych polskich partii politycznych na przełomie XX i XXI wieku

In the dissertation entitled “Communication determinants of organizational changes in Polish political parties at the turn of the century” the author has made a detailed analysis of the relationship between the political communication and the internal organization of Polish political parties. The dynamic technological development made a progress in manners and forms of communication. Making new perspectives and opportunities in making interactions, including through inventing and popularization of the Internet, have been reflected in the world of politics. Using the knowledge of Polish and foreign scientists it is important to emphasize that, on the one hand, a decrease of identification with political parties and, on the other hand, an increase of professionalization of political activities run by the management of political parties have occurred in the reality at the turn of the century. The main purpose of modern political parties is their organizational survival and development. The essence of the political activity is to establish interactions with voters in order to identify their opinions, adjust them to their own election program and shape their previous preferences. Combining together theses two conclusions, it should be noted that political communication allows constructing tools and methods by means of which political parties can be well managed, which ensures their survival and development. The dissertation consists of fiver chapters. In the first chapter the author has analysed the functioning of the democratic system, in which all considerations collected in the dissertation have been embedded. The considerations have been, however, adapted to the overall context of the dissertation. In the second chapter the author has considered the issues concerning the evolutionary character of political parties. It is also important to emphasize that the considerations are focused only on political parties at the turn of the century. The third chapter discusses the issues presented in the second chapter, but in a detailed way. It contains the key management conceptions for political parties which according to the author are important to be implemented in parties whose main purpose is long-term survival and development. The fourth chapter includes the issues associated with the political communication. In the last chapter the author has collected the whole empirical knowledge gained during the interviews with the main politicians from Polish political parties. The interviews gain an insight into managerial processes in seven Polish parties: 1. Platforma Obywatelska RP; 2. Prawo i Sprawiedliwość; 3. Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe; 4. Ruch Kukiz’15; 5. Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej; 6. Twój Ruch; 7. Nowoczesna Ryszarda Petru. The last chapter contains fifteen individual interviews. There were two criteria regarding the process of selecting the respondents. The first factor was their knowledge about managerial and communication processes in political parties they are associated with. The second fact was their experience gained during their political activity. The main purpose of these two criteria was to come to the representative conclusions for political parties as a whole organization, not only for their regional branches. Every interview had a detailed scenario which influenced on a scope and quantity of gathered information. The average interview lasted two and a half hours. During this time the author of the dissertation gained from ten to thirty one pages of the detailed information. To achieve the dissertation’s purposes mentioned in previous paragraphs, the author has presented a series of hypotheses: 1. The most effective shaping of the development of countries and societies as well as skilful managing of public resources is achieved if political parties are well managed, in particular by conducting an effective human resources policy, which means the ability to recruit qualified supporters and members who are able to construct an election program ensuring long-term survival and development, skilful fundraising for statutory purposes and creating a strategy of development for a political party perceived as an organization which exists in the changing and rivalry environment; 2. Political parties whose main purpose is to perform public functions must construct an election program that is the most suited to the needs and expectations of potential voters. The election program needs also to be presented in the most preferred form for potential voters. The election program must be more convincing than the offers presented by other political parties; 3. In the political rivalry at the turn of the century political parties need to pick up the potential and skills indispensable in the process of shaping electoral preferences. The possibility of influencing on the decision making process in the country is associated with the proper selection of the communication tools and methods; 4. The good management of political parties is associated with an organizational structure which allows establishing interactions between politicians and voters, which makes it possible to create political programmes suited to the most preferred, from a political party’s point of view, segments of the electorate, influence on electoral attitudes as well as construct a political offer more persuasive for a voter than the counterpart created by political rivals; 5. The main purpose of every political party, perceived as gaining influence on the decision making process, can be achieved only by creation effective communication methods and tools, which are the most important in political parties and can also have an influence on political party’s organizational structure; 6. The level of the citizen’s knowledge in the countries which adopted a representative democratic system is directly proportional to the level of the social and economic development in these countries. The progress of the representative democratic system is possible in most cases due to creation of effective communication methods and tools; 7. The political evolution of modern societies, among which is should be mentioned, the decreasing level of the permanent identification with political parties determines an evolution of organizational structures of political parties and ways of creating political processes. Nowadays the political communication is a factor which allows interpreting electoral preferences and adjusting all political activities to them; 8. The evolution of the modern societies leads to the evolution of ways of creating political processes, especially by their assimilation to the activity based on methods and forms known from the commercial market

Metropolizacja a lokalne governance : globalne wyzwania państwa narodowego na przykładzie V Republiki Francuskiej

Globalization undoubtedly is one of modern processes which lay foundations for most significant changes to contemporary societies. Social, economic and political phenomena, undergoing within nation-states and independently on them, have become a part of the network of global concerns and relations that the states are able to control no more than in a limited sense. In terms of localness the phenomenon is reflected in the processes of metropolization of urban agglomerations which form their own unique systems of governance. In doing so, they become distinctive laboratories of new forms of government and democracy. The increasing inadequacy of the territorial structure of the state and its institutional systems in terms of network systems and multilevel relations that form new and functional living space for contemporary man are responsible for initiating reforms in states. However, the process of those changes does not go automatically, and it most often stands for a confrontation of the global system imperatives with values, norms and institutions deeply rooted in social structure and shaped in the Westphalian era. Therefore, the search for wise answers to global challenges abounds in diverse results, an example of which may be seen in hybrid territorial units in France which are concomitant with the specific forms of governance that are formed within. Despite the fact that the book deals with French status quo in the main, it touches upon universal issues which concern challenges that modern democratic nation-states have to meet. The book addresses all researchers of contemporary times, who make an attempt to come to deeper understanding of the changes that a modern state and democracy have to face in times when the global system is being shaped. Unique is the fact that this book transcends theoretical digressions being at the same time embedded in the context of a particular society. The conclusions are based on an extensive empirical sources that the author of this book collected while conducting his research in France, where he had the honor of running discussions with French eminent scholars, politicians and people engaged in self-government. According to the reviewer of the book, professor Kazimierz Z. Sowa: „The collected research material presents itself as very interesting and valuable one; additionally its research method makes it a sui generis source of information. [...] The results provide us with a solid amount of knowledge about modern France whose problems go beyond the present ones.

Kultury energetyczne Unii Europejskiej

Literaturę i materiały wykorzystane w pracy można podzielić na dwie główne grupy – prace teoretyczne i źródła danych ilościowych. Należy też wspomnieć o publikacjach dotyczących historii gospodarczej, w tym o publikacjach z zakresu historii energetyki. Dodatkowo, w przypadku oceny czynników instytucjonalnych wykorzystano wybrane akty prawa Unii Europejskiej. W przypadku studiów nad kulturą należy wspomnieć, o takich autorach jak A. Barnard, M. Golka, C. K. M. Kluckhohn, A. Kłoskowska, A. L. Kroeber i E. Nowicka. W związku z analizą cechy warunków politycznych, jako elementu składowego kultury energetycznej, wykorzystano publikacje z zakresu kultury politycznej, takich autorów jak: G. A. Almond, Z. Blok, G. B. Powell, S. Verba. Z kolei w przypadku studiów nad kulturą energetyczną wymienić należy P. Frączka, Z. Łuckiego i W. Misiaka, A. Pach-Gurgul, P. Tapio i zespół badawczy, także liczny zespół naukowców działający w ramach Centre for Sustainability na Uniwersytecie Otago w Nowej Zelandii. W tematyce teoretycznych aspektów procesów i zmian społecznych należy uwzględnić R. Aya, Z. Bloka, J. C. Daviesa, S. Huntingtona, A. Kaplana, H. Lasswella, J. Szackiego i P. Sztompkę. Natomiast w tematyce procesów i zmian w energetyce nie można zapomnieć, o takich nazwiskach jak R. C. Allen, M. van Asselt, U. Brand, A. Cherp, R. Fouquet, F. W. Geels, A. Grübler, K. Hölscher, J. Jewell, R. Kemp, D. Loorbach, C. Marchetti, A. McDonald, J. Meadowcroft, N. Nakićenović, P. J. G. Pearson, J. Rotmans, J. Schot, V. Smil, B. K. Sovacool, A. Stirling i J. M. Wittmayer. W gronie osób zajmujących się procesami i zmianami w energetyce należy wymienić autorów, którzy dokonali syntezy różnych perspektyw badawczych m.in. E. Brutschin, A. Cherp, F. W. Geels, J. Grin, M. Grubb, A. Grübler, J.-Ch. Hourcade, L. Kanger, J. Markard, K. Neuhoff, J. Schot, A. Smith, B. K. Sovacool, B. Truffer, V. Vinichenko, J.-P. Voß. Studia w zakresie procesów i zmian w energetyce korzystają z dorobku studiów nad reżimami technologicznymi, technicznymi i gospodarczymi oraz studiów nad systemami innowacji, dlatego w tym zakresie należy wymienić, takie nazwiska jak P. Ahrweiler, W. B. Arthur, C. T. Bekar, W. Bijker, K. I. Carlaw, J. Carrillo-Hermosilla, D. Collingridge, N. Crafts, P. A. David, G. Dosi, Ch. Freeman, T. P. Hughes, B. Jovanovic, L. Leydesdorff, G. Lipsey, J. Markard, T. K. McCraw, J. Mokyr, R. R. Nelson, C. Perez, T. Pinch, A. Rip, N. Rosenberg, P. Rousseau, J. A. Schumpeter, B. Truffer, G. C. Unruh, L. Winner i S. Winter. Duże znaczenie dla pracy mają również autorzy opracowań i tekstów historycznych w zakresie historii gospodarczej i historii technologii, w tym i szeroko rozumianego sektora energetycznego – R. C. Allen, S. Arapostathis, R. Church, M. W. Flinn, R. Fouquet, G. Gooday, A. Hall, J. Hatcher, J. A. Jaffe, J. Jaros, A. Jezierski, E. Kaczyńska, A. Kander, J. W. Kanefsky, M. Kitson, S. Koszutski, D. S. Landes, J. Łukasiewicz, Ch. Macleod, P. Malanima, J. Michie, R. Millward, P. J. G. Pearson, K. Piesowicz, W. Puś, V. Smil, H. Sussman, P. Warde, E. A. Wrigley. Osobiste inklinacje autora publikacji związane są z dorobkiem, takich autorów jak A. Kander, P. Malanima i P. Warde (studia historyczne nad energią), E. A. Wrigley (studia historyczne nad energią w brytyjskiej perspektywie), R. Fouquet i P. J. G. Pearson (studia historyczne nad energią – szczególnie nad finalną konsumpcją energii), C. Marchetti i N. Nakićenović (m.in. studia ekonometryczne), R. C. Allen, M. Grubb, A. Grübler i B. K. Sovacool (studia nad transformacją energetyczną), G. Dosi, Ch. Freeman, F. W. Geels, J. Mokyr, R. R. Nelson i C. Perez (studia nad reżimami technologicznymi i innowacjami). Niewątpliwie ciekawym dorobkiem naukowym legitymizuje się V. Smil, którego praca badawcza skupia się na studiach historycznych nad energią i technologią energetyczną, studiom tym towarzyszą oryginalne syntezy danych w zakresie energetyki w długich perspektywach czasu. Z kolei najbardziej inspirujące studia nad polskim przemysłem w perspektywie historycznej zaprezentowali m.in. J. Jaros, A. Jezierski, J. Łukasiewicz i W. Puś. W przypadku źródeł danych ilościowych w zakresie wybranych problemów energetyki nie sposób zaprezentować wszystkie opracowania i zbiory, które zostały wykorzystane w publikacji. Warto jednak podkreślić wagę, takich instytucji jak BEIS, BS, EIU, Eurostat, GUS, IAEA, IEA i OECD. Z kolei cenne opracowania statystyczne w wersji drukowanej to: European Historical Statistics 1750–1970 i International Historical Statistics: Europe 1750–1993 (Mitchell, 1975, 1998), a także World Energy Production 1800–1985 (Etemad, Luciani, 1991). Ponadto warto zwrócić uwagę na elektroniczne syntezy danych w zakresie struktur energetycznych tworzone przez TSP (dane zdigitalizowane m.in. przez L. Benichou).Zakres przedmiotowy pracy obejmuje problematykę kultur energetycznych Unii Europejskiej. Przez kulturę energetyczną rozumie się praktyki użytkowania i oszczędzania energii, procesy przekształceń energii, oddziaływanie przekształceń energii na środowisko i szczególny rodzaj świadomości w zakresie praktyk związanych z użytkowaniem energii. Zatem kultura energetyczna ma dwa wymiary – materialny i społeczny. W ujęciu materialnym kulturę energetyczną można sprowadzić do produkcji i konsumpcji energii, procesów substytucji nośników i technologii energetycznych, także wpływu tych procesów na środowisko. Z kolei kultura energetyczna jako szczególny rodzaj świadomości obejmuje system wartości, aspiracje, postawy, oczekiwania, preferencje, motywacje i praktyki – indywidualne, jak i społeczne. Kultura energetyczna może być rozpatrywana w perspektywie statycznej, ale i w dynamicznej. W drugim przypadku oznacza to, że w badaniach przyjmuje się perspektywę procesualną. Perspektywa ta uwzględnia, takie elementy jak: (1) trwałość i nietrwałość przekształceń; (2) kumulatywność i akumulatywność przekształceń; (3) unilinearność, mulitilinearność i cykliczność przekształceń; (4) dynamikę przekształceń; (5) determinanty przekształceń. Stosując analogię do kierunków badań nad kulturą w naukach społecznych można wskazać na ujęcie: (1) funkcjonalne (funkcje energii w społeczeństwie; oddziaływanie użytkowania energii na instytucje społeczne; świadomość i rozumienie procesów użytkowania energii; znaczenie dla społeczeństwa), (2) strukturalistyczne (istnienie trwałych struktur użytkowania energii; wzory praktyk użytkowania energii; sposoby myślenia na temat energii); (3) poststrukturalistyczne (energia jako społeczny konstrukt; energia jako przedmiot dyskursu). Głównym celem pracy jest prezentacja stanu badań nad kulturami energetycznymi oraz prezentacja własnych badań w oparciu o analizę statystyczną i analizę jakościową wtórnych danych statystycznych. W celu uszczegółowienia zakresu przedmiotowego problemu badawczego w pracy zaprezentowano następujące pytania badawcze: (1) Czy zasadne jest twierdzenie, że w UE-28 mamy do czynienia ze specyficznymi kulturami energetycznymi? (2) Jeżeli zasadne jest twierdzenie o istnieniu specyficznych kultur energetycznych, to w związku z jakimi cechami diagnostycznymi (wartościami wskaźników) następuje podział między państwami UE-28? (2.1.) W jakim stopniu materialne aspekty energetyki wpływają na podział państw członkowskich w ramach stwierdzonych kultur energetycznych UE-28? (2.2.) W jakim stopniu społeczne aspekty życia wpływają na podział państw członkowskich w ramach stwierdzonych kultur energetycznych UE-28? (3) Czy można wskazać zależności między określonymi cechami diagnostycznymi (wartościami wskaźników) i specyficznym położeniem geograficzno-historycznym państw członkowskich UE-28? (4) Czy w okresie 2000–2015 nastąpiły zmiany w obrębie stwierdzonych wcześniej kultur energetycznych UE-28? Natomiast w celu przeprowadzenia procesu badawczego do weryfikacji przedstawiono następujące robocze hipotezy badawcze: (H1): Należy przyjąć, że różnice w strukturach energetycznych poszczególnych państw członkowskich, są wystarczającą przesłanką do stwierdzenia istnienia specyficznych kultur energetycznych w Unii Europejskiej. (H2): Należy przyjąć, że cechami diagnostycznymi wpływającymi na podział państw członkowskich Unii Europejskiej są efektywność energetyczna, struktura produkcji energii elektrycznej, trajektorie rozwoju nowych technologii energetycznych, społeczno-ekonomiczne warunki życia, zdrowotne warunki życia i polityczne warunki życia. (H2.1.): Należy przyjąć, że takie cechy diagnostyczne jak efektywność energetyczna, struktura produkcji energii i rozwój nowych technologii energetycznych wpływają w sposób znaczny na podział państw członkowskich w ramach stwierdzonych kultur energetycznych UE-28. (H2.2.): Należy przyjąć, że takie cechy diagnostyczne jak społeczno-ekonomiczne warunki życia, zdrowotne warunki życia i polityczne warunki życia wpływają w sposób znaczny na podział państw członkowskich w ramach stwierdzonych kultur energetycznych UE-28. (H3): Należy przyjąć, że ze względu na dotychczasowe badania nad problemami energetyki, odmienności struktur energetycznych, odmienności geograficzne, odmienności polityk energetycznych itd. można wykazać zależności między określonymi cechami diagnostycznymi (wartościami wskaźników) i specyficznym położeniem geograficzno-historycznym państw członkowskich UE-28. (H4): Należy przyjąć, że w okresie 2000–2015 nastąpiły zmiany w obrębie stwierdzonych wcześniej kultur energetycznych UE-28, jednak stopień ich będzie nieznaczny. W części empirycznej pracy przyjęto pozytywistyczną perspektywę badawczą, która zakłada wykorzystanie wybranych metod statystycznych i analizę wtórnych danych statystycznych (Beyme, 2005, s. 98–108; Furlong, Marsh, 2010, s. 184–211; John, 2010, s. 267–284; Laska, Nocoń, 2010, s. 93–99; Buttolph-Johnson, Reynolds, Mycoff, 2013, s. 372 i nast.). Niewątpliwie badacze, którzy analizują zjawiska i procesy społeczne, stoją przed trudnym wyborem strategii badawczej – od dedukcji po indukcję, i od wyjaśniania do rozumienia itd. Świat społeczny jawi się, jako niczym nieograniczony zbiór danych. Grozi to zawsze tym, że naukowiec zamiast prowadzić badania, staje się twórcą struktur i sensów, które jednak stanowią fałszywe wnioski – przed tym problem przestrzegał m.in. S. Lem w powieściach pod tytułem „Katar” i „Śledztwo” (Lem, 2016a, Lem, 2016b). W ramach analizy statystycznej wykorzystano wybrane metody i techniki wielowymiarowej analizy porównawczej. W celu pogrupowania państw wykorzystano metodę aglomeracyjną Warda, która należy do najczęściej stosowanych aglomeracyjnych metod grupowania. Ze względu na liczebność skupień posłużono się testem Kruskala-Wallisa, czyli jednym z testów nieparametrycznych. Wartości wskaźników powiązanych z poszczególnymi cechami diagnostycznymi zostały poddane klasycznej standaryzacji, w której 0 stanowi średnią wartość oczekiwaną, natomiast odchylenie standardowe przyjmuje wartość 1. Oprócz grupowania państw wykonano też analizę statystyczną całych cech diagnostycznych, dodatkowo za pomocą głównych składowych dokonano analizy czynnikowej. Liczbę tzw. głównych czynników wybrano na podstawie testu osypiska (Cattella) (Panek, Zwierzchowski, 2013). Analiza statystyczna została uzupełniona analizą jakościową wyników grupowania i zebranych wtórnych danych statystycznych na temat wybranych problemów energetyki w Unii Europejskiej. Na podstawie zagregowanych danych dla poszczególnych grup państw w Unii Europejskiej, często za pomocą średniej arytmetycznej, zastosowano metodę porównawczą – w rozdziale drugim i trzecim pracy (Beyme, 2005, s. 132–156; Hopkin, 2010, s. 285–306). W studium teoretycznym nad kulturami energetycznymi w pierwszym rozdziale pracy dokonano syntezy wiedzy zawartej w literaturze tematu (paradygmaty; paradygmaty technologiczno-ekonomiczne; paradygmaty energetyczne; kultury; kultury energetyczne; procesy i zmiany społeczne, polityczne i gospodarcze; procesy i zmiany w energetyce; partycypacja; partycypacja ekologiczna i energetyczna). Analiza zebranych i opracowanych materiałów oraz literatury została uzupełniona własnymi wnioskami i ocenami. Zastosowano krytyczne podejście do prezentowanych nurtów i koncepcji paradygmatów technologiczno-ekonomicznych oraz transformacji energetycznej. Podejście krytyczne uzupełnione zostało trzema studiami przypadku paradygmatów węglowych w dłuższej perspektywie czasu (świat-Unia Europejska, Wielka Brytania i Polska). Pogłębione studia i dłuższa perspektywa zastosowana do trzech wybranych przypadków służy weryfikacji ustaleń poczynionych w literaturze dotyczącej paradygmatów technologiczno-ekonomicznych i transformacji energetycznych (Yin, 2003; Flyvbjerg, 2006, s. 219–245). W związku z położeniem nacisku na ujęcie pozytywistyczne zminimalizowano stosowanie metod instytucjonalno-prawnych, w tym również ujęć metodologiczno-teoretycznych związanych z procesami integracji w Unii Europejskiej. Analizę instytucjonalną wykorzystano jedynie w przypadku oceny czynników instytucjonalnych w procesach innowacji i transformacji energetycznej. Ponadto analizę znaczenia instytucjonalizacji oraz prawa pierwotnego i wtórnego Unii Europejskiej zastosowano w drugim rozdziale pracy (Beyme, 2005, s. 87–98; Borkowski, 2007; Czaputowicz, 2007, s. 327–370; Lowndes, 2010, s. 60–78). Projekt badań obejmuje zbudowanie narzędzia w celu weryfikacji zaprezentowanych wcześniej hipotez (Creswell, 2013, s. 73–94). Dane ilościowe zagregowano w ramach poszczególnych cech diagnostycznych, które reprezentują dwa rodzaje kultur – materialną i społeczną. Przyjęto, że kulturę materialną charakteryzują następujące cechy diagnostyczne: (1) efektywność energetyczna, (2) udział poszczególnych źródeł w produkcji energii elektrycznej brutto, (3) trajektorie rozwoju nowych technologii energetycznych. Natomiast kultura społeczna jest reprezentowana przez dodatkowe cechy diagnostyczne związane z następującymi warunkami życia: (1) społeczno-ekonomicznymi, (2) zdrowotnymi i (3) politycznymi. Grupowanie państw dokonano na podstawie wskaźników, które przypisano poszczególnym cechom. Zastosowano grupowanie państw na trzy okresy, tj. na rok 2000, 2015 i ponownie na 2015 (z rozszerzoną liczbą cech diagnostycznych). Kilkukrotne użycie metody aglomeracyjnej na różne lata (w tym jeden raz dla kultury materialno-społecznej) służyć ma uchwyceniu ewentualnych transformacji w strukturach energetycznych w Unii Europejskiej

Rosja w polityce zagranicznej Polski w latach 1992-2015

Poland towards Russia between 1992 and 2015 and outline their specifics. The author attempted at a synthesis of major manifestations of Polish-Russian cooperation and most sticking points in the intergovernmental (international) relations during that period. An important objective was to show the sources and examples of a divergence of interests, and point to the goals, which were based on these premises, established by the foreign policy-makers in Poland and Russia and pursued in mutual relations and international affairs. Between 1992 and 2015, in Poland’s foreign policy towards the East and national security policy, the relations with Russia and the Ukraine were of utmost importance. On the economic level, considering the volume of mutual trade turnover, Poland’s main partner in the East was the Russian Federation, whereas on the political level, the Ukraine was seen as a strategic partner. Along with the Ukraine, Russia played a key role in Poland’s security policy in the discussed period. It should be emphasized that Polish-Russian and Polish-Ukrainian relations were very closely linked, and so was Poland’s policy towards Russia and the Ukraine. In Poland’s foreign policy towards Russia, or in broader terms, in Polish-Russian relations between 1992 and 2015, seven stages can be distinguished; each having their own characteristic. Despite some new specifics in each particular stage, they all shared an element of continuity. The constant theme was a great divergence of interests between Poland and Russia, particularly with regard to the European security system, and the role of NATO in shaping this security, as well as further stages of the alliance’s enlargement, especially by countries of the post-Soviet area; energy security and Poland’s strive for diversification of fuels supplies faced with Russia’s actions aimed at the diversification of routes of sending its gas and crude oil to Western Europe bypassing the Ukraine and Poland; a historic dispute, in which a thorough, satisfying for the Poles, explanation of the Katyn Forest massacre was particularly high on the agenda among other issues; opposing visions of building an order in Eastern Europe, and first and foremost, in the Ukraine. With the passing of time, especially after Poland’s NATO and the EU accession, the future of Eastern European countries, particularly the Ukraine and Belarus, has become a fundamental issue in Polish-Russian relations. Both Russia and Poland treated Eastern European countries as a sort of a safety buffer. However, the two countries had entirely different visions of how this buffer ought to be shaped. The political leadership in Poland saw the strenghtening of national security in the strenghtening of the Ukrainian buffer through the Ukraine’s membership in NATO and the EU, whereas for the political leadership in Russia, the strenghtening of national security through Ukrainian buffer meant preserving its outside NATO status, or incorporating it in the the security system built under the aegis of Russia on the area of CIS. A characteristic of the Polish-Russian relations in that period was a great imbalance to Poland’s disadvantage, resulting from the differences in broadly understood physical potential of the two countries and, consequently, their international roles (Poland being a medium-size country situated in Central Europe and Russia being a superpower in Central Eurasia). The capacities of Poland to shape the situation in Eastern Europe on its own were incomparably lower than Russia’s. Therefore, Poland was trying to make use of European and Euro-Atlantic multirateral structures, mainly through the Eastern Dimension realized by the EU and NATO, to have as much influence as possible, on the desired developments in Eastern Europe. The eastern policy under successive RP governments was characterized by their overrating, frequently, of their own capacities, lack of objectivity in assessment of the situation across our eastern border, and application of double standards, particularly in the policy towards Russia. Polish-Russian political relations throughout the post-Cold War period were critical, and improvements were relatively short-lasting. Not only Russia, but also Poland is to blame for such a state of events. The Polish side, due to historical reasons and imbalance of potential, expected Russia to take more initiative in coming to an agreement with Poland. However, it has to be admitted that in many activities undertaken by Poland with regard to European security, in particular Eastern European subregion, the interests of Russia were completly disregarded, although they did not have to be accepted fully. An example of this was Polish diplomacy in the second half of 2013 intended not to allow Russia to be included in the negotiations on the EU association agreement with the Ukraine about issues that had economic implications for Russia’s interests. In their policy towards Russia, foreign policy-makers in Poland, forgot, all too often, or, were unwilling to remember, about the principle that in order to meet the security needs of one’s own country, one should also consider the security needs of other countries, the neighbouring ones in the first place. Analyzing the policies under succesive III RP governments on European security and relations with the post-Soviet countries, it is hard to share the view prevailing in our country that Poland did its best to develop partnership and good neighbourly relations with Russia. Among politicians, publicists and the Polish society, there was a large group of people who took a stance, though it was not always formally articulated, that Poland has a right, or even a duty to remain hostile towards Russia. On the other hand, Russia should not act unfavourably towards Poland, regardless of Poland’s anti-Russian policy, although, obviously, it was declared otherwise. One of the few stages showing a distinct improvement in Poland’s policy towards Russia and a mutual willingness to normalize our political relations, was the one between 2008 and 2010, when an unsuccesful attempt was made at pragmatizing foreign policy towards Russia. Since the end of 2007, this new foreign policy, gradually encompassing other areas, led to a greater or lesser modification of the policy to date towards Russia, the Ukraine, Belarus and Georgia by basing it on the so-called positive realism. These new trends increased cooperation between Poland and Russia and, eventually, a considerable progress was achieved in normalizing our relations. Between 2008 and 2010, Polish policy towards the East not only changed in practice, it was also a conceptual change. The crash of the presidential plane at Smoleńsk (April 10th, 2010), in which 96 peple were killed, including President of RP Lech Kaczyński and His Spouse, was a major, if not primary reason why the normalization process (2008–2010) was seriously hampered to the point of a standstill between 2011 and 2013. The Smoleńsk air disaster, and conflicting stands over its causes in particular, exacerbated divisions in the Polish society and strenghtened reluctance, if not hostility, towards Russia. A large part of the Polish political class and society did not accept a version of an inadvertent air disaster (plane crash), whose causes, like not following correct procedures, lay on both Poles and Russians. The surveys conducted during the years following the Smoleńsk air disaster showed that over 30% of the Polish society were convinced that it had been an attempt on the life of the Polish delegation en route to a commemoration of the 70th anniversary of the Katyn Forrest massacre, and that the Russian government and secret services had been involved. After the Smoleńsk air disaster, foreign policy towards Russia and Polish-Russian relations became a ground for political struggle in our country. For many politicians and conservatist right-wing journalists, a demonstrated degree of anti-Russian sentiment became the main criterion of patriotism. In a large part of the Polish society, a belief was strenghtened that actions should be taken to weaken and isolate Russia, and to minimize, rather than increase cooperation between the two countries. This meant that internal conditions within our country, which could possibly motivate the foreign policy-makers to stop viewing Russia as the main threat and encourage a breakthrough in thinking about that issue, deteriorated markedly. Consequently, Polish-Russian relations between 2011 and 2013 remained in a state of deadlock. In the foreign policy of Poland between 1992 and 2015, Russia played the leading role. This, however, stemmed from Russia being perceived by the policy-makers as the main threat to our national security, not a recognized partner in pursuing this security. Throughout that period, in all successive stages of Polish security policy, Russia was regarded as the main threat. Each political leadership in Poland, especially since the mid 1990s, treated Russia in this way, and these were not merely anti-Russian declarations, but a guiding principle of the foreign policy. Behind it, was a conviction that Russian imperialism was timeless and Russia would never accept the sovereignty of Poland. It was an obvious reference to the classical Polish geopolitical thought about Russia posing main threats to our national security. During the crisis and conflict in eastern Ukraine, between 2014 and 2015, the foreign policymakers in Poland revived the stance of a military threat on the part of Russia. For the first time since the end of the Cold War, such loud voices were heard about a possible military attack on Poland. Unlike the earlier periods, when there was an informal presumption that Russia was a threat to the security of Poland, in 2014, for the first time, in III RP’s security policy, Russia was formally pointed to as a direct military threat. It was articulated in official state documents, including Strategia Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej from November, 2014, and in addresses delivered by the Polish government officials (for instance in exposé of Foreign Minister R. Sikorski and his follower G. Schetyna). The crisis and conflict in south-eastern Ukraine did not substantially change Poland’s policy towards Russia. What did change between 2014 and 2015, however, was that much more emphasis than ever was placed on Russia being a threat to our national security, and there being a serious risk of a Russian direct invasion of Poland. During 2014 and 2015, the process of politicizing fear (policy of fear) of Russia was at its height. For Poland, a major outcome of the Ukrainian conflict and crisis was decreased national security and growing fears, among them the fear of Russian invasion, which does not mean that such a threat was real. During the years 2014 and 2015, Polish-Russian political relations at the highest level came almost to the point of being frozen. Important direct implications of the Ukrainian conflict for Poland’s security were, apart from a growing fear of Russia, increased desires towards strenghtening its own defense capability, strenghtening NATO cohesion, increased involvement of NATO in our sub-region’s security and closer bilateral Polish-American cooperation regarding military security. Resolving the conflict in eastern Ukraine as quickly as possible was in the interests of Poland. However, Polish diplomacy did not engage much in the conflict deescalation. They were very sceptical about the successive agreements aimed at ending the military operations negotiated within the frames of the so-called Normandy format (Mińsk I and Mińsk II). It seems that, considering the geopolitical situation in the Ukraine and divisions of the Ukrainian society, this country should remain a buffer state. Alternatively, coming out of this role should occur gradually, through a simultaneous Europeization of the Ukraine and Russia. Poland should not be interested in the „revolutionary” speeding up of the processes occuring in the Ukrainian society. Responsible politicians willing to serve the best interests of their nation should be aware of the limitations in pursuing even the most support worthy goals. The policy of every country, the foreign policy of Poland and the Ukraine included, should be founded on a realistic assessment of one’s own capabilities so that aspirations would not outgrow the real possibilities of their attainment. Poland, aspiring to the role of the EU main expert in Russian and the post-Soviet area affairs, through insisting in the EU on the earliest possible Ukraine association with the EU, contributed in a way to the situation when the Ukraine had to choose between the EU and Russia. Polish politicians did not anticpate the negative outcomes of such acceleration for the Ukraine itself (including the loss of Crimea and strong separatist tendencies in the East of the Ukraine), as well as for Russian- Ukrainian relations and the security of Poland. Therefore, the firm support and involvement of the Polish political class in the so-called democratic revolution in the Ukraine during 2013 and 2014, can hardly be regarded as a succcess. Polish policy towards the East ended in yet another failure, which was shown as confirmation when Poland was not included in the talks aimed at resolving the Ukrainian crisis, which were held by officials from the Ukraine, Russia, Germany and France since the middle of 2014. The Ukrainian crisis and conflict was a turning point in Polish security policy and Polish-Russian relations. The Polish government officially began to treat Russia as the largest threat to the national and international security. A considerable part of the political elites in Poland did not see the threat in excessive dependence of Polish economy on Russian energy resources or other economic threats, but in a direct military attack. Generally speaking, it is unknown to what extent the Ukrainian crisis and conflict will, in the long run, have an impact on changes in Polish policy towards the East, particularly towards Russia and the Ukraine. It exposed the ineffectiveness of our foreign policy to date towards the East. In this context, a question arises: What will be mid- and long-term implications of the Ukrainian conflict for the modification or a radical alteration to Polish foreign policy towards the East? Another fundamental question pertains to Polish-Russian relations: What policy should Poland pursue towards Russia now and in the future? Will the foreign policy and security policy be directed, like in 2014 and 2015, at instransigence and confrontation, or will the normalization tendency prevail as regards Russia, and will the relations with the Ukraine be redefined? However, at the end of 2015, nothing implied that the foreign and security policy-makers intended to transform in any way the policy towards Russia and the Ukraine to date. It does not mean that changes will not be implemented in the years to come. It will be closely connected with the impact of the Ukrainian conflict on the modification of the policy of Germany and the entire European Union as well as the policy of the United States on the post-Soviet area. The crisis and conflict in eastern Ukraine strenghtened the legitimacy of argumentation that the main player in the post-Soviet area is Russia. None of the serious problems in this area can be resolved without the participation of Russia, and all the more, against Russia, which obviously, does not mean that the proponents of this stance overrate the capabilities of Russia in terms of shaping the closer and farther international environment. On this account, Polish policy will be hardly effective if at least some of Russia’s interests in the post-Soviet area, especially in Eastern Europe, are taken into consideration, as was proven to date. Bearing in mind long-term consquences, the strategic conceptions of the Polish policy towards the East, should opt for the closest possible ties of Russia with political and economic structures of the EU and Euro-Atlantic structures (Europeization of Russia). This, in turn, should result in the evolution of the economic-political system of Russia into liberal democracy. The Ukrainian crisis and conflict classified the effectiveness of the Polish conception aimed at occidentalizing the Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova without simultaneously occidentalizing Russia. As was indicated by the proponents of this conception, its implementation assumed an inevitable cost such as a political conflict with Russia. The crisis and conflict in the Ukraine between 2014 and 2015 should be a good reason to change this stance. The biggest price for its implementation was paid by the Ukraininas themselves. Therefore, in the context of these experiences, Poland should suport not in opposition to Russia, but together with Russia, which does not imply that this process has to be fully synchronized. The direction of actions in this matter is of key importance. Despite the many contentious issues in Polish-Russian relations and different historical memory of Poles and Russians, in the long-term interests of Poland’s security, lies implementing a cooperative and integrating, not a confrontational conception. For the normalization of Polish-Russian relations, it is essential that the successive governemnets of Poland and Russia should have a political will to a less confrontational approach towards disputable issues and resolve emerging problems in a compromising way, which is one of the „scarcest commodities” in the Polish-Russian relations. A compromise should not be treated as a failure, as is often believed, also by the Poles. It also requires changes in mutual perception. A true normalization of mutual relations between Poland and Russia will not be possible if the majority of political elites, media and society in both countries will see the other not even as a difficult partner of rival, but an enemy. The divergence of interests does not have to lead to hostility. The governing groups in Poland and Russia face a challenge in improving Polish-Russian relations. They can either attempt to broaden the area of common interests or to highlight the discrepancies and divergence of interests, and thus strenghten social attitudes prone to either cooperation or confrontation