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The Antinomy of Teleological Judgment
The antinomy of teleological judgment is one of the most controversial passages of Kant’s
"Critique of the Power of Judgment". Having developed the idea of an explanation of organized
beings by mechanical and teleological natural laws in §§ 61-68, in §§ 69-78 Kant raises the question of whether higher order mechanical and teleological natural laws, which unify the particular empirical laws of organized beings, might pose an antinomy of conflicting principles within the power of judgment. I will argue against alternative views that this antinomy is neither a conflict between objective constitutive principles of the determining power of judgment nor a conflict between an objective constitutive principle of the determining power of judgment and a subjective regulative maxim of the reflecting power of judgment nor does it
consist in a confusion of a pair of subjective regulative maxims of the reflecting power of judgment
with a pair of objective constitutive principles of the determining power of judgment, but does consist in an apparent conflict between mechanical and teleological natural laws as subjective regulative maxims of the reflecting power of judgment. I will further argue that Kant’s resolution of the antinomy consists in the regulative idea of a supersensible that represents the unity of both kinds of natural laws and justifies the unification of both kinds of natural laws in the human power of judgment. Kant uses three notions when he talks about
the supersensible – the regulative idea of a divine artisan, the regulative idea of a divine intuitive
understanding, and the regulative idea of an underdetermined, supernatural ground of
nature. I will show how each of these notions accounts for the unity of both kinds of natural
laws and will discuss possible correlations between them. I will then explain how the unity of
both kinds of natural laws in the regulative idea of a supersensible accounts for the unification
of both kinds of natural laws in the human power of judgment. While the divine intuitive
understanding is perfect and uncreated and, thus, capable of a representation of the unity
of both kinds of natural laws, the human discursive understanding is imperfect and created;
it is capable only of the representation of the unification of both kinds of natural laws in form
of a hierarchy of laws
Kant on the Peculiarity of the Human Understanding and the Antinomy of the Teleological Power of Judgment
Kant argues in the Critique of the Teleological Power of Judgment that the first stage in resolving the problem of teleology is conceiving it correctly. He explains that the conflict between mechanism and teleology, properly conceived, is an antinomy of the power of judgment in its reflective use regarding regulative maxims, and not an antinomy of the power of judgment in its determining use regarding constitutive principles. The matter in hand does not concern objective propositions regarding the possibility of objects or actual features of certain objects, namely, organisms. It is rather a methodological issue as to the appropriate way to explain the generation, development, and function of organisms. Taken in this manner as subjective maxims guiding the explanation and inquiry of organisms, the principles of mechanism and teleology need not necessarily be seen as contradictorily opposed but instead can be combined in the study of organisms. This, however, is not enough to complete the analysis of the antinomy of the teleological power of judgment. In order to show that there is an antinomy in this case, Kant has to establish that both seemingly conflicting maxims are necessary and natural to the human mind. He does it by grounding them in the ‘special character’ or peculiarity (Eigentümlichkeit) of the human understanding. However, it is not entirely clear just what exactly this peculiarity of the human understanding is. Paul Guyer argues that Kant suggests two different accounts of the peculiarity of the human intellect. According to one account, this peculiarity consists in the fact that our understanding forms general concepts and according to another, in its propensity to proceed from the parts to the whole. I will argue in this paper that Kant puts forward a single account, in which the combination of these two features demonstrate the peculiarity of the human understanding manifested in the encounter with organisms. This account explains the necessity of the regulative maxims of mechanism and teleology, and thus completes Kant’s analysis of the antinomy of the teleological power of judgment
"Alles Vergängliche ist nur ein Gleichnis" : zur Eigenart des Ästhetischen im kulturoziologischen Diskurs der Jahrhundertwende
Las destrucción del concepto teológico-racional de naturaleza humana. Sobre las dificultades de conocer al hombre
FALSEunpu
Lebensbilder aus Kriegszeiten. Zoltán Kodálys 2. Streichquartett op. 10
Zoltán Kodály composed his String Quartet no. 2 at the end of World War I. Its unusual form – two contrasting movements – comprises the possibility of interpreting the function and hidden narrative of the piece in markedly different ways. Contrary to earlier explanations, my study aims at revealing the cultural-political-aesthetical context of the composition and the compositional process. It is based on the interpretation of Kodály’s musical criticism and studies, above all on Béla Bartók’s Second String Quartet and the pentatonic layer of Hungarian folk music, as well as his readings, particularly the war-novels of the contemporary writer Zsigmond Móricz whom he admired extraordinarily. In my opinion the experiences gained during the war must have been decisive for Kodály in creating a new interpretation of modern Hungarian music abounding in references to the glorious Hungarian past. While the first movement is built on ‘feminine’ chromaticism and melodiousness, the second movement represents ‘masculine’ dance-series opening the door to a new, strong, and emphatically man-orientated world
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