Conscientious objectors during Britain's last popular war

Due to the character of the original source materials and the nature of batch digitization, quality control issues may be present in this document. Please report any quality issues you encounter to [email protected], referencing the URI of the item.Includes bibliographical references (leaves 22).This paper contains the results of my research on the conscientious objectors of World War II in Great Britain. After a brief overview of the events of the 1920's and 1930's which led to the formation of pacifist sentiments in Britain, I discuss my findings regarding who the conscientious objectors were, what the differences were between the objectors in the second world war and the first world war, and how the objectors in the second war were treated by their government and society. I also present information regarding the various experiences of the objectors during the war and the legal aspects of conscientious objection

Review of Klippenstein\u27s Peace and War, Mennonite Conscientious Objectors in Tsarist Russia and the Soviet Union before World War II, and other COs in Eastern Europe

Review of Lawrence Klippenstein, Peace and War, Mennonite Conscientious Objectors in Tsarist Russia and the Soviet Union before World War II, and other COs in Eastern Europe, Winnipeg, MB. 2017. 367pp. $30.00 including postage outside Canada

The foundations of conscientious objection: against freedom and autonomy

According to the common view, conscientious objection is grounded in autonomy or in ‘freedom of conscience’ and is tolerated out of respect for the objector's autonomy. Emphasising freedom of conscience or autonomy as a central concept within the issue of conscientious objection implies that the conscientious objector should have an independent choice among alternative beliefs, positions or values. In this paper it is argued that: (a) it is not true that the typical conscientious objector has such a choice when they decide to act upon their conscience and (b) it is not true that the typical conscientious objector exercises autonomy when developing or acquiring their conscience. Therefore, with regard to tolerating conscientious objection, we should apply the concept of autonomy with caution, as tolerating conscientious objection does not reflect respect for the conscientious objector’s right to choose but rather acknowledges their lack of real ability to choose their conscience and to refrain from acting upon their conscience. This has both normative and analytical implications for the treatment of conscientious objectors

Conscientious objection as a barrier for implementing voluntary termination of pregnancy in Uruguay: Gynecologists’ attitudes and behavior

AbstractObjectiveTo analyze the attitudes and behavior of gynecologists in Uruguay with respect to the right to conscientious objection that is included in the law concerning voluntary termination of pregnancy.MethodsThe relevant laws and decrees, academic articles, legal or administrative claims, and the positions published by the institutions representing physicians or by groups of gynecologists were analyzed.ResultsIn general, the institutions positioned themselves in favor of correct application of conscientious objection and the immense majority of gynecologists followed this conduct. Small groups mounted a strong opposition and in one department (province) all gynecologists declared themselves to be objectors.ConclusionMost gynecologists, whether or not they are objectors, proved to have a “loyalty to duty,” fulfilling their primary obligation to abide by the ethical duty to give treatment to the persons who need it. A small group used conscientious objection to impede the provision of care to the women who needed the service, some group members being genuine objectors and others pseudo-objectors

Conscription and Conscientious Objection in the Experience of Norwegian Friends

This article is a revised and elaborated version of The George Richardson Lecture of 1998. It gives an account of the young men who were members of or affiliated with the Norwegian Religious Society of Friends who refused to serve in the military in the nineteenth century. The article starts with the dramatic story ofS0ren Olsen who refused to do naval service in 1848 and was sentenced to suffer 27 lashes a day for three days with the ninetailed cat. His case went to the Supreme Court and even to the King before it was finally settled. He kept a journal of his experiences and thoughts during his ordeal, a unique testimony in the history of conscientious objection. The Dissenter Law of1845 allowed churches outside the Lutheran State Church to establish in Norway, but it did not allow conscientious objection. After general conscription was implemented in the 1850s other young men followed S0ren Olsen in refusing military service, and the article analyses their suffering and the response of Norwegian and British Quakers and their efforts to influence the authorities to make provisions for conscientious objectors (COs). During the last quarter of the century several young male Quakers emigrated to the USA to escape military service, and the very existence of the No1wegian Quaker Society was threatened. The peace organisations and members of the Norwegian Parliament used the fact that young men had to emigrate to practise their faith as a strong argument in their lobbying for a law allowing conscientious objection. The refusal on the part of the YM clerk to provide the authorities with lists of young men liable for conscription resulted in the loss of the Society\u27s status as a registered church. It seemed impossible to practise the Quaker faith under these circumstances. Conscientious objection was up to that time a Quaker issue, but around 1900 young men outside the Quaker Society were also recorded as conscientious objectors. In 1902 some provisions for conscientious objectors were granted, and in 1922 a law permitting alternative civil service was passed. In 1936 NYM was again registered as a church. The article evaluates the efforts of the Quakers in Norway and Britain on behalf of the conscientious objectors and the impact their refusal had in the struggle for religious freedom and human rights in Norway

Moral and Religious Convictions as Categories for Special Treatment: The Exemption Strategy

My topic differs from the usual inquiries about morality and law, such as how far law should embody morality, whether legal interpretation (always or sometimes) includes moral judgment, and whether an immoral law really counts as law. Concentrating on exemptions from ordinary legal requirements, I am interested in instances when the law might make especially relevant the moral judgments of individual actors. I am particularly interested in whether the law should ever treat moral judgments based on religious conviction differently from moral judgments that lack such a basis. A striking example for both questions is conscientious objection to military service. In the history of our country, objectors to military service have received exemptions from conscription; even in our present volunteer army, those who develop a conscientious objection to participation in any war are relieved from military duty they would otherwise have to perform as a consequence of their initial commitment to service. The law as it is now written requires that an objection be based on religious training and belief. The Supreme Court has interpreted the law to include all genuine conscientious objectors

Cases of Conscience: The Supreme Court and Conscientious Objectors to Military Service During the Post World War II Era

This thesis examines the history of American conscientious objectors to military service during the aftermath of World War II. It describes why conscientious objectors were viewed with distrust and suspicion for their refusal to bear arms in defense of the nation and considers how groups such as the American Legion and the Veterans of Foreign Wars attempted to prevent COs from enjoying key benefits of U.S. citizenship by demanding that conscientious objectors be excluded from public employment and denied most forms of government assistance. This thesis focuses on decisions of the United States Supreme Court following World War II that defined and extended the rights of conscientious objectors. Some of those decisions reflected and continued a debate over the protection of speech and claims of conscience that developed among the Justices on the Supreme Court following the end of World War I. This paper explores and evaluates the connections between the World War I era cases and decisions that followed the end of World War II. Analysis of the post World War II decisions reveals how the Supreme Court moved away from ideological debates over the protection of conscience towards the imposition of procedural rules designed to insure that administrative and judicial hearings involving COs met due process standards. The contests over the rights of conscientious objectors that followed the end of World War II displayed the expanding role the Supreme Court assumed in protecting the civil liberties of all Americans. The Supreme Court cases concerning conscientious objectors discussed here also showed how judicial protection of claims of conscience were influenced by Cold War fears that the philosophy of COs might undermine the ability of the nation to defend itself

Northwest Friend, September 1944

Northwest Friend, September 1944. Pertinent Observations - A Plain Statement; Quakers on the Move; Conscientious Objectors; Summer Conferences and Camps; Moments with the Word; Introducing Our New Staff. Publication of the Northwest Yearly Meeting of Friends.https://digitalcommons.georgefox.edu/nwym_nwfriend/1022/thumbnail.jp