215 research outputs found

    Modern prejudice and strength of conjunction error : overestimating proportions of minority employees

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    Modern prejudice was examined as a potential predictor of overestimating proportions of minority employees in gender-typed occupations. Strength of conjunction error was considered as an indicator of distorted perceptions of these proportions. Furthermore, we investigated whether the association between modern prejudice and strength of conjunction error was weaker for gender-untypical than for gender-typical targets. Modern prejudice was considered as a predictor of overestimations of black female employees in Study 1 (N = 183) and black female older employees in Study 2 (N = 409). Data was collected using internet-mediated questionnaires. In Study 1, modern racism, but not modern sexism, was associated with greater strength of conjunction error when respondents were presented with gender-typical targets. In Study 2, using a sample scoring higher on modern prejudice than in Study 1, modern racism, but not modern sexism and modern ageism, was associated with greater strength of conjunction error, irrespective of target occupation. Furthermore, there was an unexpected association between lower sexism and greater strength of conjunction error for gender-typical targets, but not for gender-untypical targets. The findings lend support to the ethnic-prominence hypothesis in that modern racism, but not modern sexism or modern ageism, was associated with greater strength of conjunction error. Furthermore, empirical evidence suggests that target non-prototypicality can dilute the effect of modern prejudice on strength of conjunction error. This is one of the rare studies examining attitudes and conjunction error in a work-relevant context, thereby bridging the gap between social cognition and applied psychology

    Statistical Bias and Endorsement of Conspiracy Theories

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    Previous research proposes that endorsement of anomalous beliefs is associated with proneness to conjunction error. This supposition ignores important differences between belief types. Correspondingly, the present study examined the degree to which components of statistical bias predicted conspiratorial ideation and belief in the paranormal. Confirmatory factor analysis and structural equation modelling revealed that conjunction error was associated with conspiratorial ideation, whilst perception of randomness most strongly predicted belief in the paranormal. These findings opposed the notion that anomalous beliefs, by virtue of possession of common characteristics, relate similarly to conjunction error. With regard to conspiracy, conjunction-framing manipulations produced only minor variations in relationship strength. This supported the notion that conspiratorial ideation was associated with a domain-general susceptibility to conjunction error. Framing, however, did influence the relationship between belief in the paranormal and conjunction; whilst, paranormal conjunctions were generally easier to solve, performance declined as level of paranormal belief increased

    Surprisingly Rational: Probability theory plus noise explains biases in judgment

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    The systematic biases seen in people's probability judgments are typically taken as evidence that people do not reason about probability using the rules of probability theory, but instead use heuristics which sometimes yield reasonable judgments and sometimes systematic biases. This view has had a major impact in economics, law, medicine, and other fields; indeed, the idea that people cannot reason with probabilities has become a widespread truism. We present a simple alternative to this view, where people reason about probability according to probability theory but are subject to random variation or noise in the reasoning process. In this account the effect of noise is cancelled for some probabilistic expressions: analysing data from two experiments we find that, for these expressions, people's probability judgments are strikingly close to those required by probability theory. For other expressions this account produces systematic deviations in probability estimates. These deviations explain four reliable biases in human probabilistic reasoning (conservatism, subadditivity, conjunction and disjunction fallacies). These results suggest that people's probability judgments embody the rules of probability theory, and that biases in those judgments are due to the effects of random noise.Comment: 64 pages. Final preprint version. In press, Psychological Revie

    Bias in judgement: Comparing individuals and groups

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    The relative susceptibility of individuals and groups to systematic judgmental biases is considered. An overview of the relevant empirical literature reveals no clear or general pattern. However, a theoretical analysis employing J. H. Davis's (1973) social decision scheme (SDS) model reveals that the relative magnitude of individual and group bias depends upon several factors, including group size, initial individual judgment, the magnitude of bias among individuals, the type of bias, and most of all, the group-judgment process. It is concluded that there can be no simple answer to the question, "Which are more biased, individuals or groups?," but the SDS model offers a framework for specifying some of the conditions under which individuals are both more and less biased than groups

    Erros de memória e erros de (teorias da) memória

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    I investigate three lab cases of memory error and test their consequences to the main theories of (declarative) memory: causal theory and simulationism. Roughly, the causal theory states that a subject remembers something only if her remembering is in a causal relation with a past experience of that thing. In simulationism, this relation is not necessary. The cases of memory error are DRM, ‚Äúlost in the mall‚ÄĚ, and memory-conjunction error. These are problem cases for the causal theory, but not for simulationism. My hypothesis is that this difficulty is because of¬†the causal requirement.¬†I investigate three lab cases of memory error and test their consequences to the main theories of (declarative) memory: causal theory and simulationism. Roughly, the causal theory states that a subject remembers something only if her remembering is in a causal relation with a past experience of that thing. In simulationism, this relation is not necessary. The cases of memory error are DRM, ‚Äúlost in the mall‚ÄĚ, and memory-conjunction error. These are problem cases for the causal theory, but not for simulationism. My hypothesis is that this difficulty is because of¬†the causal requirement.I investigate three lab cases of memory error and test their consequences to the main theories of (declarative) memory: causal theory and simulationism. Roughly, the causal theory states that a subject remembers something only if her remembering is in a causal relation with a past experience of that thing. In simulationism, this relation is not necessary. The cases of memory error are DRM, ‚Äúlost in the mall‚ÄĚ, and memory-conjunction error. These are problem cases for the causal theory, but not for simulationism. My hypothesis is that this difficulty is because of¬†the causal requirement.I investigate three lab cases of memory error and test their consequences to the main theories of (declarative) memory: causal theory and simulationism. Roughly, the causal theory states that a subject remembers something only if her remembering is in a causal relation with a past experience of that thing. In simulationism, this relation is not necessary. The cases of memory error are DRM, ‚Äúlost in the mall‚ÄĚ, and memory-conjunction error. These are problem cases for the causal theory, but not for simulationism. My hypothesis is that this difficulty is because of¬†the causal requirement.I investigate three lab cases of memory error and test their consequences to the main theories of (declarative) memory: causal theory and simulationism. Roughly, the causal theory states that a subject remembers something only if her remembering is in a causal relation with a past experience of that thing. In simulationism, this relation is not necessary. The cases of memory error are DRM, ‚Äúlost in the mall‚ÄĚ, and memory-conjunction error. These are problem cases for the causal theory, but not for simulationism. My hypothesis is that this difficulty is because of¬†the causal requirement.Nesse artigo, investigo tr√™s casos de erros de mem√≥ria obtidos em laborat√≥rio como forma de avaliar as principais teorias da mem√≥ria (declarativa): teoria causal e simulacionismo. De maneira geral, a teoria causal afirma que algu√©m lembra de algo somente se sua lembran√ßa est√° numa rela√ß√£o causal adequada com uma experi√™ncia anterior daquilo que √© lembrado. No simulacionismo, essa rela√ß√£o n√£o √© necess√°ria. Os casos de erros de mem√≥ria investigados s√£o DRM, ‚Äúperdido no shopping‚ÄĚ e erro de conjun√ß√£o de conte√ļdo. Esses casos s√£o dif√≠ceis para a teoria causal, especialmente em sua vers√£o direta, mas n√£o para o simulacionismo. Minha hip√≥tese √© a de que essa dificuldade se deve especificamente ao crit√©rio causal adotado
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