Blockchain and the Law: Towards a Responsible Blockchain Sector

https://larc.cardozo.yu.edu/event-invitations-2018/1043/thumbnail.jp

Not So Fast--Risks Related to the Use of a SAFT for Token Sales

On October 2, 2017, Cooley LLP and Protocol Labs released a whitepaper entitled “The SAFT Project: Toward a Compliant Token Sale Framework” (the “Whitepaper”), purporting to develop “a new, compliant framework” for engaging in the sale of blockchain-based tokens. The Whitepaper acknowledged that the framework has limitations, and invited a conversation within the blockchain and legal community. In that spirit, the below report analyzes the framework proposed in the Whitepaper and highlights a number of risks related to the use of a Simple Agreement for Future Tokens (a “SAFT”) for token sales. As explained below, while the framework proposed in the Whitepaper is arguably attractive in its simplicity, it may create more problems than it solves for sellers that follow its prescriptions. In particular, the Whitepaper seemingly advances an approach that: Blurs the true test of how tokens will be analyzed under U.S. federal securities law, which is highly dependent on the relevant facts and circumstances; Increases the risk that a token will be treated as a security by emphasizing the token’s speculative, profit-generating potential and relying on vague notions of “functionality” as a panacea to guard against broad securities laws implications; and Creates a class of early investors that are incentivized to flip their holdings instead of supporting enterprise growth, which could fuel speculation and hurt consumers. Although outside the scope of this report, the approach advanced in the Whitepaper also creates: (i) uncertainty as to the tax treatment of SAFT proceeds; and (ii) risk that the SAFT may constitute a non-exempt forward contract with potential implications under U.S. commodities laws. This report aims to advance the conversation regarding this emerging space and to caution those who may seek to rely solely on the Whitepaper’s conclusions as a basis for analyzing potential U.S. securities law risks when engaging in a token sale. The report does not take a position on whether other pre-sale or pre-order agreements for pre-functional tokens could comply with securities law. And, it is not intended to—and should not—be relied upon as legal advice; token sellers should consult their own counsel. The report proceeds in three parts. The first two sections provide a brief overview of utility tokens and the SAFT proposed in the Whitepaper. The final section outlines four concerns that should serve as a warning for those considering buying or selling tokens through a SAFT

On Cyber Risk Management of Blockchain Networks: A Game Theoretic Approach

Open-access blockchains based on proof-of-work protocols have gained tremendous popularity for their capabilities of providing decentralized tamper-proof ledgers and platforms for data-driven autonomous organization. Nevertheless, the proof-of-work based consensus protocols are vulnerable to cyber-attacks such as double-spending. In this paper, we propose a novel approach of cyber risk management for blockchain-based service. In particular, we adopt the cyber-insurance as an economic tool for neutralizing cyber risks due to attacks in blockchain networks. We consider a blockchain service market, which is composed of the infrastructure provider, the blockchain provider, the cyber-insurer, and the users. The blockchain provider purchases from the infrastructure provider, e.g., a cloud, the computing resources to maintain the blockchain consensus, and then offers blockchain services to the users. The blockchain provider strategizes its investment in the infrastructure and the service price charged to the users, in order to improve the security of the blockchain and thus optimize its profit. Meanwhile, the blockchain provider also purchases a cyber-insurance from the cyber-insurer to protect itself from the potential damage due to the attacks. In return, the cyber-insurer adjusts the insurance premium according to the perceived risk level of the blockchain service. Based on the assumption of rationality for the market entities, we model the interaction among the blockchain provider, the users, and the cyber-insurer as a two-level Stackelberg game. Namely, the blockchain provider and the cyber-insurer lead to set their pricing/investment strategies, and then the users follow to determine their demand of the blockchain service. Specifically, we consider the scenario of double-spending attacks and provide a series of analytical results about the Stackelberg equilibrium in the market game

Blockchain: A Graph Primer

Bitcoin and its underlying technology Blockchain have become popular in recent years. Designed to facilitate a secure distributed platform without central authorities, Blockchain is heralded as a paradigm that will be as powerful as Big Data, Cloud Computing and Machine learning. Blockchain incorporates novel ideas from various fields such as public key encryption and distributed systems. As such, a reader often comes across resources that explain the Blockchain technology from a certain perspective only, leaving the reader with more questions than before. We will offer a holistic view on Blockchain. Starting with a brief history, we will give the building blocks of Blockchain, and explain their interactions. As graph mining has become a major part its analysis, we will elaborate on graph theoretical aspects of the Blockchain technology. We also devote a section to the future of Blockchain and explain how extensions like Smart Contracts and De-centralized Autonomous Organizations will function. Without assuming any reader expertise, our aim is to provide a concise but complete description of the Blockchain technology.Comment: 16 pages, 8 figure

A Systematic Review of Blockchain Literature in Logistics and Supply Chain Management: Identifying Research Questions and Future Directions

Potential blockchain applications in logistics and supply chain (LSCM) have gained increasing attention within both academia and industry. However, as a field in its infancy, blockchain research often lacks theoretical foundations, and it is not clear which and to what extent organizational theories are used to investigate blockchain technology in the field of LSCM. In response, based upon a systematic literature review, this paper: (a) identifies the most relevant organizational theories used in blockchain literature in the context of LSCM; and (b) examines the content of the identified organizational theories to formulate relevant research questions for investigating blockchain technology in LSCM. Our results show that blockchain literature in LSCM is based around six organizational theories, namely: agency theory, information theory, institutional theory, network theory, the resource-based view and transaction cost analysis. We also present how these theories can be used to examine specific blockchain problems by identifying blockchain-specific research questions that are worthy of investigation

How blockchain impacts cloud-based system performance: a case study for a groupware communication application

This paper examines the performance trade-off when implementing a blockchain architecture for a cloud-based groupware communication application. We measure the additional cloud-based resources and performance costs of the overhead required to implement a groupware collaboration system over a blockchain architecture. To evaluate our groupware application, we develop measuring instruments for testing scalability and performance of computer systems deployed as cloud computing applications. While some details of our groupware collaboration application have been published in earlier work, in this paper we reflect on a generalized measuring method for blockchain-enabled applications which may in turn lead to a general methodology for testing cloud-based system performance and scalability using blockchain. Response time and transaction throughput metrics are collected for the blockchain implementation against the non-blockchain implementation and some conclusions are drawn about the additional resources that a blockchain architecture for a groupware collaboration application impose