Fostering the Biosecurity Norm: Biosecurity Education for the Next Generation of Life Scientists

Sustainable education on biosecurity and dual use for life scientists is increasingly recognised as being an important element of broader efforts to achieve biosecurity. To address this issue, a joint project between the Landau Network-Centro Volta and the Bradford Disarmament Research Centre has been initiated to analyse what currently exists in terms of biosecurity and dual use education, but also how such education can be most effectively achieved in a sustainable fashion. The purpose of this paper is to elaborate on the findings of a survey on the extent of, and attitudes to, biosecurity and dual use education in European universities, and outline the educational activities undertaken through a network of contacts built through the survey and some of the conclusions drawn from engagement with this network. The paper also outlines the development and optimization of an Educational Module Resource intended to support lecturers in the improvement and implementation of educational material related to biosecurity and dual use. This is further expanded by the authors' experience derived from implementation tests conducted at universities around Europe, in which material was tested with students and faculty members. To date, the main results from this evaluative process are that students and faculties are generally unaware of biosecurity and dual use concerns, but nonetheless appear interested in discussing these topics and have initiated challenging debates on the importance of balancing factors such as security, research, secrecy and development. However, serious efforts in terms of developing and promulgating education more broadly across the life science community will require concerted actions which look at education but also at other mutually reinforcing intervention points such as funding bodies, authors and publishers. Moreover, in the longer term it will also be necessary to develop new mechanisms and metrics to determine success in these activities and ensure that educational activities are contributing, along with other legal and regulatory measures, to mitigating the challenge of potential misuse of the life sciences in the 21st century

Education and Ethics in the Life Sciences: Strengthening the Prohibition of Biological Weapons

At the start of the twenty-first century, warnings have been raised in some quarters about how – by intent or by mishap – advances in biotechnology and related fields could aid the spread of disease. Science academics, medical organisations, governments, security analysts, and others are among those that have sought to raise concern. Education and Ethics in the Life Sciences examines a variety of attempts to bring greater awareness to security concerns associated with the life sciences. It identifies lessons from practical initiatives across a wide range of national contexts as well as more general reflections about education and ethics. The eighteen contributors bring together perspectives from a diverse range of fields – including politics, virology, sociology, ethics, security studies, microbiology, and medicine – as well as their experiences in universities, think tanks and government. In offering their assessment about what must be done and by whom, each chapter addresses a host of challenging practical and conceptual questions. Education and Ethics in the Life Sciences will be of interest to those planning and undertaking training activities in other areas. In asking how education and ethics are being made to matter in an emerging area of social unease, it will also be of interest to those with more general concerns about professional conduct

Bioethics for Biotechnologists: From Dolly to CRISPR

Abstract: Bioethics, as a discipline, has developed mainly, but not exclusively, around themes of moral importance for the medical practice, such as abortion and euthanasia, a never ending discussion that has been shaped by social mores and influenced by scientific and technological advance. However, in the past 20 years an important shift has been taking place, one where bioethical issues and their discussion are starting to being driven by the so-called emerging biotechnologies, from cloning to genome sequencing and editing. If Bioethics is concerned with human beings, and their interaction with other living beings and the environment, it makes sense for Biotechnology, by definition the use of living systems or organisms to develop products, to become an important, if not the most important, source of bioethical conflicts in modern era and for future society. As Biotechnology keeps expanding and becomes entangled in everyday life, so does the need for ethical competent biotechnologists, with competencies built not only on ethical principles but also on a realistic grasp of the impact these technologies could have on human society and the world we inhabit. Keywords: Biotechnology, genome editing, animal cloning, ethics, fairness, biothreats, biosafety, biosecurit

1st biennial seminar in health law and bioethics, Lisbon 2005

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Undergraduate teaching on biological weapons and bioterrorism at medical schools in the UK and the Republic of Ireland: results of a cross-sectional study

Objective To determine if individual undergraduate schools of medicine in the UK and the Republic of Ireland provide any teaching to medical students about biological weapons, bioterrorism, chemical weapons and weaponised radiation, if they perceive them to be relevant issues and if they figure them in their future plans. Design A cross-sectional study utilising an internet-based questionnaire sent to key figures responsible for leading on the planning and delivery of undergraduate medical teaching at all schools of medicine in the UK and Ireland. Setting All identified undergraduate schools of medicine in the UK and Ireland between August 2012 and December 2012. Outcome measures Numerical data and free text feedback about relevant aspects of undergraduate teaching. Results Of the 38 medical schools approached, 34 (28 in UK, 6 in Ireland) completed the questionnaire (89.47%). 4 (all in UK) chose not to complete it. 6/34 (17.65%) included some specific teaching on biological weapons and bioterrorism. 7/34 (20.59%) had staff with bioterrorism expertise (mainly in microbiological and syndromic aspects). 4/34 (11.76%) had plans to introduce some specific teaching on bioterrorism. Free text responses revealed that some felt that because key bodies (eg, UK's General Medical Council) did not request teaching on bioterrorism, then it should not be included, while others regarded this field of study as a postgraduate subject and not appropriate for undergraduates, or argued that the curriculum was too congested already. 4/34 (11.76%) included some specific teaching on chemical weapons, and 3/34 (8.82%) on weaponised radiation. Conclusions This study provides evidence that at the present time there is little teaching at the undergraduate level in the UK and Ireland on the subjects of biological weapons and bioterrorism, chemical weapons and weaponised radiation and signals that this situation is unlikely to change unless there were to be high-level policy guidance