Bankruptcy Law: a Mechanism of Governance for Financially Distressed Firms.

This paper explores the various governance models for financially distressed firms. We offer a new typology of major bankruptcy models and provide a connection between this bankruptcy law puzzle and the variables depicting the governance of healthy firms in order to shed light on two topics: (1) the factors that the lawyer should consider before removing its national bankruptcy law, and (2) the risks associated with each bankruptcy model according to the economic literature on bankruptcy law. Our final aim is to test whether the various bankruptcy models detailed in the paper perform in separate economic and legal environments.Bankruptcy, Governance, Law and Economics.

Entrepreneurship and the Barrier to Exit: How Does an Entrepreneur-Friendly Bankruptcy Law Affect Entrepreneurship Development at a Societal Level?

Does an entrepreneur-friendly bankruptcy law encourage more entrepreneurship development at a societal level? How does bankruptcy law affect entrepreneurship development around the world? Drawing on a real options perspective, we argue that if bankrupt entrepreneurs are excessively punished for failure, they may pass potentially high-return but inherently high-risk opportunities. Amassing a longitudinal, cross-country data base from 35 countries spanning ten years, we find that a lenient, entrepreneur-friendly bankruptcy law encourages entrepreneurs to take risks and thus let entrepreneurship prosper. Components of an entrepreneur-friendly bankruptcy law are: (1) the availability of a reorganization bankruptcy option, (2) the time spent on bankruptcy procedure, (3) the cost of bankruptcy procedure, (4) the opportunity to have a fresh start in liquidation bankruptcy, (5) the opportunity to have an automatic stay of assets, (6) the opportunity for managers to remain on the job after filing for bankruptcy, and (7) the protection of creditors at the time of bankruptcy.

Does the law alone explain the rise in bankruptcies in XIXth century France?

This paper is the first result of a project aiming at understanding the history of bankruptcy law from an empirical economic perspective. By contrast with some proponents of "law and economics" (e.g. La Porta & alii, 1998), we consider that the impact of bankruptcy law on national economic performance cannot be deducted a priori from a simple description of the law, but can only be measured examining actual court practices and economic agents' behaviour. First of all, we believe that an empirical assessment of bankruptcy must start with a better understanding of what determines the proportions of debtor-creditors relationships which end-up in court (contrasting with those settled outside the courts, see Klapper, 2001). This simple question, which is not usually discussed, is a precondition for any interpretation of aggregate bankruptcy statistics. In this paper, we try to measure the impact of the changes in French bankruptcy law in the XIXth century focusing on the behaviour of economic agents as users of bankruptcy law for the sake of finding the best solution to their economic problems. Debtors used bankruptcy law in order to minimize their debt level when facing difficulties in servicing it, but they had to convince their creditors and/or the courts of their good faith, and faced the adverse effects of bankruptcy on their reputation and on the smooth functioning of their business. Creditors used bankruptcy law in order to force their debtors to pay, if they could. We use a new and still incomplete database constructed using both the yearly official statistics produced by the judicial system from 1830 on, and individual bankruptcy files from the Paris commercial court (Tribunal de commerce) archives in order to measure actual practices. The first part of the paper presents the evolution of French bankruptcy law during the XIXth century in its historical context. The second part briefly describes the theoretical model we use in order to understand the choices facing debtors and creditors in the face of financial distress. The last part proposes some major stylized facts concerning bankruptcies during that period and tries to understand their relationship with the legal evolution described before.history ; business law ; bankruptcy ; credit ; small and medium businesses ; commercial courts ; financial distress ; private settlement ; France ; 19th century ; code de commerce

Are Russian commercial courts biased? Evidence from a Bankruptcy Law Transplant

We study the nature of judicial bias in bankruptcy proceedings following the enactment of the 1998 bankruptcy law in Russia. The two main findings are as follows. First, regional political characteristics affected judicial decisions about the number and types of bankruptcy proceedings initiated after the law took effect. Controlling for indicators of firms' insolvency and the quality of the regional judiciary, reorganization procedures were significantly more frequent in regions with politically popular governors and governors who had hostile relations with the federal center. Poor judicial quality was also associated with higher incidence of reorganizations. Second, the quality of the regional judiciary affected performance of firms under the reorganization procedure: in regions with low quality judges, firms that were reorganized according to the 1998 law had significantly lower growth in sales, labor productivity, and product variety compared to firms not subject to bankruptcy proceedings. In contrast, in regions with high quality judges, firms in reorganization outperformed firms not in bankruptcy proceedings. This effect of judicial quality on the performance of reorganized firms was stronger when governors were politically popular. These findings are consistent with the view that politically strong governors subverted enforcement of the 1998 bankruptcy law. Journal of Comparative Economics35 (2) (2007) 254-277

KEPAILITAN JABATAN NOTARIS DAN AKIBAT HUKUMNYA TERHADAP AKTA-AKTA NOTARIS YANG DIBUATNYA (STUDI KASUS TERHADAP PUTUSAN PKPU NO. 20/PDT.SUS-PKPU/2020/PN.NIAGA.SBY)

Notary is a public official who has the authority to make authentic deeds and has other powers, the authentic deeds is perfect evidence so as to guarantee certainty, order and legal protection. Normatively a Notary can be bankrupt, however the Law of Notary Office and the Law on Bankruptcy and PKPU have no clearer regulations. Devi Chrisniawati was declared bankrupt after The Surabaya Commercial Court Judge rejected PKPU’s request. Bankruptcy can cause a notary to be dishonorably dischanged from his/her duites and authority. Notary bankrupt according to their respective capacities, whether the Notary is bankrupty because of office or outside office, if the bankruptcy is due to position then the Notary Public Law regulates it even though it is not clear that the regulation is contained in the Law on Notary Office. Notary is bankrupt because of office in excercising authority it is not in accordance with the Law on the Office of Notary, namely violating the privisions of Articles 84. Law so as to cause a loss and if the value of the loss is greater so that all the assets of the Notary are insufficient to pay for it is declared bankrupt. Bankruptcy notary outside office, namely a Notary who has a business and in that business is experiencing bankruptcy and fulfills the provisions of Articles 2 paragraph (1) of the Bankruptcy Law and PKPU to be declared bankrupt. A notary as a debtor who is declared bankrupt will lose his ability to manage the assets. The deed that he has made still an authentic deed, because with the bankruptcy, the Notary does not mean that he has lost his authority as a notary and as long as the deed is not denied its validity

Personal Bankruptcy Law, Wealth and Entrepreneurship: Theory and Evidence from the Introduction of a "Fresh Start"

A personal bankruptcy law that allows for a "fresh start" after bankruptcy reduces the individual risk involved in entrepreneurial activity. On the other hand, as risk shifts to creditors who recover less of their credit after a debtor's bankruptcy, lenders may charge higher interest rates or ration credit supply, which can hamper entrepreneurship. Both aspects of a more forgiving personal bankruptcy law are less relevant for wealthy potential. - entrepreneurs who still risk losing their wealth, but tend not to face higher interest rates because they provide collateral. This paper illustrates these effects in a model and tests the hypotheses derived by exploiting the introduction of a "fresh start" policy in Germany in 1999 as a natural experiment, based on representative household panel data. The results indicate that the insurance effect of a more forgiving personal bankruptcy law exceeds the interest effect and on balance encourages less wealthy individuals to enter into entrepreneurship.Personal bankruptcy law, insolvency, entrepreneurship, fresh start

What Drives the Optimal Bankruptcy Law Design?

The extensive economic research of bankruptcy within the last decade has made many issues connected with bankruptcy legislation much clearer but there is still a large area of disagreement about how an optimal bankruptcy law should look like. At the same time, the actual bankruptcy laws in various countries differ substantially and there is an agreement that there is no one-size-fits-all solution. This paper sets stage for the debate about the optimal bankruptcy law design in the Czech Republic. It shows what problems arise in connection with bankruptcy, what methods can be used to solve them, and what are the trade-offs faced by the use of individual methods. First, the question why bankruptcy legislation is needed at all is answered. Further, three mutually intersecting approaches to the determinants of optimal bankruptcy law design are presented: concepts of ex-post and ex-ante efficiency, principal-agent theory view, and the emphasis on judicial corruption problems within different bankruptcy designs.bankruptcy; capital and ownership structure; ex-ante and ex-post efficiency; asymmetric information; moral hazard; judicial corruption

Personal Bankruptcy Law, Wealth and Entrepreneurship: Theory and Evidence from the Introduction of a "Fresh Start"

A personal bankruptcy law that allows for a "fresh start" after bankruptcy reduces the individual risk involved in entrepreneurial activity. On the other hand, as risk shifts to creditors who recover less of their credit after a debtor's bankruptcy, lenders may charge higher interest rates or ration credit supply, which can hamper entrepreneurship. Both aspects of a more forgiving personal bankruptcy law are less relevant for wealthy potential entrepreneurs who still risk losing their wealth, but tend not to face higher interest rates because they provide collateral. This paper illustrates these effects in a model and tests the hypotheses derived by exploiting the introduction of a "fresh start" policy in Germany in 1999 as a natural experiment, based on representative household panel data. The results indicate that the insurance effect of a more forgiving personal bankruptcy law exceeds the interest effect and on balance encourages less wealthy individuals to enter into entrepreneurship.Personal bankruptcy law, insolvency, entrepreneurship, fresh start

Personal Bankruptcy Law, Wealth and Entrepreneurship: Theory and Evidence from the Introduction of a "Fresh Start"

A personal bankruptcy law that allows for a "fresh start" after bankruptcy reduces the individual risk involved in entrepreneurial activity. On the other hand, as risk shifts to creditors who recover less of their credit after a debtor's bankruptcy, lenders may charge higher interest rates or ration credit supply, which can hamper entrepreneurship. Both aspects of a more forgiving personal bankruptcy law are less relevant for wealthy potential entrepreneurs who still risk losing their wealth, but tend not to face higher interest rates because they provide collateral. This paper illustrates these effects in a model and tests the hypotheses derived by exploiting the introduction of a "fresh start" policy in Germany in 1999 as a natural experiment, based on representative household panel data. The results indicate that the insurance effect of a more forgiving personal bankruptcy law exceeds the interest effect and on balance encourages less wealthy individuals to enter into entrepreneurship.personal bankruptcy law, insolvency, entrepreneurship, fresh start

Insolvency laws around the world - a statistical analysis and rules for their design

Insolvenzrecht, Welt, Konkurs, Bankruptcy law, World, Bankruptcy