Costly Signaling and China's Strategic Engagement in Arctic Regional Governance

In recent years, China has become an increasingly important actor in Arctic regional governance. While Beijing consistently frames its engagement in the region as a strategy of mutually-beneficial cooperation, some Arctic countries have raised significant concerns about its growing economic presence, warning that China may leverage its geopolitical influence to change the existing norms and rules in the polar region. Facing the mounting “China threat” skepticism, what are Beijing's coping strategies to belie concerns? Based on a review of the existing research and government documents, particularly Chinese-language scholarly works and official reports, this article specifically identifies two types of costly signaling approaches employed by China to reduce Arctic countries' distrust. First, China has started to curtail its Arctic investment in oil, gas, and mining while engaging more in sectors that chime well with Western societies' global environmental values, including clean and renewable energy, ecological research that addresses further climatic change associated with global warming, and other environmentally sustainable industries. Second, Beijing has increasingly involved in regional international organizations, such as the Arctic Council, to signal its willingness to exercise state power under institutional constraints. These approaches aim to send a series of costly signals to conventional Arctic states, reassuring them that China is not a revisionist power that pursues hegemony in the region. Taken together, our findings have both scholarly and policymaking implications to understand China's participation in Arctic regional governance

THE STRATEGIC UTILITY OF SOF IN GREAT POWER COMPETITION: A NATO PERSPECTIVE

NATO needs to discuss whether, why, and how Special Operations Forces (SOF) contribute to the “fight” in Great Power Competition. NATO’s security strategy traditionally relies on a deterrence posture with conventional and nuclear capabilities. The new NATO 2022 Strategic Concept validates the necessity to research the question: What is the strategic utility of SOF for NATO in Great Power Competition, and how can this strategic utility be enhanced? This study uses a qualitative methodology. At the core is a comparative analysis of two scenarios in the Black Sea and Arctic regions, both developed through a systematic process and enriched with imagination to contain useful vignettes. The analysis suggests that SOF have strategic utility, albeit in changing manifestations in different phases of the conflict continuum, in Great Power Competition. SOF expands the strategic options available to political and military leaders—expansion of choice—to anticipate and respond, especially in an early stage of a crises below the threshold of armed conflict. SOF also achieve significant results with limited forces—economy of force—when conventional formations are not available or capable. It is not about what SOF can and should do; the heart of the matter is what makes the strategic difference—expansion of choice and economy of force—that defines the future of SOF.Majoor, Royal Netherlands ArmyOberstleutnant, German ArmyApproved for public release. Distribution is unlimited

Russian and Chinese conceptions of deterrence: a comparative study of revisionism and the status-quo

The study of deterrence provides a unique and insightful alternative for the evaluation of state revisionism and status-quo adherence. This thesis provides an innovate method and proof-of-concept for the categorization of state revisionism, through operationalization of state deterrence strategies, using two of the most topical and relevant rising powers as cases: the Russian Federation and People’s Republic of China, during the so-called period of the ‘Rise of the Rest’ and the ‘Return of Geopolitics’. Through the use of data-driven qualitative content analysis, areas of interest are determined; from which key events are identified and evaluated by comparing the empirical results to the theoretical frameworks of deterrence and the long-established definition of revisionism. Through this methodology, this thesis finds that both the Russian Federation and People’s Republic of China are revisionist states, with the Russian Federation being significantly more revisionist than China; due to the differing security environments, historical and territorial context, and deterrence conceptions. By using the study of deterrence as an explanatory framework, this thesis provides a proof-of-concept and model for future research, and is the first holistic study on state revisionism in over 15 years, as well as it is the first comparative measurement-based study of its class.https://www.ester.ee/record=b5242312*es

PERIPHERAL DESIGNS: CHINA’S PURSUIT OF NEAR-ARCTIC STATEHOOD AND THE RE-SHAPING OF GEOPOLITICS IN THE FAR NORTH

A rising China and a changing physical environment is forever altering existing Arctic governance systems. Using China’s emergence as a self-described “Near Arctic” state as a guide, this thesis advances a theory that exclusionary practices by states and international organizations towards emerging actors in regions experiencing rapid globalization results in the unintended construction of peripheral influence systems led by the excluded. This concept is summarized as exclusion-peripheralization. In the process of highlighting the spectrum of China’s developing Arctic ascendancy, several sub-themes inherent to contemporary Arctic geopolitics are also examined. 1) How science or knowledge-based ‘territory’ supplants traditional concepts of territorial-based legitimacy in international governance systems like the Arctic Council. 2) The role political anthropology plays as both contextual foundation and strategic tool in the interactions between established and emerging states. 3) The cyclic process whereby a ‘new’ region become increasingly international, how globalization in turn acts upon that space, and how state policy creation systems are themselves altered. Each of these factor into an enduring Arctic motif as a region of complex and oft-conflicting interests, specifically of exploitation versus sustainability and competition versus cooperation. Exclusion- peripheralization theory and these sub-themes are approached via the presentation of case studies on Sino-Nordic, Inuit, and Russian collaboration, in addition to commentary on the larger strategic backdrop, including United States policy and the influence of transnational knowledge networks. This thesis concludes China’s Arctic activities, exemplified by its investment in polar science, infrastructure and trade development agreements with individual Arctic states, as well as other forms of norm-construction, are designed to establish a lasting, albeit non-territorial Chinese Arctic presence. This work concludes with policy recommendations, including commentary on the potential establishment of a new international Arctic governance regime, loosely modeled after the Antarctic Treaty; the use of political anthropology to enhance Arctic diplomatic engagement strategies; and from a U.S. perspective, the use of exclusion- peripheralization to maintain advantage in an evolving Arctic geopolitical environment. Advisor — Dorothea Wolfson, Ph.D. Thesis Readers — Chad Briggs, Ph.D. and Christina Lai, Ph.D

Revisiting Regionalism and the Contemporary World Order

The book critically analyzes the ongoing changes in the regional, intra-regional, and global dynamics of cooperation, from a multi-disciplinary and pluralist perspective. It is based on the insight that in a post-hegemonic world the formation of regions and the process of globalization can be largely disconnected from the orbit of the US, and that a plurality of power and worldviews has replaced US hegemony. In spite of these changes, most existing analyses of current changes in the world order still rely upon Western-centered approaches, and Westphalian thinking. Against this backdrop, the book proposes to advance a truly global IR understanding of the post-hegemonic world, and weaves together the pluralist and multi-disciplinary perspectives of scholars located all around the world

Revisiting Regionalism and the Contemporary World Order

The book critically analyzes the ongoing changes in the regional, intra-regional, and global dynamics of cooperation, from a multi-disciplinary and pluralist perspective. It is based on the insight that in a post-hegemonic world the formation of regions and the process of globalization can be largely disconnected from the orbit of the US, and that a plurality of power and worldviews has replaced US hegemony. In spite of these changes, most existing analyses of current changes in the world order still rely upon Western-centered approaches, and Westphalian thinking. Against this backdrop, the book proposes to advance a truly global IR understanding of the post-hegemonic world, and weaves together the pluralist and multi-disciplinary perspectives of scholars located all around the world

Mershon Center for International Security Studies Annual Report 2012-2013

The University Archives has determined that this item is of continuing value to OSU's history.RESEARCH: Highlights ; Research on Use of Force and Diplomacy ; Research on Ideas, Identities, and Decisional Processes ; Research on Institutions That Manage Violent Conflict ; Graduate Student Projects -- STUDENTS: Ralph D. Mershon Study Abroad Scholarship -- FACULTY PUBLICATIONS AND HONORS: Books ; Articles, Essays, and Book Chapters ; Honors, Awards, and Service -- EVENTS: Conferences ; Calendar of Events ; Oversight Committe

Russian capacity to develop its offshore hydrocarbon resources in the Kara Sea: Arctic and global implications

Thesis (Ph.D.) University of Alaska Fairbanks, 2016Increasing seasonal ice free Arctic waters and market demand to expand hydrocarbon extraction to previously undeveloped offshore regions has accelerated an Arctic priority in national strategies and international forums. It is proposed that geo-strategically, the sheer size of the Kara Sea hydrocarbon fields is of a predictive magnitude great enough to impact the progression or regression of the Russian economy; and thereby have a predictive value on the capacity for Russian unilateral foreign policy decisions. Rosneft has released figures of a potential 30 to 40 billion barrels of recoverable undiscovered oil reserves in the South Kara Sea basin and significantly more in the more remote northern waters, representing the largest unexploited hydrocarbon potential remaining for the Russian Federation. There are also undercurrents of skepticism that the Russians may not achieve offshore production at the pace and or scale they envision. Though the direct economic contributions to the global economy of exploitation of Kara Sea hydrocarbons is likely not a game changer, the technological sophistication it will require and the level of cooperation and integration needed between the most advanced Western corporate techniques and Russian partners, could well be for Russian central state stability. In this context, hydrocarbon development in the Kara Sea region lends itself to interdisciplinary study as a means to assess Russia's relative strategic stability. The research incorporated two primary tools to assess the drivers impacting successful Russian hydrocarbon development of its Kara Sea resources. The first was a survey-interview of experts and the second was the creation of scenario narratives (assisted by a workshop of Arctic experts and stakeholders). The four scenarios were designed to explore the complexity of the interplay of the drivers of hydrocarbon development in the Kara Sea, with the objective, of identifying plausible future decision points for planners and policy makers.7.2.2 Kara Industrial Security Region (KISR)Chapter 1 Introduction -- 1.0 Current context of hydrocarbon development in the Kara Sea -- 1.1 Significance of the study -- 1.2 Statement of the problem and purpose -- 1.3 Research questions -- 1.4 Tools, methods and research structure -- 1.5 Limitations, delimitations, assumptions and worldview -- Chapter 2 General context -- 2.0 Overview -- 2.1 Centrality of hydrocarbons to Russian strategic stability -- 2.1.1 Russian dependency on extractive export earnings -- 2.1.2 Russia's Arctic strategy and energy production -- 2.1.3 The Kara Sea: strategic maritime region for the Russian Federation -- 2.2 Context of Kara Sea hydrocarbons -- 2.2.1 Specifics of Kara Sea Rosneft-ExxonMobil JV -- 2.2.2 Major projects in the Kara Sea region and their inter-relationship -- 2.2.3 Timelines and their impact: exploration to production -- 2.2.4 The Northern Sea Route -- 2.2.5 Yamal and the Sabetta Port Project -- 2.2.6 Maritime character of the Kara Sea -- 2.2.6.1 Impact of climate change -- 2.2.7 Regional social impacts on hydrocarbon development -- 2.2.8 Character of governance -- 2.2.9 Environmental standards in Russia -- Chapter 3 Global influences on Russian hydrocarbon development -- 3.0 Overview -- 3.1 Russia and the oil and gas industry -- 3.1.1 Historical precedent: the fall of the Soviet Union -- 3.1.2 Confusion, privatization and reassertion of control -- 3.1.3 Energy as a geopolitical weapon? -- 3.2 Current and future global demand -- 3.2.1 Price of hydrocarbons and relation to demand -- 3.2.2 Difference in oil and gas markets -- 3.2.2.1 Impact of non-traditional recovery -- 3.2.3 Transportation costs -- 3.2.4 Regulatory environment for IOCs in Russia -- 3.2.5 Corporate social responsibility -- 3.2.5.1. If disaster strikes -- 3.3 Arctic strategies -- 3.3.1 Russian Arctic strategy: cooperative security or strategic zero sum game? -- 3.3.1.1 Russian strategy and international cooperation -- 3.3.1.1.1 Russian cooperation in the Arctic -- 3.3.1.2 Russian concepts of security in their Arctic strategy -- 3.3.2 US Arctic strategy -- 3.3.3 Norwegian Arctic strategy -- 3.3.3.1 Effectiveness and limits to region building -- 3.4 Sanctions and direct policy action -- Chapter 4 Methods, tools and research component -- 4.0 Overview -- 4.1 Qualitative methods -- 4.2 Complexity -- 4.3 Scenarios method -- 4.3.1 Origin of the scenario method -- 4.3.2 Quantitative and mixed method scenarios -- 4.4 Other tools used: survey-interviews and workshops -- 4.4.1 Survey-interview -- 4.4.2 Workshop -- Chapter 5 Expert survey-interview project -- 5.0 Overview -- 5.1 Survey-interview method and design -- 5.2 Survey-interview results -- 5.2.1 Self-characterization by participants -- 5.2.1.1 Highlights of self-identified expertise -- 5.2.2 Substantive questions -- 5.2.2.1 Tabulated results and (substantive questions 5-15) -- 5.3 Consolidated observations - key findings -- 5.4 Conclusions from survey-interview -- Chapter 6 Circumpolar offshore Arctic hydrocarbon scenario development -- 6.1 Scenario workshop -- 6.2 Workshop results -- 6.3 Workshop conclusion and refinement of drivers -- 6.3.1 Wildcards -- 6.3.2 Framing and defining linear endpoints -- 6.3.3 Matrix development: assessing the critical uncertainties -- 6.3.4 Framing of narrative quadrants -- Chapter 7 Scenario narratives -- 7.1 Scenarios: alternative futures for hydrocarbon development in the Kara Sea -- 7.2 Future for Kara Sea offshore hydrocarbon extraction -- 7.2.1 Western Arctic Maritime Union (WAMU) -- 7.2.3 Special Export Zone Kara (SEZK) -- 7.2.4 Arctic Shelf Ecological Park (ASEP) -- 7.3 Findings of narrative exercise -- Chapter 8 Conclusions -- 8.0 Overview -- 8.1 Outcomes -- 8.1.1 The global crude oil market is a highly significant driver -- 8.1.2 Impact of punitive sanctions -- 8.1.3 Will IOCs return? Are they necessary for Russian strategic objectives? -- 8.1.4 Significance of Kara Sea success on Russia's capacity as a state -- 8.1.5 Circumpolar impacts: environmental sound development? -- 8.1.6 Arctic and strategic policy implications -- 8.2 Final assessment -- References -- Appendices