Modernization of the pension system in Ukraine

Master of Science in Business - Public Sector Finance 201

Social preferences: fundamental characteristics and economic consequences

We review the vast literature on social preferences by assessing what is known about their fundamental properties, their distribution in the broader population, and their consequences for important economic and political behaviors. We provide, in particular, an overview of the empirically identified characteristics of distributional preferences and how they are affected by merit, luck, and risk considerations as well as by concerns for equality of opportunity. In addition, we identify what is known about belief-dependent social preferences such as reciprocity and guilt aversion. The evidence indicates that the big majority of individuals have some sort of social preference while purely self-interested subjects are a minority. Our review also shows how the findings from laboratory experiments involving social preferences provide a deeper understanding of important field phenomena such as the consequences of wage inequality on work morale, employees’ resistance to wage cuts, individuals’ self-selection into occupations and sectors that are more or less prone to morally problematic behaviors, as well as issues of distributive politics. However, although a lot has been learned in recent decades about social preferences, there are still many important, unresolved, yet exciting, questions waiting to be tackled

Social preferences: fundamental characteristics and economic consequences

We review the vast literature on social preferences by assessing what is known about their fundamental properties, their distribution in the broader population, and their consequences for important economic and political behaviors. We provide, in particular, an overview of the empirically identified characteristics of distributional preferences and how they are affected by merit, luck, and risk considerations as well as by concerns for equality of opportunity. In addition, we identify what is known about belief-dependent social preferences such as reciprocity and guilt aversion. The evidence indicates that the big majority of individuals have some sort of social preference while purely self-interested subjects are a minority. Our review also shows how the findings from laboratory experiments involving social preferences provide a deeper understanding of important field phenomena such as the consequences of wage inequality on work morale, employees’ resistance to wage cuts, individuals’ self-selection into occupations and sectors that are more or less prone to morally problematic behaviors, as well as issues of distributive politics. However, although a lot has been learned in recent decades about social preferences, there are still many important, unresolved, yet exciting, questions waiting to be tackled

Measuring cooperation and other risks : Experimental evidence on individual differences

This master's thesis examines how the degree of risk influences the cooperative behavior of individuals to understand how cooperation can be better organized. Explicitly, the individual risk preference as compared to the risk level of the environment in which individuals make their decisions. The effect of a social frame on the classical representation of economic games is investigated experimentally. In general, the understanding and identification of critical success factors enable to indicate the cooperation behavior of individuals, but organizations also benefit from the indicated components that require cooperation. Cooperation’s are associated with a high level of risk and pressure. Therefore, it is necessary to carefully study the environmental conditions to get the best result. The aim of this study is to characterize the optimal conditions for the evolution of cooperation and its critical success factors to ensure the success of cooperation and to guarantee operational excellence of the entire process. This master's thesis is based on an experimental study that collects facts and evidence from different perspectives. This experimental study helps to understand the motives behind cooperation in the Stag-hunt games by comparing different economic gams and two risk preferences elicitation methods with those Stag-hunt games of this study. The Trust game, Ultimatum game, Dictator game, as well as the Holt and Laury price list and the Bomb risk elicitation task, are compared to the Stag-hunt games. Payoffs are manipulated in a two-player one-shot Stag-hunt game. The Payoffs explain the degree of cooperation by combining three motives: Baseline, more efficient, and less risk. In addition, the social framing effect is investigated as a treatment in the experiment. This is implemented as a joint venture scenario. This study helps organizations to better understand how to develop strategies that protect against failure of cooperation. Decision-makers can use the results of this research to carry out cooperation’s from planning, through implementation, to a successful conclusion. On the one hand, payoff dominance and risk dominance are not significant. However, in the game less risk there is a positive influence on the likelihood of cooperation. On the other hand, the treatment business setting is strongly significant which means that cooperation occurs more often in the joint venture scenario than in the classical representation of the economic games. It positively influences cooperation behavior. This appears to be why previous attempts to explain Stag-hunt games' decisions only with risk attitudes have not been successful. In this study, trust does not significantly influence. However, it could be demonstrated that it is a basic requirement for cooperation

Fairness perceptions and institutions : a general cyclic scheme

Orientador: David Dequech FilhoTese (doutorado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de EconomiaResumo: O objetivo da tese é construir um modelo teórico que dê conta de sintetizar e relacionar os conceitos da teoria e as evidências experimentais relativas às três dimensões de fairness (distributiva, procedimental e interacional) que foram expostas dentro da literatura, mas que, até o momento, permanecem como contribuições esparsas e desconexas. Particularmente, o modelo ¿ Esquema Cíclico Geral ¿ é construído sobre os pressupostos ontológicos e epistemológicos tributários de uma teoria econômica evolucionária naturalista, procurando incorporar tanto o comportamento quanto os processos mentais cognitivos e afetivos dos indivíduos em sua estrutura, defendendo que os agentes possuem uma racionalidade ecológica. A partir dessas estruturas mentais, os estímulos do ambiente e as informações advindas das instituições de justiça são processados e resultam em três fatores que influenciam na formação das percepções de justiça dos indivíduos: as preferências sociais, as expectativas e as emoções. O comportamento resultante da combinação desses fatores, então, comunica ao meio externo as percepções de fairness do agente, seja através de um modo mais deliberacional ou heurístico. O resultado desse comportamento, por sua vez, pode reproduzir ou contradizer as convenções e normas de justiça vigentes, gerando um novo estímulo no ambiente e dando origem a um novo ciclo. Ressalta-se que, para além da apresentação de um modelo teórico, o trabalho intenta aliviar possíveis tensões existentes entre algumas vertentes da teoria econômica (economia evolucionária, economia institucional e economia comportamental/experimental), mostrando que suas contribuições específicas podem se complementar. Por fim, a tese também apresenta uma contribuição metodológica ao evidenciar a importância de uma abordagem de caráter interdisciplinar, fazendo uso não apenas das teorias e evidências das ciências econômicas e sociais, mas também do amplo espectro das ciências cognitivas, com destaque para a psicologia social cognitivaAbstract: The aim of the thesis is to construct a theoretical model that will synthesize and relate the concepts and experimental evidences related to the three dimensions of fairness (distributive, procedural and interactional) that have been exposed within the literature but which, to date, remain as sparse and disconnected contributions. Particularly, the model - General Cyclic Scheme - is built on the ontological and epistemological assumptions of a naturalistic evolutionary economic theory, seeking to incorporate in its structure both the behavior and the cognitive and affective mental processes of the individuals, arguing that agents have an ecological rationality. Environmental stimuli and also the informations that come from fairness institutions are processed by the mental structures, resulting in three factors that influence the formation of individuals' fairness perceptions: social preferences, expectations, and emotions. The behavior resulting from the combination of these factors communicates to the external environment the perceptions of fairness, either through a more deliberate or heuristic mode. The outcome of this behavior, in turn, can reproduce or contradict the conventions and norms of fairness in force, generating a new stimulus in the environment and giving rise to a new cycle. In addition to presenting a theoretical model, the paper attempts to alleviate possible tensions between some strands of economic theory (evolutionary economics, institutional economics, and behavioral / experimental economics), showing that its specific contributions may complement each other. Finally, the thesis also presents a methodological contribution by highlighting the importance of an interdisciplinary approach, making use not only of theories and evidences of economic and social sciences, but also of the broad spectrum of cognitive sciences, especially cognitive social psychologyDoutoradoTeoria EconomicaDoutor em Ciências Econômicas1560527CAPE

Startup dilemmas - Strategic problems of early-stage platforms on the internet

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