The future of jihad: what next for ISIL and al-Qaeda?

This report examines what the rise of ISIL means for al-Qaeda and how will it react. Overview ISIL is a real threat and must be targeted, but al-Qaeda shouldn’t be forgotten. Indeed, al-Qaeda should remain a key focus for international counterterrorism efforts. It’s a resilient and resolute terrorist organisation, but it’s also weaker than it’s been for many years. We should use this brief opportunity to dismantle the organisation completely. The report examines what the rise of ISIL means for al-Qaeda and how will it react. How will al-Qaeda seek to regain the oxygen of publicity that’s central to terrorist organisations if they’re to recruit, grow and, ultimately, challenge their enemies? Does the rise of ISIL signal the end of al-Qaeda or might al-Qaeda merge with ISIL, confront it head on or take some other course of action? The authors explore four alternative futures for al-Qaeda and ISIL and conclude that a worrying scenario of ‘one-upmanship’ is likely to take place between the two organisations in which al-Qaeda pursues a campaign of international attacks in order to regain the limelight

Al-Qaeda in Gaza: isolating “the base”

In 1996, Osama bin Laden declared jihad against the American forces occupying Saudi Arabia, calling for Muslims to expel the infidels from the “land of the two holy places.” The first sacred ground mentioned in this statement, however, was not Saudi Arabia but Palestine. His words seething with hatred, bin Laden scorned the Arab regimes for failing to recapture Jerusalem and described the situation as a festering wound upon the Islamic umma.[1] Fourteen years later, even after orchestrating devastating attacks in three Western capitals, Bin Laden’s al-Qaeda is still unable to do much against Israel besides issuing scathing diatribes. Its most vigorous efforts to establish itself in the Palestinian arena have been in the Gaza Strip. Here, however, al-Qaeda-linked groups are stymied by a perhaps surprising adversary: Hamas. But despite Hamas’s efforts to suppress them, Salafi-jihadi groups maintain an underground presence. Even if al-Qaeda affiliates remain weak operationally in comparison to Hamas, al-Qaeda’s ideology of global jihad seems to be on the rise in Gaza. Meanwhile, the al-Qaeda leadership is relentless in pursuing new and ingenious ways for its agents to penetrate the Strip. A Hamas weakened by a tightened blockade or another war with Israel would leave an opening for Salafi-jihadi militants. The prospect of these al-Qaeda-linked factions upsetting a fragile peace needs to be considered among the many other factors relevant to engagement with Hamas.Publisher PD

Upaya Transnasionalisasi Pergerakan Al Qaeda Pasca-11 September 2001

This study reveals the reason Al Qaeda can survive and develop global terrorism trend in the post-2001 period. Through the analysis of various Al Qaeda’s document, the answers obtained. First, Al Qaeda change its ideology from old ideology to new ideology. The old Al Qaeda's ideology limited to discuss about militarism issue and how to expelled U.S. military from the Middle East. While in the new idelogy, Al-Qaeda attempt to attract popular support from the muslim widely. Al Qaeda raise globalization issues that associated with U.S. global imperialism. Second, Al Qaeda use of the means of thriving in globalization. Al Qaeda applying the concept of All-Channel network and utilize information technology for the benefit of the movement. With that combination, al Qaeda succeeded in developing a global movement trend Keywords: globalization, contemporary global issues, popular support, global movements, networks, information technology. Tulisan ini mengungkapkan alasan Al Qaeda dapat bertahan dan mengembangkan trend terorisme global pasca-11 September 2001. Melalui analisis dari berbagai dokumen Al Qaeda, didapat jawaban. Pertama, Al Qaeda mengubah ideologinya dari ideologi lama menjadi ideologi baru. Ideologi lama Al Qaeda terbatas membahas ideologi militeristik dengan wacana sebatas mengusir militer AS dari Timur Tengah. Sedangkan pasca-11 September 2001, Al Qaeda berupaya menarik dukungan populer muslim secara luas dengan mulai memunculkan isu-isu globalisasi yang dikaitkan dengan imperialisme global AS. Kedua, Al Qaeda memanfaatkan sarana-sarana yang berkembang dalam globalisasi. Al Qaeda mengaplikasikan konsep All-Channel Network dan memanfaatkan teknologi-informasi untuk kepentingan pergerakan. Dengan kombinasi tersebut, Al Qaeda berhasil mengembangkan trend pergerakan global. Kata-kata kunci: globalisasi, isu global kontemporer, popular support, pergerakan global, network, teknologi informasi

Al-Qaeda in East Africa and the Horn

Al-Qaeda has had greater success in East Africa and the Horn than any other part of sub-Sahara Africa. Relative proximity to the Middle East and a series of local factors account for this situation. Al-Qaeda carried out the bombings of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 and bombed an Israeli-owned hotel in Kenya north of Mombasa in 2002. Local and international authorities foiled a number of other al-Qaeda plots in the region. Osama bin Laden had his headquarters in Sudan from late 1991 until Sudan forced him to leave in mid-1996. Subsequent al-Qaeda efforts, which were already well advanced in Kenya and Somalia, tended to emanate from those two countries. But while acknowledging there is a real al-Qaeda problem in the region, there is a tendency by the US, a few countries in the region, and al-Qaeda itself to exaggerate its impact and influence. This only plays into the hands of al-Qaeda and focuses scarce US resources primarily on the short-term goal of tracking down al-Qaeda while reducing attention and resources for dealing with the long-term reasons why al-Qaeda has been able to function in the region. Eliminating al-Qaeda is important but it will not be accomplished solely by military action against suspected al-Qaeda operatives. It is time to confront this as a long-term challenge that addresses more effectively its root causes

The new frontiers of Islamist extremism: understanding the threat that al-Qaeda affiliates pose to African security

This paper examines three violent Islamist groups in Africa - Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), al-Shabaab and Boko Haram - and the way they’ve evolved, especially in the linkages between them and al-Qaeda’s ideology and tactics. Overview Over the past decade various groups that had been operating with a predominantly nationalistic agenda have increasingly become aligned with al-Qaeda in name, ideology, methodologies of attack and tactics. A new jihadism is spreading across Africa. This paper examines three groups—Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), al-Shabaab and Boko Haram. All of these groups are separate from the al-Qaeda core. They haven’t taken up the al-Qaeda model because they’ve been told to, but they’re emulating it. They’re all looking to become dispersed, decentralised movements that frame local grievances in the language of the global jihad. For the international community, the danger lies not so much in the immediate threat to Western targets from African Islamists, but in the potential future creation of a failed state that would provide a base for training and radicalising large numbers of Islamists. The proven capacity of AQIM, Boko Haram and al-Shabaab to train and share fighting and bombmaking skills with new recruits, and then deliver those recruits into intensive front-line fighting roles in areas such as Syria and Iraq, will be the groups’ most immediate international impact. There are no clear solutions for African states combating the Islamist groups but any solution will necessarily be complex. Unfortunately, if the situation’s allowed to continue, there is danger that we’ll see a rise in instability in the regions where the groups operate, and in their growth and ambition

Al Qaeda and Jihadist Terrorism in the Light of Contest Theory, Empirical Evidence for the period 2004-2008

This paper finds an empirical evidence that al Qaeda behaves as a contest organizer rewarding a prize to candidate extremist groups. Would-be terrorists must then compete with each other to prove their commitment and ability. Hence to maximize their own probability of winning the prize, each group (maximizes its effort). In particular, in the presence of costless information each candidate group can observe the results of attacks of other groups. Therefore, each group tries to make attacks at least equally destructive as the foregoing attacks. The testable implication is that: the number of victims of terrorist attacks is associated with the number of victims of past attacks. Resulting evidence confirms the hypothesis. However, results show that al Qaeda-style jihadist terrorist activity depends also upon grievance for poverty and socio-economic conditions.Terrorism, al Qaeda, Contest Theory, Self-Starters, Tournament, Information.

The Franchising Effect on the Al-Qaeda Enterprise and Related Transnational Terror Groups: Patterns of Evolution of Al-Qaeda Affiliates in the 21st Century

The attacks of September 11, 2001 by Al-Qaeda-sponsored militants represented a high- water mark for the terrorist organization in its self-styled journey to become the inspirational Islamic vanguard for disenchanted Muslims across the globe. In the years that followed these attacks, the Al-Qaeda enterprise underwent a constant rate of evolution and mutation, resulting in a phenomenon of parallel and like-minded Islamist groups pledging allegiance to Usama bin Laden and his ideological vision of a global jihad. Instead of strengthening the overall organization, this expansion diluted the command and control of Al-Qaeda senior leaders in their ability to shape the overall movement it once led, as well as displaced the locus of power for the larger movement among various powerbrokers with unpredictable agendas and worldviews. Instead, the affiliation and franchising of parallel groups proved to result in only temporary changes in organizational behavior of these affiliates, as the domestic social, political, and economic forces present in these regions and nation-states had much more effect on Al-Qaeda affiliates and their members than the traditional Al-Qaeda agenda. This dissertation is innovative in comparing Al-Qaeda Central in 2001 to its corollary manifestations as Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), and Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) across four variables of study and across time. The findings of this study help to explain the evolution of Al-Qaeda as the most capable and feared terrorist organization that it occupied at the beginning of the decade into a vague conglomerate of affiliates and sub-groups fifteen years later. The short term gains offered by affiliation for parallel movements under the AQ brand were exploited by these affiliates for their own particular interests, but ultimately discarded for domestic welfare of the affiliates themselves, even running counter to the transnational agenda of Bin Laden’s Al-Qaeda. Breaking new ground, this research attempts to understand the evolution of the organization through the affiliation of parallel movements, what effect this affiliation has, and to identify signposts and patterns that can be overlaid on future manifestations of the global Islamic jihadist movement, either under Al-Qaeda leadership or some other organization

¿Estamos esperando tus órdenes?: el tibio compromiso global de al-Qaeda en el Magreb Islámico

Este ARI estudia la coherencia de la alianza entre los grupos terroristas Grupo Salafista para la Predicación y el Combate (GSPC)/al-Qaeda en las Tierras del Magreb Islámico (AQIM) y al-Qaeda. En este estudio se lleva a cabo un análisis de contenido de la propaganda elaborada por la organización terrorista Grupo Salafista para la Predicación y el Combate (GSPC)/al-Qaeda en el Magreb Islámico (AQIM) desde 1998 hasta 2009, con el objetivo de evaluar las repercusiones que ha tenido en su discurso la adhesión a al-Qaeda. Se mantiene la tesis de que su integración en la jerarquía de al-Qaeda ha ejercido una escasa influencia en sus objetivos y planteamientos estratégicos

Conceptualizing al-Qaeda and US Grand Strategy

The US debate about the nature of al-Qaeda and the associated threat does not occur in a political or ideological vacuum. In fact, given its on-going political salience, questions such as what al-Qaeda is, how it can be conceptualized and defeated provide a large number of access points for those trying to shape broader US policies and underlying discourses. In the context of Middle East politics, for example, the perception of an on-going terrorist threat allowed some to argue for US policies that take into account Palestinian demands, whilst others stressed the need to uphold a close relationship with the Israeli government and to vigorously pursue the ‘national interest’.1 More recently, the answer to the question of whether al-Qaeda can still be thought of as having a coherent core or whether it simply serves as a brand for essentially local, bottom-up radicalization processes has direct implications for the question of whether the US-led military presence in Afghanistan and the aggressive pursuit of the Taliban should be at the heart of US counterterrorism efforts. Ultimately, the US debate about al-Qaeda is inextricably linked to specific ontologies of international politics and long-held convictions about the global role which the United States should and can play. That is why the present analysis follows in the footsteps of those who have called for closer attention to be paid to individual perceptions and convictions as the intervening variable between international incentives and policy outcomes