Strategic Rivalries and Civil Conflicts: Analyzing US and Russian Strategies in the MENA Region\u27s Civil Wars

Abstract

This dissertation examines the often-overlooked motive of strategic denial in major-power interventions in civil wars. It shows that states act not only to advance their own interests but also to prevent rivals from increasing theirs. While traditional realist explanations focus on the pursuit of national interests, whether expanding, consolidating, or maintaining regional influence, my core argument is that preventing an adversary from gaining a foothold or expanding their power can be a key reason for foreign involvement. With reference to realist theories, especially defensive realism, and with insights from liberal humanitarian perspectives, this dissertation demonstrates that major powers are likely to prioritize denying their rivals\u27 interests over simply expanding their own influence. Through a qualitative research design that integrates case studies and historical analysis, this dissertation explores U.S. and Russian interventions in three conflicts in the Middle East and North Africa: Syria, Libya, and Yemen. Each case represents a different level of strategic importance, from high to low. The findings reveal that the scale and type of intervention, whether it involves direct military action, support through proxies, or limited diplomatic moves, correlate with how critical each conflict is perceived to be. When their interests in a conflict are high, states tend to act more direct and forceful; when they are lower, their involvement is generally more measured. By exploring the idea of strategic denial and connecting it to different levels of interest, this dissertation offers new theoretical perspectives on foreign intervention. It also provides practical guidance for understanding and predicting how major powers might act in future conflicts around the world