Using Nuclear Forces to Reconcile Status Deficits in China and Russia: Status and Identity Perception as Motivating Drivers of Change

Abstract

Status is a cognitive perception demonstrated by social interactions, self-identity reciprocity from key-comparison others, and voluntary deference. This research offers a novel theory arguing that when a nuclear weapon state suffers a status deficit, it will often adjust its nuclear force structure to reconcile the difference between the status it has and the status it desires. The two primary categories of nuclear force structures are changing and maintaining and there are three subcategories of the changing category: emergent proliferation, diversification, and reduction. Understanding China’s emergent proliferation and Russia’s diversification is possible through a systemic, holistic analysis of the following indicators of a status deficit: demonstrated understanding of an existing hierarchy, dissatisfaction with one’s own ranking in the hierarchy, dissatisfaction with the actions of a higher-ranked actor (recognized by the dissatisfied party), and a clear outline or path about how the dissatisfied actor intends to change either their ranking within their status group or change the actual hierarchy itself. Xi’s and Putin’s messaging to domestic and international audiences and their specific changes in nuclear force structure exposes the psychological relationship between nuclear forces, social mobility strategies, and status. Both are pursuing nuclear force structures for the purpose of achieving deference in the international system commensurate with their own self-perception. The intersection between nuclear forces and status shows how leaders of nuclear weapons states who perceive a status deficit use nuclear forces to generate cognitive status perceptions and status and identity reciprocity from others