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Authority and Inclusion: Reconsidering Integration in a Fragmented Age

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Abstract

This paper explores the meaning of refugee integration in a fragmented age where multi-culturalism is said to be dead. It focuses on the results of recent research in four cities in South and East Africa, which showed an increasing tendency towards new forms of association that the author termed “communities of convenience”. The author reflects upon the lessons that these highly mobile African urban contexts offer for refugee integration in Britain.

Key words: *Integration, Multi-culturalism, Authority, Inclusion, Immigrants.*

The Promise and Premise of Integration

Governments across Europe and North America have been ringing the multiculturalism’s death knell.¹ Although often criticised by progressives as anti-feminist, homophobic and culturally essentialist, multi-culturalism’s end at the hands of right-leaning governments has proved disorienting. If not multiculturalism, then what? While politicians have begun lighting fires beneath giant melting pots, will Somalis, Turks, and Poles soon be hunting foxes, drinking tea and tuning into test cricket? This vision may satisfy conservative fantasies, but are unlikely to be realised at a corner shop or community near you. More accurately and more importantly, they are unlikely to be realised in the communities where newly arrived refugees and immigrants find themselves. As Snel, *et al*, rightly note, “the old concept... that immigrants settle permanently and assimilate in the host country, has lost significance.”² Ultimately, it will be empirics, not ethics that confound the assimilationist agenda.

¹ See, for example, David Cameron’s Speech to the Munich Security Conference on 5 February 2011. (<http://www.number10.gov.uk/news/pms-speech-at-munich-security-conference/>); P.J. Buchanan. 2010, ‘The End of Multiculturalism,’ *The American Conservative* (18 October) <http://www.theamericanconservative.com/blog/2010/10/18/the-end-of-multiculturalism/>. L. Harrison. 2008, ‘The End of Multiculturalism: The US Must Be A Melting Pot – Not a Salad Bowl.’ *Christian Science Monitor Online* (February 26); R. Munck, R. 2008. ‘Review Essay: Multiculturalism and the Integration Agenda. ‘Translocations: *The Irish Migration, Race and Social Transformation Review*. Vol. 3(1):164-168.

² E. Snel, G. Engebensen and A. Leerkes. 2006. ‘Transnational Involvement and Social Integration,’ *Global Networks*. Vol. 6(3): 285.

For new immigrants, the world they occupy is often not one of structured by state social policy or dominant cultural norms. In countries' emerging immigrant gateways, transience and transgressions, of values as much as people, have become the norm. What will emerge are communities of convenience – some cosmopolitan, some conflictual – driven more by pragmatic responses to the quotidian challenges of particular sites and times than a grand imagination of an integrated society.³ Amid the fluidity and fragmentation of these new gateways, novel modes of accommodation are emerging, double helix like, with ever evolving forms of exclusion. These more or less inclusive forms of co-existence, co-habitation or conviviality—choose your term, just not integration—will less likely reflect the goals of government policies and initiatives than local demography and social dynamics. Only by purging our gaze of our own normative objectives whether assimilationist fantasy or cosmopolitan utopianism,⁴ can we begin to understand these interactions, the conditions producing them, and their potential consequences for our societies and our politics. That is what this paper tries to do.

Using examples drawn from across newly urbanising African cities—what I term 'urban estuaries'—this paper is intended to help us to help reveal cracks in the ethical foundations on which integration debates are normally premised. The first is a clear distinction between who is a host and who is a guest. The metaphors of hospitality, welcome, and asylum are founded on this dichotomy as is the philosophy of Derrida, Kant, Taylor and others. The second is migrants' desire to be part of a place bound community. If perhaps that is too strong, then the desire and willingness to be fully part of one rooted on their place of current residence be it city or a state. Doing so draws our attention to the importance of the spatial and temporal dimensions in which in which 'integration' occurs.⁵ Much as must reconsider our language of migrants and hosts, so too must we rethink our reliance on a language of national integration. Instead we must pan more widely and focus more locally to reveal both forms of multi-sited belonging and the complex dynamics and engagements of specific sites where people negotiate multiple, and often conflicting histories and social

³ I wish to thank Laavanya Kathiravelu for introducing me to the idea of 'communities of convenience', a notion that captures the pragmatic and evolving nature of loyalty and belonging in our fragmented era.

⁴ This responds to calls by Z. Skrbis, G. Kendall and I. Woodward. 2004. 'Locating Cosmopolitanism: Between Humanist Ideal and Grounded Social Category,' *Theory, Culture and Society* 21(6): 132; also U. Beck. 2009. 'Imagined Communities of Global Risk,' *Lecture for the Risk Conference in Shanghai*. First Draft: Uncorrected Version, 2.

⁵ Such an approach is called for in M. Dikec, N. Clark and C Barnett. 2009. 'Extending Hospitality: Giving Space, Taking Time,' *Paragraph*. Vol. 32(1):1-14.

positions.⁶ What we see there is confusing and often corresponds poorly with our normative principles however conservative or cosmopolitan they may be. I hope the following discussion provides an empirical basis that can allow our philosophy to begin catching up with global dynamics.⁷

The rest of the paper proceeds through a short discussion of my research methods, approach and the data I employ/ It then moves on to a phenomenon I term the ‘urban estuary’: cities, or parts thereof, where the varied migrant trajectories intersect to generate novel forms of social interaction and authority. I then return to the themes outlined above: the distinction between host and migrant, the desirability and possibility of space-bound integration, and the mechanisms through which integration is achieved. Having largely jettisoned the metric of classical ‘integration’, the article concludes by suggesting a variety of other practiced modes of accommodation: markets, tactical cosmopolitanism, and odd forms of ethnic consociationalism. The final paragraphs speculate on what this may mean for Britain and other once ‘mono-cultural’ societies.

Data, Methods and Approach

For a paper beginning with reference to state-sponsored multiculturalism in Europe, it may seem peculiar that the spaces and people described here largely include residents of Africa’s rapidly urbanising cities. The analogy between European immigration and patterns of African mobility is admittedly imperfect, but not without merit. For one, although this paper is empirically driven, it intended largely as a conceptual exercise: a means of inductively challenging presumptions about the meaning and mechanisms of integration as they are widely understood. In that sense we have much to learn from Africa’s urban estuaries where the nature of human mobility and intergroup engagement is creating a ‘moment’ when new forms of social organization and ethico-legal orders are being forged. This is not the realization of any individual or group’s grand imagination, but the products of street level pragmatism and tactics. This may not represent the future of migration and integration in Europe, but remarkable levels of heterogeneity, ongoing mobility and

⁶ See S. Bhatia and A. Ram. 2001. ‘Rethinking ‘Acculturation’ in Relation to Diasporic Cultures and Postcolonial Identities’. *Human Development*. Vol. 44(1): 2. See also A. Spire, 2009. ‘Rethinking the Political Dimension of Migrations’. *Contemporary European History*. Vol. 18(1): 141.

⁷ Cf C. Calhoun. 2002. ‘The Class Consciousness of Frequent Travellers: Towards a Critique of Actually Existing Cosmopolitanism’ in S. Vertovec and R. Cohen (Eds.) *Conceiving Cosmopolitanism – Theory, Context, Practice*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 108.

translocal loyalties and the state's limited authority and reach among the urban poor are not unique to Africa's cities. One only needs to look at the American ghettos, the French *banlieus* or parts of deindustrialised Britain for suitable parallels. I suspect we can learn much by drawing from environments that are more extreme and consequences more dramatic.

Table One: Key Statistics for Research Sites, City and Country Levels

	Johannesburg	Maputo	Nairobi
Population 1990 (millions)	1.898	.776	1.380
Population 2025 (millions)	4.041	2.560	5.871
Growth Rate (2005-2010)	3.52	3.90	3.76
Human Development Index *	129	172	147
Gini Coefficient of Inequality*	.75	.52	.59

* Data at the national level

Sources: United Nations Habitat, State of African Cities Report 2010, United Nations Development Report 2009 and United Nations World Urbanization Prospects 2007

This exploratory paper draws on an ecumenical set of data in illustrating patterns of movement and social interaction. Most of the information reflected here stems from migration-related research in Southern and Eastern Africa—beginning with Johannesburg and expanding to Nairobi and Maputo—undertaken between 2002 and 2010. While recognising the severe limitations of available data on migration and urbanisation in African cities, Table One, shows that the cities are comparable on a number of axes. For one, the growth rates are quite similar (and rapid) across all three sites. Despite the similarities, there are also clear and significant differences in the human development levels of the three cities, an indication not only of wealth but a relatively effective proxy for state capacity and economic resources. The United Nations' 2007 Human Development Index (HDI) ranked South Africa 129th, Kenya 147th, and Mozambique near the bottom at 172. However, the extent of wealth inequality also differs across countries. Due in part to its prosperity, South Africa is far more unequal than either Mozambique or Kenya. Given that its wealth is deeply spatialised as a result of Apartheid-era urban planning, parts of the country and sections of

every city – including Johannesburg – remain far poorer than the overall HDI score suggests.⁸ It was in those areas where the data were collected.

Table Two: Selected Descriptive Characteristics of City Samples (%)

	Johannesburg	Maputo	Nairobi
Nationality			
Native Born	23.5	32.0	38.5
Foreign Born	76.5	68.0	61.5
Somali	28.7	0	31.3
Congolese	39.0	21.5	34.5
Rwandan	0	34.8	0
Mozambican	31.2	0	0
Burundi	0	36.7	0
Sudanese	0	0	31.5
Other	1.1	7	3.0
Gender			
Male	59.7	72.9	62.1
Female	40.3	27.1	37.9
Age Groups			
18-30	50.1	18.7	58.1
31-40	35.5	46.8	27.7
41-50	9.0	28.4	8.8
51+	5.5	6.1	5.4
Highest Educational Level			
None/some primary	7.1	5.3	19.0
Completed Primary or secondary	70.7	81.3	60.0
Some Tertiary	22.2	13.5	21.4
N	847	609	755

The survey data used here were largely generated from interviews with 2,211 people in the three cities. These data do not fully represent either the migrant or host populations in any of the sites, let alone the experience of migration and displacement elsewhere on the continent.⁹

⁸ See J. Beal, O. Crankshaw and S. Parnell. 2002. *Uniting a Divided City: Governance and Social Exclusion in Johannesburg*, London: Earthscan; G. Götz and A. Simone, 2003. 'On Belonging and Becoming in African Cities,' in R. Tomlinson, R. A. Beauregard, L. Bremner, and X. Mangcu (Eds.), *Emerging Johannesburg: Perspectives on the Postapartheid City*, New York: Routledge.

⁹ The data used here were generated through collaboration with Tufts University, University of Nairobi, and Eduardo Mondlane University in Maputo. The statistical analysis included here was either conducted by the author or draws on two, co-authored papers: L.B. Landau and M. Duponchel, 2011. 'Laws, Policies, or Social

Rather, data collection targeted particular groups of foreigners categorized by nationality. Consequently, our information speaks most accurately about these groups. With the exception of Mozambicans included in the Johannesburg survey, the team selected groups—Somalis, Rwandans, Sudanese, and Congolese—that straddle the line between purely economic migrants and those who might be considered (in substance, if not in law), forced migrants or displaced persons. Given the lack of reliable statistics on the size of the foreign population, its composition, or, in many cases, on domestic population dynamics in any of the cities, effectively weighting the observation in the data in order to obtain a good representation of the reality is almost impossible.

While each of the sites included here is a destination and transit point for domestic and international migration, together they express a diversity of social, economic and political characteristics that gives me the confidence to make modest generalization about trends within estuarial zones or what others might call urban ‘gateways’ or ‘arrival cities.’¹⁰ Moreover, they are each destination and transit points for a ‘mixed flow’ of refugees, immigrants, circular migrants, and people transiting to communities and cities elsewhere. Table Two (above) provides some key statistics for the three cities. Although these cities are not representative all of the continent’s urban centres—and the focus on estuarial zones further limits the data’s generalisable—their diversity nevertheless reflect a variety of experiences to afford the basis for the kind of conceptual outline I hope to provide. The appearance of such similar processes in all the cases – including the often anomalous South Africa – further speaks to the importance of these trends and the suitability of the comparison. Wherever possible, I have included quotations and other qualitative evidence to provide additional texture and illustrations. Given the scope of the claims and the brevity of the document, this will be as unsatisfying to the reader as it was to the author.

Position? Capabilities and the Determinants of Effective Protection in Four African Cities.’ *Journal of Refugee Studies*. Vol. 24(1): 1-22; and L. Madhavan and L.B. Landau, ‘Bridges to Nowhere: Hosts, Migrants and the Chimera of Social Capital in Three African Cities.’ 2011. *Population and Development Review*. Vol. 37(3): 473-497.

¹⁰ See, for example, D. Saunders. 2011. *Arrival City: The Final Migration and Our Next World*. New York: Knopf; For a more scholarly approach, see A. Singer, S.W. Hardwick and C.B. Bretell (Eds.), 2008. *Twenty-First-Century Gateways Immigrant Incorporation in Suburban America*. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press.

Urban Estuaries & Elusive Hosts

Revealing the future of integration demands we first parse presumptions behind contemporary debates surrounding migrants in ‘western’ society and the meaning of hospitality. Only by rethinking the fundamental actors in the integration process—migrants and hosts—can we begin to understand the engagements likely to appear in the coming decades. Long before they were busy scuppering the Euro, the Greeks developed laws clearly defining foreigners—*xenos*—and drew firm distinctions between their rights and those of citizens.¹¹ In this schema, and in almost all that following in the last two thousand years, the terms of engagement are to be determined by hosts while *arrivants* choose between compliance or turning back. Somewhat more recently, Kant reflected on the position of the outsider in trying, “to overcome some of the limits imposed by the division of the earth’s surface by national boundaries.”¹² In *Perpetual Peace*, he outlines two rules of hospitality intended to guide interactions in the age of the nation-state, the details of which are not important to us here.¹³ What matters are the actors that occupy his argument: hosts and states. Although Levinas and Derrida famously critique Kant for the limits his ethics place on guests,¹⁴ they nonetheless continue to speak of hosts and guests or variants thereof.¹⁵ Indeed, for Derrida, one of the greatest failings of Kant is the continued power the host exercises in naming new arrivals and placing them within an existing socio-legal or cognitive schema.

For Derrida – as it presumably was for Kant, the Greeks, Taylor, Beck and a hundred other theorists – it proved difficult to comprehend a situation where distinctions between hosts and guests dissolve and the ability/right to structure engagements falter. That’s not quite fair. In fact, Derrida outlines such conditions in describing ‘unconditional hospitality’, a hospitality without limits. But, he argues, such a situation can not exist or be sustained because it ‘turns the home inside out,’¹⁶ or, in Miller’s summary, “A host is a guest, and a

¹¹ See M. W. Westmoreland. 2008. ‘Interruptions: Derrida and Hospitality’. *Kritike*. Vol. 2(1): 1-10.

¹² Dikec 2009, 5.

¹³ For those keen on a critical review of Kant, see G.W. Brown, 2010. ‘The Laws of Hospitality, Asylum Seekers and Cosmopolitan Right: A Kantian Response to Jacques Derrida.’ *European Journal of Political Theory*. Vol. 9(3): 309-327; S. Benhabib, 2002. *The Claims of Culture: Equality and Diversity in the Global Era*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.; M. Naas, 2002. ‘Hospitality as an Open Question’ in *Taking on the Tradition*. Stanford: Stanford University Press: 154-169.

¹⁴ Mark. W. Westmoreland. 2008: 8

¹⁵ Siby J. George. 2009. ‘Hospitality as Openness to the Other: Levinas, Derrida and the Indian Hospitality Ethos’ *Journal of Human Values*. Vol. 15(1): 33.

¹⁶ In Westmoreland 2008, 6.

guest is a host”.¹⁷ For Derrida, as for Kant, such a condition is effectively impossible to consciously accept as it denies the possibility of knowing who we, as hosts are or the role we should play. Moreover, denying our power to set the terms of engagement – or to at least take part in shaping our interaction – denies our individual and collective sovereignty: it “opens up the possibility for contamination in that it calls for no governing body such as a sovereign state or master of a home to establish laws and authority over another subject.”¹⁸

While few but the most utopian cosmopolitans call for the dissolution of host-guest divisions, these have already proved soluble in Africa’s urban estuaries. Snel, *et al*, rightfully note that the language of integration generally refers to the incorporation of new elements (immigrants) into an *existing* social system.”¹⁹ The question soon becomes what happens when the pace of change is such and levels of heterogeneity become so great that it makes little logical sense to speak of existing social systems. It is precisely into those environments in which migrants are typically arriving. New migrants –at least the ones we in typically worry about– do not usually move to stable, wealthy and coherent suburbs where with high levels of overlapping engagements and shared values. When they are allowed out of camps, they instead take up residence in what I have been calling ‘urban estuaries’: meeting points of people from various backgrounds, only some of which may be logically said to belong to a ‘host’ community. What is more, it is not entirely clear that the people who are arriving wish to establish a place bound community in the areas where they live. These two factors – the absence of a discernable host and ongoing transience and translocalism –fundamentally shift the terms of our discussion. I will return presently to the implications of this shift. Before doing so, let me say a bit more about what is going on.

¹⁷ J.H. Miller, J.H. 1985. *Deconstruction and Criticism*. New York: Continuum, 221.

¹⁸ Westmoreland, 2006, 8

¹⁹ Snel, *et al*, 285; emphasis added

Figure One: Transformation of Diepsloot, South Africa 1999-2009

Source: City of Johannesburg

As a result of failing rural economies, conflicts, material inequalities, gentrification and other urban development programmes, people are moving into, out of and through cities in search of profit, protection, and passage elsewhere. Countries' elite and well connected have evacuated inner-city neighbourhoods in favour of new peri-urban estates and gated communities.²⁰ In their place, rural migrants, international migrants, and the 'upwardly mobile' urban poor converge. Elsewhere, once sparsely occupied peri-urban areas have become stations and destinations for people moving out of the city and those first coming to it. Figure One (above) graphically illustrates these changes' extraordinary pace in Diepsloot, an area just outside of Johannesburg that was farmland just more than fifteen years ago.²¹ Similar transformations are occurring on the edges (and sometimes in the middle) of Kinshasa, Nairobi, Maputo and elsewhere. Clearly other regions rarely match the pace of Africa's transformations, but Saunders 2011 book, *Arrival City*, makes a case for this as a global phenomenon. In these urban estuaries – the meeting place of multiple human flows –

²⁰ See United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN Habitat). 2008. *State of the World's Cities 2010/2011: Bridging The Urban Divide*. Nairobi: UN Habitat. J. Briggs and D. Mwamfupe, 2000. 'Peri-urban Development in an Era of Structural Adjustment in Africa: The City of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania,' *Urban Studies*, Vol. 37: 797–809.

²¹ For more on Diepsloot's history, see A. Harber, 2011. *Diepsloot*. Cape Town: Knopf. Also B. Bearak, 2011. 'Watching the Murder of an Innocent Man.' *New York Times Online* (2 June 2011) <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/05/magazine/watching-the-murder-of-an-innocent-man.html?pagewanted=all>

new social socio-economic formations are taking shape.²² Figures Two and Three (below) illustrate the close overlap between international and domestic migration in South Africa.

Figure Two: International Migrants in South Africa²³





Figure Three: Trans-Provincial Migrants in South Africa



²² AbdouMaliq Simone captures some of these dynamics in, 2009. *City Life from Jakarta to Dakar: Movements at the Crossroads* New York; London: Routledge.

²³ Maps developed by Forced Migration Studies at Wits with UNOCHA (Pretoria) using data from the 2001 national census.

Much like natural estuaries where the interaction between tides and rivers create unique and dynamic ecosystems, these urban gateways generating distinct socio-political forms through the multiple movements and dynamics taking place within them. In these zones, ethnic/national heterogeneity and cultural pastiche are often the empirical norms, not exceptions.²⁴ Among other effects, these forces are generating greater disparities of wealth, language, and nationality, along with diverse gender roles, life trajectories, and intergenerational tensions in both migrant-sending and receiving communities. Through geographic movement—into, out of, and within cities—urban spaces that for many years had only tenuous connections with the people and economies of the rural hinterlands of their own countries are increasingly the loci of economic and normative ties with home villages and diasporic communities spread (and spreading) across the continent and beyond.²⁵ While we must be wary of speaking in metaphors – and migrants are often equated to influxes, tsunamis and other dangerous aquatic phenomena – the notion of the estuary helps capture the distinctiveness of a given space shaped by multiple agents bound largely by their transience and marginalisation.²⁶ For present purposes, the question is how, in such spaces can we continue to speak of hosts and migrants? And without bounded and identifiable political communities to set the term of engagement, what might integration come to mean?

Table Three illustrates the degree to which the cities in questions are, indeed, cities of strangers. Table Four further demonstrates the fluidity of the population after arrival. While these figures overestimate the total movements – remember sampling focused on ‘gateway’ neighbourhoods and estuarial zones – they nonetheless demonstrate the degree to which migrant populations are present and why such mobility offers resistance to the consolidation of community.

²⁴ See B. Larkin, 2004. ‘Bandiri Music, Globalization, and Urban Experience in Nigeria,’ *Social Text*, 22: 91–112; A. Mbembe, 2001. *On the Postcolony*. Berkeley: University of California Press; A. Simone, 2004. ‘People As Infrastructure: Intersecting Fragments in Johannesburg,’ *Public Culture* Vol. 16: 407-429; H. Zlotnick, 2006. ‘The Dimensions of Migration in Africa,’ in Tienda, Findley, Tollman, and Preston Whyte (Eds.). *Africa on the Move*. Johannesburg: Wits University Press: 15-37.

²⁵ P. Geschiere, 2005. ‘Funerals and Belonging: Different Patterns in South Cameroon,’ *African Studies Review*, 48: 45-64; D. Malauene, 2004. ‘The Impact of the Congolese Forced Migrants’ “Permanent Transit” Condition on their Relations with Mozambique and Its People.’ (MA thesis), Johannesburg: University of the Witwatersrand; M. Diouf, 2000. ‘The Senegalese Murid Trade Diaspora and the Making of a Vernacular Cosmopolitanism,’ *Public Culture*, Vol. 12: 679-702.

²⁶ L. Malkki speaks explicitly of the dangerous use of metaphor in describing refugees and other migrants (1995 ‘Refugees and Exile: From “Refugee Studies” to the National Order of Things.’ *Annual Review of Anthropology*, Vol. 24.

Table Three: Percentage of Population Resident in City by Time

	Johannesburg	Maputo	Nairobi
Years Spent in City			
Less than 2 years	24.5	17.5	10.6
Two to Five Years	19.7	21.5	16.3
Five to Ten Years	34.5	40.9	39.6
N	847	609	755

Source: Author's survey data.

Table Four: Average Number of Moves among Non-nationals since Coming to the City, 2006

Johannesburg	Maputo	Nairobi
3.1	1.8	1.5

Source: Author's survey data.

Connections and regular shifts between rural (or peri-urban) and urban areas are a critical factor in slowing the emergence of urban regimes which, rather than destinations, are often stations on an ongoing journey. For many moving for work, the primary motivation is profit and the need to extract urban resources to subsidize the 'real' life they live elsewhere. Indeed, in many instances spouses and children remain elsewhere while single men and women earn money in the cities to sustain them (see Table Five). Although urban residents may establish second urban families, in many instances social, ethnic and political ties to rural areas prevent full social integration into urban communities. The intention to retire in the countryside or move elsewhere further limits people's financial and emotional investments in urban areas. In some instances, significant numbers of the foreign-born population – or non-local citizens – arrive in the city seeking protection from conflict and persecution with the intentions to return home or move on when conditions allow. This helps generate a kind of permanent temporariness in which they actively resist incorporation.²⁷ For many, cities have, become

²⁷ C W Kihato, 2009. "Migration, Gender and Urbanisation in Johannesburg" (PhD diss., University of South Africa); L. B. Landau, 2006. 'Transplants and Transients: Idioms of Belonging and Dislocation in Inner-city Johannesburg,' *African Studies Review*, Vol. 49:125-145; Malauene, 2004.

‘places of flows’ where rooting and local representation is not the goal.²⁸ Moreover, the burdens and binding that connections and political participation offer are often something to be avoided.²⁹ Given the insecurity of land tenure, the possibility of violence, and ongoing economic deprivation, people often maintain feet in multiple sites without firmly rooting themselves in any.³⁰

Table Five: Translocal Financial Connections by City

	Johannesburg	Maputo	Nairobi
Native Born Local	41.6	55.6	62.3
Foreign Born Local	58.9	26.1	33.0
Native Born Migrant	53.7	54.2	57.5
Foreign Born Migrant	43.3	23.3	8.6
N	847	609	755

Source: Author’s survey data.

Table Six: Expectation of Residence in Two Years (Percentage)

	Johannesburg	Maputo	Nairobi
Native Born Local	50.0	76.8	75.4
Foreign Born Local	68.9	65.2	44.4
Native Born Migrant	45.0	65.6	69.3
Foreign Born Migrant	43.2	55.5	52.5
N	847	609	755

Source: Author’s survey data.

What we see in these environments is populations where the possibility of a strong, central social authority is deeply challenged. So too is the possibility of achieving—should anyone want to—a strong territorially bound set of allegiances that could demarcate insiders and outsiders, hosts and guests. Given that most migrants are citizens, citizenship and documentation is not a major variable in structuring these relations. Although Africa’s

²⁸ See M. Castells, 1996. “The Space of Flows,” in *The Castells Reader on Cities and Social Theory*, Ida Susser (Ed). Oxford: Blackwell:314-365

²⁹ P. Kankonde, 2010. “Transnational Family Ties, Remittance Motives, and Social Death among Congolese Migrants: A Socio-Anthropological Analysis,” *Journal of Comparative Family Studies*, Vol. 41: 225-244; M. L Madsen, 2004. ‘Living for Home: Policing Immorality among Undocumented Migrants in Johannesburg,’ *African Studies*, Vol. 63: 173–192.

³⁰ See I. Freemantle, 2010. “‘You Can Only Claim Your Yard and Not a Country:’ Exploring Contexts, Discourse and Practices of Quotidian Cosmopolitanism Amongst African Migrants in Johannesburg” (PhD diss., University of the Witwatersrand).

colonial and postcolonial cities have been the one geographic site where the state's powers are most evident,³¹ they are rarely able to enforce strong prohibitions on non-nationals who make their way into cities.³² Formal citizenship may have symbolic value for some, but with only limited enforcement capacity and a minimal reliance on state provided services – schools, clinics, jobs – documentation and legal status do little. At the most practical level they are poor predictors of people's welfare.³³ Even in South Africa, arguably the continent's 'strongest' state, these processes are negotiated on the ground through a panoply of rationalities and calculations, sometimes involving laws and state actors but not always in predictable ways.³⁴ That is what the process of integration will look like. What it produces is something we have yet to fully understand.

Integration and Authority

So where does this leave us? If Bulley is right that, "hospitality requires some notion of an 'at home' for its possible performance," then what is integration when we see multiple homes or where everyone is both host and visitor?³⁵ Is this the atomised disorder that Kaplan described many years ago?³⁶ Bulley tries to address this by suggesting that where everyone is both guest and host, everyone is a hostage – no one sets the terms of engagement and we are all subject to everyone else's will. Derrida proffers the term 'hostipitality,' to connate the hostility such situations of coerced hospitality tend to generate. Hostility and a manifestation of spatially chauvinist rhetoric is certainly one possible outcome. Indeed, at first glance it explains what has been among the most visible reactions to immigrants and outsiders across Africa. Few in South Africa will forget the 2008 violence in which more than 60 were killed and 120 000 displaced in a melee driven by violent efforts to claim space in the name of

³¹ J. Herbst, 2000. *States and Power in Africa*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press; M. Bratton, 2006. 'Popular Reactions to State Repress: Operation Murambatsvina in Zimbabwe,' *African Affairs*, 106: 21–45.

³² See, for example, M. Swilling, A. Simone and F. Khan. 2003. "My Soul I Can See: The Limits of Governing African Cities in an Era of Globalization and Complexity," in P. McCarney and R.E. Stren (Eds.), *Governance on the Ground: Innovations and Discontinuities in the Cities of the Developing World*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press.

³³ L.B. Landau and M. Duponchel, 2011.

³⁴ Cf. T. B. Hansen and F. Stepputat (Eds.), 2010. *States of Imagination: Ethnographic Explorations of the Postcolonial State*. Durham: Duke University Press.

³⁵ Bulley, Dan. 2006. 'Negotiating Ethics: Campbell, Ontology, and Hospitality,' *Review of International Studies*. Vol. 32: 659.

³⁶ R. D. Kaplan, 1994. "The Coming Anarchy: How Scarcity, Crime, Overpopulation, Tribalism and Disease are Rapidly Destroying the Social Fabric of our Planet." *The Atlantic Monthly*, Vol. 273:44-76.

one's ethnicity, political party, or nationality.³⁷ But it is facile to claim that membership always settles to a dichotomous norm of outsider and host with one group seeking dominance over one or more others. Not only do the numbers of actors involved complicate these processes, but such outcomes depend on people seeing both the incentive and means to make exclusive claims over specific spaces and the resources within them. This happens, but it is not always the case; at least not for everyone.

The remainder of this paper reviews—schematically given the confines of the medium—the mechanism and ethos I, together with my colleagues, have observed in our 'estuarial' research. This is work in its early stages so the ideas below are speculative and not yet fully theorised. Underlying my analysis is the question of how varied forms of belonging and systems of allocating rights and privilege are taking shape in environments with weak, if any, divisions between hosts and guests. I begin by considering broad indicators of social capital, a precursor to the formation of bounded (if not spatially defined) identities. I then explore the role of religious affiliations before touching on other forms of membership and organisation: consociational gangsterism, tactical cosmopolitanism, and ultimately (if speculatively) a kind of market-based liberalism.

Whether religious, cultural or economic, collective participation is a potentially important mechanism for inculcating a sense of common purpose and forging the social connections necessary to suffuse a population with common perspectives, values and ethics. It is also necessary if we are to speak of groups somehow negotiating as hosts, guests, or something in between. However, given the population's volatility and orientation, social networks are often spread thinly across many people and places. As such it comes as little surprise that the surveys show remarkably low levels of trust between ethnic and national groups. What is more important for our purposes is the limited trust and bonds within them. Even among citizens in both Johannesburg and Maputo, levels of social capital—trust of each other and public their institutions—are strikingly low.³⁸ Nairobi offers a slightly more trusting environment, although here too the data reflect deep tensions. Networks of clan,

³⁷ See the chapters by Neftegodian and Misago in L. Landau. 2011. *Exorcising the Demons Within: Xenophobia, Violence and Statecraft in Contemporary South Africa*, Johannesburg: Wits University Press. Also P. Geschiere, 2009. *The Perils of Belonging: Autochthony, Citizenship, and Exclusion in Africa and Europe*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

³⁸ Cf. R. Putnam, 2000. *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community*. New York: Simon & Schuster.

neighbourhood, or coreligionists undoubtedly exist,³⁹ but these are often fragmented and functional, organized without an explicit recognition or sense of mutual obligation to those beyond familial boundaries.⁴⁰ Instead, they are often limited to assisting others only to overcome immediate risks or if a corpse needs returning to a country or community of origin.⁴¹ Among neither migrants nor the ostensible host population can we speak of a community or set of overlapping institutions that are engaged in a collective project. These may eventually cohere into some form of widespread norms or implicit sense of a collective enterprise, but given the populations' dynamics and the limited engagement with common institutions, such an outcome seems particularly unlikely. Tables Seven and Eight illustrate the remarkably low levels of institutional affiliations and trust across the three cities in which we conducted research.

Table Seven: Organisational Affiliations by City and Migration Status

	Johannesburg	Maputo	Nairobi
Belongs to Religious Organization			
Native Born Local	66.3	73.7	92.0
Foreign Born Local	54.4	56.5	53.0
Native Born Migrant	52.8	72.9	92.8
Foreign Born Migrant	48.8	72.6	20.1
Belongs to Cultural Organization			
Native Born Local	9.0	8.1	24.6
Foreign Born Local	22.2	17.4	4.4
Native Born Migrant	7.4	3.1	20.9
Foreign Born Migrant	6.7	2.6	4.9
Belongs to Credit Association			
Native Born Local	9.0	40.4	39.9
Foreign Born Local	23.3	26.1	9.6
Native Born Migrant	17.6	37.5	32.7
Foreign Born Migrant	13.2	29.5	3.2

Source: Author's survey data.

³⁹ See V. Nzayabino, "Spiritual Ecology: The Role of the Church in Territorialising Belonging and its Impact on Integration of Migrants in South Africa" (MA thesis, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg).

⁴⁰ See M. Sommers, 2001. *Fear in Bongoland: Burundi Refugees in Urban Tanzania*. New York: Berghahn Books.

⁴¹ M. Madsen, "Policing"; E.A. Maina Ayiera, 2008. 'Burying Our Dead in Your City: Interpreting Individual Constructs of Belonging in the Context of Burial of Loved Ones in Exile,' (MA thesis, University of Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, 2008); J. A Andersson, 2006. 'Informal Moves, Informal Markets: International Migrants and Traders from Mzimba District, Malawi,' *African Affairs* 105: 375–397.

Table Eight: Perception of Trust

	Johannesburg	Maputo	Nairobi
Have Trust in Native Born			
Native Born Local	75.6	50.7	52.1
Foreign Born Local	11.6	57.9	25.7
Native Born Migrant	77.9	62.5	65.7
Foreign Born Migrant	25.0	33.7	26.3
Have Trust in Foreigners			
Native Born Local	33.3	29.8	22.6
Foreign Born Local	32.9	34.8	27.8
Domestic Migrant	37.4	36.9	22.4
Foreign Born Migrant	41.2	46.3	41.1
Have Trust in Co-Nationals (Foreign Born Only)			
Local	26.6	36.8	49.6
Migrant	48.6	48.6	48.6

Source: Author's survey data.

Religion is the one notable exception to relative absence of social organisation among the populations under discussion. Throughout Europe and Asia, religious institutions have played central roles in binding population to each other and to place (and in excluding everyone else).⁴² Where the state has faint influence, they can serve to help generate alternative subjectivities and publics. However, a combination of factors, including the increasing heterogeneity of the urban population, effectively denies the possibilities that religious institutions can serve a similar role in contemporary Africa cities. Among the Nairobi citizenry we surveyed, for example, 65.6% were Protestant, 30.6% Catholic, 2.7%

⁴² See, for example, Clifford Geertz, 1980. *Negara: The Theatre State in Nineteenth Century Bali*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Muslim with only 0.3% claiming no religion. In Johannesburg, the sample was 59.7% Protestant, 18.8% no religion, 14.1% Catholic, and 6.8% Muslim. (The foreign born population in Johannesburg was more evenly divided with 39% Protestants, 28.5% Catholics, 26% Muslims, and 6.3 claiming no religion.) While urban Africans are strongly religious, the denominational divisions within those affiliations—and the often fractured and conflictual relationships among them—can serve more to divide than create a unified network with which to disseminate messages of unity and sanctions to achieve it.

Along with the sheer diversity of competing claims for religion and belonging, the liturgical content of many churches serves to further undermine the possible emergence of a territorially bound or state-centred subjectivity. This is perhaps most visible in the ever expanding pool of Pentecostal churches operating within Africa's urban centres. At one level, these inclusive (often massive) institutions offer the possibility of bridging barriers between various groups. As one Zimbabwean migrant in Johannesburg stated, 'In the church, they help us in many ways, no matter where you come from, they just help you.' While they offer a sense of salvation in the form of 'health and wealth', they are distinctly post-territorial in their outlook. Although there is not space here to reflect the diversity of testimonies and preaching included in even one five hour mass, many build on their strong connections to institutions in Nigeria, Ghana, Congo and the United States. For many of the churches' founders—who are themselves migrants—their current pulpit is merely a place where they can enter a global social universe. In the words of the Nigerian Pastor at the Mountain of Fire and Miracles church in Johannesburg, 'Africa is shaped like a pistol, Nigeria is the trigger and South Africa is the mouth from where you can shoot out the word of god.' For others, they have been sent on a mission to Kenya, Mozambique or elsewhere to help counter post-colonial malaise – including corruption and state oppression—with a message of truth. Moreover, while they may preach tolerance, many of these churches generate a set of translocal and, often, anti-political tenets of belonging. Their fragmentary and often conflictual sources of religious authority further serve to deny the state—or indeed even a single church—the possibility of naming what is good and the direction the collective should follow.

Religion, at least as described above, provides a mechanism that allows people to be in a place but not off it: to be neither host nor guest. This it shares with what I have argued is

a form of ‘tactical cosmopolitanism’ on the part of migrants.⁴³ Recognising ascendant forms or exclusion levied against them, migrants draw on a variegated language of belonging that makes claims to the city while positioning them in an ephemeral, superior, and unrooted condition where they can escape localised social and political obligations. Unlike theoretical or ‘high’ cosmopolitanism, these are not necessarily grounded in normative ideas of ‘openness’ or intended to promote universal values of any form. Rather, migrants practically and rhetorically draw on various, often competing, systems of cosmopolitan rights and rhetorics to insinuate themselves, however shallowly, in the networks and spaces needed to achieve specific practical goals. These include, pan-Africanism, human rights rhetoric, and the language of the elite cosmopolitanism: of being global players in the new age. Unlike transnationalism, which is often about belonging to multiple communities – or shuttling between them—these are more ‘decentred’ tactics that emphasise individualism, generality and universality.⁴⁴ This leaves them, in Friedman’s words, “betwixt and between without being liminal...participating in many worlds without becoming part of them”.⁴⁵ This cosmopolitanism- especially in its current form – constitutes a form of ‘experiential culture’,⁴⁶ but one that has risen from the need to achieve tactical targets rather than being the result of an appreciation of cultural diversity or philosophical consideration.

In Dandora, an estuarial zone to the east of Nairobi, we are beginning to see the foundations of what I have, for lack of a better word, termed a kind of consociational-gangsterism between the Kikuyu-based Mungiki, the Luo ‘Taliban’ and Kamjesh, a resource driven neighbourhood gangsterism racket.⁴⁷ While these groups have been around in one

⁴³ L. B. Landau and I. Freemantle. 2010. ‘Tactical Cosmopolitanism and Idioms of Belonging: Insertion and Self-Exclusion in Johannesburg.’ *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*. Vol. 36(3): 375-390.

⁴⁴ cf. Pogge, T.W. 2002. ‘Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty’, *Ethics*, 103(1): 48; also V. Roudometof, 2005. ‘Transnationalism, Cosmopolitanism and Glocalization,’ *Current Sociology*, 53(1): 113–135.

⁴⁵ S. Vertovec, 2006. ‘Fostering Cosmopolitanisms: A Conceptual Survey and a Media Experiment in Berlin,’ in Lenz, G.H., Ulfers, F. and Dallmann, A. (eds.) *Towards a New Metropolitanism: Reconstituting Public Culture, Urban Citizenship, and the Multicultural Imaginary in New York and Berlin*. Heidelberg: Universitätsverlag. P. 3-10. See also G. Simmel, 1964. *The Sociology of George Simmel*. Translated by Wolff, K. New York: Free Press, p. 98.

⁴⁶ M. Lamont, M. (2000) ‘Ordinary Cosmopolitanisms: Strategies for Bridging Boundaries among Non-college Educated Workers’, paper presented at the ‘Conceiving Cosmopolitanism Conference’, University of Warwick (April 27- 29), p. 2.

⁴⁷ The description of Dandora draws from ongoing research by Sharon Mina Olago. The description included here is based on a preliminary field report and interpersonal discussions. For background on Nairobi and the violence referred to in the paragraph, see International Crisis Group (2008), Kenya in Crisis, in: *Africa Report*, 137 (21 February). Also Commission of Inquiry into Post-Election Violence (2008), *Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Post-Election Violence (CIPEV)*, (15 October 2008), online: <http://www.dialoguekenya.org/creport.aspx>.

form another for decades, they have gained increased prominence and power in the multi-party era following the end of Daniel Arap Moi's presidency. During this time they have moved from 'cultural' associations to bodies taking on state-like functions: providing security, taxing transport avenues, and regulating access to services and land. What is important for our purposes is the source of their legitimacy. While at least two of the groups (the Mungiki and the Taliban) have ethnic origins, the spaces where they claim dominance as 'host' are far beyond the city limits. There have been fights for dominance over urban space in the past, the massive bloodshed following Kenya's 2007 elections – in which branches of both ethnic groups were directly involved – seems to have encouraged them to reach a kind of accommodation where they jointly manage the suburb. Entry and residence in the area is now allocated less on ethnic grounds than on the basis of what might be called 'civic extortion': if you can pay, you can come in and stay. Their 'right' to extract these resources comes less from their ethnic foundations than their relative monopoly on the use of force and—critically—their ability to provide a relatively predictable and stable environment for their residents. The system may not be inequitable or universally inclusive and it is most certainly coercive, but the emerging mode of regulation is primarily civic and material, not ethnic. It is tied to place, but one's entry does not depend (at least not entirely) on where you are from. In this way they look similar to the medieval protection rackets Tilly famously described.⁴⁸ Under such system, the incentive is to accumulate residents and the resources they can provide regardless of their backgrounds.

In Ongata Rongai, a rapidly growing region on Nairobi's periphery, we are beginning to document a remarkable means of denying simple categorization between hosts and outsiders.⁴⁹ Although technically outside of the city, the settlement's proximity to main transport routes and the availability of land has made it an attractive space for migrants moving out of Nairobi as well as those moving towards it. The land's 'original' inhabitants were Maasai – at least as understood by almost all of the sites current residents—but they have largely evacuated the settlement, selling off their land and taking their cattle elsewhere. In their stead groups from all over Kenya have moved in. Although the Kikuyu are the largest group numerically, they by no means dominate the space or make exclusive claims to it.

⁴⁸ C. Tilly. 1985. 'War Making and State Making as Organized Crime.' In P. Evans, D. Rueschemeyer, and T. Skocpol (Eds.), *Bringing the State Back In*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

⁴⁹ The discussion of Ongata Rongai draws heavily from M.J. Otieno, 2011, *The Dominant Migrants Championing the Course of Development in Ongata Rongai Peri Urban Area*. An unpublished report based on research conducted on behalf of the African Centre for Migration and Society.

Indeed, no one does. In stark contrast to sites across urban Kenya, there seems to be a remarkably high level of ethnic mixing and peaceful conviviality. Apart from Olekasasi estate which had become the preferred destination for the Somalis (Kenyan and Somali nationals), access to residential housing and business premises appears to be determined almost completely by market mechanisms. In interviews with officials and land owners, they all spoke of the need to ensure ethnic mixing and some level of conviviality. This is not a form of integration managed by the state nor any other identifiable actor.

Unlike Dandora, the Rongai's market-driven schema does not even rely on regular coercive threats to maintain the order. Rather, recognising the dangers of ethnic chauvinism in a space that no one group can effectively dominate, residents have developed a kind of liberal ethos which provides everyone equal access. Here discrimination is not based on one's origins, political affiliations or religion, but simply by a willingness to play by local's rules. But these are unwritten and diffuse rules based largely on market principles. Although free markets notoriously and effectively disguise inequality, power and other restrictions on freedoms, by contrast to deep seated spatio-ethnic or nationalist exclusion, they reflect the kind of liberation in Marxist sense. By allowing people to retain ethnic, religious, or forms of extra-local loyalties – both religion and ethnicity remain highly visible in Rongai – residents may also inadvertently be generating a kind of radical multiculturalism, a “pluralisation of possibilities of being on the same territory.”⁵⁰ Were he still alive, Levinas would undoubtedly be pleased at what he would see in Ongata Rongai: if we all are sojourners, he argued, then on what basis can we exclude?

If nothing else, the paragraphs above suggest some of the possible means through which long-term residents, domestic migrants and non-citizens are simultaneously finding their ways in a new (and ever-changing) social landscape. Even domestic migrants may have as little in common with the people they find in the city as those coming from across international boundaries. The rapid expansion of urban populations—and its specific geography which tends to concentrate migration and urban growth in particular urban gateway neighbourhoods –calls into question the use of the term “local” or “host” to talk about the destination areas. It also suggests that the mechanisms through which rights to space and other resources are rationed are varied. The ethics behind them – when regulatory

⁵⁰ D. Campbell, D. 1998. *National Deconstruction: Violence, Identity and Justice in Bosnia*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 162

systems are coherent enough for them to be identified – are similarly complex and deserving of careful consideration and attention.

Final Notes on The Future of Integration

Ireland or Britain may not yet be as diverse as Singapore or South Africa, but they have become more so and are likely to continue on that path and patches of them are already among the most diverse places in the world. I can not match the data presented here with comparable information on cities and communities in Europe or North America. Ideally we would be able to present maps similar to those shown here illustrating what I imagine are close overlaps between new immigrants, older immigrants, and poor or otherwise marginalised British citizens. Places like West Ham and Brixton come to mind although there are certainly others spread across the country. While extreme, the hybridity, transience and translocalism described above are also not unique to African cities. Gray argues that while European policies typically portray host populations – in her case Irish citizens—as a largely undifferentiated ‘society’, they are in fact “a multiplicity of coexisting life styles and grouping.”⁵¹ Some may be the poor and marginal who, while decidedly British, no longer subscribe to a single national narrative. The riots that took place over the summer in 2011 point to this possibility. The multiplicity of life styles will also increasingly include previous immigrant groups whose allegiances to Britain may themselves be frail or faint. It is for this very reason that Levitt and Glick-Schiller argue for an analytical perspective on society that is not immediately bound by geography, but allows us to consider other principles as the basis for integration and belonging.⁵² This does not mean abandoning the importance of space, but rather to consider the relationships of the people occupying it to each other, to others, and to a range of territories.

To be sure, European states retain a much stronger presence and seem to be doing ever more to regulate the people coming to their countries; where they live, and how long they stay.⁵³ The diversity I describe above has also fragmented system of political authority.

⁵¹ B. Gray. 2006. ‘Migration Integration Policy? A Nationalist Fantasy of Management and Control’. *Translocations: The Irish Migration, Race and Social Transformation Review*. Vol. 1(1): 130.

⁵² P. Levitt and N. Glick-Schiller. 2007. ‘Conceptualizing Simultaneity: A Transnational Social Field Perspective on Society’. In A. Portes and J. DeWind (Eds.). *Rethinking Migration: New Theoretical and Empirical Perspectives*. New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books. : 181-218.

⁵³ Spire. 2009, 135.

Rather than the kind of ‘nested’ systems Eckstein and Gurr describe (a perspective that typically informs) national laws and policies,⁵⁴ political authority in practice is often faint, unevenly applied, and driven by competing imperatives and logics. Even in South Africa, perhaps the most technologically sophisticated sub-Saharan African country, there is scant ability to predict, plan for or track movements at anything but the most aggregate level and the police often apply rules in ways that work against stated policy goals.⁵⁵ Ironically, Europe’s effort to control and relative ability to do so may help generate precisely the kinds of self-alienation and translocal communities I have described. In some sense this may reflect what Beck terms a ‘coercive Cosmopolitanism’:⁵⁶ if people are not allowed to settle due to policy or perceived persecution, they will – as they have done in South Africa – develop strategies that work against the power of those who would exclude: a cosmopolitanism driven by necessity, not ethical commitments or desires.

Calhoun argues that there’s a need for people to philosophically and morally catch up with the global problems and dynamics of the day.⁵⁷ I am not a philosopher and I do not claim a vision for what spaces should look like or how we come to terms with the multiple claims bridging loyalties, spaces and peoples. Given the multiplicity of trajectories and emic communal affiliations, simply mapping what is emerging is elusive and bewildering; speaking of what should be seems foolish. What I can say is that the foundations for modern ‘ontological’ or Weberian forms of territorially bounded identity, all preconditions for a Kantian or even Derridian ethics of hospitality, are increasingly cracked and crumbling. The forms of individual or communal recognition that we depend on in talking about integration are often more ascribed fictions than identifiable social manifestations. Without a centralized authority or coercive force to direct an emergent, practical ethics, we see instead a varied range of real and existing multiculturalisms which can piece together stands of cosmopolitanism and communalism; or tolerance and territorial tyranny in ways that have hitherto seemed almost unimaginable. These communities of convenience need not be

⁵⁴ H. Eckstein and T. R. Gurr. 1975. *Patterns of Authority: A Structural Basis for Political Inquiry*. New York: John Wiley and Sons.

⁵⁵ See L. B. Landau and A. Segatti with J.P. Misago. *Governing Migration & Urbanisation in South African Municipalities: Developing Approaches to Counter Poverty and Social Fragmentation*. 2011. Pretoria: South African Local Government Association. For work on the police, see D. Vigneswaran. 2010. ‘Criminality or Monopoly? Informal Immigration Enforcement in South Africa’, *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 36 (2): 465-82; J. Hornberger. 2011. *Policing and Human Rights: The Meaning of Violence and Justice in the Everyday Policing of Johannesburg*. London: Routledge.

⁵⁶ Beck 2009: 5.

⁵⁷ C. Calhoun, 2002.

logically consistent since they make few claims to universalism or, indeed, to an underlying logic. They are practical and pragmatic – if not always equitable – modes of engagement.

Whether these eventually crystallise or bind current and future residents of given sites (or spaces affected by them) remains to be seen. But we will only be able to see them for what they are if we shed our own normativities and begin to recognize that even the language of integration evokes elements of social and political authority that, if present, may be only fleeting. We see here what Derrida termed a ‘perpetual uneasiness’⁵⁸ where coming to rest, a precondition of a negotiated settlement, is all but impossible. We must also revisit the approach pioneered by the Chicago school to see integration not as something driven by states and policies as if often the case in discussions of European policy,⁵⁹ but as a set of practices migration and integration from the point of view of those on the move and those within whom they engage, be it where they live, where they are from or where they intend to go.

⁵⁸ In Bulley 2006: 657.

⁵⁹ See Spire’s 2009 critique, p. 137.