

# Aesthetic Value in Classical Antiquity

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## CHAPTER TWO

### AMOUSIA: LIVING WITHOUT THE MUSES\*

Stephen Halliwell

#### 1. Introduction

Without music life would be a mistake: 'Ohne Musik wäre das Leben ein Irrthum'. So, famously, wrote Friedrich Nietzsche in the first section ('Maxims and Arrows') of *Twilight of the Idols*.<sup>1</sup> As always, Nietzsche had deeply personal reasons for the force and pathos of this aphorism; music did indeed help to keep him alive. His words also betray an impulse, I think, to modify Schopenhauer's pessimistically unqualified statement in *Parerga und Paralipomena* that 'human existence must be a kind of error'.<sup>2</sup> But over and above those motivations, we can detect in Nietzsche's stark utterance, I would like to suggest, a trace and resonance of Greek feeling. We might even wonder whether in formulating his maxim Nietzsche was subconsciously remembering the passage in Plato's *Philebus* where Protarchus, asked by Socrates whether music, as one of the 'impure' arts, is needed for the mixture of a humanly desirable life, says that he certainly takes it to be necessary—'at any rate', as he puts it, 'if our life is really to be a life of some kind' (εἴπερ γε ἡμῶν ὁ βίος ἔσται καὶ ὀπωσοῦν ποτε βίος, Pl. *Phlb.* 62c).<sup>3</sup> Without music, Protarchus supposes (and he seems to take the idea to be practically self-evident), human 'life' would hardly be worth the name at all. And

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<sup>1</sup> *Götzen-Dämmerung*, 'Sprüche und Pfeile' 33, in Nietzsche 1988, VI, 64. For one account of the importance of music to Nietzsche, see Safranski 2002, 19–24.

<sup>2</sup> 'Daß das menschliche Dasein eine Art Verirrung sein müsse, ...' [spelling modernized], *Parerga und Paralipomena*, vol. II, ch. 11 § 146, in Schopenhauer 1988, V, 261 (for a translation see Schopenhauer 1974, 287).

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Frede 1997, 350–351 on the context. West 1992, 13–38 cites further evidence for the importance of music in Greek life.

it is Socrates, despite his lofty disdain for the philosophical ‘imprecision’ of music’s technical resources, who prompts him to that conclusion.

Whether or not Nietzsche had this Platonic passage at the back of his mind when composing his own aphorism, we have strong justification for treating the question whether human life needs music as an authentically Greek concern: a concern which encompasses not just ‘music’ in the narrower denotation of the word but the whole of *mousikê* as the collective realm of the Muses and their contribution to the enhancement of existence.<sup>4</sup> If the Muses can be thought of as the divine source (or at least a projection onto the divine)<sup>5</sup> of distinctive forms of experiences, even forms of life, then one way of enriching our understanding of what they stand for is to engage with Greek reflections on what happens when they are absent from the lives either of individuals or of social groups. What I aim to do in this chapter is to treat the idea of a life lived without the Muses (or even, at an extreme, in *denial* of them) as a way of broaching some of the issues involved in attempts to identify and make sense of Greek conceptions of the ‘value of aesthetics’.

The lack of any one-to-one correspondence between modern uses of ‘aesthetic(s)’ and the vocabulary of Classical Greek is a complex matter. But the complexity is not all the result, as sometimes alleged, of an ancient conceptual deficit; it arises just as much from the uncertainties and obscurities which attach to the modern terminology itself. I do not myself believe that there is anything like a stable modern understanding of ‘aesthetics’ or ‘the aesthetic’, only a set of competing models and values. There is no such thing as the ‘purely aesthetic’; attempts to demarcate one come up against the multiplicity of both psychological and cultural factors which enter into all the relevant areas of experience. If we want to clarify the relationship between ancient and modern patterns of thought on this subject, we need to allow for a plurality of (partially overlapping) vocabulary, ideas, and imagery. We also need to be prepared to think dialectically: which is to say, be prepared to expose our own conceptions of what counts as aesthetic value to the force of various ancient arguments and attitudes, rather than reasoning from a fixed paradigm of the aesthetic. Part of the importance of

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<sup>4</sup> For one account of the concept of *mousikê*, see Koller 1963, 5–16.

<sup>5</sup> Greeks not only treat human experience of ‘music’ as a gift of the Muses; they see the Muses as integral to the gods’ pleasure in their *own* existence. See, among much else, Pind. fr. 31 (Snell–Maehler), where the Muses are brought into being to satisfy a divine request to ‘adorn’ (*κατακοσμεῖν*) Zeus’s world-order in song. For one reading of this Pindaric fragment, see Pucci 1998, 31–34.

ancient forms of ‘aesthetic value’, as I see it, resides precisely in their *resistance* to the modern presumption of a single, neatly circumscribed sphere of aesthetic experience. I have tried to undertake that kind of dialectical thinking for one major ancient concept (or ‘family’ of concepts) in my book *The Aesthetics of Mimesis*.<sup>6</sup> In the present chapter, I propose to treat notions of *amouisia*—itself hard to translate by any single term, but embracing various failures and/or refusals to cultivate the values of ‘music’ (*mousikê*) and the Muses—as a clue to certain Greek ways of thinking which have a special bearing on the problems of aesthetics.

I shall be concerned not only with the terminology of *amouisia* itself but also with a cluster of ideas and values with which it is associated or comes into contact. At the core of my argument will be the thesis that Greek culture gave rise to a conviction that to live ‘without music’ (to which the phrase μετ’ ἀμουσίας, soon to be encountered, provides a close approximation) is to lack something essential to the most fulfilling kind of human existence: to lack, indeed, a particular type of ‘life-value’. On this view, if the Muses and their extended domain of *mousikê*, are absent or neglected or even repudiated, then in some way *the whole of life* will be affected by that negative condition. This is not a claim that one can (or should try to) expound systematically on the basis of our Greek sources; it is not so much a doctrine as a sensibility, an outlook on life. But one can find hints and pointers towards it in many places. The present analysis will discuss three main test cases: first, the evidence of Euripidean usage, and above all a lyric passage which expresses the idea of life itself as somehow *needing* the gifts of the Muses (though voicing this idea within a context of inescapably tragic irony); secondly, two examples from Aristophanes which lend a characteristic twist of comic paradox to the notion of *amouisia* and kindred terms; thirdly, a selection of passages from the dialogues of Plato, who pays a kind of compliment to the ‘musical’ values of his culture, but at the same time reinterprets and revalues them for his own purposes, by converting the idea of *amouisia* into part of a distinctively philosophical ‘aesthetic’, making it a concept of what is lacking in the life/soul which lacks the ability to respond authentically to non-material forms of beauty and truth.

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<sup>6</sup> See Halliwell 2002, esp. 1–14, for my general approach to the history of ‘aesthetics’; cf. Halliwell 2009 for a résumé of my view of ancient thought as usefully resistant to modern paradigms of aesthetics as a single domain.

## 2. Euripides and Tragedy's Rejection of *amouisia*

The origin and earliest uses of the adjective *amouios*, as well as of the near-synonymous *apomouios*, are now impossible to reconstruct. The first surviving occurrence of *amouios* is in Empedocles 81 B74 DK, a single-line fragment in which an unknown feminine subject, often assumed to be the cosmic force of Love (Φιλία), is described as 'leading the unmusical tribe of prolific fish'.<sup>7</sup> While we can be confident that the significance of *amouios* here includes the idea of 'silent' or 'without speech', the lost context makes the word's further connotations uncertain; but what is evoked may have been the thought of the whole 'world' of fish as one which blocks out the sounds of human culture, both speech and music.<sup>8</sup> Rather different is the earliest occurrence of *apomouios* in a remarkable passage of Aeschylus' *Agamemnon* in which the chorus recall the negative impression Agamemnon made on them when he originally led off the Greek army for Troy: '[you were] pictured in my mind ... in exceedingly ugly colors', 'you were pictured very inartistically', 'you made a most unpleasing picture to me', are three attempts to capture the thrust of the boldly metaphorical phrase κάρτ' ἀπομούσως ἦσθα γεγραμμένος.<sup>9</sup> One implication of this figurative usage is that there was already available by this date a conception of *mousikê* which encompassed sensitivity to visual art. Another is that the values of *mousikê* are symbolically charged with more than surface meaning. What disturbed the Argives who watched the army depart was not in fact something purely visual about Agamemnon but his whole demeanor and state of mind, exhibited above all in his sacrifice of Iphigeneia (herself compared by the chorus, in an earlier passage, to a piercingly pitiful figure in a painting).<sup>10</sup> The flaws in the 'picture' of Agamemnon, as the Argive onlookers saw it, were flaws in the conduct of a life.

<sup>7</sup> φύλον ἄμουσον ἄγουσα πολυπερέων καμασῆνων. Tr. Inwood 2001, 253 (his fr. 82); Graham 2010, I, 391 (his no. 137) translates *amouison* as 'uncultured'. For one possible context in the poem, see Guthrie 1965, 206 n. 2.

<sup>8</sup> Cf. 'speechless' (ἀναύδων) fish at Aesch. *Pers.* 577, Soph. fr. 762, and the saying 'dumber than fish', ἀφωνότερος τῶν ἰχθύων at Lucian *Somn.* 1. Note a different evocation of the marine world in the phrase 'unmusical melody of the seashore' (ἄμουσον ἀκτῆς ... μέλος), *TrGF* 2.705b.11, which may be post-classical.

<sup>9</sup> Aesch. *Ag.* 801, with translations by Fraenkel 1950, I, 139 (cf. his discussion, *ibid.* II, 363); Denniston and Page 1957, 139; Collard 2002, 23.

<sup>10</sup> See Aesch. *Ag.* 242, where the image of a gagged Iphigeneia who can nonetheless strike the onlookers through the eyes seems to play on something akin to Simonides' famous description of painting as 'silent poetry' (see esp. Plut. *Mor.* 346F, 748A).

Even after making allowances for gaps in our evidence, it is striking that after the two passages noted above the great majority of the other dozen or so surviving fifth-century occurrences of *amousos* (and *apomousos*)<sup>11</sup> are concentrated in Euripides, who apparently had a penchant for the vocabulary of *amouisia* and whose work illustrates the subtlety of its semantics.<sup>12</sup> The terminology in question can refer directly to aspects of musical performance, denoting for example the cacophonous, drunken singing of figures such as Heracles and Polyphemus. Even in these cases, however, the quality of being *amousos*, though an attribute of the vocal sounds themselves, implies something about the condition or character of the singer: something temporary in the case of Heracles (a musically ambiguous figure in general—a fact which will recur below), something more intrinsically and irredeemably bestial in that of Polyphemus.<sup>13</sup> This implication is elsewhere strongly underlined by passages in which *amouisia* is a negative attribute that extends explicitly beyond music as such into the wider realm of character and conduct. In a fragment from Euripides' *Ino*, someone takes it as a mark of *amouisia* to fail to shed tears over pitiful things, treating the trait, in other words, as a kind of emotional insensitivity, though one with readily recognizable implications for responsiveness to poetry, song, and music.<sup>14</sup> Ion, in the play named after him, is induced by what he regards as a virtually

<sup>11</sup> Eur. *Med.* 1089, 'not strangers to the Muse' (Page 1938, 151), οὐκ ἀπόμουσον, describes that minority of women, including themselves (cf. 1085, 'we too have a Muse', ἔστιν μουσα καὶ ἡμῖν), whom the chorus take to have the cultured education and wisdom to compete with a male understanding of life: the passage implies a conception of *mousikê* which, once again, combines ideas of musico-poetic sophistication and a broader 'culture' of the mind. Cf. Mastronarde 2002, 346–348. For ἀπόμουσος cf. also n. 13 below.

<sup>12</sup> The only surviving attestation from Sophocles has the form ἀμούσωτος, which may mean 'without having heard the music': see fr. 819 with Pearson 1917, III, 47 for Mekler's speculation about the lost context.

<sup>13</sup> Heracles 'howls' (an animal metaphor) 'unmusically', ἄμουσ' ὑλακτῶν, at Eur. *Alc.* 760 and likewise in fr. 907 (where the musical standard is bad enough for 'a barbarian to notice'); for his musical ambiguity, see section 3 with n. 46 below. The same term, ἄμουσα, describes Polyphemus' singing at Eur. *Cyc.* 426 (cf. 489–490, quoted in my text below). A further point shared by *Alc.* 760–762 and *Cyc.* 425–426 is the evocation of *clashing* sound registers: rowdy celebration set against weeping. The Sphinx's 'songs' at Eur. *Phoen.* 807, an ironic metaphor for her riddle, are 'most unmusical' (ἀμουσοτάταισι mss., emended to ἀπομουσοτάταισι for metrical reasons by Nauck).

<sup>14</sup> Eur. *Ino*, fr. 407, ἀμουσία τοι μῆδ' ἐπ' οἰκτροῖσιν δάκρυ/στάζειν. Cf. Eur. *El.* 294, only the wise person (σοφός), not the ignorant (ἀμαθής), feels pity: see Denniston 1939, 85; Dover 1974, 119–123; Bond 1981, 134–135 for the cluster of associations which this exemplifies. *Qua* 'insensitivity', *amouisia* would probably have counted as one form of ἀναίσθησία (see Dover 1974, 59, 122–123; Diggle 2004, 333 for the scope of this concept), though no classical source makes the connection directly.

physical assault on him by Xuthus to generalize about those who are ‘uncultured and mad’ (ἀμούσους καὶ μεμηνότας, Eur. *Ion* 526). *Amousia*, it seems, can be manifested equally by an absence or a surfeit of emotion.

Such passages point towards a flexible conception of *amousia* (moving easily between the literal and the metaphorical)<sup>15</sup> which centers on a lack of sensitivity, sophistication, and finesse. The same is true of Euripides fr. 1033, in which one character evidently reproves another with the aphoristic statement, ‘to be obtuse is, in the first place, to display *amousia*’ (τὸ σκαίων εἶναι πρῶτ’ ἀμουσίαν ἔχει). The conjunction with ‘obtuseness’ is informative. The adjective *skaios*, literally ‘left(-handed)’ and capable of conveying various shades of ‘crass’, ‘uncouth’, ‘inept’ or the like, is interestingly used in some contexts for insensitivity relating directly to musico-poetic art. The chorus at Aristophanes *Wasps* 1013 calls ‘obtuse’ (σκαίων θεατῶν) those spectators on whom the allusive significance of the play’s *parabasis* might be lost. This brings the term within a familiar discourse used by the comic poet to praise or blame his audiences for their sophistication and cleverness or lack thereof: *skaios* (stupid, inept, crass) is the contrary of both *sophos* and *dexios*, which between them cover various kinds of cleverness, adeptness, and sophistication.<sup>16</sup> With *skaios* as with *amousos*, it is easy for the boundaries between various domains of activity to be blurred. Later in *Wasps* itself, Bdelycleon calls his father ‘obtuse and uneducated’ (ὦ σκαίε κάπαιδευτε, Ar. *Vesp.* 1183) in an exasperated reaction to Philocleon’s lack of sympotic adeptness. The ‘aesthetics’ of the symposium are a combination of social and musical skills.<sup>17</sup> Bdelycleon’s two adjectives resonate with this interplay of values.

As it happens, these same adjectives are applied to Polyphemus in a passage of Euripides’ *Cyclops* precisely with reference to that drunken singing which I have already mentioned is termed *amousos* elsewhere in the play.

<sup>15</sup> For a notable case of metaphor, see Pl. *Hp. mai.* 292c, where ‘singing a dithyramb out of tune’ (διθύραμβον τοσοῦτον ἄσας οὕτως ἀμούσως) refers to giving a flawed answer to a conceptual question; cf. n. 62 below. The note on this passage in Tarrant 1928, 59 is potentially misleading (‘the word’ refers only to the adverbial form).

<sup>16</sup> On *Wasps* 1013 and the comic poet’s treatment of his audience, see Imperio 2004, 270–271. For *skaios* and *sophos* as opposites see e.g. Eur. *Med.* 298–299, *HF* 299–300, *Heracl.* 458–459; for *skaios* and *dexios* (also spatial opposites *qua* ‘left’ and ‘right’: Pl. *Phdr.* 266a), see Ar. *Vesp.* 1265–1266 (with n. 17 below). Note also Pl. *Resp.* 41e2, quoted in section 4 below. On *skaios*, cf. Dover 1974, 120, 122; Chantraine 1956, 61–62.

<sup>17</sup> Cf. Lissarrague 1990 for one approach to the idea of sympotic aesthetics, Ford 2002, 25–45 for another. When Arynias is called *skaios* at Ar. *Vesp.* 1266, it also seems to be for reasons related to his sympotic history (with a suggestion that he lacked the social-cum-musical finesse to maintain a place in wealthy circles like those of Leogoras).

The chorus dub Polyphemus ‘an uncouth non-singer’ (σκαίος ἀπωδός) who ‘tries to make music from hideous noise’ (ἄχαριν κέλαδον μουσιζόμενος) and needs ‘educating’ for shortcomings which are simultaneously musical and social.<sup>18</sup> A character described as ‘uncouth and rustic’ (σκαίος ... κᾶγροικος) in a fragment of Ehippus for talking crudely is accused of perpetrating the linguistic equivalent of a lack of sartorial stylishness (something else, we recall, true of Philocleon in the symposium rehearsal in *Wasps*).<sup>19</sup> In Aristophanes’ *Clouds*, Socrates brands Strepsiades ‘rustic and obtuse’ (ἀγρεῖος εἶ και σκαίος, Ar. *Nub.* 655) for his inability, among other things, to grasp the technicalities of metrical rhythms (a subject Socrates thinks can make one ‘seem smart at social gatherings’ like symposia, κομψὸν ἐν συνουσίᾳ, Ar. *Nub.* 649). Notwithstanding the double-edged humor of this last passage, the force of the term *skaios* as denoting ineptitude across a wide spectrum of socio-cultural behavior is clear. And it is hard to challenge the speaker of Euripides fr. 1033 for bringing the term, as we saw, within the ambit of *amou-sia*.

The evidence so far gathered suggests that *amou-sia* was a concept with broad evaluative ramifications, some of which will reappear at various stages of my analysis. While it could apply in a strict sense to defects in musico-poetic knowledge or proficiency, it was also extendable to a lack of refinement, understanding, or sensitivity which manifests itself in different areas of personal and social behavior. As a result, the idea of *amou-sia* cuts across what modern categorization might demarcate as separate domains of aesthetic, emotional, educational, and ethical experience. In what was to become a practically proverbial passage from Euripides’ *Stheneboea* where the Nurse (?) says that ‘Eros teaches (someone to become) a poet, even if he was previously *amou-sos*’ (ποιητὴν δ’ ἄρα / Ἔρωσ διδάσκει, κἂν ἄμουσος ἦ τὸ πρῶν, Eur. fr. 663), it is not easy to hold cleanly apart two nuances of the adjective: one, a lack of aptitude for, the other a lack of any interest in, poetry.<sup>20</sup> There are, moreover, hints in some of the passages already cited of a complementary implication, namely that the symptoms of *amou-sia* are not a matter of discrete features of a person but more like the disclosure (in the eyes of those who make the judgment) of the defective structure of a character, personality, or sensibility. *Amou-sia* can be thought of, in that sense, as the condition of a life and its values as a whole.

<sup>18</sup> Eur. *Cyc.* 488–493.

<sup>19</sup> Ehippus fr. 23 KA: cf. Halliwell 2008, 240. Philocleon struggles with dress and deportment at Ar. *Vesp.* 1122–1173.

<sup>20</sup> See Collard et al. 1995, 94.

There is one further passage of Euripides which brings out that last point with eloquent clarity and which I would now like to consider in some detail, though without attempting to provide anything like an integrated reading of the text in its full dramatic context. In the second stasimon of *Heracles*, the chorus of elderly Thebans celebrate the recent return of the hero and the prospect of his family's rescue from the tyrant Lycus. Picking up a theme from the end of their previous song (Eur. *HF*. 436–441), they start by reflecting in the first strophic pair on the attractions of youthfulness (νεότητας, ἦβη) and the corresponding oppressiveness of old age.<sup>21</sup> Following on from those thoughts, the chorus then affirm, in the second strophe, their commitment to a life suffused with the values of the Muses (Eur. *HF*. 673–686):

I shall not cease to blend the Graces  
with the Muses,  
675 loveliest of partnerships.  
May I never live without the Muses,  
may I always live amidst garlands!  
Old I may be, but I am still a singer  
who proclaims with full voice the goddess Memory  
680 and still sings for Heracles  
the hymn of glorious victory  
along with Bromios giver of wine,  
along with the melody of seven-stringed lyre  
and Libyan pipes.  
685 I shall not yet put aside  
the Muses who set me dancing.

οὐ παύσομαι τὰς Χάριτας  
ταῖς Μούσαισιν συγκαταμει-  
675 γνύς, ἡδίσταν συζυγίαν.  
μὴ ζῶην μετ' ἀμουσίας,  
αἰεὶ δ' ἐν στεφάνοισιν εἶην·  
ἔτι τοι γέρων ἀοιδὸς  
κελαδῶ Μναμοσύναν,  
680 ἔτι τὰν Ἡρακλέους  
καλλίνικον ἀείδω  
παρὰ τε Βρόμιον οἰνοδόταν  
παρὰ τε χέλυος ἑπτατόνου

<sup>21</sup> Bond 1981, 224–248 provides full commentary on this and other details of the stasimon; Parry 1965 offers a reading of the ode as a variant on Pindaric epinician; cf. Swift 2010, 129–131. On the second strophic pair, see Lanata 1963, 175–178. Wright 2010, 172–173 sees in this passage a clustering of conventional motifs of 'poetics'.

μολπὴν καὶ Λίβυν αὐλόν.  
 685 οὐπὼ καταπαύσομεν  
 Μούσας αἶ μ' ἐχόρευσαν.

Particularly marked here (making this another passage which might have been in Nietzsche's subconscious when he wrote his own aphorism) is the feeling that a life without the Muses, a life of *amouisia*,<sup>22</sup> is radically impoverished and incomplete in value. The chorus of another, unknown Euripidean play (the fragment is sometimes speculatively assigned to *Antiope*), goes further still, counting a life without the Muses as a kind of death in life (Eur. fr. 1028):

Whoever in youth neglects the Muses  
 has perished for the whole of his past  
 and is dead for the future as well.

ὅστις νέος ὦν μουσῶν ἀμελεῖ  
 τὸν τε παρελθόντ' ἀπόλωλε χρόνον  
 καὶ τὸν μέλλοντα τέθνηκεν.

As with the remark of Protarchus in Plato's *Philebus* (we need music 'if our life is really to *be* a life of some kind', section 1 above), the choruses of both these Euripidean texts voice a conviction that the realm of the Muses is no self-contained, detachable activity but a complete dimension of life itself, a dimension without which life would be badly diminished. A salient feature of the passage from *Heracles* is the expressive suggestion that what the Muses endow human existence with is a counterbalance to, and compensation for, the process of aging and dying: in a way which echoes many archaic Greek sentiments, the beauty of song resists and even transcends the condition of mortality.<sup>23</sup> This point is all the more poignantly significant in the light of the chorus's counterfactual thought-experiment in the first antistrophe of the same stasimon that if the gods could adopt a perspective of *human* wisdom they would allow the good a second life, a second enjoyment of youth (δίδυμον ... ἦβαν, Eur. *HF*. 657) as a visible sign of their virtue. The transition from acceptance that this can never be so to the chorus's double assertion, as aging singers (and, in the second

<sup>22</sup> LSJ s.v. ἀμουσία II translate the term at *HF* 676 oddly as 'want of harmony'. The full force of 'without the Muses' is correctly seen by Lanata 1963, 176; Bond 1981, 239 (Euripides has 're-etymologized' the word).

<sup>23</sup> Cf. Wilson 1999–2000, 435 on 'the regenerative powers of *mousike*' in this passage, but setting it (433–439) against the imagery of destructive Dionysiac music which is to follow (cf. n. 30 below).

antistrophe, as a dying swan, Eur. *HF*. 692), that they will ‘never cease’ to dedicate themselves to the Muses, nonetheless transmits a subtle sense that the gifts of the Muses are a means of maintaining the value of a life in the face of its physical decline.<sup>24</sup>

The state of mind expressed by the chorus in this ode makes the Muses part of an intricate web of values. They represent a kind of compound, compendious *mousikê* in which vocal song, instrumental music (of both strings and woodwind), celebration (with garlands, victory hymns, and wine), choral dance, Dionysiac intoxication (Eur. *HF*. 682), and Memory (itself symbolizing a mixture of cultural tradition, memorialization, and musical facility) are all intertwined. In a familiar kind of tragic self-reference, the chorus’s own performance embodies all these things in the theatrical moment itself, at the same time as the Theban elders avow them within the world of the drama.<sup>25</sup> The conjunction of the Muses with the Graces (an old one, of course, and the legacy of a deep-rooted archaic Greek aesthetic) adds an expanded suggestion of radiance and pleasure which reinforces the idea that what the chorus devotes itself to is a ‘music’ tantamount to the fullness and fulfillment of life at its most beautiful.<sup>26</sup> One might aptly compare Pindar’s *Olympian* 14, a poem which on one level is about the power of song itself (including its capacity to transcend death, here by taking ‘news’ of the young victor’s success to his father in Hades) and in which the Graces are described as the source of *all* the pleasures and rewards (physical, intellectual, social—and above all ‘musical’) of both human and divine existence.<sup>27</sup>

If one of the functions of the second stasimon of *Heracles* is to express and enact an ideal of aesthetic value, that ideal does not purport to be self-sufficient or detached from the rest of existence. The chorus are not voicing abstract feelings; their words have a social context and meaning: they are celebrating and memorializing a momentous event, the triumphant return of Heracles ‘from the dead’ as the latest achievement of his remarkable life. (They had surveyed his previous labors in the first stasimon of the

<sup>24</sup> See Hardie 2004, 30–31 for the view that *HF* 657–666 evokes the symbolism of mystery religion. Mystery religion is certainly relevant to the play more generally (e.g. Seaford 1994, 378–381) but any resonance of it in this passage is obscured, to my mind, by the counterfactual pathos of the chorus’s sentiments.

<sup>25</sup> See Henrichs 1996, 54–55; cf. Henrichs 1995 for choral self-referentiality more generally.

<sup>26</sup> For the Kharites and Muses together, see West 1966, 177 on Hes. *Theog.* 64; cf. e.g. Ar. *Av.* 782, *Eccl.* 974a, fr. 348 KA. On ‘blending’ (συγκαταμειγνύς) the Graces with the Muses at *HF* 674–675, note the same verb at Xen. *Hier.* 6.2, where it denotes immersing the mind in sympotic celebrations (and escaping from life’s problems); cf. Halliwell 2008, 112–113.

<sup>27</sup> Pind. *Ol.* 14.5–6.

play, Eur. *HF*. 348–441, which was at the same time a kind of lament for his descent to Hades.) Moreover, in the second antistrophe they claim an explicitly ethical function for their songs. Comparing themselves to the Delian maidens who perform paeans at Apollo's temple on that island,<sup>28</sup> they think of themselves (and in a sense assume the role of) singing a paean outside Heracles' palace like a dying swan. In doing so they claim that 'what is right is the foundation of my hymns' (τὸ γὰρ εἶδ' τοῖς ὕμνοισιν ὑπάρχει, Eur. *HF*. 694–695). Song is an affirmation of more than its own pleasure; in the present case, it revolves around allegiance to Heracles as a bastion of excellence and a protection against various evils. That is why the stasimon ends with a resounding proclamation of Heracles' status as a son of Zeus who has helped to rid the world of monsters and thereby made it safer for human life (Eur. *HF*. 696–700).

The ode as a whole, then, is a vehicle of self-consciously poetic and musical praise which situates itself within a cluster of interactive values: performative beauty of voice, instruments, and dance; intensity of pleasure in the awareness of how the Muses, in collaboration with the Graces, make possible a celebration of life in defiance of its physical failings and the prospect of death; and, finally, a commitment to ethical, religious, and social standards of virtue which can themselves be fitly memorialized in song. For these Theban elders, a life 'without the Muses', a life μετ' ἀμουσίας (Eur. *HF*. 676), would indeed lack much more than music *stricto sensu*.

Yet what the chorus enacts in this ode (as well as in their almost ecstatic rejoicing over the death of Lycus, soon afterwards, in the third stasimon, Eur. *HF*. 763–814) is overcast by a terrible cloud of dramatic irony. There will soon be nothing left to celebrate about Heracles' return or his relationship to the gods; quite the reverse. To consider what difference such tragic irony makes to the values espoused by the chorus would require, in a sense, a complete theory of tragedy itself. I shall have to limit myself, for present purposes, to the rather bald claim that it is precisely because tragedy is itself a form of experience which, for its own audience, depends profoundly on values of *mousikê* that the chorus's deprecation of a life 'without the Muses' (μετ' ἀμουσίας) cannot be, and is not, simply nullified by the appalling consequences of Heracles' madness later in the play.<sup>29</sup> That madness may itself be viewed through the imagery of perverted music and dance.<sup>30</sup> The

<sup>28</sup> See Henrichs 1996, 55–60; cf. Rutherford 2001, 29, 114–115.

<sup>29</sup> For tragedy itself as part of *mousikê*, note Ar. *Ran.* 797; cf. n. 48 below.

<sup>30</sup> See esp. the ironic metaphors of music and dance at *HF* 871, 879, 889–890, 895, 925, 1303–1304, with Henrichs 1996, 60–62; cf. n. 23 above.

chorus will not, however, stop singing when they hear of Heracles' crazed slaughter of his children. They will sing a *different* kind of song instead, a song of anguished lament (in the course of which they will refer again directly to the Muses).<sup>31</sup>

So in a deeply paradoxical way the tragedy as a whole bears witness, both dramatically and in its own performance, to the chorus's continuing need for song and to their aversion to a life without the Muses. In that respect *Heracles* is ultimately representative of a central element in Attic tragedy's intrinsic nature. Tragedy testifies, among much else, to the possibility of turning, and the *need* to turn, to the expressive resources of 'song' even in the face of the worst. For some of (though not all) the direct victims of tragic misfortune there may be only the silence of death, a silence specifically characterized by the chorus of *Oedipus at Colonus* as a loss of music ('without the lyre, without dancing', ἄλυρος ἄχορος, Soph. *OC* 1222).<sup>32</sup> But within the larger dramatic world of tragedy, as well as in the genre's performative relationship to its audience, there always remains space for a 'music' which even disaster cannot wholly destroy. Furthermore, behind this fundamental component of tragic poetics is an older Greek sensibility, which makes the Muses symbolic of the capacity of song not just to come to terms with, but to impose a kind of consoling order onto, *all* aspects of existence, including suffering and death. The image of the Muses singing a lament for the dead Achilles in *Odyssey* 24 is an instructive emblem of this point.<sup>33</sup> The voices of the 'real' Muses are indefeasibly beautiful, and that is the aspiration of all human music too, including tragedy. Set against this larger background, the *amouisia* which the chorus of *Heracles* deprecate so emphatically is a negation, we might say, of an aesthetic for, and of, life in its entirety.

### 3. Aristophanes and the Comic Ambiguities of amousia

There is, however, another side to the matter. The chorus's aversion to *amouisia* in the second stasimon of *Heracles* hints delicately at the idea that not everyone would necessarily feel as they do. Tragedy, as part of the 'grand tradition' of Greek poetry, is undoubtedly wedded to an elaborate

<sup>31</sup> *HF* 1022, though the text is vexed: see Bond 1981, 327. Note also the chorus's self-conscious questioning about what kind of 'song for the dead' and 'chorus for Hades' they should sing: *HF* 1025–1027.

<sup>32</sup> Passage from the famous third stasimon: for one recent account of the ode, see Easterling 2009, esp. 164–170. On the various uses of ἄλυρος, cf. Dale 1954, 89–90.

<sup>33</sup> Hom. *Od.* 24.60–62; cf. Halliwell 2011a, 63–65.

aesthetic of life-values. But did it speak for everyone in fifth-century Athens, or was the audience to which it appealed a pre-selected cultural elite?<sup>34</sup> And even if we accept that Athenian theater to some degree represented an institutional democratization of the values of *mousikê*,<sup>35</sup> does our own tendency (part of the legacy of Romanticism) to idealize the kind of sensibility sketched in the previous section not carry with it the risk of exaggerating the extent and depth of adherence to such values within Greek culture as a whole? Might there well have been Greeks who could happily live 'without the Muses', without ever 'having any contact with *mousikê*', as the Socrates of Plato's *Republic* puts it?<sup>36</sup>

It is clearly not feasible here to address these questions systematically. Available evidence does not, in any case, allow anything like robustly sociological modeling of the relative proportions of particular Greek communities, not even in classical Athens, who were fully committed to an aesthetic of *mousikê* or, on the other hand, manifested insouciance about *amousia*. We can turn, though, to one particular source, Old Comedy, for some clues and pointers which, with suitably careful handling, may help to illuminate the issues at stake. Comedy is all the more useful in this respect because of its contiguous but ambivalent theatrical relationship to tragedy. My argument in this section, focused on a small selection of pertinent passages, will aim to show that where the aesthetics of *mousikê* and the challenge of *amousia* are concerned, comedy runs not in simple opposition to tragedy but in complex counterpoint with it.

It so happens that the only surviving fifth-century occurrence of the *amousos* wordgroup not already noted is found in Aristophanes. It turns up in the scene early in *Thesmophoriazusae* where the young, supposedly effeminate tragedian Agathon is mocked by the old, uncouth Kinsman of Euripides. The whole context hinges on a comically intricate contrast which is both discursive and personal: a contrast in both speech styles and physical demeanor. The resulting collision is one to which connotations of *amousia* mentioned in the previous section are doubly germane: both in relation

<sup>34</sup> For the current tendency to scale down the size of fifth-century audiences to perhaps 7000 or fewer, on the basis of a new archaeological reconstruction of the Theater of Dionysus, see Revermann 2006, 168–169, Csapo 2007, 97–100 (with the archaeological appendix by H. Goette, *ibid.* 116–121); Sommerstein 2010, 140.

<sup>35</sup> This is precisely the (jaundiced) point of [Xen.] *Ath. pol.* 1.13: democracy undermined the practices of *mousikê* as the preserve of an elite but made the rich pay for them in a form which benefited the demos. Cf. Wilson 2000, 13–14, 126–127.

<sup>36</sup> See Pl. *Resp.* 411c, quoted in section 4 below: sociologically, this is not a reference to the 'uneducated' *tout court* but to those obsessed with athletics.

to musico-poetic matters as such, and as a marker of more general socio-cultural values. The term *amouson* appears at the point at which Agathon, in response to the Kinsman's barrage of innuendo about his feminine attire (see below), has attempted to explain his costume as part of a 'mimetic' act of poetic creativity in which he is assimilating his whole manner to that of female characters. The Kinsman has twice interrupted this explanation with obscene comments (153, 157–158). Seemingly ignoring these, Agathon continues by asserting (*Ar. Thesm.* 159–160):

Besides, it's such an uncultured sight to see a poet  
Who belongs in the fields and is shaggy all over.

ἄλλως τ' ἄμουσόν ἐστι ποιητὴν ἰδεῖν  
ἀγρεῖον ὄντα καὶ δασύν.<sup>37</sup>

He then proceeds to invoke the counter-examples of figures such as Ibycus, Anacreon, Alcaeus and the early tragedian Phrynichus whose beautiful poetry and music were matched, he claims, by their fastidiously stylish dress and good looks.

Agathon's alignment of personal, even sartorial, deportment with the values of *mousikê* is a comically pointed version of a gesture of social and cultural exclusivity. Even his use of the term *amousoi* itself, together with ἀγρεῖος (instead of ἀγροικός) for 'rustic', may have a precious, 'poeticizing' ring to it in this context.<sup>38</sup> There is more than one point of connection with passages cited in the previous section; we have already seen *amousoi* equated with 'rusticity' and even with sartorial inelegance.<sup>39</sup> Aristophanes gives the concepts and values in question a racy immediacy, reinforced by the visual contrast between Agathon and the Kinsman, the latter himself decidedly shaggy and perhaps rustic too.<sup>40</sup> The Kinsman is no poet, of course (though

<sup>37</sup> The translation 'incongruous' for ἄμουσον in 159, LSJ s.v. ἄμουσος, is too bland, missing the resonance which the word derives from the scene's clash of poetic/cultural values. Miller 1946, 176 is unwarranted in seeing here a specific reminiscence of Eur. fr. 663 (cf. text at n. 20 above).

<sup>38</sup> See Austin and Olson 2004, 109 for both these linguistic points. We should not, however, jump to the conclusion that *amousoi* was an exclusively poetic term in the fifth century: its standard fourth-century prose usage (meaning technically 'unmusical', the opposite of *mousikos*: e.g. Arist. *Gen. corr.* 319b25–30, and cf. n. 62 below on Plato) means that the lack of comparable fifth-century evidence may be accidental.

<sup>39</sup> See *Ar. Nub.* 655, cited in section 2 above, for rusticity (ἀγρεῖος there paralleling *Thesm.* 160; cf. previous note); see n. 19 above for a linkage between *amousoi* and dress.

<sup>40</sup> The Kinsman's hair, both facial and bodily, is highlighted in the shaving scene at 215–246; he was treated by Agathon's servant as a rustic, ἀγροιώτας, within the paratragic mélange at 58.

he would be happy to create obscenities for a satyr play, Ar. *Thesm.* 157–158). But it is as if Agathon is subtextually telling him, ‘We fine poets are not vulgar riffraff (like *you*)’. The tragedian and the old man see things from opposite but complementary angles; each of them perceives a nexus of poetic artistry and social style. Agathon’s notion of *amousia* implicitly appeals to a compound aesthetic of specifically poetic activity and something broad enough to count as a ‘lifestyle’. There is some affinity between the present scene and the debate which took place in Euripides’ *Antiope* between Amphion the poet and Zethus the worldly pragmatist. We know that Zethus sneered at his brother’s allegedly effeminate appearance, which he took to be a sign of the decadence of his devotion to a life of song.<sup>41</sup> We also know, as it happens, that in an ironic appropriation of his brother’s language of values Zethus urged Amphion to ‘practise the fine music of *physical work*’ (πόνων εὐμουσίαν/ἄσκει, Eur. fr. 188)<sup>42</sup> and to make such things into his (sc. alternative to) ‘song’ (τοιαῦτ’ ἄειδε, *ibid.*). Zethus, we might say, reverses the evaluative force of *amousia*. Not only can he live happily without the Muses. He thinks others should do so too.

But is the Kinsman of *Thesmophoriazusae* just a comically reductive equivalent to the principles of Zethus? The clash between him and Agathon, I suggest, involves something more complicated than that—more complicated, not least, for the aesthetic experience of Aristophanes’ own audience. In the course of the first scene, the play sets up a series of polarized contrasts between, on one side, the intellectual-cum-poetic pretensions of Euripides, Agathon’s slave, and Agathon himself, and, on the other, the Kinsman’s traits of obtuseness, cynicism, and vulgarity. There is an important sense in which the comedy internalizes these polarities in order to make them an effective part of its own theatrical and poetic dynamics: it offers no one-sided resolution to the conflicts of styles and values between the characters. An audience of the play needs to have a degree of understanding for *both* sides of the divide—a feel for what makes the poets’ pretensions *and* the Kinsman’s crudity the sorts of stances they are—if it is to appreciate the various twists and layers of humor which give the scene its character. But that in turn opens up the possibility of perceiving in the scene

<sup>41</sup> Eur. fr. 185: the style of dress in question may have had Dionysiac connections. Cf. Amphion’s response in fr. 199. Note that part of Amphion’s case rested on a conception of beauty or beautiful things, τὰ καλά, fr. 198.2. Collard et al. 2004, 259–329 provide a useful discussion of the fragments.

<sup>42</sup> Note that the adjective cognate with *eumousia* appears in the song of Agathon’s servant at Ar. *Thesm.* 112.

a comic exposure of the difficulty of identifying just where the boundaries of *amouisia* are supposed to lie.

There is a further comic element to be factored in here: the incorporation in the Kinsman's character of something less simple than sheer ignorance of poetry. The clearest instance of this occurs when at 136–145 he displays the poetic knowledge to quote (or adapt) some extracts from Aeschylus' *Lycourgeia* in the very act of mocking Agathon with a virtuoso sequence of rhetorical questions. That 'knowledge', which cannot be fully rationalized but adds a layer of comic uncertainty to the Kinsman's relationship to poetry, brings with it a drastic shift of speech register from his earlier repertoire of verbal raspberries (βομβάξ, *Ar. Thesm.* 45, βομβαλοβομβάξ, 48) and sexual obscenities (*Ar. Thesm.* 50, 57, 62). Moreover, his resort to Aeschylean drama as a weapon of mockery against Agathon might be thought to activate a sense of historical changes in the style and ethos of tragedy: implicitly 'masculine' Aeschylus is pitted against the soft 'effeminacy' of modern Agathon—a clash of poetic qualities partly akin to the antinomies used to structure the contest of tragedians in *Frogs* and prefigured as early as *Clouds* in the dispute about poetry between father and son reported at 1364–1378. The Kinsman does not articulate any 'thesis' about the poetic differences between Aeschylus and Agathon. But, like Strepsiades (also a rustic, 'uncultured' figure) in *Clouds*, his lack of rapport with 'modern'<sup>43</sup> poetry is associated with a leaning towards the standards of the past, rather than with an aversion to poetry *tout court*.

This aspect of the scene not only illustrates the slipperiness of the Kinsman's cultural profile but draws out a teasing paradox that is built into the aesthetics of Aristophanic comedy itself. Aristophanes' own audience (or reader) must be able to see at least some of the issues raised by the idea of *amouisia* from opposing sides simultaneously. In the case of *Thesmophoriazousae*, this means that they should be capable of a sort of vicarious *amouisia* in relishing the Kinsman's mocking subversion of the elevated values—lyric beauty, self-conscious artistry, imaginative impersonations—affirmed by (some) contemporary tragedy, including its supporting poetics of 'creativity'. But at the same time they need to be able to regard the character of the Kinsman as in many respects crass and vulgar: the kind of person they would be embarrassed to resemble, one might say (adapting a comment on

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<sup>43</sup> Cf. Strepsiades' reference to the 'modern' (or 'younger generation of') poets, νεώτεροι, at *Nub.* 1370. Note the description, earlier in the same play, of the performer of 'contemporary' music as 'doing away with the Muses', τὰς Μούσας ἀφανίζων (*Nub.* 972).

comedy made by the Platonic Socrates), in the real social world *outside* the theater.<sup>44</sup> My claim is not, of course, meant to rule out many conceivable variations of response on the part of individual spectators. But it is hard if not impossible to see how anyone who was not (at some level) interested in engaging with the kinds of poetic details and nuances exploited by Aristophanes' text could derive any real satisfaction from the scene. One might encapsulate the resulting paradox by saying that the Kinsman's (comically complicated) *amouisia* is a means to the end of comedy's recuperation, on its own behalf, of the pleasures and values of *mousikê*.

It may be instructive to glance here at another Aristophanic passage which exposes the parameters of *amouisia* to the pressures of comic manipulation. The encounter between Dionysus and Heracles in the opening scene of *Frogs* involves, among other things, a clash of values between a self-professed lover of tragic poetry (including, it is worth recalling, that of Agathon as well as Euripides: see lines 83–84) and someone who appears skeptical, even dismissive, of the value of such poetry altogether. Dionysus' decision to journey to Hades in search of a dead poet is itself a (comic) enactment of attachment to *mousikê* as a life-value. It is motivated by a conviction, comparable to the one voiced by the chorus of Euripides' *Heracles* (section 2 above), that life *needs* the experiences afforded by poetry and music: Dionysus has lost something for which he feels a yearning that combines quasi-erotic feelings with a sense of bereavement.<sup>45</sup> The god's feelings treat the death of Euripides as a diminution of the 'quality of life' for lovers of poetic drama. And his quotation of a line from Euripides' own *Oineus* ('some are no longer alive, and those that survive are worthless', Ar. *Ran.* 72: οἱ μὲν γὰρ οὐκέτ' εἰσὶν, οἱ δ' ὄντες κακοί, Eur. fr. 565) enlarges his point of view into a judgment on a whole cultural state of affairs.

Heracles, by sharp contrast, has the air of a kind of (comic) 'philistine', and thus one type of *amouisos*, where poetry is concerned. Aristophanes is here creating his own version of a figure who, in his general mythological persona, stood in an unstable relationship to *mousikê*: a good enough musician, in some depictions, to play for the gods, but in others so bad a music pupil that he ends up killing his teacher, Linus.<sup>46</sup> In *Frogs*, Heracles can

<sup>44</sup> See Pl. *Resp.* 606c; cf. Halliwell 2008, 255–256.

<sup>45</sup> For a reading of *Frogs* which makes Dionysus' 'love' of poetry a crucial part of the whole play's thematic trajectory, see Halliwell 2011a, ch. 3.

<sup>46</sup> Heracles as kitharist for the gods: Bond 1981, 238; Schefold 1992, 42–45. Heracles as murderer of his own music-teacher: Gantz 1993, 378–379. Cf. n. 13 above for the inebriated Heracles' unmusical singing at Eur. *Alc.* 760, fr. 907.

rattle off the names of 'lesser' tragedians (Ar. *Ran.* 73–87), just as the Kinsman was able to do in *Thesmophoriazusae* (Ar. *Thesm.* 168–170). But in addition to his sweeping contempt for Euripides (whose poetry he calls a 'con-trick', κόβαλα, and 'total rubbish', παμπόνηρα) he conveys a cool detachment about whether *any* tragic drama matters in the way Dionysus believes that it does. Even his suggestion that Sophocles would be a preferable choice to Euripides is tempered by the statement, 'if you really *must* bring back [sc. a poet] from there' (εἴπερ ἐκεῖθεν δεῖ σ' ἄγειν, Ar. *Ran.* 77). It is open to an audience of *Frogs* to perceive Heracles as emerging from the encounter with Dionysus as someone appreciative exclusively of the pleasures of the stomach. That is Dionysus' own take on their disagreement: 'Don't try to inhabit *my* mind', he tells his half-brother, 'just stick to your own' (Ar. *Ran.* 105), before adding, 'I'll take your advice where *food* is concerned' (Ar. *Ran.* 107).<sup>47</sup>

There are, for sure, other ways of weighing up the conflicting attitudes to poetry displayed by Heracles and Dionysus. One might perhaps, for instance, see Heracles as less of a philistine than I take him to be, and Dionysus as correspondingly more eccentric (or undiscerning) in the strength of his passion for Euripides. But however one positions the two characters on the spectrum that runs from the sensitivity of the *mousikos* to the uncouth (and/or insouciant) insensitivity of the *amousos*, it is clear that Aristophanes turns the scene into a vignette of the possibility of radical disagreement over the importance of poetic-cum-aesthetic value to life. As in the first scene of *Thesmophoriazusae*, this places the audience of *Frogs* itself in an ambiguous position where they need to be able to savor the clash of values as a form of experience made available by the distinctive poetic dynamics of comedy. As I have already suggested, Aristophanic comedy offers no one-sided cynicism in such matters. If it did, plays like *Thesmophoriazusae* and *Frogs*, with their sustained and intricately allusive fabric of quotation, adaptation, and parody, would be unintelligible: what kind of audience could sit through them without being able to draw on at least an instinctive appreciation of the kinds of stylistic and thematic details on which they depend, and without an underlying awareness of the cultural values which such appreciation presupposed?<sup>48</sup> No engaged audience of such comedies, in other words, could

<sup>47</sup> Dionysus had taken this line from the start of their conversation, using a basic culinary example (soup) to give Heracles some idea of the intensity of his own desires (62–64).

<sup>48</sup> Cf. Dionysus' own aspiration to judge tragedy 'with great finesse' or 'in the most cultured manner', μουσικώτατα (873): the qualities of poetry, *qua mousikê* (cf. *Ran.* 797, with

be unconcerned about a slur of *amousia*, whether or not *amousos* is the right description for Euripides' Kinsman in *Thesmophoriazusae* or Heracles in *Frogs*.

It is unnecessary to buttress this argument by dwelling on the familiar fact that Aristophanic comedy frequently advertises the importance of a conception of *mousikê* for its generic self-image and in the process appeals to standards of sophistication and finesse on the part of both the poet and his (ideal) audience.<sup>49</sup> But it is worth adding that Aristophanes can also rely on his audience's acceptance of the disreputability of *amousia* in framing satirical gibes against named individuals. One passage which falls into that category is the disdain expressed in the final ode of *Frogs* for Euripides' supposed abandonment of traditional norms of *mousikê* under the influence of Socratic intellectualism.<sup>50</sup> Rather than reconsidering here that famous and controversial passage, I shall end this section with a rather different example, the mocking vignette of Cleon's allegedly defective musical education which is found in one of the choral odes of *Knights* (984–991):

There's another thing that amazes me:  
his swinish lack of culture!  
They say, you know,  
the boys who went to school with him,  
that the Dorian mode was the only one  
in which he used to tune his lyre—  
he refused to learn anything else!

ἀλλὰ καὶ τόδ' ἔγωγε θαυ-  
μάζω τῆς ὁμουσίας  
αὐτοῦ· φασι γὰρ αὐτὸν οἱ  
παῖδες οἱ ξυνεφοίτων,  
τὴν Δωριστὶ μόνῃν ἂν ἀρ-  
μόττεσθαι θαμὰ τὴν λύραν,  
ἄλλῃν δ' οὐκ ἐθέλειν μαθεῖν.

my next note), call for a matching sensitivity of appreciation (however unevenly Dionysus may actually live up to this aspiration).

<sup>49</sup> For appeals to a Muse or Muses as a badge of self-conscious comic *mousikê*, see esp. *Eq.* 505–506, *Vesp.* 1028, *Pax* 775, 816, *Ran.* 356, 674, 876, frs. 347–348 KA. Sommerstein 2009, 116–135 is a useful survey of the vocabulary/ways in which Old Comedians, esp. Aristophanes, construct a poetics of their genre.

<sup>50</sup> *Ran.* 1491–1499: discussions include Arrighetti 2006, 168–180 and Brancacci 2008, 35–55 (too anxious to see Plato and Xenophon as responding directly to this Aristophanic passage); cf. Halliwell 2011a, 151–152. The passage should not be read as critiquing a general 'sophistic' threat to traditional *mousikê*, contra Koller 1963, 88 (cf. n. 61 below).

A striking implication of this passage for my purposes is that musical values are culturally contestable. Cleon is portrayed as *amousos* (worse still, as badly educated as a pig, *huomousia* being a phonologically piquant variation on *amousia*)<sup>51</sup> in virtue not of incompetence but of deliberate resistance to anything more than a basic, conservative musical taste.<sup>52</sup> His restriction to the Dorian mode (which happens also to prepare the way for a pun on financial corruption in the Greek) probably implies a determination to retain a deliberately severe, manly public ethos, averse to refinements of *mousikê*.<sup>53</sup> It also carries echoes of the reputation of Themistocles, to whom Cleon compares himself at *Knights* 812 (cf. 884). We know from a fragment of Ion of Chios that Themistocles was believed to have had little or no musical education/ability; it seems also that he tried to make a virtue of this, contrasting the point with his great political achievements.<sup>54</sup> We can detect here the kind of polarization to which debates about the life-value of, in the widest sense, *mousikê* were susceptible. Themistocles and Cleon represent in the political sphere the kind of stance adopted by the mythological Zethus in Euripides' *Antiope* (section 2 above). Cleon may also have been self-consciously opposed in this respect to Pericles, who is presented by Thucydides as idealizing, and aligning himself with, Athenian 'love of beauty' as a key value of the city's culture.<sup>55</sup>

<sup>51</sup> On the metaphorical lexicon of swinishness for cultural and intellectual shortcomings, see e.g. Ar. *Pax* 928, Pl. *Tht.* 166c, with Taillardat 1965, 254–255. Beta 2004, 88 compares 'stupid, pig-stylish talk' (λόγος ... ἀμαθῆς σοβαύβαλος) in Cratinus fr. 345 KA. It is germane that at Ar. *Vesp.* 35–36 Cleon's demagogic style involves 'the voice of a burnt sow': on the sense of this see Zuntz 1989; cf. Beta 2004, 33.

<sup>52</sup> The Dorian 'mode' (or tuning/scale) counts as the most important from a culturally conservative viewpoint at Pl. *Resp.* 399a, *Lach.* 188d. On the musical modes in the classical period, cf. West 1992, 177–184.

<sup>53</sup> Neil 1901, 138 compares Cleon's 'contempt of culture' at Thuc. 3.37–38 (the Mytilenean debate). In similar vein, Gomme 1956, 300 notes a connection between Cleon's brazen exculpation of 'ignorance', *amathia* (cf. n. 51 above), at Thuc. 3.37.3–4 and the depiction of Cleon in *Knights* as lacking in *mousikê*. Cf. n. 56 below. Note the conjunction of *amathia* with *amousia* at Pl. *Resp.* 41e, quoted in section 4 below; cf. n. 16 above.

<sup>54</sup> See Ion of Chios *FGrH* 392 F13, *apud* Plut. *Vit. Cim.* 9.1; cf. Plut. *Vit. Them.* 2.4, *Phld. Mus.* 4, col. 125.33–37 (Delattre 2007, with his note 7, II, 419–420), and perhaps a further allusion at Ar. *Vesp.* 959 (cf. 989), with the discussion in Harmon 2003, 352–361, who takes no account however of Ar. *Eq.* 984–991. Wilson 2004, 299–300 finds traces of ambiguity in the sources for Themistocles' relationship to elite musical culture.

<sup>55</sup> Thuc. 2.40.1. While Rusten 1985, 17 is right to say that this and nearby claims need not apply to every individual Athenian, he is wrong, in my view, to argue that Pericles is characterizing separate kinds of 'lives': rather, he is simply generalizing about Athenian values.

Whether or not the chorus in *Knights* is picking up some of Cleon's own rhetorical slogans, Aristophanes certainly feels able to count on his audience's appreciation and enjoyment of a charge of *amousia* carried to an extreme of 'swinishness': this, after all, is a premise of the entire play, as the Sausage-Seller was reassured at the outset.<sup>56</sup> However much Aristophanes may elsewhere exploit the ambiguities arising from ideas of *amousia*, and however much the real Cleon may himself have manipulated such issues for his own populist politics, the satirical priorities of *Knights* unmistakably show that Aristophanic comedy retains the right to tarnish others with accusations of *amousia*. While comedy can appeal, in some circumstances, to the social elitism which had traditionally belonged with an extensive education in *mousikê*,<sup>57</sup> its own theatrical *raison d'être* is tied to performance (with choruses of non-aristocratic citizens) at civic festivals whose audiences, whatever their exact size and composition, are typically treated as representative of the collective democratic citizenry.<sup>58</sup> Aristophanic comedy always positions itself deftly, in the end, on the side of the Muses. Or, rather, it presents those Muses in its own gaudy clothing and proclaims its allegiance to their aesthetic and cultural values as remade in its own image.

#### 4. *Plato and the Philosophical Revaluation of mousikê*

In a famous passage of Plato's *Phaedo*, Socrates tells Cebes that on many occasions during his life he has had dreams in which various apparitions addressed him with the words, 'Socrates, compose and practice music' (μουσικήν ποίει καὶ ἐργάζου, Pl. *Phd.* 60d–61b). In his attempts to interpret the meaning of this injunction, Socrates had long assumed that his dreams were urging him to continue with (and intensify) his existing way of life, 'on the grounds that philosophy is the greatest music' (ὡς φιλοσοφίας μὲν οὔσης

<sup>56</sup> At Ar. *Eq.* 188–193 the Sausage-Seller's lack of *mousikê* (above the level of basic literacy) is converted into an ideal *qualification* for a demagogue; cf. Eup. fr. 208 KA (Maricas = Hyperbolus) with Storey 2003, 201–202. Likewise being 'ignorant' (*amathês*): see n. 53 above.

<sup>57</sup> Ar. *Ran.* 727–733 is the most direct instance of this, but even this passage, with its special political nostalgia in the circumstances of 405, suggests that an education in the values of *mousikê* was widely shared in Athens: cf. Swift 2010, 43–55 on evidence (including comedy) for 'continuity of cultural values across the socio-economic spectrum' (51).

<sup>58</sup> Choral passages in Aristophanes which imply (from various angles) that the audience represents the male citizenry as a whole include: *Ach.* 628–664, 971, *Eq.* 576–594, *Pax* 759, *Lys.* 1194–1215, *Thesm.* 352–371, 785–845.

μεγίστης μουσικῆς, Pl. *Phd.* 61a).<sup>59</sup> But once he found himself awaiting execution in prison, he began to wonder whether the dream injunction might after all be using the term *mousikê* in its 'popular' sense. As a precaution, he accordingly composed a hymn to Apollo and versified some fables of Aesop.

The significance of Socrates' strange dreams remains unresolved for readers of the *Phaedo* as well as for Socrates himself. But it is notable that on both the philosophical and the poetic interpretations which he adopts at different times, Socrates understands his dreams to be instructing him to give *mousikê* an essential place in his life, even as he approaches the moment of his death.<sup>60</sup> The dream injunction does not disclose what the value of *mousikê* is supposed to be, but the earnestness with which Socrates responds to it presupposes that *mousikê* can somehow be made a life-defining activity. In a very different Platonic context, an idea of this kind is also found in the mouth of Protagoras, who espouses a theory of education (including the teaching of poetry and music to children) built on the principle that 'the whole of human life needs good rhythm and harmony' (πάς γὰρ ὁ βίος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου εὐρυθμίας τε καὶ εὐαρμοστίας δεῖται, Pl. *Prt.* 326b). However authentic or otherwise Plato's presentation of Protagoras may be, the views advocated by the latter must make sense as a culturally plausible ideal, an ideal akin to the one Protarchus affirms in the *Philebus* (section 1 above) and which links the value of *mousikê* to the larger goals of life.<sup>61</sup> This is certainly a Protagoras one can imagine concurring with the chorus's sentiment in Euripides' *Heracles*, 'may I never live without the Muses!' We might equivalently posit for Plato's (unlike Aristophanes') Socrates the view that 'a life without *mousikê* is not worth living'. But in his case, there seems more uncertainty about just what kind of *mousikê* it is which human life requires.

In the previous sections of this chapter I used selective evidence from Euripidean and Aristophanic theater to explore some of the ways in which problems of *amouisia* form points of interference within the workings of Athenian/Greek cultural values and thereby draw attention to part of what

<sup>59</sup> Although this may be a Pythagorean idea, the reason for supposing it to be such in Burnet 1911, 17 does not meet the point: Aristoxenus fr. 26 Wehrli, reporting Pythagorean use of music for 'katharsis of the soul', refers to actual music (cf. Burkert 1972, 212). For the philosopher as true *mousikos*, cf. e.g. *Resp.* 591d, *Phdr.* 248d, *Ti.* 88c.

<sup>60</sup> See Burnet 1911, 16–17 on ἐργάζεσθαι, which implies 'practicing' music as something like a way of life. On *Phd.* 60d–61b, cf. Brancacci 2008, 53–55.

<sup>61</sup> Koller 1963, 87 cites Pl. *Prt.* 326b as testimony to traditional 'musical' education, but on 88–90 he suggests, without convincing evidence, that such education was undermined by the sophistic movement. Cf. n. 50 above.

is entailed by those values. As that evidence helped to show, the values of *mousikê*, together with perceptions of the threat of *amouisia*, attach themselves to core activities of song/poetry, music, and dance but also tend to configure themselves in terms of a number of social, educational, and ethical variables. They are, that is to say, a matter of aesthetics (in which ideas of beauty, form, expressiveness, and more besides, play a part) embedded in a larger matrix of cultural practices and standards. In this final section I turn my attention to Plato, whose dialogues, I shall suggest, do not represent a clean break with older ideas of *mousikê* and *amouisia* but instead reappraise and partly redefine them for the purposes of a new philosophical ideal. That process of redefinition, together with some of its ambiguities (for which Socrates' shifting interpretations of his dream injunction in *Phaedo* are an apt symbol), is itself testimony to the importance of issues whose long pre-platonic ancestry has been sampled in the earlier stages of my argument.

As it happens, the vocabulary of *amouisia* occurs more often in Plato than in any other author from the classical period. His dialogues confirm that by the fourth century the semantics of the *amouisos* wordgroup had settled into a pattern of usage (whose fifth-century precedents have already been noted) which embraced both a specifically musical sense and a looser denotation, each of them the opposite of a corresponding use of *mousikos* and its cognates. The first of these senses of *amouisia* picks out a lack of more or less technical proficiency and/or appreciation: so, an inability (or disinclination) to sing, play an instrument, or follow a musical performance.<sup>62</sup> The other denotes a lack of refinement across a broader spectrum of educational, social and cultural behavior, its precise inflection depending on the presuppositions of particular contexts. It is the ramifications of this second sense within Plato's own thought, and its association with a philosophically redefined ideal of *mousikê*, which concern me here. For reasons of space, I shall restrict myself mostly to some observations on the *Republic*.

When Socrates impersonates the Muses in *Republic* 8, making them predict the inevitable decline of even as scrupulously designed a constitution as that of Callipolis, he gives them a vision of a future in which a debased generation of the Guardian class will become neglectful of the Muses themselves: 'in their role as Guardians, they will start to neglect *us* first, regarding the

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<sup>62</sup> Examples of the specifically musical sense of *amouisos* in Plato include *Hp. mai.* 292c (metaphorical: n. 15 above), *Phd.* 105e, *Tht.* 144e, *Soph.* 253b, *Resp.* 335c, 349e, 455e (women). At *Leg.* 670a technical competence is nonetheless condemned as *amouisia*: the Athenian is here speaking about supposedly meaningless instrumental virtuosity; cf. West 1992, 70. Halliwell 201b provides an overview of the thematics of music in Plato's dialogues.

domain of music as less important than they should, and after that they will neglect the domain of gymnastics; the result will be that your young people will become less cultured (*amousoteroi*).<sup>63</sup> This should remind us (if some readers need reminding) that the entire structure of the *Republic's* thought-experiment of an ideal city would collapse without its foundation on the practice of a form of *mousikê*. If the (undebased) Guardian class is imagined as attaining ultimately to a philosophically higher level of *mousikê* (see below), they nonetheless do so on the basis of a system which preserves the elaborately musico-poetic (as well as the gymnastic) elements of traditional Greek education.

The argument pursued by Socrates in the *Republic* involves a reappraisal, and at certain points a challenging critique, of the idea of *mousikê* as a cultural repository of life-values. But this reappraisal does not simply overturn existing views of 'the realm of the Muses' or the price to be paid for neglecting that realm (*amousia*). It preserves from such views a notion of *mousikê* as something which does not belong in a category of its own but can shape the qualities of life as a whole. In *Republic* 3, when setting out the principles of a (partially reformed) education in poetry and music, Socrates thinks of the properties of music *per se* as expressively connected to qualities of 'life': in a manner which probably reflects the ideas of Damon,<sup>64</sup> he suggests to Glaucon that they need to find rhythms and melodic tunings (*harmoniai*) which can match and convey in sound the ethical qualities of certain kinds of life, *bios* (Pl. *Resp.* 399e–401a). Soon after this, at 401, Socrates extends the link between musical/artistic form and life-defining character into a principle which he projects onto the entire cultural environment.<sup>65</sup> In this remarkable passage, he declares that not only the arts he has already discussed (poetry, song and music, and we can add dance too)<sup>66</sup> but also painting,

<sup>63</sup> ἡμῶν πρῶτον ἄρξονται ἀμελεῖν φύλακες ὄντες, παρ' ἔλαττον τοῦ δέοντος ἡγησάμενοι τὰ μουσικῆς, δεῦτερον δὲ τὰ γυμναστικῆς, ὅθεν ἀμουσότεροι γενήσονται ὑμῖν οἱ νέοι: *Resp.* 546d. It would be at least legitimate to take φύλακες ὄντες as concessive, 'although (sc. supposedly) Guardians ...'.

<sup>64</sup> *Contra* Barker 2007, 47 and n. 18, who queries whether Damon had much influence on Plato at all.

<sup>65</sup> 'Environment' is the apt term: Socrates uses metaphors of 'pasture', 'healthy location', and beneficial 'atmosphere', 401c. Burnyeat 1999, esp. 249–258, 319–324, emphasizes the *Republic's* concern with the influence of artistic images on the culture as a whole.

<sup>66</sup> Although dance receives no explicit discussion, *Resp.* 412b makes it clear that it is subject to the same principles as poetry and music; cf. 373b for the inclusion of dancers in the class of practitioners of *mousikê* (οἱ περὶ μουσικήν), and 383c for a passing reference to the choral component of drama in the city's culture.

weaving, architecture, and related activities, as well as the human body and the structures of other natural objects, all exhibit a principle of good and bad form: ‘in all these things there is the intrinsic possibility of beauty or ugliness of form’ (ἐν πᾶσι γὰρ τοῦτοις ἔνεστιν εὐσχημοσύνη ἢ ἀσχημοσύνη, Pl. *Resp.* 401a). This is a principle, he indicates, of mimetically *expressive* form (whether rhythmic, melodic, verbal, or visual): form which embodies, represents, and communicates qualities of ethical ‘life’, and whose beauty (or ugliness) will be absorbed into the souls of those who come into contact with it.<sup>67</sup> The passage promotes an ideal, therefore, which is self-evidently educational, social, and political. But its sensitivity to expressiveness and beauty of form makes its concerns also, in quintessentially Greek terms, a matter of irreducibly aesthetic value—a kind of experience which operates through the capacities for evaluative judgment that inhere in perception, *aisthêsis*.<sup>68</sup>

Socrates’ notion of *euskhêmosunê* (beauty of form) covers *mousikê* in both the narrower and wider senses mentioned above. As we have seen, it is a notion which grows out of a discussion of the rhythmic and melodic possibilities of music (in its role as an accompaniment to poetry) but also serves, in its strongly ethical and ‘life-expressive’ slant, to transform the concept of *mousikê* into something far more than a sphere of technical competency. Following on from the passage just cited, Socrates describes the ideal *mousikos* as someone who will be capable of recognizing the ‘patterns’ or ‘forms’ (*eidê*) of ethical qualities (self-discipline, courage, etc.) both in their actual instances and in ‘images’ (*eikones*) of them (Pl. *Resp.* 402b–c). Such a person will be aroused to a powerful passion (*erôs*) for the most beautiful sights, above all for the person in whom there is discernible concord between body and soul; beauty of this kind is apprehended through the senses but has a value that is more than material (Pl. *Resp.* 402d). The impetus of his argument enables Socrates to reach the point where he can describe sexual desire that seeks fulfillment in merely carnal acts as itself a type of *amouisia* and of insensitivity to beauty, *apeirokalia* (Pl. *Resp.* 403c). Immediately after this, he encapsulates his ideal in the grand

<sup>67</sup> For perceptive remarks on this passage, including the mimetic aspect of the theory, see Schofield 2011, 236–238; his article is the best analysis of the psychology of music in the *Republic*. Cf. Halliwell 201b, 309–311.

<sup>68</sup> Although the terminology of *aisthêsis* is no necessary part of my argument, I note that Socrates’ ideals in this section of *Republic* 3 do in fact identify sense-perception (αἰσθήσεις, αἰσθησις) as the channel of the evaluative experiences in question: see 401e3, 402c5, 411d5.

pronouncement that ‘the practice of music should culminate in the erotics of beauty’ (δεῖ δέ που τελευτᾶν τὰ μουσικά εἰς τὰ τοῦ καλοῦ ἐρωτικά, Pl. *Resp.* 403c).

Correspondingly, Socrates develops the category of *amouisia* into one which marks a deficiency of sensibility in regard to much more than music in the tonal sense. He does so in a way which once again illustrates how life-informing, life-defining values are at stake in matters of *mousikê*. Later in *Republic* 3, Socrates applies the term ‘uncultured’ (*amouisos*) to the person who leads a life dominated by the body and who ‘never has any contact with [or ‘never touches’] music or philosophy’ (μουσικῆς δὲ καὶ φιλοσοφίας μὴ ἄπτηται), who ‘never keeps the company of a Muse’ (μηδὲ κοινωνῆ Μούσης μηδαμῆ), and who lacks any concern for ‘either reason or the rest of *mousikê*’ (οὔτε λόγου ... οὔτε τῆς ἄλλης μουσικῆς). Such a person becomes ‘a beast living in ignorance and insensitivity, with a lack of rhythm and grace’ (ὥσπερ θηρίον ... ἐν ἀμαθίᾳ καὶ σκαιότητι μετὰ ἀρρυθμίας τε καὶ ἀχαριστίας ζῆ, Pl. *Resp.* 411c–e.). The scope of both *mousikê* and *amouisia* in this part of *Republic* 3 expands from literal reference to music into a philosophically ‘thickened’ conception of the workings of mind or soul as a whole, so much so that Socrates seems to come close, as at *Phaedo* 61a (above), to fusing into one the ideas of *mousikê* and philosophy.<sup>69</sup> Yet that process of conceptual expansion does not lose its connection to the tonal, formal, and expressive properties of music as such (alongside poetry, dance, and more besides). On the contrary, the need for the right kind of music and for its carefully balanced incorporation into the structure of a life is reiterated by Socrates at 411a–b immediately before the characterization of the *amouisos* paraphrased above. If Plato’s dialogue, then, in a sense appropriates the value-terms of *mousikê* for its own purposes, it is just as true that the ideal of the philosophical soul advanced by Socrates retains an authentically musical dimension. We are dealing here with—among other things—a philosophical aesthetics.

Two further points about this stretch of the *Republic* are worth emphasizing. One is that while the line of thought represents a characteristically Platonic model of the soul’s orientation towards ethically grounded beauty, it lacks anything like the metaphysical idealism found in the visionary sections of the later books of the *Republic*, Socrates’ second speech on love in the *Phaedrus*, or Diotima’s speech in the *Symposium*. All those other passages make aesthetics dependent on metaphysical hypotheses; *Republic* 3

<sup>69</sup> Cf. also Pl. *Resp.* 486d, where the nature of an un-philosophical soul is called ‘uncultured and badly formed’, τῆς ἀμούσου τε καὶ ἀσχήμονος φύσεως: both adjectives hark back to *Republic* 3.

does not, and to that extent its principles of form and expression are less far removed from the values of *mousikê* espoused elsewhere in Greek culture. The second point is that the argument gives a much more explicit, central place to the experience of certain 'art-forms' (including music, poetry, painting, architecture, etc.) than any of those other texts do, and arguably more than any other passage in the whole of Plato.<sup>70</sup> Is that—paradoxically—why, even now (with a few exceptions), it remains an often neglected, even a 'forgotten', text where many attempts to read an aesthetics in Plato are concerned?<sup>71</sup> Certainly, the relationship of the passage to others in Plato, even within the *Republic* itself, is problematic. How is it, for instance, that Socrates can so emphatically here count painting as an art 'full', as he puts it, of potential for ethically expressive beauty of form (i.e. *euskhêmosunê*), while in *Republic* 10 he will reductively use the same art as an example of 'mere' mirroring of appearances and superficial pretense? The orthodox answer to this question is simply to privilege one of these texts (*Republic* 10) as somehow definitive, Plato's 'final word' on the subject, while downgrading or ignoring the implications of the other. But large parts of the *Republic*, from *Republic* 2 to 8, are underpinned by a conviction of the importance of (a reformed) *mousikê* for the life of both body and soul. If *Republic* 10 seems to suggest something radically different, we should perhaps reconsider our ways of reading it.<sup>72</sup>

### 5. Conclusion

What, in fact, could be more telling for the purposes of my present argument, and as a conclusion to these compressed observations on Plato, than the way in which Socrates rounds off his critique of mimetic poetry in *Republic* 10 by both anticipating and defending himself against a potential charge of cultural philistinism? *Apologetically* appealing to the now famous motif of an 'ancient quarrel' between philosophy and poetry,<sup>73</sup> Socrates

<sup>70</sup> See esp. the reference to painting, weaving, architecture and more besides at 401a, cited in my text above.

<sup>71</sup> Annas 1981, 95–101 strains to minimize the positive aesthetic principles outlined at Pl. *Resp.* 401–403. Nehamas 2007, 73, despite his own platonizing strands of thought, ignores this passage when he states, 'Plato himself did not include art among the proper expressions of culture'; contrast Burnyeat 1999, esp. 217–222.

<sup>72</sup> For my own attempt at a new reading, see Halliwell 2011a, 179–207.

<sup>73</sup> In Halliwell 2011a, 191–193 I insist, against the grain of prevailing orthodoxy, on the apologetic function of the 'ancient quarrel' motif.

avoids the term *amousia* itself but uses others which belong to a cluster of vocabulary we have seen associated with it. He imagines the personified figure of Poetry (and, by implication, some of the ‘lovers of poetry’, *Resp.* 607d7, who read the *Republic*) accusing himself and Glaucon of ‘uncouthness and crudity’ (σκληρότητα ... και άγροικίαν), i.e. uncultured insensitivity, in relation to poetry’s bewitching power.<sup>74</sup> Stressing that in fact he and Glaucon know only too well what it is like to be ‘bewitched’ (κηλουμένοις, *Pl. Resp.* 607c7: an idea as old as Homer), and that they would in principle ‘gladly welcome back’ poetry (ἄσμενοι ἂν καταδεχοίμεθα, *Pl. Resp.* 607c6) into their city (and souls) if only the right reasons for doing so could be found, Socrates appears deeply anxious to rebut a charge of philistinism—the kind of charge Aristophanes’ *Frogs* 1491–1499 shows to have been at least an imaginable gibe against the historical Socrates.<sup>75</sup> Whatever else it signifies, Socrates’ anxiety at *Republic* 607b–c discloses, I submit, that Plato himself is anxious that readers of the dialogue should not think that *Republic* 10’s critique of poetic mimesis amounts to a philistine repudiation of *mousikê*, as opposed to a probing philosophical scrutiny of the foundations on which its values rest. In the light of the other evidence surveyed in this chapter, we can see this moment in the *Republic* as contributing to a larger debate about aesthetic value: more particularly, about whether the value of all those experiences provided by the art(s) of the Muses is indispensable to the best kind of human life. That debate would, of course, continue in various forms.<sup>76</sup> A history of intense commitment to *mousikê* was one of the defining features of Greek culture. It was a history always defined in part by complex interplay with the perceived threat of *amousia*.

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<sup>74</sup> For the vocabulary of σκαίότης and άγροικία, including their pairing in Ehippus fr. 23 KA and Ar. *Nub.* 655, see section 2 above.

<sup>75</sup> See n. 50 above.

<sup>76</sup> For one germane example, see Philodemus’ response to those who accused Epicureans like himself of cultural philistinism (*agroikia*) because of their reductive view of music (in relation to poetry) at *Phld. Mus.* 4, col. 140.14–27, 144.1–6 Delattre: on the apparent reference to Plato’s ‘lovers of poetry’ (*Resp.* 607d7) at *Mus.* col. 140.27, cf. Delattre 2007, II, 440–441, nn. 2, 5, but his idea that Philodemus is parodying Plato seems misplaced and his claim that Plato ‘condemns’ lovers of poetry is seriously misleading.

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