The philosophy of perceptions a Wittgensteinian perspective

Robinson, David

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The aim of this thesis is to balance a positive account of the family of concepts included in and logically involved with the concept of perception, with critical considerations of accounts that are philosophically problematic.

The problematic accounts in question will range from those of Wittgenstein's contemporaries, or near contemporaries, such as Russell, James and Köhler, to those of psychologists and philosophers of our own time, some, but not all, of whom profess to embrace Wittgenstein's position; these will include the authors of a standard textbook on visual perception (Bruce and Green), Quine, Peacocke, Vesey, Anscombe, Martin, McDowell, Mulhall and Candlish. Additionally, the general nature of the problems in question will be reflected in a positive account of the concepts of acceleration (chapter 1), identity and personal identity (chapter 5), in relation to problematic accounts given by Leibniz and Parfit respectively.

Crucial to this aim will be an interpretation of Wittgenstein's position that is distinct from all those positions that profess to be Wittgensteinian, but that in fact remain in the grip of the very Cartesian / empiricist preconceptions that Wittgenstein diagnoses as the source of the problems. This will be the key to the positive account, and will depend on showing that Wittgenstein's diagnosis is essentially the same for all problems of a philosophical nature, despite its highly specific application to problems concerning various concepts in different parts of the Investigations, whose subtle differences it is equally important to discern clearly.
The Philosophy of Perception: A Wittgensteinian Perspective

David John Robinson

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University of Durham

Department of Philosophy

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What I hope to show in this thesis is that Wittgenstein's approach to philosophical problems in general and to the problems traditionally associated with the concept of perception in particular, manifests an entirely distinctive position, from the viewpoint of which the problems are genuinely dissolved.

Unless the distinctiveness of this position is appreciated, however, the sense felt by some that Wittgenstein's approach is merely a philosophically respectable way of avoiding the problems, and that his methodology is more stylistic than substantial, becomes inevitable. My aim, therefore, is two-fold. The positive account I shall give of what I see as the substantially Wittgensteinian position, and of its relevance to the problems of perception, will be balanced against analyses of a number of ways in which I believe its distinctiveness has not been appreciated by various philosophers.

Interpretations of Wittgenstein are often coloured by the preconceptions from which a commentator approaches him. What can seem difficult about his writings is that his highly compressed comments will sometimes appear almost to fit a certain preconception, but not quite. The tendency then is to dismiss the "loose ends" as stylistic quirks, or ineffective attempts to resist being grouped among other philosophers with basically the same outlook.

Some of these commentators perhaps hope they can use Wittgenstein to lend weight to their own positions, which Wittgenstein putatively "approximates" to and, with appropriate modifications can be made to serve a more "exact" account (I am thinking of Peacocke in particular here). Alternatively, a philosopher who places himself in one "camp" may interpret Wittgenstein as falling into an opposing one. J.J.C.Smart, for example, construes Wittgenstein as a behaviourist, which indeed seems the only interpretation available from within the preconceptions of materialism. The difficulty for such philosophers really lies in escaping the confines of their own preconceptions. Without being able to do so, the distinctiveness of Wittgenstein's position will not be grasped and will be consistently misunderstood.

Overcoming the preconceptions of empiricism, which has shaped thinking in the English-speaking world for more than three centuries, remains a difficulty for those who resist physicalism in the philosophy of mind. We are thus easily persuaded that Wittgenstein's observations
are clarified by being translated into the terms of such preconceptions. Here I am thinking of Vesey, who, like Peacocke, interprets Wittgenstein in such a way that the apparent solution to the problem he is trying to solve contains the very misconceptions that Wittgenstein himself identifies as the source of that problem. In chapter 2 I hope to show that the perceptual concepts treated in II, xi of the Investigations are coherently accommodated only on a distinctively Wittgensteinian categorical axis, that indirect realism, Humean idealism and the radical empiricism of James and the Gestaltists all fail to recognize.

One of the crucial features of Wittgenstein's methodology is the balancing of a very general distinction or axis that applies to all problems of a philosophical nature, with the extremely subtle discernment of differences among concepts to which its application takes a very precise form. The general axis, which can be traced back to the Tractatus as the distinction between the nature of science and of philosophy (which there was taken to mark the limits of language), is manifested in its application to clusters of related but subtly different concepts; the generality of its relevance within each cluster is gradually revealed in a sequence of examples representing a different concept of the "family", each of which helps to indicate the point being made by eliminating the inessentials of the others by means of its differences.

The general nature of the science/philosophy distinction will form the subject of chapter 1, where, to emphasise its generality, I shall illustrate its application to the concept of acceleration; all concepts, including those of perception, rest on the concepts of space, time and motion, so the examination of the structure of this family of concepts entailed by considerations of the concept of acceleration, may help to reveal something of the structure of perceptual concepts.

Both Mulhall and Candlish, I think, place too much emphasis on just one of the concepts of the clusters presented in Investigations II, xi and viii respectively, resulting in an unwarranted generalization that loses sight both of the general point that Wittgenstein is drawing out of the whole cluster, and of the fact that each concept of the cluster is a different concept. Each cluster reveals a distinctive aspect of the categorical axis, the "point" of which is to present the antidote to a certain misunderstanding of such concepts. The misunderstanding treated in xi is actually perpetuated by Mulhall's
application of "continuous aspect perception" to perception in general, for that concept is revealed by "noticing an aspect", which in turn manifests the categorical distinction between two senses of seeing. Mulhall's generalization merely fuses the two senses, thus obliterating the very axis that is the key to the solution of philosophical problems in general, and in this case to those associated with empiricist misconceptions of perceptual concepts in particular. These criticisms will form part III of chapter 2.

The reasons for my criticisms of Candlish's account of viii are similar but inverted. Since the "point" in viii is explicitly applied not just to Kinaesthesia but to concepts of hearing, seeing and sensation also, the putative "radical difference" between Kinaesthetic awareness and visual or auditory perception cannot be Wittgenstein's point here. The concepts of this cluster are all different, of course, but Wittgenstein's purpose in juxtaposing them is to reveal the categorical axis that runs through these as well as the cluster of xi, but in a light peculiar to the cluster of viii. The misunderstanding to be cured in this case is that which gives rise to the pseudo-concept of "sense-data" and their putative role in the "flow of information", which once again trades on the obliteration of the crucial axis. In part II of chapter 3, criticism of Candlish's, Martin's and Anscombe's accounts of kinaesthesia will be complimentary to a positive account.

In chapter 4 my main target will be Quine's account of the acquisition of beliefs and of concept-formation, and Armstrong's construal of perception in terms of belief-states will be discarded along the way. Then I shall bring criticisms of Anscombe's account of proprioception outlined in chapter 3 into line with criticisms of McDowell's disjunctive account of perception (the reasons for my objections are similar in the two cases).

In the final chapter I shall develop a positive account of recognition and identity stemming from my objections in chapter 4 to Quine's construal of the discernment of identity in terms of systems of hypotheses. I shall offer an alternative to Leibniz's indiscernibility criterion and then take a critical view of Parfit's "psychological survival" substitution for personal identity.
A recurrent theme in parts I and II of the Philosophical Investigations, and indeed in the Tractatus, is the distinctive nature of philosophy as opposed to science, and the methodology appropriate to philosophical and scientific problems respectively. This theme is particularly pertinent to the philosophy of perception, since the philosophical problems concerning perception traditionally arise from scientific considerations.

A Wittgensteinian solution to the traditional "paradoxes" of perception will therefore hinge on the important distinction between the methodology of science, and that of philosophy, which corresponds to a distinction between problems of two different kinds. In the final section of the Investigations, Wittgenstein concludes that psychology has failed to solve such paradoxes, not because it is a "young science", but because its methodology is inappropriate to the nature of the problems it addresses, so that "problem and method pass one another by." Hence, psychology is merely "barren and confused".1

In part one of the Investigations, Wittgenstein prepares us for this conclusion by drawing our attention to the relevant distinction at several points. At 109 it is observed that "our considerations could not be scientific ones" (since they concern logic and language); "We may not advance any kind of theory" (as perhaps Wittgenstein himself did in the Tractatus); "There must not be anything hypothetical in our considerations" (such as the "formal unity" of "what we call 'sentence' and 'language'", or the "preconceived idea of crystalline purity"); "We must do away with all explanation, and description alone must take its place. And this description gets its light, that is to say its purpose, from the philosophical problems."

What determines the way we describe things is our consideration of which words are appropriate. This concerns the meanings of the words used, which is to say the rules for their use. In 108 the ideal "formal unity" of these rules presumed in the Tractatus is replaced by the analogy for language that is most central to and characteristic of part I of the Investigations - the concept of games as spatio-temporal phenomena: "We are talking about the spatial and temporal phenomenon of language, not about some non-spatial, non-temporal phantasm." But crucially the concept "language" is analogous to the concept "game", not
to any specific game which has fixed rules. Many "games" might be played within language. Language as a whole is not analogous to a game, such as chess, but a language-game might be analogous to, say, chess. In the Tractatus, the rules of what we might call "language as a whole" were thought of as being like the rules of a specific game, instead of games generally.

However, the point that concerns us here is one that runs through both the Tractatus and the Investigations, because it legitimately applies to language-games in general, and can be illustrated by an analogous example in the form of any specific game. This analogy is made at the end of 108, and the point is developed in 109: "But we talk about [language] as we do [for example] about the pieces in chess when we are stating the rules of the game, not describing their physical properties." (Compare this with Tractatus 4.111 - "Philosophy is not one of the natural sciences.") Since we are concerned with the various ways the rules of language operate, our philosophical descriptions operate on a metalinguistic level. That is why we must be content with "description alone"; any possible theory will make the rules out to be fixed and unified as in a particular game, and hence alter them. Scientific description, on the other hand, operates in the object-language. We can offer theories on this level, since such theorizing constitutes just one language-game that alters neither the world itself nor the rules of other language-games.

The point appears once more at 654: "Our mistake is to look for an explanation where we ought to look at what happens as a 'proto-phenomenon'. That is, where we ought to have said: this language-game is played." And 655 - "The question is not one of explaining a language-game by means of our experiences, but of noting a language-game." - echoes a proposition near the end of 109: "The problems are solved, not by giving new information, but by arranging what we have always known."

The explicit application of this idea to a specifically perceptual concept and its attendant philosophical "problems" occurs in section xi of part II (p.212). The experience of seeing something differently that remains the same may invite various attempts at explanation when certain preconceptions about the concept of seeing make the actual experience seem paradoxical. But should we really be looking for an explanation, or examining the concept and our preconception of it? Perhaps I do not "see something different each time", but only "interpret what I see in a
different way". But this "explanation" does not do justice to the nature of the experience: "To interpret is to think, to do something; seeing is a state."

Alternatively: "Imagine a physiological explanation of the experience. Let it be this: [when we notice an alternative "aspect" our eyes jump from one pattern of oscillation to another] - Yes, that shews it is a kind of seeing.- You have now introduced a new, a physiological criterion for seeing. And this can screen the old problem from view, but not solve it...The psychological concept hangs out of reach of this explanation. And this makes the nature of the problem clearer."

The problem is not a scientific one, then, but one concerning the concept of seeing - how the word "see" is used, which is something we already know if we understand its meaning; so that it is only a matter of reminding ourselves. If we do not already know, we shall gain no relevant understanding by examining the physical processes of vision.

The same lesson implicitly underlies an example concerning our hearing in section viii: "I may be able to tell the direction from which a sound comes only because it affects one ear more strongly than another" - that is a likely explanation, but it introduces a new, physical criterion for hearing the direction from which a sound comes. The usual criterion must be part of my experience, but this physical cause is not so - "I don't feel this in my ears". The "new criterion" will solve any possible "problems" with this concept only by overriding the usual criterion and thus denying the true nature of the experience. (Section viii will be a main topic in chapter 3.)

Despite the very specific nature of the examples to which it has a useful application, this distinction is perhaps Wittgenstein's most generally applicable, since it concerns the nature of philosophy itself. For that reason it is easily overlooked, as if we were always too close to it to see it. So it is all the more helpful to be reminded of it in approaching any problem of a philosophical nature, thought its generality should not be allowed to disguise the precise and often difficult way that it actually weaves into the treatment of a given problem. In the case of the family of subtly different perceptual concepts, the distinction lies within the concepts themselves, which span it. Perceptual concepts are perhaps most central in problems of a philosophical nature, since the slightest adjustment in their characterization has implications in metaphysics, epistemology and the
philosophy of mind. The subtlest misdescription can throw us into seemingly inescapable absurdities, collapse us into spaceless, timeless nothingness; and its rectification can just as easily bring us back into a familiar and intelligible world where we are allowed to go on understanding things as it comes most naturally to us to do so. That this main distinction is the single most useful tool in the description of perceptual concepts is shown by its crucial presence in II, xi of the *Investigations*, where its categorical nature is illuminated. This will be the main theme of chapter 2.

In the *Investigations*, though the distinction is introduced in its most general form as an observation about language and logic, its main purpose becomes the treatment of psychological concepts, including perceptual ones. Wittgenstein's aim is to clear away the false foundations on which the psychologizing tendencies of empiricism in philosophy and the natural sciences, as well as the "scientizing" of psychology, had grown since the time of Locke, Berkeley and Hume, to that of James, Russell, Mach, Freud and the Gestaltists. These "false foundations" are formed like knots in our understanding by various maladjustments in the characterization of the concepts in question, that gather inevitably in clusters around the central oversight of this main distinction. The "knots" unravelled in the *Investigations* are perhaps most central to philosophy and of the most general human concern, but "knots" in the concepts of time, space and motion also result from the same source; the paradoxical consequences of Cartesian and Leibnizian (and indeed Newtonian and Kantian) accounts of these concepts result from the same categorical oversight, perhaps as an inheritance from Zeno. In order not to lose sight of the extreme universality of the distinction, and hence to be able to recognize the same principle at work in the various highly specific contexts where the subtle discernment of different perceptual concepts is equally important, it may be helpful to illustrate the unravelling of one of the characteristically Leibnizian "knots" in a particular concept of space, time and motion - that of acceleration. I shall approach this with a reminder of the nature of the distinction between scientific and philosophical methodology.

Given a specific scientific theory, an observed anomaly will demand an explanation within the terms of that theory. To cite a well-known example, the orbit of the planet Uranus was not explained by the
presence of Neptune alone. Given Newtonian mechanics, only the presence of an undiscovered ninth planet would explain the anomaly. The theory therefore predicted the presence of a ninth planet, and the subsequent discovery of Pluto confirmed the predictive power of Newtonian mechanics; but, ironically, the nature of Pluto is such that still it did not account for the precise orbit of Uranus.

The relative success of Newtonian mechanics may seem sufficient to motivate the continued search for explanations of the anomaly within the terms of the theory (e.g. the possibility of a tenth planet); but a more critical approach would be to suspect the theory itself. Indeed, even the Theory of Relativity, though providing more accurately confirmed predictions than Newtonian mechanics, did not give the accuracy astronomers expected.

Theories, unlike the phenomena they attempt to explain, are linguistic items. A fact, such as the presence of a planet, serves as an explanation only as the referent of a declarative sentence that is a logical consequence of a theory. Theories presuppose and work with a language whose terms are commonly understood. To allow for the possibility that a given theory or hypothesis may be false, this presupposed language upon which all theories depend, must at some level remain immune to the fortunes of theory. If ordinary language can appropriately be called a "foundation" in this context, then it is this special linguistic brand of foundationalism which characterises Wittgenstein's position; the foundation which remains after any scientific hypothesis has risen or fallen, and to which we must return in order to replace one theory with another, is "what happens [in language] as a 'proto-phenomenon'"\textsuperscript{2}, and to reveal this, we must "do away with all explanation and description alone must take its place."\textsuperscript{3} But of course a "foundation" is such only if it does serve the function of a foundation, and since this "proto-phenomenon" need not support any theoretical superstructure at all, Wittgenstein's position may be regarded as a kind of foundationalism only in relation to scientific purposes.

The relation between explanation and description here is a supervenient one - explanations are descriptions, but not all descriptions are explanations. Equally, some descriptions are false or incoherent; but the possibility of a false or incoherent description is dependent on the possibility of a true and coherent one. Scientific
(explanatory) description operates in the object-language and seeks new facts to provide as many theoretical consequences with the confirmation they require to serve an explanatory function as possible. The discovery of new facts, however, also introduces new observation statements. Certain facts may prompt descriptions which nest in our ordinary language in a paradoxical manner. The uncritical approach to such problems is to accept the description as it stands as a contribution to the class of true observation statements which, given a commensurate explanation, will support the theory in question. The critical approach, on the other hand, is to examine the description itself, and so operates in the metalanguage. Problems solved in this way are philosophical problems in Wittgenstein's sense; Wittgensteinian solutions, or dissolutions, are elucidations of "what we have always known". "What we have always known" underpins further knowledge, but unlike Kantian a priori knowledge, still had to be learned.

I shall now try to illustrate the application of Wittgensteinian methodology to the unravelling of the characteristic Leibnizian "knot" in the concept of acceleration that results from a traditional way of describing the measurement of space and time, which seems to justify the introduction of the paradoxical pseudo-concept of infinitesimals.

If it is accepted that the correct terms for the representation of a particular instance of acceleration is, say, that a car is travelling at precisely 60 m.p.h. after precisely 15 seconds - i.e., that the car must be doing an exact speed at an exact time, then the concept of acceleration is rendered inherently paradoxical, since it is impossible to arrive at a metaphysically precise value for the ratio of speed against time (as opposed to the ratio of distance against time for constant speed). Given such a description, the concept of infinitesimals seems indispensable, since this allows so close an approach to the impossible that the remainder is, supposedly, not even quantifiable; yet because this unquantifiable remainder will not allow the impossible ever to be reached, it seems to save such a representation of acceleration from collapsing into absurdity. But this is to fight fire with fire, for instead of one philosophical problem we now have two, thanks to the paradoxical nature of infinitesimals themselves. While we accept this account as an accurate and coherent description of the phenomenon, we can only hope to find a solution to the paradoxes, if at all, by seeking some new fact to act as the referent of an explanatory observation.
statement. But by examining the description itself, we may uncover its inherent confusions and perhaps replace it with a coherent one, in which case there will be no requirement for explanation.

The fundamental flaw in the Leibnizian account is the acceptance of an implicit interpretation of acceleration values which incoherently represents something travelling at a certain speed, increasing or constant, at a certain "point in time", rather than during a certain period of time. This amounts to the requirement that something be travelling at a certain speed in no time. The source of the confusion lies in the fact that constant speed is correctly represented by a direct ratio between a period of time and an interval of space, each with metaphysically precise limits. Because one end of the temporal interval coincides precisely with one end of the spatial one, the illusion is created that it is the limits which represent the speed value rather than the periods. This confusion between limits and the periods they define inevitably creates problems in the representation of acceleration, where a scale of increasing speed, which already contains time, is plotted against time. Hence, what appears as a limit on the speed scale really represents a ratio between periods, which in turn is plotted against a limit on the temporal scale. The problem is solved once it is recognized that the limit on the temporal scale represents a period of time defined by limits corresponding to the limits of a range of increasing speed on the speed scale, such that the resulting acceleration value is always a ratio between an arbitrarily defined, or undefined, period of time, and an average speed. The breadth between the limits we set on this average varies according to circumstance, context, and above all, purpose.

This categorical difference between spatio-temporal regions and the limits which define them corresponds roughly to the Kantian distinction between the content and the form of "empirical reality"; as important as the distinction itself is the mutual dependency between the two aspects - form cannot be separated from content, or vice-versa, any more than the colour of an apple can be "peeled" off the apple, or an apple can be without any colour. The failure to understand this dependency is an integral part of the failure to recognize that the distinction is a categorical one rather than one between "objects" or "substances".

The importance of these issues to Wittgenstein's aims in the
Investigations emerges clearly at para.108, in relation to the
difference between the methods of science and of philosophy, which is
shown to be a categorical one by means of an analogy between syntax and
the rules of chess. While science investigates the physical properties
of objects, we would not discover what makes a particular lump of wood a
chess-piece by any such investigation. And what we must investigate in
order to discover this is not some other "object", but the system of
rules in which such an object operates. The rules of chess, which
determine the way the various pieces relate to each other, are analogous
to the rules of syntax which determine the way words relate to each
other. But while it is syntax which carries the deductive forms of our
reasoning, this is "empty" without the semantic dimension (whose rules
relate sentences to facts), which is probabilistic.

The rules of syntax in most languages are more or less "fixed". In
the Investigations this is implicitly accepted in the chess analogy, by
means of which Wittgenstein draws the same categorical distinction
between the methods of science and those of philosophy that he did in
the Tractatus. It is in the semantic dimension that the essentialism of
the earlier work is abandoned. In the Tractatus, the limits of language
- of "what can be said"⁴ are fixed in both syntactic and semantic
dimensions. This renders the propositions of the Tractatus, strictly
speaking, meaningless, since ex hypothesi it is impossible to use
language to talk about language - the limits of language coincide with
the subject matter of science (though what is important for W., as
opposed to the positivists, is precisely what "we must pass over in
silence"). The Tractatus presents a paradox concerning language which is
similar to the paradox concerning acceleration that the Infinitesimal
Calculus presents. In the desire for metaphysical precision, the limits
of language are drawn as an absolute boundary, whereas in fact the
finitude of language is marked by an indefinite range of boundaries,
which are chosen according to the purpose which motivates a particular
use of that language, much in the way that the limits of a given
acceleration value are set in particular circumstances according to
context and purpose, but cannot be fixed in an absolute sense. Just as a
representation of acceleration must take account of the continuing
acceleration of an accelerating body through time, so a representation
of language must take account of its continued application through time.
Science sets a certain limit on language, but philosophy cannot set its
limit in the same place; for the subject matter of philosophy -
language,
which is the equipment of theoretical science - creates its own time and
space. It cannot be reduced to a metaphysical, dimensionless point. It
is not a limit on the world, but a region of it: "We are talking about
the spatial and temporal phenomenon of language, not about some non-
spatial, non-temporal phantasm."5

Paradoxes are not independent of certain kinds of description;
they occur when "language goes on holiday"6, from whence our steps have
to be retraced to the "proto-phenomenon"7 of ordinary language, and this
means a return to the de facto intelligibility of familiar concepts. But
for this to be possible, our "proto-phenomenon" must inhabit time and
space - we must be able to go there, if only to "arrive where we
started/And know the place for the first time."8

The de Facto Intelligibility of the Concept "Perception".
Like the concept "belief", Wittgenstein does not treat the concept
"perception" explicitly until part II of the Investigations. In both
cases, the concepts are treated in the context of special philosophical
problems; belief is considered with respect to Moore's Paradox9, and
perception to the "paradoxical" pictures which were of particular
importance in Gestalt Psychology. The latter presented for Wittgenstein
an opportunity to apply his own principle of reminding ourselves of what
we already know but might have overlooked. The categorical distinction
between the subject matter of science and that of philosophy, originally
misidentified in the Tractatus as the metaphysical limit of what can be
said, then identified in part I of the Investigations as a spatio-
temporal region occupied, or rather autonomously created, by human
activity ("forms of life"), is manifested in part II, section xi, as the
formal crux of the concept of perception. Perception involves both sides
of the distinction. This is reflected in the Kantian observation that
perceptual experience integrates concepts (or language) with
"intuitions".

Both Traditional Empiricism10 and Gestalt Psychology overlook that
"perception" bestrides this categorical distinction, consequently
placing the concept entirely on one side or the other. According to
Traditional Empiricism (e.g. Hume), we do not perceive relations
(e.g. causation) but somehow (and in the case of causation, without
philosophical justification) infer them. The error of this position is
exposed by its inability to provide a coherent account of the kind of experience which interested the Gestalt Psychologists. The two ways of seeing e.g. Jastrow's "duck-rabbit" figure are, supposedly, not ways of seeing at all, but merely two different interpretations of the same bare experience (of lines on a page), for clearly the figure itself is not different under each "interpretation". But this means there is no distinction between coming to acknowledge from testimony that the figure can be interpreted a certain way, and interpreting it that way oneself. Clearly, the only way one could come to interpret the figure one way or another independently of testimony is experientially - by seeing it a certain way - which, afterall, must in any case inform testimony itself somewhere along the line.

The mistake here is the thought that relations in themselves are not perceived, while "objects" are; but there is of course no such thing as a relation "in itself" - to suppose this is to confuse relations with objects, and consequently to confuse our experience of the figure on the page with the figure "in itself".

The Gestalt Psychologists (e.g. Köhler), though discerning the shortcomings of Traditional Empiricism, are guilty of the same confusion only for the opposite reason. The different ways of seeing the figure here is acknowledged to be experiential, but now everything becomes subjective and there is no sense in which the figure itself is seen to remain the same. Here it is the fact that the figure does not itself alter which is supposedly a matter of inference. But once again, we do not rely on testimony to realize this, so this too is something we experience rather than merely "think".

The apparent paradox in this kind of experience lies in the fact that we experience both the sameness and the difference of the figure simultaneously (i.e. during the same period of time). Wittgenstein reminds us that the categorical distinction between objects and relations is tracked by "two uses of the word 'see'"; the concept of visual perception spans it.

Not only are relations perceived, but they are in an important sense dependent on the very external viewpoints that are essential to the concept of visual perception. A resemblance is of a different order to, say, a face, since a resemblance is a relation; and it is hard to imagine resemblances "existing" independently of their being perceived. Berkeley displays the typical empiricist tendency to overlook the
categorical distinction here by claiming that nothing exists independently of its being perceived.

The relation of resemblance is an especially apt example in this context, since it is the "cement" of empirical concepts. All faces resemble one another in a large "family" of ways, but when two particular faces are said to resemble each other, they do so more strikingly than the usual resemblances which tie in various particulars under the concept "face".

In chapter 2 I shall explore and develop an account of how experiences involving the sort of double-aspect pictures used in part II, section xi of the Investigations might be coherently and comprehensively represented, following the implications of Wittgenstein's treatment. This will tie in very closely with some of the observations made in this chapter on acceleration. The remainder of this chapter will be concerned with the debate between "direct" and "indirect" realism, for which the preceding comments will have obvious implications. Some aspects of this debate are implicitly treated by the collection of elucidations in the Investigations, loosely termed the "Private Language Argument", which refutes the "inner object" model of sensations, and by implication, of what for the indirect realist is directly perceived. But section xi of part II reveals the source of the confusion underlying this debate with a deeper focus on its crux, independently of the success or failure of the Private Language Argument.

The Direct/Indirect Debate

The direct/indirect debate is one which so puzzled G.E.Moore that, as J.J. Valberg quotes him, he confessed to the inclination to believe both apparently incompatible sides of it. For Valberg, as for Moore, it is scientific investigation that creates the philosophical problem (the "problematic reasoning") here. Valberg himself offers no suggestions for a possible solution, but is content to present with emphatic deliberation the form of the problem itself.

The majority of recent writers whose interest in perception is chiefly scientific, such as Marr, Campbell, Tye and Eilan, have attempted to construct representational/computational theories of perception, which are essentially sophisticated developments of the indirect/inferential model of Traditional Empiricism (although Marr has
some affinities with Gibson). J.J.Gibson is the notable exception, being one of the few theorists who subscribe to direct realism. Bruce and Green, in their "Visual Perception" (1990), attempt a synthesis between Gibson's "ecological" approach and traditional representational theories. This allows that certain aspects of the physical environment (e.g., distances, slants and textures) are perceived directly in terms of the structure or pattern of light (an optic array), rather than being "constructed" from "elements of point intensity" (streams of photons) by means of inference or computation. As in Gestalt Psychology, spatio-temporal relations are acknowledged to be directly perceived rather than just inferred, yet the internal relations of resemblance essential to the concepts we apply in experience are, supposedly, perceived only through the mediation of inference or computation. In their emphasis on levels of explanation as a means of reconciling apparently incompatible considerations, Bruce and Green agree with Ullman and Marr that some form of computational (algorithmic) mediation is explanatively appropriate at a level somewhere between the "ecological" (the level at which a person or animal interacts with the environment) and the physiological. They "feel that direct theorists have not paid sufficient attention to the relationship between ecological and physiological levels of explanation." (p. 379)

But the very notion of direct perception is something indirect realism presupposes and trades on. The possibility of indirect realism requires that something must be perceived directly to form the basis from which higher epistemic levels (concept application) can be computed. Gibsonian optics allows the physics of light structure to take up this direct role, in place of traditional "sense-data". However, Gibson himself extends invariants in light structure to explain all levels of perception, and this is what Bruce and Green object to in Gibsonian theory. In their view, spatial relations such as distances, slants and textures are perceived "directly" in the sense of the eye's physical contact with the structure of light; on the other hand, what one perceives something to be (a different sense of "seeing-as" from Wittgenstein's), supposedly can only be inferred or computed from those basic spatio-temporal elements by means of knowledge of the world. The basic spatial relations which are perceived directly are, allegedly, items of information "contained" in, and "provided" by, invariants in light structure; our computations mediate between these and our perceptions, in the full, epistemic sense of "perception".
There are three related confusions in this account. The first concerns the role of knowledge of the world in the computational process; the second concerns the notion of "information" being "contained" in light structure; the third is a consequence of the other two confusions, such that perception is forced into only one side of the relation between percipient and perceptum (the perceptum now relates to "a perception", instead of a percipient). I shall briefly outline the nature of each of these confusions, then expand and try to resolve the confusions in the light of what has been said so far in this chapter.

1. The computation of higher epistemic levels of perception based on the structure of light requires knowledge of the world (other than the basic spatial relations), so presumably this knowledge itself, being of a higher order than the basic spatial relations, had to be computed; in which case, it too required some other knowledge of the world (other than the basic spatial relations), which also had to be computed, and so on \textit{ad infinitum}. The question is, therefore, how did we ever acquire the knowledge necessary for the computations necessary for higher level perception? The only way in which the computational process is a possible explanation of the higher epistemic levels of perception, is if it is not necessary! Furthermore, as an explanation this is viciously circular, since it requires the explanandum as part of the explanans.

2. An item of information is a linguistic item. Information is "contained" in language, not in nature.\footnote{15}

3. Perception is a relational concept, not an "object" concept - it cannot be crammed into only one side of the two places which comprise it at the level of its use.

In the first case, according to Bruce and Green, we know that \(x\) is a pencil by carrying out a process of computation based on certain directly perceived invariants in light structure plus, crucially, what we already know or "remember" about pencils in general. The assumption seems to be that because the higher epistemic levels involve cultural elements (i.e. concepts), that these are manufactured or constructed by the percipient. They are certainly the result of human activity, but are not "constructed" separately by each individual; rather, as systems of rules they emerge in social interaction, and are \textit{learned} by each individual as a necessary condition for our understanding of the world in some way. If the conceptual aspects of perception are computed from more basic elements, then these systems of rules are computed; but then
the question arises of what rules are followed in the computation of these rules. A computation must follow rules - it cannot create them. The rules of language are what we "already know" if we understand a concept, not what we must compute in order to individually manufacture concepts (which are in any case a necessary precondition for any such computation).

The second confusion is one that crosses the categorical distinction between the space-time of objects and that of language (concepts). Structures of light, optic arrays, tree-stumps, and so on, are no more items of information than they are subjects of truth or falsity. It is what is said of such things that carries information if true, or misinformation if false. As in the third case, the tendency here is to cram what is essentially comprised by a two-place relation spanning this categorical distinction into one side of that relation. Hence, information allegedly lies around in the world independently of human cognition, and we supposedly "have perceptions" independently (except in some contingently causal sense) of the objects that occupy the second place of the relation between percipient and perceptum. The remainder of this chapter will be concerned to expose and resolve the third confusion, bringing us back centrally to the concept of perception itself.

Whatever confusions Bruce and Green inherit from both Gibsonian and traditional theory, credit must go to them for emphasising the Gibsonian insight into the "the importance of describing what animals and people do in their worlds and how they do it" (p.391) to the study of perception; for this "ecological" level of description is indeed Wittgenstein's "proto-phenomenon", to which we must return for the de facto intelligibility of the concept of perception. But as a "proto-phenomenon" it is inappropriately considered a level of explanation at all, since it is precisely "what animals and people do...and how they do it" which, from the theoretical point of view, requires an explanation. Equally, however, it requires no explanation, since it is what we already know; moreover, it is what we must already know in order to have any understanding of the world at all. What happens at the ecological level presents anomalies requiring explanation only in the light of erroneous theories, and provides explanations only in the sense of showing that a certain theory must be wrong or incomplete. The kind of question we might genuinely seek an explanation for with respect to
perception would be something like: "what is it about people and animals and the world that enables people and animals to move about in, and experience, the world in the way they do"; this is a scientific question and we would then be looking for those physical properties which are necessary conditions for perception, rather than trying in this way to answer the question of what perception is - a question properly concerning the rules comprising the concept, which of course inhabit the "ecological" level. Any such "explanation" must take a consistent mereological step, wherein none of the original relata of the concept will be involved in the terms of the description.

The concept of perception at the proto-phenomenal level involves a two-place relation between percipient and percepturn; like any two-place relation, this is inappropriately described either as "direct" or as "indirect". A snooker ball only indirectly hits another if three snooker balls are involved in the overall relation; without introducing a concept that fixes the number of relata, it is appropriate to speak of whether any particular snooker ball has directly or indirectly struck another. But if we concentrate exclusively on the relationship between two snooker balls, the question of whether or not one strikes the other "directly" or "indirectly" becomes fatuous. The scientific discovery that snooker balls, like everything else, are composed of atoms and that atoms repel each other by means of their force-fields, does not mean that snooker balls never make "direct contact", but rather that this is precisely what "direct contact" involves (i.e. science may alter our views about what physical conditions are necessary for contact between solid objects, without altering the concept itself - but then it was science which gave us these views in the first place). The way clouds behave may be explained by taking the mereological step to the level of water droplets. But having made this categorical shift, it would be an error to suppose that water droplets mediate between clouds and, say, rain. Similarly, it would be an error to suppose that sub-atomic force-fields mediate between striking snooker balls.

The question of whether perception is "direct" or "indirect" is appropriate only when the number of relata is not fixed; for example, if a scene is perceived in a mirror or on television, the scene would correctly be described as being perceived indirectly, since this is opposed to the possibility of perceiving the scene without the aid of a mirror or a television. Indirect realism commits the categorical
inconsistency of importing a property of one of the original relata into the level of the original relation itself—hence, it is we who do not perceive things "directly". There is, after all, no possibility of visually perceiving things without light, eyes and a brain, so it makes no sense to speak of unaided perception as either "direct" or "indirect".

The sense in which Bruce and Green accept "direct" perception is in terms of invariants in the structure of light, which make "direct contact" with the eye. But since objects such as pencils are separated from the eye by the very space occupied by the structure of light, as well as by epistemic considerations, the perception of these is held to be "indirect", mediated by the physical and epistemic space-time of light structure and computation.

Light structure and epistemic considerations are, however, necessary conditions for perception. It is because of the space between eye and object, and the light structure that "occupies" it, that the object is perceived at all. It is as much a confusion to say that light structure and epistemic considerations mediate between us and what we perceive, as it is to say that our eyes and brains do so. The original concept of perception is comprised by a two-place spatial relation, not a non-spatial "contact" between spaces, or a three-place spatial relation; neither can it include the space between the relata without including both relata.

This confusion of certain necessary conditions for perception with the object of perception, produces a picture of perception in which the categorical distinction identified by Wittgenstein is distorted to fit the incoherent distinction between direct and indirect realism. Consequently, in so far as perception, allegedly, is in one sense direct, the original relation of the concept is crammed into one side of a new relation which corresponds to perception in so far as, allegedly, it is in another sense indirect. This confused picture refocuses the original relation between percipient and perceptum into an apparent relation holding between perception and the object perceived, which is to treat perception as if it were only one of the two relata necessary to the concept (i.e., as if it were an object).

Gibson's direct realism perpetuates this confusion in the way that Gestalt Psychology perpetuates the confusion of Traditional Empiricism. Bruce and Green's synthesis unfortunately only finds a compromise
between the two positions and does not resolve the confusion underlying the conflict.
Chapter 1, Notes.

2. Ibid, 654.
5. PI, 108.
6. PI, 38.
7. PI, 654.
9. PI II, x.
10. I shall give a fuller account of my particular (and perhaps not standard) use of "Traditional Empiricism" (and the "Radical Empiricism" that opposes it) in chapter 2.
11. A point made by B. Falk in "Consciousness, Cognition and the Phenomenal" (1993). But I find Falk's "explanation" of aspect-dawning unconvincing, for reasons other than Mulhall's and which should be clear in this and the following chapter.
12. The simultaneity of sameness and difference here is not to be confused with noticing the aspect - the two aspects are never seen simultaneously.
15. This point is made by A.J. Hamilton in "A New Look at Personal Identity" (1995).
16. "The world" would have been a happier phrase than "their worlds", though the latter is consistent with Bruce and Green's overall position.
As promised in chapter 1, this chapter is concerned to develop a coherent description of the type of experience Wittgenstein calls "noticing an aspect", which forms the main subject of part II, section xi of the Investigations. The whole of this section, including the well known "paradoxical" schemata, first appeared in Philosophical Grammar II.

The "Two uses of the word 'see' which initiate Wittgenstein's discussion of "noticing an aspect" correspond to two categorically distinct uses of the word "object"; a relation such as a resemblance between two faces is an "'object' of sight", but is obviously not an "object" in the sense that a face or a chair is. No description, drawing or copy of a likeness between two faces can be produced independently of a description, drawing or copy of the faces themselves. Each face, on the other hand, can be described, drawn or copied independently of the other. The resemblance between them, though, might still be seen "in" one or the other, and then the relation of resemblance becomes an internal one.

The distinction I shall use between "Traditional Empiricism" and "Radical Empiricism" is perhaps not the usual one, which would place Berkeley and Hume on the "Radical" side. I shall call their brand of idealism "Traditional" in the sense that it retains an atomistic conception of experience that has been a constant feature of British Empiricism since Hobbes and Locke. By "Radical Empiricism" I refer to a position that retains Humean idealism while admitting a more holistic or organic conception of "the given", exemplified by William James and Wolfgang Köhler.

As Wittgenstein indicates, a coherent description of noticing an aspect crucially hinges on the discerned difference of category. Both Traditional and Radical Empiricism fail to capture the essential characteristics of "noticing an aspect" through their failure to place this difference of category appropriately within the concept of visual perception. Indeed, the way in which neither position finds it possible to give an adequate account of "noticing aspects" highlights the misconception that is shared by each at its core.

In part I I shall develop a description based on Wittgenstein's insights, in the light of the observations made in chapter 1 concerning
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the representation of acceleration, which will show how the difference between "noticing an aspect" and "continuous aspect perception" ("seeing as") parallels in certain formal respects (but differs from in some others), the difference between acceleration and constant speed. Following this I shall discuss and criticize, in part II, Christopher Peacocke's use of "noticing aspects" to support his distinction between "representational" and "sensational" content in experience;\(^1\) and in part III, Stephen Mulhall's emphasis on "continuous aspect perception" as the significant point of Wittgenstein's comments in this part of the Investigations.\(^2\)

I

At the outset of his discussion of "noticing an aspect", Wittgenstein gives a brief characterization of the type of experience in question:

"I contemplate a face, and then suddenly notice its likeness to another. I see that it has not changed; and yet I see it differently. I call this experience 'noticing an aspect'."\(^3\)

There are two important points here: 1) seeing the face differently occurs during the period of time in which it is seen not to have changed; 2) the sameness and the difference are both seen.

Traditional and Radical Empiricism can accommodate 1) (in modified form) only by rejecting 2). Traditional Empiricism denies that the difference is seen, while Radical Empiricism inadvertently prevents the possibility of the sameness being seen. Notice that Wittgenstein italicizes "see" in the context of seeing that the face has not changed; his target here is clearly Radical Empiricism (e.g. William James and Wolfgang Köhler)\(^4\). The two senses of "see" facilitate the accommodation of both 1) and 2), since what is seen differently is categorically (not physically) distinct from what is seen not to have changed; the difference rides over the sameness on a different "level" (in the sense that Orion inhabits a different "level" to the stars which comprise that constellation). With this insight at hand, all that remains is to describe the way one level "rides" upon the other temporally and spatially (i.e., the temporal and spatial relationships obtaining between the two levels).

Before going on to do this I shall briefly expand on the way Traditional and Radical Empiricism both fail to incorporate the
categorical distinction: they do so by trying to cram the concept of perception into one level or the other, instead of allowing it to span both levels. Hence, according to Traditional Empiricism, our "objects of sight" are confined to "objects" in the sense of individuals or "simples", while all relationships between them, including internal or epistemic ones, are inferred or interpreted. To remain consistent we are now forced to deny that the "simples" we perceive "directly" are "trees" or "faces", since the internal relations which tie various particulars under the concept "tree" or "face" etc. have to be inferred from a basis devoid of any conceptual element - but why necessarily a psychological "object" such as a "sense-impression" or "-datum", rather than a physical object merely unclassified? In order to see a sense-impression we surely just as much require the concept "sense-impression"? The original categorical distinction is distorted into an apparent distinction between what is "directly" perceived (i.e. sense-data), and what is only "indirectly" perceived by means of inference, or merely interpreted. (Since experience of the bare sense-datum has no conceptual element, it is difficult to see how this is perceived, directly or otherwise; and since the epistemic levels are a matter of interpretation it is difficult to see how perception is possible even "indirectly".) Wittgenstein's categorical distinction clearly does not divide all epistemic levels from a "purely sensory" one, but rather distinguishes different epistemic levels - a face lies on a different epistemic level to a resemblance between two faces, just as the stars comprising Orion lie on a different level to the constellation of Orion. Whatever mereological level is reached, our perception has an epistemic element. Unless this point is taken on board the position collapses back into Indirect Realism - a fate that awaits Godfrey Vesey's interpretation of Wittgenstein's categorical distinction in terms of optic/epistemic appearance. Vesey is closer to Peacocke than to Wittgenstein, but I shall reserve Peacocke for part II.

Radical Empiricism is obviously a reaction to the impossible situation of Traditional Empiricism but it makes the same mistake of cramming all our "objects of sight" onto one level - the other level of course. We now directly perceive "organized wholes", but the constituent parts are taken up into the wholes in such a way that they no longer occupy a different epistemic level. Consequently there can be no change at one level without a change at the other. Instead, there is a "flexing
of the visual field" when the "rabbit" aspect of the "duck-rabbit" figure is suddenly noticed. The noticing therefore does not, apparently, take place at any epistemic level, but at a physical level in a spatially enriched sensory field. This makes the "visual impression" a "queerly shifting construction" or "chimera". There is now no possibility that what is seen differently also appears the same; the sameness must now become a matter of inference ("we all know that drawings in books do not suddenly 'flex', so I know this one didn't") — an inversion of Traditional Empiricism.

Now I shall go on to give a fuller account of the temporal and spatial relationships between the two levels of perception, in terms of which the experience of "noticing an aspect" is coherently described. The distinction between "noticing an aspect" and "continuous aspect perception" will emerge clearly in this description. It will be convenient to label the two levels "1st" and "2nd" sense of seeing: the 1st is the sense in which "I see this (e.g. a face)", and the 2nd is the sense in which "I see a likeness between these two faces".

If I look at the "duck-rabbit" figure and "see it as" a duck-picture without noticing the rabbit aspect, my seeing the duck aspect is continuous. The beginning of my seeing the figure as a duck-picture coincides with the beginning of my seeing the figure at all. Consequently it is inappropriate to say that I notice the duck aspect. But then perhaps a question arises: in what sense am I seeing an aspect — seeing the figure as a duck-picture — for what is my seeing it this way opposed to? Are there really two epistemic levels involved here at all? My conclusion is that there are because what is seen is a representation. As Wittgenstein points out, we do not "take" a knife and fork "for" cutlery — we would not say "I see this as a knife and fork", precisely because it is not a representation. Being a knife and fork is not something we notice about something which might be described on another epistemic level; and seeing (possibly without noticing) the knife and fork does not involve any epistemic level other than the two consisting of 1) the concepts "knife" and "fork", and 2) the (relational) concept "and". (Seeing the knife and fork "as" a knife and fork is not opposed to anything else it might be taken to be.) This is not so in the case of a representation — a drawing or copy. When we see a knife and fork we are aware that what we see is a knife and fork. But when we see a picture of a duck we are aware that what we see is not a duck. What we
see is a picture; if it were an oil painting we might describe the shape of the canvas, style of frame, texture of the paint, and so on. But we see the intentional\(^9\) "object" depicted thereby as a duck. This is not something we notice about the picture, but is something about the picture we see. The "object" seen in the 2\(^{\text{nd}}\) sense here might even be characterized as a resemblance between the picture and the kind of thing depicted (whereas words do not resemble their meanings). Seeing this resemblance is unlikely to begin after the start of seeing the picture, though it is possible (whereas its beginning before is obviously impossible).

This gives an outline of the concept of "seeing-as" or "continuous aspect perception". It does not depend on noticing an aspect, but noticing an aspect depends on seeing-as in the way that acceleration depends on constant speed. When "I suddenly notice a likeness between two faces", my seeing in the 2\(^{\text{nd}}\) sense begins after the start of my seeing in the 1\(^{\text{st}}\) sense. My noticing in this case does not occur after the start of a period of seeing in the 2\(^{\text{nd}}\) sense, so noticing an aspect does not depend on a prior period of seeing-as. Rather, it is dependent on (and inseparable from) the period of seeing-as it marks the start of, quite generally. Obviously the reverse dependency obtains whenever the start of a period of seeing-as is marked by noticing an aspect, but since the start of a period of seeing-as is not necessarily marked by the noticing of an aspect, seeing-as does not depend on noticing an aspect generally.

Now the double-aspect schemata such as the "duck-rabbit" provide cases in which, as in the "faces" example, the start of a period of seeing-as is marked by noticing an aspect, provided both aspects are seen; but unlike the "faces" example, the noticing also marks the end of a previous period of seeing-as. Both aspects cannot possibly be seen without noticing one or the other of them. Noticing the aspect in this case marks a limit between periods; the two periods not only never coincide temporally, they never even overlap. This is because the two periods occupy the same level - the 2\(^{\text{nd}}\) sense of seeing. But the two periods on this level occur during a period of seeing in the 1\(^{\text{st}}\) sense whose limits at start and finish may or may not extend beyond the limits of both periods on the 2\(^{\text{nd}}\) level.

The indexicality of the expression of noticing an aspect is therefore temporal - "Now I see it as a rabbit!". The change in aspect
is expressed by the indexical "now". The change here parallels the change in speed during acceleration; but unlike acceleration, this change does not continue, so does not itself require a period of time, but is a limit between periods of time. The equivalent in acceleration would be where "now" expresses the noticing of the beginning of a change in speed, just as "Ouch!" expresses the beginning of a period of (perhaps diminishing) pain. Of course "now" is not always used as an "ausserung"\(^{10}\), but can be used to designate a period of time.

A change in the velocity of a moving body is noticeable at a specific time (within a given time-system). Here the change is noticed, whereas in noticing an aspect, the change is the noticing. But the limits which define a particular acceleration value (a linguistic item), are like the limit which is the noticing of an aspect, in that neither can be "fixed" in an absolute sense (or rather, in the sense that an atomic bomb detonated over Hiroshima at a specific time and date within the time-system of the Earth); there is no "fixed" time at which the rabbit aspect of the duck-rabbit figure is noticeable. Different people will say "Now I see it as a rabbit" at different (Earth-system) times, even if they started seeing the figure at the same (Earth-system) time. (When I say "Now I am seeing it as a rabbit", perhaps I am using "Now" both to express the change and to designate the period of seeing the rabbit aspect.) There is a mereological order of time-systems - each of us is a time-system within the time-system of the Earth.

In the case of continuous aspect perception, there is no indexical expression, but a spatial, as opposed to temporal, viewpoint relativity. I might report my perception of the duck-rabbit figure in the way I would report my perception of one of the animals it depicts - "It's a duck". I report this as if I were seeing a duck in the 1\(^{st}\) sense, though of course I am really reporting a perception in the 2\(^{nd}\) sense - i.e., a period of seeing-as.

If I only ever see the figure as a duck-picture, then the periods of seeing in each sense always coincide with one another. But it is still appropriate to say I am seeing an aspect, since this is opposed to a different aspect which someone else might see. Someone else might only ever see the figure as a rabbit-picture. The two aspects are then not divided by a noticing and seen one after the other by a single person; instead they are seen from different parts of space, possibly during the same period of time, or during overlapping periods of time, by two
people. But what they see differently in the 2nd sense, they see the same in the 1st sense.

II

In chapter 1 of *Sense and Content*, Christopher Peacocke rejects Wittgenstein's schemata as unsuitable for illustrating the distinction he wishes to draw between "sensational" and "representational" (or propositional) content in perceptual experience. Peacocke is quite right to do so, since his intended distinction is not the categorical one Wittgenstein draws, though I suspect Peacocke thinks it is and intends the wire cube as a better way of illustrating it than the schemata; certainly he thinks he is talking about "noticing an aspect".

As noted in part I of the present chapter, Wittgenstein's Categorical distinction distinguishes two epistemic or propositional levels, not all epistemic levels from a "purely sensory" one. Godfrey Vesey interprets Wittgenstein's distinction in Peacockean terms by distinguishing "optic" and "epistemic" appearance. This position collapses into the very position Wittgenstein escapes - Traditional Empiricism. Vesey is obviously unaware of this, as he thinks he is stating Wittgenstein's position. Peacocke, on the other hand, perhaps does not pretend to be other than an Indirect Realist, since he explicitly subscribes to the representational theory of perception. But Peacocke may not be aware that he is not describing "noticing an aspect" at all, since his distinction is not a categorical one; it does not distinguish sensational from epistemic concepts, but the sensational from the conceptual (a categorical distinction can of course only distinguish between conceptual levels).

"Sensational content" possibly corresponds to the Kantian "given" - the "intuitions" of empirical reality. Peacocke may be caught under the spell of a misleading Kantian metaphor; intuitions without concepts are "blind", and concepts without intuitions are "empty". This metaphor goes some way towards capturing the inter-dependency of sensations and concepts in experience, but does not go far enough. An intuition would still seem independently intelligible even if it were "blind" (blindness is, after all, a property of something); and a concept would seem to be some kind of pre-existent container waiting to be filled, if it were merely "empty". This reflects Kant's Newtonian conception of absolute space and time (imagine non-spatial, non-temporal matter waiting to "fill" non-physical space and time); less obviously, it also reflects
the Kantian distinction between empirical and noumenal reality. Noumenal reality is epistemically inaccessible, so ex hypothesi, the concept of noumenal reality must be intelligible independently of the twelve categories which mark the limits of our understanding in Kant's philosophy (a contradiction of course). And this must also apply to "intuitions", since none of the concepts which make intuitions intelligible is the concept of an intuition. While concepts and "intuitions" are required to be independently intelligible (in the way that form and content are not), even to the small extent that Kant allows, we face an infinite regress of empirical and noumenal reality. The difficulty facing Peacocke's representationalism is of the same kind. "Sensational content" would require its own level of propositional content to render that concept independently intelligible (as it must be to serve Peacocke's thesis); yet this possibility is ruled out by the distinction itself; like "intuitions", "sensational content" becomes as noumenal as whatever it is (if anything) that the representational theory of perception supposes our perceptions "represent".

If we do describe those perceived aspects which Peacocke labels "sensational content" - e.g. the proportion of the visual field an object occupies, or the shape an object presents on a plane perpendicular to a particular line of sight - we do so by using a host of appropriate concepts, such as "two-thirds" or "ellipse" (and these concepts might be applied in contexts other than visual fields and perspectival planes). What Peacocke calls "sensational content" (of perception), I shall call "viewpoint-relative aspects of states of affairs"; for these features are not described in terms of sensation concepts.

The issue here would be a mere quibble over terminology if by "sensational content" Peacocke actually meant "viewpoint-relative aspects of states of affairs"; for this does draw attention to an epistemic distinction that Radical Empiricism obliterates (Radical Empiricism puts colour and shape on the same level as "organization", as Wittgenstein points out.) However, Peacocke's intention is to use this distinction to support the thesis that experience is not entirely captured by concepts - that "sensational content" lies outside the epistemic net. The distinction is supposed to lend weight to the thesis by explaining certain perceptual phenomena (what Peacocke takes to be "noticing an aspect") by means of it. Since the viewpoint-relative aspects of states of affairs are, allegedly, not only intelligible
independently of propositional content, but are devoid of it, they ought to be like Kantian intuitions without concepts — i.e., "blind".

My conclusion will be that the viewpoint-relative aspects of states of affairs are instrumental in describing the wire cube experience, but do not "explain" it; and, furthermore, that this goes no way towards supporting the thesis that "sensational content" lies outside the epistemic net. Peacocke would have given better support to this position had "sensational content" more to do with sensations than with the viewpoint-relative aspects of states of affairs. In the remainder of this section I shall, firstly, discuss the case of the wire cube in relation to Peacocke's thesis and to the concept of "noticing an aspect"; then I shall suggest the kind of experiences which might more reasonably be thought to lack any propositional content.

Peacocke's reason for trying to elucidate the concept of "noticing an aspect" by describing a certain visual experience engendered by a wire cube, rather than by an ambiguous line drawing of the kind used by Wittgenstein, is that a line drawing is a representation. The application of Peacocke's distinction to a representation would put representational content on a meta-propositional level — an unnecessary complication for Peacocke's purposes. Wittgenstein makes it clear that the concept of "noticing an aspect" is not restricted to ambiguous representations with his initial example of the faces. However, when noticing an aspect does not involve a representation, it does involve a relationship between two objects, though this may be an internal one. Peacocke's example, on the other hand, involves only one object. What is important about this one object is of course the spatial relationships between its parts and the observer; but there is an important difference between purely spatial relationships and epistemic ones. Spatial levels are obviously not categorical levels. In fact the case of the wire cube does not fit the concept of "noticing an aspect" for a number of reasons; moreover, it does not provide the kind of experience that Peacocke requires for his own purpose. Peacocke requires an experience that, he thinks, only the distinction between sensational and representational content can "explain". Noticing an aspect provides the necessary "air of paradox" created by seeing something differently and, during the same period of time, seeing that it has not changed. Unfortunately for Peacocke, this does not characterize the experience involving the wire cube.
The crucial difference between Peacocke's example and noticing an aspect is identified by Malcolm Budd: the wire cube looks to be first one way, then another; of the two faces perpendicular to the observer's line of sight, the one that first appears to be the more distant suddenly appears to be the nearer (and vice-versa of course). By contrast, there is no sense in which the duck or the rabbit aspect of the "duck-rabbit" figure gives it the appearance of being a duck or a rabbit, or in which the resemblance between two faces gives one face the appearance of being the other.

Budd's brief observation can be expanded to show how the wire cube example fails to serve Peacocke's own purpose. Although one may not be able to decide which of the two ways the cube appears to be is the way it is, there is a real question of its being either one way or the other. It is logically impossible for one face of the cube to be both the nearer and the more distant from only one viewpoint and without the rotation of the cube in time and space. It is therefore a matter of deductive inference (on pain of a reductio ad absurdum) that while one of the ways the cube appears to be is really the way it is, the other way it appears to be is an optical illusion. This is true not so much in spite of, but because of the fact that one might not know which way is which, and of the fact that the distinction between the two ways is as viewpoint-relative and, possibly, as empirically indiscernible (in an absolute sense) as the distinction between any two spatial dimensions. But in the case of noticing an aspect, this is simply not an issue.

Neither of the two ways in which the duck-rabbit figure can be seen is an illusion, since all that is logically ruled out is that both aspects can be seen simultaneously by the same person. Moreover, whichever of the two ways the wire cube appears to be is the optical illusion, though a viewpoint-relative aspect of the cube, obviously cannot be a perceived aspect of the cube (because the cube is perceived from the opposite viewpoint).

The fatal consequence for Peacocke is that while the orientation of the wire cube appears to have reversed, there is nothing left to appear not to have changed, precisely because the experience involves an optical illusion. It is, rather, a question of inferring that the wire cube has not changed from the fact that, without the physical rotation of the cube in relation to the viewpoint, or vice-versa, the orientation of the cube could not possibly have reversed.
To be fair to Peacocke, it might be thought that the isomorphism of both apparent ways is what appears not to change. Of course the cube is isomorphic with itself whatever the orientation, so it is only the shapes of 2-d translations of different orientations that could be non-isomorphic; but there are not two orientations here to appear isomorphic in 2-d translation, for the orientation is relative to a single viewpoint. The duck-rabbit figure, on the other hand, illustrates that a duck's head and a rabbit's head can present (unexpectedly) congruent shapes in 2-d translation; neither the duck aspect nor the rabbit aspect is an illusion, as the figure does not appear to be a duck or a rabbit.

What the figure appears to be is a rudimentary 2-d translation of both a duck's and a rabbit's head, though it looks to be a representation whose stylized simplicity is exploited to produce an approximation of the shape that duck's and rabbit's heads in general have in common, rather than one copied from any particular duck's or rabbit's head.

Even if we supposed that the illusion of change in the wire cube example were underlaid by an appearance of non-change, it would not support Peacocke's thesis. For if the appearance of difference is captured conceptually (which it is, on the level of the relationship between cube and viewpoint) then the appearance of sameness certainly would be, since it would be described in the same viewpoint-relative terms (as indeed the actual sameness is); and if the appearance of difference is not captured propositionally, then neither is the appearance of sameness, since neither can be described independently of the same viewpoint-relative terms. In other words, the orientational appearance of the wire cube is described in exactly the same terms as its actual orientation with respect to different viewpoints.

So, something other than the viewpoint-relative aspects of states of affairs is required to exemplify non-propositional content.

Our experience certainly involves sensations which have nothing to do with how things are outside our own bodies. We tend to think of sensations in exclusively fleshly terms — pains, itches, etc. (just as we tend to neglect perceptual modalities other than the visual); we also, for example, experience visual and aural sensations. With a rapid change of altitude, we usually experience not just pains in our ears, but certain aural sensations which we describe as if they were sounds — "a high pitched whine", say. The visual equivalent would be something like "seeing stars" when subjected to a violent blow. After-images also come into the category of visual sensations, and again we describe these
in the terms we would use to describe objects - only in this case, at
the level of colours and shapes; the colours may be the opposite of
those of the objects the after-image is an image of, but the shapes are
generally the same. There is no aural equivalent of after-images, since
the way light affects the retina is so different to the way sound
affects the ear-drum; but very loud noises may leave a "ringing in the
ears" after they have stopped (and are heard to have stopped).

Sensations such as these do not form part of perception in the
ordinary sense (i.e. perception of how things are outside our own
bodies); rather, they are experienced effects of the necessary
conditions for perception. Whether or not there is any other sense of
"perception" which applies, for example, to kinaesthetic sensations will
be the subject of chapter 3.

III
Because Peacocke's wire-cube experience involves an optical illusion,
this case requires an explanation; it is pertinent to know the physical/
physiological causes of the illusion. By contrast, no more would be
revealed about noticing an aspect by discovering its physical causes,
than would be learned about a chess-piece by discovering its physical
properties.

This point applies to perception quite generally. Only in a case
of genuine illusion is an explanation required to make sense of the
experience. Otherwise, what is required is a coherent description.
Wittgenstein indicates as much when, on p.211 of PI, he touches on the
subject of looking without seeing: "'Just now I looked at the shape
rather than at the colour.' Do not let such phrases confuse you. Above
all, don't wonder 'what can be going on in the eyes or brain?'" To make
this particular point, Wittgenstein does not need to restrict himself to
noticing an aspect, or seeing-as, for, like the distinction between
seeing and interpreting, it applies to seeing quite generally.

As mentioned in chapter 1, the categorical distinction involved in
noticing an aspect is a specific manifestation of a universal boundary
defining the nature of philosophy against that of science. The two
senses of seeing span this boundary, and reveal it in the experience of
noticing an aspect. But if only one of these senses (the more general
sense on which seeing-as is supervenient) is made to span it, then the
coherence of the distinction is lost entirely; it is no longer a
distinction between epistemic levels, but between all epistemic levels and a level that, putatively, no epistemic level has access to. This is the quasi-noumenal realm of Peacocke's "sensational content" or Vesey's "optic appearance".

Though vaguely allowing that "noticing an aspect" is a special case of seeing, Stephen Mulhall's claim in his book *On Being in the World* is that "continuous aspect perception" (or "seeing-as"), is applicable, at least in a sense, to perception generally (i.e. to seeing in the first sense). Although "continuous aspect perception" does not necessarily involve noticing an aspect, and the latter merely reveals the former, the former is distinguished from seeing in the 1st sense in that it involves both senses, as does noticing an aspect. The difference between the last two concepts has to do with the difference between noticing (quite generally), and seeing (quite generally), not between what applies only to seeing in the 2nd sense and what applies to seeing in either sense. The concept of "continuous aspect perception" must be distinguished from seeing in the 1st sense by the categorical distinction the former spans and the latter does not, in order to preserve its coherence as a concept. It's generalization to seeing in the 1st sense serves merely to obliterate the distinction and hence its own coherence. What makes the concept of "seeing-as" coherent is what makes the concept of seeing a pictorial representation (or a resemblance) coherent, and that is what makes both concepts different to that of seeing in the 1st sense.

Noticing an aspect is obviously like noticing in general, in that both are noticing; but the difference is crucial to Wittgenstein's critique of Gestalt psychology. Equally, though seeing-as is involved in noticing an aspect, the difference between them is crucial to a coherent description of experiencing the Gestaltist's ambiguous schemata. And lastly, though seeing-as is like seeing generally, in that both are seeing, the difference is crucial to a coherent description of the difference between perceiving representations and perceiving other things. Like "thinking" and "inward speech", these are all "different concepts".

Mulhall's book is evidently inspired by the aesthetic, or quasi-ethical implications of the experience/interpretation distinction. Mulhall picks on Davidson's *Truth and Interpretation* as a contemporary statement of the position he appeals to Wittgenstein in order to oppose.
Truth and Interpretation is indeed yet another sophisticated development of Traditional Empiricism (along Quinean lines). But, like Vesey, Mulhall is going to find himself collapsing into the very position he thinks he is opposing. Though he acknowledges that the relevant categorical distinction lies between epistemic levels—that, in opposition to Heidegger, there is in perception no content outside the epistemic net—this acknowledgement seems to fluctuate in and out of focus, due to Mulhall's failure to preserve the categorical order of epistemic levels. This order depends on all the differences between the various concepts involved; the "objects" of seeing-as belong to the category that representations and language belong to, not to the category of objects as such. To the extent that the distinction between representations and other things is blurred, so the distinction between the "opposing traditions" is equally blurred. Mulhall's position flows effortlessly into Peacockean representationalism.

Mulhall might well have been both inspired and confused by one paragraph from PI in particular, on p.212:

"Now it is easy to recognize cases in which we are interpreting. When we interpret we form hypotheses, which may prove false—'I am seeing this figure as a ...' can be verified as little as (or in the same sense as) 'I am seeing bright red.' So there is a similarity in the use of 'seeing' in the two contexts."

The similarity between seeing-as and seeing, say, a colour, is not just that neither is a case of interpretation; there is a closer similarity here than there is between seeing-as and seeing, say, a table—for while the latter is also not a case of interpretation, it is verifiable. Yet there are still two uses of "see" here which, though similar in these respects, are categorically different; colours (and shapes), though aspects of things rather than things, are not in themselves relations in the way a resemblance is. And of course, "This object is bright red" is verifiable in the way that "I am seeing bright red" is not. The same goes for "This figure looks like a duck" in relation to "I am seeing this figure as a duck". But "I am seeing a table" is no less verifiable than "This is a table".

Obviously the distinction between seeing and interpreting applies across all senses of seeing; this much the different uses have in common, but it does not diminish the differences between them. The distinction between seeing and interpreting is important to coherent
descriptions of noticing an aspect and seeing-as, but it is peripheral, not central - otherwise Traditional Empiricism would do just as well. Traditional Empiricism is opposed to Wittgenstein on these issues only because the distinction between seeing and interpreting replaces the distinction between the two senses of seeing in the relevant context; and Traditional Empiricism is opposed to Wittgenstein on perception in general only because interpretation displaces our usual "objects of sight" into an unfamiliar realm of "sense-data".

What appeals to Mulhall about Wittgenstein's account is the sense in which the significance of our environment is felt: if I am "aware of the spatial character, the depth of an object (of this cupboard for instance), the whole time I am seeing it", then I, "so to speak, feel it the whole time." The point of this passage is to suggest that claims to "continuous" awareness rest on a false foundation, which itself casts a shadow of dubiousness over Mulhall's emphasis on "continuous aspect perception". But this passage also indicates the vitality of our relationship to the world and to each other. Traditional Empiricism, and its Davidsonian developments, amount to a denial of this vital "ecology" for the sake of an apparent safety-net of calculated interpretation. This, not only for Mulhall, is a moral issue, similar to the one that can be seen to inspire, for example, the poetry of William Blake. But none of this need involve the concept of "seeing-as", except by obvious implication. The distinction between seeing and interpreting does not need noticing an aspect or seeing-as to show it up, as it is already acknowledged, in its own strange way, by Traditional Empiricism and is presupposed in describing the concept of noticing an aspect. However, seeing-as gains its relevance to the issue through the concept of a person who is incapable of seeing an aspect - the concept of someone who is "aspect-blind" - for this concept has much in common with the concept of a "Davisonian interpreter". Both kinds of person have an inability to experience or "feel". While the aspect-blind person is unable to see, for example, the intentional object represented by a picture, without applying some system of inference, the Davidsonian interpreter is unable to make sense of human behaviour and language-use without applying a calculus of interpretation - he must apply a "principle of charity" which reduces everything to his own pre-conceived standards of rationality. The "charity" shown here is of a sort uncannily like that shown by a nineteenth century missionary to a culture that puzzles and
frightens him. Consistent with this kind of inability to experience, is that the interpreter requires an explanation of our understanding language, in order to make sense of it. Hence, the main purpose of Truth and Interpretation is to find one.

The similarity between the concepts of "aspect-blindness" and of "Davidsonian interpretation" is further strengthened by the significance that Wittgenstein himself attaches to aspect-blindness:

"The importance of this concept ['aspect-blindness'] lies in the connexion between the concepts of 'seeing an aspect' and 'experiencing the meaning of a word'."¹⁰

The issue here is clearly central to On Being in the World. The connexion does not imply, however, a connexion between "seeing an aspect" and "seeing generally", other than the obvious one that both are seeing rather than interpreting. Instead, it implies a connexion between pictures and words - or more particularly, our attitude towards each: "The 'aspect-blind' will have an altogether different relationship to pictures from ours."¹¹ Words can be used as kinds of representation, which pictures are. The latter rely on visual resemblance, and the former on symbolic association. Hence, both concepts inhabit the same categorical level (they are both psychological concepts). The categorical distinction which is so crucial throughout this section of the Investigations is eroded when the features which characterize "seeing an aspect" and "experiencing the meaning of a word" are attributed to "seeing generally", since then all concepts become psychological concepts. Mulhall's mistake here is understandable in the light of "experiencing the meaning of a word", due to the deep interdependency between the way we experience the world and the concepts which inform that experience. Nevertheless, the temptation to make this error is the temptation to ignore the categorical difference between psychological concepts and other concepts. All our concepts inhabit the categorical level of language, obviously (concepts are not objects), but psychological concepts are meta-psychological, just as linguistic concepts, such as "truth", "logic", "sentence" and indeed "language", are metalinguistic.

To experience the meaning of a word is to experience something categorically distinct from what is experienced in experiencing a state of affairs, even though meanings are integral to the latter. The crucial point that Mulhall fails to appreciate, I think, is that the two sides
of a categorical distinction bear a *supervenient* relation to each other, whereas the relation between experience and concepts is like that between colour and shape; they lie on the *same* categorical level, because they are mutually dependent, like content and form. Equally, the concept of a star, for example, does not depend for its intelligibility on a categorical level other than that which contains stars, whereas, by contrast, the concept of a constellation depends on a categorical level other than that which contains constellations - i.e., that which contains stars. Because Mulhall confuses the two kinds of relationship, his position falls away from Wittgenstein's and collapses into Traditional Empiricism.
1. *Sense and Content*, ch.1.

2. *On Being in the World*.


5. "Mereological" - concerning the parts comprising a given whole, and hence the categorical order of descriptions in the object language; clouds are mereologically explained by the water droplets that comprise them, while water droplets are mereologically explained by H2O molecules. Hence, there are different levels of mereological explanation, and clouds inhabit a different "mereological level" to water droplets.

6. "Epistemic appearance" = what kind of thing something appears to be; "optic appearance" is therefore supposed to be what something appears to be independently of concepts!

7. E.g. James and Köhler.


9. The "intentional object" here is the object referred to by the painter (see chapter 5). In other cases it might be what someone believes he is seeing that might or might not be the object actually seen. (In contrast to "material object" = object which physically causes the experience at the time.) C.f. Anscombe *The Intentionality of Sensation*.

10."Ausserung" approx = "exclamation" or "expression".

11.I call these "viewpoint-relative aspects of states of affairs" rather than of "perception", because perception is viewpoint-relative (so it cannot have V.R. aspects).

12.*PI*, p.196.

13.*Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Psychology*.

14.Or "propositionally".

15.*PI*, p.214.

16.I am thinking here of Quine's "hypotheses" that attend "sensory stimulation" (sounds like sense-datum theory). (*Theories and Things* ch.1.)

17.Ibid, p.211.

18."Ecology" in Gibson's sense - i.e. our interaction with the world.

19.The sense in which this vitality is compromised by an unwillingness
to take risks is captured perfectly, I think, in Blake's Nurses Song, from Songs of Experience. The Nurse's apparent concern for the safety of the children becomes a tyranny disguising envy of the children's carefree attitude she herself once possessed.

20.PI, p.214.

21.Ibid.
3 Sensations and Knowledge.

Even if I have shown in the previous chapter that Peacocke has misapplied his notion of sensational (as opposed to propositional or conceptual) "content" to what I called "the viewpoint-relative aspects of states of affairs", the paradoxical concept of something that is intelligible independently of concepts remains, if it is "sensations as such" that properly occupy the role required by Peacocke. What remains, therefore, is to show that even "sensations as such" neither need nor can serve Peacocke's requirement. This will be the aim of part I.

Part II will address the more general question of how sensation relates to knowledge, and will specifically be concerned with Investigations II, viii; I hope to be able to interpret Wittgenstein's treatment of the complex relationships between kinaesthetic awareness, sensations, knowledge of bodily states, experience and knowledge of thing outside the body, in a way that accommodates all of Wittgenstein's comments non-counter-intuitively. I have found Stewart Candlish's account instructive, but I have some serious criticisms of it.

I

The concept of "sensation" is intelligible - it is not the concept that faces a difficulty, but our way of characterizing it. It is plausible to say that sensations escape the epistemic net, yet it is equally plausible to say that no intelligible concept can escape it. How, then, do we resolve this apparent paradox? The solution is of a kind already familiar: sensations are not captured by concepts only in a certain sense. The clue to this solution was provided, in the context of seeing-as, by the observation that "'I am seeing this figure as...' can be verified as little as (or in the same sense as) 'I am seeing bright red'." This is not to say that seeing-as is a sensation, any more than it is, or is even in the same category as, seeing a colour. Rather, there is a relevant similarity between all three cases; there is a sense in which none of them is verifiable, and the sense in which they are verifiable is the same.

It is of course sentences asserting or expressing seeing-as, seeing colours and the occurrence of sensations that are verifiable or otherwise. Such sentences can be divided into two types, one of which is verifiable and the other not. The type that is not verifiable involves
the first-personal pronoun: "I am seeing this as a...", "I am seeing bright red", "I am in pain", are not verifiable, since no one can be in a position to disagree (assuming the use to be sincere and comprehending). In this sense the concepts of "seeing-as", "seeing colours", and "sensations", have a non-propositional use. But this does not affect the intelligibility of the concepts, since they occur in another type of sentence which is verifiable. "This figure can be seen as a rabbit", "This object is bright red", "This person is in pain", all invite assent or dissent.

Each of these concepts is therefore similar in that it has two uses, one of which involves the first-personal pronoun and is non-verifiable. The other (verifiable) use that each concept has, on the other hand, highlights the differences between them. When the subject of the sentence involving the concept is not oneself, it is in each case of a different kind. In the case of seeing-as, it is either a representation, or an object or person that resembles something or someone else. In the case of seeing a colour, it is an object so coloured. And in the case of a sensation, it is some other person or animal (than oneself), who behaves in certain recognizable ways. These recognizable ways of behaving provide third-personal criteria for judgements about what sensations are attributable to a person in the other, non-verifiable sense - the sense in which a person experiences sensations first-personally. The judgement is therefore also about what sensation concepts the observed person is likely to use in this expressive sense; and such use becomes a further criterion for third-personal ascription (i.e., the verifiable use of sensation concepts). For example, if someone hits his thumb while hammering in a nail, and then holds his thumb under his arm etc. in a manner expressive of pain, an observer then has criteria for the judgement that this person feels pain in his thumb. If the observed person then says "Ow, my thumb!", the initial judgement is confirmed by this verbal expression. More pedantically precise confirmation would be provided by a strict avowal, such as "My thumb hurts!".

This position differs from logical behaviourism in that behaviourism does not distinguish the two uses of sensation concepts. For the behaviourist, there is no sense in which sensation concepts are non-verifiable, so first-personal use is the same as third-personal; I supposedly ascribe sensations to myself on the same grounds that anyone
else ascribes them to me. So this behavioural basis does not (for the
default used by others) provide criteria for other people's judgements about what
sensation concepts I am likely to use in an expressive sense.

The ascription of sensations in their verifiable sense is of
course defeasible - the behavioural criteria do not provide necessary or
sufficient conditions for sensations in the non-verifiable sense
(otherwise there wouldn't be a non-verifiable sense); but this does not
diminish the mutual dependency of the two uses for their intelligibility
and meaning. Unlike the relationship between the two senses of seeing,
the relationship here is not merely a supervenient one. Human behaviour
is not intelligible independently of the mental life that informs it -
the intentions that motivate actions (including speech), the sensations
and emotions that are expressed, and so on. Conversely, psychological
concepts such as "intentions", "sensations" and "emotions" are
intelligible only via human behaviour.

As John McDowell points out\(^3\), the defeasibility of criteria for
judgements applies not only to the behavioural criteria for the
sensations of others, but equally to the perceptual criteria for
knowledge of states of affairs generally. If I assert "p", and I am
asked "how do you know that-p", I should answer, if the basis of my
assertion is perceptual, that "I can see that-p". That I can see that-p
is my criterion for the judgement that-p, but of course this does not
mean my judgement is necessarily true. If it is false, then I could not
have seen that-p after all. My assertion was motivated by the belief
that-p, but my belief was based on a deception and turned out to be
false. Part of McDowell's point is also that such perceptual criteria
are not independently intelligible from the facts they are criteria for,
and vice-versa, despite their defeasibility. So the mutual dependency
here is just like that between behavioural criteria and sensations.
However, I shall criticise the quasi-explanatory role that McDowell
gives to his disjunctive account of perception, in chapter 4.

Before going on to part II, I shall briefly consider how the
preceding comments apply to visual and auditory sensations, and how the
concept of "pain" compares with other sensation concepts.

The concept of "pain" clearly plays a different role from concepts
such as "after-images" in the "family" of sensation concepts. For
example, "painful" is an adjective that might be used to describe a
tactile, auditory or visual sensation. "Pain" is a rather general term
that describes many different kinds of sensation, and indicates a level of intensity rather than any particular quality. Tactile sensations might include itches, tingles, tickles, pressures etc., which are not painful. But while a pressure, for example, may become painful, itches, tingles and tickles do not become painful without ceasing to be itches, tingles or tickles. This is because "pressure" describes a wide range of intensities, while the others describe certain narrow ranges of low-level intensity which have a particular quality. Visual and aural sensations cover a wide range of intensities, like pressure, but like tingles and tickles, are characterized by qualities other than intensity. These qualities are different in visual and aural sensations, however, since they are often described in terms which would describe some state of affairs outside the body. This is especially the case for after-images. While a concept like "pain" is not intelligible independently of the sort of behaviour that expresses it, the concept of an "after-image" is not intelligible independently of the terms which would describe the (verifiable) state of affairs that the after-image is an image of, or at least that it is like. So here again, there is a sense in which after-images are unverifiable, in that no one can be in a position to disagree if I say, for example, "I am seeing a yellow, box-shaped after-image". If it is not of a yellow box, I describe it as if it were. But if I drop the "as if" and assert in a literal sense that "I am seeing an after-image of a yellow box", then I am making a report that is open to third-personal scrutiny and may be false; the "yellow box" may only be an intentional object in a description that presumes it to be a material one. "I am seeing an after-image of a yellow box" is verifiable in the sense that "I am seeing a yellow box is; if there is no yellow box, then my after-image cannot be of one, any more than I can see one.

II

The other question is really two questions which apply respectively to different examples of sensations. After-images, for example, prompt us to ask whether or not these are perceived. Itches and pains, on the other hand, invite consideration of how or if they provide knowledge about our own bodies - of whether or not they are bodily perceptions.

The body and what happens in and to it is of course a verifiable state of affairs; to a limited extent, each person's relationship to the different parts of his or her own body is more or less the same as other
people's. When I look at my hand, for example, I know its shape and features by the same means as anyone else who might be looking over my shoulder. But of course my relationship to my own hand is also very different from anyone else's relationship to it, while being the same as anyone else's relationship to his or her own hand. Only I can say that this hand is a part of me; but because "this" is an indexical expression, every individual can say the same (where "this" refers to a different hand in each case, and "I" and "me" to a different individual).

The relationship that each individual bears to the various parts of someone else's body involves a relationship at the level of individuals as a whole, and so is logically different to the relationship between an individual as a whole and the parts of his or her own body. But it is also a contingent fact that each individual can be aware of the parts of his or her own body by means that are not available in the relationship between each individual and the parts of other individual's bodies. Someone else may be able to see a cut in my hand, but only I can feel it (i.e., feel this cut).

But what part of my body am I aware of when, for example, I "hear" "whinings" and "buzzings" during a rapid change of altitude, or when I experience an after-image? It is part of the experience that the former is "in my ears" and the latter is "in my eyes", so such experiences can be characterized as involving a relationship to a person's ears or eyes that is unique to the person whose ears or eyes they are. But what knowledge about my ears or eyes can these experiences provide? I cannot hear or see any fact about my ears or eyes that is comparable, for example, to the fact that my hand is cut, which I can feel. But there is also a difference between the aural and the visual cases. After-images depend on a prior period of ordinary visual perception, whereas such auditory sensations are independent of ordinary hearing. This difference is reflected in the fact that while an after-image might be described in terms that would also describe aspects of the state of affairs it is an image of, there is no state of affairs aspects of which could be described in terms that would also describe aural sensations of the kind mentioned.

It is plausible that a cut in my hand is something I come to know of by means of my feeling it; being a verifiable state of affairs, it is something I can know (and be mistaken about), either by perceiving it in
a way others might (e.g. by looking), or by "perceiving" it in a way only available to me. Is the latter a genuine sense of perception?

The fact that I can see my own foot or hand as anyone else might see it means there is no logical difficulty about the concept of perceiving a state of affairs that happens to be a part of one's own body. But what about cases in which the way I "perceive" some part of me is available only to me? Viewpoints for objects outside the human body are available to everyone equally; is viewpoint equality a logical condition for perception? I think not. Visually, each individual has a viewpoint on his or her own body that is not available to anyone else. This in fact is a more limited viewpoint than we have of others (it is a single viewpoint all the time, while we have several viewpoints of others through time). One cannot, for example, see the back of one's own head, or most of one's own face, except in a mirror. That is a limitation unique to each individual's relationship to his or her own body, and one that cannot be escaped from cradle to grave. Equally, what one can see of one's own face, e.g. one's nose, presents an aspect unique to that relationship.

So there is nothing inherently absurd about the idea of perceiving parts of one's body from a unique viewpoint that a person occupies all his or her life, that no other person can "enter" and can only "share" with respect to different bodies. And of course there is no reason why that should not apply to sense modalities other than vision. Indeed, when it comes to the perception of one's own body, the modality of feeling provides essential compensation for the limitations of vision. All that is logically required for perception in this respect is that it is a verifiable state of affairs that a particular instance of sensation makes knowledge of possible. The "object" of knowledge is not the sensation; the sensation is the means of knowing, e.g., that one's back has been lacerated.

Aural sensations and after-images, on the other hand, are sensations, not verifiable states of affairs, so they cannot be said to be objects of perception. If they are to be considered at all perceptual, they will have to make knowledge of a verifiable state of affairs possible. The kind of aural sensations described do not. But in describing an after-image, I might be describing certain aspects of whatever it is an image of. If, for example, I have been looking out of a leaded window, I may well, if I close my eyes, be left with an
after-image describable in terms of a pattern of diamond shapes. Even if I did not know I had been looking at a leaded window, I might suddenly be struck by the resemblance of the after-image to a leaded window. That does make it seem as if I am able to report the presence of an after-image, as I might report the presence of a cut in my hand. But what verifiable state of affairs might I report? I might report the presence of a leaded window, but equally I might report the presence of a pattern of diamond shapes, for that is a fact about something even if I do not know what it is a fact about. As it happens, I would be right to attribute this fact to a leaded window, but I might have been wrong. If, on the other hand, I attribute the pattern of diamond shapes to my after-image, I could only be wrong if I have misused the term "diamond-shape" (i.e., if I do not properly understand the meaning of the term, as in the case of "pain"). Furthermore, when a property is attributed to something, there is the possibility of attributing other properties; the properties of a leaded window are not exhausted by a pattern of diamond-shaped colours. But if such a property is attributed to an after-image, what other properties might be attributable to it? In fact the after-image is identical with the pattern of diamond-shaped colours, so it is inappropriate to attribute such a pattern to an after-image, as if it were a property of something not exhausted by that property. Rather, the after-image can be attributed to whatever it is an image of (as with a reflection or memory image).

I can report the presence of a reflection in a mirror or on a lake, and I can report the presence of an after-image "in my eyes". Whatever the physical differences are, the logical difference is that the after-image is a feature of my unique viewpoint on my own body, whereas viewpoints on a reflection are various and universally available. But what is common to both is that the terms that would describe a reflection or an after-image are applicable to whatever they are reflections or images of, and such properties are identical with the reflection or the after-image, so the latter cannot be the subjects of those properties.

It is appropriate to say that we see reflections, since the logical requirement of a verifiable state of affairs that the relevant sense modality enables us know about, is satisfied (e.g. by a reflection on a lake or a rainbow in the sky). But in the case of an after-image, the only verifiable state of affairs is, say, the leaded window, not the
after-image, so it is inappropriate to say that we see the after-image. 6

In the case of itches and pains, there is no state of affairs entirely outside the body the description of which can be used to describe the sensation. Yet there is still a verifiable state of affairs the description of which can be so used, since the physical condition of a person's body is a verifiable state of affairs; and this bodily state of affairs is what such sensations might feasibly be thought to be perceptions of. For example, one may, quite spontaneously, react to a severe pain in the ankle by saying "I think I have sprained my ankle", or to a searing pain in the hand by saying "I've burned my hand". In each case, medical evidence could (but needn't) verify or falsify one's initial diagnosis. Part of such knowledge on the sufferer's part would undoubtedly be derived from the circumstances in which the pain was occasioned - spraining one's ankle is commensurate with stumbling in a certain way, and burning one's hand with grasping something excessively hot. But the sensation alone might contain these epistemic elements, thus being a way - our primary way - of knowing something of what has happened to the body (or at least of knowing something is wrong and that one had better find out what it is). Such knowledge includes the location of the injury. That part of the "feel" of pains is their location in different parts of the body probably has an evolutionary explanation; but that is merely an awkward way of stating the obvious - the fact that injuries are sharply felt in dominating states of consciousness we call "pain" is as obvious a candidate for an evolutionary explanation as any; if we did not feel pain we would have little chance of survival, and if our pains did not tell us where our injuries are, they would be evolutionarily redundant.

Any such explanation is irrelevant to a description of the phenomenology of pain, but it does support the intuition that it is the phenomenology that gives the meaning of the term (in the criterially-dependent way indicated above), rather than the behavioural types of behaviourism, the causal roles of functionalism, or the brain-states of materialism. (When did anyone ever feel a pain in the brain? - that is physically impossible). 6

Now I shall turn to the issue of kinaesthesia and its place in II, viii of the Investigations. Wittgenstein presents a cluster of related but subtly different cases to illustrate the same point. The first of these cases concerns knowledge of the position and movement of the limbs
in relation to what Stewart Candlish\textsuperscript{7} calls the "Doctrine of kinaesthesia". The "Doctrine" is that "My kinaesthetic sensations advise me of the movement and position of my limbs". In the short paragraph that follows, Wittgenstein observes that I can move, say, a finger and feel nothing or very little, and that even when I do feel a slight sensation this does not "advise" me of the movement, and cannot possibly do so to the degree of precision with which I can describe it.

"Knowing" this movement, Wittgenstein says, "only means: being able to describe it". Anscombe\textsuperscript{8} evidently interprets "being able to describe it" in purely dispositional terms; that is why Michael Martin\textsuperscript{9} criticizes her account for rendering such ability mysterious and inexplicable. Wittgensteinians might criticise her for retreating into behaviourism.

From what ground does this knowledge or ability to describe derive? Pure dispositions do not capture the distinctive first-personal relationship to such knowledge; I do not "discover" how my limbs are moving in the same way that other people do - i.e. by looking. So pure dispositions can hardly account for my ability to know without looking. The knowledge is certainly grounded dispositionally from a third-personal point of view, but first-personally it is grounded in the intentions with which I act. While dispositions are criteria for my intentions, they are not identical with them, since for me my intentions take the form of what I am able to describe, not my manifest description.(I shall expand on this later.)

But dispositions are at least commensurate with intentionality. Martin's response to Anscombe's account, however, is to insist that the relevant knowledge is grounded experientially; this for him is the only possible grounding. This also seems to be the case for Candlish - it is just that some "experiences" are not sensational. According to Candlish, "the deliverances of our kinaesthetic receptors" cannot "with the remotest plausibility" be thought of in terms of sensations (even if "the deliverances of our eyes and ears" can)(p.23). This makes knowledge of the movement and position of the limbs out to be some kind of sensory but non-sensational experience (i.e. with genuine duration). Both Martin and Candlish assume that such knowledge is to be identified with kinaesthetic awareness. The discord between them therefore concerns whether or not such "experience" or "awareness" is sensational. Candlish would argue that Martin resists the introspectionism of sense-datum
theory by means of a "tempting" argument that preserves the assumption that "sensations are the only means by which we receive intimation of changes, whether outside of us or within our own body". The "tempting argument" is that the relevant sensations are not intelligible independently of what is known (or believed). Candlish provides an apt example with the smell of coffee. The smell cannot be characterized independently of being a smell of coffee. Candlish admits that this is enough to undermine the introspectionism of sense-datum theory, and hence of Russell's "logical construction programme", which would hold that the smell is an independently intelligible "datum" that will reveal its "coffeeness" only if introspectively "read" for some indicative feature. The disputed assumption here is what Candlish calls the "introspectionist assumption". I shall use this as a term of convenience, though I do not agree with Candlish's statement of it as being that "one way of finding out what the mind contains is to introspect so that the relevant items become present to consciousness or attention". I should prefer to characterize it as being that "our only way of knowing anything about ourselves or the world is by consciously attending to the contents of the mind and inferring what information it contains". The "tempting argument" undermines this assumption but leaves what Candlish calls the "empiricist assumption" untouched. This is the assumption that "sensations are the only means by which we receive intimation of changes, whether outside of us or within our own body".

Candlish sees the undermining of Russell's "logical construction programme", and hence the sense-datum theory on which it rests, as the "point" of Investigations II, viii. I think a reading of viii supports this view. Yet in the next breath, so to speak, Candlish dismisses the "tempting argument" that achieves this as a "side-issue" compared to the "main point", which is, apparently, that the "empiricist assumption" is false. The first case in viii does falsify this assumption, under the interpretation already outlined. The irony is that Candlish's own argument against the "empiricist assumption" is circular. He is arguing for the conclusion that knowledge of the movement and position of the limbs is not derived from sensations, but this is complicated by his identification of this knowledge with "the deliverances of our kinaesthetic receptors", implying a state of consciousness with genuine duration. What he needs to show, therefore, is that this state of consciousness is not sensational. Only then can he claim kinaesthesia as
the best case against the "empiricist assumption". All Candlish can do, however, given his interpretation, and all in fact he does do, is to assert that "the deliverances of our kinaesthetic receptors" are "radically different" from those of our "eyes and ears" - that even if the latter can be thought of in terms of sensations, the former "cannot with the remotest plausibility" be thought of in such terms. His rhetorical insistence here has to make up for the fact that, given his identification of the relevant knowledge with kinaesthetic "deliverances", it really does seem plausible to think of such knowledge in terms analogous to visual or auditory experience. Candlish's interpretation of this knowledge hardly justifies the claim of a "radical difference".

So Candlish has put Martin in a favourable position, for Martin could rightly argue that such "deliverances" must at least be sensory, if they come via our "kinaesthetic receptors". I think, however, that both Martin and Candlish have missed the point.

The point is that knowledge of the movement and position of the limbs is not identified with any state of consciousness with genuine duration, sensational or otherwise. Rather, it is identified with the intentionality of action. It is our kinaesthetic awareness that has genuine duration, but this does not "advise me of the movement and position of my limbs". Moreover, if "knowing" how my finger is moving only means "being able to describe it", then there is a further consideration that supports this interpretation and which Candlish's interpretation cannot accommodate. I shall dwell on this in some detail.

I am able to describe how my finger is going to move before I move it. That is because the way I move my finger depends on how I intend to move it. Consequently, my ability to describe the movement does not depend on any possible kinaesthetic awareness, sensational or otherwise. Some kinaesthetic awareness might accompany the movement; this movement as a physical event is continuous in space and time, so the kinaesthetic awareness that follows it has genuine duration, though it might not last for the duration of the movement. Whether or not this awareness is sensational is therefore irrelevant to knowledge of the movement, for my knowledge is independent of my kinaesthetic awareness even if the latter is not sensational. It is hard to see how it is not at least sensory, but that is not the point either.

Now I shall try to make my interpretation somewhat clearer.
Suppose I close my eyes and "draw" a square in the air with my forefinger. I already know what shape my forefinger is going to follow when I move it, because I intend it to follow that shape. I might imagine a square and "follow" it with my finger; I am able to describe the movement in the precise terms of a square-shape because that is the shape I intended my finger to follow before I started moving it, and it remains the shape I intend it to follow all the while I am moving it. My awareness of the physical movement, on the other hand, only applies while I am moving my finger, and even then, only when I turn my attention to that physical event in space and time, as opposed to the imagined square. This is my kinaesthetic awareness, which should not be confused with my ability to describe the movement.

I cannot use this awareness to "check" that my hand is indeed following the intended shape, for the more my attention turns to the physical movement, the further it gets from the terms with which I would accurately describe it. If I want to verify that the movement is going according to my intention, I must use the same method as anyone else - I must look. But of course I am not driven to the need for such verification, even if my awareness of the movement is intensified by pain, since I do not question my inherent ability to move according to my intentions.

There are, of course, many cases in which I would not be able to describe exactly how my limbs have been moving, when, for example, my intention has been to perform some task, rather than simply to move in a certain way. If I set out, for example, to build a wooden shed, I may not know half the (remarkably precise) movements I make, not due to the absence of kinaesthetic awareness, but to the nature of my intention. My ability to act does not depend on my ability to know or describe the movements involved, but the reverse dependency obtains; my knowledge of such movements depends on my ability to act according to my intentions. So my ability to make all the movements necessary to achieve a particular task, should not be confused with my ability to know my movements, not because the latter depends on a "kinaesthetic ability", but because it depends on a specific kind of intention.

The point Wittgenstein makes with respect to knowledge of the movement and position of the limbs is illustrated by a series of examples of quite different kinds, indicating that this "point" applies equally to each example. The case of the moving finger is followed by an
example involving hearing a sound, which serves to illustrate something that applies to both - namely, that "knowing" only means "being able to describe" (or point etc.). This is embarrassing for Candlish, who claims that the "main point" is the "radical difference" between the "deliverances of our kinaesthetic receptors" and those of our eyes and ears. Even if Candlish had identified the real difference between knowledge of bodily movement and visual and aural perception, this would have been irrelevant to Wittgenstein's purpose, for it is the similarity that matters here, despite the difference.

In the case of hearing a sound, I know the direction from which the sound comes, but "knowing" here only means "being able to to point or look in the right direction", for example. The ground of my ability is different in this case, however. It is not purely intentional, but experiential. If I heard no sound at all, I could hardly tell where it came from. The sound may "affect one ear more strongly than another" - that may explain my ability to tell where it comes from, but it is not part of my experience; "I don't feel this in my ears". I hear the sound, and my sense of where it comes from is not an independent "feeling", but an integral part of my hearing it. And if, oddly, it is not, then I will not "find out" by introspectively "examining" the aural "sense-impression" for some indicative "feature". I shall have to seek out the source of the sound. Otherwise, whatever physical conditions are necessary for this knowledge have their effect and "I know the direction from which the sound comes" - but this only means, for instance, that "I look in that direction".

And so to the third example: "It is the same", Wittgenstein says, "with the idea that it must be some feature of our pain that advises us of the whereabouts of the pain in the body"... and the fourth: "and some feature of our memory image that tells us the time to which it belongs." The same point now applies to a case in which it is obvious that the relevant knowledge depends on feeling a sensation (I obviously cannot tell where a pain is if I do not feel it), and then to a case in which, as with the bodily movement example, the relevant knowledge is quite independent of the disputed means of knowing. The pain example parallels the sound example, in that in both cases the ability to know is grounded in sensory experience. The memory-image example, meanwhile, parallels the kinaesthesia example, in that the memory-image is irrelevant to knowing the time remembered, just as the kinaesthetic awareness is
irrelevant to knowing the movement and position of the limbs; the knowledge in these two cases is grounded intentionally rather than experientially. But the same point applies irrespective of the grounding.

By now, therefore, it should be clear that LW's object is to reveal the incoherence of the "introspectionist assumption" rather than of the "empiricist assumption", though the latter of course is undermined implicitly by the intentionally grounded examples. In these cases, the knowledge precedes the disputed ground, thus proving that the disputed ground is not the actual ground, since knowledge cannot precede its ground. In the experientially grounded cases, however, it is not the ground that is disputed, but the independence of its intelligibility. The disputed means of knowing (i.e. "sense-impressions" or "-data") purportedly precedes the knowledge, whereas the actual means of knowing coincides with the knowledge.

In the case of locating a pain, care should be taken to observe that the knowledge here concerns the location of an injury (or other cause), not the apparent location of the sensation, which is not a question of knowledge at all. The point here of course is that knowledge is verifiable, and so it must be possible for the knower to be mistaken (i.e. not to know). I may be mistaken about the location of an injury, but no one is in a position to confirm or deny where my pain is felt. As I suggested near the end of part I of this chapter, the fact that the location of an injury usually coincides with the apparent location of a pain probably has an evolutionary explanation, just as the ability to move according to one's intentions probably has. But the relationship of the explanation to the ability has the same significance here as it has in the case of locating the source of a sound - it may or may not be the correct explanation, but even if it is correct, it is not part of the experience (or the intention), and so is not constitutive of the relevant knowledge.

In the fourth paragraph, Wittgenstein returns to knowledge of the movement or position of a limb, in a way that may initially seem baffling. But again, this is more baffling under Candlish's interpretation than under ours. Wittgenstein says that "A sensation can advise us of the movement and position of a limb." But he quickly makes it clear that anyone who does not already know is abnormal. This reflects the fact that our normal means of knowing here depends on our
ability to move etc. according to our intentions - in other words, on our ability to control our movements. A person who has no such control is abnormal and then might have to rely on a special "method". He might "find out" that his arm is outstretched if he feels a pain in his elbow, for example; this would rely on the association of the pain with the arm being outstretched, from past experience (as well as on the normal ability to locate the pain). But this method will certainly not enable the unfortunate person to describe his movements to the degree of precision with which a normal person can describe his. (It is nevertheless one way of knowing something about oneself, so on Candlish's rendering of the "introspectionist assumption", Wittgenstein himself commits this very assumption!).

Also in the fourth paragraph, Wittgenstein provides an analogy for the memory-image case with the example of telling the age of a photograph. The yellowness of a photograph might indicate that it was taken rather a long time ago, because we know from past experience that photographs tend to go yellow with age. But what the photograph is of is a much better indication of the time it was taken. If you took the photograph yourself, and the photograph is of, say, the Eiffel Tower, and the one time you visited Paris was, say, April 1985, then you can date the photograph down to the year and the month. You could hardly date it so accurately by looking at how yellow it is.

The point that Wittgenstein then goes on to make about "sense-impressions" is not that our knowledge of objects is not grounded in sensory experience, but that the very "concept" of "sense-impressions" erroneously implies that our sensory experience is intelligible independently of our knowing about the world - that it forms some kind of "data" off which we "read" what is the case by means of certain "features" of it. "What sense-impression?", Wittgenstein asks.- There is simply no entity formed by our sensory experience that can be characterized independently of what the disputed entity is supposed to "advise" us of.

When the knowledge is grounded experientially, the experience is not intelligible independently of the knowledge, precisely because the knowledge is grounded in experience. But when the knowledge is grounded intentionally, such phenomena as kinaesthetic sensations and memory-images are intelligible independently of the knowledge, precisely because it is not grounded in such phenomena. But I do not "read" either
my experience or my intentions like a book; they do not "tell" me anything, for it is in one or the other that I already know.

Chapter 3, Notes.


3. "Criteria, Defeasibility, and Knowledge".

4. "What if I'm asked to draw the after-image and my drawing isn't box-shaped?"—Then either I have misdescribed the shape or misdrawn it. (An after-image is not like a memory-image). My point here concerns what the after-image looks as if it could be an image of, not what it necessarily is an image of; it is only the shape that matters. If I were looking at the corner of a box and saw a pyramidal shape, my after-image would be pyramidal shaped— I would be misrepresenting it if I described it as box-shaped, or drew a box shape.

5. G.E.M. Anscombe in "The Intentionality of Sensation" (Collected Philosophical Papers, vol.II), draws the useful distinction between "material" and "intentional" objects.

6. "The patient did not feel pain in his grey-matter."


8. Intention (1957) and On Sensations of Position (1962).

The subject of this chapter is the relationship between experience and belief. In part 1 I shall describe an imaginary scenario from which certain implications can be derived. These will undermine Armstrong's view that perceptions are necessarily belief-states; but more significantly they will form the basis for criticisms of Quine's analysis of the role of inference and theory in experience, and in part 2, of the quasi-explanatory character of McDowell's disjunctive account of perception.

I

Suppose we lived in a world where there was no such thing as a green pane of glass, in much the same way that we do actually live in a world, or so we believe, where there is no such thing as a unicorn. And then, one day, someone - "A" - sees a green pane of glass; or at least that is how it seems to A - that what he sees before him is a green pane of glass. He can see that it is, say, about four feet square. He walks around it. It shows the same emerald shade of green from the other side. He touches its surface to make sure it is not a hologram. He even carries out a scratch-test to make sure it is glass and not some other material. There is nothing A can do to prove it is not, after all, a green pane of glass. Yet still, such is A's faith in the science of his world, he does not believe that what he sees before him is really a green pane of glass. There must, A thinks, be some explanation for his seeing this object - "x" - as a green pane of glass, other than that x is a green pane of glass. But in the absence of any actual explanation, A is, to say the least, puzzled by this paradoxical state of affairs.

Next day, A describes his puzzling experience to B. B laughs and says: "I know what you saw, because I saw the same thing myself and decided to investigate the cause of this phenomenon; in fact there were two panes of glass, one blue and one yellow, making congruent surface contact." A has to think about this for a moment. Not being familiar with colour theory, A reasons that if there were two congruently superimposed panes of glass, one blue and one yellow, then it is probable that blue and yellow make green, since that would explain the fact that he saw the blue and yellow panes as a single green pane. It
now seems to A highly unlikely that this hypothesis is false, since it accounts for the facts entirely and without anomaly. All A needs to do now is to check that blue and yellow do make green, and then, with a positive result, he will be satisfied that a highly plausible answer has been found to the apparent paradox of seeing x as something known, or at least believed, not to exist.\(^3\)

Now let us suppose that A takes his reasoning a stage further. On the basis of the kind of inference involved in arriving at an explanation of what A saw x as, A reasons that his seeing x as a green pane of glass involved a similar kind of inference, only a mistaken, invalid or false one. That is to say, A now thinks that when he saw x as a green pane of glass, instead of inferring correctly that x was a congruent superimposition of two panes of glass, one blue and the other yellow, he inferred incorrectly that x was a green pane of glass.

However, it is obvious that A's further reasoning cannot be right, since A only saw x as a green pane of glass; he never once believed that it was a green pane of glass. A is misrepresenting the original experience in claiming that any such inference was involved, because no such belief was involved. The accusation that A is misrepresenting his own past experience assumes, of course, that inference from a set of premises that are believed to a conclusion necessarily entails belief in the conclusion. But I think it is difficult to argue against this if we are considering conscious inference or reasoning rather than mere mechanical calculation. A's newly acquired belief that such an inference and therefore, implicitly, such a belief, was involved in his seeing x as a green pane of glass is a false belief about his own past experience.

The true situation might be summed up by saying, 1) at time t1, A's conception of x was that of a green pane of glass; 2) at t1, A did not believe that x was a green pane of glass; 3) A's conception of x at t1 was explained at t2 by the fact that x was a congruent superimposition of two panes of glass, one blue and one yellow; 4) at t1, A did not believe that x was such as the explanation at t2 described it.

These four propositions, if it is even possible that they could be true, rule out the possibility that the formation of a conception or concept necessarily involves a belief. It follows from this that, if inference and interpretation necessarily involve belief, then the formation of a concept does not necessarily involve inference or
interpretation. Hence, if the conditionals are satisfied here, then since A's conception of x did not involve a belief, it could not have formed through inference or interpretation. I take it that the relevant conditionals are satisfied.

I shall now apply this conclusion to a certain position held by Quine (1981). Quine says (p.20) that "The scientific system, ontology and all, is a conceptual bridge of our own making, linking sensory stimulation to sensory stimulation." From the general context, it does not appear that this is a "bridge" that links sensory stimuli to sensory stimuli in any straightforward or immediate sense, for Quine states in the previous paragraph that "Whether we encounter the same apple the next time around, or only another one like it, is settled if at all by inference from a network of hypotheses that we have internalised little by little in the course of acquiring the non-observational superstructure of our language." For Wittgenstein, it is doubtful even if the "aspect-blind" have to resort to this kind of strategy (cf.R.P.P. p.899).

Quine is right to say that concepts link sensory stimuli. For example, without the concept of identity persisting through time, we would never tend in our visual perception to identify a particular apple (or person) as being the same as the one seen yesterday in the same (or a different) place. Recognition implies this concept, such that the concept of any particular object, animal or person, be that a nameless apple, "Fido" or a close relative, must include some conception of identity through time in the absence of observation, in order to include the possibility of recognition on another occasion. But Quine makes the further assumption that for observation-independent identity to come to form an integral aspect of the conception of a particular, such that recognition becomes possible, necessarily involves the same kind of reasoning that would be involved in explaining how such a conception might have been formed - i.e., in terms of "inference from a network of hypotheses", or in other words, in terms of a theory. For example, the hypothesis that apples have a relatively stable molecular structure that keeps their form, size and colour patterning more or less constant over periods of, say, a few weeks, explains, if true, 1)why the apple has a similar appearance from one day to the next, and 2)why such a similar appearance provides grounds for assuming (believing) identity. If this kind of reasoning were involved in recognising a particular apple next
time around, our recognition would necessarily entail the belief that this is the same apple.

Prima Facie, this may seem plausible. Surely one does not recognize something without believing it to be the same thing as seen previously? However, for one thing, this does not account for our ability to recognize someone or something in a photograph or drawing. Neither does this account for two other aspects of our experience of recognition with respect to belief. Firstly, it does not account for, as sometimes happens, the recognition of something or someone one does not believe one has seen before. Secondly, and perhaps more crucially, it does not account for the fact that one may correctly identify a thing or person by expressing one's sense of recognition, without believing it to be the same thing or person. For example, suppose someone fakes his own funeral so that all his family believe he is dead. Then one day he is recognized in the street by his son. The son is startled by this recognition, but he does not believe it is his father, even though it is his father. As in the case of seeing something as a green pane of glass, there is no belief that what x is seen as is what x actually is.

The difference in the two cases is that while in one case any such belief would be false (in the circumstances), in the other case any such belief would be true.

What Quine's "bridge" of theory settles is whether or not one believes, ultimately, that x is the same thing next time around, not whether or not one recognizes it. It may be objected here that this is precisely Quine's point; he is not talking about recognition at all, but about what settles our belief. But that only goes against Quine's idea that the formation of the concept of identity requires inference from a set of hypotheses, since this concept is entailed in recognition, and recognition does not entail belief (whereas inference does).

Science and religion have this much in common: they try to settle our beliefs about the world. Quine's chief concern is with establishing a language - an edifice of sentences - compatible with the demands of science; consequently he is concerned with what establishes belief, and in particular, true belief. But what establishes belief is not necessarily what establishes conception. Artistic conception, paradigmatically, may involve no belief at all - that is, no belief concerning the content of the art. Artistic conception exemplifies the point that the concept of identity that is inherent in our capacity for
recognition does not involve the kind of inference that would settle and explain a conflict of beliefs.

Another source of confusion in this matter lies in insufficient attention to the distinction between particulars and universals. Encountering the "same apple next time around" and recognizing it is to encounter and recognize the same particular apple. But this may be confused with our recognition of the fact that this particular thing is an apple, which is a matter of classification. Classification "transcends the 'Fido'-Fido principle"; but we need not have transcended this principle in order to recognize the same thing (which happens to be an apple) next time around (and therefore exhibit the presence of the concept of identity through time in one's experience). One may well recognize the same thing without having the slightest idea how to classify it. It is conceivable that an isolated tribe in New Guinea might recognize the sun each day (have a conception of the sun as one and the same object that rises each morning), without realising that it is a star (it may be considered unique, like the sky). Identification of particulars does not presuppose classification. You identify a class, not a particular, when you say "this is a dog" (what you do with the particular here is to classify it).

One can concede to Quine that as far as classification is concerned, theory can play a vital role. Yet even here there is a level at which similarity is recognized in the same way that identity is. It is just that such immediate recognition of similarity is not enough for a scientifically adequate system of classification. A giant panda, for example, looks more like a bear than a red panda, while a red panda looks more like a raccoon than a giant panda. But the biologists classify giant and red pandas together as pandas, not separately as bears and raccoons. In other words, our visual capacity for recognition of identity and similarity is not sufficient for science, which requires inference and theory for satisfactory classification. The theory that apples grow on trees would rule out anything that looked (and even tasted) just like an apple but did not grow on trees, from being classed as an apple. But greengrocers might abandon this theory for purposes of trade. So we could classify things purely according to visual (and/or gustatory) similarity if we so chose, which then would not involve inference and theory. Indeed, theories such as that apples grow on trees presuppose in their very terms a conception of identity persisting
through time. So the position of Quine's theoretical "bridge", which places a need for hypothesis and inference (and hence belief) before we can go on to have a conception of "sameness" (or indeed a belief in identity), generates an infinite regress of theory, conception and belief. According to Quine, we need a belief in identity before we can have a belief in identity.

A similar point can be made with respect to belief itself; surely belief one way or the other concerning identity is normally settled just by simple recognition or seeing - one believes that what seems to see is what x is, unless there is a reason for not believing this; e.g., some previous belief with which any such new belief would be incompatible (if A had not believed that green panes of glass did not exist, A would have believed that x was a green pane of glass). It is just that, as this example shows, such recognition on its own is not adequate for scientific purposes. But even if Quine's own terms are accepted - that it is occasion-sentences reporting sensory stimuli that ultimately decide our acceptance or rejection of a theory, then simple recognition is in the end our only means of settling our beliefs about about the world; and no amount of theory can alter that situation.

II

I shall now consider ways in which consideration of the role of belief in experience can lead to confusion in respects that are diametrically opposed, so to speak, to those I have levelled against Quine. This second sort of mistake is due to a reluctance to accept that inferential relations play a role in the concept of perception at any level, motivated by the fact that causal reasoning seems to generate philosophical problems such as the argument from illusion (which, as I hope I have shown in chapter 1, it needn't). Whereas the first sort of mistake extended inference and theory to a point at which an infinite regress of theory and conception becomes inevitable, the second sort of mistake extends the kind of conception that does not require inference and theory to a point at which the possibility of explanation with respect to experience and knowledge is defeated. Anscombe and McDowell, I think, both make this second kind of mistake.

In Sense Modalities and Spatial Properties, Michael Martin criticises G.E.M.Anscombe on the subject of kinaesthesis. Anscombe's position is that awareness of the position of limbs or the location of
injuries is something quite independent of sensations - that sensations are "purely subjective" in neither containing any such objective awareness intrinsically, nor causing such awareness extrinsically. In chapter 3 I suggested that while Martin's criticism is right in so far as Anscombe's account fails to find a ground for such knowledge, he is wrong in his construal of the necessary ground as being sensational as opposed to being purely intentional. While it may well be difficult to make sense of the concept of kinaesthetic awareness other than in Martin's terms of "impure sensations", it is not kinaesthetic awareness that grounds knowledge of the movement and position of the limbs, but the intentionality of action. In the case of knowledge of the location of an injury, on the other hand, Martin's point applies without reservation, since the ground is obviously sensational. It is here that the internalism of knowledge to sensation is commensurate with Wittgenstein, since this still opposes the putative independent intelligibility of "sense-data". A Wittgensteinian objection to Anscombe's account is that it collapses into behaviourism. Anscombe's dispositional account of the relevant knowledge denies any ground for which dispositions to behave in x-ways form mere third-personal criteria. Martin observes that, "Anscombe suggested that there is simply 'knowledge without observation' of the position of one's limbs; and instead of a felt location for sensations, there is simply a disposition to act towards whichever part of one's body in which the sensation is said to be located." His objection should not be that observation is really involved in both cases, but that Anscombe denies any ground, observational or otherwise, for either case, and that although the ground is different in each case, there is a ground of some kind in both cases, for which dispositions to act are criteria. Anscombe does therefore admit, rightly, that the position of one's limbs is known; she is also right to avoid saying that the location of sensations is known. But she also avoids saying what is known here (i.e. the location of the cause of the sensation). Once we admit that something is known in both cases, we can see that they face the same difficulties in Anscombe's account. The conclusion that the location of an injury is not felt simply goes against our subjective experience, while in both cases the lack of a ground poses difficulties for explanation. When a person declares something to be the case, only if his or her means of knowing is a puzzle is it pertinent to ask how he or she knows. If someone says, for example, "there is a collection of
rifles in that house", it might be pertinent to ask "how do you know?"; and the answer might be "I went in there and saw them". His seeing the rifles explains his knowledge. In normal circumstances no such explanation is required, since it is obvious how people know, for example, what was on the television last night. The same applies, to an even greater extent, for our knowledge of the location of injuries. If someone exclaims "My ankle hurts!", no sane human being would bother to ask, "how do you know it's your ankle that hurts?". We would not ask this, not because it is utterly mysterious how the sufferer knows it is his ankle there is something the matter with, but because it is absolutely obvious how he knows - he can feel it! If he claimed to feel nothing, then such a question would be pertinent. The peculiarity of the circumstances here would be paralleled in ordinary visual perception only by such unusual phenomena as "blind-sight". It does become something of a mystery as to how the blind-sighted individual can know what he does about his environment, since he claims not to be able to see it. What is unfortunate about Anscombe's account is that, as in the strange case of blind-sight, it compels us to ask how we know the location of our injuries or the position of our limbs, because it eliminates what we took to be the obvious answers. So now we require an explanation where it never occurred to us that one was needed. Yet no explanation is possible, since it is blocked by that which displaced what we took for an explanation - namely, by dispositions and knowledge without any ground whatsoever. These, then, ought to provide the explanatory power that sensations or intentions, according to Anscombe, do not; but they themselves motivate the requirement for an explanation in the first place.

McDowell's account of perception leaves us equally mystified and compelled to seek an explanation where it would otherwise never have occurred to us that one was needed. Of course it is true that for every experience that seems veridical, either it is veridical or it isn't; but this disjunctive fact cannot, as McDowell tries to make it do, replace the causal (external) relation between the seeing of an object and the object seen (when it is seen), which both explains the experience and describes the difference between veridical perception and cases of illusion. In the case of bodily perception, we were not forced to deny a causal relation between an injury and the feeling of it, location and all, in order to accommodate Martin's (and Wittgenstein's) internalism. That is to say, the relation is internal on one level and external on
This applies equally to the relation between the seeing of an object and the object seen. The relation here is external in the sense that the object of perception is material (to use Anscombe's distinction). In each case, either the intentional object is also a material one, or it isn't. This is the disjunctive fact about experience, but this fact is not properly understood if it motivates the denial of the externality of the relationship between the material object and the intentional one. For then the difference between the two sides of the disjunct can neither be described nor explained. From the "inside", after all, the difference may be indiscernible. Then the difference is intelligible, and describable, only from an "outside" point of view, which shows an external relation between the percipient and whatever he either sees or mistakes for something else.

It is intuitive to suggest that in cases of veridical perception, what one seems to see is "really" there, materially. This serves not only to describe the situation, but also to explain it. With this obvious explanation eliminated, we are compelled to seek another. Yet all explanatory power is blocked by the extension of the internal relations on both sides of the disjunct, to replace the external relation additional on one of them.

While material objects are intelligible to us only in the sense that they are also intentional objects, the difference between veridical and non-veridical experience is intelligible only in the sense that intentional objects are, in cases of veridical perception, also material ones; this in turn is intelligible only in terms of an external relationship in addition to the internal ones of intentionality. This externality provides the sense in which veridical perception is, at the simplest level, explained.

McDowell's account does not solve any philosophical problems; it merely tries to alter the nature of the problem. The problem is no longer philosophical, apparently, but explanatory. Yet it is philosophical, since no explanation is possible. To make the problem an explanatory one, it must be shown that an explanation is possible; McDowell attempts to do this by talking of the world "getting inside" the head. He thus forces the internal relations which alone he will allow, into a quasi-explanatory role which only an external relation can fill. The result is a collapse into idealism.
1. "Criteria, Defeasibility and Knowledge".

2. Perhaps this will seem a non-Wittgensteinian use of "seeing-as", but I think this use is consistent with the account of seeing-as in chapter 2. It would be seeing-as in the Peacockean sense if A took $x$ to be a green pain of glass, but he manifestly does not. A is struck by the fact that $x$ resembles a green pane of glass to the extent of looking exactly like one. The one difficulty is that A could never have seen any green pane of glass that it might resemble; but then we recognize unicorns in pictures without ever having seen a unicorn.

3. We assume here that in this world the production of green panes of glass is considered physically impossible.

4. And then it is not a case of seeing-as.
5 Recognition and Identity.

In part 1 of chapter 4 I suggested, in opposition to Quine\textsuperscript{1}, that what normally "decides" whether or not something (e.g., an apple), seen once before, is the same thing "next time around", is not a set of hypotheses, but simple recognition, or non-recognition as the case may be. There must, after all, be some way of deciding whether or not to believe such hypotheses to be true—obviously something other than the hypotheses themselves. Furthermore, if we do recognize an apple or a face, then it \textit{is} the same apple or face we saw before; so recognition does not merely decide whether or not we \textbf{believe} it to be the same.

But of course we can be mistaken as to whether or not we recognize the apple or the face, just as we may be mistaken as to whether or not we remember certain events. If we do remember them, then those events did occur. Memory and recognition, unlike thought, belief or sensation, are open to second- or third-personal scrutiny; someone may tell me that I could not possibly have remembered or recognized such-and-such, and be right, however convinced I am. In such cases the pertinent decision is whether or not the apple or the face has been recognized, rather than whether or not it is the same. For the question of its being the same is fatuous unless related to particular circumstances in which it might or might not have occurred before—such as its having been seen or not seen by a certain person on a particular occasion. The apple is obviously the same as itself through time (time is integral with its existence, for nothing exists independently of time); that is simply not an issue.

Just as the truth of a hypothesis is settled by factors other than the hypothesis itself, so the question of recognition must equally be settled by factors other than claims to recognition. For example, if someone visits an exhibition and claims to recognize an original painting that has been displayed for the first time, then the truth or falsity of all the hypotheses concerning the origins of the painting will decide whether or not the claim to recognition can possibly be true. If it turns out, say, that it is the visitor who painted the picture and not the exhibitor who claims to have painted it, then there is every reason to believe the visitor when he says he recognizes the painting. Otherwise, he is simply mistaken.

But what if the painting is a copy? Even if the painting is only
vaguely similar to another that the visitor has seen before, is there not some justification for his claim to recognize it? There is an important difference between recognition and noticing a resemblance, as well as important similarities. That is not to say, however, that a painting is not recognized when it is only a copy that is seen second time around, even if the copy only vaguely resembles the original. The purpose of this chapter will be to explore the similarities and the differences between recognition and noticing a resemblance, the latter being the subject of chapter 2 under the label "noticing an aspect".

The main similarity between the two concepts is that both are kinds of noticing. The important difference is that while noticing a resemblance involves two different things, or even two different kinds of thing, and is the very source of concept formation (the generation of universals), recognition, by contrast, is restricted to what Quine humorously calls the "'Fido'-Fido" principle, involving one and the same thing only. Recognition therefore implicitly concerns identity, while noticing a resemblance implicitly concerns class or kind. There are many ways in which identity and kind tend to be confused; by exploring the differences between recognition and noticing a resemblance, some of these confusions will be unravelled, while the similarities between them will help to explain why such confusions tend to occur.

Let us then return to the question of recognizing a painting when viewing a mere copy. If the observer notices a vague resemblance, or even a striking one, to some other painting he has seen before, this does not constitute recognition, though the observer may well mistake the sense of familiarity for recognition; he may say, quizzically, "I'm sure I've seen that picture before", or "I'm sure I recognize that picture", forgetting what it was exactly he had seen before that resembles it. According to the stated criterion, the reason this is not a case of recognition is that it involves more than one thing - it is a case of noticing a resemblance. But now suppose the painting is a copy, or it is not a painting but a print, of an original the observer has seen before. This equally involves two things, and if it involves two things in the same way, or on the same level, then the situation should not seem any closer to being a case of recognition, however close the resemblance. Yet it does seem closer, and not just because of the degree of resemblance.
Three possibilities present themselves: 1, the stated criterion is false; 2, the sense of being closer to recognition spells confusion; 3, the two things involved here are not involved in the way they are in a case of noticing a resemblance. I think the third of these possibilities is true. I am not necessarily mistaken if when I see, for example, a print or photograph of Wyndham Lewis's portrait of T.S.Eliot, I say that I recognize W.L.'s painting, whether it was the original I saw before or I have only ever seen other copies of it and have never seen this copy of it before. The question hinges on whether or not the picture I see is in fact a copy. A similar criterion applies when, seeing W.L.'s portrait, I claim to recognize Eliot. I am not mistaken just because the painting is not, literally, T.S.Eliot, or because I have only ever seen Eliot in pictures and have never seen this picture of him before. What matters is that the painting is in fact a portrait of T.S.Eliot. In this case my recognition depends on the intention of the painter. I think intentionality also has a role to play concerning identity in certain cases, but I shall discuss that later.

The concept of recognizing someone in a picture clearly faces the same difficulty as the concept of recognizing a painting if it is a copy I see now and the original I saw before, or it is only copies I have ever seen. How is either case possible, given the stated criterion for recognition? It is necessary to show how the two things involved in each case are not involved in the way that they are in cases of noticing a resemblance.

When I recognize a person in a portrait, I do not merely wish to say that the person depicted looks like so-and-so. I want to say it is so-and-so. The person depicted is one and the same as the person depicted in other pictures I have seen of him or her, and that is not affected by the fact that all these pictures are different. If it is the same person depicted in all these different pictures, then I am right to claim that I recognize that person, even though I have never seen him at first hand, so to speak, and have never seen this particular picture of him before. For it is not the picture I claim to recognize, but the person depicted; and because it is the same person in all the different pictures, and the same person whether depicted or seen at first hand, the fact that it is only through having seen a different picture that I now recognize him in this one is irrelevant. The relevant point is that the different pictures are of one and the same person, and my claim to
recognition concerns the person these are pictures of, rather than the pictures. The pictures are my means of recognition, not what I recognize. So on the level of what I recognize, only one individual is involved; whereas, in the case of noticing a resemblance, there are two things involved on the level of what is seen to resemble what, and that is the crucial difference.

Let us say that the first time I saw Wyndham Lewis's portrait of T.S. Eliot, I was at a gallery and it was the original I saw. I had seen photographs of Eliot before, so I recognized Eliot immediately, before I had the chance to read who in fact it was a portrait of. In confirming this to be the case by reading the title on the wall, I confirm that I did recognize Eliot, and did not merely notice a resemblance. Whether or not that confirmation is forthcoming will therefore depend on the intention of the artist. It will not depend on whether or not, in choosing Eliot as his subject, the painter intended the painting to represent Eliot in particular rather than some abstract idea; neither will it depend on whether or not Eliot was present when W.L. painted the picture. Rather, it will depend on whether or not the painter referred to Eliot in producing the picture; on whether or not it was Eliot's features that informed the painter's choice of line and shape, from life or from sketches or from mere memory. The artist might even have used someone else as a model, but provided his decisions were modified by constant reference to Eliot as he remembered him, then the picture is of Eliot, even if the artist decides it is not "about" Eliot specifically, but, say, civilized man in general.

Having established that the portrait is of T.S. Eliot and that when I saw it for the first time I recognized Eliot, suppose then at some later date I see a photograph of this very portrait on the cover of a biography by Peter Ackroyd. I not only recognize T.S. Eliot once again, but Wyndham Lewis's portrait (I recognize the latter for the first time, for it is only the second time I have seen it either at first hand or in a copy) - before having the chance to check that it is indeed a photograph of W.L.'s portrait. Of course the photograph on the cover of the book is not W.L.'s painting any more than W.L.'s painting is T.S. Eliot. But the photograph is of W.L.'s painting, just as the painting is of T.S. Eliot. The reference of the photograph to the painting need not be intentional as the reference of the painting to T.S. Eliot was, since it is not necessarily an act that is affected by the subject; the
photograph could have captured the painting quite accidentally, and that does not affect my recognition. What matters in this case is that it was W.L.'s portrait that affected the light that falls onto the photographic plate or film. So, even though my means of recognition involves two different things, what I claim to recognize is indeed one and the same thing, namely Wyndham Lewis's portrait of T.S. Eliot, and that is enough to validate my claim.

Nothing is altered if the reverse obtains - if it was the photograph on the cover of Ackroyd's biography I saw first, and the original painting in the gallery later; neither is my claim to recognition invalidated if I never saw the original at all, but only different photographs of the same portrait. I still recognize the portrait, since the different photographs are of one and the same portrait and it is that I claim to recognize, not the photograph.

Recognition might therefore be characterized as the perceptual discernment of identity - of the same thing or person in different circumstances (and hence on different occasions), those circumstances being different, perhaps, only in the matter of time, and those occasions separated only by the movement of the observer, not necessarily by the movement or change of his surroundings. That recognition concerns identity and that noticing a resemblance does not is what most crucially distinguishes the two concepts.

Unlike recognition, noticing a resemblance gives rise to the possibility of sorting things into various kinds. This important difference is easily obscured by the similarities, for these similarities are more finely meshed than the crude fact of their both being noticings. They are, indeed, noticings of a certain kind.

In chapter 2 I described noticing a resemblance in terms of periods of time layered one on the other. Noticing a resemblance marks the beginning of a period of seeing that "rides" (superveniently) on another period of seeing that began earlier and underlies it all through. These "layers" of seeing correspond to different "epistemic levels", as I called them. If a face, for example, is seen at first without seeing any resemblance to another, for however short a time, and then the resemblance is seen, the resemblance is noticed in its own right, even though it is supervenient on seeing the face. But if the start of seeing the resemblance coincides with the start of seeing the face, then the resemblance is not noticed in its own right, but only as
part of noticing the face, if indeed the face in turn has been noticed in its own right.

Equally, in the case of noticing, say, a pen on a desk, periods of seeing are layered one on another, or run side by side, and the beginnings of these periods do not coincide if it is a noticing in its own right; the desk has been seen before the pen has begun to be seen. However, the "layers" here do not correspond to different epistemic levels, but lie along the same epistemic plane. Hence, noticing the pen is not supervenient on seeing the table, even though the pen is on it. What does lie on a different epistemic plane is seeing (or noticing) that the pen is on the table, and this is the same kind of noticing as both recognition and noticing a resemblance, in that all three involve two epistemic levels.

Perhaps the inclusion of recognition in this type will seem problematic, in view of the stated criterion that what is recognized is one and the same thing; how can one and the same thing lie on two epistemic levels? That question merely leads us into the trap of its own confusion, for it should be borne in mind that each of the two things involved in noticing a resemblance also occupy the same epistemic level. It is the relation of resemblance that lies on a different one. Equally, T.S.Eliot obviously occupies the same epistemic level as himself. It is the relation of identity that occupies a different one; and the relation of identity is not a "relation" between a thing and itself, but between different sets of circumstances in which the same thing occurs (sets of circumstances related by the same thing). Questions of identity take this form: "Is this apple, which I find in this present set of circumstances, the same apple as the one I found in a certain past set of circumstances?" If I seem to recognize the apple, then I am likely to answer "yes". If not, then my answer is likely to be "no". Whether or not I believe that I do in fact recognize the apple would be influenced by such factors as my seeming to remember that I ate the apple I saw previously. This would tell me that if I do in fact remember eating the apple then I could not possibly recognize it now. All that remains to settle my belief is some evidence to show that I did in fact eat the apple, while what settles the truth of my belief has been all along whether or not I in fact recognize the apple. But the question of whether the apple now is the same as itself previously is of course absurd, though it makes perfect sense to enquire as to how much or how
little the apple has changed over a given period of time. To speak of
the apple changing necessarily implies that it is the same apple that
changes; but if you are tempted, as Hume might have been, to suggest
that the slightest change means another apple, then the possibility of
talking about an apple changing is denied to you (and so, therefore, is
your Humean suggestion).

The similarities between noticing a resemblance and recognition
are therefore significant; they make the differences all the more
important for avoiding confusion between the concepts of kind and of
identity, as well as making these confusions all the more
understandable. I shall give an example of such a confusion— one met
very frequently: suppose someone points to a tree and asks, "can you
identify this tree?" What is the appropriate answer? Provided you can
see the tree and are capable of drawing attention to it yourself, your
answer should be "yes", even if you have no idea what kind of tree it
is. Yet you know that what the questioner means to ask is precisely that
— if you can tell what kind of tree it is. Then why doesn't he say
that? Why doesn't he ask if you can classify the tree? The questioner
might even ask if you recognize the tree, when he knows it is extremely
unlikely you have seen that particular tree before, either at first hand
or in pictures. What he means to ask, of course, is if the tree strikes
you as resembling other trees you are familiar with and whose genus you
know the name of. It seems, therefore, there are two uses of the word
"identify", corresponding to two uses of the word "recognize". Unlike
the two uses of the word "see", for which there is really no alternative
expression in either use, the sense of "identify" that means "classify"
is a source of great confusion precisely because "classify" is an
alternative (and less ambiguous) expression in that use.

The confusion here is particularly understandable when one
considers the method one might use to teach someone how to classify
trees. One is likely to point to an oak to give an example of the kind
of tree we call "oak". A particular tree is then identified in the
process of providing an example. The purpose of the identification is
not, however, to identify that particular tree, but to show it as an
example of a certain kind and hence to classify it. The kind of
situation in which a tree, or some other object, might be identified for
the purpose of identification is, for example, when it serves as a
landmark. Then it really does matter that the object has been identified
and not merely classified; what one is looking for then is a particular tree seen in certain circumstances previously, and not just any tree of a certain kind. This is precisely the kind of situation in which what one hopes to do is to recognize something. The difference between the two kinds of situation is marked by the appropriate ausserung that accompanies success in each case. When you recognize a landmark, you might exclaim, "There it is!" But when you notice an example of a certain kind of thing you have been trying to find, you might exclaim, "There's one!" You have not recognized anything, but have noticed a resemblance between something you see now and have never seen before, and other things you have seen before, or have seen pictures of, but do not see now; this tells you that all these things, seen and remembered, are of the same kind.

There remains one further apparent possibility, however. Might it be true to say that someone who can distinguish oaks can recognize oaks, in the sense that he can distinguish one and the same type? Might a type take the place of a particular in the way that a picture can take the place of the thing depicted when it comes to recognizing a picture as opposed to what it depicts?

The important difference that cannot be put aside is that while a picture is a particular (or a "token" of the type called "picture"), a type is not a token of anything. But does that really matter? We can and do count types as well as tokens (e.g. numbers of different species), and all that cannot be avoided is that what is recognized is one and the same, whether it be token or type. Then one is able to speak of identifying a type, and all that is required to amend the question "Can you identify this tree?" is to say, "Can you identify this type of tree?" Could this be right?

What I think is being overlooked here is that though we can count types, this is supervenient on the individuation of tokens — we count one token of each type. Enumeration cannot escape dependence on individuation. But let us ignore this obstacle for a moment and suppose that types can be identified.4 For even if they can, another way in which the question about identifying trees is understandably confused is highlighted by this thought. Consider these two questions: 1. "Can you identify this man?", when shown the man himself or a picture of him. 2. "Can you identify Ludwig Wittgenstein?", when shown a series of pictures of different men.5 In the second question we are interested in
the relationship between an individual and a name. In the first question
this might also be the point of interest; the question might be answered
by saying, "Yes, he is Ludwig Wittgenstein." But then again that might
not be the point of interest. The questioner might instead be interested
in the relationship between the individual and his occupation or
something he is famous for. The question might be answered by saying,
"Yes, he is the man who gave his inherited fortune to his sister."; or,
"...who said that death is not an event in life."; or, "...who repudiated
Russell's Theory of Descriptions." ...and so on. Alternatively, the
questioner might not be interested in anything you happen to know about
the man, including his name, but only in whether or not you have seen
him before, and if so where; or even just whether or not you recognize
him. But clearly there is something wrong there. If the questioner meant
that, he would not ask if you can identify the man, but if you recognize
him. Yet is there anything less wrong with asking if you can identify
someone when what is required is some information about him, such as his
name?

The two questions at issue are easily confused. The first is not a
question about identity at all, but about what can be attributed to
someone already identified. If you ask a person his name, you are not
trying to "establish his identity", for even if identity is something
that can be established of someone, that has already been established -
there he is in front of you. To say that this is what you are trying to
do not only assumes that identity is a property, but makes it seem as
if, without knowing his name, you cannot be sure of recognizing this
person on any future occasion. The second question - "Can you identify
Ludwig Wittgenstein?", when shown a series of pictures of various people
-is a different matter. This really is a question about identity. You
are then trying to establish which man has that name. The question might
be put differently, and indeed split into two questions, without
altering its sense: a)"Would you recognize Wittgenstein if you saw a
picture of him?" b)"Which of these men, if any, is Wittgenstein?"

Questions of identity therefore have a certain direction of fit
that is opposed to the direction of fit of questions concerning
classification, description (definite or indefinite), or proper name.
Questions of identity concern which individual fits a given name,
description, or other pre-conceived criterion of uniqueness - the quest
is to find that individual. Questions of attribution, on the other hand,
concern which description or proper name fits a given individual - the
quest is to find "the right words".

Now it is clear that the question, "Can you identify this type of tree", even if types can be identified, is like question 1 rather than question 2. Its "direction of fit" is that of "finding the right words". If types can be identified, then the type here has already been identified. But what is really required, of course, is the name of the type - and if types can be identified, then a common noun, such as "oak", will now function as a proper name, like "Wittgenstein". Even allowing this obvious absurdity, the question ought to be, "Can you name this type of tree?"

This particular confusion concerning direction of fit does not affect questions like 2. But now the problem of whether or not types can be identified becomes crucial. If types can be identified, then the question, "Which type of tree is this?", which otherwise belongs to type 1 questions, could also be a question of type 2 - it could have either direction of fit. But the question, "Can you identify an oak?" is most problematic of all, as it seems to make sense as a whole, yet makes no sense either as a question about identifying a token, or as a question about identifying a type, even if the latter is possible. Somehow, it is a combination of 1- and 2- type questions, trading on both directions of fit. On one level, it gives the appearance of being a type-1 question, in that it is a token of the type "oak" that is to be "identified". But then it is not a request for identification, but for classification - it has the descriptive direction of fit, and the appropriate ausserung for success is "There's one!" (the implied type that the token is one of is fitted to this token). On the other hand, the name of the type has already been given in the question, so if the question is amended to "Can you classify an oak?", it still seems odd - the "right words" have already been found.

In view of this, the question gives the appearance, on another level, of being a type-2 question, like "Can you identify the Eiffel Tower?" The appropriate ausserung for success then is "There it is!", and it has an identificatory direction of fit. But then that assumes types can be identified; "an oak" needs amending to "the oak". The question is even odder now, however, since some particular oak is going to be granted the special privilege of being identical with the type of which it is a token, and it does not matter which oak that is. In an act of identification, it always matters which thing is picked or pointed
out, whereas in an act of classification, it matters which type what is picked belongs to, and that is what matters here. This brings us back to the unavoidable conclusion that the thought that types can be identified involves an assumption of identity between a type and a token, which is an error integral with the confusion between identification and classification; it is a failure to distinguish epistemic levels, similar to that which afflicts empiricism with respect to seeing. What has been misleading here was to speak of naming a type; the type, rather, is constituted by the meaning of the (general) name. Hence, the term "oak" does not function as a proper name in relation to a type, but as a general name in relation to tokens of that type.

What status, then, does that leave to the question, "Can you identify an oak?"? One seems to know what is intended; I would respond by trying to find an example of an oak, and my ausserung on success would be "There's one!" Yet neither the act of exemplification nor the ausserung fit the question. When I find an example, I fit the description to this tree; but my quest was not to find this tree in particular, so I was not trying to fit this tree to a description or proper name. My act would therefore be one of classification. Yet the question "can you classify an oak?" does not seem to make sense either.

However, I think this question only does not seem to make sense due to its similarity to the question, "Can you classify this oak?", which is as silly a question as "Can you name the Eiffel Tower?" The point is that having the word "oak" ready to hand does not affect the direction of fit, and that is why it does not matter that it is already contained in the question. The sense in which a classificatory quest is one of "finding the right words" is not the literal sense in which an identificatory quest is one of "finding the right person/thing" (this is a metaphorical sense of "find" - one does not carry out an "internal" search). The words might have been "ready to hand" all along, but what matters is when (and where) you apply them. Hence, the answer to the question, "Can you classify an oak?", wherein an appropriate example is found to which the descriptive term already given in the question can be applied, has the same direction of fit as the answer to the question, "Can you classify this tree?", wherein the appropriate term is applied to the example already pointed to as part of the indexical expression "this". The gesture is as much a part of the latter question as the term "oak" is a part of the former, but that does not make either question
circular. Circularity is introduced only if the two questions merge into the hybrid form, "Can you classify this oak?" (assuming no other level of classification is required).

Nevertheless, "Can you classify an oak?" still seems ill-formed, as does "can you identify Wittgenstein?" The reason is this: questions, whether genuine requests for information or tests, might either directly concern the propositional content of a possible answer impersonally, or only concern the propositional content of a possible answer via the person who is the subject of the question. A question of the former sort would imply that an act of classification is required by the form, "Which kind of tree is this?" or, "What is an example of an oak?"

Alternatively it would imply that an act of identification is required by the form, "Which of these men is Wittgenstein?" A question of the latter sort, on the other hand, concerns the ability of the person addressed second-personally to carry out such an act of classification or identification. Such a question is therefore really about the person's past experience and perceptual capacities. Hence, it would imply that an act of classification is required by the form, "Can you tell what kind of tree this is?" or, "Can you distinguish an oak?" And alternatively it would imply that an act of identification is required by the form, "Do you recognize Wittgenstein?" The problem with questions like "Can you classify an oak?" or, "Can you identify Wittgenstein?", is that they are hybrids of these two types of question.

These considerations have therefore been led through a cluster of interrelated confusions which sometimes afflict our thoughts in multiple fashion. Each of them is made all the more tempting by the ease with which the concept of identity is misunderstood. The identity relation is a relation between sets of circumstances in which the same thing occurs on different occasions. In other words, it is a relationship of contexts. The misunderstanding of this relation in terms of something being the same as itself may be cause or symptom of the construal of identity in terms of things having the same appearance, or being "indiscernible". Hence, we speak of "identical" twins, and it becomes a matter of mere probability that something treated as if it were two things "the same as each other" is really one and the same thing if the "two" things are indiscernible. Then the sense of "sameness" is not a substantive one in time, but a predicative one separated by time; something might not have been "the same as itself" because the time that is integral to existence is treated as if it separated things from
themselves, thus creating a need for indiscernibility to bring the "separated" thing back "together". Identity then seems to become a matter of our means of discerning it - recognition would then become identical with identity.

Another aspect of this misunderstanding is that the indiscernibility account cannot do justice to the fact that one and the same thing can change in appearance and even in substantial properties. If something appears discernibly different on two occasions, then ex hypothesi that thing is no longer "identical with itself". Unlike Leibniz, Hume does not try to pretend that there is some other way of interpreting the indiscernibility "criterion" that might avoid this difficulty; Hume is more consistent in embracing its absurd and ultimately self-refuting results. (As pointed out earlier, if the slightest change in an apple means another apple, how can it be this apple that has changed?)

These criticisms have obvious implications for the concept of recognition, and are borne out by the nature of recognition as we commonly experience it. We do not need the appearance of something to be unchanged in all respects on different occasions in order to recognize it. We might recognize someone we know despite the effects of age; we might "see through" a disguise. Indeed it is not the appearance of something, or anything discernible about it that must be the same in order to recognize it, but rather that which makes an appearance. The sameness of that which makes an appearance is a necessary condition for recognition, but of course this is a sufficient (and analytically trivial) condition only for identity. Recognition requires a perceptual criterion in addition. The appearance of something might have changed so radically that we can no longer recognize it; then our means of discerning that this is something we have seen before is denied us, and even if somehow, perhaps through testimony, we come to know that we have seen this thing before on such-and-such an occasion, we have not recognized it, except in a non-perceptual sense of "recognition", as in "recognizing" someone's authority (but that really means "acknowledgement").

In order to recognize something, there must be something about its appearance, however transformed, that strikes in us a sense of recognition. That will then give reason to ask the question, "Do I recognize this, or have I merely noticed its resemblance to something else?" Such a thought is only likely to cross one's mind if the
appearance is sufficiently transformed to cast doubt over the sense of familiarity; instead of taking it for granted that this is so-and-so, one wonders whether it is or not (and of course it still might not be so-and-so even if one does take it for granted that it is). Once this sense of recognition has struck us, the only remaining condition for recognition is that what one seems to recognize is what one has seen before.

Having outlined what I see as a misconception of identity and recognition, which creates many of the traditional problems of identity, including personal identity, the test for the alternative description I have offered is to see if it can be developed and filled in in such a way as to dissolve these problems. Let us consider the problem of Hobbes's ship. In fact this example is not as representative as Hobbes may have thought, since the change the ship undergoes is due to human agency. Prima Facie that may seem irrelevant, but, as I shall try to show, the question of identity here is intimately bound up with the specific nature of the intentionality that causes the change, and this intentionality is inapplicable in cases not involving human (or animal) agency. Nevertheless, as I shall also try to show, what is distinctive about the physical manifestation of the specific nature of this intentionality is also what decides questions of identity in cases not involving human agency.

Imagine a ferryboat that has taken passengers back and forth across a lake for many years, and has been affectionately named, say, "The Lady of the Lake". Then suppose it is decided not only that the boat requires a complete replacement of timbers, but that it needs to be redesigned. It will be somewhat larger and a slightly different shape, to take more passengers per crossing with greater safety. When the work is done, "The Lady of the Lake" is painted back on the side.

It does not seem nonsensical to say that the name has been painted back on; it does not seem nonsensical to say that this boat required a complete replacement of timbers and needed to be redesigned. Yet a little reflection may raise some doubts. One may well be struck by the thought, "Of course it is not the same boat - another one has taken its place, and all that is the same is the function it serves and the name given to it. But if this is now another boat because it has been redesigned, which of the "two" boats has been redesigned? It is not as if the blue-print for the manufacture of a number of boats has been redrawn to different specifications, so that the old boat will be left..."
to languish in a shed somewhere, while the new boats are being built. It is just one boat that has been redesigned. If it is a case of an old boat being replaced by a new one, is it the old boat or the new replacement that has been redesigned?

Suppose a regular passenger notices the change and says to the skipper, "A new boat! What's happened to the old one?" The skipper might reply, "She's been transformed! You'd hardly recognize her, but there she is." The passenger might think, "What's the difference?" In fact there is a difference, but the skipper's reply is appropriate only if the work was carried out in a certain way; that is, if the work was carried out on the old boat, and the new timbers were not put together independently. The physical manifestation of the intention that informs the work, in terms of which the specific nature of the intention is discernable, is distinctive. One obvious way in which work on a different boat can be distinguished from work on the same boat, is if the new timbers are put together in such a way that there are, even momentarily, two objects in existence during the same period of time, each of which is appropriately described as a boat; then it is obvious that a new boat is being built, and therefore that the boat to be used henceforward is not the boat used before. But what if the old boat were destroyed and then work begins with the new timbers? Again, the new timbers are put together independently, since what is done by putting the new timbers together is independent of what is done to the old boat - these are two independent acts. This is a case of the destruction and construction of two different boats, as opposed to the radical transformation of a single boat, since the act of construction is not an extension of the act of destruction, such that the former is an act of alteration.

But what is physically distinctive about an act of alteration, as opposed to one of new creation? Or does it, after all, come down purely to the intention of the craftsman - what he decides is the case? In the case of the portrait of T.S Eliot, what decided whether or not it was a portrait of Eliot was the intention of the artist, but in terms of reference and not just what the artist "decided". However, this is analogous to what determines whether or not what is being built or altered is a boat, not to what determines whether or not it is the same boat. The two cases obviously both involve human agency, but the boat is analogous to the painting, not to T.S.Eliot. The intention of the artist determined what the painting was of, not anything about Eliot himself;
that the painting was of T.S. Eliot was necessary for the possibility of recognizing him in the painting, but nothing about T.S. Eliot depends on the intentionality of anyone but himself, except the language he uses and what is done to him, since he is not a manufactured object. But since the painting, like the boat, is a manufactured object, everything about its nature as a painting depends on the intentionality of the artist. If the artist radically goes over the work he has already done on the painting, what decides whether it is the same painting or a new one therefore cannot be divorced from the nature of the artist's intentions. However, what matters is the nature of the physical manifestation of these intentions, not simply what the artist decides is the case.

There are two ways this physical manifestation is required to distinguish an act of alteration from an act of new creation. Firstly, so that the painting is still of the same subject, the artist must continue to refer to T.S. Eliot in the way previously described. This is of course not sufficient by itself, since the artist (or indeed different artists) could paint several pictures of the same subject. The equivalent of this reference in the case of the boat is the purpose that the finished article serves (i.e., the use to which it is put) — this is what determines its "boathood", in the way that reference determines "portrait-of-T.S.Eliot-hood". Again, this condition is not sufficient to determine that the boat is the same boat, since many different boats can serve the same purpose. Furthermore, with respect to questions of identity, this condition applies only to manufactured objects, which are classified functionally; when a term is defined functionally, the nature of the objects to which the term applies is partly determined by that application during manufacture, including whether or not the object remains numerically identical during the process (i.e., the nature of a painting or a boat is entirely determined by this intentionality in so far as it is a painting or a boat).

The second condition that is required for identity in these two examples, however, and which is equally insufficient by itself in cases involving human agency, is also required in cases not involving human agency, for which it is then sufficient by itself. This condition is causal continuity. A painting can only be said to have been altered if the revisionary work carried out on it has been in a special sense causally continuous. The first strokes of the revisionary work must link up with some of the original strokes; the totality of original strokes
must support the new ones (they must not, for example, have been cleaned off or covered over, since that would be a case of "starting again"). Likewise, the boat is being altered, as opposed to newly created, only if the original structure of timbers support the new timbers in the process of replacement and change of structure.

Only the combination of these two conditions is sufficient to distinguish an act of alteration from one of new creation, in terms of it being an extension of an act of new creation. It does not matter that the beginning of the physical act of alteration is separated in time from the end of the original physical act of new creation, for the intentional categories do not in any case involve duration in time. (This point will gain significance later in connexion with personal identity.) But the first condition is required only because it is acts that are being distinguished here; this condition is not required where no agency is involved; causal continuity then suffices. I shall now illustrate the application of the criterion of causal continuity to a case not involving human agency.

What do we mean when we say this butterfly used to be a caterpillar? We imply that it is one and the same thing that has undergone such a radical transformation that it satisfies entirely different descriptions at different stages of its life. Must this really be some kind of "naive mistake" just because the caterpillar and the butterfly are dissimilar in virtually every discernable respect, including the number of legs? But if the caterpillar and the butterfly are two different things, which of the two has undergone the metamorphosis? Where is the sense in saying that the caterpillar has turned into the butterfly? The sense in which they are "two different things" is that they are classified differently; that has no more bearing on whether or not it is the same thing, than the fact that people are classified differently during various stages of their lives ("baby", "child", "adult"), has any bearing on who is being referred to. But then if we are referring to one thing, what is the higher classification for this one thing that is a caterpillar and then a butterfly? We seem to have no equivalent of "person" in this case, but that is just a peculiarity of our language. What is required is a more general description than "person" that applies to this case as well as to persons, and such a description might be something like "causal tract". Some causal tracts are manifest as caterpillars or as butterflies on different occasions, and the sense in which the numerical
identity of the causal tract is discernable throughout the different manifestations is the sense in which we can observe a sequence of causally related events - a sense of "see" that finds no place in Hume's universe.

The causal continuity that characterizes the kind of organic transformations that occur in living things is of course internal to those things; the externality of the causal relations concerns the parts of that organic whole, not the whole in relation to other wholes, which in turn constitute together a whole on a different mereological level. The paths that such causal tracts actually forge is nevertheless affected by other tracts. The way, for example, people affect each other can itself be traced as a tract on a different mereological level, in which human existence is seen as a whole - a tract we call "history". Each of our lives is a part of history. Equally, the causal continuity of every tract extends far beyond the apparent bounds of a given whole. A plant, animal or person flourishes or perishes according to the nature of what it or he or she absorbs, or fails to absorb, from the environment - just as the environment is affected by what the organism exudes into it and/or how it acts on it, which in turn helps to determine what the organism continues to absorb. The boundaries of a given causal tract is therefore far from clear, for certain parts of different tracts become parts of each other. Hence, at the highest mereological level, all these tracts are parts internal to the totality of all that exists. That is made possible by the causal interaction of the parts. So although we lead individual lives, each of us is a part of something greater; not of something with metaphysically precise boundaries like a country, or of anything that is the result if human agency (affected by that as it may be), but of the natural world.

Perhaps, however, this causal continuity that applies to the inorganic as well as to the organic, and even when to the organic, as much to a plant as to a person as a physical entity, will not seem sufficient for personal identity. Indeed, but this is more a question of personhood than of identity, and that is entirely down to intentionality; there can be no "psychological criterion" other than this. And intentionality can never be a criterion of identity, since continuity is inapplicable; it can only be a criterion of personhood.

The intentional categories, such as "thought", "belief", "memory", "imagination", are distinguished from sensational states of
consciousness precisely in that they are non-continuous - they have no duration, but are re-created on each occasion they are called into question. Each time you are asked if you believe that - p, you decide afresh; your decision, which alone settles what you believe, does not persist in time, for no change is possible without it being a different belief (and time, after all, is change). Rather, your decision marks a boundary.

Sensations, on the other hand, are continuous in the sense that something is going on in a part of the body in the absence of which the sensation would not be felt. The location of what is "going on" may or may not be an integral aspect of such a state of consciousness. You might say with some surprise, "Ah! - the pain has stopped." But you would not express a similar sense of surprise if you stopped believing a certain proposition. Equally, you cannot decide whether you are in pain or not. The pain is marked by boundaries, which are typically expressed by ausserungen, but it does not itself mark a boundary.

How, then, can the tract of my thoughts, beliefs, memories and imaginings be traced through the course of my life? There simply is no such "tract". Though Derek Parfit does not claim his "psychological criteria" are criteria for identity, they still suffer from confusion between his substitute for identity - survival - and personhood, as well as between identity and resemblance. Psychological survival for Parfit is constituted by the similarity of memories and thoughts etc., and though survival is supposedly independent of the issue of identity, it implies the survival of someone; the concept of identity is built into the concept of survival. If it is the survival of memories and thoughts that matters, rather than of people, then those memories and thoughts themselves must be allowed the possibility of the very transformations that Parfit thinks is a problem for identity. But since these intentional categories do not persist in time precisely because the possibility of change is denied them (only exchange is possible), we cannot speak of their survival. So there is a problem about the idea of anything surviving if survival is defined in terms of psychological criteria. If I say that I "have" the same beliefs, memories etc. as someone else, I have assumed the possibility that they might also be similar; by "same", I do not mean they are in the same "place" at the same time, since both someone else and myself are supposed to "have" them at the same time. This of course is to assume that beliefs and
memories are "inner" psychological "objects", which in this case rules out the possibility of my beliefs and memories being numerically identical with someone else's at the same time.

If, on the other hand, I use "belief" and "memory" in a more verbal sense, I should be speaking of what someone else and myself believes and remembers, and that, of course, could be numerically identical during the same period of time. I should say that I think differently these days, that I believe different propositions, remember different events, imagine different scenarios, rather than that my thoughts, beliefs, memories and imaginings have changed; for I do not treat these as if they were things that might be identified (or compared), any more than I treat resemblances and types in that way.

For Parfit, my survivor, if indeed it is I who survives, is whoever "has" thoughts and memories etc. most similar to the ones I have "had". Equally, someone who q-remembers "my" experiences is q-remembering experiences that are "identical" to "mine", in the sense that there is no "discernable" difference between the two "sets of experiences". The q-memory now has a verbal sense, while the experiences become psychological "objects". But instead of speaking of "having the same experiences", I should rather speak of several people experiencing the same event, thing, state of affairs etc. The sense of "same" then is that of numerical identity, not qualitative similarity.

It might matter to me that what I have experienced is remembered (or even experienced) by other people after my death, but that has as little to do with personal survival as it has with personal identity; if identity does not matter, why should it matter to me that "my" experiences are q-remembered? But if it matters to me that what I have experienced is remembered, then it is identity that matters to me - not my own, but that of what I have experienced. Parfit understandably seeks consolation for mortality, which of course is a distinctively and historically philosophical aspiration. But Parfit's answer in terms of q-memory is not a very philosophical "solution". Compared to the selfless serenity and love aspired to in Taoist nature-mysticism, for example, Parfit's offering satisfies and reflects only the petty egotism and insubstantial simulation that have become the hallmarks of Western Civilization.
3. The possibility of recognizing someone who no longer exists is an interesting feature of our relationship to pictures, films and televised recordings. We are able to perceive past events by means of them, indicating an asymmetric causal relationship with the past. But this subject requires a whole thesis in its own right, concerning time and causation.

4. I do not mean to imply that the incoherence of this supposition can be brushed aside as an independent issue - it emerges in what follows as integral to the confusion which at first might seem independent of it.

5. I intend these two questions to serve as examples of two different kinds of question, to which the two "directions of fit" subsequently discussed apply.

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