

The Korean Armistice of 1953 and its Consequences Part II

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*The Korean Armistice, 1953: Meaning and Consequences for
China under Mao Zedong*

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*The Korean Armistice and Japanese Politics: The Establishment
of the 1955 System*

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Preface

In continuation of the International Studies pamphlet issued in February, we now publish the paper by Dr Rana Mitter (Institute of Chinese Studies, University of Oxford) entitled *The Korean Armistice, 1953: Meaning and Consequences for China under Mao Zedong*.

In place of Professor Tanaka's paper, we are fortunate to be able to include a paper by Dr Koji Nakakita (Associate Professor, Rikkyo University, Tokyo) who has been a visitor at STICERD for the academic year, 2003-4.

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Abstracts

Mitter: China emerged from the Korean War as a more confident actor in the international order. The paper considers three wider contexts within which China's experience of the Korean War should be considered: as part of a spectrum of 20th century wars, as part of a Cold War binarism in politics, and as part of a drive toward technological modernity.

Nakakita: The Korean armistice which ended the hot war in Asia encouraged Japanese political parties of the left and right to amalgamate and inaugurate 'the 1955 system'. It caused some domestic hardship by further reducing US Special Procurements which had played a vital part in reviving Japan's postwar industry. It also enabled Japan to re-frame its policies towards China and the US.

Keywords: Korea, Korean War, Mao, Stalin, Kim Il-sung, prisoners-of-war, War of Resistance to Japan, Cold War, Yoshida, Japan Socialist Party, Liberal party, Democratic party, US Special Procurements, China trade.

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The Korean Armistice, 1953: Meaning and Consequences for China under Mao Zedong

Rana Mitter

'After three years we have won a great victory in the war to resist U S aggression and aid Korea,' announced Mao Zedong on 12 September 1953. 'It has now come to a halt.'¹ As the conflict on the Korean peninsula turned into stalemate, Mao left the citizenry of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in no doubt that the recently concluded conflict was one of great significance not just in terms of territorial control in the region, but rather as part of the statebuilding process within the PRC itself.

War has, of course, been a historically important phenomenon in the reshaping of societies around the globe. One of the notable trends in political culture in the United States in the 1990s was the rediscovery of past wars as a means of rethinking national identity. The war in the Pacific, overshadowed for decades by a less glorious-seeming war in Vietnam, now reappeared as the dying 'greatest generation' of World War II was celebrated by a younger generation for whom even Vietnam was only hearsay. Another war, dubbed 'orgotten' by its veterans, whose memory was revived was the one in Korea. A memorial to the US and UN soldiers who fought across the 38th parallel between 1950 and 1953 was erected on the Mall in Washington DC, a tribute to a conflict in Asia that had been squeezed between the more prominent theatres of the Pacific and southeast Asia. It was not true, of course, that the conflict had been wholly forgotten in the US. For a decade in the 1970s and early 1980s, Alan Alda and the other stars of the television series *M*A*S*H*, based on Robert Altman's hit movie, had dominated the nation's television screens with a fictionalized, darkly comic, account of the Korean conflict. Yet even the film and television series used Korea primarily as a metaphor for the Vietnam conflict and the theme of the absurdity of war seemed to reflect a later generation's cynicism.

But even this dark, questioning take on Korea reflected an assumption that has remained very much at the centre of western historiography of the war: that the Korean War was primarily an American war. As counterpoint to this, it not just important to say that it was also a UN war; the Washington memorial acknowledges the many other nations who fought in Korea too. It was also, of course, a war about and between Koreans; huge numbers of South and North Koreans fought each other,

and the Korean Communist leader Kim Il-sung was instrumental in starting the slide to war. But it was also an international war for the eastern bloc. Again, this was obviously true for Stalin, trying to carve out spheres of influence as the still malleable reordering of the world in the early Cold War began to harden and set. But it was also true for the other emergent power in the region, the People's Republic of China, in existence for less than a year when the conflict broke out. The Korean War was not just crucial to China because of its status on the latter's immediate borders. Just as the US used the conflict to set boundaries about what its new imperial power meant in the new world, so China too reviewed its aims and its own purpose in the world through the Korean war; in particular, making it clear that its ambitions were no less than what Hedley Bull would call a revolutionary state in the world order.²

The war from the Chinese side

The war emerged in a complex mix of ideological commitment and bluff and double bluff. The emergence of new archival sources from the USSR and elsewhere in the eastern bloc since the early 1990s has enabled historians to confirm suspicions which had long been held about the origins of the Korean War. The sudden collapse of the Japanese empire in Asia in 1945 had led to the hasty division of the Korean peninsula into a Communist north and non-Communist south. Yet the Northern leader, Kim Il-sung, driven by a personal sense of destiny as well as ideological commitment, demanded that Stalin assist him in taking the South. Thus challenged, Stalin could hardly cry off; but by stating that Mao's agreement was needed as well, he may well have hoped that Mao would let him off the hook by turning down the request, which would have enabled Stalin to regret that his ally had prevented him from helping further.³ Mao could have been forgiven for declining to take part. The PRC was still not stable. The final territories, including Hainan Island and parts of the southwest, were not brought under Communist control until well into 1950. Taiwan also remained unfinished business. In addition, the new state had to deal with the aftermath of a devastating war against Japan and the complete domestic transformation of society that the Communist revolution demanded, not least through a thorough and often violent campaign of land redistribution in the countryside. Although various western powers had moved to recognize the new government, the United States remained unwilling to recognize the new regime. Consolidation at

home rather than adventures abroad – the choice that had faced the new Soviet state in the 1920s – would have been a perfectly sensible strategy.

Yet, perhaps unlike Stalin, who had chosen to concentrate on 'socialism in one country', Mao was not just a pragmatist but also a romantic. Stalin had been shaped by the dour influences of the Russian Orthodox church (in which he had been in training for the priesthood), Tsarist prison camps, and the criminal underworld. Mao had been shaped by one of the most powerful cultural waves anywhere in the world in the early twentieth century: the May Fourth Movement which brought a self-declared 'New Culture' to China, albeit mostly urban China, in the aftermath of the 1911 revolution. Alienated from his father, Mao travelled from his small Hunan birthplace to the regional capital of Changsha, and then on to Beijing, where he arrived in 1920. While in the capital, he entered the intellectual maelstrom centred on the city's university. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was ultimately the most influential body to emerge from that period, but among the intellectual trends which inspired many of the young, such as Mao, who took part in the movement, were western-derived ideas which celebrated the self and the ego in a way that Confucian cultural norms had frowned upon. Among these ideas, the romanticist celebration of the ego, derived from the western nineteenth-century 'revolt against reason', took particular hold among some of the young Beijing intellectuals such as Guo Moruo. Mao's exposure to these ideas fed his own sense of personal destiny, providing a counterpoint to his other sides: the pragmatist who argued that one should 'seek truth from facts' and who painstakingly compiled detailed accounts of local conditions as in his 1930 Report from Xunwu county, or the ideological master who skilfully adapted Marxism-Leninism to the circumstances of China's society while still maintaining ideological continuity with his Soviet mentors. 'Mao's military romanticism', in the phrase of Shu Guang Zhang, was a powerful thread in his decision to enter the Korean War in 1950.⁴

Romanticism and ideological conviction led Mao, after much hesitation and consultation, to decide to support the North Korean assault on the South, from the first attack on 25 June 1950. There was ambivalence, though, as Mao became aware of the massive counter-force that the United States was prepared to offer to the North Korean and Chinese offensive. Stalin did ultimately provide assistance, but displeased Mao with suggestions such as the idea that the Chinese should pay for

the military supplies that the USSR was providing on credit. With some 900,000 Chinese casualties by the end of the war, this did not go down well.

Chen Jian's essential reassessment of China's role in the Korean conflict shows that Mao's own personality and aspirations were a key part of the equation. Mao's regime was determined to hold the mantle of revolutionary nationalism, and to foment revolutionary world-view within Asia, as well as using the war as part of a strategy to legitimate the revolution at home. Despite the stalemate of 1953, Mao in fact found himself in a position of even greater prestige and unchallengeability after the ending of the war. The duplicitous behaviour of Stalin also had further consequences. Having egged Mao on to intervene in the war, Stalin then dawdled in providing Soviet support. While Mao continued to speak in terms of Sino-Soviet alliance, this experience led him further towards the policy of *zili gengsheng* or self-reliance. This included a new stress on mass mobilization and technological development.⁵

Chen's latest work, in his book *Mao's China and the Cold War*, makes the same argument for China's reasons for entering and remaining in Korea, but takes the story up to the armistice. The Chinese, he shows, were convinced throughout the war that they had a potential battlefield superiority which was not always borne out by results, or indeed shared by the US/UN side. However, various circumstances, including Stalin's death, the advent of the Eisenhower administration, and a self-perception at that point that the Chinese could negotiate from strength, led the Chinese to agree to the armistice in July 1953.

The armistice itself was not easily won. The Chinese side assumed that an agreement would be reached fairly quickly in 1951 because they judged China's position as being strong. However, the demands made by the Chinese, including the recognition of the PRC in the UN, led to flat refusal on the US side and meant that the negotiations became bogged down. Several issues affected the outcome.

First, there was the issue of prisoners-of-war. The Chinese side believed that the Chinese and North Korean wish to exchange all POWs after the conflict had been ended would not be problematic for the US, but in practice, the US was reluctant to hand over North Koreans or Chinese who did not wish to return to their own countries. The argument was phrased as one of human rights, but the US realized also that not to hand over such prisoners would be very beneficial as a propaganda

thrust against the Communist countries, and furthermore, that the return of large numbers of POWs would also give a great manpower boost to the North Korean and Chinese sides. Syngman Rhee's government was also strongly opposed to concessions being given to the Communist side. The offer in April 1952 of the return of only 70,000 rather than 116,000 POWs was the signal for Qiao Guanhua, Li Kenong, and the other negotiators to break off discussions for the time being, as the Beijing leadership became convinced that they were in a good position to keep fighting and gain a more advantageous position for the resumption of negotiations.⁶

February 1952 also saw the start of another hotly contested issue of the time, the accusations that the US was carrying out bacteriological warfare in North Korea and Manchuria. It certainly seems clear that the Chinese leadership genuinely believed that biological weapons (BW) were being used against them. There was recent historical precedent; Northeast China (Manchuria) had had the grim experience of being used as the base for Japanese BW experiments in the notorious Unit 731, and the Nationalist-controlled areas of China during the war against Japan had been attacked with anthrax bombs and other biological weapons. However, conclusive evidence that BW was used against the Chinese in the Korean War has yet to emerge. Nonetheless, as a moral counterblast to the POW issue, BW was highly effective, and prominent western sympathizers with China such as Joseph Needham took the Chinese side very strongly.⁷

The ending of the war in 1953 came shortly after the death of Stalin. This was one of the most shocking events for the Chinese leadership. Mao in particular had had a tempestuous but nonetheless deeply-felt relationship with the Soviet leader. Stalin had given often disastrous advice to the CCP from the 1920s onwards, and Mao's development of a rural revolution was a reaction in part to Comintern advice drawn from Leninist experience that simply did not apply to China. During the recent Civil War, Stalin had played double and triple bluff with his Chinese colleagues, temporarily brushing them off when it appeared that a deal with the Nationalist government of Chiang Kaishek might be more advantageous. Yet Stalin had also been an ideological inspiration, the leader of a world revolution that had but one member until the end of World War II, and a natural ideological ally in the emerging Cold War. It has now quite often been observed, but bears repetition, that America did not lose its chance to be friends with Communist China in the 1950s. It might well

have been wise to open diplomatic relations much earlier – isolation from the outside world certainly contributed to the inward-looking nature of Chinese ideology in the 1950s and 1960s – but the idea that there could have been much closer cooperation is surely misleading. Stalin and Mao saw world through the kind of similar lenses that Dulles and Eisenhower never would.⁸

Nonetheless, the death of Stalin did provide a catalyst to the armistice finally being signed. Kathryn Weathersby has shown that by late 1952, the Chinese position had moved closer to the one espoused by the North Koreans earlier that year, that an armistice should indeed be negotiated. But Stalin's intransigence meant that he refused to consider this compromise. His sudden death on 5 March 1953 meant that the new Soviet leadership could, tortuously, change their line and argue for an armistice.⁹

The historiography of the Chinese involvement in the Korean War has been developing rapidly in both English and Chinese, and this brief account of the way in which some of the major scholars have approached the question cannot do anything like full justice to the richness of their arguments. Instead, I would suggest that interested readers refer not only to the texts mentioned here, but the excellent guides to further reading which these books contain.

Instead, I would like to go on from this account of the detail of how and why China agreed to end its involvement in the Korean War to looking at some of the reasons why this was a significant turning point, and providing both context and consequence. Rather than arguing about large numbers of specific incidents, I want to place the Korean war in several contexts: first, the ending of the Korean War as part of a longer sequence of conflicts that had been raging since the 1930s and even before; secondly, the importance of the war in placing China within the Cold War binary; and thirdly, but not least, the importance of the war as part of Mao and the Communist party's solidifying of its domestic rule.

Korea: a war among wars

First, the context of 1953 as a time in Chinese history needs to be remembered. In just five years, from 1945 to 1950, China ended one eight-year-long war against Japan, went through three years of civil war, and then plunged, yet again, into a war

on its immediate borders. Two assumptions have often been made about 1949. One is that China, after years of weakness, finally 'stood up' in the face of foreign aggression, whereas it had previously been weak. Another was that it ushered in a period of peace.

The Korean War and its end point in 1953 can certainly be seen as a radical shift in China's international role and status, from being a victim or secondary power to one which sought to change the international environment and found itself powerful enough to do so. This has been the most usual, and convincing, way of situating the conflict in China's wider century.

Yet it is also important to see Korea as part of a continuity of conflict, and the legitimacy that accompanied the way in which the Chinese state coped with war. As Hans van de Ven has shown in his recent book, war and the militarization of political culture marks most of the early twentieth century in China. The division of the country into areas of control under rival militarists led to constant warfare; the war against Japan saw the country divided into Nationalist, Communist and collaborationist areas. The civil war then further divided society, as O. A. Westad has demonstrated. The 'scars of war', as Lary and MacKinnon put it, were strongly in the minds of all Chinese by 1949.¹⁰

Since the CCP's legitimacy in part derived from its ability to unite and pacify China, entry into the Korean War just a year or so after the new state's foundation was a gamble, just as much as it had been for a Truman or Attlee administration dealing with war-weary America or Britain. It also contributed to the continued militarization of society. The decision to go to war was not something that was exclusively of relevance to a communist society, therefore. While the new ideological thrust in Chinese society was shaped by the CCP, the need to deal with state legitimacy was an extension of the existing nationalist agenda that had been pursued by all Chinese governments in the twentieth century. In addition, the nature of the question about the relationship between war and statebuilding was one which all twentieth-century Chinese governments had grappled with. In the case of Korea, the question was different in crucial respects from that faced by the Nationalists or the militarist governments which had preceded it. Those earlier governments had had to deal with war on Chinese territory itself, either civil war or else invasion and occupation by

foreign powers. In the case of the PRC, the choice was whether to assist in a war outside Chinese borders.

Yet in the circumstances of the time, and judging by recent precedent, the case may not have looked as different to the PRC leadership, when comparing it to earlier wars, as it appears to us now. There was no guarantee that a hostile Korean state on Chinese borders might not be the bridgehead to a western-sponsored attempt to recapture control of China for Chiang Kaishek. Certainly Chiang himself was heard to tell close advisers that World War III, which he anticipated coming swiftly, would be the chance for the Nationalists to redeem themselves and retake the mainland. The memory of the 1931-37 period would also have been strong in the minds of CCP leaders. In this interval between the occupation of Manchuria and the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War, it was unclear whether China and Japan were at peace or war. During the run-up to the war against Japan, on the one hand, the two countries had diplomatic relations and no open conflict was declared. On the other hand, the Japanese had occupied large parts of Chinese territory by military force, launched one short but bloody military campaign in Shanghai in 1932, and moved steadily into North China between 1935 and 1937. The political atmosphere certainly reflected an expectation of war as the decade moved on. In the same way, the fact that no actual war was taking place on Chinese territory in the middle of 1950 (as opposed to most of the period from 1937 to 1949) was no guarantee that such a war might not break out very shortly. Political decisions by the superpowers, and in particular, a preference for proxy wars rather than direct confrontation, meant that, ultimately, the Korean War was contained to the Korean peninsula itself. However, that did not prevent the PRC leadership and Mao in particular from seeing it as the starting point for a much wider rebuilding of society. That rebuilding not only created a new China, but also addressed problems and issues of statebuilding which the modern state had been grappling with for decades.

The ending of the Korean War, after all, provided the political circumstances in which Mao was able to increase the mobilization, militarization, and politicization of the state as a whole. The use of the War against Japan as a 'good war', a war which could provide a unifying theme to bind a nation together (to use Studs Terkel's ironically-intended phrase slightly anachronistically) was difficult. This was because of the clashes – Nationalist versus communist, anti-Japanese versus collaborationist

– that made it difficult to find a dominant interpretation of the war around which to unite. In this sense, the history of the war was quite different from that of China's new ally, the USSR, or the other Allied powers – UK, US, etc – which had been unequivocally on the winning side. Instead, the complex memory of war was more akin to that in France, with contested and repressed memories.¹¹

However, the ambivalent victory in Korea in 1953 was sufficient to allow the state to portray it as a 'good war': in other words, an ideologically uplifting and worthwhile exercise that gave some kind of legitimacy to yet another episode in the string of international conflicts of which Korea was just the latest over some four decades. Many years later, in the reform era, the War of Resistance would also be recast as a 'good war', and a means for the Nationalists to be brought back subtly into the national narrative, but the wounds of the civil war, and the seeming menace of Chiang Kaishek on Taiwan, were far too recent for this to be a possibility in the 1950s. Therefore, Chinese fiction and culture glorified the Korean war as a recent successful and fraternal blow for the progressive states of the Communist world.

Korea and China's Cold War

The Korean War also entered China's political culture in a variety of ways. The way in which the war had escalated emphasized existing tendencies in the Manicheism of Maoist ideological politics. It has been observed that one of the products of the New Cold War history is that it restores ideology to a position of importance: the belief on both sides in the importance of their ideologies was of central importance to their identity and behaviour.¹²

The ability of the Chinese leadership to present the Korean armistice as a victory, but one which was won at immense cost and sacrifice, was a highly useful tool to enable the still new PRC regime to adapt, but also fit into, particular ideological and cultural models which shaped, and continue to shape, Chinese modernity. For a start, the most ostensible division that was made was between the communist and the capitalist worlds. The condemnation of Khrushchev by the Chinese leadership in 1956 was fuelled by a sense of betrayal at the willingness of the new leader to condemn Stalin and ratchet down tensions with the US in particular (the state which continued to refuse to recognize the PRC).

But the binary split that shaped the Cold War was also very noticeable in the way that language was used in and around the Korean War. The anti-Enlightenment, fascist vision of 'anti-rational' modernity that had held sway in much of the world before World War II became irrelevant after the defeat of the Axis powers. This led to the curious scenario by which two different version of Enlightenment modernity were competing for ownership of the same language during the Cold War. Fascism had ostensibly rejected ideas of rationality, progress, democracy, and so forth as bourgeois conceits. Both liberal market capitalism and communism, in contrast, spent the Cold War claiming ownership of these terms, and in a notable incongruity, the bourgeois, targets of fascism before 1945, were now blamed by the communists too for not living up to the standards of modernity.

Various ideological tendencies which predated the Cold War now affected the way in which the Korean conflict helped to shape the PRC's self-image in the world. First of all was the strong Social Darwinist tendency that argued that China was in danger of 'disappearance' or 'extermination'.¹³ This remained an absolute constant throughout the Mao period (and beyond), the difference being that China was in a position of relative strength after 1949; it therefore had the paradox of being a strong state which believed itself weak in the international system. Chinese communism, of course, was heavily shaped by Social Darwinist assumptions from its earliest days, as Mao's obsessions with youth, physical exercise and militarism showed. The Korean war provided an object lesson in this sort of continuing dualistic zero-sum view of the international system. This was further informed by two other pre-1949 cultural currents. One was the strong influence of Bolshevik models on both Communist and Nationalist political thought because of the strong Comintern influence of the early 1920s, which drowned out the previous anarchist concentration. In addition, the legacy of the Confucian black and white view of what was orthodox and morally correct clearly shaped Communist thinking from the earliest twentieth century.¹⁴

The Korean armistice also opened the way for China, for the next decade and a half to place itself at odds with the normative institutions of the post-1945 international order. For the western world, the vision of the UN fighting a rogue North Korean regime aided by a mysterious and frightening Chinese communist state was an occasion when good and evil were clearly defined. Yet for the PRC, the UN was

hardly a respectable organization. Not only did it deny China entry (despite repeated attempts by Zhou Enlai to make PRC entry a condition of peace in Korea), but worse, allowed the Manichaeic enemy, Taiwan, to masquerade as the true face of 'China'. In contrast, the USSR was a founder member of the UN, and however fierce the Cold War dichotomy became, it was always still integrated into the international order, which China, as a non-participant state, was clearly not. In effect, the exclusion of the USSR from the old League of Nations was being repeated with the PRC, and with similar consequences in terms of the domestic turn inwards as a result of internationalist isolation.

The end result was that the moral certainty of China's revolutionary diplomacy was bolstered by the experience of Korea. The armistice had not provided an overwhelming victory in reality, yet China's worst fears had not been realized. There was not a hostile, fiercely anti-Communist state right on China's northeast border, as had seemed possible at the height of MacArthur's thrust in 1950. In addition, China was now seen as a powerful actor in its own right, in a way that would have seemed impossible even a decade or so earlier, when the country was ravaged by the Japanese occupation and still subject to laws of extraterritoriality which had been imposed a century earlier.

The Korean success was a go-ahead signal for the strengthening of Mao's revolutionary diplomacy, and simultaneously for the growing split with the Soviet Union. These two tendencies, it is not an exaggeration to say, exacerbated a tendency that had begun by the late 1930s; the rejection of the internationalist model of politics that had been so key to the early Republican era when China's May Fourth 'New Culture' had held strong. The values of this era had been distinctly outward-looking, a fact due to circumstances both voluntary and forced. Imperialism had meant that China could not look inward even if it had wished to do so, yet the elite and grassroots culture alike were flavoured by an internationalism that was largely shaped by a conviction that the outside world, while a source of menace, might also provide solutions to China's crisis. In contrast, the Mao era marked a distinct turning inward. William Kirby has pointed out that for a decade, at least, China continued to look outward, but in one direction only: toward the Soviet Union.¹⁵ Yet even this marked a distinct change from the riot of intellectual possibilities and political

solutions that the pre-1949 period had offered. Korea consolidated the narrowing of possibilities.

Korean War and class war

An irony of the Maoist era was that, despite the ostensibly inward turn of public culture in China, international events continued to be highly influential on developments in policy. A few years later, for example, it was the events in Hungary and Poland in 1956 that led Mao to think that it would be necessary to allow more free voice for the intellectuals in China, leading to the Hundred Flowers campaign of the following year. In the case of Korea, the outbreak of war had allowed the 'Resist America, aid Korea' campaign to galvanize politics across China in the first year of the PRC. At the war's conclusion, Mao's speech at the time made it clear that the consolidation of domestic rule in China would be explicitly tied to the 'victory' in Korea. Thus Mao took on those who had complained about the rise in taxation that had been mandated to pay for the war:

Last year and the year before last, the agricultural tax was a shade on the heavy side, and so this set some friends talking. At this time, we had to do our utmost to win victory in the war to resist US aggression and aid Korea. For the peasants, for the people of the whole country, which was in their interest? Undoubtedly winning the war was in their interest. It was because the war required money that we collected a bit more in agricultural tax last year and the year before.¹⁶

Mao moved on to make explicit links between the recent past and the immediate tasks in the future:

Now some friends wanted us to give up the war to resist US aggression and aid Korea, and now they want us to give up the building of heavy industry. We must criticize this erroneous view.¹⁷

The ending of the Korean war also marked the end of the first phase of consolidation of the PRC government. The united front policies and tactical accommodation that had marked its earliest years began to fall away, and the prestige that Mao had gained from China's entry into the war allowed him to exercise the romanticist tendencies that would lead to much stronger campaigns against 'counterrevolutionaries' as well as the collectivist excesses of the Great Leap Forward in the late 1950s. Although the conflict itself was over, Mao's language made it clear that the war footing on which the country had been based was being

transferred to the internal task of class warfare. The 'US aggressors' and 'running dogs' which had been propaganda targets were now transposed to the immediate task of refashioning society fundamentally.

As well as mass mobilization, Mao's China used the Korean experience to stimulate the new state's need to develop high technology; as Chen Jian points out, this led to the development of China's atomic bomb.¹⁸ As with the experience of war, the obsession with technology was also part of a trajectory of thought that had emerged in the late nineteenth century. The Qing dynasty had attempted "self-strengthening" through the development of western technology, and this tendency had been emphasized yet further during that same May Fourth era when Mao had helped found the CCP. 'Science and democracy' had been the catchphrase of the May Fourth movement, and the idea that scientific modernity might be a panacea that would bring China into modernity was fixed in the minds of most of the elite leaders of the early twentieth century, whether Nationalist or Communist in orientation. The Korean confrontation further strengthened the conviction of the CCP that the development of technology was necessary to the state. However, the increasing suspicion of Soviet help, on which Stalin seemed to have been lukewarm, also pushed Mao toward the policy of 'self-reliance' (zili gengsheng). The tension between these goals, one of which seemed to be oriented toward cooperation with the outside world, the other to reject it, would lead to the disastrously contradictory campaigns of the high Maoist era, such as the backyard steel smelters of the Great Leap Forward, and the self-aggrandizing xenophobia of the Cultural Revolution.

Conclusion

China's involvement with the Korean War has moved out of the shadows of historiography in the last decade. The war was clearly a turning-point in the fledgling PRC's reorientation within the international system. Yet it is also clear that in term of domestic politics and culture, the success of Mao's gamble, however ambivalent, also became the basis of a new energy in the shaping of the Communist state. Korea had a powerful domestic effect around the world; it was certainly instrumental in the defeat of the Democrats for the White House in 1952 after twenty years. In Mao's China too, Korea became part of the militarized, unstable mixture that had marked statebuilding throughout the twentieth century.

Endnotes

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² Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics* (Basingstoke, 1995; 2nd ed.), 90.

³ Chen Jian, *China's Road to the Korean War: The Making of the Sino-American Confrontation* (New York, 1994), 85-90, gives a detailed account of the ambiguities in the Mao-Stalin discussions on China's involvement.

⁴ Shu Guang Zhang, *Mao's Military Romanticism: China and the Korean War* (Lawrence, KA, 1995).

⁵ Chen, *China's Road*, 223.

⁶ Chen, *China's Road*, 100.

⁷ Chen, *China's Road*, 110.

⁸ Chen Jian, *Mao's China and the Cold War* (Chapel Hill, 2001), ch.2, 'The Myth of America's Lost Chance in China'.

⁹ Kathryn Weathersby, 'Stalin, Mao, and the End of the Korean War', in Odd Arne Westad, ed., *Brothers in Arms: The Rise and Fall of the Sino-Soviet Alliance* (Stanford, 2000), 108.

¹⁰ Hans van de Ven, *War and Nationalism in China, 1925-1945* (London, 2003); Odd Arne Westad, *Decisive Encounters: The Chinese Civil War, 1946-1950* (Stanford, 2003); Diana Lary and Stephen MacKinnon, *Scars of War: The Impact of Warfare on Modern China* (Vancouver, 2001).

¹¹ In the 1980s, these divisions changed, as the CCP tried to persuade Taiwan into reunification, and used anti-Japanese rhetoric as part of its project to develop nationalist sentiment. See Rana Mitter, 'Old Ghosts, New Memories: China's Changing War History in the Era of Post-Mao Politics', *Journal of Contemporary History* 38:1 (January 2003).

¹² See, e.g., Nigel Gould-Davies, 'Rethinking the Role of Ideology in International Politics during the Cold War', *Journal of Cold War Studies* 1/1 (Winter 1999).

¹³ See, e.g., Ruth Rogaski, 'Nature, Annihilation, and Modernity: China's Korean Germ-Warfare Experience Considered', *Journal of Asian Studies* 61:2 (May 2002).

¹⁴ See, e.g., Lin Yu-sheng, *The Crisis of Chinese Consciousness* (Madison WI, 1979). On the reshaping of intellectual influences on Chinese modern politics from the May Fourth period through the Cold War, see Rana Mitter, *A Bitter Revolution: China's Struggle with the Modern World* (Oxford, 2004), especially chs. 4 and 5.

¹⁵ William C. Kirby, 'The Internationalization of China: Foreign Relations at Home and Abroad', *The China Quarterly* 150 (June 1997), 458.

¹⁶ Mao, "Our Great Victory," 118.

¹⁷ Mao, "Our Great Victory," 119.

¹⁸ Chen, *China's Road*, 223.

The Korean Armistice and Japanese Politics: The Establishment of the 1955 System

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In this paper I assess the effects of the Korean War and especially the Korean Armistice in influencing Japanese politics. This is generally described as the transition to the 1955 system¹, a subject on which I have published a book entitled *1955 Nen Taisei no Seiritsu* (The Establishment of the 1955 System in Japanese Politics)². In Japan the Liberal Party and the Democratic Party merged into the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) on 15 November 1955 and the Left-wing and the Right-wing of the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) reunited into a single party on 13 October. After that, until the birth of the Hosokawa cabinet on 9 August 1993, the LDP was continuously in office and the JSP was the biggest opposition party. The year 1955 was therefore a significant turning point in postwar Japanese politics and its relationship with the Korean War is an interesting subject of study.

Under the 1955 system the LDP had approximately two thirds of the seats in the House of Representatives and the JSP obtained the remaining one third of the seats. The party system was called the 'one and a half party system' since it was composed of two major parties but virtually did not allow for change of power between them³. Nevertheless, we should not regard the 1955 system as a mere party system. It is a fact that the core of the 1955 system dealt with political parties, but it was a huge political system which spread to foreign relations and industrial relations⁴. Talks for normalization in diplomatic relations between Japan and the Soviet Union were initiated in 1955 and in the same year Japan was admitted to complete its accession to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). As to industrial relations, the Japan Productivity Centre (JPC) (Nihon Seisansei Honbu) was established by the

employer's associations in cooperation with the Right-wing trade unions and the Spring Labour Offensive (Shunto) started on the initiative of the General Council of Trade Unions of Japan (Sohyo). Therefore, in order to do some research on the establishment of the 1955 system, we should analyze not only political parties but also relations with foreign countries as well as the employers' associations and the trade unions.

Easing of Tension after the Korean Armistice

What was the major factor which defined the interaction leading to the establishment of the 1955 system? Some political historians have pointed out that it was the outbreak of the Korean War on 25 June 1950, in other words, the outbreak of the 'Hot War' in East Asia⁵. Consequently, rearmament in Japan developed gradually: the Police Reserve Force was formed according to General Douglas MacArthur's instructions in the following month, upgraded to the Public Security Force in 1952 and reorganized into the Japan Self-Defence Forces (JSDF) two years later. The economy then recovered rapidly depending on the special procurements of the American military involved in the Korean War. Moreover, the San Francisco Peace Treaty, without the participation of the Soviet Union and Communist China, and the Japan-US Security Treaty were signed on the same day in 1951 linking Japan closely to American military strategy in East Asia. Japanese conservative parties, especially the ruling Liberal Party led by the Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru, promoted policies of dependence on the United States and militarization. Opposing this, the two socialist parties, in particular the Left-wing Socialist Party, insisted on the 'unarmed neutrality policy' which mainly consisted of the defence of the Constitution (in particular its peace clause) and neutral diplomacy aimed at easing the tension between the two blocs. This polarization of political parties led ultimately to the

formation of the LDP and the reunion of the JSP.

I fully admit the importance of the outbreak of the Korean War for postwar Japanese politics⁶. Nevertheless, the major factor which led directly to the establishment of the 1955 system was the Korean Armistice on 27 July 1953, to be more precise, the easing of tension which started from the Korean Armistice, but accelerated strongly with the Indochinese Armistice on 21 July 1954, bringing about the summit conference of the four powers in Geneva on 18 July 1955. This meant the end of the 'Hot War' in Asia and the establishment of the Cold War in the real sense of the term. The boundaries of the two blocs were practically almost determined. The Cold War virtually reached a deadlock which was expected to last for a long time. As a result, the importance of military power decreased compared with political or economic power. Globally the exchanges between the two blocs developed by degrees⁷. This was also true in Japan. In general, de-militarization started and independence from the United States increased. There was a decline of special procurements which meant militarization and the increased dependence of the Japanese economy on the United States. There was also a rise in the demand for trade in non-military goods with Communist China. In my opinion, this was the direct background to the establishment of the 1955 system.⁸

Decrease of Special Procurements

After the outbreak of the Korean War, the US military placed orders with Japanese firms for goods and services they needed in order to wage the war. Needless to say, it was anticipated that, as soon as the Korean War ended, the special procurements would decrease so much that the Japanese economy would go into crisis. On 5 March 1953 Joseph Stalin of the Soviet Union died and the move towards the Korean Armistice started. Then, Japanese stock prices fell drastically, which concerned the

US Government deeply. There was a possibility that Japanese business circles might be tempted to develop trade with Communist China if the Japanese economy declined because of its shortage of foreign currency. In order to keep Japan in the Free World, the US State Department publicly promised the maintenance of the amount of special procurements in Japan on 15 April. Although stock prices rose sharply, the assurance was actually a kind of expectation.

The Japanese government expected assistance from the United States based on the US Mutual Security Act (MSA) to compensate for the decrease in special procurements. In the negotiations for a Mutual Security Assistance Agreement started on 15 July 1953, the Yoshida Government was anxious to get as much assistance as possible, not only military assistance but also economic assistance, without reinforcing Japan's defence forces. But the Eisenhower administration denied economic assistance to Japan and asked her to strengthen her military power. Consequently, the Japanese Government failed to attain its purpose of acquiring the assistance equivalent to the loss of special procurements. The agreement was signed on 8 March 1954 and came into effect on 1 May, which was much later than expected.

In the spring of 1954, the drastic decrease of special procurements became obvious. The Japanese government therefore called on the US government for talks referring to the American public assurance of the previous year in April. Nevertheless, the US government was pessimistic about the maintenance of special procurements in Japan on account of the Korean Armistice. Moreover, the Indochinese War was over by July 1954 and resulted in a further decrease of special procurements. The talks started on 11 August, developed into a sharp conflict between the two countries and ended without any final agreement in April 1955. As a result, the Japanese defence industry which had revived owing to the Korean War suffered serious losses and quite a few

munitions companies went bankrupt or scaled down their business operations.

One of the reasons of the trouble was that the Japanese government was reluctant to increase its defence forces. Furthermore, the Yoshida administration decided to cut defence spending in the budget for the 1954 fiscal year at the cabinet meeting on 29 June. This was part of its austerity measures for the purpose of overcoming the deficit in the international balance of payments due to reductions in special procurements. Defence spending was something which had been agreed in the MSA talks, so the US government severely criticized the Yoshida cabinet. But the austerity measures were so indispensable to the Japanese economy that Yoshida did not change his decision and the next Hatoyama cabinet followed these austerity measures and decreased defence spending for the 1955 fiscal year. The defence spending cut was one of the reasons why the US government did not try hard enough to increase its special procurements. The Japanese economy was de-militarized both by the reduction of the special procurements on the US side and by the limitation in defence spending on the Japanese side.

Improving Relations with Communist Countries

After the Korean Armistice Communist China and the Soviet Union started expressing their intentions to normalize diplomatic relations with Japan and strengthened their so-called 'peace offensives' after the Indochinese Armistice of 21 July 1954. After that there was an increasing momentum in Japan towards the normalization of diplomatic relations with communist countries. The 'National Congress for the Normalization of Diplomatic Relations with Communist China and the Soviet Union' (Nitchu Nisso Kokko Kaifuku Kokumin Kaigi) was formed on 28 October. Its members included conservative political and business leaders. Even pro-American Ikeda Hayato, the secretary general of the ruling Liberal Party, suggested an improvement in relations

with Communist China twice in the middle of August, which greatly shocked the US government. After the resignation of the Yoshida cabinet, Hatoyama Ichiro organized a cabinet with the policy of improving relations with communist countries on 10 December and formally decided to begin normalization talks with the Soviet Union on 4 February 1955.

It was not as easy to improve relations with Communist China as compared to the Soviet Union because it had actually fought against the United States in the Korean War and had no diplomatic relations with the United States. Japan had established diplomatic relations with the Republic of China (Taiwan) on 28 April 1952 under pressure from the United States. Since both the Chiang Kai-Shek regime and the Mao Tse-Tung regime claimed to represent the whole of China, the recognition of the former made that of the latter difficult. Nevertheless, there were strong demands for improvement in the relations with Communist China because of the recession due to the reduction of special procurements. Trade with Communist China, which had been strictly limited under the agreement with the United States, was considered even by influential conservative business and political leaders as the most effective measure to revive the Japanese economy in the view of the huge scale of prewar trade with China. The 'Association for the Promotion of International Trade in Japan' (Nihon Kokusai Boeki Sokushin Kyokai) was established on 22 September 1954 by Murata Shozo who had a close connection with Prime Minister Yoshida. Two cabinet ministers of the Hatoyama cabinet, Ishibashi Tanzan, the Minister of International Trade and Industry, as well as Takasaki Tatsunosuke, the Director General of the Economic Planning Agency, were its members.

Before that, private (un-official) trade agreements between Japan and Communist China had been signed twice in Beijing to enable and enlarge bilateral trade. The

second agreement was to lose effect by the end of 1954. Murata made every effort to start negotiations in Tokyo for the third agreement. Communist China and pro-Communist China groups in Japan intended to boost private exchanges in order to bring about the normalization of diplomatic relations and considered a third private trade agreement as an important step. The critical point of this process was the official authorization of the clause which would permit the setting up of offices for trade representatives both in Tokyo and Beijing. Prime Minister Hatoyama who intended to improve relations with Communist China sometimes made slips of the tongue, implying recognition of both Chinese regimes. Hatoyama privately agreed to Murata's proposal for the setting up of offices for trade representatives. On 23 March 1955 the Hatoyama administration issued visas for the members of the Chinese Trade Mission and filled in the category for nationality 'the People's Republic of China'.

Reunion of the Socialist Parties

This situation was favourable particularly to the Left-wing Socialist Party and its power base Sohyo, the largest national trade union centre in Japan. After the outbreak of the Korean War, the different opinions over the San Francisco Peace Treaty and the Japan-US Security Treaty had split the JSP into two parties. The Left-wing then insisted on the 'unarmed neutrality policy', totally opposing dependence on the United States and militarization. On the other hand, the Right-wing was pro-American and accepted limited rearmament on the same level as the Police Reserve Force. Nevertheless, because of the easing of tension mostly after the Indochinese Armistice, the policies of the Right-wing came closer to those of the Left-wing. On 11 November 1954 the two parties agreed on some general policies to be implemented by their coalition government, including the normalization of diplomatic relations with

Communist China and the Soviet Union. This policy agreement enabled the reunion of the JSP.

Furthermore, the conservatives were divided mainly into two parties: the Liberal and the Progressive Party. The Liberal Party led by Yoshida lost its absolute majority in the House of Representatives in the general election held on 19 April 1953 though it stayed in power until 7 December 1954. That is to say, conservative rule became rather weak. The Democratic Party, which was formed on 24 November 1954 being based mainly on the Progressive Party, cooperated with both socialist parties and succeeded in overthrowing the Yoshida cabinet and establishing the Hatoyama cabinet. The socialist parties cast their vote for Hatoyama in the Diet nomination for the Prime Minister. This was not because they supported Hatoyama, but because they were longing for a general election. There was no possibility of a coalition government between Democrats and Socialists. However, it was important that these socialist parties were strong enough to affect the outcome on the political scene.

In this situation, the leaders of the socialist parties thought they could come into power in the near future if they would reunite. The main purpose of the reunion was to capture the reins of government. Therefore, they tried to make realistic policies as close as possible to those of the conservatives. The policies agreed on 11 November 1954 included maintaining or reducing the JSDF instead of breaking it up. Moreover, they promised to reunite for the electoral campaign. The result of the general election of 27 February 1955 was as follows: the Democratic Party 185, the Liberal Party 112, the Left-wing Socialist Party 89 and the Right-wing Socialist Party 67. Total seats of both socialist parties were 156, which was 18 seats more than in the previous election.

The conservative parties, business circles and the US government were greatly concerned at these results. Although there were some serious conflicts among them over certain issues such as the special procurements mentioned previously, they all coped with the threat from the JSP. Their countermeasures needed to be more than the merger of the conservative parties because the threat from the JSP was not only its seats in the Diet but also its policies enforced by the easing of the international tension. The main part of their countermeasures was how to deal with the moves towards de-militarization and independence from the United States after the Korean Armistice. The easing of tension did not mean the end of the Cold War but the establishment of the Cold War in the real sense of the term. Therefore, the “unarmed neutrality policy” should be kept in check. Independence from the United States must be restricted so as not to damage the extent of Japan-US cooperation. De-militarization should be just the priority of economic power over military power.

Integration of the Japanese Economy into the Western Bloc

As mentioned before, Murata Shozo, the President of the 'Association for the Promotion of International Trade in Japan', arranged negotiations in Tokyo for the third private trade agreement between Japan and Communist China. Prime Minister Hatoyama supported it and business circles such as the Japan Federation of Economic Organizations (Keidanren) endorsed it. The US administration feared this situation and pressed the new government not to get involved in such negotiations. Firstly, on 6 March 1955 it was reported in the newspapers that trading companies conducting transactions in Communist China would be prohibited from any dealings with the United States. Fearing US sanctions, business circles retreated from such negotiations. Secondly, on 7 April the US ambassador John Allison handed Hatoyama a memorandum calling on him not to support negotiations. The Hatoyama cabinet, lacking a strong political base in the Diet, had no choice but to accept it. Accordingly, the negotiations which started on 1 April ended with a third agreement containing no official authorization for the setting up of trade representatives' offices. This meant the failure of economic exchanges for the normalization of diplomatic relations.

Furthermore, the US government supported Japan's complete accession to the GATT with the aim of Japan's integration into the western international economic order so that the Japanese economy would not require trade with Communist China. The Eisenhower administration had to help Japan economically in some ways since Japan's desire for trade with China was related to the special procurements problem and would endanger US strategy in East Asia. But Eisenhower was financially conservative and the US government rejected the Japanese government's request for economic assistance. The Japanese government attempted to use the economic development of Southeast Asia in order to draw funds from the United States. Prime Minister Yoshida visited the United States in November 1954 and proposed an 'Asia Marshall Plan'. However, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles flatly refused it because of lack of funds. 'Trade, not Aid' was the most important principle in Eisenhower's foreign policy, which was also applied in the case of Japan. The US government attempted to realize Japan's complete entry to the GATT for the purpose of enlarging its exports to free countries.

Although the Japanese government and business circles were eager for a full membership of the GATT, there were two groups of opponents. The first was the US congress then controlled by the Republican Party. It had a tendency toward protectionism. The Eisenhower administration requested it to give the president the authority to reduce tariffs on goods imported from Japan, stressing the threat from communists. Congress passed a law for the new Reciprocal Trade Agreement on 1 July 1954, which enabled tariff negotiations with Japan. The second opponents were the signatories to the GATT. They were afraid of huge Japanese exports. But the US government persuaded them to enter into tariff negotiations with Japan. As a result, Japan was admitted to the GATT on 10 September 1955. Some countries, including

the UK, resorted to article 35 to suspend the effects on the bilateral exchanges. But Japan vastly expanded her trade with the United States, which became an important factor underlying her high economic growth.

Domestic Measures for Economic Development

In order to overcome the shortage of foreign currency due to the decrease of special procurements, the Japanese government adopted a retrenchment policy. The Yoshida cabinet made an austerity budget for the 1954 fiscal year which is known as the 'one billion yen budget'. The Bank of Japan (BOJ) also vigorously pursued a tight money policy. Hatoyama appointed BOJ governor Ichimada Naoto as the Minister of Finance and continued the 'one billion yen budget' policy. The US government and business circles in Japan strongly supported it. The Japan Federation of Employers' Association (Nikkeiren) made every effort to restrain wages. For this purpose Nikkeiren attempted to cooperate with the Right-wing national labour centre, the Japanese Trade Union Congress (Zenro) on the one hand, but on the other hand it confronted the Left-wing trade union federation Sohyo. Nevertheless, Zenro opposed such wage restraint and Sohyo organized the Spring Labour Offensive against it for the first time. However, Nikkeiren overwhelmed Sohyo and almost achieved a wage restraint. Austerity measures increased exports from Japan soon after.

Although the Right-wing trade unions were against wage restraint, they admitted the importance of labour-management cooperation in improving labour productivity so as to increase wages by means of economic growth. Therefore, they joined the Japan Productivity Centre established mainly by the Japan Association of Corporate Executives (Keizai Doyukai) on 1 March. Sohyo naturally criticized the productivity movement, but the Japanese government supported the JPC, and more importantly, the US government had induced Keizaidoyukai to embark on the productivity

movement giving its assistance. The concept of 'productivity' was the key to postwar US foreign economic policy, because the improvement of productivity was a kind of cure-all which would not only lessen labour-management conflicts, but also contribute to economic growth through an increase in exports. This was also true in postwar Japan.

The Hatoyama cabinet reorganized the Economic Council Agency (Keizai Shingicho) into the Economic Planning Agency (EPA) (Keizai Kikakucho) and formally determined the 'Five-year Economic Self-support Plan' on 23 December 1955. As pointed out previously, the Director General of the EPA was a famous business leader, Takasaki Tatsunosuke, and business circles strongly supported the economic planning. This was the first long-term economic plan decided by a cabinet meeting in postwar Japan and had the following two targets. The first was economic autonomy which was equilibrium in balance of payments achieved by increase in exports mainly to the Free World without any special procurements or economic assistance by the United States. The second was full employment accomplished by economic growth.

Formation of the Liberal Democratic Party

In order to secure economic development, it was necessary to achieve a political stability by the merger of the conservative parties. To put it more concretely, after the general election of April 1953 the ruling parties, that is the Liberal Party under the 5th Yoshida cabinet and the Democratic Party under the Hatoyama cabinet, did not have an absolute majority in the House of Representatives. Consequently, they had to accept the demand from the opposition parties for an additional revision in the budget, which greatly damaged their austerity measures. Furthermore, political stability was desirable for the implementation of a long-term economic plan and the promotion of labour-management cooperation. As a matter of fact, on 27 December 1953 Ogata

Taketora, the deputy prime minister of the Yoshida cabinet, and Ashida Hitoshi, an influential leader in the Progressive Party, discussed Japan's economic difficulty and agreed on the necessity for a merger of the conservative parties. Ogata publicly announced three principles on the merger (the 'Ogata Plan') on 28 March 1954, from which moves towards the merger started. Nevertheless, these negotiations collapsed on 23 June.

The US government and Japanese business leaders induced the conservative political leaders to accomplish the merger. The Eisenhower administration determined a new basic policy towards Japan NSC5516/1 on 9 April 1955. This gave priority to Japan's political stability and economic viability over its military power in the context of easing international tensions. It was immediately applied to the talks regarding Japan's defence spending for the 1955 fiscal year. As a result, the US government agreed to Hatoyama's demand for a defence spending cut in return for the merger promotion as well as maintaining austerity measures. This was the reason why Miki Bukichi, the General Council chairman of the Democratic Party, appealed to the Liberal Party for the merger (the 'Miki statement') on 12 April, which started negotiations between the two parties. Moreover, Finance Minister Ichimada, the former BOJ governor and champion of business leaders, spurred on the merger. Ichimada accepted the demand for an additional revision in the budget by the Liberal Party in exchange for a further development in the merger. Consequently, the two parties agreed to set up a joint policy committee for a new party on 30 June.

The final factor which encouraged the parties to merge was the reunion of the JSP on 13 October. Although the two conservative parties had over half the seats in the House of Representatives, it was anticipated that the reunited JSP, then the second biggest party, would become the largest party which would come to power in the near

future unless the two conservative parties merged. In order to keep the JSP from office, the LDP was eventually formed on 15 November. More importantly, the LDP tried to counter the JSP by introducing 'progressive' policies since the threat from the JSP was because of its policies as well as its seats in the Diet. The core of LDP's policies was to be the realization of a welfare state through economic growth, which would undermine the JSP's support base. This was an important reason why the LDP stayed in power until 1993.

The easing of tension after the Korean Armistice had consequences not only for international relations but also for domestic policies of countries in the region. In the case of Japan, it was a major factor in the establishment of the 1955 system which was composed of a party system dominated by the LDP, the economy orientated towards the Free World and domestic institutions designed for the purpose of high economic growth, in particular labour-management cooperation.⁹

Endnotes

¹ The concept of the 1955 system was created by Masumi Junnosuke. "1955 Nen no Seiji Taisei [The 1955 Political System]", in *Shiso*, No. 480, 1964.

² Nakakita Koji, *1955 Nen Taisei no Seiritsu* [The Establishment of the 1955 System in Japanese Politics], Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 2002.

³ Oka Yoshisato, "Seito to Seito Seiji [Parties and Party Politics]," in Oka Yoshitake ed., *Gendai Nihon no Seiji Taisei* [Contemporary Japanese Political System], Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1958, p. 103.

⁴ Ishii Osamu, "Reisen no 55 Nen Taisei [The 1955 System in the Cold War]," in *Kokusai Seiji*, No. 100, 1992; Shinkawa Toshimitsu, "Mo Hiitotsu no 55 Nen Taisei [Another 1955 System]," in *Hokudai Hogaku Ronshu*, Vol. 47, No. 1, 1996.

⁵ Miyazaki Ryuji, “Nihon ni okeru Sengo Demokurashi no Koteika [The Consolidation of Postwar Democracy in Japan]”, in Indo Kazuo et al. eds., *Sengo Demokurashi no Seiritsu* [The Establishment of Postwar Democracy], Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1988; Takenaka Yoshihiko, “Chudo Seiji no Hokai [Breakdown of Moderate Politics],” in Kindai Nihon Kenkyukai ed., *Nenpo Kindai Nihon Kenkyu*, No. 16, Tokyo: Yamakawa Shuppansha, 1994.

⁶ Nakakita Koji, *Keizai Fukko to Sengo Seiji: Nihon Shakaito, 1945-1951 Nen* [The Politics of Economic Reconstruction in Postwar Japan: The Japan Socialist Party, 1945-1951], Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1998.

⁷ Ishii, “Reisen no 55 Nen Taisei”.

⁸ Hereafter, footnotes are omitted. Refer to Nakakita, *1955 Nen Taisei no Seiritsu*.

⁹ As to the consolidation process of the 1955 system in the late 1950s, see Nakakita Koji, “Hatoyama Ishibashi Kishi Naikakuki no Seito to Seisaku [Political Parties and Policies under the Hatoyama, the Ishibashi and the Kishi Cabinet],” in Kitamura Kimihiko et al. eds., *Gendai Nihon Seito Shiroku* [The History of Contemporary Japanese Party Politics], Vol. 3, Tokyo: Daiichi Hoki Shuppan, 2003.