Japanese Saving Rate*

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First Version April 2004
This Version: January 22, 2005

Abstract

Japanese and U.S. saving rates have been significantly different over the last forty years. Can a standard growth model explain this difference? The answer is yes. Our results indicate that both an infinite horizon, complete markets setup and an overlapping generations model with incomplete markets are about equally able to generate saving rates that are remarkably similar to the data during 1961-1998. Our quantitative findings identify changes in the growth rate of total factor productivity and the low initial capital stock as the main factors generating the time series behavior of the net national saving rate in Japan. We show that if the Japanese had faced the U.S. TFP and initial conditions, their saving rate would have looked very similar to that of the U.S. households. In other words, it seems that there is nothing peculiar about the Japanese saving behavior.

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1 Introduction

There have been substantial differences between the Japanese and U.S. saving rates in the last forty years that have motivated extensive research in this area. Figure 1 presents net national saving rates for the two countries between 1961 and 1998.[1]



Figure 1: Data

In an earlier work, Christiano (1989) argues that the standard neoclassical growth model is not able to generate anything close to the actual time path of the saving rate in Japan. In particular, he examines if the low initial capital stock can lead to the observed behavior of the saving rate in a one-sector, infinite horizon, representative agent model.[2] He assumes that in 1946 the Japanese capital-output ratio was at 12% of its steady-state level, and computes the transition path to a steady-state which coincides with that of the U.S. economy. His results indicate a failure of the standard growth model.[3]

[1] The data are obtained from Hayashi (1989) who provides a comprehensive data set that corrects for differences in accounting and measurement standards between the two countries. According to Hayashi (1989) there are two major differences between the accounting standards of the two countries. First, Japanese National Income and Product accounts report depreciation based on historical cost as opposed to the replacement cost as in the U.S. Second, government investment is explicitly accounted for in Japan, where as in the U.S. all government purchases are classified as government consumption. While Dekle and Summers (1991) argue that the implied depreciation rates in Japan are implausibly high with these adjustments, Hayashi (1991) argues that they are justified due to the high depreciation rate for owner-occupied housing and the treatment of equipment capital.

[2] Hayashi (1986) argues that low initial capital stock is the main reason behind the high saving rate in the late 1960s and the early 1970s.

[3] Christiano then introduces a subsistence level of consumption in the period utility function that makes the marginal utility of the distance between consumption and its subsistence level very small as consumption

In the last twenty years attempts to explain the relatively high saving rate in Japan have focused on many factors. Discussions ranged from economic factors to preferences peculiar to Japan as well as the relevance of life-cycle versus dynastic models. Dekle (1986) and Hayashi (1986) emphasize the importance of a bequest motive in understanding Japanese savings. Hayashi, Ito, and Slemrod (1987) present a life-cycle simulation analysis which includes housing purchase decisions. Their results indicate that the contribution of the relatively large down payment requirement seems to be too small to explain the large differential in the saving rates of the two economies. They are able to generate high saving rates only when they introduce a bequest motive. They also show the tax deductibility of mortgage interest payments and the tax exempt status of interest income to have a small impact on the aggregate saving rate. Horioka, Yamashita, Nishikawa, and Iwamoto (2002) argue that bequest motives are weak in Japan both absolutely and relative to the U.S. and suggest that the life-cycle model is the dominant model of household behavior in Japan.

The difficulties faced in explaining the differences between the U.S. and Japanese saving rates by using standard models seem to have spurred research that focuses on many other factors that may be peculiar to Japan, such as the bonus system that exists in Japan, high housing prices, high educational costs and high marriage costs.[4] There does not appear to be a consensus on the importance of any of these factors.

In this paper, we ask the following question: 'What features of the Japanese economy are critical in generating the observed saving behavior between 1961 and 1998?' Our approach is in line with the recent use of the one-sector growth model to explain 'Great Depressions'. In particular, we follow the methodology of Cole and Ohanian (1999) and Kehoe and Prescott (2002) in using an applied general equilibrium setup to account for the actual time path of Japanese saving behavior.[5] We use two calibrated general equilibrium models to evaluate the extent to which either model economy can generate the year-to-year fluctuations in the Japanese saving rate and capital-output ratio. The first model is a standard infinite horizon model with complete markets, and the second model is an overlapping generations setup with incomplete markets. The former has been the workhorse of macroeconomics, and the latter model is helpful in assessing the role of public institutions such as the unfunded social security system in Japan given that the size of the retirement benefits has changed significantly over time. In both models, we incorporate the actual time path of total factor

falls (and saving rises rapidly in the first few years of convergence) and therefore dampens the desire to save. The resulting (smooth) path of 'slow convergence' does better in terms of mimicking the Japanese saving rate.

[4] See Horioka (1990) for a survey.

[5] Related work that uses general equilibrium models to address short run issues are Ohanian (1997), Cooley and Ohanian (1997), Cole and Ohanian (2002, 2004), and all the papers in the 2002 special issue of *Review of Economic Dynamics,* entitled 'Great Depressions of the 20th Century'.

productivity (TFP), and government fiscal policy parameters.

We start by repeating Christiano's (1989) exercise in the standard one-sector, neoclassical growth model with an infinitely-lived representative agent facing complete markets. We show that when a constant TFP growth rate is assumed, as in Christiano (1989) the neoclassical growth model generates a saving rate that does not resemble the data well. We then use the actual TFP series that the Japanese consumers were faced with and compute the saving rate.[6] In the next part of the paper, we employ an overlapping generations (OLG) model populated by 80-period-lived individuals facing mortality risk and borrowing constraints. Private annuity markets and credit markets are closed by assumption. Until the mandatory retirement age, agents in this economy work an exogenously given number of hours and accumulate assets to self-insure and to provide for old-age consumption. After retirement agents receive social security benefits that are financed by a payroll tax. In both models, the return on asset holdings and the wage rate are at least in part determined by the profit maximizing behavior of a firm with a constant returns to scale technology.

We calibrate both model economies to Japanese data provided by Hayashi and Prescott (2002) for the 1961-1998 period. We use the average population growth rate, the average tax rates on capital income, labor income, and consumption for both models, and observed social security replacement rate, and conditional survival probabilities that prevailed in that time period for the OLG model. We conduct deterministic simulations, as in Hayashi and Prescott (2002), and perform an 'accounting exercise' to evaluate several factors that may explain the differences in saving rates between Japan and the U.S. The simulations take the actual capital stock in 1960 as an initial condition and use the actual time path of TFP. This exercise not only allows us to identify the role of TFP growth in a standard infinite horizon model, but it also facilitates a quantitative exercise to understand the relative importance of certain fiscal policy parameters that can only be present in an OLG setup.

Our findings indicate that both the standard infinite horizon, and the OLG models are capable of generating saving rates that mimic the data remarkably well once simulations take into account the time series behavior of TFP. Given this result we continue with the OLG framework and conduct several counterfactual experiments to quantify the role of different factors in understanding the time series behavior of saving rates in Japan between 1961-1998. Our numerical results suggest that two factors alone can account for most of the differences between the saving rates in Japan and the U.S. in this time period. These are the differences in the TFP growth rates and the levels of the initial capital stock. We show that if Japan had faced the U.S. TFP during this period as well as a relatively high initial capital stock, the time path of the saving rate in Japan would have looked very similar to that of the U.S. In other words, it seems that there is nothing peculiar about the Japanese saving behavior.

[6] It is important to note that the TFP series on Japan is now easily available which allows this exercise to be relatively straight forward.

Our quantitative findings on the role of social security benefits in Japan are similar to findings for the U.S. For example, an increase in the replacement rate for social security from zero to 50% results in a 15% lower capital output ratio at the steady state. While such an impact is not small, it is not in the order of magnitude that would help explain the large differences in the saving rate between Japan and the U.S. These findings suggest that the impact of factors such as the social security system or the aging of the population on the Japanese saving rate in this time period are of second order importance.

Overall, we conclude that in order to understand the Japanese saving behavior, we need to understand the factors behind TFP growth. The rapid growth in TFP experienced by Japan after World War II has been the focus of much research. More recently, Parente and Prescott (1994) argue that the high TFP growth rate observed in postwar Japan was partly due to the break up of Japan's bureaucratic complex after the war. This framework eroded monopoly powers and gave rise to diffusion of technological and organizational knowledge from the U.S. Eaton and Kortum (1997) argue that manufacturing productivity growth in Japan between 1950-1990 can be explained by a model of international technology diffusion. According to their results, Japan, Germany and France grew fast by adopting technology from the U.S. that was the technological leader at that time. Analysis of the factors behind TFP growth, perhaps by incorporating some of the features discussed above would further enhance our understanding of the Japanese saving behavior. This very important issue is left for future research.

The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the two versions of the growth model that are used to evaluate the Japanese saving behavior. Data and calibration issues are discussed in Section 3, and the quantitative findings are presented in Section 4. Concluding remarks are given in Section 5. Appendix A contains the data sources and additional figures used for calibration and comparison with the model generated simulations, and Appendix B describes the numerical solution method used to obtain the transition path with the OLG model .

2 Two Growth Models

We start this section by describing the standard infinite horizon model and the OLG model we use to understand the factors behind the time series behavior of the saving rate in Japan.

2.1 An Infinite Horizon Growth Model

As our benchmark model we use an exogenous labor version of the model used in Hayashi and Prescott (2002). In this framework a representative household maximizes

$$\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \log C_t$$

subject to

$$C_t + X_t \leq w_t E_t + r_t K_t - \tau(r_t - \delta)K_t - \pi_t,$$

where C_t is consumption and β is the subjective discount factor, E_t is the measure of labor input, τ is the tax rate on capital income, w_t is the real wage, π_t is a lump sum tax and r_t is the rental rate of capital. Households are assumed to own the capital, K_t, and rent it to businesses. Aggregate output Y_t is divided between consumption, C_t, investment X_t, and government purchases of goods and services, G_t.

$$C_t + X_t + G_t = Y_t.$$

The law of motion for the capital stock is given by $K_{t+1} = (1-\delta)K_t + X_t$ where δ is the depreciation rate.[7]

The aggregate production function is given by

$$Y_t = A_t K_t^{\theta} E_t^{1-\theta},$$

where θ is the income share of capital and A_t is total factor productivity which grows exogenously.

Hayashi and Prescott (2002) describe the conditions that must be satisfied by a competitive equilibrium. For sake of brevity, we do not repeat these standard conditions here.[8]

2.2 OLG Model

2.2.1 The Environment and Demographics

The question we want to study requires the computation of a transition path to a steady state. However, it is easier to start the description of the model with a stationary overlapping

[7] In some of our experiments we will let δ be a function of time since Hayashi (1989) argues that there were large changes in the depreciation rate in Japan over time.

[8] We follow their solution method and use a shooting algorithm to obtain model simulations. For details of the method, see Hayashi and Prescott (2002).

generations setup similar to that in Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987) but with a different market structure.

At each date s, a new generation of individuals is born. We denote the population growth rate by $\eta\%$. Individuals face long but random lives, work until the mandatory retirement age of j_R, and might live through maximum possible age J. Life-span uncertainty is described by ψ_j, the conditional survival probability from age j to $j+1$. We assume a stationary population by making the survival probabilities $\{\psi_j\}_{j=1}^J$ and the population growth rate η time-invariant. We also assume $\psi_J = 0$. The cohort shares, $\{\mu_j\}_{j=1}^J$, are given by

$$\mu_j = \frac{\psi_{j-1}}{(1+\eta)}\mu_{j-1}, \text{ where } \sum_{j=1}^{J} \mu_j = 1. \tag{1}$$

Although the notation above assumes a stationary population, it is easy to allow the conditional survival probabilities and the population growth rate to vary over time. This would allow us to capture the impact of the aging of the population along the transition path to the eventual balanced growth path. For the time being, we abstract from demographic dynamics.[9]

2.2.2 Technology

There is a representative firm with access to a constant returns to scale Cobb-Douglas production function with deterministic total factor productivity A_s:

$$Y_s = A_s K_s^{\theta} {H_s}^{1-\theta}, \tag{2}$$

where K_s and H_s are aggregate capital and labor inputs, respectively, θ is capital's output share, and TFP grows at the rate ${g_s}^{1/(1-\theta)} > 0$. We assume that $H_s = \bar{h}N_s$, and N_s grows at the rate η.

The aggregate capital stock evolves according to the law of motion:

$$K_{s+1} = (1-\delta_s)K_s + X_s,$$

where X_s is aggregate gross investment and δ_s is the rate of depreciation of capital at time s.

The stand-in firm rents capital and labor from the households in competitive spot markets at the rates r_s and w_s, respectively, and maximizes its profits. Factor prices equal their

[9] Braun, Ikeda, and Joines (2004) study the impact of the aging of the population on the Japanese saving rate in the 1990s and beyond.

marginal productivities:

$$
\begin{aligned}
r_s &= \theta A_s \left(\frac{K_s}{H_s}\right)^{\theta-1}, \\
w_s &= (1-\theta) A_s \left(\frac{K_s}{H_s}\right)^{\theta}.
\end{aligned} \tag{3}
$$

2.2.3 Households

A household who is i years old at time t solves the following problem:

$$
\max \sum_{j=i}^{J} \beta^{j-i} \left[\prod_{k=i}^{j} \psi_k\right] u(c_{j,s})
$$

subject to a sequence of budget constraints over the remaining lifetime:

$$
(1+\tau_c)c_{j,s} + a_{j+1,s+1} = R_s a_{j,s} + (1-\tau_{h,s}-\tau_{n,s}) w_s \varepsilon_j h + b_{j,s} + \ell_s, \tag{4}
$$

where β is the subjective discount factor and $c_{j,s}$ is consumption of an age-j household at time $s = t + j - i$. Asset holdings at the beginning of age j at time s are given by $a_{j,s}$. They earn the gross interest rate (net of taxes and depreciation) $R_s = [1 + (1-\tau_{a,s})(r_s - \delta_s)]$. The age-efficiency profile is denoted by $\{\varepsilon_j\}_{j=1}^{J}$ and h indicates the exogenous number of hours worked in a week. The tax rates on consumption, capital income, and labor income are denoted by τ_c, $\tau_{a,s}$, and $\tau_{h,s}$, respectively. $b_{j,s}$ denotes social security benefits received by an age-j household at time s, to be described later, and $\tau_{n,s}$ is the payroll tax for social security at time s. Retirement benefits $b_{j,s}$ are a fraction λ_s of average lifetime earnings. Each household receives a lump-sum amount ℓ_s which is the sum of a government transfer (to clear its budget) and the redistribution of accidental bequests. Note that we allow for some of the tax rates and the rate of depreciation δ_s to vary over time. We do not allow for annuity markets and assume that there is no borrowing:

$$
a_{j,s} \geq 0, \quad \text{all} \quad j, s, \tag{5}
$$

with $a_{1,s} = 0$ for all s. Since death is certain beyond J, households choose $a_{J+1,s} = 0$.

The above notation allows for some transitional generations that will have to re-solve their remaining lifetime optimization problem in response to an unanticipated change in their environment, starting from an initial balanced growth path or given initial conditions. For a newborn at time t, the objective function simplifies to

$$
\sum_{j=1}^{J} \beta^{j-1} \left[\prod_{k=1}^{j} \psi_k\right] u(c_{j,s}), \tag{6}
$$

and $s = t + j - 1$.

We use recursive tools to solve the individual's perfect foresight decision problem. Let $V_{j,s}(a_{j,s})$ denote the value function of an age-j individual at time $s = t + j - 1$. We compute the value functions for $j = 1, 2, \ldots, J$, and all s, using

$$V_{j,s}(a_{j,s}) = \max_{\{c_{j,s}, a_{j+1,s+1}\}} \left\{ u(c_{j,s}) + \beta \psi_j V_{j+1,s+1}(a_{j+1,s+1}) \right\} \tag{7}$$

subject to (4) and (5).[10]

2.2.4 Social Security

Social security benefits are given by

$$b_{j,s} = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{for } j = 1, 2, \cdots, j_R - 1, \\ b_{j_R, t+j_R-j} & \text{for } j = j_R, j_R + 1, \cdots, J. \end{cases}$$

where the pension received by a new retiree at time $t + j_R - i$ is given by

$$b_{j_R, t+j_R-i} = \lambda_s \frac{1}{j_R - 1} \sum_{j=1}^{j_R-1} w_{t+j-i} h \varepsilon_j (1+g)^{j_R-j}.$$

Note that the retirement benefits received by an individual are constant throughout the individual's lifetime, although successive cohorts receive successively larger benefits at the rate of TFP growth.

We assume that the system is unfunded so that the payroll tax is selected to equate the total benefits to total taxes collected for each time period. Total benefits paid at time $t + j_R - i$ are equal to $\sum_{j=j_R}^{J} \mu_j b_{j,t+j_R-i} = b_{j_R,t+j_R-i} \sum_{j=j_R}^{J} \mu_j (1+g)^{j_R-j}$. The social security tax rate is then given by

$$\tau_{n,s} = \frac{b_{j_R,t+j_R-i} \sum_{j=j_R}^{J} \mu_j (1+g)^{j_R-j}}{w_{t+j_R-i} h \sum_{j=1}^{j_R-1} \mu_j \varepsilon_j}. \tag{8}$$

2.2.5 Government

In addition to managing the unfunded social security system, the government needs to finance its per capita purchases G_s by taxing consumption, labor and capital income, and confiscating unintended bequests.[11] We require period-by-period budget balance which necessitates a (per capita) lump-sum transfer ℓ_s.

[10] We discretize the state space and numerically obtain the value functions and the accompanying decision rules. See for example İmrohoroğlu, İmrohoroğlu, and Joines (1999).

[11] Whether accidental bequests are given directly to survivors, or to survivors of a particular age group does not seem to matter quantitatively.

$$\tau_c \sum_{j=1}^{J} \mu_j c_{j,s} + \tau_{h,s} \sum_{j=1}^{J} \mu_j w_s \varepsilon_j h + \tau_{a,s} \sum_{j=1}^{J} \mu_j (r_s - \delta_s) a_{j,s} + \sum_{j=1}^{J-1} (1-\psi_j) a_{j+1,s} \mu_j / (1+\eta) = G_s + \ell_s. \tag{9}$$

2.2.6 Recursive Competitive Equilibrium

A *government policy* consists of $\{G_s, \tau_c, \tau_{a,s}, \tau_{h,s}, \tau_{n,s}, \lambda_s, \ell_s\}_{s=s_1}^{s_2}$, where s_1 and s_2 are some initial and final dates. An *allocation* is given by a sequence of decision rules $\{A_{j+1,s+1}(a), C_{j,s}(a)\}_{j=1}^{J}$ over $[s_1, s_2]$. A *price system* is a sequence of pairs $\{w_s, r_s\}_{s=s_1}^{s_2}$. For a given government policy, a *Recursive Competitive Equilibrium* is an *allocation* and *price system* such that

- the allocation solves the dynamic program (7) for all individuals, given the price system and government policy,
- the allocation maximizes firms' profit by satisfying (3),
- the allocation and government policy satisfy the government's budget constraint (9) given the price system,
- the social security system is unfunded, that is (8) satisfied,
- individual and aggregate behavior are consistent

$$\begin{aligned} K_s/N_s &= \sum_{j=1}^{J} \mu_j a_{j,s}, \\ H_s/N_s &= \sum_{j=1}^{J} \mu_j \varepsilon_j h, \\ C_s/N_s &= \sum_{j=1}^{J} \mu_j c_{j,s}, \end{aligned}$$

and,

- the commodity market clears:

$$C_s + X_s + G_s = Y_s.$$

3 Data and Calibration

We calibrate the model economies to the 1961-1998 Japanese economy using data provided by Hayashi and Prescott (2002).[12] The capital share parameter, θ is set to its average value over 1961-1998. The subjective discount factor and the risk aversion parameter are set so that the capital output ratio is 2 at the final steady state as Hayashi and Prescott's data set indicates. We set h and E so that the average labor input in the model matches the average labor input used in growth accounting to generate the level of TFP for Japan.[13] The period utility function is taken as:

$$u(c_{j,s}) = \frac{c_{j,s}^{1-\sigma} - 1}{1-\sigma},$$

where σ is the coefficient of relative risk aversion.

For the steady state calculations we set the values for the share of government purchases, G_s/Y_s, the depreciation rate δ_s, tax rates on capital income, $\tau_{a,s}$, labor income, $\tau_{h,s}$, and consumption, τ_c, equal to their average values over 1961-1998.[14] The resulting values used for the steady state are $G/Y = 15\%$, $\delta = 10\%$, $\tau_a = 35\%$, $\tau_h = 10\%$, $\tau_c = 5.6\%$.[15] We set the growth rate of TFP to its 1961-1998 average value of 1.9%, the growth rate of the population to 1.2% and assume that the steady state is reached in eighty years.[16]

Since our main question is to examine the determinants of the saving rate in Japan between 1961-1998, our simulations take the actual capital output ratio in 1960 as the initial

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[12] TFP data provided by Hayashi and Prescott (2003) start in 1960. However, since the saving rate in Japan between 1955 and 1960 shows dramatic changes, we calculate Japanese TFP and report the results on the saving rate for that time period as well in the sensitivity analysis. In addition, TFP measure in Hayashi and Prescott (2003) does not make any quality adjustments for capital or labor. As a sensitivity analysis, we also use a TFP measure provided by Jorgenson (2003) who uses a quality index for both capital and labor. Those results are presented in Section 4.2.2.

[13] For the OLG model this procedure results in $h = 40$, and for the infinite horizon model $E = 35$. Using the entire time series data as opposed to the average value for employment, which is the benchmark case, does not affect our conclusions in any siginificant way.

[14] The data for the tax rate on capital income and the depreciation rate are displayed in Appendix A. The tax rates are obtained from Mendoza, Razin, and Tesar (1994) and cover the period 1965-1996. We have assumed the 1961-1964 period tax rate on capital income to equal its value in 1965 and 1997-1998 tax rates to equal its level in 1996.

The same table also includes data on the capital output ratio, net national saving and the after tax interest rate in Japan. This information will be used to examine if the saving rate, capital output ratio and the interest rate generated by the models mimic the data.

[15] The labor income tax rate in the model does not include the payroll tax for social security since that tax rate is computed endogenously to clear the social security balance for the government.

[16] Between 1998 and the steady state, we assume that all exogenous variables take their steady state values.

condition.[17] More precisely, we set the initial level of capital to 32% of its level in 1990.[18] We use the data for actual TFP, A_s, during this time period. In our benchmark experiment we use the average value for the depreciation rate, δ_s, share of government purchases, G_s/Y_s, and the tax rate on capital income, $\tau_{a,s}$, which are the same as the steady state values mentioned above. Since these variables display significant variation over this time period we check the sensitivity of our results by conducting additional experiments where the actual time series values for these variables are used in the simulations.

The calibration goals we have specified, such as obtaining a capital output ratio of 2 at the steady state, necessitate differences between the two models in terms of some of the parameters chosen. The following table lists the calibrated parameters:

Table 1: Calibration

		OLG	**INF**
θ	capital share	0.363	0.363
β	discount factor	0.999	0.963
σ	risk aversion	1.5	1.373
$\{\varepsilon_j\}_{j=1}^J$	efficiency profile	Hayashi, Ito, and Slemrod (1987)	n/a
$\{\psi_j\}_{j=1}^J$	survival probabilities	Japanese Life Tables	n/a

For the OLG model we approximate the replacement rate for social security following Oshio and Yashiro (1997) who indicate that it was roughly equal to 17% for 1961-1976 and 40% afterwards. We take the age-specific efficiency profiles from Hayashi, Ito, and Slemrod (1987). In addition, we take the survival probabilities from the Japanese Life Tables for 1970.[19]

To summarize, our benchmark experiment uses the actual time series values for A_s for the period 1961-1998 and assume long-run averages for all the exogenous variables for the periods after 1998.

[17] A potentially important issue is whether to treat Japan as a closed or an open economy. In setting the initial capital output ratio, we use the data given by Hayashi and Prescott (2003) which excludes foreign capital. This assumption plays a small role in the magnitude of the initial saving rate which will be discussed later.

[18] We also need to assume an initial distribution of assets among age groups in the OLG model in order to start out our simulations. In our benchmark results we use a uniform distribution of assets. We also experiment with a hump-shaped distribution that is generated endogenously at the final steady state. The results are not sensitive to this feature of the model.

[19] "Abridged Life Tables For Japan 2002", Statistics and Information Department, Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare.

4 Results

In examining the time series behavior of the saving rate in Japan, we follow Hayashi and Prescott (20032 and conduct deterministic simulations. We do not argue that the entire path of TFP during 1961-1998 could have been perfectly anticipated by agents even though we treat it as if it were. We start by examining the net national saving rate (net national saving divided by NNP) generated by a standard infinite horizon model. Then we examine the saving rate generated by the overlapping generations model and perform counterfactual experiments to isolate the factors that impact the behavior of the saving rate in Japan.

4.1 Infinite Horizon Model

We start this section by repeating the exercise in Christiano (1989) for the time period he had studied. This involves simulating the infinite horizon model with a constant TFP growth rate of 3% starting from 1956. Figure 2 displays the results of this experiment. The actual data on the saving rate for Japan in this time period displays two humps, one in the early sixties and a larger one in the late sixties. However, the simulated saving rate approaches its steady state value by late sixties. These results had led Christiano (1989) to conclude that the standard model failed in generating saving rates for Japan that resemble the data.



Figure 2: Infinite Horizon Model

As we have mentioned in the calibration section, the time series data for TFP start from 1960. In the following experiment we change the sample period from 1956-1987 to 1961-1998, and introduce the actual time series for TFP into the infinite horizon model and examine the saving rate generated by the model.[20]

[20] In the sensitivity analysis we extend the simulations to start in 1955 by calculating A_t for the period 1955-1960.



Figure 3: Saving Rate: Data and the Infinite Horizon Model

Figure 3 shows that the standard model performs fairly well in capturing the major movements in the saving rate in this time period. The major difference between Figure 2 and Figure 3 is the introduction of the actual time series for TFP in Figure 3.[21]

4.2 OLG Model

In the next figure we present the saving rate in the data and the one generated by the OLG model where the time series sequence on TFP and the social security replacement rate are the only exogenous time series information that are included in the simulations. The rest of the exogenous variables are set to their long term averages. The average saving rate for the period is 13.6 in the data and 13.1 in the model.

[21] It is important to note that the initial level of the capital output ratio is quantitatively important in these results. If we were to assume a lower ratio as indicated by the K/Y series that includes foreign capital in Japan, as given by Hayashi and Prescott (2002), we would obtain a 20% higher saving rate for 1961. However, for the rest of the results, and for the time series properties of the saving rate, the measurement of foreign capital plays a quantitatively small role. Perhaps this is not surprising since the current account surplus has averaged about 1.5% of output in Japan in this time period.



Figure 4: Saving Rate: Data and the Two Models

According to Figure 4, the model economy generates fluctuations in the saving rate that resemble the data remarkably well for most of the periods. The results are very similar to the ones obtained in the infinite horizon model which is also provided in Figure 4. While at first glance the similarities between the OLG and the infinite horizon model may seem surprising, a similar finding, in a different context, is presented in Rios-Rull (1996) who shows that the cyclical properties of calibrated life cycle models are quantitatively very similar to those of the infinite horizon models.

The main discrepancies between the simulated data and the actual data for both models are in the late 1960s and early 1970s, and mid 1980s. In both time periods the saving rate generated by the model is smaller than the data.

In the next experiment, we include time series data for the capital income tax, depreciation rate and the government's share in GNP into the OLG model. Figure A2 in the appendix shows the significant time variation in the deprecation rate and the capital income tax rate in this time period, with the deprecation rate declining and the capital income tax rate increasing.

This experiment, which is displayed in Figure 5, moves the two series closer to each other in the mid 1960s and early 1970s.[22] For graphical clarity we only display the results for the OLG model.

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[22]In order to understand the impact of these factors better we will conduct counterfactual experiments where we make one of these variables time-varying and set the other one constant. However, before moving to the counterfactual experiments, we present data on other features of this economy.



Figure 5: Saving Rate

In Figure 6 we display the capital output ratio and the after tax return on capital for this economy. The model economy is able to generate movements in the capital output ratio and the interest rate that mimic the data.



Figure 6: Additional Properties

In addition, this framework allows us to investigate the properties of the saving rate for different age and cohort groups. In figure 7 we display the age-saving profiles of two new born cohorts of age 21 in 1960 and in 1980. The cohort born in 1960 faces higher TFP growth and delays saving for longer than the cohort of the 1980. Typical life cycle behavior can be observed for both cohorts where agents save during most of their working years and dissave after retirement. [23]



Figure 7: Age-Saving Profiles

4.2.1 Counterfactual Experiments

This framework allows us to conduct counterfactual experiments to assess the role of different factors that may have a role in the determination of saving rates in Japan. We continue with the OLG setup to conduct these experiments since it allows us to compare the relative

[23] Ando and Moro (1995) provide detailed data for different demographic groups in Japan in 1985. The categories include families, single male head of households (HH) and single males. In our framework, while we calibrate to the properties of the entire economy, the agents act as if they do not have families. Consequently, it may be best to compare the model generated saving rates for different age groups to the data for taking into account all the three categories. For example, since our OLG model does not have altruism bequests, saving rates for ages above 60 are all negative. In the Ando and Moro (1995) data provided in Appendix A, while families and heads of households display positive saving rates, single males do not seem to save after age 70. Up to the age 60, the model generated saving rate looks more similar to the saving rate data reported for single male head of the household.

importance of some of the other factors, such as the generosity of the social security system to the role of TFP in understanding the Japanese saving rate. .

Japanese Economy with U.S. TFP and High Initial K/Y In the first set of counterfactual experiments, we examine the role of the TFP growth rate and the initial capital output ratio in determining the saving rate in Japan. While there are several ways we could carry out such a counterfactual experiment, we do it by asking the following question: If the Japanese TFP and the initial capital output ratio were the same as the U.S. TFP and the initial capital output ratio during this time period, what would the Japanese saving rate look like? In order to answer this question we need a measure of the U.S. TFP which we take from Jorgenson (2003).[24] The noteworthy differences between the time series behavior of U.S. versus Japanese TFP's are summarized in Table 2, and TFP and its growth rate for both countries are displayed in the appendix Table A1.

Table 2: TFP Growth Rates

Years	Japan	U.S.
1962-1967	3.32	1.88
1968-1978	1.72	0.72
1979-1989	1.46	1.29
1990-1998	0.27	0.77

According to Table 2, the TFP growth rate in Japan is significantly higher than that of the U.S. in the 1962-1967 period. There is also a large decline in the U.S. TFP in period 1968-1978.

In Figure 8, we display the saving rate for Japan that would have occurred if both the initial conditions and the TFP growth rate for Japan were similar to conditions that existed for the U.S.[25] In addition, we show the U.S. saving rate in the graph. With these two

[24] The data include TFP measures for Japan and the U.S. In the following tables we use the Hayashi and Prescott (2002) measure of TFP for Japan and the Jorgenson (2003) measure of TFP for U.S. Since Jorgenson's data set ends in 1995, we have included our calculations for the 1995-1998 period for the U.S. In the sensitivity analysis we examine the Japanese saving rate based on the TFP measure provided in Jorgenson (2003) as well.

In addition, since there are large differences in the methodologies followed by Hayashi and Prescott (2002) and Jorgenson (2003) in calculating TFP growth rates, we also calculated a TFP series for the U.S. using the methodology followed by Hayashi and Prescott (2002). While there are differences between the TFP series generated by the two methods, the main results of this paper do not change dramatically. In both cases, it is clear that the Japanese saving rate would have looked very similar to the U.S. saving rate if the U.S. TFP and high initial conditions were present in Japan.

[25] We change the initial level of capital from 32% of its detrended level in 1990 to 77% of its level in 1990.

counterfactual features our model economy generates a saving rate for Japan that looks very similar to the actual U.S. saving rate. The average model-generated Japanese saving rate for the 1961-1998 period for this case is equal to 8.1%. The average empirical saving rate for the U.S. in the same time period was 8.4%.



Figure 8: Japanese Saving with U.S. TFP and High Initial K/Y

These results indicate that the time series behavior of the saving rate in Japan is mainly influenced by the TFP growth rate and low level of initial capital in this time period.

We can further analyze this result by separating the two features that are present in the above experiment. Table 3 summarizes the results where each feature is introduced one at a time. In the fourth column of Table 3 we summarize the results of the counterfactual experiment where only the U.S. TFP is used for the Japanese economy.[26]

[26] As one can observe from these results, the relationship between the TFP growth rate and saving rate is a nonlinear one. The saving rate in a given period is affected by the growth rate of current and future TFP. When we use the U.S. TFP for Japan together with the low initial capital stock that was faced by the Japanese, we actually obtain a higher saving rate for the period 1962-1967. Notice also that the TFP growth rate declines more dramatically in the 1968-1978 period in U.S. than in Japan.

Table 3: Counterfactual Experiment

		Saving Rates		
Year	**Data**	**Benchmark**	**U.S. TFP**	**Initial Cond.**
1962-1967	16.20	17.0	19.0	4.2
1968-1978	18.62	17.0	14.0	13.7
1979-1989	11.12	9.7	7.1	8.6
1990-1998	8.83	9.5	7.2	9.5
1962-1998	13.62	13.0	11.0	9.8

The same information is also displayed in Figure 9. That is, the counterfactual simulations are carried out for a case where the Japanese are assumed to be faced with the U.S. TFP. However, their initial K/Y ratio is still the value that was faced in Japan in 1960. The results indicate that the low initial conditions combined with the lower and declining TFP faced by the U.S. would have resulted in a higher saving rate in Japan than was observed for the first five years. In addition, notice that the two humps that are present in the data disappear when U.S. TFP is used.



Figure 9: Japanese Saving with U.S. TFP Only

Next we only change the initial level of capital from 32% of its detrended level in 1990 to 77% of its level in 1990. The last column of Table 3 shows that the change in the initial condition leads to a dramatic decrease in the saving rate between 1962-1967. In other words, the high saving rate that was observed in Japan during 1962-1967 may very well be due to the fact that Japan was catching up.

Time Variation in Depreciation and Taxes In the next set of experiments we examine the role of the depreciation rate, δ, and the capital income tax rate, τ_a. Our benchmark is an economy where δ and τ_a are set to their long-term averages, 10% and 35%, respectively. Now we change one feature at a time and examine its impact on the saving rate.

Table 4: Accounting Exercise

	Data		Saving Rates		
Year	τ_a	δ	**Benchmark**	τ_a **time series**	δ **time series**
1962-1967	20.14	16.14	17.1	18.0	12.0
1968-1978	27.39	11.01	17.0	15.7	17.4
1979-1989	41.82	9.02	9.7	7.3	10.8
1990-1998	43.57	8.46	9.5	8.7	10.4

We can make several observation from Table 4. For example, if the capital income tax rate were to stay at its long run average of 35% instead of increasing to 41.82% between 1979-1989 the saving rate would have been higher by 2.5 percentage points. If the depreciation rate were equal to its long run average of 10% instead of the 16.14% in the 1962-1967 period, the saving rate in that period would have been higher by about 5 percentage points.

Overall, the above results indicate that the time series behavior of the saving rate in Japan is mainly influenced by the TFP growth rate and low level of initial capital in this time period. Given this finding it is unlikely that many of the factors that are discussed in the literature, such as the social security system, mortgage arrangements, family structure, monetary policy, equity or land price bubble, or the aging of the population in Japan would play a significant role in explaining the differences in saving rates between Japan and the U.S. Nevertheless our framework allows us to examine some of these factors.

In this paper we do not investigate the role of the changes in the population growth rate over time. However, we can examine the quantitative impact of such a change in the overall saving rate by changing the growth rate of the population that was used in our experiments. So far we had assumed the growth rate of population to be equal to its long run average of 1.2%. Instead, if we assume the population growth rate to be 0.9%, its average in the 1980-1998 period, the overall saving rate declines by 1 percentage point. In general, a decrease in the population growth rate has a similar effect to a decrease in the TFP growth rate, causing the saving rate to decline.

We can also analyze the role of social security by experimenting with different social security replacement rates at the steady state and along the transition. Our findings indicate that, an economy where the social security replacement rate is zero along the transition as well as at the steady state generates a saving rate that is 2 percentage points higher than that in an economy where the replacement rate is set to 50%. The steady state with 50% replacement rate results in a 15% higher capital output ratio compared to the steady state with a zero replacement rate. These magnitudes are in line with other research examining the effects of social security.[27] While these changes are not small, they are not in the order of magnitude that would help resolve the difference between the U.S. and Japanese saving rates, especially since in the beginning of the 1960s there was an unfunded social security system in Japan even if it was a modest one.

Overall, our results indicate that the major factors behind the behavior of the saving rate in Japan are the TFP growth rate and the initial low level of the capital output ratio.

4.2.2 Sensitivity Analysis

In this section we examine the impact of certain parameters and exogenous variables on the saving rate in the model.

Jorgenson's TFP In our benchmark economy, we used the TFP measure provided by Hayashi and Prescott (2002). In the following experiment we use the TFP data given in Jorgenson (2003). This experiment provides an important sensitivity analysis since Jorgenson measure differs from the benchmark measure in significant ways. For example, Jorgenson measure includes a constant quality index of capital input that reflect differences in capital consumption, tax treatment, and the rate of decline of asset prices. In addition, the labor input incorporates a constant quality index based on weights by age, sex, educational attainment, and employment status. The resulting TFP growth rates implied by the two methods are provided in Table 5. The main difference between the two measures takes place until mid-70s where the TFP growth rate implied by the Jorgenson measure is larger and less volatile compared to the Hayashi and Prescott (HP) measure. In addition, in the period after 1979, Jorgenson measure results in a lower growth rate of TFP compared to the HP measure.

Table 5: TFP Growth and Saving Rates

	TFP Data		Saving Rate	
Years	Japan (HP)	Japan (Jorgenson)	Japan(HP)	Japan(Jorgenson)
1962-1967	3.3	5.9	17.1	14.0
1968-1978	1.7	2.4	17.0	19.0
1979-1989	1.5	0.8	9.7	10.5
1990-1995	0.3	−0.2	9.5	7.5

[27] For example, Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987) reports a 24% increase in the long run capital stock and Storesletten, Telmer and Yaron (1999) obtain a 34.28% increase in long-run capital stock if the U.S. social security benefits were driven to zero.

The last two columns of Table 5 display the saving rates implied by these two measures of TFP. There are some visible differences between the two saving rates. The saving rate obtained for the Japanese economy for the entire time period using the TFP data for Japan taken from Jorgenson (2003) is displayed in Figure 10. With this measure, the saving rate in early 1960s turns out to be lower, and the saving rate in the mid-1970s turns out to be higher than that in the data. Nevertheless, the model generates fluctuations in the saving rate that still mimic the data quite well.



Figure 10: Sensitivity to TFP Measure

Taxes In our initial calculations we had set the tax rate on capital income to be 35% which was taken from data provided in Mendoza, Razin, and Tesar (1994). However, Hayashi and Prescott (2002) estimate the tax rate on capital income to be 45% for a similar time period. Thus, we repeat our experiment for a constant tax rate of 0.45 for the entire period. Our results indicate that the average capital output ratio for the 1961-1998 period goes down by approximately 3.5% for all time periods with this higher tax rate. The average saving rate in the initial ten year period declines from 17.5% to 14.2%, but the major swings in the saving rate are still similar to those in the data.

Our benchmark economy also has taxes on labor income and consumption. When we examine the saving rate with these tax rates set to zero, we find an increase of about 1 percentage point in the average saving rate.

Time Period As we had mentioned before, we simulate our economies for the 1961-1998 time period because the TFP data given in Hayashi and Prescott (2002) start in 1960. However, the actual saving rate for Japan between 1956-1961 shows a dramatic increase. In order to see if our model economy can also generate this increase, we calculate the TFP series for Japan for this period using the data on capital that are provided by Hayashi and Prescott (2002) and assuming that the labor input, which is the missing series in that time period, is equal to its value in 1960. Figure 11 shows the results of this experiment where the only actual time series that is used is the TFP which demonstrates that except for the initial period, the simulated data capture the main changes in the saving rate in Japan very well. In addition, we can again observe the similarities between the results in the OLG and the infinite horizon models by examining Figure 11.



Figure 11: Sensitivity to Time Period

5 Conclusions

In this paper, we use two models that are very different in many dimensions to explore the year-to-year fluctuations in the Japanese saving rate and capital-output ratio between 1961 and 1998. The first model is an environment with infinitely lived individuals who face perfect capital markets. The second model is an overlapping generations framework where individuals live for 80 periods and face mortality risk and borrowing constraints. Private annuity markets and credit markets are closed by assumption. Until the mandatory retirement age, agents in this economy work an exogenously given number of hours. After retirement agents receive social security benefits that are financed by a payroll tax. In both models the return on asset holdings and the wage rate are determined endogenously by the profit maximizing behavior of a stand-in competitive firm.

We calibrate both models to Japanese data for the 1961-1998 period. We use the average tax rates on capital income, labor income and consumption, observed social security replacement rate, average population growth rate and survival probabilities that prevailed in that time period. The simulations take the actual capital stock in 1960 as an initial condition and use the actual time path of TFP. We conduct deterministic simulations that allow us to identify the factors that may explain the differences in saving rates between Japan and U.S.

Our results demonstrate that both models do remarkably well in capturing the major movements in the saving rate in Japan in this time period. We show that two factors alone can account for most of the differences between the saving rates in Japan and U.S. These are the TFP growth rate and the low level of the initial capital stock in Japan. Our results indicate that if the Japanese were faced with the U.S. TFP during the 1961-1998 period as well as a relatively high initial capital stock like that of the U.S. in 1960, the time path of the saving rate in Japan would have looked very similar to that of the U.S.

The growth miracle experienced by Japan after World War II and the rapid growth in TFP have been the focus of much research. More recently, Parente and Prescott (1994) argue that the high TFP growth rate observed in postwar Japan was partly due to the break up of Japan's bureaucratic complex after the war. This framework eroded monopoly powers and gave rise to diffusion of technological and organizational knowledge from the U.S. Gilchrist and Williams (2001) use a model with embodied technological change where postwar growth in Japan occurs due to a catch-up mechanism through capital accumulation where technology is embodied in new capital goods. Eaton and Kortum (1997) argue that manufacturing productivity growth in Japan between 1950-1990 can be explained by a model of international technology diffusion. According to their results, Japan, Germany and France experienced fast growth in TFP mainly due to research performed abroad, that is, grew fast by adopting technology from the U.S. that was the technological leader at that time.

Given the growth rate in Japanese TFP, our numerical results demonstrate that a standard neoclassical growth model is capable of generating a saving rate that is consistent with the observed saving rate in Japan. Analysis of the factors behind TFP growth, perhaps by incorporating some of the features discussed above, would further enhance our understanding of the Japanese saving behavior. This very important issue is left for future research.

6 Appendix A: Data

Japanese data are obtained from the following sources. Data on TFP, A_t, depreciation rate, δ_t, government share in output, G_t/Y_t, and the capital output ratio, K_t/Y_t, are taken from Hayashi and Prescott (2002). Net national saving rate and the after-tax return on capital are obtained from Hayashi (1989). Tax rates on consumption, and capital and labor income are obtained from Mendoza, Razin, and Tesar (1994).

Figure A1 displays the TFP data used for Japan and the U.S. As mentioned in the text, Japanese TFP data are taken from Hayashi and Prescott (2002). U.S. TFP is calculated by using the differences in TFP levels between the two countries implied in Jorgenson (2003). Second part of the graph displays the TFP growth rate for each country.

TFP



TFP Growth Rate



Figure A1: TFP Data

Figure A2 displays the capital income tax rate and the depreciation rate in Japan between 1961 and 1998.



Figure A2: Tax and Depreciation Rate Data

Table A.1 shows the saving rates for different demographic groups in Japan taken from Ando and Moro (1995).

Table A.1: Saving Rates for Demographic Groups

	1985 Data			Model
	Families	Single Male HH	Single Males	
≤ 29	0.041	-0.061	0.218	0.018
30-39	0.108	0.144	0.370	0.160
40-49	0.119	0.194	0.415	0.217
50-59	0.136	0.225	0.421	0.220
60-69	0.176	0.248	0.303	-0.088
≥ 70	0.194	0.137	0.005	-0.668

7 Appendix B: Computational Details:

In this paper, we follow Hayashi and Prescott (2002) in computing a transition path towards the final steady state, starting from a given set of initial conditions, taking as given the sequence of exogenous variables $\{A_s, \delta_s, G_s/Y_s, N_s, \lambda_s, \tau_{a,s}, \tau_{h,s}\}_{s=s_1}^{s_2}$.

Our steps are as follows:

1. Compute the final steady state following the algorithm in İmrohoroğlu et. al (1999). This step requires the detrending of aggregate variables by $A_s^{1/(1-\theta)} N_s$ so that we obtain a balanced growth path, after specializing the definition of recursive competitive equilibrium and numerically solving the two-dimensional fixed point problem. In particular, we iterate on an initial guess for the interest rate and the lump-sum transfer to the individuals (r, ℓ) until convergence. Note that the individuals can solve their optimization problems when we feed them the two factor prices and all policy parameters which is accomplished with our initial guesses and other calibrated parameters. We assume that the Japanese economy reaches the final steady state in eighty years.

2. Use the actual 1960 and 1961 Japanese data as given initial conditions; in particular use the actual capital output ratio in Japan, and assume a uniform distribution of assets holdings (except for age 1 individuals who are born with zero assets) at the initial state.

3. Guess a time path for the vector $\{(r_s, \ell_s)\}_{s=1962}^{S}$ of endogenous variables. Together with the sequence of exogenous variables $\{A_s, \delta_s, G_s/Y_s, N_s, \lambda_s, \tau_{a,s}, \tau_{h,s}\}_{s=1962}^{S}$, all individuals can now solve their optimization problems as they have complete knowledge of the time paths of policy and prices.

4. Compute the transition path taking the initial conditions as given.

   (a) Starting from $S-1$ and working backward, obtain the decision rules of all cohorts through backward recursions.

   (b) Using the given initial asset distribution Φ_2 over the initial cohorts in 1961, and the collection of decision rules just computed, calculate the new $\{\Phi_s\}_{s=3}^{S-1}$ and $\{(r_s, \ell_s\}_{s=3}^{S-1}$.

   (c) Compare the first sequence of $\{(r_s, \ell_s)\}$ to the latest and iterate on it until convergence.

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