The London School of Economics and Political Science

Nationalism and Regime Overthrow in Early Twentieth Century Portugal

Susana Adelina Sinfrónio Gomes Sousa Carvalho

DECLARATION

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ABSTRACT

The thesis aims to explain the role played by opposition nationalisms in the overthrow of two distinct regimes in early twentieth century Portugal – the Constitutional Monarchy in 1910 and the First Republic in 1926. After identifying a gap in the existing literature on Nationalism – namely, the importance of political opposition nationalisms in explaining the overthrow of ruling regimes in homogeneous, but ideologically divided, nation-states – this research project presents a three-phased theoretical framework devised with the objective of explaining the political events that led to the demise of both regimes. Accordingly, this thesis argues that in the case of Portugal, the demise of the Constitutional Monarchy and of the First Republic were preceded by the emergence of two opposition nationalisms, a left-wing and anti-clerical republican nationalism and a reactionary and Catholic integralist nationalism, respectively. Both opposition nationalisms were anti-systemic and revolutionary. They unfolded in three phases, which are common in both cases. Phase One, an opposing intelligentsia created a new nationalist ideology that contested the official rule of the governing regime. During the Constitutional Monarchy, this opposing intelligentsia was embodied by the 1870 Generation (1870-1876), whereas during the First Republic it was best articulated by Integralismo Lusitano (1910-1916). Phase Two, the ideological movement gave rise to a political opposition movement that competed at the electoral level, albeit with little success, and disseminated an alternative definition of who and what constituted the nation. Once again, intellectuals of the 1870 Generation created the Portuguese Republican Party (PRP) in 1876 while the integralists created the Junta Central do Integralismo Lusitano in 1916. Finally, Phase Three, the political opposition movement, barred from exercising power, formed a civilian-military coalition with the explicit aim of overthrowing the ruling regime from power. Between 1903 and 1910, an alliance was gradually built between the lower ranks of the military, the PRP, the
Masonry and the Carbonária. In the final years of the First Republic (1922-1926), a civil-military alliance was formed between the higher ranks of the military and moderate and radical conservatives, including the integralists. As this thesis argues, these civil-military coalitions succeeded in overthrowing the regime when a series of economic and political crises put in question the legitimacy of the ruling institutions, and the defensive forces, loyal to the regime, ultimately adopted a neutral position vis-à-vis the belligerent attacks of the opposition nationalists.
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INTRODUCTION

Purpose of the Thesis

The purpose of this thesis is to study the role played by nationalism in the politics of opposition that preceded regime overthrow in early twentieth century Portugal, an homogeneous nation-state with no apparent political and historical divisions. By looking at the demise of the Constitutional Monarchy (1822-1910) and the First Republic (1910-1926), I argue that nationalisms of opposition should be taken in consideration, together with other economic, social, political and international causes, when explaining the successful overthrow of these political regimes.

The existing literature on Nationalism has somewhat overlooked the relationship between the emergence of a nationalist opposition movement and the demise of a ruling regime, especially in the context of homogeneous nation-states. The aim of this thesis is therefore to draw attention to this relationship by taking into consideration a three-phased theoretical structure with the sole purpose of studying the two coup d’états that shook early twentieth century Portugal.

The three-phased structure is presented here as a political process by which a nationalist opposition movement pursues a revolutionary path in its quest for power that sees it evolving from an intellectual movement (Phase One) to a political movement (Phase Two), and finally to a revolutionary movement (Phase Three). In the coming chapters, as we analyse the historical demise of both regimes from a political point of view, we will see that the three-phased structure is present in both cases. Both the
Constitutional Monarchy and the First Republic were attacked by disloyal\(^1\) nationalist opposition movements – the anti-clerical left-wing republicans and the reactionary Catholic and monarchist integralists, respectively.

Throughout the thesis, I argue that *nationalism* is the ideology that gives meaning to these political and revolutionary opposition movements. Although the republicans and the integralists differed greatly in their political ideals, they shared a fervent belief that the homogeneous Portuguese nation should be redefined according to their own conceptualisation of *who* and *what* constituted the Portuguese nation. Their anti-establishment nationalisms were disparate and ideologically asymmetric, but they still based their demands for national regeneration, by way of regime change, on a common understanding of the values that made up the essence of the nation. They accepted and promoted the common idea that the Portuguese nation, a perennial entity crafted out of the medieval *Reconquista* wars, had reached its climax during the Middle Ages, which were considered to be the nation’s Golden Age. In their quest for political power, they promulgated this common view of the essence of the nation in order to justify their anti-systemic aims and, ultimately, they were able to grasp the imaginary of the people. They claimed that, unless the political institutions of the country were drastically reformed by way of *ruptura*\(^2\), the nation might implode due to its internal and imperial difficulties or, worse still, fall prey to Spain’s and England’s geopolitical ambitions, thus perishing forever.

In both instances, the republicans and the integralists shared the same political path in their nationalist quest for power. The purpose of this thesis is to highlight this similarity which can best be summarised in a three-phased analysis of their political journey.

\(^1\)Disloyal here is used in the terms of Juan Linz (1978). According to him, a disloyal opposition questions the existence, the efficacy, efficiency, and legitimacy of the regime in power with the aim of changing it by the means of unconstitutional and illegal actions.

\(^2\) According to Juan Linz (1978), *ruptura* means the collapse of a regime without previous negotiations on regime change.
Introduction to the Three-Phased Theoretical Framework

In the study of early twentieth century Portuguese regime overthrows, one can discern three phases which have resulted in the successful overthrow of a ruling regime by a nationalist opposition movement (Table 1). The three-phased theoretical framework that I present here was inspired by the work of Miroslav Hroch (1996 and 2000 [1985]) who devised three phases (Phase A, Phase B and Phase C) in the formation of small nations living under oppressive foreign rule in Central and Eastern Europe. According to Hroch’s theory (1996, 2000 [1985]: Chapter Six), which is the result of a quantitative approach that this thesis ignores in favour of a more qualitative approach, Phase A is the period of “scholarly interest” in the oppressed nationality; Phase B is the period of “patriotic agitation”; and Phase C is the period of “mass diffusion of patriotic attitudes” and “the rise of a mass national movement”.

In contrast, this thesis presents a three-phased theoretical framework devised with the sole purpose of explaining the political process by which two Portuguese nationalisms of opposition, republican and integralist, were successful in their efforts to overthrow the Constitutional Monarchy on 5 October 1910 and the First Republic on 28 May 1926. This three-phased theoretical framework will be put to the test as this thesis progresses, drawing on the political analysis of Portugal’s late nineteenth and early twentieth century history to determine the validity of each of these phases as well as the resulting outcome, i.e. the successful overthrow of the Constitutional Monarchy and the First Republic.
Table 1 – Opposition Nationalism: Three Phases of Regime Overthrow in Early Twentieth Century Portugal

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regime Overthrow</th>
<th>Constitutional Monarchy, 1910</th>
<th>First Republic, 1926</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Opposing Nationalism</td>
<td>Republicanism (left)</td>
<td>Integralism (right)</td>
<td>Regime overthrow was successful when the defensive forces of the regime did not resist the attempted coup d’êtat and the people did not oppose the emergence of a new official version of who and what constituted the nation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase One: Intellectuals</td>
<td>1870-1876 1870 Generation</td>
<td>1910-1916 Integralismo Lusitano</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Phase Two: Political Mobilisation and Agitation</td>
<td>1876-1903 Portuguese Republican Party (PRP, urban working and middle classes) Politics of contention: invention of anti-clerical ceremonies and traditions, and demonstrations against the 1879 Lourenço Marques Treaty and the 1890 British Ultimatum</td>
<td>1914-1922 Junta Nacional do Integralismo Lusitano, (politcised high-ranking officers, rural landowners, aristocracy and urban middle and upper classes) Politics of contention: First World War, New Republic, Monarquia do Norte and the Monsanto uprising</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase Three: Recruitment to the Revolutionary Cause</td>
<td>1903-1910 PRP (urban working and middle classes), Carbonária (working class, sergeants and enlisted men), Masonry (middle-class and professional junior officers)</td>
<td>1922-1926 Integralismo Lusitano (Catholic reactionaries, monarchists and landowners), União dos Interesses Económicos (oligarchs, urban upper classes and rural landowners), Cruzada Nuno Álvares Pereira (reactionary influentials) and professional senior officers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crisis</td>
<td>Emergence of a militant working class (1900-1910); end of rotativismo and the splintering of the dominant constitutionalist parties (1901-1910); alienation of the PRP from public institutions and the Cortes; several corruption crises such as the tobacco scandal (1904-1906), the cash advances question (1906-1907) and the bankruptcy of Crédito Predial (1910); students strike (1907); Franco dictatorship (1906-1908); 1908 Regicide and</td>
<td>PRP/PD’s hegemonic control of power, political fractionalism and high turnover of governments in power (1910-1926); alienation of conservatives from power (moderates, monarchists and Catholics) (1910-1926); Portugal’s entry in the First World War and subsequent economic and financial crisis (1916-1926); divisions within the military (1910-1926); pronunciamentos (1924-</td>
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In broad terms, Phase One (*Intellectuals*) represents the formation of a nationalist movement of ideological opposition that breaks with the status quo and conceptualises a new definition of the nation. Phase Two (*Political Mobilisation and Agitation*) refers to the creation of a political movement out of the already existing intellectual movement. The aim of the new political movement is to contest elections and to reform the institutions from within, according to their definition of who and what constitutes the nation, while trying to gain political legitimacy by mobilising popular/elite support for their cause through a strategy of nationalist contention against the established authorities. Phase Three (*Recruitment to the Revolutionary Cause*) sees the creation of a revolutionary coalition at a time when the regime falters due to several economic and political crises. The nationalist opposition movement, alienated from power and convinced that the only way to save the nation from the mismanagement of the ruling elites is to overthrow the regime, grasps this historical moment and forms a revolutionary coalition. This revolutionary coalition, usually formed in cooperation with other civilian groups, devises the conspiratorial plans and initiates the preparatory campaign by way of civil-military recruitment. However, when it comes to the execution of the revolution, the revolutionary coalition is largely helped by the military or it is executed by the military.

Regime overthrow becomes successful when the defensive forces of the regime in power do not resist the attempted coup d’État, and the people, disenchanted with the regime in power, do not oppose the emergence of a new official version of who and
what constitutes the nation. This general apathy occurs due to a series of internal crises that have shaken the people and the military’s trust in the current political elites, who are no longer seen as politically legitimate to rule. The idea that a regime overthrow may only succeed when the military apparatus of repression has been demobilised has been previously advanced by students of Revolution. Goldstone (1991), Skocpol (1979) and Tilly (1978) stressed the importance of intra-elite conflicts and elite division as causes of revolutionary outbreak. They also correctly claimed that regime overthrow is conditional not only on intra-elite conflict but also on the demobilisation of the military apparatus of repression. Only when both conditions seem to be in place, can mass mobilisation from below result in regime overthrow.

When applied to the case of the 1910 and 1926 Revolutions, as this thesis will attempt to demonstrate, Phase One reflects the emergence of a group of nationalist intellectuals who challenged the historical orthodoxy of the day. During the Constitutional Monarchy, the most prominent intellectual group, who broke with the past and contributed to the emergence of an anti-clerical and left-wing republican nationalism as an ideology, was the 1870 Generation. Their work also influenced the intellectuals in opposition during the First Republic. Here, the nationalist ideological work carried out by the opposition was pursued by the Catholic and monarchist right-wing integralists who convened around the journals, *Alma Portuguesa* (founded in 1913), *Nação Portuguesa* (founded in 1914) and *A Monarquia* (founded in 1916). Both the republican and integralist intellectual contributions to the reconceptualisation of the Portuguese nation, at a time when they were part of the opposition, was of paramount importance to the national politics of the incoming regimes (i.e. the First Republic and the New State, respectively).

Phase Two cannot be viewed separately from Phase One, nor perceived to be less important, as it happened in consonance with the latter. The “ideological
revolutions” resulted in the creation of political platforms which endeavoured 1) to give political substance to the works of the intellectuals in opposition, 2) to mobilise the people to their national cause, and 3) to compete in elections in an attempt to reform the ruling regime from within. In this sense, the positivist writings of Teófilo Braga, a member of the 1870 Generation, led to the creation of the Portuguese Republican Party (PRP). The PRP competed in elections for the Cortes from 1878 to 1910 but only made some notable electoral gains towards the end of the Constitutional Monarchy. These electoral gains, however, did not materialise into real political gains as they did not result in cabinet ruling, nor did they consistently guarantee the party a seat in the Cortes, as the legislative chambers were adjourned on several occasions, usually coinciding with short periods of dictatorial rule. Consistent practices of caciquismo, electoral fraud and political repression (especially after the 1890 Ultimatum) pursued by the constitutionalist parties also ensured that the republicans were devoided of full and legitimate representation in the public institutions and in the town councils. In parallel with their electoral strategy, the PRP pursued a strategy of nationalist contention in the streets against the ruling regime. In order to set itself apart from the existing parties in opposition, the PRP invented anti-clerical traditions and ceremonies and demonstrated against the 1879 Lourenço Marques Treaty and the 1890 British Ultimatum. The failed 1891 Porto republican uprising that followed the British Ultimatum resulted in the imposition of harsh repressive measures by the public authorities that almost destroyed the party.

In 1916, the integralist intelligentsia formed their own political movement, the Junta Central do Integralismo Lusitano (JCIL) with the aim of propagating their strategy of nationalist contention which saw Portugal’s entry in the First World War as an opportunity to cleanse Portugal from the enemies within (i.e. anti-clerical republicans). Another aim of the JCIL was to enter the political arena that hitherto had been
monopolised by the Democratic Party (PD). The PD (earlier known as the Portuguese Republican Party) was an hegemonic force throughout the first years of the First Republic, showing an unwavering reluctance to accommodate the opposition in the state institutions and in the streets. During the First World War, in the face of much economic and political turmoil, the conservative ranks of the military managed to momentarily displace the republicans from power. By allying themselves with the Dictator Sidónio Pais, the integralists finally succeeded in being included in the state structures in an attempt to reform the political system from within. However, their time in power was short-lived. After the assassination of Sidónio Pais, the integralists attempted to re-establish the monarchy (i.e. Monarquia do Norte and the Monsanto uprising). Their effort, however, ended in failure. Without the support of the constitutionalist and legitimist branches of the exiled royal family, the integralists eventually suspended the political activities of the Junta Central.

Phase Three marked the beginning of a revolutionary alliance struck between the nationalist opposition movement, other like-minded groups and the military. Alienated from power and convinced that the institutional approach pursued up to then was ineffective in establishing their version of who and what constituted the Portuguese nation, the republicans and the integralists reorganised themselves and commenced the revolutionary works. They restructured their political platforms and eventually created a political-military alliance that would put an end to the Constitutional Monarchy and the First Republic, respectively. In the case of the republicans, the radicals had already showed their recruitment capability in the failed 1891 Porto uprising. Obstructed from gaining power and repressed by the state forces since its reorganisation, the PRP Directorate abandoned the exclusivity of the electoral strategy it had adopted since its inception and officialised a revolutionary alternative for the attainment of power in the 1908 April Congress. At the end of Franco’s Dictatorship (1906-1908), several
members of the Directorate had already formed an alliance with the Carbonária and the Masonry with the aim of recruiting members of the urban working class and the lower ranks of the military to overthrow the Constitutional Monarchy. These sections of the Portuguese society had suffered the most due to the inability of the ruling cabinets to bring political stability and economic prosperity to the country. After the failed 1908 Lisbon Republican uprising, which culminated in the King’s assassination, the conspiracy took a life of its own, resulting in the successful 5 October 1910 Revolution.

After the suspension of Junta Central, the integralists reviewed their doctrine and joined other conservative groups, such as the study group Cruzada Nuno Álvares Pereira and the União dos Interesses Económicos, a business association transformed into a political party. Through these civilian groups, representative of the interests of the oligarchs, upper urban classes and reactionary influentials, the integralists continued to appeal to their followers, to their peers and to the high ranks of the military to join forces and overthrow the regime. By then the military had reached its most divisive point in modern history becoming an interventionist force in the life of the Republic. The country’s political spectrum was in shatters, its economy was devastated and the Democratic Party continued to hold on to power, convincing the opposition that the only way to displace the Democratic Party was to replace the regime. Eventually a civilian-military alliance was built around the integralists and other conservative forces who opposed the democrats. With the help of the aforementioned civilian groups and disenchanted professional officers, the integralists accomplished their goal of bringing down the First Republic on 28 May 1926.

In 1910 and in 1926, the ruling regime crumbled when the state defensive forces did not resist the attempted coup d’état and the people did not oppose the emergence of a new official version of who and what constituted the nation. The people and the military had become seriously disillusioned with the ruling regime after a number of
crises undermined the political legitimacy of the ruling institutions. In the case of the Constitutional Monarchy, the main crises that shook the credibility of the regime in the first decade of the twentieth century were: the emergence of a militant working class (1900-1910); the end of *rotativismo* and the splintering of the dominant constitutionalist parties (1901-1910); the alienation of the PRP from public institutions and the Cortes; several corruption scandals such as the tobacco monopoly (1904-1906), the cash advances question (1906-1907) and the bankruptcy of Crédito Predial (1910); the students strike (1907); the Franco dictatorship (1906-1908); the 1908 Regicide and the resurgence of the Catholic Church (1907-1909). In the case of the First Republic the crises that accentuated a lack of legitimacy in the regime were the PRP/PD’s hegemonic control of power, political factionalism and the high turnover of governments in power (1910-1926); the alienation of conservatives from power (moderates, monarchists and Catholics) (1910-1926); Portugal’s entry in the First World War and subsequent economic and financial crisis (1916-1926); divisions within the military (1910-1926); *pronunciamentos* (1924-1926); the Angolan Banknote Scheme and Tobacco Question (1925-1926) and the alienation and repression of the workers’ movement (1925-1926).

Unable to cope with these crises both regimes lost moral sustenance and the people and the soldiers grew impatient with the status quo. Sensing a withdrawal of popular support for the regime in power, the nationalist opposition movements rose to the challenge by forming successful coalitions with other civilian groups and factions of the military. This eventually resulted in the demobilisation (or neutrality) of the defensive forces who were loyal to the regime in favour of the revolutionary demands of the nationalist opposition.
Sources and Methods

In order to better understand how nationalism of opposition is related to the successful overthrow of two regimes in early twentieth century Portugal, this research project uses the qualitative method of process tracing by which nationalism is described and analysed as one of the most prominent factors that led to the outcome of regime overthrow.

Process tracing is, according to Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennet (2005: 206), a method that “attempts to identify the intervening causal process – the causal chain and causal mechanism – between an independent variable (or variables) and the outcome of the dependent variable”. In this sense, nationalism of opposition is seen here as one of the independent variables of this research puzzle, whereas regime overthrow is held as the dependent variable.

By taking into consideration Portugal’s 1910 and 1926 regime overthrows, this research aims to test a three-phased structure that has nationalism of opposition at the heart of its hypothetical puzzle, empirically framed in a temporal comparison that stretches from the last decades of the Constitutional Monarchy (1820-1910) to the demise of the left-wing First Republic (1910-1926).

Finally, it should be noted that the conclusions reached in this thesis by employing this method are only applicable to early twentieth century Portugal. Any attempts to generalise this exercise to other case studies should be approached with caution.

As far as the sources are concerned, the main argument is based on primary sources such as testimonies, memoirs, letters, political programmes, manifestoes, pamphlets, periodicals, newspapers and speeches delivered by the opposition intellectuals (e.g. Teófilo Braga, Antero de Quental, Oliveira Martins, António
Sardinha, Pequito Rebelo and Almeida Braga) and the nationalist opposition movements in their different phases. This thesis also refers to several memoirs, legal documents, newspaper articles, statistical data and school textbooks produced during the years of the Constitutional Monarchy and the First Republic by the ruling politicians, social critics and members of the armed forces. Most of the primary sources were collected from the British Library of Political and Economic Science through their inter-library lending service, and from the British Library and the Biblioteca Museu República e Resistência (Republic and Resistance Museum Library).

As far as the secondary sources are concerned, this research work relies heavily on the literature produced by several Portuguese historians, sociologists and political scientists, namely Valentim Alexandre, Manuel Braga da Cruz, Maria Carrilho, Fernando Catroga, António Costa Pinto, José Medeiros Ferreira, António H. Oliveira Marques, Vasco Pulido Valente, Rui Ramos, Nuno Severiano Teixeira, Pedro Tavares de Almeida and António José Telo. These academics feature prominently in the following chapters as their contribution to the study of the Constitutional Monarchy and the First Republic is paramount to the understanding of the demise of both regimes.

Definitions and Review of the Nationalism Literature

3 When reading this section, one should bear in mind that the review of nationalism literature presented here is not exhaustive, and other scholars’ works will also be duly assessed at a later stage, in subsequent chapters, according to the arguments that are presented therein - namely, Elie Kedourie’s theory on the role played by the intelligentsia in the emergence of modern nationalism will be discussed with regard to the republican and integralist intelligentsias in Chapters Two and Six, respectively. Eric Hobsbawm’s theory on state, mass politics and modern nationalism will be discussed in reference to the role played by the republicans in the emergence of modern nationalism in Portugal in the last decades of the nineteenth century and in the establishment of the Republic after 1910, Chapter Three and Chapter Five, respectively. And Ernest Gellner’s theory on the importance of a mass education for the imposition of a high culture will be studied in regards to the education policies pursued by the republicans after 1910 in Chapter Five.
Since the French Revolution, it has become the norm in the western world that the political system that governs over a national territory derives in principle its legitimacy from the nation. As a result of this, over the past two centuries, nationalism has become a political principle, “which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent” (Gellner 1983: 1; Hobsbawm also adopted Gellner’s principle, 1990: 9). This implies that the way the nation is placed within the legislative, executive and judicial institutional framework of the state, and the way by which the nation is given access to power and to decision-making procedures may affect the political definition of who and what constitutes the nation. It is from this political principle that the early twentieth century Portuguese nationalist opposition movements drafted their political institutional reform programmes and, when precluded by the regime in power from ascending to positions of influence, demanded the overthrow of the ruling regime in favour of one that would best express, legally and politically, their definition of the Portuguese nation.

Although there are several ways by which regime change may commence – 1) internal regime overthrow as I refer to it, or regime change by ruptura as the regime change literature refers to it; 2) regime restoration/reformation after external conquest, and 3) regime change by (negotiated) reform (Linz 1978; Stepan 1986) – this thesis focuses only on internal regime overthrow of liberal regimes. In both cases where regime change took place in early twentieth century Portugal, a military-sponsored coup d’état initiated the process. In each case, nationalist opposition movements had a major influence on the military’s disposition to intervene in the political life of the country. In both cases, also, once a new regime was established, existing links were cut with the outgoing institutional framework and all doors to possible negotiations between the new and the ousted leaders were deliberately shut.
Regime overthrow and nationalism, therefore, are the main political phenomena around which this thesis revolves in its study of regime change in early twentieth century Portugal. Regime overthrow is defined here as the internal *forceful* removal from power of a governing institutional framework, with its rules and practices of governance by which access to power and decision-making occur, and its subsequent replacement by a new set of political institutions and rules that break off with the political past and derive their legitimacy from a new conception of the nation.

This thesis defines nationalism as a modern political movement and ideology that emerged with the American and French Revolutions of the eighteenth century. Nationalism is not only a political project that aims to create a state from an already existing nation or that aims to nationalise the masses in order to legitimise an elite’s rule within the framework of an already existing state (e.g. Breuilly 1993, 2005; Gellner 1983; Giddens 1985; Hobsbawm 1990; Hobsbawm & Ranger 2004 [1983]; Kedourie 1994 [1960]; Mann 1993; Tilly 1975). Nationalism is also, for the purpose of this thesis and according to John Breuilly (1993), “a political movement seeking or exercising state power and justifying such action with nationalist arguments” (p. 2).

According to this political definition, nationalism can be both a movement that exercises power and a movement that opposes the authorities in power, provided it uses nationalist arguments to justify its actions. Breuilly (1993: 2) defines a nationalist argument as a political doctrine built upon three basic assertions:

(a) “There exists a nation with an explicit and peculiar character.

(b) The interests and values of this nation take priority over all other interests and values.

(c) The nation must be as independent as possible. This usually requires the attainment of political sovereignty”
In the decades that preceded Portugal’s early twentieth century regime overthrows, there were two strands of Portuguese nationalism competing for the minds and hearts of the Portuguese people – an official and an oppositional strand of nationalism. Official nationalism was a political movement in power that imposed its official doctrine of *who* and *what* constituted the nation in order to maintain its rule and legitimise the regime’s status quo. This type of nationalism is mostly evident after the demise of the dynastic regime of the Constitutional Monarchy, in the official nationalism of the First Republic. On the other hand, oppositional nationalism was also a political movement, but in this case a political movement opposed to the established regime that had emerged from society. Nationalist opposition movements aimed to attain state power, based on a redefinition of *who* and *what* constituted the nation, which clashed with the official definition. By attaining power these movements hoped to reform drastically the institutional structures of the state while justifying such goals with nationalist arguments. According to Breuilly (1993) there are three kinds of nationalist movements. Those who pursue secessionist goals (e.g. Basque and Magyar nationalist movements), those who pursue unification goals (e.g. nineteenth century German and Italian nationalist movements) and, finally, those who pursue the reform of state structures. This thesis focuses on the latter.

A nation, in contrast, is a concept much harder to grasp. More than a century after the French theologian, Ernest Renan, asked, *Qu’Est-Ce Qu’Une Nation?* (1994), the definition of nation is still the basis of much academic debate in the Nationalism literature, being at the centre of the scholarly divisions that encompass the main
paradigms of nationalism (Primordialism, Perennialism, Modernism, Ethno-Symbolism and Post-Modernism)⁴.

However, there seems to be a consensus towards the use of a definition that merges objective and subjective elements, both important to the Modernist approach that I use in this thesis. Objective elements are, for instance, a common language, a common religion, a common homeland and common cultural traits⁵. Subjective elements are a belief in a common ancestral origin (Connor 1994: xi), in a common imagined community (B. Anderson 1991) and in a common legacy of remembrance (Renan 1994: 17-18). This common legacy of remembrance, however, is especially important when studying nationalism. That is why this thesis also takes a Symbolist approach – because of the emphasis it gives to subjective elements of nationhood, for it does not matter how inaccurate the portrayal of the past is to a nationalist movement, what really matters is that “notions of common descent” resonate with the people (M. Weber 1994: 21-25). These notions of common descent are in their turn based on a common set of historical raw materials that are reinterpreted by nationalists as they see fit in their quest to build a sense of comradeship within the nation.

A nation, therefore, is defined here as an imagined, constructed and sovereign human community that occupies a given homeland. Its members share a public culture, a single economy, a set of common rights and duties irrespective of their birth, and a belief in a common past and in common myths of origin.⁶ As we will see in the coming

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⁴ The study of the main paradigms of nationalism falls outside the scope of this thesis. For a useful overview of the debate of “what is a nation?” see for instance Hearn (2006), Ozkirimli (2000) and Smith (1998, 2001).

⁵ Joseph Stalin’s (1994: 20) definition is an example of nationhood based on objective criteria: “A nation is a historically constituted, stable community of people, formed on the basis of a common language, territory, economic life, and psychological make-up manifested in a common culture”.

⁶ This is a “Modern-Symbolist” definition that I merged from the modernist definitions introduced above as well as from Anthony D. Smith’s ethno-symbolist definition (2001:13): a nation is “a named human community occupying a homeland, and having common myths and a shared history, a common public culture, a single economy and common rights and duties for all members”. Unlike Smith, I see the nation as a constructed concept. And I define nation as a sovereign entity because, in Benedict Anderson’s words (1991: 7), “the concept was born in an age in which Enlightenment and Revolution were destroying the legitimacy of the divinely-ordained, hierarchical dynastic realm”.

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chapters, it is the interpretation that the republicans and the integralists gave to this common past and to these myths that sets the borders of who and what constituted the nation in their quest for power.

As was already noted elsewhere (e.g. Sobral 2003; Vakil 1996), when browsing through the Nationalism literature one quickly realises that Portugal has been largely overlooked as a case for research enquiry. Usually, when focusing on state-centred Western European cases, theories of nationalism tend to give more importance to countries, such as England/Britain (e.g. Greenfeld 1993; 2001; Hastings 1997; Hobsbawm & Ranger 2004 [1983]; Kumar 2003; Mann 1993; Smith 1986), Ireland (e.g. Hutchinson 1987), France (e.g. Greenfeld 1993; Mann 1993; Smith 1986; E. Weber 1976), Italy (e.g. Breuilly 1993; Hechter 2000; Hobsbawm 1990), Germany (e.g. Breuilly 1993; Greenfeld 1993; Hobsbawm 1990; Kedourie 1994 [1960]; Mann 1993; Smith 1986), Switzerland (e.g. Zimmer 2003), the Netherlands (e.g. Gorski 2000) and Spain (e.g. Armstrong 1982; Smith 1986).

Portugal is only mentioned in the Nationalism literature when the main concern of the nationalism scholar is to pinpoint in time when was the Portuguese nation, seeing Portugal as a good example that either suits his readings of pre-modern national genealogies or that serves to illustrate the scarcity in the world of “genuine” “mono-ethnic” “nation-states” (e.g. Gellner 1997; Hastings 1997: 7-8, 190; Kohn 2005 [1944]: 493; Seton-Watson 1977: 7). In these works, Portugal has been largely branded as a case of an “old” and “authentic” nation-state with few or no nationalist peculiarities worthy of academic probe. Perhaps the reason for this is because it is almost assumed that ethnic homogeneity results in political uniformity (e.g. Hobsbawm & Ranger 2004 [1983]; Smith 1986).
At first glance, this affirmation seems to be valid. Portugal is one of the very few cases in the world where the boundaries of the state coincide with the boundaries of the mono-ethnic nation.

As Nuno Monteiro and António Costa Pinto (2000: 205-208) have observed, Portugal has been a monolingual\(^7\) and largely culturally homogeneous country since its inception. The country emerged as an independent kingdom in 1139 and, unlike its western European counterparts, it has largely maintained the same political borders since the thirteenth century. Apart from a short spell of dynastic unification, in which the Portuguese kingdom became part of the Iberian Catholic Crown under the rule of the Spanish Felipes (1560-1640), Portugal has enjoyed independence since medieval times, together with a high level of cultural homogeneity and political centralisation. The Portuguese Kingdom emerged in northern Iberia from the Kingdom of Galicia as a product of the Crusade Wars of the twelfth century. As it happened with the rest of the Iberian medieval kingdoms, Galicia eventually fell to Castile and Leon while Portugal gained its independence from the latter under King Afonso Henriques – an “anomaly” that the Castilians unsuccessfully attempted to correct for centuries, while throwing Portugal’s political destiny into the arms of England. It comes as no surprise, therefore, that this geopolitical oddity has resulted in Portugal’s perennial suspicion of both its bigger and more powerful Castilian (later Spanish) neighbour and its wealthier and rather temperamental English ally.

After King Afonso Henriques declared Portugal’s independence in 1139, the expansion of the kingdom continued southwards by way of conquest rather than assimilation, being completed in 1253. Following Portugal’s unification, the centralisation of the kingdom began in earnest under the rule of King Afonso III (1258-

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\(^7\) Mirandese has been recently recognised by the law of 7/99 of 29 January 1999 as a co-official language for local matters in the north-eastern municipalities of Miranda do Douro, Mogadouro and Vimioso. Mirandese is related to modern Leonese and Asturian, but it has only been spoken by a tiny, almost insignificant, minority of the northern population. Mirandese-speakers have hardly numbered more than 15,000 throughout Portugal’s history and nowadays it is assumed the status of an “endangered” language.
1264) (Mattoso 2001). The Crown neither granted rights to the regions, nor did it allow for the creation of provincial institutions and parliaments as France, for instance, had done. The Portuguese Crown did not encompass, either, kingdoms with autonomous rights (e.g. *fueros*) in the way that the Spanish Crown did, in the cases of Catalonia, Navarre and Aragon. The centralisation was achieved with no opposition from the people. From the mid-eighteenth century (and until very recently) no significant ethno-cultural minorities have inhabited Portugal’s borders. After King Manuel decreed the expulsion and forced mass conversions of the Jewish and Muslim minorities in 1496, the Holy Office of the Inquisition persecuted Judaism for two centuries, dividing the Portuguese society into Old Christians (the Catholic overwhelming majority) and New Christians (the newly converted Jews and Moors who suffered severe discrimination at the hands of the authorities and the rest of the population). However, this division was brought to an end by Premier Marquis of Pombal (1750-1777) in his attempt to secularise the state by abolishing all religious distinctions (Medeiros 1991).

When Portugal entered the age of modern nationalism, the main concern of the nineteenth century nationalists was not to create a new state out of the subversion and fragmentation of the existing state, so as to better reflect the cultural and linguistic boundaries of the Portuguese people. Rather, the most important issue for these nationalists was to devise a way by which intuitional reform could be implemented, so that matters of the state and the regime became the matters of the newly politicised nation and vice-versa. This was due to a direct link that had already been assumed to exist in Portugal’s history between the state and the nation. The aim of modern nationalism was therefore to transform the institutions of the state in order to give political expression to the nation. However, the desire to implement this transformation encompassed a redefinition of who and what constituted the nation, causing a severe internal division at the turn of the twentieth century between anti-clerical republicans
and Catholic integralists, with each movement vying to impose their own strand of nationalism by resorting to revolutionary means.

Bearing this in mind, it is surprising that the literature on nationalism seems to have largely ignored the fact that even "genuine" and "homogeneous" European nation-states, such as Portugal, which apart from France was the only one to enter nineteenth century with its present-time political borders defined (Catroga 1985: 421), at some point underwent the process of the "nationalisation of the masses" (Hobsbawm & Ranger 2004 [1983]) with all the ideological polarisation and division that such a process usually entails. This is one of the reasons why Portugal is a relevant case for the study of nationalism, in particular for the study of homogeneous ethnies that share a stable, perennial and undisputed political border, but yet continue to question the definition of who and what constitutes their nation.

This unresolved ideological issue was so contentious at the turn of the century that it eventually led to the overthrow of two regimes in 1910 and 1926. This is what makes the case of Portugal a worthy subject for academic enquiry in the study of nationalism.

Apart from any attempts to answer questions about Portugal’s national genealogy or ethnic composition, whose sociological character is less important than the political approach this thesis aims to pursue, this research work is far more interested in the nationalism side of the literature, i.e. in studying nationalism as a modern ideology of power and as a movement of political opposition that strives for power. This thesis, therefore, attempts both to redress the existing literature imbalance in Portugal’s case as a subject for academic enquiry and to introduce a theoretical structure, already presented earlier and duly inferred from the empirical evidence presented throughout the following chapters, that best explains how the emergence of two nationalisms of
opposition succeeded in overthrowing the regimes in power within the boundaries of a “genuine”, “mono-ethnic”, “nation-state” such as Portugal.

These two contesting nationalisms, each with its own discursive strategies of national identity, competing for national representation and for the implementation at the official level of their own conceptualisation of who and what is the Portuguese nation, have their roots in the 1828-1834 Civil War. Despite Portugal’s historical, ethnic and linguistic homogeneity, the country has been the centre of a major political divide since the Civil War, when two conflicting ideologies, absolutism and liberalism, struggled for power. The conflict pitted traditional absolutists, who were defenders of the ancien régime, the Church and the aristocracy, against liberals, who tended to side with the political and social values of the 1789 French Revolution – secularism, equality and national sovereignty. Although the liberals were victorious in the civil war, the conflict eventually produced two distinct versions of the nation (left vs. right, secular vs. Catholic). This became the ideological basis for the contesting forms of nationalism that we see acting in the political arena at the end of the nineteenth century and into the early twentieth century, which had the attainment of power as their objective and eventually resulted in the overthrow of the Constitutional Monarchy in 1910 and the First Republic in 1926.

Republican nationalism and integralist nationalism have their roots in the 1828-1834 Civil War, making this period in Portuguese history a turning point for the emergence of contesting forms of nationalism in modern Portugal.

In this sense, Portugal, albeit a genuine homogeneous nation-state apparently free from internal tension due to the homogenisation of language, ethnie and culture, is still the perfect example of a “nation as a zone conflict”, as first conceptualised by John Hutchinson (2005). Hutchinson draws attention to the fact that conflicting interpretations of the past may give rise to different conceptions of the same nation, thus
turning it into an internal subject of discord. In his book, *Nations as Zones of Conflict* (2005), he argues that nations are the epicentre of conflicts stemming from long-running cultural wars “that organise symbolic and political projects round two or three rival conceptions of the national past, taking on a quasi-ethnic form, and that articulate a diverse and changing set of issues and grievances” (p. 78). He rightly claims that the literature on nationalism has ignored the significance of persisting differences in national identity “because of the widespread assumption that nations are an embodiment of a long-term trend to cultural homogenisation in the modern world. Such cultural wars, however, are important in determining how societies modernise” (p. 78).

Hutchinson’s argument has received several criticisms (Delanty et al 2008) when it comes to his “alternative model” of looking at modern “national states”. He sees these as being heterogeneous entities, no matter how homogeneous modern states try to portray them. His book combines a seemingly contradictory approach that merges “two apparently antithetical approaches”: “the *longue durée* ‘ethnosymbolic’ framework”, “which views nations as dynamic, long term historical processes that structure the forms of modernity” and a postmodernist framework, “which emphasises that collectivities and individuals have multiple and conflictual identities over which there can be no final consensus” (Delanty et al 2008: 5). Hutchinson’s apparently contradictory, if not refreshing, approach to the study of “old” nations has shown that internal divisions rising from an acrimonious historical past, may give rise to heterogeneous interpretations of the same national entity in the long term.

In this light, Hutchinson claims that French, Russian, Greek, English and Irish nationalisms have suffered “long-running disputes” (p. 78), which stem from “divergent deep-seated historical memories” (p. 85), revolving around “powerful collective experiences such as state-religious schisms; revolutions or civil wars; wars and colonisations; and religio-national conflicts, whose consequences have been formative
and memories of which have been carried by social institutions. Around these ‘memories’ rival repertoires develop as mobilisers of collective action” (p. 88). In other words, Hutchinson argues that at the centre of certain nations one can identify unresolved past conflicts that tend to recur at the institutional and grassroots level for many years if not centuries, causing national divisions within nations that portray themselves as being homogeneous. This argument is particularly relevant to the case of Portugal.

However, contrary to what Hutchinson argues, Portugal’s political divide was the product of a nineteenth century civil war, rather than its cause. Looking at the case of the French Revolution and the American Civil War, Hutchinson (2005: 101) claims that both historical events gave expression to hostilities between rival national projects that were already present in society prior to the outbreak of such conflicts. However, that was not the case in Portugal, where the 1828-1834 Civil War gave rise to alternative conceptions of the nation that assailed both the last decades of the Constitutional Monarchy and the First Republic. As we will see in the next chapter, nationalism, as a political movement and an ideology, did not exist in Portugal until the emergence of republicanism in the last decades of the nineteenth century. The Civil War was not a nationalist conflict, but rather a conflict over royal succession between two brothers, Dom Pedro IV and Dom Miguel. The brothers sided with two different parties struggling for power since the end of the Napoleonic wars – the constitutional liberals and the authoritarian absolutists, respectively. However, that did not stop Republican nationalism from portraying itself as the genuine descendant of the most radical liberal faction fighting in the civil war (the vintistas), while taking great inspiration from the subsequent setembrista movement formed after the hostilities had ceased (1836-1842). During the First Republic, integralist nationalism emerged as a conservative reaction against republican nationalism, while creating a link between their ideals and those
espoused by the *miguelista* literature of the Civil War. The integralists reacted strongly against what they saw as an increasingly secular society in which Crown, Altar and Tradition had been declared the enemies of the newly established republican regime. Both nationalisms of opposition created competing political reform projects which presented different solutions to a nation continuously seen as under threat from Spain and England, assailed by a shambolic economic and political life, and struggling to maintain a burdensome overseas Empire intact. In their quest to institutionalise their definition of who and what constituted the Portuguese nation, republican nationalism and, later, integralist nationalism managed to ally themselves with important factions of the military and play a crucial role in the 1910 and 1926 Revolutions, respectively.

The historian Robert Gildea identified the same political pattern in France after 1789. According to his book, *The Past in French History* (1994), since the French Revolution two different “political communities”, left and right, have engendered different conceptions of the past in order to legitimise their political identities and aims over the last two centuries. In a quest for political legitimacy and for the attainment of power, these political movements (or as Gildea prefers to call them, “political communities”) have enlisted the same “heroes” and “myths” for their cause, while attempting to universalise their conceptualisation of the past. The cult of the “hero” mostly appropriated by all factions has been that of Joan of Arc. Her life and image have been seized and interpreted in order to give expression to “rival political cultures each anxious to assert its version as the orthodoxy to be accepted by all, in order to conquer a national legitimacy for themselves” (Gildea 1994: 154). However, in doing so, the cult of Joan of Arc, and the perpetual struggle over her historical meaning, has shown that behind a portrayal of France as an homogeneous nation, there are rival political identities using competing readings of the same historical events. France, just
like Portugal, is a nation with deep-seated political rivalries that use the language of the nation and its symbols to advance political goals.

In Portugal, it was not so much the same heroes but rather the same golden age that created a parallel between the republican and the integralist nationalist movement. Both saw themselves as movements of “national salvation”, who looked on the Middle Ages as the golden age of the nation. Although their historical interpretation of the Middle Ages differed greatly, when it came to the solution to the contemporary problems of the Portuguese nation, they still strived to universalise their collective view of Portugal’s history as the authentic interpretation of past events. At the centre of their contradictory understanding of the past they created different conceptions of who and what constituted the Portuguese nation. Beginning as intellectual exercises of national redefinition and then evolving into full-blown nationalist opposition movements striving for power, both the republican and integralist movements did not hesitate in using the same golden age to carve legitimacy for their nationalist programmes, while at the same time giving expression to a deep-seated national division rising from the 1828-1834 Civil War.

At times of crisis, these movements gained popularity when people saw them as the answer to the country’s economic and political troubles. In their quest for power, they mobilised the people and/or recruited support within the ranks of the military. Once the defensive forces of the ruling regime acquiesced to their attacks by remaining neutral, they succeeded in overthrowing the regime in power. As the new leaders of the incoming regime, especially in the case of the republicans, they changed the definition of who and what constituted the Portuguese nation at the official level by reforming the state institutions and institutionalising their own set of heroes, myths, memories and commemorations.
Structure

This thesis is mainly divided into two parts. The first part provides an analytical account of the development of republican nationalism from an ideological opposition movement, into a political opposition movement and finally into a revolutionary opposition movement intent on overthrowing the Constitutional Monarchy. I start the first part by looking at Portugal’s modern history, focusing on the nineteenth century, before turning our attention to the three phases of regime overthrow that resulted in the demise of the Constitutional Monarchy in 1910. Here, I employ the three-phased theoretical framework, testing its validity by analysing the emergence of the 1870 Generation (Phase One), the formation of the Portuguese Republican Party (Phase Two) and the subsequent creation of an alliance between the PRP, the Carbonária, the Masonry and the military against the Constitutional Monarchy (Phase Three). The purpose of this part is to analyse the evolution of this republican nationalism, from its ideological roots to its revolutionary actions, ultimately culminating in the country’s first regime overthrow of the twentieth century. With this aim in mind, I have divided the first part of this thesis into the following chapters:

Chapter One – Portugal Before the Emergence of Modern Nationalism analyses how the end of feudalism, the decline of the Church, the age of liberalism and, most importantly, the 1828-1834 Civil War caused a deep ideological divide at the social and political level, giving rise to a radical liberal movement called setembrismo. This was later turned into republican nationalism, and into a reactionary counterpart, articulated in the form of Catholic nationalism. Both opposition nationalisms, which were at the basis of the 1910 and 1926 Revolutions, respectively, find their roots in the Civil War. In this chapter, I also refer to the political and economic background that explains the
emergence of republican nationalism in the 1870s in the context of Regeneration. Republicanism rose to prominence due to a set of historical particularities, which included a corrupt and bankrupt rotativist system with over-aggrandising dreams of imperial conquest.

Chapter Two – Phase One: The 1870 Generation (1870-1876) gives an account of the First Phase of regime overthrow – the emergence and preponderance of the 1870 Generation, whose republican views gave way to an ideological revolution that preceded the political revolution of October 1910. In this chapter, I make reference to this Generation’s obsession with the discourse of “the decadent nation” and their efforts to break with the romantic tradition, and also with the monarchical and clerical traditions. I present these intellectuals’ social background, ideological leanings and political agendas, as well as their individual views of the republican nation, especially those of Teófilo Braga. This exercise will help us understand the ideological roots of republican nationalism.

Chapter Three – Phase Two: The Portuguese Republican Party (1876-1903) analyses the formation of the Portuguese Republican Party, its initial ideological and structural division and subsequent conformity; the social and economic background of its leaders and followers; and the party’s own recipe for national regeneration, duly borrowed from the positivist works of Teófilo Braga, i.e. republicanism, nationalism, colonialism, anti-British imperialism and anti-clericalism. This chapter makes reference, amongst other things, to the PRP’s invention of national commemorations and reintegration of long-forgotten heroes, namely the 1880 Commemoration of Camões Centenary and the 1882 Commemoration of Marquis of Pombal’s Centenary. The PRP’s nationalist appropriation of the political reaction against the 1879 Treaty of Lourenço Marques and of the 1890 British Ultimatum are also analysed here. The study of the 1890 British Ultimatum and the nationalist outcry that it provoked will also help
us understand why all forms of Iberianism which had hitherto been upheld by the PRP were forever abandoned. The ensuing 1891 republican uprising in Porto that ended in failure and left the party struggling until 1903 closes the chronological bracket of this chapter.

Chapter Four – Phase Three: Revolutionary Recruitment (1903-1910) focuses on the Third Phase, that is, on the popular mobilisation strategies pursued by the PRP, the Masonry and the Carbonária against the Constitutional Monarchy. These three movements differed in many ways when it came to their preferred *modus operandi*, as they shared an intrinsic suspicion of each other. However, their desire to bring down the dynastic regime and to establish an anti-clerical republic, led to the creation of an alliance that saw the radical Carbonária mobilising the urban working class and the enlisted and non-commissioned personnel, while the moderate PRP and the Masonry turned their attention to the middle-class and the junior ranks of the armed forces. After the apparent demise of the PRP, in 1903, the party reorganised and regained some ground. Following a series of political crises, the republicans became more popular than ever among the urban classes. After Franco’s rule (1906-1908) came to an end with the assassination of King Carlos in 1908, the PRP in conjunction with the Carbonária and the Masonry started planning an attack in earnest on the monarchy which was successfully carried out on 5 October 1910.

The second part of this thesis focuses on the political events that resulted in the downfall of the First Republic by, once again, using and testing the three-phased theoretical framework. We will see how Integralismo Lusitano, a right-wing Catholic and monarchist nationalism of opposition, first emerged as an ideological opposition to the Republic’s anti-clerical policies before turning into a political opposition movement
that eventually allied itself with the higher ranks of the military in order to overthrow
the left-wing First Republic (1910-1926)\textsuperscript{8}.

In \textit{Chapter Five – The Republican Nation (1910-1915)}, I provide an account of
the efforts and strains the hegemonic PRP/PD went through to create a Republican
nation as soon as they overthrew the Constitutional Monarchy. In their first year of
government, they replaced all royalist traits of power symbology with republican
symbols, memories and myths that aimed to legitimise the foundation of a modern
Portuguese nation. In their quest to institutionalise their version of Portuguese
nationalism, they created republican schools and a national army, and decreed several
anti-clerical measures. As we will see in this chapter, both the republican schools and
the national army turned out to be a big disappointment in the face of economic
difficulties and political irresponsibility, alienating the high ranks of the military forces.
However, the most controversial policy pursued by the party was by far their
determination to turn the Catholic Portuguese into an anticlerical republican nation. In
their quest to reconceptualise the nation at the institutional level, the PRP/PD alienated
a majority of the population with its aggressive and noninclusive version of who and
what constituted the Portuguese nation. This contributed to the emergence of a
reactionary nationalism of opposition that found its most radical expression in
Integralismo Lusitano. In parallel with the alienation of high-ranking officers, Catholics
and conservatives, the PRP also managed to aggravate some of their own supporters,
who dissented from the PRP and created the Evolutionist Party (Partido Republicano
Evolucionista, PRE) and the Unionist Party (Partido da União Republicana, PUR),
while the PRP was renamed Democratic Party (Partido Democrático, PD). This chapter
follows the same purpose as Chapter One with respect to the 1870 Generation, in as
much as it assesses the political conditions that led to the emergence of Integralismo

\textsuperscript{8} Although not divided exactly in these same terms, Manuel Braga da Cruz (1986) and José Manuel
Quintas (2004) also trace an historic journey of Integralismo Lusitano from their ideological roots to their
partisan years, and finally to their involvement in conspiracies and uprisings against the regime in power.
Lusitano in 1913 as an ideological movement of nationalist opposition to the ruling regime.

Chapter Six – Phase One: Integralismo Lusitano (1910-1916) examines the emergence of Integralismo Lusitano out of a feeling of political alienation. In this chapter, I study its ideological roots, which corresponds to Phase One of the three-phased theoretical framework. Phase One represents the formation of Integralismo Lusitano as an ideological movement by a diaspora of young Catholic Monarchists based in France and Belgium. They built their ideology around a neo-romantic view of the nation which emphasised Charles Maurras’s work, the miguelista literature of the Civil War and partially the works of the 1870 Generation. They differentiated themselves from other monarchist and Catholic opposition movements, and most importantly, from the official nationalism of the republican regime, by emphasising an organicist, traditionalist, anti-parliamentarian and monarchic version of the Portuguese nation.

Chapter Seven – Phase Two: Junta Central of Integralismo Lusitano (1914-1922) turns our attention to Integralismo’s development into a political movement during the Great War years. Phase Two embodies the transformation of Integralismo Lusitano into a political party, supporting Sidónio Pais’s military rule, also known as the New Republic (1917-1919), the Monarquia do Norte and the Monsanto uprising (1919). This is the phase when Integralismo enjoyed a handful of political successes as part of Sidónio’s dictatorship. They joined the cabinet, took seats in the Congress and influenced the legal documents issued at the time. However, these successes were short-lived. Sidónio’s reluctance to kowtow to monarchist demands ended in the alienation of the integralists and the monarchists from the conservative coalition. After the dictator’s assassination in December 1918 and the monarchists’ defeat in the Monarquia do Norte and the Monsanto uprising, Integralismo Lusitano suffered an internal split due to the
century-long dynastic question, pitting legitimists against constitutionalists. Abandoned by both constitutionalists and legitimists, the JCIL suspended its political activities.

Chapter Eight – Phase Three: Revolutionary Recruitment (1922-1926) is devoted to the integralists’ efforts to influence and instigate the military and other conservative parties to overthrow the First Republic. Phase Three corresponds to the end of the partisan strategy followed by Integralismo Lusitano, especially after the defeat of the Monarquia do Norte and the Monsanto uprising. This resulted in a reformulation of the integralist doctrine, in favour of a conspiratorial strategy, aimed at forming alliances with like-minded conservatives against the ruling regime – e.g. disillusioned senior officers, the União dos Interesses Económicos (representative of the interests of the oligarchs, upper urban classes and rural landowners), and the Cruzada Nuno Álvares Pereira (mostly composed of conservative and reactionary influentials by the end of the Republic). In the face of an acute post-war economic and political crisis, the military became increasingly more interventionist, while the middle and working classes, hitherto strong supporters of the Republic, refused to intervene to stop the conservative coup of 28 May 1926.

Finally, this thesis ends with a Conclusion chapter, which summarises the main arguments of the thesis. It reflects on the particularities of each phase of the three-phased theoretical structure in relation to the similarities and differences followed by both movements in their political trajectory for the overthrow of the ruling regime. This chapter also makes suggestions for further research.
CHAPTER ONE – PORTUGAL BEFORE THE EMERGENCE OF MODERN NATIONALISM

1.1. Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to present a summary of the political, social and economic events that characterised nineteenth century Portugal, from the Napoleonic Wars to the Regeneration years. Of the most important historical events that happened during this period, one should pay special attention to the Portuguese Civil War of 1828-1834, which opened deep fissures in Portuguese society, pitting liberals against absolutists. The ideological differences that characterised these two grouping were at the basis of the nationalist opposition movements – i.e. republican and integralist – that overthrew the Constitutional Monarchy in 1910 and the First Republic in 1926, respectively.

This chapter also serves as an introduction to the emergence of a disillusioned nationalist intelligentsia in the late part of the century. As we will see in the next chapter (Chapter Two – Phase One: The 1870 Generation), this nationalist intelligentsia, better known as the 1870 Generation, led to the creation of the first nationalist opposition movement, the Portuguese Republican Party, which turned into an open “disloyal” revolutionary movement after the 1890 British Ultimatum.

The 1870 Generation was a product of Portugal’s liberalism. In order to understand the liberal intellectuals’ disenchantment with the Constitutional Monarchy and their rise as the most influential intellectual generation of the nineteenth century, we must bear in mind a few important historical events that characterised the political, economic and social life of the country in the first decades of the nineteenth century.
This historical subtext had an enormous impact on the works of these intellectuals. For reasons of analytical clarity, what follows in this chapter is an historical description of the period in question. This is important to the critical argument that follows in the subsequent chapters.

1.2. Portugal’s Entry in the Age of Liberalism

Portugal entered the age of liberalism through the door of the Napoleonic wars and the consequent establishment of a British protectorate in Portugal.

In 1807, when Portugal refused to enforce Napoleon’s Continental Blockade against Britain, the French and the Spanish armies, led by General Jean-Andoche Junot, invaded the country (Birmingham 1993: 96-97). This, however, was not the first time that Spain had declared war on its neighbour, invaded the country or attempted to submit Portugal to its political designs. Since 1263, when Castile had renounced any territorial claims to Algarve, Portugal and Castile, later Spain, had found themselves at loggerheads on various occasions more often than not as a consequence of Portugal’s desire to remain a separate kingdom from Castile and to maintain an alliance with England, later Britain, who was the main guarantor of Portugal’s independence in the region. This attitude led to the 1385 Battle of Aljubarrota, the 1640-1668 Restoration War that followed the Iberian Union of 1580-1640, the 1704 Spanish declaration of war on occasion of the Spanish Succession War, the 1762 Franco-Spanish invasion during the Seven Years War, the 1801 War of the Oranges, and finally, in the twentieth century, the tête-à-tête that followed the establishment of the Portuguese Republic between the Portuguese Republicans and the Spanish King Alfonso XIII, who
harboured a strong desire to dominate its weaker neighbour (on the latter, see Medeiros Ferreira 1989).

The Anglo-Portuguese alliance was first confirmed in 1373, and later reconfirmed in 1385, 1642 and in 1703. Under the alliance, Portugal agreed to enter into a commercial partnership with England in exchange for a military alliance that maintained Britain’s influence in the peninsula. This helped Portugal to counteract any external threats to its independence. Since the fourteenth century, when Castile first adopted a belligerent attitude towards Portugal, England had invariably come to the rescue of Portugal. When the Napoleonic armies invaded the Portuguese Kingdom in 1807, the same historical pattern was repeated. Britain, under the joint command of General Arthur Wellesley, later known as the Second Duke of Wellington, and General William Beresford took control of the moribund Portuguese army and successfully expelled the French from Portugal in 1811 after Spain had realigned with Britain in 1808.

As a sign of gratitude for Britain’s intervention, the Portuguese royal family, at the time exiled in Rio de Janeiro, signed an Anglo-Portuguese treaty which replaced the commercial 1703 Methuen Treaties and opened the Brazilian ports to British traders, “thus accelerating the drift towards Brazil’s political independence” (Birmingham 1993: 96). General William Beresford was proclaimed the de facto military governor of Portugal by royal decree, with the monarchy deciding to remain in Brazil after the defeat of Napoleon in 1814.

However, the officers and politicians who were left behind in the European metropolis, now governed from the Tropics, were not happy with this state of affairs. Beresford was an unpopular ruler and became a persona non grata after the execution, in 1817, of General Gomes Freire de Andrade, a highly respected officer, former soldier of Napoleon’s Portuguese legion, and grandmaster of the Portuguese Freemasonry.
Gomes Freire de Andrade had been accused of conspiring against Marshall Beresford, the government and the existing institutions of the *ancien régime* and as a result was sentenced to death at the stake. But the General’s execution sprouted even more rebellions among liberal army officers and bureaucrats, who believed in the values of the French Revolution, and demanded an end to British rule and to the control it exercised over the Portuguese army. They also insisted that the King should return to Portugal.

Gomes Freire de Andrade’s execution was seen as an act of martyrdom by those who defended the restoration of independence and the liberal cause, ever so popular among the small bourgeoisie and duly inspired by the Spanish 1812 Cadiz Revolution. By 1820, Britain’s rule had become openly oppressive, reactionary and “foreign”. Taking advantage of Beresford’s trip to Brazil to seek an extension of powers from King Dom João VI in order to reform the military and repress the liberal threat, British rule was overthrown by a successful military and popular uprising in Porto, organised by the Masonry. The revolution put an end to Portugal’s foreign administration (Birmingham 1993: 103-108; Oliveira Marques 1972: 42, 54-55; Wheeler 1978: 21-22).

This was a remarkable turning point in Portuguese history, as it was during the 1820 Revolution that, in the words of the historian Tom Gallagher (1983: 13), “middle- and upper middle-class civilian elites – and the Portuguese military – first came to the political foreground. They have been there ever since, the dominant elements in Portuguese national politics from the 1820s to the 1980s.”

1.3. The Vintista and the Cartista Constitutions
King Dom João VI returned to Portugal in July 1821 after promising the liberals that he would swear allegiance to a highly progressive constitution which was still to be drafted. The subsequent *Vintista* Constitution was approved a year later and contemplated in its articles: people’s sovereignty; suffrage for all literate males regardless of income; direct elections to the Cortes, which now only consisted of a chamber of deputies; the end of the Inquisition; free press; the separation of Church and State; and the abolition of legal and tax privileges. However, as Beresford had predicted during his years at the helm of the Portuguese army, apart from a small bourgeoisie, the majority of the Portuguese population – the clergy, the nobility and the uneducated pious peasantry – remained loyal to the traditional church and to the *ancien régime* and were wary of such advanced ideas as those espoused by the *Vintista* Constitution. The 1822 Constitution, which was directly based on the liberal Spanish Constitution of Cadiz (1812), did not contemplate any special prerogatives favouring the nobility or the clergy, and reduced the powers of the monarch to a symbolic role. Furthermore, the independence of Brazil in September 1822 had rendered the liberal cause highly unpopular. The Portuguese had hoped that the 1820 Revolution would bring Brazil back to the periphery of the Empire, but Prince Dom Pedro IV’s declaration of Brazil’s independence as an “autonomous” empire and his self-proclamation as Emperor of Brazil put the survival of the Portuguese Empire in danger (Birmingham 1993: 110-112; Oliveira Marques 1972: 55-57; Miranda 1997: 260-269).

After the death of King Dom João VI in 1826, Dom Pedro IV ascended to the throne. His main concern was to appease the internal fissures that the *Vintista* constitution had created among the people and within the dynastic family. The latter was now divided between a liberal faction led by Dom Pedro IV and an absolutist faction led by his brother, Prince Dom Miguel. The latter was inspired by Fernando VII of Spain who, upon his restoration to the throne, rejected the 1812 Cadiz Constitution
and made extensive use of autocratic and repressive measures to keep the Spanish liberals at bay. In an attempt to halt the liberal advance in Portugal, Dom Miguel rose up in arms against his father, King Dom João VI, as soon as the Vintista Constitution was approved in what came to be known as the 1823 Vila Francada. In April 1824, Dom Miguel revolted again (the Abrilada), on this occasion with the support of his mother, Dona Carlota Joaquina, but was defeated and forced into exile.

Faced with such internal opposition, Dom Pedro IV, now King of Portugal, but residing in Brazil, took upon himself the task of drafting a new constitution, featuring a compromise between liberal principles and political traditions. Dom Pedro IV’s constitution, also known as the 1826 Carta (1826 Charter), as it was stipulated by the King but never approved by the Cortes, established a constitutional monarchy whereby the monarch increased his powers by embodying the moderating power and, as a result, retaining the authority to legislate by decree, veto laws emanating from the Cortes, dissolve the Cortes, and appoint and dismiss constitutional governments. The Carta, based on the French Constitutional Charter of 1814 and on the Brazilian Constitution of 1824, re-established deference to hereditary nobility and to its privileges. Sovereignty was no longer solely based on the people. As a result, the path towards nationhood, which had begun with the Vintista Constitution, was abandoned by the ruling elites.

The Cortes were now divided into two chambers. The Upper Chamber, or the Chamber of Peers, included archbishops, bishops and nobles, and was appointed by the monarch who issued peerage titles for life with the possibility of extending them to successive heirs. The Lower Chamber, or the Chamber of Deputies, was elected by indirect and restricted suffrage, limited to wealthy literate males. Some of the most fundamental liberal principles of the Vintista Constitution were therefore annulled, but unlike the latter the Carta had the support of a larger part of the population, i.e. the nobility, the secular clergy, the landowners and the prosperous bourgeoisie.
1.4. The Portuguese 1828-1834 Civil War

However, despite the changes made to the liberal constitution, the Carta was still deemed excessively liberal by Dom Miguel and his absolutist supporters, who managed to suspend the Carta two years after it had come into effect. Taking advantage of the fact that King Dom Pedro IV was reluctant to abdicate his throne in recently-independent Brazil, preferring to leave the Portuguese crown in the hands of his young daughter, Infanta Dona Maria da Glória, Dom Miguel incited a rebellion from exile, sparking off several skirmishes with the support of the Spanish reactionary government (1826-1827). In March 1828, recently returned from Austria, Dom Miguel suspended the liberal Cortes, persecuted and killed hundreds of liberals. This started a civil war (1828-1834) between liberals loyal to Dom Pedro IV and absolutists loyal to Dom Miguel (Oliveira Marques 1972: 58-62; Birmingham 1993: 13-14).9

The civil war was a conflict between two brothers over succession rights to the throne. Dom Pedro IV was a liberal constitutionalist who believed in a common ground between the liberal and absolutist systems of government. His Carta, as devised by him, reflected that position. However, Dom Miguel did not think that the compromise articulated by the Carta went far enough. He and his absolutist supporters believed they had become the legitimate successors to the throne when Dom Pedro IV became Emperor of Brazil, thus abdicating any right to rule Portugal or to choose an heir.

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9 For a military account of the Civil War see, for instance, Ventura (2004).
The absolutists were comprised of landowners and the Church, those who had been mostly affected by the liberal reforms that had been introduced during the Napoleonic invasions. They were the counterparts of Spanish *carlismo*. They resented the liberal changes that had spread around Europe at the beginning of the century, especially those in neighbouring Spain, and were determined to revert to the *ancien régime*. The *miguelista* ideology was apostolic, legitimist, traditionalist, anti-constitutional, anti-masonic and proto-nationalist (Barreiros Malheiro da Silva 1993; Lousada 1992). The *miguelistas* defended a direct link between the Church and the Throne, whilst rejecting national sovereignty, and saw anyone who opposed this system of government, namely the “liberal-bourgeois-masons”, as enemies of the *pátria*, or even, as anti-Portuguese invaders, who had to be destroyed in the same manner that the Portuguese had defeated Napoleon. According to the absolutist ideology, the King’s subjects had to be obedient to the King if the *pátria* was to survive in its unitary form against the invasion of deadly foreign ideas. In this sense, the absolutist King assumed the traits of a messiah, a saviour of the people, the defender of the traditional royal institutions which had ensured Portugal’s survival for centuries on end (Lousada 1992: 65-66).

Ironic as it may sound, the liberals eventually defeated the absolutists in 1834 with the help of none other than the British. After all, the French Revolution was no longer seen by the Whig Foreign Secretary Lord Palmerston as a threat to Britain. However, although the liberals emerged victorious, disputes over power still raged for a long time between absolutists and liberals in the north of Portugal, a stronghold of absolutist support. The effects of these were felt well into the twentieth century (e.g. 1846 Maria da Fonte, 1848-1849 Pátuleia, 1911-1912 Monarchist Incursions). This was due to the fact that one of the most important changes that came out of the Civil War was the end of feudalism and of the religious orders. This contributed to the emergence
of new social classes in the political life of the country, i.e. the landed bourgeoisie and the urban middle class. The emergence of these classes caused, in turn, a reaction amongst the most conservative and traditional sectors of the population, i.e. the aristocratic elite and the lower ranks of rural society, mostly dependent on the support of the clergy for their subsistence. Another consequence of the Civil War was an emerging split within the liberal wing of the Constitutional Monarchy, which ultimately resulted in the division of the left into two separate parts: a radical faction and a moderate faction.

1.5. The End of Feudalism, the Decline of the Clergy’s Influence and the Rise of New Urban Social Classes

During the Civil War, the clergy had sided with the Absolutists against King Dom Pedro IV. An alliance between the clergy and Dom Miguel was first struck in the 1820s at a time when the liberal governments had abolished clerical titles and taxes, depriving the Catholic Church of both social status and financial revenue. This anticlerical “offensive” was taken one step further when the liberals imposed harsh taxes on the Catholic Church, claiming 50% of their total revenue. Adding insult to injury, the Vintista Constitution and the Carta denied the regular clergy the right to be represented in the Chamber of Deputies and the right to vote in elections for the Cortes. However, as was said above, the Carta, being more moderate than the Vintista Constitution, granted permanent representation in the Chamber of Peers to members of the secular clergy, placing them on a par with the high nobility.

After the civil war, the clergy, who had actively supported the defeated side, suffered another backlash that resulted in a decrease of influence over the bourgeoisie and the new urban classes. This contributed to a decline in the faith and an increased
tolerance of alternative ideologies, such as secular republicanism (Callahan 2006). The post-civil war backlash included the expulsion of the Jesuits and of the Papal Nuncio. Diplomatic relations with Rome were broken off, as Rome had supported and recognised Dom Miguel’s short-lived rule. Ecclesiastical patronages were abolished and the regular clergy – monks, friars and priests – suffered open persecution, even death. In 1834, all monasteries were abolished, their property reverted to the State and their members dispersed. Convents were not dissolved, but they gradually closed their doors. According to one estimate, the number of clerics as a percentage of the total population was 1.1% in 1820, but after the end of the Civil War, in the 1850s, this percentage dropped to as low as 0.1% (Mouta Faria 2004: 82). Even if one takes into consideration the increase in the total population, this is still a staggering drop in numbers.

However, relations between the Church and the State were normalised in the 1840s and, after the 1850s, the Catholic Church enjoyed official protection from the governments of the Regeneration. In 1842, diplomatic relations were re-established with Rome. Six years later, an agreement was signed that paved the way for peaceful coexistence between the Church and the State, lasting until the demise of the Constitutional Monarchy. A union of Church and State became official, allowing freedom of worship in private as the Catholic faith was declared the official religion of the state (Callahan 2006: 382). As a result of this, freedom of speech without censorship was limited by the Church to morals and dogma (Oliveira Marques 1972: 21-25, 43-48). The Jesuits were eventually allowed to return to Portugal in 1857. In 1901 Prime Minister Hintze Ribeiro’s 18 April Decree allowed the establishment of any religious orders, who provided welfare assistance to the population on the condition that they did not become involved in local or national politics (Carvalho da Silva 1996: 38-42; Villares 1995). However, the number of clerics never recovered. In the 1860s, the clergy comprised only 0.11% of the total population and by the eve of the First
Republic this percentage had dropped to 0.09%. These figures were synonymous with a significant decrease in the secular clergy. In 1838-1840, the secular clergy included about 10,000 members. In 1910, that number had fallen to 5,535 (Mouta Faria 2004: 82, 85, 96).

Despite their loss in numbers, power, status and wealth, the Catholic Church still had a strong influence over the aristocracy, the peasantry and the most conservative elements of the rural bourgeoisie, especially in the north. The peasants were largely the beneficiaries of a law passed by Minister Martens Ferrão in the late 1860s, which relieved the state of the responsibility of providing social services to the poor, and delegated that responsibility to the Church. The Church was therefore the main provider of basic services in the countryside, such as education, health and basic food rations. It was also among the peasants that the secular clergy found a steady inflow of recruits who saw the priesthood as an escape from their miserable rural lives (Mouta Faria 2004: 87-88).

As previously outlined, this scenario was more predominant in the north of the country, where, according to the Catholic Church historian, William J. Callahan (2006: 387), “dense infrastructure of rural parishes intimately connected to the concerns of peasant communities survived. Conditions in the large cities, whether (...) Lisbon or Oporto, were less promising, for there were already signs of the religious alienation of urban populations. Moreover, the cities were strongholds of liberalisation both politically and ideologically”. In the south, the hold of the Church over the people was weaker. As Callahan (2006: 389) claims, “parishes were few compared to the north, while in districts of large estates worked by landless day labourers religious indifference took root”. In the northern archdiocese of Braga, for example, there were 1,270 parishes in the mid-nineteenth century; whereas in the southern archdiocese of Évora there were only 145 (Callahan 2006: Footnote 26). According to another historian, Vítor Neto
(1998: 481), in 1906, “excepting some regions of the north, where the people conserve the custom of daily mass (...) in the rest of the country churches are nearly empty”. In one particular town in the southern region of Alentejo with 11,000 inhabitants, Neto noted that hardly anyone attended Sunday mass, a situation that according to him was also prevalent in Lisbon.

Overall, the constitutional reforms that were imposed on the Church liberated large areas of unused land, benefitting the development of agriculture and landownerships. This contributed to the emergence of a landed bourgeoisie and an urban middle-class that sided with the liberals in their opposition to traditional conservatism. As the century progressed, the urban middle-class was also the main beneficiary of a lay, free and universal primary and secondary education, established with relative success by the liberal governments in the largest cities of the country. These educational reforms were important in as much as they contributed to a decrease in illiteracy, mostly in the urban centres. They also opened people’s minds to alternative ideologies of power with the Church no longer playing a central role nor being the main educator of the people. According to the Portuguese historian, Oliveira Marques, in 1834, about 90% of the total population was illiterate (Oliveira Marques 1972: 30). But by 1900, that figure had decreased to 78.6% of the total population (5,423,123), or to 74.1% of the population over seven years old (Trindade Coelho 1906: 161). In the cities, the decline of the clergy’s power, despite its official protection, went hand in hand with the rise of anticlericalism and republicanism. The Church was seen as a reactionary institution, unable to cope with the establishment of liberalism and the end of feudalism. It comes as no surprise, therefore, that the Portuguese Republican Party was founded in Lisbon by members of the upper middle class with strong support from the working class. Republicanism was largely an urban phenomenon, scarcely spread to the rest of
the country, but strong enough to overthrow the monarchist regime in 1910 from downtown Lisbon.

1.6. The Origins of an Ideological Division Translated into the Ideology of Modern Nationalist Opposition Movements

Taking into consideration the aforementioned, one can identify the Civil War and its aftermath as the historical landmark that ushered in an important division in Portuguese society. This division would be crystallised in the collective memory of the Portuguese for more than a century, not only along ideological lines – liberals versus absolutists, but also along geographical lines – a liberal south versus a conservative north.

The nationalisms of opposition that later emerged as strong contestants against the established institutions – republican nationalism in the 1870s and integralist nationalism in the 1910s – borrowed much of their ideology and discourse from this division. Republican nationalism saw itself as the inheritor of the Vintista party, the most radical liberal party present in the Civil War, and of their 1830s splinter movement, the setembristas; while integralist nationalism drew much of its ideology from the miguelista works that emerged during the Civil War. The absolutists might have been defeated but they had not completely surrendered.

Both nationalisms saw themselves as the descendants of their respective predecessors and during the First Republic they found themselves in direct collision just as their predecessors had a century earlier. As was mentioned in the Introduction, John Hutchinson (2005) draws attention to this fact. He says that ethnic heritages of modern nationalisms “are not singular but layered, and, just as ethnic revivalists in the
premodern period have clashed over different pasts, so too have nationalists in the modern period”, who tend to disagree over “compeing (sic) conceptions of the nation, often of a quasi-ethnic nature, that develop into long-running cultural wars” (p. 77). He argues that it is this different conception of the same nation, based on an historical conflict, that sees the emergence of different “symbolic and political projects round two or three rival conceptions of the national past, taking on a quasi-ethnic form, and that articulate a diverse and changing set of issues and grievances” (p. 78).

In this sense, the 1828-1834 Civil War seems to have been the historical conflict that triggered the ideological emergence of republican and integralist nationalisms of opposition in Portugal. These in turn drew on their antagonistic predecessors as the basis for the creation of a layered nationalist past. The 1828-1834 Civil War was a modern dynastic conflict that opposed the values of an old Europe, based on the ancien régime, against the values espoused by a new Europe, based on liberal forms of power organisation. This is the point in Portugal’s history where both republican nationalism and integralist nationalism saw their ideological roots and this is where they drew a line between themselves and their opponents. The Portuguese Civil War was a belligerent conflict over power and over the establishment of a particular form of government. The resentments and aspirations that were manifested during this conflict became fodder for the ensuing cultural war that both nationalisms of opposition mimicked a few decades later. As we will see in more detail in the coming chapters, republican nationalism succeeded in overthrowing the Constitutional Monarchy and when it finally established itself in power, it was defeated by a conservative coalition of which integralist nationalism was a major part. However, contrary to their historical predecessors, republicans and integralists aimed to bring the newly politicised factions of society into their side of the conflict, especially now that they had imbued themselves with the language and the power of mobilisation of modern nationalism. This is one of the most
important reasons that accounts for their success in overthrowing, firstly, the Constitutional Monarchy and, later, the First Republic, respectively.

1.7. Split of the Liberal Wing

Another consequence that emerged from the 1828-1834 Civil War was an internal disagreement within the liberal wing of the Constitutional Monarchy. Although vintistas and cartistas had fought together against the absolutists, once the civil war was over they turned against each other. In September 1836, the inheritors of the Vintista Constitution, the leftist setembristas, grabbed the reins of power by means of both electoral victory and garrison revolt. The setembristas formed an alliance with the emerging urban industrial bourgeoisie and the middle class traders (both supported by the lower classes) and replaced the constitutional Charter, still considered to be too conservative, with the Vintista Constitution, before approving a progressive and highly controversial constitution of their own. The short-lived Setembrista Constitution (1838-1842), based on the 1830 French Constitution and on the 1831 Belgian Constitution, was a compromise between the Constitution of 1822 and the Constitution of 1824. The Setembrista Constitution reasserted popular sovereignty, suppressed the moderating power and the hereditary Chamber of Peers – replacing it with an elective chamber of senators – contemplated direct elections to both chambers based on the vote of a restricted suffrage, and ascertained the monarch’s right to veto laws and to dissolve the Cortes (Birmingham 1993: 113-118, Miranda 1997: 281-284; Oliveira Marques 1972: 46, 62-65).

The setembristas were eventually driven from power in 1848 by one of their former staunchest supporters, the radical politician, now turned into a conservative
member of cabinet, António Bernardo da Costa Cabral. As the Secretary of Justice, he re-established the Carta in 1842 in a bloodless coup d’état in Porto.

1.8. Regeneration and Rotativism

However, after Costa Cabral caused much discontent among the moderate factions of the military and the conservative factions of the population, namely the God-fearing peasants, popular revolt ensued (i.e. Maria da Fonte Uprising and Patuleia) (Birmingham 1993: 121-124; Oliveira Marques 1972: 65-68). Costa Cabral, who had been appointed Prime Minister of Portugal, was ousted by the conservative Marshall Duke of Saldanha, a “hero” of the Civil War.

In April 1851, Saldanha rebelled against the established authorities and was supported by a military uprising in Porto. He imposed a new political system, thereafter known as the Regeneration (Regeneração), which oversaw the appeasement of internal divisions, the maturation of the Constitutional Monarchy and the development of Portugal’s infrastructures. The three decades or so that followed were characterised by an unprecedented degree of political stability at the elite level and by economic development under Fontes Pereira de Melo, the regenerator Minister of Finance, who later became Minister of Public Works and eventually Prime Minister of Portugal. It was a time of political conformity and of no real threat to the institutions nor to the social and economic policies of the regeneration governments. The upper middle-class united and kept a firm hold on power, preventing the lower classes from revolting. The period of praetorian politics, popular uprisings and internal wars had apparently come to an end (Oliveira Marques 1972: 68-69; Wheeler 1978: 25).
By inaugurating the period known as the Regeneration, Saldanha established a bipartisan and oligarchic system of government with two similar parties striving for power in a two-chamber parliament. A new generation of political leaders was then welcomed into the Cortes and the Cabinet, thus creating the conditions for political reconciliation. For the first time in nineteenth century Portugal, the new system provided “a state of equilibrium among the several social classes and groups, and a clever manipulation of the political machine”, which consisted in the rotation of the two main parties in power, namely, the right-wing Regenerator Party, created in 1851, and the left-wing Historical Party, created in 1852, and later known as the Progressist Party (Oliveira Marques 1972: 68). While the military took a back seat, the two parties alternated in power or ruled in coalition in a cycle that came to be known as rotativismo (Oliveira Marques 1972: 70).

The differences that set apart these two constitutionalist parties of the Regeneration were very subtle and hardly noticeable, as neither the regenerators nor the historicals/progressists had an explicitly written program with a defining ideology and an action plan. However, in the absence of such a programme, one can still discern a preoccupation with strong government and economic laissez faire on the part of the regenerators. While Fontes Pereira de Melo was at the helm, the right-wing party also endeavoured to develop the infrastructure and communications system of the country, which was supported by state funding and foreign loans. As for the historicals/progressists, they defended a revision of the Cartista constitution, which was successfully achieved in 1852 and 1878 when elections to the Chamber of Deputies became direct and voting rights were expanded to a larger fraction of the male population. The historicals/progressists also diverged from the regenerators in minor economic, financial and political matters, accusing their counterparts of being too

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10 The regenerators only issued a political programme in 1910. However, it was never put into practice as the Constitutional Monarchy was overthrown a few months later.
acquiescent to the royal family and too conservative in their policies. However, in
general terms, the ideological differences of both parties were insubstantial by the end
of the nineteenth century (Oliveira Marques 1972: 51; Ramos 1994: 20; Wheeler 1978:
27).

1.9. Caciquismo, Clientelism and Political Corruption

Despite the political stability that this dual arrangement brought to the country, it
still created a false sense of peace amongst the population, as the short-lived 1868
Janeirinha uprising showed. Whilst the politicians seemed happy with rotativismo, the
people got progressively agitated. This was due to the fact that both parties “were loose
coalitions based on personal loyalties and local interests”, among whom ideological
differences were of less importance than personal or factional interests. The urban lower
classes did not find political representation and expression in the rotating parties, partly
because, on the one hand, the parties were dominated by financial and agrarian
oligarchs and, on the other hand, their social status did not grant them membership of
the political elite (Gallagher 1983: 15). The Regeneration did not deliver what it had
promised – i.e. the regeneration of the political regime – and the system soon proved to
be as corrupt as ever.

Rotativismo was a political “musical chairs”, part and parcel of a system that
prevented power from changing hands in response to genuine expressions of public
opinion and discontent. The whole political system of rotativismo with its parties,
elections and parliamentary activities, reflected the interests and views of the oligarchy
and of a small petty aristocracy. As the Portuguese political sociologist, Tavares de
Almeida (1991: 178-189) tells us, parties were, therefore, self-replicating political
elites, formed by cliques of private friends and relatives that dispensed clientelism, patronage and favouritism while repressing any changes that might put their monopoly of revenues, public positions and prestige at risk. Although, in the cities, vote rigging was not as endemic as it was in the countryside, because freedom of press had helped to build a strong civic consciousness, the civic liberties enjoyed in the cities had yet to favour the lower classes, who were still denied representation by the two oligarchic parties. In the rural areas, on the other hand, the people had no voice regarding the problems of the country, except through a patronage system based on local caciques by which they were made to vote as they were told. Local bosses, composed of landowners, noblemen, lawyers, doctors, professors and priests who wanted to extend their social and economic power to the political sphere, orchestrated the local vote in return for such “commodities” as money, exemption from military service and jobs (Tavares de Almeida 1991: 131-132). Elections were therefore largely rigged outside the cities, where physical isolation and illiteracy were prevalent, in order to give each of the two parties a chance to govern.

The monarch also played a major role in this political game. Only the monarch had the power to dissolve the Cortes. He used this power frequently before the end of each legislature in order to ensure a smooth transfer of power to the opposition. As a result, rather than appointing a Prime Minister based on popular choice, the King chose the next government, whenever either the ruling party, the party in opposition, or even the monarch himself found it most convenient. Once a new government was appointed, the King dissolved the Chamber of Peers and called for new elections. Invariably, the elections were controlled by the newly appointed government. Under the patronage system and the network of local caciques – whereby local notables were recruited as Deputies or their interests were promised to be advanced at the parliamentary level – the newly appointed government was bound to have a majority in the new Chamber.
However, the system of rotativismo became increasingly discredited in the eyes of the people and, by the early 1870s, the monarch’s role came into focus. He was seen as being intimately associated with the corruption and caciquismo that sustained the Constitutional Monarchy. Popular resentment and disenchantment festered under the appearance of political stability, as state institutions were run by a clique of oligarchs, who still had to gain the support of the lower urban classes (Oliveira Marques 1972: 51-53; Pulido Valente 1974: 26-27; Tavares de Almeida 1991: Chapter 3; Wheeler 1978: 25-28).

1.10. Economic Disarray

In economic terms, the country under the Regeneration system was not faring much better. The initial economic expansion that the transportation and public works programmes of Fontes Pereira de Melo had brought to the country ended in much disappointment, as they increased the deficit and the public debt from 100,000 contos in 1852 to 500,000 contos in 1890, the latter figure being especially disturbing when the total value of state revenues for the year 1890 was lower than 40,000 contos. Contrary to what the politicians had hoped, the industrial revolution never took off in earnest. Portugal lacked the most basic infrastructures and resources for the sustenance of a strong industrial activity, such as steel. As a result, the kingdom remained largely an agricultural economy and a commercial ally of Britain with whom wine, Portugal’s most important agricultural product, was traded. Furthermore, with Portugal’s attention focused on the viticulture business, the country did not produce enough wheat to feed itself, aggravating the cost of living, already one of the highest in Europe. In 1891 and then in 1902, Portugal declared bankruptcy when it found itself incapable of paying off

In light of this, it comes as no surprise that Portugal with a total population of less than 6 million people in 1910 experienced a change in demographics over the last decades of the Constitutional Monarchy. Although the majority of the population still lived in rural areas, the country became more urbanised. Peasants and small town dwellers moved to the city in search of manufacturing, banking and commercial jobs. As a result, the population of Lisbon increased from about 200,000 people in 1820 to 434,436 in 1911, with over 120,000 people alone moving into the city in the last two decades that preceded the overthrow of the Constitutional Monarchy. In Porto, the change in demographics was even more significant. In 1820, only about 50,000 people lived in the northern city, but in 1878, that number had more than doubled to 105,000, and in 1911 the number increased to 194,000 (Oliveira Marques 1972: 19-20).

1.11. The Portuguese Empire: The Reality of the Myth

The Portuguese Empire did not generate as much revenue as its Western European counterparts, especially after the loss of Brazil in 1822 (Alexandre 2004). In fact, from 1822 to 1892, the colonies contributed greatly to the soaring budget deficits and did not necessarily bring economic and financial respite to the metropolis (Lains 1998; Villaverde Cabral 1988: 109-111). Trade between the metropolis and the African colonies was minimal, only improving substantially in the last two decades of the Constitutional Monarchy when the republicans voiced a strong nationalist fervour in favour of imperial development after the 1890 British Ultimatum. In this sense, exports to the African colonies increased from 2.9% to 10.8% as a percentage of Portugal’s total
trade in 1890-1899 (Table 1.1). In the following decade, 1900-1909, it increased by another 5 per cent. On the same note, public expenditure in the colonies only soared in the last two decades of the Constitutional Monarchy in comparison with previous decades, reaching a climax of 5.7% of Portugal’s total expenditures in 1891-1900 (Table 1.2.). This was mainly due to the fact that any attempt to develop the colonies was opposed by a strong traditionalist view that the colonies should support themselves, rather than sacrifice the development of the metropolis (Alexandre 2004: 971).

Table 1.1 - Portugal's Colonial Trade with Africa (% of Portugal's Total Trade)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Imports</th>
<th>Exports</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1840-1849</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1850-1859</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1860-1869</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1870-1879</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1880-1889</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1890-1899</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>10.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900-1909</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>15.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Lains (1998: 477)

Table 1.2 - Public Expenditures in the Colonies (% of Portugal's Total Public Expenditures)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Investment</th>
<th>Military</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1852-1860</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1861-1870</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1871-1880</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1881-1890</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>92.9</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
However, despite this the empire was still very much part and parcel of the political and historical life of the country and regardless of the associated financial costs, the governments of the Constitutional Monarchy were reluctant to abandon their claims to the largely coastal strips that Portugal occupied in Africa and Asia. In this sense, when faced with a new found interest in Africa, on the part of Britain, France, Italy, Germany and Belgium, Portugal was obliged to expand the exploration of its coastal territories in the continent, in order to lay a historical claim to a vast extension of land, over which it had no de facto control. In the 1890s, for example, only 10,000 soldiers controlled the overseas possessions. Under the command of Portuguese officers, less than a third of these soldiers were white, the rest being African or Asian (Oliveira Marques 1972: 82-83). The highest rank among them was that of Colonel, of which there were two out of a total of 86 officers (Telo 1996: 9).

Inspired by the London-based Royal Colonial Society, the main institution that promoted, fostered, sponsored and subsidised the exploration movement was the Lisbon Geographical Society, which was created by the regenerator government in 1876. Under its auspices, scores of expeditions were organised and led by military officers, peddlers and scientists. The principal motivation for these expeditions was without question Portugal’s assertion of an historical claim to the African territories (Oliveira Marques 1972: 79-80, 107; Severiano Teixeira 1990: 48-49).

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11 According to the references above, the most important of these were those carried out by navy commanders Hermegildo Capelo and Roberto Ivens, and by army officer Henrique de Carvalho in Angola in 1877-1880 and 1884-1886, respectively. Navy Lieutenant António Maria Cardoso and Captain Serpa Pinto also played a crucial role in the exploration of the Mozambican hinterlands in 1883 and 1885-1886, respectively. Captain Serpa Pinto’s Africa crossing from Angola to the Transvaal in 1877-1879 was also a landmark in Portugal’s exploration of austral Africa, as was Capelo and Ivens voyage from South Angola to Mozambique via present-day Congo in 1884-1885.
However, attempts to officially promote colonisation in Africa were very disappointing. Portuguese emigrants neglected the African colonies in favour of Brazil, where maritime connections, jobs, money and financial opportunities sponsored by private companies were easier to come by. The only people who moved to the African territories were criminals, banished from the metropolis, and a few colonial soldiers. By the early nineteenth century, less than 10,000 Europeans lived in the colonies and up to 1890, the number of people emigrating of their own accord from Portugal to the African colonies totalled a few dozen annually (Alexandre 2004: Footnote 9). Although the European population living in Angola and Mozambique increased between eight and nine times from 1850 to 1910, the total number of white people living in Angola at the end of the Constitutional Monarchy was only 12,000 and in Mozambique the number was half of that. It is understandable, however, why not many people wanted to live in Portuguese Africa, especially if one considers the fact that the colonies were mostly associated with criminals and slavery, and were virtually cut off from the European centre by a poor system of maritime lines that postponed economic progress well into the twentieth century (Oliveira Marques 1972: 82-83, 98-101; Ramos 1994: 30-31).

For all purposes, the Empire was more a myth than a reality. Its *raison d’être* was based on political prestige and on megalomaniac aspirations unbefitting of an unindustrialised and bankrupt kingdom that saw the empire, especially after the 1890s, as the economic solution to its problems (Clarence-Smith 1985: Chapter Four; Lains 1998). How the Portuguese Empire was allowed to continue to exist, and even to expand, in such precarious logistical, praetorian and financial conditions, at a time when the Berlin Conference (1884-1885) dictated the rule of “effective occupation” and the Scramble for Africa threatened the country’s interests overseas, can be best explained by taking into consideration three factors.
Firstly, in light of the fact that Portugal was the weakest military state in Western Europe, the Regeneration governments settled territorial disputes with its European counterparts exclusively by diplomatic means. These culminated in several international arbitrations and territorial treaties with France, Britain, Germany and Belgium that effectively increased Portugal’s possessions and firmly established the Portuguese borders in Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique and Angola. In Goa, Macao and Timor the Portuguese presence was not disputed by the Western powers, so the integrity of these territories was not put in question (Alexandre 2004: 975; Axelson 1967: Chapter 10; Lains 1998; Oliveira Marques 1972: 107-110, 114-115; Pinto Coelho 1990: 177; Pinto Coelho 2006: 2; Ramos 1994: 138; Severiano Teixeira 2000: 44, 57-58)

Secondly, the native tribes did not particularly threaten Portugal’s presence in the occupied territories. This was due to the fact that the country resorted to a cunning use of alliances and rivalries with the native populations to resolve territorial issues, while making minimalist demands in terms of tribute payments and of theoretical subjugation to the Portuguese flag and authorities. However, whenever peaceful means of subjugation proved insufficient, especially after Portugal followed a *de facto* policy of effective occupation, imposed by the Berlin Conference – as in the case of Angola, Guinea and Mozambique from the 1880s to the 1920s – the Portuguese embarked on brutal pacification campaigns. These were poorly financed and equipped, in which several brave officers became “national heroes” at the expense of the lives of many natives (Pélissier 1994, 1997a, 1997b). Social Darwinism was applied to the rationale of these conflicts, which were meant to subjugate the “inferior” and “backward” natives to the enlightened despotic rule of the Europeans. Many officers were distinguished for their military achievements by the Regeneration governments, the Portuguese
Republican Party and the Catholic movements\(^{12}\) (Carrilho 1982b; Oliveira Marques 1972: 85, 116-118).

Finally, in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, Britain passively supported Portugal’s foolish, colonial ambitions as long as the Iberian kingdom neither jeopardised Britain’s interests nor upset the precarious European balance of power. The best example of Britain’s support for Portugal’s Empire was the Treaty of Zaire. This was signed between Portugal and Britain in 1884, but was eventually made ineffective by an internal and international outcry, which rejected it outright before it was submitted to the British Parliament for discussion. Under the (now abandoned) treaty, Britain had recognised Portuguese sovereignty on both shores of the Zaire River over French and Belgian interests in the region, on condition that Portugal ensured free trade in the area. This assurance, however, was neither seen as sufficient by the British entrepreneurs, who were wary of Portugal’s protectionist tendencies, nor was it accepted by British humanitarian associations who rejected the inhuman manner in which the Portuguese administration exerted control over its African territories (Alexandre 2004: 972-975; Ramos 1994: 139; Severiano Teixeira 1990: 49-50).

However, it should be noted that Portugal’s dependency on Britain to maintain a certain advantage over other colonial powers, also left the Portuguese Empire (and the stability of the country’s internal political life) vulnerable to the whims of its old ally, putting the domestic governments in a rather sensitive position. In 1879, for instance, Portugal was left with no other choice but to sign the Treaty of Lourenço Marques with Britain, who recognised Portugal’s political and administrative authority over the Lourenço Marques port, previously ruled by international arbitration. In exchange, Portugal granted free passage to British forces making their way to and from the

\(^{12}\)Namely Major Teixeira Pinto distinguished himself in the Guinean pacification campaigns and officers Artur de Paiva, Alves Roçadas and Pereira de Eça in Angola. In Mozambique, by far the most difficult colony to subdue, Major Caldas Xavier, Colonel Eduardo Galhando, General Freire de Andrade, Captain Paiva Couceiro and Major Mousinho de Albuquerque were distinguished. In Timor, General Celestino da Silva’s campaigns pacified the region.
hinterlands of South Africa during the Boer conflict. This concession created much upheaval in Lisbon, which was duly exploited by the newly created Portuguese Republican Party, and, as a result, the regenerator government fell (Alexandre 2004: 969-971; Axelson 1967: Chapter 2; Lains 1998: 473-474).

British support for Portugal’s colonial claims was also withdrawn when Portugal jeopardised British colonial interests by trespassing the latter’s designated areas of influence. As we will see in Chapter Three, at the end of the 1880s, the Regeneration governments developed a colonial project, known in Portuguese historiography as the “Rose-Coloured Map”. The project laid claim over a large stretch of land linking the coast of Angola to the coast of Mozambique. Such a magnanimous project, tacitly supported by Germany in 1886, clashed with Britain’s own imperial designs to unite Cape Town to Cairo and culminated in the memorandum of 11 January 1890, which was to all effects a British ultimatum. The ultimatum eventually resulted in Portugal’s military withdrawal from the contested territories of the Nyassa (present-day Malawi), Macololo and Machona tribes (present-day Zambia and Zimbabwe). Following an outburst of nationalist feeling, duly appropriated by the Portuguese Republican Party, the matter was finally resolved between the two allies in the June 1891 Treaty. Even though the treaty effectively enlarged the Portuguese territorial possessions in Austral Africa, the national humiliation inflicted by the British Ultimatum ensured that the episode went down in Portuguese history as a major defeat suffered by Portugal at the hands of the “Perfidious Albion” (Nowell 1982; Pinto Colelho 1990; Severiano Teixeira 1990)\(^\text{13}\).

Furthermore, in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, when the balance of power in Europe was redefined after Germany emerged victorious from the Franco-

\(^{13}\) More will be said in Chapter Three about the impact that the Treaty of Lourenço Marques and the British Ultimatum had in the political life of the country – both brought down the regenerator and progressist governments, respectively, while unleashing the force of republican nationalism and increasing the popularity of the Portuguese Republican Party who interpreted the concessions made by the King and the monarchical governments as “betrayals to the nation”.

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Prussian War, Britain had no qualms in using the Portuguese overseas territories to appease its newest European contender. In 1898, for instance, the Anglo-German Convention decreed that both parties would not loan any money to Portugal without their mutual consent and inclusion, and in the case Portugal faltered on the payment of its foreign debt and decided to sell the colonies – a viable possibility especially after the country had declared bankruptcy in 1891 – Britain and Germany would divide Angola, Mozambique and Timor between themselves. The Protocol was eventually annulled with the outbreak of the Boer War (1899-1902) and instead a secret treaty was signed by Portugal and Britain in which the latter pledged once again to recognise and guarantee the territorial integrity of the Portuguese Empire in Africa, as long as Portugal remained neutral and allowed British troops to disembark in Mozambique’s ports on their way to the Transvaal. After 1902, in competition with Germany, Britain once again recognised Angola and Mozambique’s borders on condition that Portugal acknowledged Britain’s economic supremacy in the area in detriment of Germany. However, in 1913, Britain reverted to its old tactics and used Portuguese Africa to appease Germany. This precipitated Portugal’s entry in the First World War, on the side of the Entente, in order to protect the Empire from both the British and the Germans (Alexandre 2000: 40-41; Oliveira Marques 1972: 115-116; Ramos 1994: 29-30, 144-153; Severiano Teixeira 2000: 60-62).

At home, the colonial territories were very much seen as organic parts of the metropolis. The Vintista, the Cartista and the Setembrista Constitutions (and later, in the twentieth century, the 1911 Republican and the 1933 New State Constitutions) regarded the overseas territories as an intrinsic part of Portugal. Constitutionally speaking, Portugal was the first European colonial power to define itself as “the union of all Portuguese of both hemispheres” with no distinction of race or territorial discontinuity. In principle, it was presupposed that all the peoples who lived in the
Portuguese colonies were regarded as citizens of the metropolis, enjoying the same rights and guarantees as their European counterparts (Oliveira Marques 1972: 92-96). This principle, however, was never reflected in the day-to-day life in the colonies. Slavery continued to exist until 1869, when it was finally abolished (on paper) due to British pressure (Marques 1994). It was replaced by a generalised practice of forced labour and “exceptional measures” (*medidas de excepção*), duly regulated by the 1926, 1928 and 1930 labour codes, which still kept the indigenous population very much “enslaved”, albeit in a less open manner until the mid-twentieth century (P. Anderson 1962a, 1962b, Lains 1998).

Furthermore, even though the overseas territories were seen as being intrinsically bound to the metropolis to the point that they even had electoral representatives in the Cortes, their deputies, who more often than not did not originate from the colonies, were few in number and were simply “appointed” by the Lisbon authorities in an electoral game that banned the local populations from voting. In addition, unlike their British counterparts, the Portuguese colonies never enjoyed self-government, despite the efforts of several influential figures who aspired to establish the British model of colonial administration, as they saw it as the best solution to Portugal’s mismanagement of its empire. Marnoco e Sousa, a professor at the University of Coimbra and the last royal Minister of the Colonies, argued in favour of what he saw as a superior British model, whose financial, economic and civic components brought prosperity to the British colonies. In the early twentieth century, Ruy Ulrich, an integralist and also a professor at the University of Coimbra, believed that only autonomy could encourage the colonies to rule themselves and become less dependent on Portugal’s strained budget. In the same way, the Lisbon Geographical Society advocated the same decentralising principle, which was largely echoed by the republican José de Macedo in his book *A Autonomia de Angola. Estudo de*
Administração Colonial (“Angola’s Autonomy. A Study in Colonial Administration”, 1910). At a time when the pacification campaigns were still raging in Angola and Mozambique, Macedo believed that only the creation of free communes, in accordance with principles of nationality, could establish peace between the metropolis and the colonies.

However, despite the proposals put forward by the right and the left alike, the colonial administration model, followed by the Portuguese governments of the Constitutional Monarchy and the First Republic, was always one that preferred centralisation over decentralisation. The idea that the empire was an intrinsic part of the organic body of the nation was reflected in the centralising legislative and executive powers that governed Portugal. Unlike Britain, Portugal had no tradition of regional administration, so the application of a British colonial administrative model that in many ways reflected the reality in the British Isles themselves was literally foreign to Portugal.

In sum, the main motivations underlying Portuguese imperialism were, especially after 1891, an urgent need to bring some economic respite to a very dim economic situation, national prestige and a strong sense of historical legacy. This was felt and instigated not only by the Regeneration governments, but also by the republicans and the Catholics, and by a mobilised public opinion that exerted the ruling elites to take better care of the colonies (Alexandre 1979; Clarence-Smith 1985, Chapter Four; Lains 1998). The republican intellectual José Sampaio Bruno summarised the importance of the empire to Portugal at the time, when he said that the formation of a Portuguese Empire in Africa, from coast to coast, was the collective thought necessary to raise the nation (Ramos 1994: 31-32). As we will see in the next chapter, “Empire” and “Nation” were two words rarely used separately in Teófilo Braga’s republican definition of the Portuguese nation and subsequently in the republicans’ attack on the
Constitutional Monarchy. The republicans were very much aware of the importance of the Empire to the collective imaginary and theirs was the first imperial nationalism to emerge in the political scene, being subsequently replicated at the state level up to the last quarter of the twentieth century.
2.1. Introduction

In the previous chapter, we saw how the advent of Liberalism in Portugal resulted in the creation of the Vintista and Cartista Constitutions, whose modern ideals divided the political elites and the royal family. When the liberal King Dom Pedro IV abdicated the Portuguese throne in favour of his daughter, Prince Dom Miguel convened his absolutist followers and attacked the liberal institutions and its supporters. The 1828-1834 Civil War was largely a conflict over succession rights. However, beneath its *raison d’être* lay an ideological conflict between Catholic reactionary ideals and secular liberal ideals, which reoccurred in the political landscape of the country well into the twentieth century.

Although the liberals eventually vanquished the absolutists, the latter remained somewhat influential in the north, whereas the former were unable to maintain a unified front once the war was over. Dissidence within the liberal movement resulted in several military and popular uprisings. However, in 1851, Marshall Duke of Saldanha, a “hero” of the Civil War, imposed a new system of government called Regeneration with the purpose of unifying the liberal front, bring political stability to the country and develop the economy. The Regeneration was based on a system of power sharing that saw two constitutionalist parties rotating in power. Although this system put an end to military intervention in politics, the majority of the population neither felt represented by the established elites nor by the constitutionalist parties. *Caciquismo*, clientelism and political corruption were prevalent. The state budgets ran huge deficits and the economy
fared badly. The Empire did not bring much respite either. After the Berlin Conference, Portugal was only able to hold on to the overseas possessions, and even to expand them in Africa, due to the geopolitical interests of the old ally, Britain, and to a succession of diplomatic agreements that the country signed with its European counterparts.

By the last decades of the nineteenth century, Portugal was suffering a crisis of political legitimacy that created an ideological void, allowing a new generation of intellectuals to emerge.

This chapter analyses the first phase of the three-phased theoretical framework that explains the successful overthrow of the Constitutional Monarchy, i.e. the emergence of an ideological movement of nationalist opposition – the 1870 Generation. In the following sections, we will introduce the 1870 Generation’s social background, ideological leanings and political agendas, as well as their individual views on the republican nation, namely those of Teófilo Braga. We will see how the 1870 Generation broke with orthodoxy and presented itself against the romantic literary movement as the true defenders of the nation. By adopting a rhetoric of decadence in the Casino Conferences, they offered a republican solution to the nation’s problems, while acting on their political ideals by founding republican centres.

2.2. The 1870 Generation

From what was described in the previous chapter, it comes as no surprise that although enjoying all the legal and political advantages of a liberal regime, sections of the Portuguese society were still unhappy with the way the Regeneration elites were governing the affairs of the country. One of these sections was the left-wing intelligentsia of the 1870s, the inheritors of Vintismo, Setembrismo and of the Patuleia,
to whom the radical revolution, with its French republican ideals as promised in 1820, never arrived.

The most important intellectuals of this decade, as far as the subject of this thesis is concerned, were Eça de Queirós (1845-1900), Ramalho Ortigão (1836-1915), Antero de Quental (1842-1891), Oliveira Martins (1845-1894) and Teófilo Braga (1843-1924) – the latter being considered the founding father of the First Republic. Although their ideological leanings were not homogeneous – they were divided between republican socialists (Antero de Quental, Oliveira Martins, Eça de Queirós) and republican positivists (Teófilo Braga) – they were still harsh critics of the ruling regime, which they saw as perpetuating a corrupt brand of liberalism, the one defended by the Cartistas. Also, their ideological work paved the way for the emergence of a republican nationalism of opposition in the last quarter of the nineteenth century.

The 1870 Generation differed from Elie Kedourie’s German intelligentsia (1994 [1960]) inasmuch as their inclusion in the liberal regime was a fait accompli.

In his biggest contribution to the study of nationalism, Kedourie (1994 [1960]) claims that nationalism was first conceptualised at the beginning of the nineteenth century by German intellectuals. At a time when the ideals of the French Revolution had not been implemented by the German rulers to the satisfaction of the intelligentsia, the latter reacted by creating nationalism as an Enlightenment doctrine of self-determination that counteracted the remains of an obsolete ancient régime. In this respect, the Portuguese case seems to consolidate Kedourie’s theoretical work, as the disenchanted 1870 Generation created a different nationalism of opposition in an attempt to deeply reform the structures of the ruling regime.

However, Kedourie claims that nationalism was created by German intellectuals out of a feeling of social immobilisation and alienation. They came from a low social class, or in Kedourie’s words (1994 [1960]), they “belonged to a caste which was
relatively low on the social scale. They were, most of them, the sons of pastors, artisans, or small farmers” (p. 35). “When they graduated they found that their knowledge opened no doors, that they were still in the same social class, looked down upon by a nobility which was stupid, unlettered, and which engrossed the public employments they felt themselves so capable of filling” (p. 36). In short, they sought to themselves the task of curing the “illness of society”. “And the cure would be effected only when men of intelligence and sensibility were no longer left outside, when they were taken in and given their rightful place” (p. 38).

In the case of nineteenth century Portugal, such an account of the German intelligentsia can hardly find meaning in the social, economic and even political advantages enjoyed by the intellectuals of the 1870 Generation.

First of all, the latter were not fighting an absolutist regime, but rather a liberal regime. In a letter sent by Oliveira Martins to Antero de Quental, the former recognised that Portugal was one of the few countries where liberalism had truly been achieved (Quental 1989 [1879] vol. 1: 478).

Second, because of the liberal laws that governed the kingdom, the Portuguese intelligentsia enjoyed freedom of speech and publication – even if within the limits of religious mores – freedom of assembly – as long as it was not explicitly with political end – property rights and social mobility (Catroga 1991 vol. 1: 22; Sardica 2000). What is more, according to the historian Rui Ramos (1994: 52; 2004: 124), there is no record of books being censored. The works of the 1870 Generation were read in their thousands and reedited multiple times. Oliveira Martins’s História de Portugal had five editions in the author’s lifetime; História da Civilização Ibérica had four; Portugal Contemporâneo had three; and O Brasil e as Colônias also had three (Ramos 1994: 57).

In a country where illiteracy was high – approximately 75% of the population over
seven years old could not read or write by 1900 – that was quite an achievement (Mauricio 2000: 58; Ramos 1994: 57-58; Trindade Coelho 1906: 161, 168).

Third, the republican intellectuals were graduates of the University of Coimbra, who came from wealthy backgrounds, enjoyed public employment in the most prestigious universities and other academic organisations of the kingdom, ran for elections and, in some instances, were even part of the ruling cabinets. Eça de Queirós was a civil servant and a Portuguese consul in England and France. Ramalho Ortigão was a prestigious writer and journalist. Antero de Quental was a well-off typographer, founder of the Portuguese branch of the International Alliance of Workers (1871) and of the Portuguese Socialist Party (1875), and president of the Northern Patriotic League (1890-1891). Oliveira Martins was an academic, a public administrator, a progressist member of the lower chamber of the Cortes and a minister in Dias Ferreiro’s progressist cabinet (1892). Teófilo Braga was a Professor of Modern Literature at the University of Lisbon, the vice-president of the Royal Academy of Science (nominated in 1894; the President was the King) and a founding member of the Portuguese Republican Party (1876) (Catroga 1991 vol. 1: 36-37; Ramos 1994: 58-59; 2004: 124, 127, 131-132; Pulido Valente 1974: 35).

In sum, at this point, they were not a “disenchanted” intellectual elite because they were alienated from the social and political life of the ruling regime in the lines of Kedourie’s theory. Rather, the 1870 Generation was “disenchanted” because, just like their German counterparts, they felt that the ideals of the French Revolution had yet to be fulfilled. According to these intellectuals, the liberal revolution initiated in the 1820s had not gone far enough. Their aim was the establishment of a true nation-state where the people would be sovereign and where democratic justice, political inclusion and political rights would be extended to all members of society, with no discrimination of birth. Their republican nationalist ideology derived from the 1789 French Revolution, in
which “liberty, equality and fraternity” became the mantra of progressive movements in nineteenth century Europe. Anti-clericalism was also prominent in their ideology of mobilisation and this developed from the Masonic tradition and the positivism of Augusto Comte. Ultimately, their political aim was the creation of a true nation-state in which the Church and the State would be duly separated. Freedom of worship (unheard of since the years of the Portuguese Inquisition) would be guaranteed in the context of a regime free of Catholic legitimation and endorsement of every aspect of a citizen’s private life (e.g. marriage, divorce, childbearing, education). An aspiration to form a more equal nation-state was at the centre of their contestation of the Constitutional Monarchy, which, although liberal in principle, stubbornly held on to a traditionalist view of society.

2.3. The Rhetoric of Decadence

Although, the 1870 Generation was a product of the liberal regime first legally established in 1822, still, they shared the same rhetoric of national decadence that had been prevalent for many centuries among their predecessors. The rhetoric of decadence had been prevalent in the Portuguese literature since the sixteenth century when Portugal was one of the most important colonial powers in Europe. For centuries, the intellectual elites, contrary to their political counterparts, had tended to view the Empire as a golden period of national affirmation but also as a period of national disgrace, in which the ruling elites built an empire at the expense of the kingdom.

Sá de Miranda (1481-1558), a contemporary of the Portuguese overseas explorations in the sixteenth century, criticised the luxuries and moral vices that embodied the renaissance court, because they had resulted in the abandonment of
agriculture and economic prosperity. At a time when colonial wealth was pouring in from Asia, Portugal was still importing corn, one of the most basic dietary supplements of the time. The poet saw in Portugal’s ascendancy as a maritime power the kingdom’s own downfall, due to the court’s inefficient management of recently acquired wealth (Sá de Miranda 1784: 216-231).

Luís Vaz de Camões (1524-1580), another renaissance poet, regarded in Portugal as a counterpart of Ancient Greece’s Homer, England’s Shakespeare and Spain’s Cervantes, praised Portugal’s imperial conquests in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries and the heroism of the Portuguese navigators in his epic poem, Os Lusíadas. However, in Canto X, the poet lamented the decadent and apathetic state of the kingdom once the caravels had returned home. In order to reawaken the pâtria, Camões exerted King Dom Sebastião, a fervent Catholic, to embark on an enactment of the medieval crusades and to return to northern Africa (verses 145-156) (Camões 1860 [1572]: 393-397). Once again, the period of overseas discoveries was seen as the apogee of the kingdom’s history. However, unlike Sá de Miranda, Camões was convinced that the conquests should continue, because the country’s manifest destiny would only live on if Portugal continued its Christian mission in the territories that fell under its natural sphere of influence.

Almeida Garrett (1799-1854), an early nineteenth century romantic poet, essayist and politician took the rhetoric of decadence a step further when he claimed that Portugal had perished a long time ago. In fact, the death of Portugal coincided with the death of Camões himself. Camões died the same year that Portugal became part of the Iberian Union (1580-1640), which in itself was a result of Dom Sebastião returning to Morocco as Camões had suggested in Os Lusíadas. Dom Sebastião disappeared in Al Quasr al-kibr during a battle for the subjugation of the sultan of Morocco in 1578. Due to Portugal’s imperial aspirations, the country was left with no legitimate heir to the
throne after Dom Sebastião’s uncle, Cardinal Dom Henrique, died in 1580. As a result, the Portuguese Crown and the Spanish Crown were merged under the Spanish King Felipe II. In his poem Camões, Almeida Garrett attributed to his renaissance counterpart the following words: “‘Pátria, at least / we die together’... and with the pátria he expired”\textsuperscript{14} (Almeida Garrett 1886 [1825]: 185).

Alexandre Herculano (1810-1877), another romantic thinker of the early nineteenth century also saw the colonial expeditions of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries as a glorious but corrupt enterprise that had destroyed the “democratic” and “municipal” elements of the medieval monarchy. The empire had empowered and financed the “absolutist aristocracy” which was still in power in nineteenth century Portugal even though, according to Herculano, they had destroyed the nation centuries ago. Herculano was a republican precursor of the 1870 Generation. His historical works claimed that Portugal could only be saved if the empire was abandoned and the country returned to medieval municipalism which had ensured a genuine “liberal” rule of the kingdom. According to Herculano, only by creating small municipal “republics” in the manner of those existing in the Medieval Ages could a larger Portuguese republic be established and Portugal be rescued from centuries of political and moral corruption (Herculano 1875 [1846-1853], 1985a [1842], 1985b [1850]).

However, it was with the 1870 Generation that the rhetoric of decadence gained an “almost obsessive” tone (Freeland 1995: 205), becoming henceforth part and parcel of Portugal’s literary reproduction of national identity by means of print-capitalism (B. Anderson 1991). Curiously enough, this tendency lasted into the end of the twentieth century, until after the establishment of the Third Republic in 1975, when Portugal no longer had an empire. One only has to skim through some of the most notable Third

\textsuperscript{14} Throughout this thesis, all Portuguese quotations are my own translation, but the original will always be provided as a footnote for reasons of scientific rigour. Spelling has been readjusted to present-time Portuguese before the 2009 ortographical reform: “‘Pátria, ao menos / Juntos morremos...’ E expirou com a pátria.”
Republic’s literary novels and non-fictional works to immediately identify a more restrained but still ongoing national crisis of historical conscious\textsuperscript{15}.

But what made the 1870 Generation so unique and so emblematic, to the point that it continued to be emulated by its successors, was the way it distanced itself from the more complacent Romantic Generation that preceded it in the first half of the nineteenth century. Furthermore, the former’s identification of national decadence with the Cartista regime was as courageous as it was innovative. By establishing a connection between Portugal’s decadence and the Constitutional Monarchy in both fictional and non-fictional literary works, the 1870 Generation broke with historical orthodoxy.

Eça de Queirós, for instance, was a harsh and pessimistic critic of the social and political life of the Constitutional Monarchy. His literary works were the echo of a generation, profoundly disappointed with the corrupted and inefficient Regeneration governments, which exploited the mass stupor of the people in order to maintain their privileges. Throughout his body of work, which to this day is still part of the school curriculum, Eça blamed the dynastic regime for the decadence of the nation, no longer seen as a reversing “tragedy” but, rather, as a “commonplace” (Pulido Valente 1974: 37).

In his novel, \textit{O Crime do Padre Amaro} (1950 [1880]), Eça criticised the clergy and the faithful, while declaring the decay of a once “glorious” and “magnanimous” pát\^ria, by positioning two clergymen and a statesman by the statue of Camões before closing his book with the poignant affirmation: “Pátria forever passed, memory almost

lost!”\(^{16}\). This allegory of decadence replicated Almeida Garrett’s poem, *Camões*, already mentioned above, in which the end of the *pátria* coincided with the end of the poet’s life while the latter’s work, *Os Lusíadas*, became nothing but an epitaph of a moribund Portugal – an idea also shared by two other “pessimist” members of the 1870 Generation, Antero de Quental (1923a [1861]: 23; 1923b [1881]: 309) and Oliveira Martins (1872; 1950 [1872]: 116, 123). The positioning of Eça’s three characters in the last scene of *O Crime do Padre Amaro*, however, gives us the impression that the culprits of Portugal’s continuous state of decadence were, in the novelist’s view, the imperial conquests, the clergy and the ruling politicians of the Constitutional Monarchy.

In *O Conde d’Abranhos* (1926 [1925]), he continued to provide an unsympathetic reflection on the political regime, while in *O Primo Basílio* (1946 [1875]), Eça turned his attention to the bourgeoisie who had become apathetic. A theme that he returned to in his most famous novel, *Os Maias* (1966 [1888]), albeit from the point of view of those who actually ran the country.

In the latter, Eça described a scene where one of his bohemian characters tells his friend, “Portugal doesn’t need any reforms, what Portugal needs, Cohen, is a Spanish invasion”\(^{17}\) (p. 116). Both *Os Maias* and his previous short story, *A Catástrofe* (1986 [1878]), argued that only a foreign invasion could save Portugal, because only then the necessary “civic communion” for the regeneration of the *pátria* could reignite a passion for the *pátria*. Both works denoted a strong disenchantment with the *status quo* and with the apparent indifference of the people to what was happening around them. A disenchantment that Eça had already elaborated in his political articles written for the satirical pamphlet, *As Farpas*, which he edited with his friend, Ramalho Ortigão, from 1871 to 1872:

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\(^{16}\) “Pátria para sempre passada, memória quase perdida!”.

\(^{17}\) “Portugal não necessita reformas, Cohen, Portugal o que precisa é a invasão espanhola.”
“The country lost its intelligence and moral conscience. Costumes have been dissolved, consciences disbanded, characters corrupted. (...) There is no institution that is not mocked. There is no respect for one another. There’s no solidarity among citizens. No one believes that public men are honest. (...) The middle class is progressively debilitated by imbecility and inertia. The people live miserably. Public services are abandoned to a dull routine. We all live aimlessly. Perfect, absolute indifference from top to bottom! The spiritual and intellectual life brought to a still. Boredom has invaded our souls. (...) Economic ruin grows, grows, grows. (...) The certainty of this indignity has invaded our minds. Everywhere we go we hear: the country is lost! (...) We didn’t want to be accomplices of this universal indifference. And here we begin, calmly, in fairness and without rage, pointing out every day what we could call – the progress of decadence.” 18 (Eça de Queirós & Ramalho Ortigão 2004 [May, 1871]: 16-17)

2.4. A Rupture with Tradition

This sort of affirmation, however, paled in comparison to the accusations aimed at the Romantics, who were mercilessly criticised by the intellectuals of the 1870 Generation with the exception of the romantic Alexandre Herculano, who was regarded with deep admiration by the republicans as a precursor of their movement. In fact, the

emergence of the 1870 Generation can be dated to 1865, when a strong reaction to the ideological and political “passivity” of the Romantics turned into the Coimbran Question (Questão Coimbrã).

The Coimbran Question was a confrontation between students of the University of Coimbra in their early 20s – e.g. Antero de Quental and Teófilo Braga – and the prestigious romantic António Feliciano de Castilho. The Coimbran students saw the aged Castilho as the representative of the setembrista generation who had sold out his ideological beliefs in exchange for public employment and regime accommodation. The Romantics had become “accomplices of constitutionalism”. Teófilo Braga, for instance, accused them of political “betrayal” and intellectual “dissolution” through the use of “artificial romanticism”. “Who would have guessed”, asked Teófilo, “that the generous academic generation that took part in Maria da Fonte (...) would supply such a pedantocracy of ministers, deputies and senior civil servants”19 (Teófilo Braga 1892 vol.1: 109).

Antero de Quental, in the pamphlet Bom-Senso e Bom-Gosto (1865) which he addressed to Castilho, sparking off the Coimbran question, accused the old romantic writer of artistic clientelism. According to Quental, the new generation of intellectuals should become more proactive in order to make sense of the social and political transformations that had brought new ideological problems to the fore. It was therefore of paramount importance that the young intellectuals regained their independent voice apart from the established academic elites:

“What is attacked in the Coimbra School is not a less tested literary opinion, a more daring poetic conception, a style or an idea. That is only a pretext. Rather, war is being waged against the irreverent independence of those writers who

19 “Quem diria que a generosa geração académica que tomou parte na Maria da Fonte (...) forneceria toda essa pedantocracia de ministros, parlamentares e altos funcionários”.

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desire to tread their own path without asking permission from the masters, but by consulting their own work and conscience. (...) the Coimbra School has effectively committed something worse than a crime – it has committed a major fault: it has wanted to innovate.”²⁰ (Quental 1865: 5-6)

Intrinsic to these accusations against the Romantic Generation was a full-blown desire to break free from ideological tradition, to criticise openly the liberal regime by siding with the new ideologies of the day, such as federalism, socialism and republican positivism, and, last but not least, to introduce Portugal to modernity. In this sense, the 1870 intellectuals became the precursors of the republican and integralist opposition movements that emerged a few years later. For the first time, they broke with the ideological past and turned to the people in an attempt to mobilise them into proclaiming a *vida nova* (“new life”) by way of “social revolution” and “spiritual conversion” (Ramos 2004: 123, 128-129)²¹. Their critique of the ruling regime ensured a rupture with Catholic and monarchic traditions opening the way to a full rejection of the liberal Constitutional Monarchy.

**2.5. The Casino Conferences**

²⁰ “O que se ataca na escola de Coimbra (...) não é uma opinião literária menos provada, uma concepção poética mais atrevida, um estilo ou uma ideia. Isso é o pretexto apenas. Mas a guerra faz-se à independência irreverente de escritores, que entendem fazer por si o seu caminho sem pedirem licença aos mestres, mas consultando só o seu trabalho e a sua consciência. (...) a escola de Coimbra cometeu efectivamente alguma coisa pior do que um crime – cometeu uma grande falta: quis inovar.”

²¹ Even António Sardinha, the ideologue of Integralismo Lusitano who shared very little with leftist republicanism, still acknowledged this ideological break with the past by saying that the 1870 Generation was at the same time “destructive and renewing”; it was the first intellectual generation in Portugal to have extricated itself from the comforts of tradition, opposed “liberalism” and the “individualist chimera of romanticism” and prepared the “counter-revolution” for the re-emergence of the “old traditional pátria” (Sardinha 1929: 27-28).
The 1870 Generation broke with ideological tradition by first siding with republican federalism. According to them, federalism, inspired by the successful examples of Switzerland and the United States of America, was seen as the most appropriate form of government to bring prosperity, peace and modernisation to a small country like Portugal. At a time when the size of states mattered and new states were created out of unifications (i.e. Italy and Germany) (Hobsbawm 1990: 30-32), Portugal suffered from a severe inferiority complex, which was made worse by Britain’s continuing influence over the political and colonial matters of the kingdom. The intellectuals of the 1870 Generation were not indifferent to this question (e.g. Oliveira Martins 1869, 1886 [1879]; Quental 1871; Teófilo Braga 1884); and they went as far as to even contemplate a possible confederacy with Spain, when the latter declared a Republic in 1873. The Iberian confederation was envisaged in Kantian terms as part of a larger Latin federation that would include the French and the Italian peoples (Teófilo Braga 1884) or part of an even larger European and world federation (Oliveira Martins 1952a [1872: 40]). It was assumed that under this political arrangement Portugal’s identity and independence would be safeguarded because the two Iberian republican states would not merge into one (Teófilo Braga 1884). Rather, local governance would be the order of the day and medieval municipalism, as defended by the romantic Alexandre Herculano (1875 [1846-1853], 1985a [1842], 1985b [1850]) would finally flourish granting freedom and equality to the local populations against the centralisation tendencies of the current regime.

This matter, among many others, was discussed by Antero de Quental, Teófilo de Braga, Eça de Queirós and Oliveira Martins as well as other republican thinkers in what came to be known as the 1871 Democratic Conferences of the Lisbonense Casino.

22 In 1868, after the Spanish Crown had found itself without a legitimate successor, Antero de Quental defended the idea that “for the peninsula there is none other but one possible policy today: the democratic-republican federation” (1982: 237). “Para toda a península não há hoje senão uma única política possível: a da federação republicana-democrática”.
The Conferences were the sequel of the Coimbran Question, a gathering of intellectuals who reflected on the “upcoming” revolution that seemed to be sweeping across Europe, especially after the establishment of the 1871 Paris Commune. The Conferences’ patrons had high hopes that the revolution would one day come to Portugal and in preparation for such an eventuality they took upon themselves the academic responsibility of “establishing an intellectual communion” and preparing the “public conscience” for that outcome (Teófilo Braga 1983 [1880]: 93; Salgado Junior 1930). In that sense, the 1870 Generation had become what John Hutchinson (1992) has called the self-styled moral innovators of society, the harbingers of modernity. The manifesto of the Conferences, published in the newspaper A Revolução de Setembro, was very clear about that.

“To open a tribune, where the works and ideas that characterise this moment in this century have a voice, concerning themselves, above all, with the social, moral and political transformation of the people; To connect Portugal with the Modern movement, feeding itself off the vital elements that civilised humankind already lives by; To seek conscience of the European facts that surround us; To stir public opinion with the great questions of Philosophy and Modern Science; To study the conditions for the political, economic and religious transformation of the Portuguese society; These are the aims of the Democratic Conferences” (A Revolução de Setembro, 18 May 1871).23

23 “Abrir uma tribuna, onde tenham voz as ideias e os trabalhos que caracterizam este momento do século, preocupando-se sobretudo com a transformação social, moral e política dos povos; Ligar Portugal com o movimento moderno, fazendo-o assim nutrir-se dos elementos vitais de que vive a humanidade civilizada; Procurar adquirir consciência dos factos que nos rodeiam, na Europa; Agitar na opinião pública as grandes questões da Filosofia e da Ciência moderna; Estudar as condições da transformação política, económica e religiosa da sociedade portuguesa; Tal é o fim das Conferências Democráticas.”
The Conferences’ speakers, namely Antero de Quental, the person mainly responsible for this academic enterprise, saw themselves as the intellectual revolutionaries of their time, the opponents of a depressed and lethargic country that despite a liberal governing regime still lived under the yoke of centralism and religious tradition. Their worshipping “gods” were modernity, progress, secularism, science, republicanism and, for a few of them, socialism. In the years leading up to the Conferences, Antero de Quental had become the head of a radical workers association in one of the most proletarian neighbourhoods of Lisbon, Alcântara. Together with Oliveira Martins, both presented themselves, to the annoyance of the positivist Teófilo Braga, as the intellectual luminaries of the more ignorant lower urban classes, which due to their high illiteracy rates, had to be guided by those who practiced the cult of ideas, demanded moral regeneration as a condition to reinvigorated political action, and talked of a primary need to replace religion with science (Ramos 1992: 503-505).

The Conferences, however, did not survive more than five weekly sessions. By the sixth week, the topics had become increasingly controversial. When Salomão Saragga was about to give a lecture on Jesus’s Critical History, the police entered the Casino and disbanded the Conferences as they were seen by the government as too offensive to the state religion (Medina 1984; Ramos 1992: 505; Salgado Junior 1930).

2.6. Ideology and Political Action: Republican Socialism and Republican Positivism

However, “ideological damage” to state-sponsored orthodoxy had already been done – the Casino Conferences established an intellectual republican opposition to the Constitutional Monarchy while ushering in an ideological division within the 1870 Generation between republican socialists and republican positivists (Medina 1984).
In the second session of the Conferences of the Casino, Antero de Quental gave a groundbreaking lecture entitled *Causas da Decadência dos Povos Peninsulares nos Últimos Três Séculos* (“The Causes of the Iberian Peoples’ Decadence in the Last Three Centuries”, 1871). Quental’s lecture had an enormous influence on Oliveira Martins’s future publications, *A Teoria do Socialismo* (1952a [1872]), *Portugal e o Socialismo* (1990 [1873]), *História da Civilização Ibérica* (1886 [1879]) and *História de Portugal* (1882 [1879]), in which he followed Antero de Quental’s initiative in analysing Portugal’s history from Proudhon’s ideological point of view.

In his lecture, Quental argued that after reaching its apogee in the early sixteenth century, Portugal fell into decline within a few decades. Once the naturally “messianic genius” of the Portuguese, which had ensured the success of the Crusades, had been usurped by the increasingly fanatical Jesuits – a consequence of the Church’s Counter-Reform reaction to Protestantism – the conquests were used as a tool to spread Catholicism and to enrich and to centralise the power of the Catholic monarchy. In this sense, according to Quental, the three causes of Portugal’s decadence were the “conquests”, “Trento” and “absolutism” (Quental 1871: 19-20). The causes were interrelated: not only had the ruling elites outstretched the nation in their ambitious maritime enterprises, they had also stifled the country’s economic growth by investing the nation’s energies in an overseas enterprise. The wealth acquired during the Discoveries financed the repression of local freedoms in benefit of an absolutist monarchy, which continued its imperial mission with the blessing of the Catholic Church duly controlled by the Jesuits. The latter, having contaminated the medieval “messianic genius” of the Portuguese ruling elites, replaced the autonomous scientific development of the Portuguese human spirit with an unproductive “warrior aristocratic spirit” that turned the maritime expansion into a barren sequence of slavery, pillage and intolerance (Quental 1871).
Furthermore, the quick accumulation of overseas fortunes led to the abandonment of productive activities, such as agriculture, and to the corruption of the elite's customs and mores (Oliveira Martins 1886 [1879]; Quental 1871). As noted above, this reading of Portugal’s Renaissance history had already been voiced by Sá de Miranda (1784) and Alexandre Herculano (1875 [1846-1853]). In Quental’s words, Portugal was devoid of any economic resources and all the wealth that it had acquired in its maritime expeditions was shamelessly wasted away by the royal court:

“There was then only one national industry... India! One would go to India to fetch a name and a fortune, and then return to enjoy oneself, to dissipate oneself unproductively. Life was concentrated in the capital. The noblemen left the fields, the ancestral home, where they lived in a certain communion with the people, and came to the court to shine, to splurge ... to beg nobly. The fidalgo became a courtesan: the layman, unable to be a worker, became a lackey: his uniform was the seal of his decadence. (...) Like never before did a people absorb so many treasures, while remaining so poor.”

As a result, and to reiterate, the conquests, the Trento and absolutism had been the reasons why according to Quental and, later Oliveira Martins, Portugal initiated a long stretch of decline that resulted in the kingdom falling into the arms of Spain after Dom Sebastião’s unsuccessful crusade in Morocco. But the “long process of decline” did not halt after Portugal’s independence in 1640 either. According to Antero and

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24 “Havia então uma única indústria nacional... a Índia! Vai-se à Índia buscar um nome e uma fortuna, e volta-se para gozar, dissipar esterilmente. A vida concentra-se na capital. Os nobres deixam os campos, os solares dos seus maiores, onde viviam em certa comunhão com o povo, e vêm para a corte brilhar, ostentar... e mendigar nobremente. O fidalgo faz-se cortesão: o homem do povo, não podendo já ser trabalhador, faz-se lacaio: a libré é o selo da sua decadência. (...) Nunca povo algum absorveu tantos tesouros, ficando ao mesmo tempo tão pobre.”

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Oliveira, the nation’s restoration had been largely left “incomplete” in the following centuries (Freeland 1996: 55) because the empire continued to be the backbone of the nation, rather than the other way around. In the nineteenth century, therefore, there could be no place for the empire in the affairs of the nation. In the words of Oliveira Martins, “in the same way that excessive labour consumes the body (...) so it happens to the peoples who one day carried out a grandiose work or lived off an ardent idea”\textsuperscript{25} (Oliveira Martins 1886 [1879]: 277). Portugal’s imperial mission had already been a fait accompli, achieved in the fifteenth century, when Portuguese “messianism” opened Europe to the “New World” and contributed to the groundbreaking geographical studies of maritime navigation (Oliveira Martins 1886 [1879]: 231) – a time when “Europe had its eyes on us, and our national influence in Europe was one of the most significant”\textsuperscript{26} (Quental 1871: 11). However, since then, the socialists Antero de Quental and Oliveira Martins claimed, the Portuguese Empire not only had contributed to Portugal’s continuing decadence but it had also helped to establish a capitalist and utilitarian world system led by Europe that thrived on inequality, slavery and uneven development. In this sense, the Portuguese Discoveries were not only a cause of Portugal’s decadence; they were also a “fatality to Europe” (Oliveira Martins 1886 [1879]: 257).

Antero de Quental (1982: 389-394; 447) and Oliveira Martins (1957 vol. 1: 257-331) believed that the best way to cure the nation from its current malaises was to establish a republican form of government. Antero and Oliveira’s “ideal” republic was based on Rousseau’s “classic” republic which brought the people together as a unit around a collective moral ideal and a public cult of national virtue and justice. In this republic, political authority would be duly legitimised by the devotion of all individuals to the common good and by their participation in the moral community. The “ideal” republic distinguished itself from the de facto republic inasmuch as the latter replaced

\textsuperscript{25} “Assim como o excessivo trabalho consome o corpo (...) assim acontece aos povos que um dia executaram uma grande obra ou viveram de uma ardente ideia”.

\textsuperscript{26} “A Europa tinha os olhos em nós, e na Europa a nossa influência nacional era das que mais pesavam.”
the king with an elected president, whilst everything remained the same. For this reason, as the Portuguese historian Rui Ramos notes (1992: 522-523; 2004: 129-130), Quental and Oliveira shared the idea that the classic republic could and should live within a monarchical regime, provided the latter became imbued with the civic and patriotic values of the former.

Within this regime of strong classicist republican values, Antero de Quental and Oliveira Martins argued for a municipalist remedy in the lines of Proudhon as a solution to the centralisation of the Portuguese state. Antero de Quental, for instance, believed that in order to reconcile freedom with equality at the local level, a truly republican democracy should create as many centres of local authority as those existing at the national level so as to protect the local populaces from the abuses of centralised power (Quental 1982: 225).

In his book, História da Civilização Ibérica (1886 [1879]), Oliveira Martins prescribed a set of remedies to cure Portugal’s decadence based on the already mentioned causes. In his opinion, in order to restore Portugal’s past glories, the country should turn its attention to the development of the countryside by using its own resources and let go of all ephemeral illusions of wealth and luxury, “for only modest poverty can be virtuous”27 and virtuous here means “patriotic” in the classic Roman sense (Oliveira Martins 1952b [1885] vol. 1: 285). Portugal should also become more pragmatic towards the administration and the hinterland exploration of its colonies. As a matter of fact, according to Oliveira Martins (1920 [1880]), all the colonies should be sold, except for Angola and São Tomé, where most of the profitable plantations for exportation lay, in order to finance an internal colonisation and development of Portugal, which by all accounts was still very much backward (Alexandre 1996: 195-197):

27 Só pode ser virtuosa a pobreza modesta“.

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As far as the Iberian peoples were concerned, unlike Teófilo Braga as we will see below, Oliveira Martins (1886 [1879]) – and, for that matter, Antero de Quental (1871) – did not believe that the difference between the Portuguese and the Spanish peoples went beyond a minor concern with national character. Indeed, Oliveira thought the Iberian Peninsula was a cohesive cultural and ethnological body whose expression of a common “genius” and “heroism” had been shown during the period of maritime conquest, when both Portugal and Spain built vast empires, ensuring a continuing flow of exotic goods, resources and wealth from Asia, America and Africa to Europe. In the lines of Pi y Margall’s federalist thought, very popular at the time, Oliveira argued that the solidarity, common history and ethnic traits shared by the Iberian peoples should become the basis of a confederate alliance between the peoples of Portugal and Spain, rather than their unitary states. Only this alliance could re-establish the greatness of the Iberian peoples and guarantee their continuing survival. In the 1880s and 1890s, Oliveira Martins (1957 vol. 2: 301-303) took the Iberian confederation one step further by defending the formation of an “Iberian League” that encompassed all the Portuguese-speaking and Spanish-speaking peoples of both hemispheres. Such a political association, in turn, would form an intermediate level in a far larger European and world federation already conceptualised in the 1870s (Oliveira Martins 1952a [1872: 40]). For both Antero and Oliveira, the purpose of such a political configuration was to reduce the centralised state to a republican federation of world federations based on the voluntary and decentralisation governance of individuals and autonomous groups. Only federalism, according to them, could bring real freedom and representation to the individual and the associations he belonged to (Alexandre 1996: 194; H. Martins 1998: 29, 37; Mauricio 2000: 58-59).

In sum, Antero and Oliveira’s recipe for Portugal’s regeneration lay in the utopian aspiration of reformulating the nation along voluntary, rustic, municipal and
anticlerical lines. They hoped that by sharing the common republican values of patriotism and general good, the regenerated nation would dissociate itself from an imperial past that had brought nothing but ruin and decadence, while concentrating its energies on building a republic of Iberian peoples by taking the first step in forming a confederacy with Spain.

The success of this nationalist project, however, was dependent on the will of the ruling elites. Until the ruling elites proved to be capable of serious internal reform that would put an end to the Jesuit control of the monarchy, to absolutism and to economic mismanagement, Portugal would remain a dying nation. But firstly, the ruling elites had to be willing to bring about change, a precondition for reform that seemed to be lacking among the dynastic elites and the ruling family, qualified by Oliveira Martins as invariably “crazy or innately evil” (1882 [1879] vol. 2: 255)

Both intellectuals, therefore, were strong believers that the regeneration of the Portuguese nation was dependent on a top-down strategy that left the destinies of the nation in the hands of the ruling elites. In other words, the best political regime was the one that completely organised the life of its citizens. The view that the necessary political changes could only be brought about by the elites was at the basis of Oliveira Martins’s decision to join the constitutionalist Progressist Party for which he wrote the guidelines of a political programme called *Vida Nova* (“New Life”) (Oliveira Martins 1885: Introduction). In 1871, while the Conferences were still ongoing, Antero also acted upon his political beliefs. He founded a national branch of the International Association of Workers (Quental 1980 [1871]) which Oliveira Martins and Eça de Queirós joined (Eça de Queirós 1982 [1871], vol. 1: 61). The Portuguese branch of the International had no public significance, as it was a secret association of press printers and socialist intellectuals that largely followed Antero de Quental and Oliveira Martins’s ideological teachings.
As far as these two were concerned, due to Portugal’s backwardness, the workers should be assigned a *passive* and conformist role in the struggle for socialism while the enlightened men, the true agents of revolution, strived to bring in the necessary political changes through the “education of spirits” rather than the political mobilisation of the people. The “ideal” Republic was, therefore, more of a chimera than a feasible reality to both Antero and Oliveira. A few years later, in 1875, the International evolved into the equally non-confrontational Portuguese Socialist Party, breaking with the federal republican movement. However, while Antero ran for elections as an “enlightened” candidate of the Socialist Party who, regardless, never managed to win any seats in the Cortes, his friend Oliveira Martins, preferred to bring socialism to the country through an inner reform of the constitutionalist parties, becoming a progressist deputy in the lower chamber of the Cortes in 1878 and a progressist Minister in 1892 (Catroga 1991 vol. 1: 17-19; Ramos 1992: 506-519).

However, not all intellectuals that encompassed the 1870 Generation were socialist republicans. The political path followed by Teófilo Braga was somewhat less linear as that followed by Antero de Quental, reflecting his ideological divergence from the socialist republicans.

Teófilo Braga started out with Antero de Quental and Oliveira Martins as a member of the Promoting Centre for the Improvement of the Labour Classes (Centro Promotor do Melhoramento das Classes Laboriosas) which had been founded in 1852. Apart from the Centre, the three intellectuals were also members of a republican federalist group based in Lisbon in the late 1860s and early 1870s. But with the creation of the Portuguese International by Antero in 1871, Teófilo Braga eventually left the Promoting Centre and created the Federal Centre of Lisbon in 1873 (inspired by the proclamation of the Spanish First Republic), of which the newspaper *O Rebate* was the main mouthpiece.
Three years later, in 1876, several left-wing republicans, including Teófilo Braga, opened the Democratic Republican Centre, in hope of convening under the same organisation all the republican clubs of non-socialist orientation operating throughout the country. In the same year, the Directorate of the Portuguese Republican Party was formed and as a result the first republican party in the history of the country came to life. However, soon afterwards, there was a split in the Centre between those who wanted to work closely with the constitutionalist parties and those, like Teófilo Braga, who wanted to follow their own course as independently as possible from the established powers. From the 1880s onwards, it was this faction that became predominant in the Portuguese Republican Party, while Teófilo Braga took his due seat in the PRP’s Directorate (e.g. Catroga 1991 vol. 1: Chapter One; Pulido Valente 1974: Introduction).

Teófilo Braga’s ideological beliefs set him apart from his peers. The Professor of Literature rejected Quental and Oliveira’s determination to strip the Portuguese nation of its ethnic dimension. Rather, he saw in the Portuguese ethnie the democratic essence of the nation – a trait of ethnic individualism – that lived within the Portuguese as a race and that, according to him, would eventually lead to the establishment of a republic. In order to trace the ethnic origins of the Portuguese people, as well as their historical and literary legacy, Teófilo believed that a serious study of archaeology, literature, philology, ethnology and geography should be pursued. These academic sciences, as far as he was concerned, should be employed in the (re)discovery of the nation; and in this nationalist project, he took a prominent position.

Furthermore, Teófilo Braga believed that Oliveira Martins, by renouncing the race as the basis of the nation, was placing Portugal’s future in the hands of the corrupted politicians of the monarchical regime while rejecting the idea that the people, through a robust civic education, were capable of revitalising the nation and maintaining
their independence. Oliveira’s reading of history was very much refuted by Teófilo, who did not trust the ruling monarchical elites to bring the necessary changes to the country. Rather, Teófilo hoped that changes should be pursued and implemented from the bottom up, by the people, because the latter, sharing an ethnic bond, would be more open to a “civic commotion” created by the “invention” of ceremonies, such as the Centennial Ceremonies of Camões and of Marquis of Pombal as we will see below (Mauricio 2000: 59-60, 73-77; e.g. Teófilo Braga 1872: 25; 1873: 83; 1879; 1881; 1892 vol. 2: 469-497; 1894: 17-21, 146-155, 244-253, 284-293, 301-307; 1908).

What is more, contrary to his peers, Teófilo Braga believed that the Portuguese had an historical right and need to own an empire if they were to maintain their independence. In this sense, Teófilo Braga claimed that the empire was not the reason why Portugal had become a decadent nation. Rather, the fault lay, according to him, with the ruling elites that governed over the destinies of the empire.

After the Portuguese International was founded in 1871, Antero de Quental and Teófilo Braga also diverged in regards to the role that the working class should play in the country’s opposition politics against the Constitutional Monarchy. Teófilo Braga, recently converted to Comte’s positivism,28 did not believe in socialism or class struggle (1983 [1880]), but believed that the people, originating from all classes, should come together and actively take part in a civic communion of the spiritual nation duly reproduced through the creation and maintenance of traditions and ceremonies. Although Teófilo Braga had experimented with Iberianism in the same way that Antero de Quental and Oliveira Martins had done in the late 1860s and early 1870s, he was a fervent defender of the republican nation, especially of the ethnic moçárabe nation, as we will see below.

28 Other republican intellectuals who had converted to positivism in the second half of the 1870s were Manuel Emídio Garcia and José Falcão, lecturers at the University of Coimbra; Jaime Batalha Reis, affiliated with the Institute of Agronomy; Vasconcelos de Abreu and Adolfo Coelho, professors at the University of Lisbon, and Luciano Cordeiro, lecturer at the Military School (Colégio Militar) (Ramos 1992: 517).
Contrary to the other two “metaphysical” intellectuals, Teófilo’s conception of the republic as the ideal system of government was not utopian in character (Teófilo Braga 1983 [1880]: 126). Positivism, as a scientific philosophy, left no space for metaphysical speculations. Rather, the establishment of a republic was a realistic political demand that should be brought to the masses in order to best unfold Portugal’s full potential as an ethnic nation, even if political struggle and mobilisation were required to reach such a purpose. According to the Professor of Modern Literature, a republic started out as an “aspiration”, it developed into a systematic “idea”, it spread as an “opinion” and when the latter was shared by all, it converted itself into a “fact” (Teófilo Braga 1912 [1879]: 66). In true positivist tradition, which affirms that human conceptions and actions may be changed due to the creation of individual and collective affections, the role of the intellectuals was, therefore, to act over the “idea” by the use of commemorations, propaganda and popular mobilisation so as to create the public “opinion” necessary for the formation of the Portuguese Republic.

Regardless of their ideological differences, Teófilo Braga, Oliveira Martins and Antero de Quental were part and parcel of the opposition politics against the Constitutional Monarchy. Not only were they members of republican intellectual circles, they were also political practitioners of their own doctrines. The development of their intellectual work coincided with their membership in political movements that demanded change. From the perspective of this thesis’s theoretical framework, they were the link between Phase One of intellectual contestation and Phase Two of political agitation and mobilisation. They might not have agreed on which sections of the Portuguese society should be mobilised for the cause of political change, but their conceptualisation of the Portuguese nation along republican lines enabled the solidification of an intellectual discourse from which the subsequent emerging Portuguese nationalisms of opposition borrowed much ideological legitimacy.
However, Teófilo Braga’s positivist view of the Portuguese nation is the most important of the two as it gave meaning to the first nationalist political movement to emerge in modern Portugal, the Portuguese Republican Party. Teófilo’s definition and account of the evolution of the Portuguese nation were adopted by the PRP, bringing the necessary ideological consensus to the republican movement that eventually resulted in the successful overthrow of the Constitutional Monarchy. His use of nationalism as an ideology for the attainment of power in order to reform the internal structures of the state in accordance with his views of the nation was without precedent. His historical reading of the Portuguese nation as an “ethnic anticlerical and republican nation with a glorious empire” was the first nationalist reading to be established at the state level by way of a regime overthrow.

After the demise of the Constitutional Monarchy, Teófilo’s reading of Portugal’s history continued to be influential, setting the ideological foundations of the First Republic. His work was so innovative that it was even “hijacked” by the reactionary integralists, albeit in a much more adulterated way. In light of this, it is important to understand how Teófilo Braga, considered the founding father of Portuguese modern nationalism, depicted the evolution of the Portuguese nation in the shape of a curve from the origin of the nation to its present decadent state, peaking somewhere along the way at a period usually referred to as the nation’s golden age.

2.7. Teófilo Braga: The Ethnic Anticlerical and Republican Nation with a Glorious Empire

Teófilo Braga’s account of Portugal’s history can be seen as a discursive strategy of a distinct political project that strived to identify the reasons for Portugal’s
decadence, while aspiring to an utopian future by pinpointing in time Portugal’s golden past as a comparison to its decadent present. As it was written elsewhere, in nationalist discourses, “golden ages are invaluable”. They “provide essential blueprints for realizing the national self and for encouraging the process of collective regeneration” (Smith 2003: 213, 215-216). What is more, in the “triadic structure of nationalist rhetoric”, in which a golden past, a present decadence and a utopian future take central stage (Levinger & Franklin 2001), a golden age usually claims that “the original nation once existed as a pure, unified and harmonious community”. When compared with the “degraded present” brought about by a “traumatic series of events”, the golden age highlights the present loss of harmony and “integrity of the national community”. What follows from this is an “identification of the sources of the nation’s decay” that will set the ground for the “community’s redemption” through the aspiration of an utopian future that serves as the basis for political mobilisation (Levinger & Franklin 2001: 176-178).

According to Teófilo Braga, after the German Visigoth invasion of the Iberian Peninsula, two distinct ethnic groups were formed in what came to be known as Portugal – the aristocratic Gothic-Romans and the popular Moçárabes who had originated from a mix of the Gothic and Arab races. The Gothic-Romans were distinct from the Moçárabes because they attempted to emulate the power structures and the culture of the Roman civilisation they had just expelled from the region. They snubbed the local Arab culture, their language, religion, poetry, customs and law and became the embodiment of the Christian reaction in the peninsula. The Gothic-Arabs, on the other hand, as the name indicates, stayed in touch with the Arabs and learned from them the art of manufacturing and the values of “tolerance and political equality” to the point that they almost fused with them (Teófilo Braga 1871: 2-3). In his eulogy of the Arab civilisation, Teófilo Braga (1883-1884: 447) was not refuting the importance of the
Crusades in Portugal’s history, but rather he was highlighting the cultural differences that were present in medieval Portugal and from which two different national dispositions were born, one at the level of the people who embraced the Arab culture, and another at the level of the Catholic reactionary aristocracy who oppressed the former and threw Portugal into the arms of Spain after the death of King Dom Sebastião in Morocco.

Even though Teófilo Braga eventually refined his Moçárabe theory in order to give more prominence to the ethnic Lusitanian roots of the Portuguese people, he still maintained that a division existed within Portuguese society as a consequence of the crusades. The people were portrayed as being oppressed by a Romanised, absolutist, and now Cartista aristocracy who had ruined the country with the help of the Jesuits while making the country vulnerable to Spain’s whims (Mauricio 2000: 59-60). In the late sixteenth century, “the Jesuits dominated the conscience of the young monarch, Dom Sebastião, and were plotting with Spain the infamous incorporation of Portugal”²⁹. In the midst of this, only Camões had noticed what was happening. “Camões realised that Cardinal Dom Henrique [King Sebastião’s uncle], the blind tool of the Jesuits, was conspiring against Portugal’s autonomy, and all the supporters of national independence gathered around the poet”³⁰. Camões, therefore, was Teófilo Braga’s national hero, the one who had foreseen the nation’s imminent fall from grace, the prophet and the martyr of the nation who had died in the same year that Portugal had succumbed to Spanish rule, as Almeida Garrett had observed earlier in the century (Teófilo Braga 1884: 42-43; Freeland 1996: 59).

²⁹ “Os Jesuítas dominavam a consciência do jovem monarca D. Sebastião, e maquinavam com a Espanha a incorporação infame de Portugal.”
³⁰ “Camões conheceu que o cardeal D. Henrique instrumento cego dos Jesuítas, conspirava contra a autonomia de Portugal, e todos os partidários da independência nacional se agrupavam em volta do poeta”.
The best solution, therefore, to the decadent state brought about by the ruling elites was, according to Teófilo Braga, to strengthen the civic conscience of the people and to make them aware of their ethnic heritage and of their past heroes, namely of Camões.

Antero de Quental and Oliveira Martins adopted a pessimist view of Portugal based on the idea that Portugal had emerged as a voluntarist nation due to the political will expressed by a medieval aristocracy. Since that political will seemed to be lacking at the time of their publications, Antero and Oliveira did not envisage the regeneration of the Portuguese nation any time soon (Quental 1942 [1872]). Teófilo Braga, on the other hand, had a much more positive view of Portugal’s past and future that derived from his ethnic idea of the nation, rooted in a moçárabe race which set it apart from the other Iberian peoples (Teófilo Braga 1871: 25-26). Although Teófilo did see the nation as suffering from an acute crisis of decadence, contrary to Quental and Oliveira, he thought it was possible to “resuscitate” the nation from the bottom up, provided the people were “injected” with a sense of solidarity, or as he preferred to call it, with a sense of “affective synthesis”. As far as Teófilo was concerned “a feeling of nationality” was “Portugal’s biggest strength” and this feeling, translated into a “moral impulse” and into an “intuition of a great destiny”, would help to raise the nation again (Teófilo Braga 1892 vol. 2: iii; Ramos 1994: 65).

However, in the eyes of Teófilo Braga, the Portuguese were not aware of their country’s history yet (Ramos 1992: 526; 1994: 65); and here lay one of the reasons why Portugal was a lethargic nation in decadence for only when the people shared a civic commotion with their co-nationals, could they become more involved and be able to exert their full authority over the destiny of the country:
“Portugal is the country that is least aware of its history: the result is the abandonment of national tradition in the arts, the contempt for its monuments, the regrettable distance between the writers and the people, the lack of conscience and of a plan to guide the political activity of those who exert authority (...)”\(^{31}\) (Teófilo Braga 1892 vol. 2: 363).

As a result, contrary to Antero de Quental and Oliveira Martins, Teófilo Braga believed that in an active quest for the affective regeneration of the Portuguese nation, it was the intellectual’s duty, rather than the politician’s duty, to return the positive elements to the people, the same elements that allowed them to restore their lost nationality and turn the nation into the expression of an original race. In this sense, according to the Professor of Literature, the role of the intellectual was to create a bridge between the people and its national history as it was reproduced in the nation’s literature, monuments and artistic artefacts, so that the people could become aware of the horizontal bond they shared with one another through an acquaintance of a mutual history and ethnic lineage (Ramos 1994: 64; Teófilo Braga 1884). This ethnic lineage was rooted in the *moçárabe* race, which according to Teófilo had not been allowed to flourish by the ruling medieval aristocracy. In this sense, it was important that the people rediscovered the nation’s literary history, namely the medieval *romanceiros*, which were written at a time when Portugal’s *moçárabe* race still had to be fully affected by the aristocracy of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries (Teófilo Braga 1870 vol. 1: 3, 8-9, 13, 76; 1877; Ramos 1992: 522).

As a result, Teófilo researched and published the most important works of several Portuguese authors, from the medieval *romanceiros* of Arab influence to the romantics, in order to create a Portuguese literature (e.g. Teófilo Braga 1867, 1870,

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\(^{31}\) “Portugal é o país que mais desconhece a sua história: daqui resulta o abandono da tradição nacional na arte, o desprezo pelos seus monumentos, a separação lamentável entre os escritores e o povo, a falta de consciência e de plano na actividade política dos que exercem as autoridades (…)”.

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1896) and he researched and compiled several volumes on the ethnology of the Portuguese people (e.g. customs, beliefs and traditions) in order to establish what he called “the positive basis of the [Portuguese] nationality”, or in other words, a Portuguese national culture that united the people and gave it a distinct character (e.g. Teófilo Braga 1885: v, but also 1987 [1883]).

Furthermore, Teófilo argued that the best way to create an affective synthesis of the nation was through the organisation of exhibitions, congresses and, most importantly, commemorations. The exhibitions would serve to show the industrial producers that their enterprise was not pursued in the name of individual wealth but of a collective progress that should be put on display for the whole nation to see. The congresses would be held by intellectuals in order to dissipate any non-corroborated speculations and to affirm the “spiritual power of science”, the foundation of the secular republic.

Finally, the commemorations were paramount inasmuch as they would give prominence to those who had contributed the most to the “mental evolution” of the Portuguese people for they were the true heroes who had better grasped the soul of the nation by contributing to an increased sense of horizontal solidarity. In the opinion of the republican positivist, “each people elects the genius which is the synthesis of their national character” (Teófilo Braga [1884] quoted in Vakil 1996: 42). In the republican context, the national heroes worthy of celebration were, therefore, those who had provided the nation with both a lyrical account of the people’s conquests and achievements (e.g. Camões) and with political enlightenment in the form of anti-Jesuitism, anti-clericalism and secularism (e.g. Marquis of Pombal). They were the ones who had shattered the chains of throne and altar to which the Portuguese, so Teófilo argued, had been enslaved for so many centuries.
At the basis of the republican commemorations was, therefore, the genesis of a new civic religion, in which the “veneration” of the nation’s heroes, as well as the nation’s ethnic inheritance, was deemed significant in creating “one of the most important coordinating forces in human societies”, without which “order was nothing but violence”. Power legitimacy, therefore, could only emerge from the people and the people, in turn, could only be involved in the political life of the country when they were imbued with a sense of “affective synthesis” instigated by a public opinion shaped by those who were concerned with the political affairs of the nation.

In 1880, Teófilo Braga put his teachings into practice, when he decided to organise the commemoration of Camões’s Tercentenary, integrating the executive commission of the festivities alongside his friend, the republican positivist, Luciano Cordeiro. In the view of the historian Rui Ramos, “with a military determination, [Teófilo] stood out presenting grandiose plans in order to organise the living forces and the public opinion, and to prepare a national resurrection”\(^{32}\) (Ramos 1994: 65). All along, Teófilo reclaimed the historic figure of Camões to the republican cause, making the poet a hero of the democratic republican nation. Camões had been largely ignored by the ruling elites for the last centuries, so the poet’s place in the collective imaginary was still very much available for political appropriation. Teófilo Braga was the first political ideologue to capture the name, the epic poem and the legend that surrounded Camões in order to create a sense of collective communion that recognised the need for national “salvation”, based on the heroic example of those who were seen as best exemplifying the virtues of the republican nation.

The commemoration of Camões’s Tercentenary was remarkably popular and well attended by the people. The commemoration itself was a secular procession to the Camões statue where a wreath was laid at its feet. Outside Lisbon, other events were

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\(^{32}\) “Com uma determinação militar, fez sucesso apresentando planos grandiosos para organizar as forças vivas e a opinião publica e preparar uma ressurreição nacional”.

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also planned (Teófilo Braga 1891: 274-281). However, for the tens of thousands of those who marched side by side with the republican leaders – 40,000 in total, according to Pulido Valente (1974: 38), including representatives of municipalities and public bodies – it symbolised much more than that. It was a protest against the dynastic ruling elites, their corruptive means of attaining power and staying in power, the critical state of the economy and the British influence over the affairs of the empire.

“Portuguese democracy has a glorious date, which marks the beginning of a new era: 10 June 1880. (...) The whole nation understood this date, in which the loss of nationality coincided with the death of that one great spirit, who seeing the nation invaded by the armies of Felipe II, expired discouragingly, becoming the eternal protest of freedom. (...) The day 10 June 1880 could not have gone unnoticed; it was a terrible proof against our vitality and the nation understood the meaning of that great day. Camões’s Centennial showed Europe that we knew how to take from the biggest tradition of our historical past the stimulus [needed] for a rebirth”\(^{33}\) (Teófilo Braga 1983 [1880]: 78, 163).

As it was expected, the Monarchy did not share the republican enthusiasm for the “rebirth” of the nation along republican lines. Only four months after Teófilo first suggested the organisation of Camões’s Tercentenary, did the royal government decide to take its place in the festivities. And only four days before the event actually took place, did the royal family confirm their attendance, albeit in a private capacity. By reacting this way, the monarchy legitimised the republican claim to the historical

\(^{33}\) “A democracia portuguesa conta com uma data gloriosa, que é o começo de uma nova era: o dia 10 de Junho de 1880. (...) A nação inteira compreendeu esta grande data, em que a perda da nacionalidade coincidiu com o passamento daquele grande espírito, que ao ver a pátria invadida pelos exércitos de Filipe II, expirou em um desalento que se tornou o protesto eterno da liberdade. (...) O dia 10 de Junho de 1880 não devia passar despercebido; era uma prova terrível contra a nossa vitalidade e a nação compreendeu o sentido desse grande dia. O Centenário de Camões manifestou à Europa que sabíamos tirar da maior tradição do nosso passado histórico o estímulo para um renascimento”.
importance of Luís de Camões and officially dissociated itself from any projects of national rebirth. The “invention” of the first republican tradition and ceremony, which from then onwards was repeated every year attaining the status of a national holiday after the establishment of the First Republic, was a success for the republicans. It portrayed the Monarchy as the enemy of the nation and it mobilised the people to the republican cause. Months later, as the historian Pulido Valente (1974: 38) claims, Teófilo Braga was able to say with a newly proven political credibility that a choice had to be made between the “monarchy or the individual interest of a family” and “the republic or the general interest of the state”.

3.1. Introduction

As we saw in the previous chapter, the 1870 Generation broke with literary tradition while it attempted to bring Portugal into modernity. The intellectuals of the 1870 Generation studied the causes of Portugal’s decadence and saw the Republic as the best form of government to resuscitate the nation from a long period of decay. Their ideas were presented in the short-lived Casino Conferences. However, they differed in the form of achieving their political goals. While Antero de Quental and Oliveira Martins emphasised the establishment of an “ideal” socialist Republic by the elites, Teófilo Braga defended the “positive” mobilisation of the people as a means for the establishment of a factual Republic. Their differing views were also reflected in the political path they chose to pursue. Antero de Quental created labour associations and the Socialist Party and Oliveira Martins joined the constitutionalist Progressist Party in cabinet and in the Cortes. Teófilo Braga, on the other hand, founded republican centres with the aim of including all sectors of society from which the Directorate of the Portuguese Republican Party eventually emerged. The study of the 1870 Generation aimed to show how the First Phase of the three-phased theoretical framework came into being. In this chapter we will see how Teófilo Braga’s ideas developed into the formation of a political movement, the Portuguese Republican Party, and how the party itself managed to gather popular support from outside the chambers of power from 1876 to 1903 (Phase Two).
The PRP, founded in 1876, was the political expression of Teófilo Braga’s positivist view of the nation, as well as a vehicle through which the pâtria would achieve the perfect “affective synthesis”. His nationalist ideology was effectively adopted by the PRP in its 1891 Political Programme. In order to outlive its decadency, the nation had to become sovereign, imperial, anticlerical and republican and had to include all the people equally, regardless of their social and economic background, in the political affairs of the country, as long as they shared the same ethnicity. That was Teófilo Braga’s and, effectively, the Portuguese Republican Party’s conception of who and what constituted the Portuguese nation.

In this chapter we will also see how the formation of the PRP contributed to much political agitation and nationalist mobilisation against the Constitutional Monarchy, portrayed by the republicans as a tyrannical and corrupted system that had ruined the nation with the connivance of the clergy. We will see that the PRP was largely formed by intellectuals and members of the urban upper middle class, who sided with Teófilo’s nationalist ideology. Although the party’s political trajectory was not very linear at the beginning, the PRP eventually consolidated its internal structure with the 1882-1883 Project for the Definitive Organisation of the Republican Party and followed an electoral strategy to attain power. By competing in the general elections, the PRP was able to gain a few marginal seats in the Cortes, with several members elected mostly in Lisbon and Porto, despite the intentional strategy pursued by the constitutionalist parties to keep the PRP outside the chambers of power. The party was also able to consolidate its popularity in the urban centres and surrounding towns in the South of the country by opening several republican centres and employing on the ground a programme of nationalist contention against the established institutions. The Party’s opposition to the 1879 Lourenço Marques Treaty and to the 1890 British Ultimatum crystallised its ideology as an imperialist, anti-clerical, anti-monarchist and
nationalist opposition movement that mobilised the urban working class and the middle class against the Constitutional Monarchy. However, following the nationalist frenzy that swept through Portugal after the 1890 British Ultimatum, the authorities implemented several repressive measures that reduced the levels of nationalist hysteria, but split the Republican Party into two flanks. Two different strategies to achieve power competed against each other: a militant revolutionary flank and a moderate political flank. After the moderates passed a partisan programme in early January 1891, defending in implicit terms an electoral strategy to achieve power, the radicals staged a republican uprising in Porto three weeks later. After the uprising ended in failure, the levels of political oppression increased and the party almost succumbed to repression by the public authorities.

3.2. The Formation of the Portuguese Republican Party

As was mentioned in Section 2.6, the Portuguese Republican Party had a divisive beginning (see, for instance, Pulido Valente 1974: Introduction and Catroga 1991 vol. 1: Chapter One for a full account of this trajectory).

The PRP emerged from a split within the 1870 Generation. As we saw above, the Republican intellectual movement was divided into two ideological camps, the socialists and the positivists. Inspired by the establishment of the First Republic in Spain (1873) and by the reestablishment of the French Republic in 1870 (Third Republic), the positivists affiliated with the Democratic Republican Centre founded the Portuguese Republican Party on 25 March 1876 and on 3 April the first Directorate was elected with Grand-Mason Elias Garcia, Latino Coelho and Oliveira Marreca at the helm.
Despite its growing popularity (in 1878 the party elected its first Deputy to the Cortes), the party was initially plagued by factionalism. On the one hand, Elias Garcia resisted the inclusion of the lower classes in the decisive meetings of the party, while defending a cooperation and alliance with the right-wing Regenerator Party. On the other hand, the positivists, including Teófilo Braga, wished to bring radical transformation to the political institutions of the Monarchy by including members from all classes in the party and distancing the latter from the constitutionalist parties (Catroga 1991 vol. 1: 27-44).

However, over the 1880s several events worked in favour of a rising consensus among the Republicans: 1) the republican opposition to the 1879 Treaty of Lourenço Marques, which was forced upon Portugal by Britain for the purpose of turning Mozambique into a British protectorate; 2) the already mentioned 1880 Tercentenary Commemoration of Camões’s death organised by Teófilo Braga, Ramalho Ortigão and Emídio Garcia; and 3) the anti-clerical Centennial Commemoration of Marquis of Pombal’s death in 1882. These republican-sponsored events resulted in a wave of urban popular support for the PRP, as well as in state-led persecution of the PRP leaders and of the republican journalists who wrote for the newly founded mouthpiece of the PRP, *O Século* (1881-1896), creating in both cases a strong camaraderie among the republicans (Catroga 1991 vol. 1: 45-47).

By the early 1880s, factionalism had already diminished considerably. The number of republican clubs around the country increased from 4 in 1879 to around 30 between 1880 and 1884. Most of them were located in Lisbon and in the south of the country (Catroga 1991 vol. 1: 47-48). Furthermore, in 1882-1883, the Project for the Definitive Organisation of the Republican Party was approved and published. The Project aimed to bring structure and consensus to the party’s decision-making process. The document regulated the centres that made up the organic structure of the party.
while it diminished the influence of clubism and localism over the national Directorate, where the executive decisions were made. All the republican centres, congresses and commissions, such as the parochial commissions, which were responsible to the municipal commissions, which in their turn were accountable to the district commissions, became subordinate to the common direction of the Directorate. The party grew into a democratic organisation. The militants elected the parochial commissions, which elected the municipal commissions, which in their turn elected the district commissions. The highest organ of the PRP was the Annual Congress where delegates of the three commissions, the party newspapers and the republican and anti-clerical centres convened in order to elect the Directorate, to set the party’s strategy and to amend the organic statute, if it was necessary (Catroga 1991 vol. 1: 51-53; Pulido Valente 1974: 67-68).

The composition of the Directorate, elected after the approval of the Project for the Definitive Organisation of the PRP in 1883, provides us with a social sampling of those who led the party. The party was largely an urban political grouping centred in Lisbon, in the surrounding towns and in the south of the country. It was formed by an overwhelming majority of intellectuals who came from the upper urban middle class, and were either already employed by the state bureaucracy or held liberal professions. In 1883, the Directorate was formed by Teófilo Braga (a professor of Literature), José Elias Garcia (a Colonel and professor in the Army School), Manuel de Arriaga (a lawyer and writer), Bernardino Pinheiro (an Audit Court secretary), Teixeira de Queirós (a doctor and lawyer), Magalhães Lima (a journalist), Sabino de Sousa (a professor at the Veterinary Hospital), Castelo Branco Saraiva (a doctor), Oliveira Marreca (a professor of Economics), Rodrigues Freitas (a professor at the Porto Polytechnic School), Latino Coelho (a professor at the Lisbon Polytechnic School), Jacinto Nunes (a lawyer and landowner), Anselmo Xavier (a journalist), Emidio Garcia (a professor at
the University of Coimbra) and José de Sousa Larcher (an entrepreneur) (Catroga 1991 vol. 1: 104).

One generation later, in 1907, the social background of the Directorate of the PRP had not changed. Intellectuals and holders of liberal professions continued to dominate the leadership ranks\(^{34}\) (Catroga 1991 vol. 2: Anexos).

At the grassroots level, however, the party’s supporters were far less educated and more varied in their social background than the members of the Directorate. They came from the urban middle and working classes, which found no real representation in Antero de Quental’s Socialist Party who continued to preach social reform without contemplating a true social revolution.

The PRP’s supporters were usually small business and shop owners, manual workers, factory workers, civil servants, junior officers and non-commissioned officers, salesclerks, office clerks and members of the liberal professions. Most of them had no hope of climbing up the social ladder, as the entrenched ruling oligarchy hampered any social ambitions. As a result, the republican ideology – nationalist, democratic, anti-clerical and egalitarian – spoke closer to their social and economic needs than the constitutionalist parties in power (Pulido Valente 1994: 60-61).

The number of affiliated PRP members varied as the decades progressed. With the aim of recruiting and indoctrinating the middle and working classes, the PRP opened several republican and anti-clerical centres in Lisbon, Porto and the rest of the country. In 1883, the same year that the Project for the Definitive Organisation of the PRP was approved, there were 34 republican centres in Lisbon and 20 in the rest of the country, with a total of at least 4,400 militants affiliated. However, after the failed Porto republican uprising of 1891 and the subsequent repression suffered at the hands of the

\(^{34}\) António José de Almeida (a doctor), António Luís Gomes (a lawyer and professor), Bernardino Machado (a professor at the University of Coimbra), Celestino de Almeida (a doctor), Francisco José Fernandes Costa (a lawyer), Agostinho Fortes (a professor of history), Albano Coutinho (a journalist) and João José de Freitas (a lawyer and high school teacher).
monarchical regime, the number of Lisbon centres decreased to 19, while 23 centres remained opened in the rest of the country. The total number of militants associated with the centres also decreased to 3,250. But in 1907, during João Franco’s dictatorship, the number of PRP supporters rose again, and 22 centres were opened in Lisbon, 11 in Porto and 30 in the rest of the country. It is estimated that the total number of affiliated militants at the time also increased to 4,800. By April 1910, at the pinnacle of the PRP’s popularity, there were a total of 165 republican centres and over 100 republican newspapers. The most important newspapers were *A Vanguarda* (a Masonic newspaper), *O País*, *A Luta* (first published in 1906), *A Voz Pública* (1891-1909) and *O Mundo* (1900-1910). This last one became the official mouthpiece of the PRP after 1900 and in the first decade of the twentieth century had a circulation of 35,000 daily copies. The centres also encompassed republican schools that admitted less privileged children. It is estimated that only in Lisbon there were 2,500 children enrolled in these schools, 750 in Porto and 870 in the rest of the country. The PRP’s mission was not only to recruit the disenfranchised members of society, but also to educate them in the republican ideals of the party (Catroga 1991 vol. 1: 27-34, 103, vol. 2: Anexos; Ramos 1994: 52).

### 3.3. Electoral Results

From its inception, the PRP aimed to bring change to the political structures of the country by following an electoral strategy to achieve power. Most of the republican leaders genuinely believed that the party should allow for an institutional resolution of Portugal’s political crisis. As a result, the Directorate managed to dissuade any radical
conspiracies against the ruling regime for several years, until the official repression that followed the British Ultimatum created deep fissures within the party.

The PRP first entered the electoral race in 1878 at a time when the electoral law had just been changed to allow all male citizens over 21 years old to vote, provided they earned 100$000 réis a year, or were literate or were heads of family. The enfranchising of a larger section of the male population resulted in an increase of the electorate from 478,509 voters in 1877 to 808,784 voters in 1878 (from 39.6% in 1877 to 66.9% in 1878 of the total adult male population). The change was meant to not only accommodate the demands of the opposition, both the republicans and the progressists, but also to broaden the electoral legitimacy of the Constitutional Monarchy, at a time when contestation of the regime had reached a new peak (Catroga 1991 vol. 1: 96; Tavares de Almeida 1985: 141).

The enlargement of the political electorate resulted in the successful election in 1878 of a PRP deputy from Porto. In 1881, Elias Garcia was elected to the Cortes by the Lisbon circle with the support of the Regenerator Party (Catroga 1991 vol. 1: 96-98; Wheeler 1978: 35).

However, after the PRP consolidated its internal discipline in 1883, the party managed to win more seats as the republicans stopped running against each other. In 1884, 1887 and 1889, the party won two seats. In 1890, the year of the British Ultimatum, the party increased the number of elected deputies to three. Two years later, the party managed to win four seats in the Cortes, the highest number of republican deputies elected in the 1890s. The last victory was mainly due to an increase in the PRP’s popularity, achieved at the expense of the 1890 British Ultimatum and of Portugal’s declaration of bankruptcy.

However, just as had happened in 1890, the PRP’s electoral gains were soon quashed by the sitting government. The wary regenerator government, led by Hintze
Ribeiro, took advantage of a short spell of dictatorship rule (1894-1896) and decided to reform the electoral law once again, on this occasion by reducing the male suffrage. His aim was to maintain power and keep the rotativist system rolling. In 1895, the electoral college was limited to all men over 21 years old, who could read and write, or who earned more than 500$000 réis. Being the “head of a family” was no longer a sufficient prerequisite to gain a voting right as it had been up to then. Excluded from the new electoral college, therefore, were low ranking civil servants and the enlisted personnel of the armed forces, among whom republican ideals were most popular (Catroga 1991 vol. 1: 96-98; Ramos 1994: 218; Wheeler 1978: 35).

As a consequence, the number of voters decreased from 951,490 in 1890 to 598,000 in 1901 or from 72.3% to 43.7% of the total adult male population (Tavares de Almeida 1985: 141). What followed was a change in electoral tactics by the PRP. In 1894 the party formed an electoral coalition with the progressists (the Liberal Coalition) during Hintze Ribeiro’s dictatorship. Two PRP members were elected. However, the party’s subsequent decision to abstain altogether from future elections as a sign of protest weakened the party. The PRP fell into deep disarray and further internal divisions, due to a successful campaign of persecution and censorship pursued by the royalist governments after the 1890 British Ultimatum and, especially, after the involvement of the PRP’s radical wing in the 1891 Porto republican uprising.

Only in 1906, before the beginning of João Franco’s dictatorship, did the Republican Party manage to win 4 seats in Lisbon in the national elections. In 1908, the number increased to 7 and in 1910, less than two months before the 1910 October Revolution, the PRP won 14 seats, the party’s best results to date.

As we can see from Table 3.1, the electoral victories of the PRP were mostly concentrated in Lisbon and in the surrounding southern areas, attesting to the fact that the party was mainly a republican nationalist platform that addressed the concerns of the
urban middle and working classes, but failed to appeal to the northern rural areas that were usually under strong clerical and traditional influence (see Section 1.5). In the 1906, 1908 and 1910 elections, 54.1%, 53.5% and 62.3% of the Lisbon electorate voted PRP (Tavares de Almeida 1985: 144). By 1908, they had won the city halls of Lisbon, Almeirim, Benavente, Grândola, Lagos, Odemira, São Tiago do Cacém, Alcochete, Aldeagle, Cuba and Moita, but failed to secure any city halls in the north (Catroga 1991 vol. 1: 100; Pulido Valente 1974: 71).

However, by 1910, the electoral strategy to gain power had been abandoned by the party. Just as had happened in 1890, 1894 and in 1906, on 27 June 1910 the Cortes were adjourned and the republicans were not allowed to take their seats. The victorious cabinet party formed an extra-parliamentary coalition with the Progressive Dissidents (founded in 1905), ruling by decree. The PRP felt pushed aside from the corridors of power by the constitutionalist parties. What is more, as we will see later in this chapter, the party’s structural consensus achieved in 1883 was only predominant at the structural level. At the tactical level, the party remained split. The absence of a clear political strategy, that would ultimately result in the reform of the state, caused many divisions within the party, especially after the 1890 British Ultimatum. Not even the approval of the first Political Programme on 11 January 1891, which was reasonably moderate in essence and was supported by most republican leaders, amongst them Teófilo Braga, was sufficient to deter the enthusiasm of the radical faction who, in a matter of weeks, carried out a failed attempt to establish a republic in Porto with the help of a handful of disgruntled soldiers (Catroga 1991 vol. 1: 54-56). After 1895, when the PRP’s electoral victories were jeopardised by the electoral law reform, the radicals gained more admirers. As we will see in the next chapter, the radical faction of the PRP managed to convene the support of the Carbonária and the Masonry in the first years of the

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twentieth century, and from 1908 initiated a successful campaign of revolutionary mobilisation in the back of João Franco’s dictatorship. As far as the radical faction of the PRP was concerned, the 1910 electoral success was nothing more than a referendum on the people’s support for regime overthrow.

Table 3.1 - Elections to the Low Chamber of the Cortes, PRP Results (1878-1910)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of PRP Deputies Elected</th>
<th>Names</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1878</td>
<td>1 (Porto)</td>
<td>José Rodrigues de Freitas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1879</td>
<td>1 (Porto)</td>
<td>José Rodrigues de Freitas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1881</td>
<td>1 (Lisbon)</td>
<td>Elias Garcia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1883 (by-election)</td>
<td>1 (Funchal)</td>
<td>Manuel de Arriaga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1884</td>
<td>2 (Lisbon)</td>
<td>Consiglieri Pedroso, Elias Garcia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1887</td>
<td>2 (Lisbon)</td>
<td>Consiglieri Pedroso, Elias Garcia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1888 (by-election)</td>
<td>1 (Lisbon)</td>
<td>Teófilo Braga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1889</td>
<td>2 (Lisbon, Porto)</td>
<td>Rodrigues de Freitas, n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1890</td>
<td>3 (Lisbon)</td>
<td>Elias Garcia, Latino Coelho, Manuel de Arriaga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1892</td>
<td>4 (1 Lisbon, 1 Porto, 1 Santiago do Cacém, 1 extraordinary)</td>
<td>Jacinto Nunes, João Chagas, Rodrigues de Freitas, Teixeira de Queirós</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1894 (Liberal Coalition with)</td>
<td>2 (Lisbon)</td>
<td>Eduardo de Abreu, Gomes da Silva</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1900 (the 1899 elections had been annulled but the results were still the same) | 3 (Porto) | Afonso Costa, Francisco Xavier Esteves, Paulo Falcão

1906 | 4 (Lisbon) | Afonso Costa, Alexandre Braga, António João de Meneses, José de Almeida

1908 | 7 (4 Lisbon, 2 Setubal, 1 Beja) | Afonso Costa, Alexandre Braga, António José de Almeida, Brito Camacho, Estêvão de Vasconcelos, Feio Terenas, João de Meneses

1910 | 14 (10 Lisbon, 3 Setubal, 1 Beja) | Afonso Costa, Alexandre Braga, Alfredo de Magalhães, António Aurélio da Costa Ferreira, António José de Almeida, António Luís Gomes, Bernardino Machado, Cândido dos Reis, Estêvão de Vasconcelos, Feio Terenas, João de Meneses, Teófilo Braga, Miguel Bombarda


### 3.4. The Nationalist Politics of Contention

In parallel with its electoral strategy (1878-1894), the Portuguese Republican Party also followed a strategy of political mobilisation in the streets, organising rallies with the aim of gathering popular support for the republican nationalist cause. The PRP
was an interclass, catch-all party that appealed to those sections of the urban population that were mostly frustrated in their desire to climb the social ladder by an entrenched oligarchy seen as corrupt, incompetent and serving the interests of a royal family that had grown increasingly distant from the common people. By spreading its nationalist ideology, through a large array of propaganda tactics that included republican newspapers, pamphlets, political rallies, public lectures, electoral campaigns and parliamentary activity, the PRP was successful in maintaining and increasing the level of its grassroots support.

The politics of contention of the Republican Party revolved around four main themes that echoed Teófilo Braga’s nationalist teachings: the regeneration of the nation from the bottom up; the end of political corruption and economic mismanagement; the full secularisation of politics and society; and the revitalisation of the Portuguese Empire. In the process, the PRP pointed an accusing finger at the monarchy and the clergy, seen as the main culprits for the nation’s state of decay. But, how did the PRP succeed in convincing the people that the monarchy and the clergy were the main culprits for the nation’s decadence, when Portugal had been a dynastic state since 1139 and 93% of the population was Catholic at the turn of the century (Volovitch-Tavares 1985: 247)?

As we saw above, the PRP, led by its main ideologue Teófilo Braga, was the pioneer of a series of “invented traditions” that made the nation the centre of civic commemorations, of which the 1880 Tercentenary of Camões was the first to be organised (see Section 2.7). These “invented traditions”, contrary to what Eric Hobsbawm (1990, & Ranger 2004 [1983]: Chapters One and Seven) has argued, were the efforts of an opposition party to create a state that reflected the nation from below, rather than the efforts of a state elite to consolidate the state by including the nation within its borders.
Hobsbawm tells us that the major factors that contributed to the emergence of nationalism in Europe were mass politics and capitalism. In an age of secularism and capitalism, the rising of new social classes, namely the working class, exposed a power legitimacy vacuum. In order to address this vacuum, state elites were obliged to resort to the mass production of invented traditions, rituals and ceremonies, duly based on an appeal to a long and continuous past. In this sense, state elites used nationalism not only as an ideology of political legitimacy but also as the “glue” that made the political and the national unit congruent.36

In the case of Portugal, despite its economic backwardness, the emergence of republican nationalism also coincided with the rise of the urban working class in an age when politics paid more heed to the reaction of the masses. Republican nationalism endeavoured to include the disenfranchised working class in the politics of their aspired republican nation by the creation of a new set of heroes and commemorations. The Constitutional Monarchy, probably assuming that the historical ethnic homogeneity of the Portuguese people would not raise any challenge to their ruling rights, failed to turn Portugal into a true nation-state by postponing indefinitely the process of the “nationalisation” of the masses. The republicans, on the other hand, in synch with the zeitgeist, hijacked this process from the dynastic regime and used it against the ruling elites. The PRP’s determination to include the masses in its republican project turned the party into a fully-fledged “messianic idea” which, duly “infused with nationalism”, answered a “general public feeling for ressurgimento”. The American historian of Portugal, Douglas Wheeler (1978: 38-39) says that the “urban masses locked into severe poverty and drudgery became enthused over the idea of a mythical future republic which would solve all problems”. “Republicanism represented for a variety of

36 Hobsbawm uses the same definition of nationalism as that of Gellner (Hobsbawm 1990: 9): “I use the term ‘nationalism’ in the sense defined by Gellner, namely to mean ‘primarily a principle which holds that the political and national unit should be congruent’.”
Portuguese a ‘Republican Sebastianism’\textsuperscript{37}, a new religion and cult where the nation, the people, became the main object of worship.

For the first time in Portuguese politics, the republicans talked about a nation where every member, including those that came from a working class background, was seen as an equal part of a sovereign entity. They invented traditions and ceremonies against the ruling regime and rescued “heroes” from the past that better encapsulated their ideals\textsuperscript{38}.

After the 1880 Tercentenary of Camões, the PRP decided to organise another centennial, on this occasion centred on the figure of Premier Sebastião José de Carvalho e Mello, the Marquis of Pombal. He was recaptured by the Republican Party as an anticlerical and “enlightened” Prime Minister who, despite his despotic tendencies, had opened the country to “democracy”. According to the republicans, he had done this by expelling the Jesuits, fighting against the influence of the Inquisition, and putting an end to the religious divisions that assailed the Portuguese society by abolishing once and for all any categorisations of old Christians and recently converted new Christians that had been inherited from the Counter-Reformation period.

The Marquis of Pombal was commemorated as a representative figure of the PRP’s secular ideals, ideologically inspired by the anticlerical 1870 Generation, who

\textsuperscript{37} Sebastiamism in the words of Richard Robinson is (1979: 32): “the term given to a popular yearning for sudden, miraculous political and social solutions to be brought about by a great man. It is the Portuguese variant of messianism, dating from the late sixteenth century when Portugal was ruled by the Spanish Crown, in the popular myth that the quixotic King Sebastian, killed in battle in Morocco in 1578, would return as a saviour to inaugurate the millennium of national grandeur when the people would be liberated from all oppression”.

\textsuperscript{38} The dynastic elites were forced to mimic the republican commemorations and to create their own set of national ceremonies in an attempt to show the people that the King and his cabinets were also involved in the symbolic discourse of the nation. As a result, in 1886, both republicans and monarchists unveiled a monument in Lisbon dedicated to the independentist heroes of 1640. In 1894, King Dom Carlos associated himself with the centennial commemorations of Prince Dom Henrique “The Navigator” in Porto. The Catholics also tried to catch up in an attempt to put an end to the increasing secularisation of society. In 1894 they responded with their first invented celebration, the Fifth Centenary of Infante Dom Henrique (1894), closely followed by the Seventh Centenary of Saint Antônio of Lisbon (1895), the Bicentenary of Father António Vieira (1897) and several festivities organised in honour of Dom Nuno Álvares Pereira. The Socialist Party, in a clear understanding of the new politics of invented traditions at the grassroots level, also promoted the May First celebrations (Catroga 1989; Ramos 1994: 69-102; Vakil 1996: 43).
expressively considered the Church as the metaphysical pillar of the monarchical regime (Pulido Valente 1974: 47). In commemorating Premier Marquis of Pombal, the PRP hoped to celebrate itself and the republican nation that it aspired to establish in Portugal. In this sense, Camões represented the memory of the past, the historical discoveries of the brave, while the Marquis of Pombal represented the construction of Portugal’s future along democratic and anticlerical lines (Leira Perente 2001).

However, the royal governments tried to pre-empt any connections that the PRP aimed to establish between the current liberal dynastic regime and reactionary Jesuitism. Learning from the criticism they had received when they took a back seat in the 1880 Camões Tercentenary commemorations, they joined and even chaired the executive commission that was responsible for organising the Marquis of Pombal’s festivities all over the country and the colonies. When the day arrived, the royal family also attended the ceremonies, while the Republican Party headed several anticlerical and antimonarchical demonstrations clashing with the municipal guard and the police forces in bloody urban skirmishes.

Both the Camões Tercentenary and the Marquis of Pombal Centenary were part of a well organised strategy followed by the PRP in order to lay claim to those historical figures that were mostly associated with rationality, enlightenment and science. With this in mind, other prominent characters in Portuguese history were also celebrated (e.g. 1899 Centenary of Almeida Garrett, 1898 Fourth Centenary of the Discovery by Vasco da Gama of a Maritime Route to India and 1910 Centenary of Alexandre Herculano). Alongside these celebrations, the PRP successfully campaigned for the transfer of the body remains of Alexandre Herculano (1888), João de Deus (1896) and Almeida Garrett (1903) to the Jerónimos Monastery, the monarchical equivalent of the republican National Pantheon that would later open in 1916 (Carvalho da Silva 1996: 27).
In their quest to honour those men who had been mostly associated with anticlericalism and with the scientific aspects of Portugal’s colonial mission, the PRP emphasised a conceptualisation of the Portuguese nation as a political body based on positivist, republican, secular and rational values that rejected any connotations with metaphysical beliefs. Any historical claims made by Antero de Quental and Oliveira Martins that Portugal’s imperial mission had ruined the nation were rejected. Rather, according to the Republican Party, Portugal’s renaissance empire had set the stage for the beginning of a new rational and scientific era in European history.

However, although these republican celebrations were a PRP invention designed to create, among other things, a fervent anticlerical spirit against the monarchy, portrayed in the republican demonstrations as the embodiment of Jesuitism, not everyone sided with this view until 1901. It was true that the middle and lower social classes neither appreciated the extra-legal payment of congrua portio and emoluments, nor did they appreciate the social and political influence that the clergy exerted outside the urban centres, where they maintained a prosperous position duly supported by the caciques (Pulido Valente 1974: 46-47). However, no one could deny at the time that liberalism had been the uncontested victor of the 1828-1834 Civil War. As was already argued in Section 1.5, the outcome of the civil war was a de facto decline of the clergy’s influence in the matters of the state. Although the Jesuits were eventually allowed to return to Portugal in 1857, their influence over the monarchy remained minimal. As the Portuguese historian Vasco Pulido Valente tells us (1974: 47), both King Dom Luís (1861-1889) and King Dom Carlos (1889-1908) were to all effects considered “solid liberals by dynastic tradition and personal formation”.

However, at the turn of the century, anticlericalism started to resonate among the urban masses in Lisbon and in the neighbouring southern towns when a renewal of the Jesuit “threat” took over Portugal’s political (and imaginary) landscape. Finally, the
nationalist politics of contention initiated in the 1880s against the Church and the Jesuits had paid dividends. Once the Church showed signs of collaborating with or exercising influence over the established authorities, the PRP’s accusations were deemed truthful and support for the party’s anticlerical cause rallied spontaneously in the streets of Lisbon.

Prime Minister Hintze Ribeiro’s 18 April of 1901 Decree was supposed to be anticlerical in essence, as it banned the existence of any regular religious orders. However, the same decree still allowed the presence in the country and in the colonies of any religious institutions that claimed to offer social services such as the establishment of schools, hospices, orphanages and hospitals. The result was an increase in the number of religious congregations operating in Portugal that used the new legislation to mask their evangelical purpose. By the end of the Constitutional Monarchy, and despite the legislation in place, as many as 56 religious associations had been formed in Portugal, mostly in Lisbon (Villares 1995). From 1901 to 1910, fifteen convents had also been founded, of which five were Jesuit (Braga da Cruz 1980: 220-228).

The Jesuits were also an influential presence in the Catholic Nationalist Party (PN) who was formed in 1903. The support that this party gave to João Franco’s dictatorship served only to increase the existing suspicion that the Jesuits were attempting to establish themselves in power. The PN was created as a conservative “response to the decadence and deterioration of liberal patriotism” and as a reaction to the politics of “personalism” pursued by the constitutionalist parties (Braga da Cruz 1980: 220-228; Carvalho da Silva 1996: 30). The party’s slogan was “God and Pátria”. It was led by the former regenerator Jacinto Cândido and supported by the Catholic Church. The party intended to absorb all Catholic forces within its structures, including
Absolutists and Legitimists, and to collaborate with those constitutionalist parties who shared the same goals (Carvalho da Silva 1996: 30).

However, contrary to what had been planned, the party failed to include all Catholic politicians as they refused to change party affiliation because, as the historian Carvalho da Silva tells us, “the social and political work they were developing in those [constitutionalist] parties made more sense in them” (Carvalho da Silva 1996: 44). As a result, the Catholic party who had begun by stating that it was against political oligarchies, quickly turned into the political instrument of its leader, Jacinto Cândido. He had no qualms in entering into alliances with the constitutionalist parties in order to gain power, including João Franco’s Liberal Regenerator Party (Carvalho da Silva 1996: 66, Anexo 1: 107-113). Cândido’s alliance with Franco turned the Catholic party into an accomplice of the conservative dictatorship that ruled Portugal with the consent of King Dom Carlos from 1906 to 1908. In the eyes of the urban dwellers, their alliance showed the lengths the Catholic Church was willing to go in order to regain influence in the political affairs of the country. As we will see in the next chapter, after King Dom Carlos’s assassination, Franco’s dictatorship ended, but the Jesuit menace continued to populate the republican newspapers, which accused the Queen Mother of being controlled by members of the Society of Jesus. This together with the Church scandals of 1909, enabled the PRP to benefit greatly from the popular disapproval of the Church’s latest actions.

In parallel with anticlericalism, the PRP also followed a policy of contestation against the ruling Constitutional Monarchy that centred on imperialism. From 1879 to 1891, Portugal suffered several humiliations at the hands of the British, giving rise to unprecedented demonstrations of nationalist fervour that were mostly appropriated and engineered by the republicans to their own advantage. As was mentioned above in Section 1.11, the Portuguese Empire was allowed to survive the scramble for Africa due
to a concerted diplomatic effort pursued by the Portuguese in order to maintain the country’s so-called “historical rights” in the continent. Portugal’s dependence on Britain’s protection and sponsorship was also beneficial to the small Iberian kingdom, but only as long as British colonial interests were not harmed by the maintenance (and expansion) of a largely mythical Portuguese Empire, in which case the stronger ally had no qualms in using the Portuguese overseas possessions to advance their own interests. When this happened, many frictions between Portugal and Britain ensued, invariably resulting in Portugal’s humiliating subjection to Britain’s concerns. However, two of these instances – the 1879 Lourenço Marques Treaty and the 1890 British Ultimatum – proved to be more humiliating than usual, at least that is what the republicans sought to portray. Riding on the tails of an anti-British nationalist rhetoric, the republicans established their presence in the political life of the country and in the imaginary of the people, as the agents of republican nationalism whose preferred form of regime, the Republic, was the solution to a corrupt and treacherous Monarchy. As a result, especially after the 1890 British Ultimatum, the PRP abandoned all remaining claims to federalism and dropped their Iberianist position in favour of a straightforward nationalist position that saw Portugal as a nation which had to remain as independent as possible in order to overcome British and Spanish influence. The universal idealism of the 1870 Generation was replaced by the nationalist fervour of the 1890 republicans, as the Ultimatum adjusted the ideological centre of republican nationalism.

The 1879 Lourenço Marques Treaty was signed in the context of the British Zulu War in southern Africa. In 1879, Britain had suffered a defeat at the hands of the Zulu army in Natal and in the Transvaal territories. Transvaal had no connections to the sea as it was cut off by present-day Mozambique. In order to avoid another defeat, it was in the interest of the British to ensure a sea connection so that men, weapons and ammunitions could be easily shipped into the disputed territories. With this in mind,
Britain persuaded Portugal to sign a treaty that would allow the British free access from the Lourenço Marques port to the Transvaal. In exchange, the British offered military and trade advantages in the area, while the Portuguese asked the British to build a railway from Lourenço Marques to Pretoria in order to stimulate commercial exchanges between both colonies.

However, when the treaty was signed in 1879, the railway guarantee was not assured by the British. Furthermore, the commercial advantages promised by the British threatened the protectionist practices of the Portuguese traders who, unlike their political leaders, did not see any advantage in liberalising colonial trade. In this respect, the ruling oligarchy found itself at loggerheads with the economic forces of the country. The Progressive and the Republican parties protested against the treaty with the former accusing the government of not paying heed to Portugal’s national interests and the latter blaming the Portuguese Crown for sustaining an alliance that was threatening Portugal’s interests in Africa. Accused of being a lackey of the British, the regenerator government fell. As soon as the British realised what was happening, they ordered the British minister stationed in Lisbon to send a letter to the new head of Cabinet, protesting vehemently against Lisbon’s withdrawal from the treaty and requesting that the Cortes remain open so that the treaty could be approved. The Cortes remained in session, but the treaty was sent to the Constitutional Commission. A decision on the future of the Treaty was postponed for a year (Alexandre 2004: 972-973; Lains 1998: 473-474; Severiano Teixeira 1990: 78)

During that time, the Republicans took the helm of the nationalist demonstrations and established their credentials as a newly formed political party by organising several political rallies. In March 1880, Manuel Arriaga, Elias Garcia and Magalhães Lima headed a political rally at the Recreios Theatre drawing a reasonable attendance to the event. On 8 June the republican newspaper, O Século, published its
first issue, and alongside several articles commemorating the Camões Tercentenary, it featured harsh attacks against the treaty.

When the Cortes reconvened in 1881 and some of the most controversial clauses of the treaty were approved, the republicans took to the streets again. On 6 March 1881, O Século organised a political rally against the treaty at the Dom Fernando Theatre. The following day the republicans submitted a petition to the Cortes with thousands of signatures collected at the event. However, that did not stop the Cortes from approving the Treaty on 8 March, exacerbating even more the ferocity of the anti-British demonstrations. On 13 March, the government lost its patience and sent the cavalry to charge against the protesters. A few days later, a new government was formed39.

Opposition to the treaty, engendered by the republicans and the economic forces, ensured that the document never became effective, but it sent alarm bells across the political class. From then onwards, Lisbon adopted a maximalist position regarding any negotiations that concerned the territorial limits of its African colonies. Throughout the 1880s, the small country started claiming more and more of the African hinterland from the British, based on a purported historical right of occupation (Alexandre 2004: 972). Eventually, Portugal’s megalomaniac plans clashed with those of the old ally, Britain, and produced another diplomatic incident with humiliating consequences for Portugal – the Rose-Coloured Map40.

In 1886 Portugal signed a Treaty with France that included the Rose-Coloured Map in its annexes as part of the list of territories France had no claims over. The Rose-Coloured Map, was named as such after the progressist Foreign Minister, Barros Gomes, presented a map to the Cortes which highlighted in pink all the territories that


40 For a more detailed account of the Rose-Coloured Map incident which resulted in a British Ultimatum see for instance: Birmingham (1999: 110-121); Coelho (1990: 175-179, 2006: 1-3); Severiano Teixeira (1990: 54-70); Alexandre (2004: 975-977).
Portugal claimed as part of its sphere of imperial influence. The map linked the Indian Ocean to the Atlantic Ocean by a pink land corridor stretching from Mozambique to Angola, including the territories of Niasa, Mashona and Gaza – present-day Malawi, Zimbabwe and Zambia. Later that year, Portugal signed a Treaty with Germany and once again the Rose-Coloured Map was annexed. As France had done previously, Germany assured Portugal that it did not have any interest in those territories.

However, Britain was not pleased with Portugal’s sudden approach to Germany. Under the local leadership of Cecil Rhodes, Britain aspired to link Cairo to Cape Town. Not surprisingly, Britain informed Portugal that it did not recognise what had been agreed between the small Iberian kingdom and France and Germany. London argued that not only Portugal had no effective control over such territories, but they also coincided with the operating zone of the British South Africa Company created by Cecil Rhodes. Furthermore, as Teresa Coelho tells us, “Portuguese pretensions in Nyasaland (today Malawi) were an obstacle to the activities of the Scottish missionaries, who had settled in the area in 1875 to carry on Livingstone’s work”. Livingstone was a missionary, who was very popular among the British liberals and had denounced Portugal’s maladministration in Africa in the 1850s (Coelho 1990: 177).

However, the Portuguese government decided to ignore Britain’s protests and sent several expeditions to the region in order to claim effective control of the contested territories as dictated by the clause of “effective occupation” agreed at the Conference of Berlin. In the process, Portugal recruited the support of Germany and of the Boers to its cause, arguing that the contested territories should remain in the hands of a third party who was indifferent to the ongoing Anglo-Boer conflict. Furthermore, in 1889, Lisbon nationalised the Lourenço Marques railway system and ended British control over the train services. In the same year, Portugal signed a treaty with the Transvaal,
establishing the political borders of Mozambique and a common customs tariff between both colonies.

Annoyed with Portugal’s impetuosity, Britain filed an official complaint and demanded that the railways dispute should be settled by an international panel of arbitration chaired by the United States. But once again, Portugal refused to pay heed to Britain’s grievances. After the Portuguese explorer, Serpa Pinto, entered the Shire District (over which Britain claimed sovereignty), and defeated the Makololo, Portugal left the old ally no other choice but to issue an ultimatum on 11 January 1890. Under pressure from the Church of Scotland and Rhodes’ increasing influence in London, Prime Minister Lord Salisbury demanded that Portugal withdrew all military forces from the disputed territories in present-day Zimbabwe and Malawi, lest all diplomatic relations between both countries were severed (Coelho 1990: 179). Diplomatically isolated, due to Germany’s reluctance to act in Portugal’s favour, the Lisbon government yielded to London’s demands and withdrew from the area. The Progressive Government recalled the military expedition and subsequently resigned. The regenerators formed a new government and sent a diplomatic mission to London immediately to negotiate the end of the crisis (Couto 2008: 10; Pulido Valente 1974: 39). On 20 August 1890, Portugal and Britain signed a treaty settling the issue.

However, the treaty was not ratified by the Cortes due to a massive nationalist outcry instigated by the republicans in the days following Portugal’s retreat. Only a year later, on 11 June 1891, after the failed republican uprising in 1891, did the constitutional political parties join forces and ratify the 11 June 1891 Treaty. This did not add much to what had been settled in the 1890 Anglo-Portuguese Treaty: the west bank of Lake Niassa and the Central African plateau remained under British sovereignty, and Britain was given preference if Portugal ever decided to sell Zambezi’s south bank. But the

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41 The British Ultimatum can be read in Coelho 2006: 1.
boundaries of Portuguese Africa were officially drawn and recognised by the British, adding vast territories to the Empire which had not been effectively occupied by the Portuguese. In overall terms, the Treaty was beneficial to Portugal’s interests, but that was not the way the people saw it and that was not the way it went down in history either (Alexandre 2004: 977; Ramos 1994: 143-144).

Contrary to the British historiography, which has barely mentioned the 1890 Ultimatum, qualifying it as “one incident in the Scramble for Africa”, “mild” in tone and with minimal importance to British politics (Birmingham 1999: 111-112; Coelho 1990: 190), Portugal’s reaction to the British Ultimatum reached an all time point of nationalist hysteria and humiliation, which was duly encouraged by the Portuguese Republican Party who portrayed the royalist governments as kowtowing to British demands. “For the Portuguese, the Ultimatum became a painful wound which did not easily heal” (Coelho 1990: 190) and the republicans did not waste time stirring up that wound. Even the British press recognised it:

“No Englishmen, however, farsighted, probably foresaw the storm which this Lake Nyassa dispute has aroused in Portugal. It may perhaps be traced to three causes – to the excitable character of a southern people; to self-reproach felt by the Portuguese for their prolonged neglect of splendid colonial opportunities; and lastly... to republic intrigue” (The Guardian 19 February 1890, quoted in Coelho 2006: 5, my emphasis).

While the British press dismissed the diplomatic incident with patronising and chauvinistic expressions uttered against an “uncivilized, backward nation”, the Portuguese press accused Britain of being a despicable bully, a “greedy self-seeking, extortionate nation” (Coelho 1990; 2006; Howes 2007). A press war ensued between
both countries and public opinions were whipped to a frenzy with most of the British press siding with the official line, with the exception of the nationalist newspapers (i.e. Irish dailies, Howes 2007), and the Portuguese republican press asking for the King’s abdication for succumbing to British demands (O Século 14 January 1890). As Teresa Coelho argues (1990: 183), “it was mainly the republican press that converted the Ultimatum into a national trauma. The republicans spread the image of Portugal as a country in decay and seized the opportunity to proclaim themselves the redeemers of the Portuguese nation”.

As soon as the progressist government yielded to the British Ultimatum, the republican newspaper, O Século (12 January 1890), published on the front page an hysterical article predicting the bombardment of Lisbon and listing the injustices done by the British against the smaller ally.

“The English government, the philanthropic and honest English government, finally resorted to the argument that is most usual in her disagreements with the smaller peoples. It resorted to the argument of force! (...) Lisbon, our beloved and most charming Lisbon, bombed by English cannons! From where audacious discoverers departed and gave the world – and in the world, more than to any other people, to the British people – prodigious America and Asia, where England has her big empire, and Africa, where because of an insignificant point the present conflict emerged – [Lisbon], the city of brave and generous sailors destroyed by gunshots fired from battleships owned by the colonial nation pour excellence! It’s truly horrendous!”

42 “O Governo Inglês, o filantrópico e honesto governo Inglês, recorreu enfim ao argumento que lhe é usual nas discórdias com os povos pequenos. Recorreu ao argumento da força!... Lisboa, a nossa querida e formosíssima Lisboa, bombardeada pelos canhões de Inglaterra! A cidade de onde partiram os descobridores audazes que deram ao mundo – e no mundo, mais que a nenhum outro povo ao povo Britânico – a América prodigiosa e essa Ásia onde a Inglaterra tem o seu grande império e essa África por um ponto insignificante da qual se levantou o presente conflito – a cidade dos navegadores heróicos e
A day after the ultimatum was issued, a group of republicans managed to convene a crowd of 50,000 sympathisers in downtown Lisbon (Pulido Valente 1974: 39). On their way to the British Consulate, they marched up and down the streets shouting “Down with the Braganças!” and “Down with the pirates!” Patriotic demonstrations were held spontaneously in front of O Século and of the Lisbon Geographical Society, while the Premier’s house and the British Consulate were stoned. People invaded the National Theatre, a place usually frequented by British citizens, lowered the flag to half-mast and announced, “Today is not a show day, today is a day of mourning”\(^\text{43}\). More than fifty demonstrators were arrested that night, amongst them the republicans who had started the demonstrations, Alberto de Oliveira and Geraldino Gomes. The next day O Século (13 January 1890) denounced the absurdity of the arrests, “The Government betrayed the nation, now it arrests the patriotas”. Days later, the PRP Directorate published their manifesto in O Século (17 January 1890). In the political tract they speculated over an alleged conspiracy between the Bragança royal family and the British people against the Portuguese. As a solution to the royalist problem, the document suggested two outcomes: the establishment of a Republic and the replacement of the Anglo-Portuguese alliance with an Iberian Alliance. No other country resented England more than Spain. Therefore, Spain should become Portugal’s new ally, as the Anglo-Portuguese alliance had become synonymous with Portugal’s political and economic dependence on Britain (Coelho 1990: 179; Debates 18 January 1890; Ramos 1994: 69; Severiano Teixeira 1990: 108-109).

The PRP organised rallies, demonstrations and marches all over the country, while its mouthpiece, O Século, declared “Commercial war on England” (17 January 1890). A large number of hotels and commercial houses refused to serve British clients,

generosos destruída a tiros de peças pelos couraçados da nação colonial por excelência! É fantasticamente horrível!”.
\(^\text{43}\) “Hoje não é dia de espectáculo, é dia de luto”. 
brandishing placards on their front doors, announcing “We neither buy nor sell to the English” and “No lodging for English people”. Several newspapers decided to boycott the advertising of English goods while others published the brands of British goods on sale in Portugal as well as the shops that kept selling them so that the Portuguese knew which products and shops to avoid. Several streets in Lisbon were renamed after Portuguese Africanists (i.e. the Paiva de Andrade, Vitor Cordon and António Maria Cardoso streets). In Évora and other small towns, several streets were named after Serpa Pinto. Shops, schools and publications with English names were quickly changed to Portuguese. For instance, the newspaper O Reporter was renamed as O Portuguez. Those places that refused to change their English names were vandalised by the public. Proposals to purge the Portuguese language of English words and to ban the teaching of English from Portuguese schools were set in place. Students were excused from taking the English Language exam by government decree. A performance of Hamlet showing at the National Theatre was cancelled in order to prevent riots. Translations of Shakespeare’s works were embargoed until 1899. A Lisbon circus company, the Companhia de Circo do Coliseu, decided not to recruit any more English artists. The noun “ingles” (English) became synonymous of a person of lower morals. It started being used colloquially to qualify the actions of a thief (i.e. “uma inglesada” = a theft). Workers’ associations demonstrated against England at Largo das Necessidades and demanded that all British workers be replaced by Portuguese men. (Coelho 1990: 180, 182; Ferreira Duarte 2000: 104-105; Ramos 1994: 74-77, 79; Severiano Teixeira 1990: 112-118, 125-127).

A “national subscription” (Grande Subscrição Nacional) was also opened on 23 January 1890 outside the Dom Maria II Theatre under the banner of a huge rose-coloured map. Although the government and the royal family were absent from this republican initiative, everyone was invited to contribute financially, “from the capitalist
to the homeless”, so that a battleship and military artillery could be bought to ensure the “defence of the Pátria” (Ramos 1994: 72, 78; Severiano Teixeira 1990: 112-119). Members of the 1870 Generation and their successors also got involved in the National Subscription and other civic organisations created around the time. Teófilo Braga, Antero de Quental, Eça de Queirós, Oliveira Martins, Basílio Teles, Guerra Junqueiro, Magalhães Lima and others instigated the patriotic movement by using their influence and the prestige of their penmanship against Britain in the press (Coelho 1990: 179-180; Severiano Teixeira 1990: 124).

On 6 March, during a political rally organised in favour of the Subscrição Nacional, a new republican anthem was presented to the public. A Portuguesa was a patriotic song written by Lopes de Mendonça and composed by Alfredo Keil. The lyrics echoed the chauvinistic paranoia first expressed by the republican newspapers in the first days after the British Ultimatum. The chorus exulted everyone to march against the British cannons - Contra os canhões / Marchar / Marchar (Against the cannons / March / March). The anti-British anthem became so popular among the republicans in 1890 that after the Constitutional Monarchy was overthrown, the anthem was elevated to the status of national anthem, remaining the national anthem of Portugal to this day.

However, by March 1890, the regenerators in power became concerned that the popular displays of nationalism were jeopardising the ongoing negotiations with the British, and reacted to the nationalist uprising by adopting several repressive measures (i.e. Laws of 11 March and 7 April 1890). Censorship was decreed, the republican centres were closed, several republicans were arrested, the republican press was silenced by the Lei das Rolhas (Corks’ Law), O Século was occupied by the police, the Lisbon Municipal Chamber was dissolved, student meetings were forcefully disbanded and the regenerators tried, albeit unsuccessfully, to transfer the funds gathered by the
Subscrição Nacional to the state coffers\textsuperscript{44}. As a result of these repressive measures, the regenerators ensured their re-election on 30 March 1890. But, contrary to the regenerators’ wishes, the republicans also managed to do well in the elections. In coalition with a faction of the Progressist Party, the PRP managed to have 3 deputies elected. This was their biggest victory to date (Coelho 1990: 179; Ramos 1994: 106; Severiano Teixeira 1990: 91-95, 132-136).

Although the \textit{Lei das Rolhas} gagged the PRP (Ramos 1994: 302; Severiano Teixeira 1990: 135-140) and assuaged the nationalist fervour, when a treaty settling the colonial question was temporarily signed between Portugal and Britain in the summer of 1890, a new wave of nationalist indignation resurfaced. Oliveira Martins founded the Liga Liberal in Lisbon as a reaction to the new Treaty. In August, the Liga convened a meeting in São Luís Theatre and 400 military officers attended the gathering, wearing their uniforms. General indignation had reached the higher ranks of the military (Severiano Teixeira 1990: 87-88). The PRP and their electoral allies, the Progressist Party, joined forces and also initiated a new crusade against the Treaty. Nationalist demonstrations were organised all over the country, especially in Lisbon, Porto and Coimbra. In Lisbon, 40,000 people laid a wreath at the feet of Camões’s statue (Pulido Valente 1974: 39). By September 1890, the regenerator government fell and with it fell the 1890 Treaty. However, elections were not called. Rather, the regenerators were replaced by a non-partisan cabinet, headed by the monarchist General João Crisóstomo (1890-1892), who was a member of the Liga Liberal, enjoyed the support of military officers and had the King’s blessing. Both constitutionalist parties had lost much of their reputations over the issue of the Rose-Coloured Map (Couto 2008: 10).

Normality slowly returned to the streets. The PRP came out of this crisis with a newfound prestige and a boosted popularity. The party had already taken advantage of

\textsuperscript{44} In the end, the Subscription funds were used to buy a small cruiser - \textit{O Adamastor} – two gunboats and two smaller gunboats (Ramos 1994: 379).
the uproar caused by the Treaty of Lourenço Marques and had boosted their credentials during the Camões Tercentenary and the Marquis of Pombal Centenary. Now, with the incidents provoked by the British Ultimatum, which saw the progressists succumbing to the British and the regenerators imposing an unpopular treaty, the party had finally strengthened its reputation as the party of the people, the party of the nation. On 15 October 1890, when the republican Manuel Arriaga told the Chamber of Peers, “Enough already. Do not trust the enemy, trust us. Yes, us, the Pátria!”45 (cited in Severiano Teixeira 1990: 152), he compared the PRP to the nation, doing it with a confidence that resonated with the urban masses, who had been oppressed by the constitutionalist parties in the preceding months. As Guerra Junqueiro summarised it, “Republican and Patriot became synonymous. Today, whoever says Pátria, means Republic”46 (quoted in Chagas and Coelho 1901: 29). For the republicans what was at stake was very clear, “On one side, there was the monarchy with its old ally England who had not been repudiated. On the other, there was the nation against England and the monarchy”47 (Chagas and Coelho 1901: 23). As the Portuguese historian Vasco Pulido Valente argues (1974: 39-41), Portugal’s rights and interests became synonymous with the rights and interests of the PRP and Portugal’s struggle against England for independence became synonymous with the party’s fight against the monarchy. “The PRP incarnated Portugal”.

3.5. The 1891 Porto Republican Uprising

45 “Basta do que já está feito. Não confiem no inimigo, confiem em nós. Em nós, sim, na Pátria”.
46 “Republicano e Patriota tornaram-se sinónimos. Hoje, quem diz Pátria, diz Republica”.
47 “De um lado, fica a monarquia com a sua velha aliada a Inglaterra que não quis repudiar. Do outro, fica a nação contra Inglaterra e contra a monarquia”.

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After the *Lei das Rolhas* was decreed, a radical faction of the party began to emerge from the party’s lower ranks in the city of Porto, devising plans for a revolutionary coup d’état with the initial knowledge and consent of the Directorate. Whereas in Lisbon the PRP members still preferred a legal approach to the establishment of a Republic, in Porto, a handful of radicals led by the republican lawyer and journalist Alves da Veiga and the actor Santos Cardoso were convinced that only an armed revolution could overthrow the Monarchy. At no stage had the 1883 Project for the Definitive Organisation of the Republican Party referred to the means to be used for the establishment of the republican regime. The absence of a clear political strategy, that would ultimately result in the reform of the state, caused many divisions within the party, especially at this juncture, when the PRP was the victim of harsh repressive measures and the party had been stripped of their best electoral results to date by the rise of General João Crisóstomo.

Faced with the realisation that a small faction of the party was plotting a revolution, the Directorate split into two. One defended the electoral and civic action programme led by Elias Garcia and another sided with Homem de Cristo, who, weary of seeing the PRP sidetracked by the rotativist system and resentful of the repressive measures used by the constitutionalist parties, favoured an illegitimate take on power (Sousa 2001).

Despite the emerging contention within the party structures, in early January 1891, the Directorate managed to come together to draft and approve the party’s Official Programme at its Annual Congress. The Official Programme aimed to conciliate in the same document the programmes that had been devised in the preceding years, while at the same time it continued to emphasise its nationalist and interclassist ideology. Underlying its articulate was the main objective of the party, which was, in the words of the Portuguese historian Fernando Catroga (1991 vol. 1: 84), “the
consummation of the cultural revolution that was needed in order to complete the historical process initiated by liberalism, but that only the republic could raise to a state of bigger perfection." The programme, which can be found in Manual Político do Cidadão Portuguez by Trindade Coelho (1906: 638-642), was very innovative for the time and it echoed the ideological revolution that had taken place twenty years earlier.

The first two points of article 1 contemplated the decentralisation of the legislative and executive powers at two levels: the municipal level and the provincial level. True to the republican ideals, as first expressed by the romantic Alexandre Herculano and then adopted by the 1870 Generation, “municipal autonomy and decentralisation” were made a central part of the programme’s “political freedoms, or guarantees” (article 2.2).

The programme was also groundbreaking with concern to the emancipation of women, who were for the first time regarded by a political party as political individuals in their own right. Under section “political freedoms, or guarantees”, both “universal suffrage” and “representation of minority groups” were secured, including men and women within the social borders of the republican nation, whilst the rights of minorities inhabiting the territory of the state were safeguarded (article 2.2).

As far as the inclusion of the middle and working classes was concerned, the programme adopted a self-styled “social republicanism” without leaning towards open political “socialism” (so as not to alienate the middle class). It envisaged free primary education (article 2.1.), “universal suffrage” (article 2.2) – irrespective of economic and social background – “freedom of association, meeting and representation”, “freedom of employment and enterprise”, abolition of private monopolies (article 2.2), extinction of feudal forms of ownership, establishment of labour courts, acknowledgment of and

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48 "… a consumação da revolução cultural que seria necessária para completar o processo histórico iniciado com o liberalismo, mas que somente a republica poderia elevar a um estado de maior perfeição".
assistance to labour unions, creation of apprenticeships and defence of “the capitalisation” of small ownership (article 2.3).

The PRP’s programme was also very affirmative in its intention to secularise Portuguese society. In this respect, article 2.1. aimed to establish “freedom of conscience, and civil and political equality among all cults, abolition of [religious] oaths in all civil and political acts, mandatory civil registry of all births, marriages and deaths, (...) secularisation of all cemeteries and the creation of a national Pantheon for civic honours”. Furthermore, the programme defended “freedom of press, discussion and teaching”, the establishment of “mandatory, secular and free elementary education” (article 2.1), “the extinction of hereditary powers and privileges, the replacement of noble feudal titles with a system of civic rewards” and, last but not least, the creation of a true “national militia” by way of “military mandatory service” (article 2.2).

However, although the party managed to agree on the articulation of the republican ideological revolution in the shape of an official party programme, it failed miserably to agree on the most pressing question at hand – i.e. which tactics to employ in order to establish a republican regime.

The Grand-Mason Elias Garcia, who had travelled to Porto to dissuade the radicals from staging a revolution, was displaced from the Directorate in the Annual Congress elections, while Homem de Cristo joined Teófilo Braga, Jacinto Nunes and Bernardino Pinheiro in the PRP’s cupola. Together they agreed in principle to support the revolutionary coup being planned in Porto.

But the Directorate’s position changed in the space of three weeks. After Alves da Veiga and Santos Cardoso failed to recruit army officers to the revolutionary movement, they were only able to secure the participation of sergeants and enlisted men. During his time in power, General Crisóstomo had managed to alienate the lower

49 “Liberdade de consciência, e igualdade civil e política para todos os cultos. Abolição do juramento nos actos civis e políticos. Registo civil obrigatório para os nascimentos, casamento e óbitos. (…) Secularização dos cemitérios e criação de um Panteão nacional para as honras cívicas”.
ranks of the military by maintaining a block on the promotion of non-commissioned men in favour of low-ranked officers. By arguing that their corporativist resentments continued to be unaddressed, despite General Crisóstomo’s ascendency to power, enlisted men and sergeants started to question the political status quo and thought it would be in their best interests to ally themselves with the republicans (Catroga 1991 vol. 1: 120-121). The Directorate immediately withdrew their support and threatened to expel any republican members who took part in the conspiracy. The PRP of the late nineteenth century was still a bourgeois party who believed in top-down revolutions and refused to fall prey to revolutionary movements organised by civilians and sergeants (Sousa 2001).

However, contrary to the wishes of the Directorate, João Chagas, an influential republican journalist, instigated a military uprising, leading the revolutionaries to Porto’s city hall. From one of its balconies, Alves da Veiga made a dramatic proclamation of the Republic and named a provisional government (Chagas and Coelho 1974 [1891]: 31-33; Catroga 1991 vol. 1: 117-119; 122-126; Teles 1905; Wheeler 1978: 41).

Chagas and his men saw themselves as part of an historic messianic movement, i.e. as the successors of the 1383 and 1640 independentist movements, that had successfully rescued Portugal from Spanish control (Chagas and Coelho 1974 [1891]: 39). By seeing England as the newest threat against Portugal’s sovereignty, the Porto republicans attempted to mimic their “predecessor”. They were convinced that the only way to save Portugal from further humiliation was to overthrow the royalist regime by force as it had been an accomplice of England’s economic exploration for many centuries. As Chagas (Chagas and Coelho 1974 [1891]: 48, 51, 54) explained in his republican manifesto:
“There is no doubt: one word compiles the set of organic ideas tending to solve the present Lusitanian crisis. That word is on the lips of every Portuguese: it is Republic. It is of the utmost urgency that a Republic be established in our country or fatedly, with much shame, Portugal will disappear from the register of autonomous nations, chained to the parasitic monarchy, which, with no strength to keep [our] national dignity abroad, thinks it has got moral authority to suppress national freedom, citing the necessities of an agreement, which, in any case, is a capitulation. (…) The men of 31 January intended to put an end to this unworthy and intolerable situation once and for all. The reason that disposed them [to act] was, therefore, the purest and most candid patriotic [feeling]” 50 (authors’ emphasis).

That is why they took up arms “(…) so that the country saved itself from an irremediable catastrophe, if not acted upon on time (…)”51 (Chagas and Coelho 1974 [1891]: 46).

However, despite Chagas’s best intentions, within hours of the republican proclamation, the republican coup d’état collapsed. Most of the soldiers and civilians who had joined Alves da Veiga in the City Hall dispersed and twelve were killed as soon as the Municipal Guard and the royalist army reached the precincts (Catroga 1991 vol. 1: 127; Teles 1905). The revolutionaries were arrested and 505 soldiers were court-martialed. Around 205 people were convicted to sentences ranging from 18 months to

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50 “Não há que duvidar: uma palavra compendia o conjunto das ideias orgânicas tendentes a resolver a hodierna crise lusitana. Essa palavra está nos lábios de todos os portugueses; é a de Republica. É preciso, urgente, inadiável que se estabeleça a Republica no nosso país ou está escrito que, com ignominia, Portugal desapareça do cadastro das nações autônomas, acorrentado à monarquia parasitária, que, não tendo força para manter a dignidade nacional no exterior, se julga com autoridade moral para, alegando as necessidades de um convénio, que, todavia, é uma capitulação, sufocar a liberdade no interior. (…) O inimigo continua no gozo das vantajosas preferências dos convénios mercantis e proclama-se, como sempre, o fiel aliado. Os homens do 31 de Janeiro entenderam terminar por uma vez com esta situação indigna e intolerável. O móbil que os determinou foi, pois, o mais puro, o mais desinteressadamente patriótico”.

51 “(...) para que o país se salvasse duma catástrofe irremediável, desde que a tempo se lhe não acudisse, é que eles tomaram mão das armas”.
15 years in the African colonies. However, two years later, due to hostile public opposition to the harsh sentences, the revolutionaries were, with the exception of three officers, given an amnesty by King Dom Carlos (Wheeler 1978: 41). This ensured that most of those involved in the 1891 uprising were allowed to remain in Portugal. Most of them continued to conspire with the republican secret societies and were easily enticed to participate in future republican uprisings, namely in the successful 1910 Revolution (Croca Caeiro 1997: 69).

The Generation of 1890, who lived through the traumatic humiliation of the British Ultimatum while they were finishing their university years, became the revolutionaries of 1910. Their ideology was nationalism, their goal was the establishment of a Republic and the expansion of the Third Portuguese Empire, composed of the remaining colonies in Africa and Asia.

3.6. The Apparent Demise of the Portuguese Republican Party

Despite the PRP’s rise in popularity during the British Ultimatum, after the failure of the 1891 republican uprising in Porto, the party suffered a severe backlash that took several years to recover from.

The party still managed to receive 39.8% of the Lisbon votes in the 1892 elections, with four members elected to the lower chamber of the Cortes, and 42.2% of the Lisbon votes in the 1894 elections, resulting in the election of two deputies. However, the gagging effects felt by the Lei das Rolhas, the alliance with the progressists in 1894, the continuing monarchical repression against the republican centres, and the prevailing division within the republicans, which had resulted in the 1891 republican uprising without the support of the Directorate, caused great damage to
the party’s reputation and to its ability to work as a legitimate party in opposition. In the 1890s, most of the republican grassroots commissions were dissolved (Catroga 1991 vol. 1: 135-136). Almost no one participated in the republican centres and clubs. The republican newspapers had lost their voice.

In 1894, when the regenerator Hintze Ribeiro rose to power heading a cabinet with dictatorial powers (1893-1897), the party joined forces with the progressists, led by João Crisóstomo, the Premier who had defeated the Porto uprising in 1891. The “liberal coalition” formed between the progressists and the republicans against the regenerators lasted three years, and damaged the party’s reputation, causing further frictions within the PRP. As a result, in 1894, the radicals presented their own candidates for the elections, running against the official candidates of the PRP. Although the party managed to have two deputies elected, its association with the progressists did not bring any actual benefits to the republicans. As we saw above, in 1895, the regenerators passed a new electoral law, which restricted the electoral college to all men aged over 21 years old, who could read and write, or who earned more than 500$00 réis. As a sign of protest, the PRP boycotted the elections and stayed out of the electoral roll until 1900 when it won enough votes to send three Porto deputies to the Cortes.

In the meantime, the regenerators took advantage of their powers. After they undermined the power of the PRP’s electorate by removing their voting rights, the ruling party reformed the Municipal Guard in Lisbon and Porto, effectively turning it into a repression weapon against popular unrest and disorder, using it against those who dared to oppose the government. Furthermore, the regenerators passed an anti-anarchist law in 1896 that provided the government with a legal weapon aimed at repressing any political activity that might challenge the government. On top of that the Lei das Rolhas remained in force until 1900, ensuring that the republicans were unable to express their views freely. Eventually, these measures limited the PRP’s political projection to a
group of middle class intellectuals. For many years, it seemed that the republicans had returned to their initial intellectual core and had lost the popular support they had mustered with such diligence (Catroga 1991 vol. 1: 56, 136; Pulido Valente 1974: 17-18).

At the turn of the century, the monarchy seemed to be gaining further ground against the republicans. In 1901, a second electoral law passed by Hintze Ribeiro (1900-1904), reshaped the electoral circles by transferring electoral power from the urban centres to the small towns. The urban circles were merged with the rural circles into twenty-one large electoral circles in which the cities had no majority. Furthermore, in a desperate attempt to breathe some life into the PRP, the party decided in the 1902 Congress to approve a new party structure. It was believed that the best way to resuscitate the party was to give more power to the grassroots supporters at the expense of the Directorate. As a result three new regional juntas were created (North, Centre and South), which were meant to operate under the Directorate. However, this strategy backfired, as the party had no logistical means or strength to deal with local issues. The PRP was a national party and its ideology only resonated with the urban masses of Lisbon. By 1903, the party had no branches in most of the local parishes. In Porto, Coimbra and Setubal, there were a few disjointed republican groups but no municipal commissions (Pulido Valente 1974: 18-19, 63).

However, matters changed in 1903. The republican generation of the Ultimatum had come of age and they were determined to roll up their sleeves and start the arduous but fast-paced reconstruction of the Portuguese Republican Party that would lead to the October Revolution.
4.1. Introduction

So far we have seen how the revolutionary process, that resulted in the successful overthrow of the Constitutional Monarchy in 1910, evolved from Phase One to Phase Two. In Chapter Two we saw how Phase One played out - an emerging group of nationalist intellectuals, namely the 1870 Generation, challenged the ideological status quo and called for full liberalisation of the regime along republican lines. Of these intellectuals, Teófilo Braga is, according to this thesis, the most crucial intellectual in opposition as his academic works created the ideological background for the emergence of the Portuguese Republican Party.

In Chapter Three, we saw how the ideological revolution of Phase One led to Phase Two of the revolutionary process, by which the PRP was formed with the main purpose of contesting elections, mobilising the people against the Constitutional Monarchy and creating political agitation in the urban centres. After the approval of the 1883 Project for the Definitive Organisation of the Republican Party, the party gained political consistency, tacitly following an electoral strategy with the aim of reforming the ruling regime from within.

However, the party’s marginal victories at the polls, coupled with two instances of short-lived dictatorial spells, prevented the republican deputies from taking their seats in the Cortes. This called into question the strategy of institutional approach to state reform, especially after the British Ultimatum. Outside the Cortes, the party had strived to mobile the people to their national cause by creating anti-clerical traditions.
and ceremonies and demonstrating against the 1879 Lourenço Marques Treaty and the 1890 British Ultimatum. The latter created such a nationalist frenzy among the people that the governments in power decreed several repressive measures, splitting the party into two factions, a moderate and a radical faction. The latter planned and carried out the failed 1891 Porto republican uprising that followed the British Ultimatum, resulting in the imposition of more repressive measures by the public authorities. At the end of the century, it seemed that the party’s demise was imminent.

In this Chapter, we will turn our attention to the analysis of Phase Three, which marked the consolidation of a revolutionary alliance, resulting in the successful overthrow of the Constitutional Monarchy. We will see how in the first years of the twentieth century, the republicans reorganised themselves and embarked on a campaign to win the hearts and minds of the emerging urban working class without any serious competition from other class parties in opposition. We will also see how the party’s reputation was boosted by a series of political and economic crises which troubled the regime in the last decade of the Constitutional Monarchy, putting in question its political legitimacy and credibility.

Finally, we will analyse the creation of the revolutionary coalition formed by the PRP, the Carbonária, the Masonry and the low ranks of the armed forces. Tapping into the people’s frustration with the current regime, the PRP Directorate officialised a revolutionary alternative for the achievement of their republican aims, while maintaining the electoral strategy they had adopted since its inception. Before and during Franco’s Dictatorship (1906-1908), several members of the Directorate struck a tentative alliance with the Carbonária and several army and navy soldiers. After the failure of the 1906 warship mutinies and the 1908 Lisbon uprising, the repercussions of which culminated in the King’s assassination by the Carbonária, the revolutionary path continued, but this time in earnest and with the Directorate at the helm. At a time when
the high ranks of the army had become disillusioned with the actions of the new king (the young and inexperienced Dom Manuel), the PRP created a revolutionary committee (Lisbon Executive Commission) which organised the Carbonária, the Masonry and the lower ranks of the army and navy into an effective revolutionary front. After a couple of failed attempts, the republicans eventually managed to overthrow the Constitutional Monarchy on 5 October 1910 without much opposition from the loyalist forces and the constitutionalist politicians.

4.2. The Resurgence of the PRP

After spending a few years in a dormant state, the PRP saw a resurgence in 1903. At the turn of the century, Portugal was a different country embroiled in a serious economic and social crisis. From the end of the 1890s to 1910, there was an industrial surge that saw the opening of the first factories and commercial banks, while foreign investment grew. As a consequence of the introduction of new technological and mechanised means of production, the cost of living raised, the fiscal burden on the working and rural classes became relentless and unemployment increased exponentially. Strikes and street riots paralysed many cities and towns and the army were sent in to put down some of the most violent demonstrations (Pulido Valente 1974: 64; Villaverde Cabral 1988: 124-129). Although strike action was illegal in Portugal at the time, that did not stop people from demonstrating against meagre wages and worsening living and working conditions. From 1887 to 1908, the number of strikes reached 1,428, most of them taking place in Lisbon and some of them lasting for as long as three months. This is a rather remarkable number if one bears in mind that from 1871 to 1886, the national press had only reported 140 strikes (Ramos 1994: 243; Villaverde Cabral 1988: 76, 124-
The labour unions intensified their actions, and by the eve of the Republican Revolution, a general strike blocked the industrial cities of Barreiro, Lisbon, Almada, Setúbal, Évora, São Bartolomeu de Messines, Abrantes and Sines (Villaverde Cabral 1988: 129).

Against this background, the republicans broadened their recruitment strategy and joined forces with the urban petite bourgeoisie, who started showing an appetite for political militancy. The republicans accused the Constitutional Monarchy of overtaxing the people, contributing to the budget deficit and increasing the national debt so that the king and his politicians could live comfortably off the state coffers. The petite bourgeoisie that supported the republicans agreed with this reading of the economic crisis. The urban middle class felt excluded from the lucrative deals and all the prestigious positions in the state apparatus. For them, Portugal belonged to an oligarchic caste that pillaged the state for their own advantage. The worst crime committed by them was influence peddling. According to the republican newspaper, O Mundo, in 1904, 52 of the most influential monarchic politicians held between themselves 263 jobs, which made an average of 4.7 jobs per head. Apart from their political careers in the Cortes and in the government, the monarchic politicians were members of the boards of directors of several major Portuguese and foreign companies. For the republicans, this constituted a double crime of corruption and betrayal to the pátria (Pulido Valente 1974: 42-45).

A dissatisfied working class also turned to the PRP to defend their interests, as the anarchists continued to preach electoral abstinence and the socialists were still connected to the constitutionalist parties while refusing to admonish clericalism and the ruling regime (Pulido Valente 1974: 64, 68).

The PRP was the only party that promised a serious social and political transformation for everyone, while pointing an accusing finger at the Monarchy and the
clergy for the state of perpetual corruption and bankruptcy that Portugal lived in. The PRP faced no serious competition from other parties in opposition. The anti-anarchist law of 1895, which was aimed at any political groupings that espoused a leftist revolutionary attitude, had considerably weakened the Socialist Party (PS). Furthermore, in the 1902 National Congress of the Class Association, where the socialists had a predominant position, an anti-strike resolution was approved, declaring that only one strike could be called at any one time. Neither could strike action take place without the approval of the Association and of the local Federation (Villaverde Cabral 1988: 78-79). By approving this resolution, the Class Association attempted to keep social upheaval under control, while showing to the constitutionalist parties that they could be seen as a credible interlocutor between the government and the working class. The socialists were also afraid that any perceived incitement to public disorder might jeopardise their chances in the polls.

However, the anti-strike resolution infuriated the working class who were desperate to bring public attention to their plight. As was already mentioned above, in spite of the resolution, strikes continued to be called throughout the decade. The sectors mostly affected by the wave of strikes were the textile, cork and canned fish industries along with construction and transport services, based in the capital and in the outskirts of Lisbon, where the labour movement was the strongest (Villaverde Cabral 1988: 131).

As if that was not enough to alienate the working class and throw it into the arms of the republicans, a unionist movement also failed to emerge at the national level when it pre-empted the unification of the labour class by declaring that only salaried workers could become part of the movement. Such a condition alienated the rural workers, the small landowners and the farmers, causing a major division between a minority of industrial workers based in the largest cities and towns and a majority of rural workers living in the rest of the country (Villaverde Cabral 1988: 132). It comes as
no surprise, therefore, that the republicans eventually benefited from the political void left by the Socialist Party and the labour unions when they failed to fully represent the working class in its entirety as well as their grievances. As the historian Pulido Valente (1974: 68) points out, “despite the resistance showed by the unions and the PS, the majority of the manufacturing and workshop workers ‘abandoned the struggle for emancipation’ and, as the [working class newspaper] A Greve said, followed ‘blindly and suggestively’ the bombastic republican train”52.

The PRP captivated the attention of the urban disaffected and disenfranchised classes and, in no time, the party started expanding again under the leadership of António José de Almeida and Bernardino Machado, a former regenerator minister converted to republicanism.

Of the 32 republican clubs operating in Lisbon in 1908, five had opened their doors in 1903, five in 1904, three in 1905, two in 1906 and seventeen in 1907. The last figure was largely due to João Franco’s Dictatorship and the opposition it caused among the people in Lisbon, as we will see below. In April 1910, the PRP was effectively running 130 municipal commissions, 258 parish commissions and twelve district commissions. In the same year, there were 160 republican newspapers and publications linked to the PRP. The party had 165 republican centres based in Continental Portugal (only 21 in Lisbon), five in Brazil, one in Lourenço Marques and one in Azores. These numbers are impressive when compared to the 19 centres in Lisbon and the 23 in the rest of Portugal that survived the repression that followed the 1890 British Ultimatum in the last decade of the nineteenth century (see Section 3.2.). The centres organised fund-raising activities for the party and dance balls for the members. They functioned as propaganda points, where speeches were given, important republican dates were commemorated, men were urged to register as voters, and poor children learned to read

52 “(...) apesar de toda a resistência dos sindicatos e do PS, a maioria dos operários fabris e oficinais ‘abandonou a luta pela sua emancipação’ e, como dizia A Greve, seguir ‘cega e sugestionada’ o bombástico comboio republicano”.

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and write. As far as the republican schools were concerned, in 1907, there were thirteen of which eight were based in Lisbon. As soon as the party gained popular strength the three regional juntas, created in the 1902 Congress, disappeared and in 1906 they were formally abolished. Once again, in light of the numbers stated above, the predominance of the capital in the resurgence of the party shows how much the PRP continued to be a phenomenon of the urban masses (all data from Catroga 1991 vol. 1: 57 and Anexo IV; Pulido Valente 1974: 68, 71, 75; Ramos 1994: 340-341; Rêgo 2008: 37, 97, 105).

Equally important to the expansion of the PRP was the party’s return to the polls, where they attempted to capitalise on the growing social disaffection. With the Directorate back in charge of the party, the politics of contention were once again focused mainly on Lisbon and that was reflected in the voting preferences of the electorate. Between 1900 and 1910, the republican vote increased by 491% in the western circle of Lisbon and 444% in the eastern circle. Outside of Lisbon, though, the PRP failed to mobilise the electorate. Only in 1908, when the number of republican representatives in the Cortes increased from four to seven, did the party manage to win 12 municipalities, while in 1910 the PRP won majorities in the industrial city of Setubal and the southern agricultural town of Beja. In any case, the electoral campaigns were also a good opportunity to convert the people to the republican ideals and to create a sense of communion with those who no longer believed that the monarchy and the political oligarchy ruling the regime could revitalise the country (Catroga 1991 vol. 1: Anexo IV; Pulido Valente 1974: 68, 70-71, 75; Ramos 1994: 340-341).

From 1904 onwards, the number of demonstrations, marches and parades organised by the PRP increased dramatically. Any excuse was a good excuse to bring the people out onto the streets and to shout insults and accusations at the government. Invariably the Municipal Guard or the army were called in to bring order. Several people were usually arrested and a few were killed in these incidents. However, the
bloody outcome always played in favour of the republicans. As Pulido Valente says (1974: 74) “No matter what [the regime] did, it was helpless. The PRP, on the other hand, only had to provoke the violence and then denounce the consequences indignantly”\(^{53}\). The party made the most of these encounters, by condemning the monarchists’ repressive and abusive measures, while its mouthpiece, \textit{O Mundo}, approved the violent tactics pursued by the PRP. According to that republican newspaper, “(...) ‘parties like the Republican Party need[ed] violence’, because ‘only an outrageous and clamorous persecution’ could create ‘the necessary revolutionary environment for the acquisition of power’”\(^{54}\) (cited in Pulido Valente 1974: 73).

\textbf{4.3. Monarchy in Crisis}

The unification of the republicans under the banner of the PRP and the successful conversion of the urban masses to the republican ideals was also made possible thanks to a serious of scandals that weakened the Constitutional Monarchy in the first decade of the twentieth century. \textit{Rotativismo} came to an end with the splintering of the dominant constitutionalist parties from 1901 onwards and with João Franco’s dictatorship (1906-1908). The shattered political landscape was further damaged by a series of crises that devastated the political reputation of the Constitutional Monarchy. The tobacco scandal (1904-1906), the “cash advances” question (1906-1907), the students general strike (1907), the aforementioned João Franco Dictatorship (1906-1908), the regicide (1908), the increasing influence of the Catholic Church over the royal family (1909) and the Crédito Predial bankruptcy (1910)

\(^{53}\) “[O regime] fizesse o que fizesse, estava perdido. Ao PRP, em contrapartida, bastava provocar a violência e, depois, denunciar indignamente as consequências”.

\(^{54}\) “(...) ‘partidos como o republicano precis[avam] da violência’”, porque “‘só uma perseguição acintosa e clamorosa’ criaria ‘o ambiente revolucionário indispensável à conquista do poder’”
depleted the regime of its political legitimacy, alienated the people and the armed forces, set the stage for the failed 1906 warship mutinies and 1908 Lisbon uprising, and opened the door for the consolidation of the Republican Party, as the true defender of the nation’s interests.

At the turn of the century, the constitutionalist parties fragmented into splinter groups headed by the regenerators João Franco and Jacinto Cândido, and the progressist José Maria de Alpoim who formed the Liberal Regenerator Party in 1901, the Nationalist Party in 1903 and the Progressist Dissidence in 1905, respectively. In the space of four years, the two main constitutionalist parties saw the emergence of three new parties who competed for power against each other while trying to fend off the republican threat. As a consequence, it became impossible for non-coalition governments to win a majority of seats in the Cortes (Wheeler 1987: 43). The fragmentation of the political system dictated the end of rotativismo and increased political instability (from 1901 to 1910 there were 10 governments). This worked in favour of the republicans, as the PRP saw the number of elected deputies rise from four in 1906 to fourteen in 1910 (see Section 3.3.).

In parallel with the end of rotativismo, the political oligarchy was undermined by political and financial scandals that were duly explored by the republicans in the Cortes and in the streets to their own advantage.

Between 1903 and 1906, both the Regenerator Party and the Progressist Party compromised greatly their political credibility by being directly involved in the corrupt business of the tobacco monopoly, known in Portuguese historiography as the “tobacco question”. The tobacco question initially started in 1891, when the government in power sought a political deal with the French Henry Burnay, who founded the Compagnie des Tabacs Portugal, granting him the monopoly of the tobacco business in exchange for an annual rent, a 60% share of the profits and a loan of 36,000 contos. Under these
conditions, the government was able to pay its short-term loans and secure another foreign loan whose interest rate was meant to be paid with the tobacco revenue. The Portuguese state was at the time facing an enormous internal and external debt and found in the tobacco monopoly a temporary respite for its financial problems. In his own right, entrepreneur Henry Burnay became an indispensable partner of the Portuguese state, managing to attain an usurping influence over governmental decisions in exchange for financial cooperation (Lima 2009: 574; Mata 2005: 11).

In 1906, the tobacco contract was revised, as its expiration was imminent. However the negotiations that preceded the revision of the contract ended in the fall of two regenerator and one progressist cabinets in the space of two years. Although a public bid for the concession of the tobacco business extended the number of competitors who were interested in the monopoly, the Compagnie des Tabacs once again obtained the status of best proposal. This caused much controversy in the Cortes and led to accusations of corruption and favouritism. The PRP benefited greatly from this, as it was the only party who had never been involved in the tobacco negotiations (Mata 2005: 23, 25-26). As a Portuguese economic historian Maria Eugénia Mata (2005: 25) observes, the “tobacco revision” was a “true political nightmare”:

“The Progressist government was not unanimous in approving the contract. In the Parliament the discussion of the contract degenerated into a turmoil in which the furniture was destroyed. Political meetings against the “tobacco gang” led to social unrest by the end of 1905. The political regime was accused of corruption and financial inefficiency. As the opposition (the Regenerador Party) was also involved in past tobacco negotiations, the accusations were mutual between the two parties of the monarchy. The Republican ideology alone was free from responsibilities, as an outsider of the constitutional regime. The Republican
movement accused the king and the monarchy. Institutions were under fire. The society’s tolerance of them came to an end”.

The scandal of the tobacco monopoly caused much political upheaval inside and outside the Cortes and boosted the republican credentials among the low ranks of the navy. On 8 and 13 April 1906, navy petty and warrant officers rebelled in the Dom Carlos cruiser and in the Vasco da Gama dreadnought. Their aim was to establish a republican regime that would bring better conditions to their branch of arms and “fair” promotions to those who didn’t attend the Army School. Just as had happened in the 1891 Porto uprising, corporativist resentments were linked to calls for the demise of the monarchy, proving the republicans’ ability to tap into the resentments of low rank soldiers. The republican mutiny was immediately put down by loyalist forces. However, it created an important precedent for the emerging Carbonária, a republican secret society, that had successfully managed to recruit several low rank soldiers to the uprising.

The political situation was so out of control that King Dom Carlos decided to break with tradition and call a leader outside of the rotativista parties to form a government. In May 1906, João Franco formed a government of “liberal concentration” with the support of the Progressist Party. Five years after the Liberal Regenerator Party had been formed, João Franco capitalised on the support and acceptance of those monarchists who saw both the progressists and the regenerators lose political capital over the tobacco question. After the fall of regenerator Hintze Ribeiro, the liberal regenerators emerged as a possible solution to the political mayhem created by the latest scandal.

On 15 August 1906, Franco dissolved the Cortes and called for new elections, hoping that his party would win a majority in the Lower Chamber as had happened to
the incumbent government since the beginning of the Regeneration era. However, with the death of rotativismo, Franco did not get the majority he had anticipated. In fact, the liberal regenerators only managed to elect 70 franquistas against 43 progressists, 30 regenerators and 4 republicans (Afonso Costa, António José de Almeida, Alexandre Braga and João de Meneses) (Villaverde Cabral 1988: 149).

After a series of negotiations, the progressists, decided to support João Franco’s government, as did the republicans, albeit tacitly. Franco had promised to clean the regime from above, banish the political, cosy agreements that had ensured the rotativista system for several decades, and to put an end to the public handouts allocated from a special fund that maintained both parties in power by dispensing payouts to the respective caciquistas. The PRP hoped to benefit from the cleansing of the old Regeneration system and the beginning of a new democratic era in Portugal (Villaverde Cabral 1988: 49-50).

However, it did not take long before fissures started to show between the franquistas and the republicans. The leader of the liberal regenerators failed to pass the Law of Public Accountancy which would have put an end to the special funds. In November 1906, João Franco aggravated the republicans even more when he decided to solve the question surrounding cash advances granted to the royal family (adiantamentos). Since the reign of Dom João VI (1816-1825), the Civil List had not been raised. For almost a century, the royal family had been living on the same amount of money that had been approved by the Portuguese Cortes in 1821. As a result, the Monarchy accumulated a large public debt over the decades, which also included expenses paid for state visits to Portugal by foreign heads of state. The King and his family were financially supported by cash advances granted by the constitutionalist governments, who in a twisted way also owed money to the royal family for the use of buildings owned by the royal family. After declaring the cash advances illegal, João
Franco called for a reform that would resolve the problem by settling the public accounts squarely in a way that benefited both the Monarchy and the State (Ramos 1994: 283; Ramos 2001: 141).

However, the PRP did not agree with this reform and was scandalised by the fact that the Monarchy had been living off the state in secret for so many decades. They saw the reform as a devious way to fill the King’s coffers and engaged in a ferocious parliamentarian debate. On 20 November 1906, Afonso Costa said in the Cortes, “Louis XIV’s head rolled in the gallows for less than what Dom Carlos did”55 (quoted in Veríssimo Serrão 1997: 120). Such affirmation resulted in his and Alexandre Braga’s suspension for one month, causing much uproar among their republican followers. Immediately, public demonstrations were organised in favour of Afonso Costa and 63 people were arrested. A few days later 12,000 people attended a republican rally in Porto. When Afonso Costa and Alexandre Braga returned to the Cortes they were presented with a message of support signed by 45,000 people56.

However, the final straw that alienated the republicans from Franco came with the academic strike of March and April 1907. The academic strike started when José Eugénio Dias Ferreira failed his viva in the Law School of the University of Coimbra by unanimous decision. José Eugénio Ferreira was the son of former Premier José Dias Ferreira, and a law student who had joined the PRP in January and dedicated his thesis to Teófilo Braga. When he failed his viva, his colleagues accused the University of Coimbra of being biased and reactionary. They immediately demanded an education reform that opened the curriculum and the academic staff to a new generation of intellectuals who defended rational and scientific ideas. The students ceased to attend classes and exerted their colleagues to boycott their lectures. Soon, the academic strike

55 “Por menos do que fez o Senhor D. Carlos, rolou no cadafalso a cabeça de Luís XIV.”
spread to the rest of the country. Students organised rallies, demonstrations and sit-ins. They occupied university halls and classrooms. António José de Almeida, Teófilo Braga, Brito Camacho, João Chagas and Guerra Junqueiro expressed their public support for the students – as they, themselves, had also been asking for a secular education reform for many years – and even more so after Franco decreed several repressive measures that resulted in a ban of public meetings and rallies. On 11 April 1907, the Prime Minister passed another decree banning freedom of expression. The decree was an updated version of the Lei das Rolhas. The republican newspapers, O Mundo, O País, A Vanguarda and 21 other newspapers of various ideological backgrounds were suspended between June and December 1907. Eventually the students saw some of their demands met and the academic strikes dwindled down. For instance, the reactionary dean of the University of Coimbra was replaced by the moderate João Alarcão; the mandatory religious oath was abolished; Bernardino Machado, who as a lecturer at Coimbra had been persecuted by his colleagues for his defence of the students, was left alone; and an amnesty was declared for those students, mostly republicans, who had been the target of disciplinary enquiries. In due course, the students returned to the classrooms, especially when the exams season started looming (Neves Leal Gonçalves 2007; Pulido Valente 1974: 75; Ramos 2001: 162-163; Xavier 1962).

After the republicans, and then, the progressists withdrew their support from the government, the King decided to bury the rotativista system once and for all. He gave permission to Franco to dissolve the Cortes and rule over a de facto dictatorship with the support of Jacinto Cândido and his Catholic Nationalist Party (Pulido Valente 1974: 30; Ramos 2001: 148-152). The PRP’s protests fell on deaf ears and the PRP’s Directorate became more convinced than ever that the only way to put an end to the franquista threat was to engage in a revolutionary conspiracy. This episode marked the
beginning of the party’s opening to a true revolutionary conspiracy (Pulido Valente 1974: 75).

One of Franco’s first executive acts was to pass a Decree that endeavoured to solve the question of the adiantamentos once and for all (Decree of 30 August 1907). The rent owed by the state to the royal family was liquidated and the Civil List was raised by 60% to a total of 160 contos yearly. The fact that the question of advances was solved outside parliament without proper public discussion on the merits of the initiative was enough to infuriate the PRP, who immediately accused the constitutionalist parties of supporting the royal family with much needed public money, contributing even further to the already dire state of the budget. The republicans and their supporters did not see the Decree as settling an old issue that had caused much financial annoyance to both sides, but rather as a way for Franco to maintain the King’s support during his dictatorship. Furthermore, the republicans saw the “question of advances” as a much awaited admission of political corruption, whereby the royal family and the constitutionalist parties had reached a compromise outside of public scrutiny that allowed them to live off public moneys. At a time when unemployment was soaring, the cost of living was rising, the number of expats and strikes was increasing, and labour unrest was causing bloodbaths in Lisbon and the outskirts, the republicans made the most out of the scandal and accused the regime of bankrupting the country at the expense of the working and middle classes just to feed off the expensive lifestyle of the royal family (Ramos 1994: 283; 2001: 141-144).

Furthermore, Franco also used his authoritative powers to settle the tobacco question. Amid strong criticism from the Republican Party, Franco decreed that the tobacco monopoly should be administered directly by the state once the existing contract expired. The republicans opposed the decree vehemently as they were convinced that such an arrangement would increase corruption and embezzlement
among the ruling elites, as the government in power would also have control over the huge amount of money amassed by the monopoly.

By late 1907, opposition to Franco’s dictatorship became unmanageable and personal dissidences to the republican side commenced. The former progressist Prime Minister, Anselmo Braamcamp Freire, joined the PRP, as did the President of the Upper Chamber of the Cortes and former dean of the University of Lisbon, the progressist Augusto José da Cunha (Pulido Valente 1974: 30).

On 28 January 1908, the police were alerted by a repentent republican conspirator to a plot that was being organised in Lisbon by several leaders of the PRP, the Carbonária, low rank soldiers in the navy and in the Lisbon army garrison, and several monarchists affiliated with the Progressist Dissidence Party. About a hundred people were arrested. The PRP deputies Afonso Costa and António José de Almeida, the journalist João Chagas and the carbonário Luz de Almeida were jailed for conspiring against the Monarchy. It was more evident than ever that the regime was cracking when the monarchists sided with the Republican Party. The PRP was ready to take advantage of the situation, change its tactics and pursue an open attack on the Monarchy (Catroga 1991 vol. 1: 141-142; Villaverde Cabral 1988: 153; Wheeler 1978: 44).

Franco persuaded the King to sign a decree ordering the immediate deportation to the colonies of the political prisoners without trial (Couto 2008: 17; Ramos 2001: 167-168; Wheeler 1978: 44). Dom Carlos reluctantly conceded, radicalising even more the republicans and the Carbonária. What followed was the assassination of the King on 1 February 1908.

The royal family was returning from a vacation in their Bragança estate at Vila Viçosa, when the carbonários Manuel Buíça and Alfredo Costa approached the royal coach in downtown Lisbon and assassinated King Dom Carlos and Crown Prince Dom
Luís Filipe. The carbonários were instantly killed by the police on the spot (Couto 2008: 17; Wheeler 1978: 44). Two other regicides, Fabricio de Lemos and José Maria Nunes, managed to escape alongside fourteen carbonários who had been strategically positioned downtown to support the regicide. Their testimonies, collected at a later stage, provide a colourful picture of the assassination plot, including the fact that the regicide had initially been planned in late 1907 in Paris with French anarchists, the rifles used had been passed on to them after the failed 28 January coup, and the plot had been financed by members of the Progressist Dissidence (Albuquerque 1909; Nunes 2008 [1912]).

There was not much opposition to the regicide among the general population. After Franco’s dictatorship, the people had come to associate Dom Carlos with despotism. The “cash advances question” also alienated most of the urban population, who saw the royal family as ransacking the public coffers (Pulido Valente 1974: 44). There was little sympathy for the Monarchy. In fact, while the King and his son were buried in a very discreet funeral ceremony, the regicides were honoured as heroes and martyrs by the republicans and during their obsequies 80,000 people marched in procession to the cemetery (O Mundo, 17 February 1908: 2). A month later, a republican rally organised in Lisbon in honour of the regicides drew as many as 50,000 people (A Lucta, 30 March 1908).

Following the assassination of King Dom Carlos, his youngest son, Dom Manuel II, not yet eighteen years old, was crowned King of Portugal. The royal family blamed Franco for the radicalisation of politics and ultimately for the regicide. He was immediately sacked by the new King and went into exile in Spain (Couto 2008: 18). Dom Carlos’s Minister of the Navy and Minister of War were also dismissed and banned from the King’s funeral. Such a humiliating punishment alienated the high ranks
of the military and made them indifferent to the fate of the Monarchy (Croca Caeiro 1997: 89).

Fearful that the monarchy might be attacked again, the newly appointed left-wing Premier Admiral Ferreira do Amaral, head of a supra-party government (“governo de acalmação”), reinstated freedom of press and expression, granted a full amnesty to the sailors involved in the 1906 mutinies, released from prison the republicans jailed for the 28 January plot and called new elections (Couto 2008: 18).

But despite Ferreira do Amaral’s best efforts to appease the increasingly revolutionary mood, the country remained more divided than ever. The high ranks of the army, for instance, were shocked with the Premier’s decision to cleanse the Lisbon garrison of all officers who had supported Franco, mostly Africanists. More than that, they were stunned to see the 28 January republicans back on the streets (see Colonel Alfredo Augusto de Albuquerque in Teixeira de Sousa 1913: 172).

But the army was not the only corporation that was disappointed with the new government. The republicans did not see any difference between the current supra-party cabinet and the outgoing dictator. Newspapers were still being arbitrarily closed, journalists were arrested for publishing opinions contrary to the official line, and the people were still being killed by the Municipal Guard in Lisbon (Couto 2008: 18). In April 1908, on election day, clashes between republicans and the Municipal Guard resulted in “nine people dead and around a hundred injured”57 (O Século, 7 April 1908). “A slaughter”, as O Paiz (8 April 1908) called it, while the fallen were branded by the republican newspaper A Vanguarda (6 April 1908) as “victims (...) sacrificed by the monarchy (...).” “The massacre has begun!”, declared the same periodical, adding, “Bandits govern us!”, the ones who have “driven the nation to misery and dishonour”58.

57 “(...) nove cadáveres e cerca de cem feridos”.
58 “vítimas (...) sacrificadas pela monarquia. (...) começou o massacre! Governam os bandidos” [que têm] levado a nação à miséria e à desonra”.

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In the midst of the political upheaval, the PRP’s reputation as the true saviour of the nation continued to grow. The party came out of the crisis stronger than ever. Franco’s dictatorship had “promoted” the PRP as the champion of freedom. Their fight against the ruling oligarchy echoed among the urban masses. With the tobacco and the advances scandals, people had started to question the ruling regime and its ability to bring real change to the country. Such a realisation was converted into political votes in favour of the PRP. In 1908, despite the restrictive electoral laws, the party had 7 members elected to the Cortes, won the Lisbon Municipal Chamber and several seats in ten other small towns outside Lisbon (Couto 2008: 19).

After the regicide, the country fell into serious political turmoil. From February 1908 to October 1910, six different governments tried to bring stability to the country to no avail.

The scandals did not cease either.

After the assassination of King Dom Carlos in 1908, public opinion became wary of the influence of the clergy over the political affairs of the country, this time around, over the royal family. The Queen Mother Dona Amélia became the dominant figure in the family due to her son’s young age. Dona Amélia was very much considered a pious person and soon the rumours started. The republican newspapers (e.g. O Mundo, A Vanguarda and O Norte) began an offensive campaign against the Queen Mother, accusing her of being controlled by the Jesuits. This claim was not altogether erroneous if one takes in consideration the fact that after King Dom Carlos’s assassination, the regime started to change its stance on secularism.

In 1909, two incidents involving the Church scandalised public opinion, prompting the republicans to organise a demonstration demanding more rigorous anticlerical measures. According to the historian Pulido Valente, almost 100,000 people convened in central Lisbon. In the first incident, a parliamentary enquiry was requested
after the Church was found holding illegal seminars that had not been duly vetted by the government. When the bishops refused to respond to the accusation, the enquiry was closed, showing a lack of stamina on the part of the governing cabinet to control an increasingly defiant Catholic Church. In the second incident, two teachers were dismissed from their positions at a Catholic seminar by the Bishop of Beja without the respective political agencies being notified. When the government learned about the incident, it demanded the reinstatement of the teachers. The Bishop of Beja appealed to the Patriarch who appealed to the Queen Mother. Under pressure from Dona Amélia, the government simply annulled the order that it had previously issued (Pulido Valente 1974: 48-52).

All in all, after the death of King Dom Carlos, the influence of the clergy over the royal family became obvious. Even the constitutionalist parties recognised this and sided with the republicans. The behaviour of the royal family, together with the newfound courage of the clergy to openly enter into conflict with the political parties and the ruling governments, helped the PRP gain ground on the question of the absolute necessity to implement an effective separation of church and state. The urban masses, who were not so prone to Catholicism, increasingly sided with the republicans and were easily susceptible in believing every rumour and accusation, whether true or highly exaggerated, that the PRP spread in their official press. The nationalist politics of anticlerical contention, pursued by the PRP since the creation of the 1882 Marquis of Pombal Centenary festivities (see Section 3.4.), had reached a climax in the final years of the Constitutional Monarchy. The malicious accusations articulated against the Catholic Church for decades had finally resonated with the urban populace.

On top of that, another scandal erupted – the Crédito Predial, which had been administered by the governing politicians of the Constitutional Monarchy, went bankrupt. In May 1910, when the bank went bankrupt, thousands of public servants,
shopkeepers, soldiers and several associations and cooperatives, who had made a living out of property investments, deposits and savings lost everything. They were as furious as the working class who kept striking in the industrial cities and in the towns outside of Lisbon and Porto. Their livelihoods could not be reassured by the current regime anymore as the political elites had engaged in corrupt practices, such as embezzlement and the distribution of fictitious dividends so as to hide the real deficit of the Crédito Predial (Ramos 1994: 374). After the Banco de Portugal refused a loan of 800 contos to the bank in order to ensure the monthly payments, the Crédito Predial went bankrupt. On 31 May 1910, the Association of Shopkeepers (Associação de Lojistas) summoned a meeting of bondholders. After declaring that only a coalition of citizens could save the country’s economy they decided to create the Association of Public and Private Bondholders (Associação dos Possuidores de Títulos de Crédito Público e Particular). Afonso Costa was appointed the Association’s lawyer. The PRP had, once again, managed to take advantage of yet another scandal. As soon as the Crédito Predial faltered, the party jumped to the defence of the bondholders who had been “betrayed by the regime’s elite” (Ramos 1994: 375). Afonso Costa promised to protect their savings and in the process recruited a few more people to the republican cause.

4.4. The Revolutionary Alliance

The crises that assailed the Constitutional Monarchy depleted the state institutions of the political legitimacy that had sustained the regime for almost a century. At the same time as the people and the armed forces were losing faith in the political oligarchy, the PRP formed a revolutionary alliance with the Carbonária, the Masonry and the low ranks of the army and the navy.
Franco’s dictatorship consolidated the revolutionary phase of the Portuguese Republican Party, which was for the first time articulated in the 1908 April Congress. The Congress established that a revolutionary alternative to the ruling regime should be pursued side by side with the electoral strategy that had been in place for several decades (Catroga 1991 vol. 1: 143). However, the Directorate, still ruled by the moderates, was not yet ready to throw caution to the wind. According to the proposal approved in the 1908 Congress, “the use of violent means of transformation, even if they are legitimate, morally and socially, may never be considered an official act, regular, public and announced by the Republican Party. [Therefore], our Party’s Directorate, and each of its members, when exercising their functions, may not engage in activities that do not abide by the law”59 (cited in Catroga 1991 vol. 1: 144).

But one year later, the moderates had lost ground to the radicals.

In the 1909 Congress, a new Directorate, more sympathetic to the radicals and the carbonários, was nominated. The PRP began a phase of consistent recruitment to the revolutionary cause by which the party took upon itself the responsibility of bringing down the regime regardless of the means used. A division of labour was then stipulated to the attainment of the revolutionary outcome within the newly formed Lisbon Executive Commission. Admiral Cândido dos Reis, Afonso Costa and João Chagas, both members of the 1890 radical generation, assumed the leadership of the recruitment effort and of the revolutionary plans. Their group was officially turned into a military branch of the PRP’s Revolutionary Committee and their recruitment target was the high military ranks. But their success among the officers was practically nil and by 1909, they had recruited no professional officers. António José de Almeida, António Maria da Silva and Cândido dos Reis took over the civilian branch of the same

59 “(...) o emprego de meios violentos de transformação, por mais legítimo que se torne, moral e socialmente, não pode jamais reputar-se em acto oficial, normal, publico e anunciado do Partido Republicano. [Por isso], o Directório do nosso Partido, e bem assim qualquer do seus membros, não devem ocupar-se, nessa qualidade, de funções que não tenham de ser respeitadas perante as leis vigentes”.

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Committee and aimed their recruitment efforts at the populace and the low ranks of the military. For that effect, they joined the Carbonária and the Masonry with the aim of gaining their support and engaging their members in the PRP’s revolutionary plans. Their strategy was much more successful than their counterparts’, as they intensified their propaganda in the military barracks and managed to recruit a considerable number of sergeants and enlisted men (Catroga 1991 vol. 1: 145-146).

At the same time, the newly nominated Directorate, elected at the 1909 Congress and consisting of Teófilo Braga, Basílio Teles, José Cupertino Ribeiro, Eusébio Leão and José Relvas, was given the role of bringing electoral pressure on the constitutionalist parties by running for elections while lending support to the revolutionary plans devised by the Lisbon Executive Commission. The Directorate’s mandate, as given by the Congress, was to “Assist or make the revolution”60 (Machado Santos 1982 [1911]: 34; Ramos 1994: 362). On 13 November 1909, the Directorate issued a manifesto to the country after the latest clerical scandals that was essentially a declaration of war against the Constitutional Monarchy (O Mundo, 13 November 1909: 1):

“The Monarchy’s resistances, in their purely political aspect, already demanded a hellish fight in light of all the evils inherent to an institution traditionally hostile to the most vital patriotic interests; its identification with clericalism, which is the enemy of all scientific and social progress, demands that democracy feels obliged to oppose, by all means, the predominance of the Catholic-reactionary forces”61.

60 “Auxiliar ou fazer a revolução”.
61 “As resistências da monarquia, no seu aspecto puramente político, já exigiam uma luta sem trégua, atendendo aos males de uma instituição tradicionalmente hostil aos mais vitais interesses patrióticos; a sua identificação com o clericalismo, que é o inimigo de todo o progresso científico e social, impõe à democracia a obrigação de se opor, por todos os meios, ao predomínio das forças católico-reaccionárias”.
Of all the Carbonária lodges operating in Portugal since the mid-1880s, the most important, in terms of membership and organisation, was the Carbonária based in Lisbon. The Lisbon Carbonária was headed by the civil servants António Maria da Silva and Luz de Almeida and the Naval Commissioner Machado Santos who formed the executive power of the Venda Nova (J. Brandão 1984; Catroga 1991 vol. 1: 138).

The Alta Venda was the executive commission of all carbonária groups, which included anarchists, socialists and radical republicans. Their main purpose was to organise a republican revolution and any discussions on the nature of the incoming regime (e.g. anarcho-republican, socialist) were postponed until the Constitutional Monarchy had been overthrown (Catroga 1991 vol. 1: 139; Villaverde Cabral 1988: 153). On 28 January 1908, in alliance with the PRP and the Progressist Dissidence they staged their first serious attack on the Monarchy. However, as we saw above, although their coup was not successful, it increased the Carbonária’s reputation within the PRP.

António Maria da Silva and Cândido dos Reis joined Luz de Almeida in his efforts to reorganise the Carbonária. With the support of Admiral Cândido dos Reis and Navy Commissioner Machado Santos, the Carbonária infiltrated the Lisbon regiments and the warships stationed along the Tagus River in Lisbon (Telo 1996: 22; Villaverde Cabral 1988: 154). They recruited sergeants, enlisted men, traders, shop assistants, students, high school teachers and anyone who was willing to fight against Franco’s dictatorship. The exact number of carbonários operating in Portugal varied from 30,000 to 40,000, depending on the historical sources consulted (e.g. Catroga 1991 vol. 1: 140; Ramos 1994: 372). But the most realistic number of hardcore members seems to have been 3,000, mostly based in Lisbon (R. Brandão s.d. vol. 2: 274-275). The carbonários
manufactured bombs at home and aimed them at the monarchist forces (Nunes 2008 [1912]).

The political influence that the Carbonária exercised over the PRP became more obvious in the 1909 Congress, when influential members of the civilian branch of the Lisbon Executive Commission joined the Carbonária (e.g. Machado Santos, João Chagas and Cândido dos Reis) and Luz de Almeida was appointed the liaison officer between the Carbonária and the PRP. Gradually, the Carbonária also gained enough influence over the moderate wing of the PRP, managing to convince them to support the Carbonária’s armed efforts. The PRP gave them enough money to arm a few men, but not too much, as the Party did not want to see the revolution falling in the hands of the populace (Ramos 1994: 366-367). Despite the fact that the PRP welcomed an alliance with the Carbonária, they still wanted to be in control of the revolution and the political aftermath.

Furthermore, João Chagas, Afonso Costa and Admiral Cândido dos Reis, who were in charge of the military branch of the Lisbon Executive Commission, were wary of the Carbonária and its involvement in the revolutionary plans, with João Chagas and Admiral Cândido dos Reis especially focusing their attention on recruiting officers and navy sailors. The failure of the 1891 Porto uprising had taught the republican rebel, João Chagas, a crucial lesson: no armed uprising could succeed without the support of professional officers and a strong chain of command (Catroga 1991 vol. 1: 147; Carrilho 1985: 84). However, the Carbonária and the newly formed PRP’s Revolutionary Military Committee, which was responsible for devising the military plans for the Revolution, opposed Chagas’s plans. As far as they were concerned the revolution should be carried out by the populace and the Carbonária, supported by the effective political force of the PRP and directed by the few republican officers who had already been recruited by the Masonry (Fontes Pereira de Melo 1912: 44). The
Committee, consisting of Mason Navy Commander João Augusto de Fontes Pereira de Melo, Colonel Ramos da Costa and Captain Afonso Palla, was afraid that anything short of a popular revolution would inevitably result in a military dictatorship (Catroga 1991 vol. 1: 146-147).

This issue caused major delays in the preparative works of the revolution so much so that in the summer of 1910, on 16 July and 20 August, two small coup attempts were quickly aborted by the republican officers, as a result of the impatience felt by the carbonários and low rank soldiers, in the Lisbon streets and in the barracks (Catroga 1991 vol. 1: 147). The republican officers seemed reluctant to rush into a revolution. Only after the Masonry stepped in, at the request of Machado Santos, did the revolutionary preparations start progressing quickly, eventually leading to the events of the morning of 4 October 1910.

The Masonry played a crucial role in the final events that led to the Republican Revolution. Their members came from an upper middle-class background. Contrary to the Carbonária, the Masonry was more elitist in nature. The Portugal Masonic Lodge counted among its members professional officers from the Lisbon regiment. The most distinct officers were Captain José Afonso Palla (a conspirator of the 1891 Republican coup in Porto), Colonel Correia Barreto (the future republican Minister of War in 1910) and Lieutenant-Colonel Duarte Fava, who had been involved in the short-lived Liga Liberal that opposed the Ultimatum in 1890. Other officers were predominantly recruited by the Grémio Lusitano Lodge (Ramos 1994: 368).

The dominant figure in the Portuguese Masonry was the republican Sebastião Magalhães Lima. The initiation of Machado Santos in 1909, however, propelled the secret society to assume a distinct role in the revolutionary works, hitherto predominantly executed by the Carbonária and the PRP.
As a member of the Montanha Masonic lodge, Machado Santos asked for a general assembly of masons to be convened in order to discuss the best way to advance the revolutionary works carried out up to then. The Grande Oriente Lusitano met on 14 June 1910 and decided to form a Masonic Resistance Commission (Villaverde Cabral 1988: 155). António Maria da Silva and Admiral Cândido dos Reis, recently initiated as Masons, were asked by the PRP to take a seat in the Commission as the party’s civil and military representatives, respectively. The Commission endeavoured to finish the work already started by the Venda Nova. While the latter organised Carbonária committees in the low ranks of the military, the Commission tried to mobilise the officer corps based in the capital. Energised by the PRP’s all time victory at the polls in August 1910, Cândido dos Reis decided to overrule the PRP’s Revolutionary Military Committee, which had yet to make its plans clear, and to ask a group of officers to develop a new military strategy (Wheeler 1978: 45-46).

Supervised by the Masonic Commission, Captain Sá Cardoso, Colonel Hélder Ribeiro and Navy Lieutenant Aragão e Melo delineated the final revolutionary plans (Catroga 1991 vol. 1: 148-149). They urged the Directorate to support their coup plans and to use their large stash of arms. “The final republican conspiracy was laid on meetings in September and early October” (Wheeler 1978: 48). The PRP leaders’ strategy of forming a triadic alliance with the Carbonária and the Masonry, while controlling the revolutionary plans by becoming members of the secret societies themselves, had paid off (Catroga 1991 vol. 1: 140). In the morning of 4 October 1910, they were ready to put their plan into action with the help of the low ranks of the armed forces (Silva 1974: 223-303).
The military were an important pillar of the revolutionary conspiracies that overthrew the Constitutional Monarchy. Although very few officers joined the Carbonária and the Masonry and even fewer took part in the regime change plans, the assistance given by the low ranks of the army and the navy was indispensable to the success of the Revolution. The 5th of October was first and foremost an armed conspiracy carried out by republican civilians and a large number of sergeants and enlisted men from both branches. Apart from Admiral Cândido dos Reis and Naval Commissioner Machado Santos, the leadership of the revolutionary movement was comprised of a group of civilians rather than professional officers (Croca Caeiro 1997: 93-94; Wheeler 1978: Chapter Four). Having said that, the coup d’état did not encounter much opposition from the royal armed forces, who preferred to remain passive or neutral, thus facilitating the republican victory (de la Torre Gomez and Cervelló 1992: 80). But in order to understand why the upper echelons of the military were not as militant as their lower counterparts at this stage, thus creating a political schism between the ranks, one needs to place the Portuguese armed forces in an historical and social context.

Despite the success of educational and training policies in creating an expert officer corps (Carrilho 1982a; 1982b; 1985: 135-147), the institution was far from sharing a strong sense of esprit de corps. As Rui Ramos (1994: 375) argues, on the eve of the 1910 Revolution, “the army, as an autonomous military corporation, with a unified command and a group of officers with esprit de corps did not yet exist”.

Firstly, the army was divided into the metropolitan army and the colonial army, both separately controlled by the monarchist governments until the First Republic. This division created an ideological schism among the officers who commanded both armies.
– the colonialists, on the one hand, were openly reactionary and imperialist (e.g. Paiva Couceiro, Gomes da Costa, Mouzinho de Albuquerque, Azevedo Coutinho), while the metropolitanists, who didn’t usually serve overseas, tended to be more preoccupied with the matters of Continental Portugal, rather than with the administrative affairs of the empire. Only with the political backlash that followed the 1890 British Ultimatum did this schism commence to disappear and the metropolitanists feel confident enough to associate their fears with those of the colonialists and to express concerns over the way the empire was being run by the monarchist governments.

The same thing, however, did not tend to happen in the armada. According to the aforementioned historian, there was a stronger sense of esprit de corps in the armada, largely based on a collective resentment towards the monarchical governments, which allocated the least number of conscripts possible and the least amount of money to sustain and modernise the navy (Ramos 1994: 379). As a consequence, the officer corps of this military branch tended to be more open to the promises of republicanism. And in 1910, unlike the majority of their army peers, they were directly involved in the demise of the Constitutional Monarchy.

Secondly, the nineteenth century military service was very unpopular. The universal male conscription system was largely based on “lottery tickets” which excluded from the military service those able-bodied men between the ages of 19 and 20 who drew a safe ticket or who were wealthy enough to pay an exemption fee (Croca Caeiro 1997: 102; Ramos 1994: 375-376). Since the military had a mediocre reputation among the population – until the establishment of the First Republic the main function of the metropolitan army was to enforce the law in provincial towns – those who could dodge the draft, by proving *ius causa*\(^2\), paying remissions, corrupting the local authorities, paying homage to the *caciquista* system or by emigrating overseas would

\(^2\) For instance, the eldest sons of single mothers, as well as those who had a disabled brother.
happily avoid conscription (Carrilho 1982a; 1982b; 1985: 99-116). In the first years of the twentieth century draft dodgers comprised around 15% of the total number of draftees. As a consequence, the military found itself recruiting only those who could not escape from it – i.e. the illiterate peasants and urban workers who came from the least well-off backgrounds.

Although there were several attempts to reform the conscription system in order to diminish (e.g. 1884, 1891, 1893 and 1901) or even to eliminate (e.g. 1887) the weight of remissions in the military draft, these political initiatives were invariably reversed or their language tempered in a way that they still permitted the payment of remissions by the wealthiest classes. After all, remissions were one of the main sources of income the Constitutional Monarchy had at its disposal to finance the obsolete and decrepit military equipment (Carrilho 1982a; 1982b; 1985: 100-104).

Thirdly, the creation of a strong esprit de corps was also undermined by the fact that during their three to five years of military service (Carrilho 1985: 105-106), conscripts were usually not treated fairly by their superiors. They suffered physical abuse at the hands of the officers and were very badly paid (20 réis per day by 1907, less than a civil servant). In the final years of the Monarchy, they were still insulted in public, as this was a common practice among the population (Ramos 1994: 375-378). They were also excluded from the electorate. According to the Electoral Laws, tramps, criminals, servants, the destitute and conscripts could not exercise voting rights. The same restriction, however, did not apply to the officer corps, which was allowed to vote and to run for parliament up to the end of the Constitutional Monarchy. In short, the honourable defence of the pátria, by which a soldier was meant to commit the ultimate

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63 For a study of the state of the Portuguese armament during the Constitutional Monarchy see, for instance, Carrilho (1985), Ramos (1994) and Telo (2004a; 2004b; 2004c).
64 Note that after the 1891 Porto pronunciamiento, in 1895, only generals were freely allowed to run for public office (Carrilho 1985: 171).
sacrifice, was a “privilege” bestowed upon those who saw the military service as a punishment (Carrilho 1982a; 1982b; Carrilho 1985: 99, 114, 171).

So although the military had become a modern state institution, with a functional concentration and specialisation of the profession of arms, as a result of a series of top-down policies decreed by the constitutionalist governments, the institution itself failed to develop a strong sense of corporativism among its men. The men were split by rank, and even by arms. On the one hand, there was the enlisted and conscripted corps who thought of their superiors as dismissive oppressors and did not find the military service particularly representative of Portuguese society, what with the remissions system which always benefited the wealthiest classes (Carrilho 1982a; 1982b; 1985: 103). They were the ones who joined the Carbonária, whose anti-elitist ideology and promises of enfranchisement appealed to their downtrodden minds. On the other hand, there was the officer corps who felt diminished by their miserable wages and living conditions and were more preoccupied with other matters related to the institution, namely, the acquisition of armament, rather than their subalterns (Carrilho 1982a; 1982b; 1985: 103). When their low rank comrades overthrew the Constitutional Monarchy, they looked on passively, reluctant to intervene in the likelihood that a change of regime would ameliorate their social status.

To the benefit of the republican revolutionaries, the social composition of the Portuguese officer corps had changed radically in the space of a century. What had once been a largely conservative, aristocratic and untrained institution was transformed into a liberal, educated, middle-class body largely originating from the urban centres. In 1792, the army opened for the first time its ranks to the emerging liberal bourgeoisie and allowed their sons to join the army (Carrilho 1982a; 1982b; 1985: 128).

In the armada, it was only in 1832 that the entry requirements for the officer corps were lowered to include the middle class. As soon as entry requirements based on
birth privileges were eradicated, the middle-class took over the armada and at the beginning of the twentieth century they made up for the large majority of the naval officer corps (Ramos 1994: 378-379). The army also denoted the same social outline. In 1909, on the eve of the Revolution, out of 1,948 army officers in active service only 16 had a noble title (Carrilho 1985: 123).

The Portuguese aristocracy did not struggle to keep control over the armed forces either. The Peninsular Wars had made conscription universal and opened the military ranks to a flood of lay men with whom the aristocracy was not inclined to consort. Furthermore, the new technical and scientific developments of the time required systematic training and attendance at highly specialised courses in the newly created higher learning institutes, where merit was assessed collectively with no distinction of birth privileges (1982a; 1982b; Carrilho 1985: 122-123). Gradually, the Portuguese nobility abandoned the officer corps, whilst the middle class took over the institution, eager to ascend to the highest posts of the state.

On the eve of the 1910 Revolution, the Portuguese officer corps was also strongly urban in composition. Almost 40% of the Portuguese cadets who attended the Army School from 1900 to 1910 originated from the urban districts of Lisbon and Porto where a large proportion of the middle class resided and where the PRP found most of its supporters (Carrilho 1985: 124-126).

Bearing in mind this historical and social background of the Portuguese armed forces, it comes as no surprise that the PRP made a serious attempt to recruit both the low and high ranks of the Portuguese military to the revolutionary side.

On 3 October 1910, republican army soldiers and navy non-commissioned and junior officers joined forces with the PRP, the Carbonária and the Masonry in a major attempt to take over the Lisbon garrisons while senior officers looked on unfettered.

65 Amongst the junior officers were Naval Commissary Machado Santos, Captain Afonso Palla, Captain Sá Cardoso, Sub-Lieutenant Tito de Morais, Sub-Lieutenant Mendes Cabeças, Sub-Lieutenant José Carlos da Maia, Lieutenant Ladislau Moreira, Lieutenant Sousa Dias.
disenchanted with the current regime and unwilling to defend it (Croca Caeiro 1997: 88-94; Ramos 1994: Chapter Two; Pulido Valente 1974: Chapter Three). Only a handful of officers rose up in arms against the republicans (e.g. Paiva Couceiro and Rafael Gorjão, Martins de Lima) but they were defeated in Rotunda less than 48 hours after the first republican garrisons had rebelled, despite the fact that they had a larger number of soldiers under their command. By adopting a passive approach, most of the officer corps allowed the dynastic regime to fall. That, in itself, was as significant as the political statement that republican low rank soldiers made in central Lisbon with arms in hand surrounded by cheering crowds. It seemed that as far as the military was concerned, the monarchy had died a long time ago and was no longer worth fighting for.

Displacement was the officer’s method of intervention (Finer 2002 [1962]: xvi-xix), whereby they failed to defend the civilian authorities from violence and allowed the regime to be replaced. On the other hand, low rank soldiers resorted to supplantment (Finer 1962: xvi-xix) as their method of intervention. They actively sought the removal of “illegitimate” and “unrepresentative” institutions in favour of a more egalitarian institutional framework.

The motives that led enlisted men and a handful of officers to side with the republicans in their quest to overthrow the Constitutional Monarchy in 1891, 1906, 1908 and 1910 might have been related to professional grievances (e.g. rank promotions), as we have seen above, but were also genuinely rooted in the appeal that republican nationalism exerted upon them. Republican nationalism imbued the low

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66 There is no consensus on the number of soldiers that participated in the 1910 Revolution. It is nevertheless assumed that at the apogee of the Rotunda skirmishes about 500 republican soldiers and 500 armed civilians fought in the Rotunda while 1,000-1,500 armed men had taken over the ships stationed in Tagus and Alcântara. On the other side, it is thought that the Monarchy had at its disposal between 2,000 and 3,500 troops, who quickly put down their guns as soon as the king acknowledged defeat (Carrilho 1985; Ramos 1994; Wheeler 1978). The first republican garrisons to rebel were Infantry regiment 16, Artillery regiment 1, Sailor’s Headquarters, S. Rafael Cruiser, Adamastor Cruiser and D. Carlos Cruiser. In a matter of hours the following garrisons either surrendered or joined the republicans: Queluz’s Battery of Artillery, Artillery regiment 3, Artillery regiment 13, Infantry regiment 1, Infantry regiment 2, Infantry regiment 11, Infantry regiment 15, Cavalry regiment, Chasseurs Regiment 2 and Chasseurs regiment 6. For a full account of the revolutionary military manoeuvres see, for instance, Carrilho (1985: 86-96).
ranks with a national purpose that had not transpired in the institution since the 1820 Revolution. Nationalism was the political doctrine that the PRP used to recruit soldiers to their cause. In their pursuit of power, republicans portrayed themselves as the “guardians of the nation” and convinced the enlisted corps that they were part of this collectivity. In the final years of the Constitutional Monarchy, the Carbonária soldiers believed they were political outsiders and that a change in the political system could only materialise if they intervened directly in the political life of the country, not in the legislative and executive institutions, in which they had no representation.

Infiltrated by the Carbonária and the Masonry, the low ranks of the army and the navy conspired with the Directorate to overthrow the Constitutional Monarchy. Despite the government’s final attempt to arrest and interrogate any soldiers in possession of republican propaganda or republican newspapers – some were even transferred to units outside of Lisbon – the plans went ahead (Carrilho 1985: 85; Ramos 1994: 273).

4.5. The Final Attack on the Constitutional Monarchy

On 3 October, after the Republican Doctor Miguel Bombarda was assassinated by one of his mental patients, the republican tabloids spread the news that the patient was a “reactionary monarchist” prompting unruly crowds to take over Lisbon threatening violence against anyone and anything associated with the Monarchy. The security forces reacted immediately by issuing marching orders to the “republican” cruisers stationed in the Lisbon harbour, precipitating the Revolution. After a final meeting between the Directorate and the republican soldiers on 3 October, the revolution finally exploded in the early hours of 4 October 1910. Revolutionary sailors attacked and took over the navy barracks and the cruisers stationed in Lisbon. Machado Santos led the uprising of the Sixteenth Infantry Regiment. Captain Afonso Palla incited
most of the First Artillery to revolt. The revolutionaries, made up of soldiers and civilians, held fast at Rotunda against the attacks of the Lisbon Municipal Guard and of the few monarchist forces who were still willing to fight for the regime. While the revolutionary troops fought with the artillery they had confiscated in the mutinied Lisbon units, civilians “threw bombs and fired their rifles and pistols”. “With the aid of the Carbonária, the republicans during 4 October cut off nearly all telephone and telegraph communications as well as most train services between Lisbon and the provinces; railroad tracks outside Lisbon were sabotaged”. “By sealing Lisbon off from the north and west, these conspirators helped to assure the success of the Lisbon Revolution” (all quotes from Wheeler 1978: 48-56).

On the same day, the republican cruisers began shelling the Necessidades Palace, hastening King Dom Manuel’s escape to Mafra. By the evening of 4 October, after Machado Santos managed to defeat a threatening attack by monarchist reinforcements which had prompted the suicide of Admiral Cândido dos Reis, it was clear that the forces of the regime, mostly neutral to the coup d’état, especially outside Lisbon, were unwilling to defeat the revolutionaries. As the last Premier of the Constitutional Monarchy admitted in his memoirs, out of 53 army officers belonging to King Dom Manuel’s guards, only one risked his life for the monarchy – i.e. Paiva Couceiro (Teixeira de Sousa, 1913:172).

On the morning of 5 October, the German charge d’affaires asked for a temporary truce so that foreign residents could leave downtown Lisbon. A white flag was raised signalling the beginning of the armistice. However, the revolutionaries misinterpreted the significance of the white flag and, convinced that it meant the surrender of the monarchists, abandoned their fighting positions and fraternised with the royal troops. The latter, “already demoralised after the king had left Lisbon”, dropped their weapons and surrendered. “The King eventually boarded a British vessel at
Gibraltar for exile in England”. The Republican Revolution had succeeded. At 9 o’clock, the República was proclaimed from the balcony of the Lisbon Municipal Chamber (Wheeler 1978: 48-56).

4.6. Conclusion

The revolutionary coup that succeeded on 5 October was part of a political process that developed in three phases: the emergence of an intellectual opposition movement, which developed into the formation of a nationalist party in opposition aiming for political agitation and popular mobilisation, and culminated in a revolutionary alliance between the people and the military with the expressed purpose of overthrowing the regime in power. In Phase One (Chapter Two) we saw the emergence of a nationalist intellectual opposition movement, known in Portuguese historiography as the 1870 Generation, who contested the official ideology of the state along republican lines. Dissatisfied with the fact that the state oligarchy had not implemented liberalism to the full, they broke with the official orthodoxy and presented their own causes for the decadence of the nation as well as their own “recipes” for its regeneration in the Lisbonense Casino Conferences and in their subsequent intellectual works. While Antero de Quental and Oliveira Martins defended a top-bottom approach to the renewal of the nation, working in cooperation with the existing institutions and constitutionalist parties, Teófilo de Braga adopted a more extreme approach. A student of Positivism, Teófilo saw the Portuguese nation as an historical “ethnic, anticlerical and republican nation with a glorious empire”, centred around the moçárabe race. He thought it was possible to “resuscitate” the decadent nation from the bottom-up, provided the people were infused with a sense of “affective synthesis”. With this
purpose in mind he invented national traditions and commemorations of which the Camões Tercentenary and the Marquis of Pombal Centenary were the first examples.

His ideas were included in the ideology of the subsequently created Portuguese Republican Party. The formation of the PRP embodies Phase Two of the 1910 revolutionary process (Chapter Three). From its inception, the party followed an electoral strategy to achieve power. After consolidating its internal structure in 1882-1883, the PRP was able to gain a few marginal seats in the Cortes despite an intentional strategy pursued by the constitutionalist parties to alienate the PRP from the state institutions. In the streets, the party was also able to boost its popularity by opening several republican centres and protesting fervently against the 1879 Lourenço Marques Treaty and the 1890 British Ultimatum. Portraying itself as an imperialist, anti-clerical, anti-monarchist and nationalist opposition movement, the PRP was able to mobilise the urban working class and the middle class against the Constitutional Monarchy. However, the nationalist agitation that followed the 1890 British Ultimatum resulted in the implementation of harsh repressive measures by the state authorities that split the party into two flanks. One flank defended the attainment of power through moderate electoral means, while the other defended a violent overthrow of the regime. Acting against the wishes of the Directorate, the latter staged a failed uprising in Porto. The failure of the Porto uprising ended in harsh repressive measures that almost destroyed the party.

However, in the first years of the twentieth century, the republicans reorganised themselves and were successful in boosting the party’s reputation at the expense of a series of political and economic crises which put into question the political legitimacy and credibility of the ruling regime. Phase three of the revolutionary process, as we saw in this chapter, translated into the creation of a successful revolutionary coalition. In 1908 the PRP embarked on a revolutionary alternative to power attainment and created
a revolutionary committee which organised the Carbonária, the Masonry and the low ranks of the army and navy stationed in Lisbon into a consolidated alliance. On 5 October 1910, as most of the loyalist army looked on unfettered, indifferent to the destiny of the Constitutional Monarchy, the republicans overthrew the regime and established themselves in power.
5.1. Introduction

As we saw in the previous chapters, the PRP was a nationalist opposition movement, emerging first at the intellectual level (Phase One) and then developing into a political platform, striving to mobilise the people to their cause (Phase Two). When excluded from power and repressed by the public authorities, the republicans actively pursued a revolutionary path. At a time when the regime had been undermined by a serious crisis of political legitimacy, the PRP urged the people and the military to intervene and overthrow the Constitutional Monarchy (Phase Three). On 5 October 1910, the PRP staged a successful revolution that put an end to almost eight centuries of monarchical rule.

In this chapter, we will see how the PRP, once established in power, became an hegemonic political force, ruling with almost no opposition in parliament. The party’s uncontested power in the first years of the Republic, due to a continual practice of caciquismo, electoral corruption and state patronage, allowed them to make a drastic break with the outgoing regime – an open “ruptura”, one might argue (Linz & Stepan 1978) – while propagating their own version of who and what constituted the Portuguese nation through the state apparatus. The PRP created a new republican cult at the state level, engineered a republican school system and a national army while aggressively persecuting the Catholic Church and its representatives in their quest to create an anti-clerical nation.
However, the anti-clerical Republic was not accepted by all. The republican school system was not fully implemented and the creation of a national army failed miserably in the face of economic difficulties, political irresponsibility and corporativist indiscipline, resulting in the alienation of the conservative high ranks of the armed forces. What is more, the PRP’s determination to secularise the state in an aggressive top-down manner isolated the anti-clerical minority from the rest of the country. The Catholic majority living outside of the urban centres felt persecuted by the republican laws. The monarchists were oppressed, especially after the failed monarchist incursions led by Captain Paiva Couceiro. The rural population felt disenfranchised by a regime that did not include them in their official definition of the Portuguese nation, as Catholics and monarchists were vilified and oppressed, drawing international condemnation, especially from the old ally Britain.

In the midst of this controversy, the PRP also managed to aggravate some of their own supporters. In 1911, the PRP reformulated and readjusted its stance on the organisation of state rule, abandoning municipalism, decentralisation and universal suffrage from its ideological programme. By maintaining a centralised system of government in the 1911 Constitution, the party alienated the most “purist” republicans who had fought for the republicanisation of the nation. In 1912, António José de Almeida and Brito Camacho dissented from the PRP. They created the Evolutionist Republican Party (PRE) and the Republican Union’s Party (PUR) respectively, while the PRP, led by Afonso Costa, was renamed Democratic Party (PD). Both dissidents favoured a decentralisation of the republican state and opposed the extreme anticlerical measures pursued by the Democrats.

However, their parties never gathered much popular backing, and failed to attract the support of those who felt mostly oppressed and sidetracked by the PRP – i.e. Catholics, monarchists, conservatives and reactionaries. Differences and divisions
which had been latent since the 1828-1834 Civil War re-emerged with a vengeance. A reactionary form of Catholic nationalism, Integralismo Lusitano, rooted in a medieval conception of power distribution, surfaced in 1913, calling for the overthrow of the sacrilegious and non-believing republican regime. In 1926, they succeeded in forming a revolutionary coalition that overthrew the PD from power and opened the way to a regime change. This chapter, not unlike the historical exercise we did in Chapter One in relation to the 1870 Generation, aims to assess in more detail the above-mentioned political conditions that led to the emergence of Integralismo Lusitano in 1913 as an ideological movement of nationalist opposition to the ruling regime.

5.2. The Republican Nation

As soon as the Republic was proclaimed, the PRP’s Directorate became the Provisional Government, headed by Teófilo Braga and assisted by António José de Almeida (Minister of the Interior), Afonso Costa (Minister of Justice and Cults), Bernardino Machado (Foreign Affairs) and Brito Camacho (Minister of Public Works). The Provisional Government ruled in a de facto dictatorship from 5 October to 4 September 1911, when the first constitutional government was nominated. The first elections held in republican Portugal took place on 28 May 1911 for the National Constituent Assembly. The elections banned Catholics and monarchists from running. As a result, the PRP won the elections with an overwhelming majority of the votes, taking 97.9% of the seats in the Constituent Assembly (Costa Pinto 1998: 52). After the Assembly was disbanded with the approval of the Constitution in August 1911, the members of parliament maintained their seats in what came to be known as the first

Determined to create a new republican nation, the PRP banned any political opposition that challenged the ideals of the Republic, turning every dissenter and political opponent into a traitor of the pâtria (*A Capital*, 15 April 1913). Accordingly, on 28 December 1910, the Provisional Government decreed the Republic’s Defence Law (*Lei de Defesa da República*). Any criminal attempts to assault or offend the President of the Provisional Government or of the Republic were punished with severe sentences, as were any actions that put in question the republican form of government or the integrity of the Republic. This last category included any attempts to re-establish the Monarchy, desecrate the new national flag or to “spread false rumours with the purpose of alarming the public spirit, or susceptible of causing injury to the State, public credit or social safety”\(^67\). In other words, anyone who did not support the new regime in power and voiced any kind of injurious criticism was considered an outlaw and an enemy of the nation (Pulido Valente 1982: 169; Ramos 1994: 417).

### 5.2.1. Official Establishment of New Republican Symbols and Heroes

Once the PRP established itself in power, all public agencies and state institutions were used to propagate the party’s republican nationalism and its conception of who and what constituted the Portuguese nation. No longer a party in opposition, the PRP abandoned its strategy of creating a republican nation from the bottom-up through the invention of ceremonies, heroes and centennials, and embarked on an ambitious top-down nationalist project for the republicanisation of the masses. By turning their

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\(^{67}\) “…espalhem boato falso, destinado a alarmar o espírito público, ou susceptível de causar prejuízo ao Estado, ao crédito público, ou à segurança social (…)”.

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nationalism in opposition into the official nationalism of the Republic, the PRP aspired to shift people’s loyalty and obedience from the former dynastic rulers to the revolutionary republicans. Their aim was to create a symbiosis between the state, the nation and the new regime, in other words, to ensure that the political unit and the national unit remained congruent (Gellner 1983: 1).

As soon as they rose to power, their first goal was to institutionalise a new national identity. This involved establishing a new repertoire of symbols and heroes with the purpose of giving legitimacy to a new national purpose – the erection and maintenance of a Republic – which would be adopted by the masses through the spread of education and the creation of a true national army. In pursuit of this line of action, the PRP invented new state “traditions” to inculcate the beliefs and value systems of the new ruling elites into the masses just as many other western state elites had done since the industrial revolution in order to generate a sense of national unity which encouraged popular cooperation with the ruling regime (Hobsbawm 1990: Chapter 3; Hobsbawm & Ranger 2004 [1983]: Introduction, Chapter 7).

As a result, from the inception of the Portuguese Republic, the republicans proceeded to create a modern nation, morally cleansed from the old political structures. Their model was the First and Third French Republics from which the PRP “pirated” (to borrow Benedict Anderson’s word) a constructivist approach to the formation of the republican nation, namely through the creation of a national day, public ceremonies and festivals - such as the “trees of liberty” festival – and through the production of monuments, the commemoration of notable figures and the organisation of processions and marches of the civilian citizenry (Hobsbawm & Ranger 2004 [1983]: Chapter 7).

Republican nationalism became the official language of the new political regime, impregnating every aspect of the political life of the country. All maps of identity associated with the Constitutional Monarchy were replaced by very distinctive
republican symbols, memories, heroes and myths. Any mention of a Catholic identity or a dynastic reference to a political structure was abolished. The words “royal” and “crown” were effectively replaced by “republic” and “national”. For instance, on 29 December 1910, the “royal roads” were renamed “national roads” (Ramos 1994: 422); the typical pastry cake, King-Cake (Bolo-Rei), was renamed National Cake (Bolo-Nacional) (Pulido Valente 1982: 169); official documents stopped mentioning “the adopted year is the ordinary era named Christ...” (my emphasis) while the promulgation of legislative acts reflected the fact that Portugal was no longer a kingdom of subjects, but a nation of equal citizens amongst whom national sovereignty resided. In this way, the old formula adopted by the King to promulgate legislative acts during the Constitutional Monarchy, “D. (F.) by the grace of God King of Portugal and the Algarves, etc. We hereby make known to our Subjects that the Cortes Gerais decreed and We want the following law...” (my emphasis), was replaced by a new formula adopted by the President of the Republic, “In the name of the Nation, the Republican Congress decrees and I promulgate the following law (or resolution)...” (Catroga 1991 vol. 2: 438, 440, my emphasis).

As part of their attempt to turn every monarchic institution into a republican institution, the Provisional Government replaced the royalist Lisbon Municipal Guard with the Republican National Guard (GNR), a republican military police created with the purpose of policing the rural areas and safeguarding the existence of the Republic (Decree-Law of 3 May 1911, Chapter I) – much in the same way that the Municipal Guard had done vis-à-vis the Constitutional Monarchy.

Furthermore, the Provisional Government adopted a new currency, the escudo (shield), to replace the real (royal). The republican anthem A Portuguesa, written after

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68 ¨(…) o ano adoptado é o da era vulgar chamada de Cristo¨.
69 ¨D. (F.) por graça de Deus Rei de Portugal e dos Algarves, etc. Fazemos saber a todos os nossos Súbditos, que as Cortes Gerais decretaram e Nós queremos a lei seguinte”; “Em nome da Nação, o Congresso da República decreta e eu promulgo a lei (ou resolução) seguinte¨.

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the 1890 British Ultimatum (see Chapter Three), also replaced the *Hino da Carta*. A new orthography with more simplified spelling was instituted. Old holidays gave way to a new set of civic holidays (Decree of 13 October 1910), secularising those which had been previously connected to religious events. Other republican dates were also commemorated. For instance, every year, on 1 February, pilgrimages were organised to the tombs of the *carbonários* who had assassinated King Dom Carlos and Prince Dom Felipe in 1908. The 31 January was also celebrated as “the day consecrated to the precursors and martyrs of the Republic” in direct homage to those who had been involved in the 1891 failed republican uprising in Porto. The 5 October was established as “the day consecrated to the heroes of the Republic”. The old white and blue Portuguese flag was replaced with a green and red flag (Decree of 22 November 1910).

The Provisional Government associated the new flag with the civic cult of Portugal’s Restoration of Independence from Spain in 1640, and on 1 December 1910, the Day of Restoration, the cabinet asked the Lisbon municipal authorities to organise a large civic procession that would march from the city hall to the Restauradores (Restorers) monument, where the new flag was unveiled. Thereafter, the Day of Restoration also became known as the Day of the Flag. As ordered by the Ministry of the Interior, copies of the new national flag were sent to schools and all teachers were instructed to explain the symbolic value of the flag to their pupils. In the military barracks, it was established that the ceremonies of allegiance sworn by the new recruits were to be performed in front of the new flag (Catroga 1991 vol. 2: 437-439; Oliveira Marques 1972: 164; Ramos 1994: 425-427).

Street names were also replaced overnight, in order to accommodate the quick turn of events. One day after the Republic had been established, the Lisbon municipal authorities named the downtown avenues “Avenida da República” and “Avenida 5 de Outubro”. In a similar fashion, several streets in central Lisbon adopted the names of
the most prestigious republican figures of the Constitutional Monarchy who had perished before the republicans were able to defeat the royalist forces in the Rotunda, namely the Cândido dos Reis Street and the Miguel Bombarda Street. In the same month, dozens of avenues, roads, paths, squares and alleys which had been previously named after saints, royal family members and monarchist politicians, had their names replaced with important dates of the republican movement, names of leaders, martyrs and heroes of the Portuguese Republican Party (Pulido Valente 1982: 168-169; Ramos 1994: 427-428).

National heroes previously celebrated by the republicans during their time in opposition were now given a paramount place in the civic imaginary of the republican nation. For the republicans, Portugal was the land of the poet Luís de Camões and of Marquis of Pombal as we saw in Chapters 2 and 3. Both historical figures were therefore officially installed in the new collective memory as the national heroes of the Portuguese Republic. In this sense, in 1911, a march was organised in Lisbon in memory of Camões’s death, while the prestigious Ilustração Portuguesa (1911: 777-788) published twelve pages narrating the poet’s life and his impact on contemporary Portugal under the title “Camões: The New Lisbon Saint”. The old patron saint of Lisbon, Saint Anthony, was momentarily forgotten. Later, in 1914, an architectural project was devised to build a statue in honour of Marquis of Pombal in the middle of Rotunda where the republicans had vanquished the monarchist forces in 191070.

5.2.2. The Republican School

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In parallel with the engineering of new republican symbols and heroes at the state level, there was a genuine concern with the civic education of the younger generations and the use of primary schools to disseminate the values and essence of the republican regime. The French Third Republic had already confronted this concern (Posen 1995: 159-160). The regime had developed primary education as a secular equivalent of the Church. Revolutionary and republican principles were taught in the French schools by the secular priesthood – the *instituteurs*. The content of the school manuals was monitored and written by the state authorities (Hobsbawm & Ranger 2004 [1983]: 271). Only the pursuit of state-sponsored mass education and literacy – with the main function of the school being to teach a “new patriotism” rather than “useful skills” – could ensure that peasants were turned into Frenchmen and most importantly, that Frenchmen were turned into good republicans (E. Weber 1976: Chapter 18).

The Portuguese republicans, assembled in the Constituent Assembly, were very much aware that only the Republic could create republicans (e.g. Deputy João Meneses, parliamentary speech in *Diário da Assembleia Constituinte, session no. 19*, 12 July 1911, p. 14). By taking the example of the French Third Republic and of its most emblematic leader, Jules Ferry, they were convinced that the Portuguese Republic could not be created out of violence and cannon balls. “It has to be created by law, education and the institution of new customs,” said Deputy Francisco Correia de Lemos in a parliamentary speech (*Diário da Assembleia Constituinte, session no. 15*, 6 July 1911, p. 17).

The secularisation of the educational institutions was therefore fundamental in the erection of a republican regime, which relied on the idea that religion stifled the most basic liberties of democracy. In line with this argument, the Decree of 22 October 1910 banned the teaching of the Christian doctrine in all primary schools. It claimed

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71 “One academic remarked early in the Third Republic, ‘If the schoolboy does not become a citizen fully aware of his duties, and a soldier who loves his gun, the teacher will have wasted his time.’”

72 “(…) ela tem de fazer-se pelas leis, pela educação e instituição de novos costumes”.
that it was important to keep religion out of the classroom in order to satisfy the “liberal spirit” and “the republican aspirations of the Portuguese nation”. The decree also justified such measures on the principle that the state could not “force a certain religious belief on the families and, therefore, on the children”\(^73\). In the preamble of the Primary Instruction Reform (Decree of 29 March 1911) the articulate went as far as to say that the dispositions of that legal document emancipated “the Portuguese children, saving them from all Jesuitical influence” (Catroga 1991 vol. 2: 400). Underlying the PRP’s determination to cleanse the republican classrooms of religious teachings was a deliberate attempt to turn republicanism into the “high culture” of the state.

As Gellner (1983: 55-57) tells us, state-sponsored mass education and literacy is seen as the only vehicle through which a standardised and homogenised “high culture” pervades the entire population, consolidating a unified nation with which all men from a very early age “willingly and often ardently identify”. In their attempt to impose the republican “high culture” on the masses, the PRP aimed to hold together every individual, who hitherto might have been living a localised life with local and parish loyalties adverse to national bonds, under the unity of the republican state.

The secular primary school became, as a result, an instrument of public reproduction of republican values and a pet project of the PRP governments who saw Portugal’s widespread illiteracy as an obstacle to progress and modernisation. In this respect, the number of primary schools increased by almost a thousand in a year. In 1909-1910 there were 5,552 schools and in 1911-1912 there were 6,412 (Ramos 1994: 421).

In 1911, free public education and compulsory school attendance for all children between the ages of 7 and 10 were established as part of a larger plan which was not only to teach children the basics of literacy but also to educate them on the patriotic

\(^{73}\) “(...) [não podia] obrigar as famílias, e, portanto, as crianças a determinada crença religiosa”.

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values of civic integration (Oliveira Marques 1972: 141; Ramos 1994: 421). According to the new Secretary General of Education, João de Barros (1913: 33-34), the primary school was a vehicle of assimilation in the pátria republicana for not only did it transmit knowledge, but it also educated children so they could become patriots and citizens of the new Republic. By excluding all “foreign vestiges”\textsuperscript{74} from the school curriculum and by focusing solely on Portuguese history and culture, Barros was convinced that the republican education should be a “patriotic education”\textsuperscript{75} in which the pupil was taught “to love the land, the landscape, its products, its noble traditions, its thought processes, its art forms”\textsuperscript{76}. In sum, “the pupil (…) should be submitted to a continuous and vigilant patriotic influence”\textsuperscript{77} (Barros 1913).

In a campaign to “enlighten” the younger generations on the damage done to the pátria by the previous regime, primary school books adopted the new republican historiography, echoing the propaganda carried out by the PRP against the Constitutional Monarchy during the party’s years in opposition. The Portuguese historian, Vasco Pulido Valente (1982: 217), points out (in a rather sarcastic manner) that in an history book officially approved in 1911 one could read “with notable rigour that the royal ministers [had] ‘practiced great crimes’; that the Portuguese had been ‘robbed, scorned and mercilessly dispossessed’ by João Franco; that Dom Manuel was ‘very young, not very intelligent, shy and pious’; and that the royal court was ‘as intolerant and fanatic as Dom João III’s court’”\textsuperscript{78}. School books also attempted to educate young pupils on the virtues of the republic and the symbols that best represented the regime. One particular school book urged primary school pupils to love

\begin{itemize}
\item\textsuperscript{74}“(…) excluir todo e qualquer vestígio do estrangeiro”.
\item\textsuperscript{75}“(…) educação patriótica (…)”.
\item\textsuperscript{76}“(…) amor à terra, à paisagem, aos seus produtos, às suas tradições nobres, ao seu pensarinto, à sua arte”.
\item\textsuperscript{77}“(…) o aluno das escolas normais deve estar sujeito a uma continua e vigilante influência patriótica”
\item\textsuperscript{78}“(…) com notável rigor que os ministros da Monarquia ‘praticado grandes crimes’; que os portugueses tinham sido ‘roubados, escarnecidos e espoliados sem piedade’ por João Franco; que D. Manuel era ‘muito novo, pouco inteligente, timorato e devoto’; e a corte ‘tão intolerante e fanática como a corte de D. João III’.”
\end{itemize}
“with all your heart the Pátria and the Republic, because both are merged in the same ideal of happiness shared by all of us”\textsuperscript{79}.

5.2.3. The National Army

Hand in hand with the creation of the republican school, the Provisional Government pursued an ambitious project to turn the monarchist permanent army into a republican militia (i.e. a true national army), based on the examples of Republican France and of the Swiss national militia.

The ultimate goal was the creation of a nation in arms and of a citizen’s army that not only provided national defence against the secular Spanish threat, but also acted “as a national, surrogate school of literacy, patriotism, and technical skills for the masses of illiterate peasants” (Wheeler 1978: 114). The idea that underlined such a massive project finds resonance, once again, in Eugene Weber’s study of the French Third Republic. Weber (1976) claims that, alongside mass education, the military service brought the rural masses of France into the nation. “The army turned out to be an agency for emigration, acculturation, and in the final analysis, civilization, an agency as potent in its way as the schools” (E. Weber 1976: 302). Compulsory primary education enhanced the technical military utility of the French soldiers and also spread “the ‘culture’ and the version of history that are central to the national identity” (Posen 1995: 139). In time, the French Republican Army was considered “a school in which French youth acquired basic principles of citizenship” (Challener 1955: 46). Based on the experience of the French Third Republic, the PRP aimed to forge a bond between

\textsuperscript{79} “(…) de todo o coração à Pátria e a Republica, porque ambas se acham consubstanciadas no mesmo ideal de felicidade para todos nós”.
mass education and the army in the hope that both institutions would spread and consolidate the nationalist ideology of the republican regime.

A speech given at the Portuguese Army School during the official opening of the 1910-1911 academic year reiterated the idea that the army was the school of the nation. The army should be considered a “school with enough means to be the continuation of primary school (if not a primary school in itself) in a country of illiterates as is sadly ours”\(^80\) (Anuário da Escola do Exército, 1910-1911, pp. 47-48, cited in Carrilho 1985: 211). The preamble of the Decree of 25 May 1911, which effectively created a militia force within the organisation of the armed forces, claimed that the goal of the nation in arms was to “open the large doors of the army barracks so that all the necessary energies needed to defend the Pátria may enter; [the Pátria] that the Army rallies, identifies, instructs and prepares for the great work of constituting the national defence”\(^81\). In other words, only the military service could instil civic virtues in the young generations.

The PRP was also determined to make the republican army a servant of the people rather than an instrument of state oppression. In this respect, the PRP seemed to have followed in the footsteps of their French counterparts. After the French republican armies were formed, there was a sustained political campaign to motivate the armies to forge powerful emotional bonds with the civilian population (Posen 1995: 146). With this goal in mind, in the months that followed the Portuguese revolution, several officers and sergeants were sent to the countryside to educate the rural population on the virtues of the republican regime. They held public sessions of political clarification and preached against the “evils” of the Monarchy and of the Church, while reassuring the locals that the Republic was the only regime that could bring them prosperity and freedom (Carrilho 1985: 212; Pulido Valente 1982: 130).

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\(^80\) “(…) escola que tem condições para ser a continuação da escola primária (se não a própria escola primária) num País de analfabetos como tristemente é o nosso”.

\(^81\) “(…) abrir as largas portas dos quartéis para por elas entrarem todas as energias necessárias à defesa da Pátria que o Exército reúna, identifica, instrui e prepara para a grande obra de constituição de defesa nacional”.
Based on republican ideals, the democratic national army was created by the Decree of 2 March 1911. It declared that all male citizens, regardless of their economic background and social influence, had to participate in the military service. The aim was to identify the army with the nation by ensuring that society as a whole was represented in the army ranks in the same way that the French revolutionary armies had been during the First Republic (Posen 1995: 146). Military service was proclaimed personal and mandatory. Such a measure was designed to put an end to the remissions system and to the inequalities prevalent in the former monarchist army, as we saw in Section 4.4.2. (Carrilho 1985: 206-207).

In the first years of the Republic, the PRP’s expectations were high and the republicans were confident that they could achieve a true representation of the nation within the army, not only in numbers but also in social expression.

5.2.4. The Godless Republic

At the same time as the PRP was pursuing an ambitious nationalist project of the republicanism of the masses by engineering a new school system and a new militia force composed of all national citizens, the PRP was also determined to transform the nation-state into a godless anti-clerical expression of the party’s ideals. As we saw in Chapters Two to Four, anticlericalism was a passionate point of contention for the republicans during the Constitutional Monarchy. In the first days of the First Republic the republicans’ hatred of the Jesuits was still as palpable as it had been in the final years of the Constitutional Monarchy, when the Jesuits had supported the Nationalist Party after the party’s victory in the 1904 general elections (see Sections 3.4. and 4.3.). When the revolution came, popular hatred of the Jesuits spilled onto the streets of
Lisbon and surrounding towns with unprecedented fervour. As Douglas Wheeler (1978: 57, 59) tells us:

“Several convents were burned in towns. Scientific equipment at the Jesuit college in Campolide [Lisbon] was destroyed. Several priests were murdered by populares, including the French Lazarist confessor of Queen Maria Amélia. During the period of 4-7 October, especially, persons wearing priests’ or nuns’ clothing were in danger of assault in public places. In the towns of south of Lisbon, such as Barreiro or Azeitão, armed populares ‘searched’ for priests who might be suspected of ‘counterrevolutionary’ acts. Anticlerical mobs assaulted the offices of such Catholic newspapers as Portugal in Lisbon and A Palavra in Oporto; as a result, publications of A Palavra were forcibly but temporarily suspended on 6-7 October. There was also vandalism in the churches (...). In some places, royal busts of King Carlos or King Manuel were ostentatiously replaced by portraits of anticlerical dictator-tyrant, the Marquês de Pombal (...).

After proclamation of the republic, some violence continued in Lisbon; shooting occurred in or near religious buildings such as the Quelhas convent, where revolutionary populares suspected or imagined that priests or nuns were hiding and firing on the people”.

The republicans were not afraid of attacking the Church and its representatives openly. In their quest for the creation of a republic based on the sovereignty of an equal and free people, they adopted some of the most visceral tactics used by their French Jacobin counterparts. They embarked on a crusade against the Jesuits and the Catholics and they were not shy of using the Carbonária, still operating in the largest urban
centres, to arbitrarily arrest and physically attack any clerical representatives found in the streets of Lisbon.

In the first year of the First Republic, 400 Jesuits were detained and expelled from the country. Others were subjected to a thorough biological scrutiny in order to prove that a particular Jesuitical race suffered from degenerative physiognomies. The Coimbra-based Academic Centre of Christian Democracy and the workers’ social charity Circles of Catholic Workers were suspended and in the Easter of 1911 all pilgrimages and processions were forbidden. Between 1910 and 1912, all bishops based in Continental Portugal, except the Bishop of Coimbra, were evicted from their Sees. The only cult that was tolerated by the PRP was the cult of the pâtria. Practice of other cults and religions was restricted to the private sphere (Braga da Cruz 1980: 243, 245; Ramos 1994: 408-44; Robinson 1999: 96-98).

For the first time in Portuguese history, radical legal measures were also taken to ensure the separation of church and state. The main supporter of these measures was the Minister of Justice and Cults Afonso Costa, the most radical anticlericalist in government. He defended in Parliament that Portugal needed to morally cleanse itself from the Jesuit Order, seen as an “association of wrongdoers”\(^82\) who “practised true infamies”\(^83\) and the worst “degenerations not only in the public life of the country, but also in its internal life”\(^84\) (Costa 1976: 71-83).

By putting his words into action, a set of decrees were passed by the Provisional Government, even before the 1911 Constitution had been approved, with the aim of ensuring that religion remained once and for all separate from the state. The republicans were convinced that the drastic separation of church and state was the only means by which the Portuguese society could emancipate itself from any remaining ancien régime

\(^82\) “(…)associação de malfeitores (…)”
\(^83\) “(…) praticaram verdadeiras infâmias (…)”.
\(^84\) “(…) não só na vida publica do Pais praticaram as maiores indignidades, como na sua vida interior (…)”
trappings that still lingered in the collective conscience of the people since the end of the Civil War. A policy of independence vis-à-vis Rome was, therefore, pursued without historical precedents to the point that diplomatic relations with the Holy See were officially broken in 1913. As far as the PRP was concerned any spiritual links with Rome were deemed anti-patriotic as they entailed allegiance to a political centre that fell outside of the boundaries of the pátria (Oliveira Marques 1972: 132; Ramos 1994: 413; Robinson 1999: 97).

From the beginning, it was decided that the state, as opposed to any religious order, assumed sole responsibility for the guardianship of the citizens, turning them into individuals with a civic and moral conscience that reflected the values of modernity and democracy. In this sense, the Decree of 18 October 1910 banned all religious oaths, including those taken in school and in the armed forces. The Chaplain’s Corps was abolished and religious services were banished from the armed forces. Although the republicans made some readjustments to this law in 1916, following a fierce campaign by the Academic Centres of Christian Democracy and its mouthpiece, O Imparcial, soldiers went without “religious assistance” for most of the First World War (Amaro 1993: 137-138). As it was mentioned above, the Decree of 22 October 1910 suppressed the teaching of the Catholic doctrine in all primary schools. The Decree of 3 November 1910 legalised divorce for the first time. The Decree of 14 November 1910 abolished the prestigious Coimbra Theology School. The Decree of 28 November 1910 forbade the military institution from taking part in any religious ceremonies. The Decree of 25 December 1910 declared marriage an exclusively civil contract.

Physically and morally threatened by the new Republic, the bishops reacted angrily to Afonso Costa’s “Jacobin” decrees, publishing a collective pastoral in December 1910. In their pastoral, made public in February 1911, they were incapable of
remaining “silent and impassive at such an exceptional juncture”\textsuperscript{85}, saying “how distressing, and seriously grave is this crisis that our p\textipa{\textae}tria is living due to the religious question”\textsuperscript{86}. They called the anti-clerical legislation Jacobin and anti-Catholic, namely the laws that put an end to religious oaths, expelled the religious orders from Portugal and legalised divorce. Despite their attempts not to express any preference for any particular form of government, they asserted in their pastoral that “all anti-religious attempts are anti-social and also anti-national and anti-patriotic” (cited in Braga da Cruz 1980: 246). Such an affirmation infuriated the Minister of Justice and Cults Afonso Costa who forbade the circulation of the pastoral in the churches. When the clergy refused to follow his instruction, the Bishop of Porto, who had written the pastoral was expelled from the country and many others were arrested or sent into exile (i.e. the bishops of Bragança, Portalegre, Algarve, Coimbra, Viseu and Lamêgo).

Unfazed by the bishops’ reaction, Afonso Costa, now nicknamed friars’ killer (\textit{mata-frades}), continued to issue more anti-clerical decrees after the pastoral had been made public. The Decree of 15 February 1911 established freedom of expression in religion matters by revoking several articles of the 1886 Penal Code which had withdrawn the political rights of those who had disrespected or abnegated the official religion of the kingdom. The Decree of 18 February 1911 expelled all religious orders from the country and introduced the compulsory recording of births, deaths and marriages by state officers rather than the clergy. The Decree of 29 March 1911 established religious neutrality in all matters relating to public education by forbidding the teaching of Christianity in schools, as the state assumed sole responsibility for public education.

The Decree of 20 April 1911, also known as the Separation Law, established the effective separation of State and Church by declaring the state free of religion and by

\textsuperscript{85} “(…) continuar silenciosos e impassíveis em tão excepcional conjuntura”
\textsuperscript{86} “(…) que angustiosa, gravíssima é a crise por que está passando a nossa pátria sob o aspecto religioso”.
regulating and controlling all forms of cult manifestation. Accordingly, all religious organisations were replaced by civic commissions (called cultic commissions) monitored by the government. Church property was nationalised and the publication of clerical decrees, papal bulls and pastoral writings was forbidden without the express approval of the public authorities. All religious manifestations such as processions, religious emblems and symbols were confined to predefined private spaces. The clergy were granted a state pension as long as they followed the separation rules. Finally, the public use of long habits was outlawed (Braga da Cruz 1980: 244-245; Catroga 1991 vol. 2: 332-333, 336-338; Oliveira Marques 1972: 131-132; Pulido Valente 1982: 167, 172, 177-178; Wheeler 1978: 68).

The abovementioned decrees eventually became an integral part of the 1911 Constitution (Miranda 1984: 196-197), drafted by a commission headed by Master Mason Magalhães Lima. The Constitutional Commission worked under the supervision of the Constituent Assembly, which had no monarchist or catholic representatives in session. As was mentioned earlier in this section, only republicans and a few independents, considered “safe republicans” (read anti-clericals), were allowed to take a seat in the Constitutional Assembly (Oliveira Marques 1972: 161; Wheeler 1978: 78-79).

The 1911 Constitution was based on the anticlerical laws “(…) of Pombal and the Constitutional Liberals of the 1830s [Setembristas], and from the anticlerical policy of France’s Third Republic during the years 1900-1906, in particular” (Wheeler 1978: 67; and also Braga Cruz 1980: 244). In accordance with the decrees approved by the Provisional Government, the 1911 Constitution banished God and Catholicism from the public life of the country. This was a major step in Portugal’s constitutional history, as the previous Constitutions of the nineteenth century, albeit liberal in character, still recognized a Catholic God within the political order of the state. In the 1822, 1826 and
1838 Constitutions, the king had been given a right to rule “by inheritance and by the grace of God” (my emphasis), whereas the Catholic religion had been defined as the official religion of the kingdom (art. 25 of the 1822 Constitution, art. 6 of the 1824 Carta and art. 3 of the 1838 Constitution) (Catroga 1991 vol. 2: 267-268, 325, 333).

When the Separation Law was approved on 20 April 1911, the Church protested again, describing it as an “atrocity”, a “tyranny”, a “humiliation” and a “mockery”; and basically summarising it in four words: “injustice, oppression, plunder, contempt” (cited in Pulido Valente 1982: 178). Pope Pius X cut relations with Portugal and circulated an encyclical under the name “Iamdudum in Lusitania” around the Catholic world (Braga da Cruz 1980: 248). The encyclical condemned the Portuguese Republic for nationalising the Church’s properties, making the Church dependent on civic powers, abolishing religious freedom, intruding on religious matters, attributing pensions to the widows and illegitimate children of the clergy, forbidding the use of religious habits and outlawing public manifestations of faith and cult (Braga da Cruz 1980: 249).

After the publication of the Separation Law, the Portuguese bishops instructed the clergy to reject the state pensions offered by the Republic and to boycott the cultic commissions, which the Pope had already considered anti-orthodox and therefore subject to excommunication. Almost 85% of the clergy followed the bishops’ instructions. In the north, support for the bishops’ anti-secular stance was practically unanimous (Pulido Valente 1982: 178). In most northern parishes, the Separation Law was never observed. From 1911 to 1914, only 11% of the clergymen accepted the attribution of state pensions, mostly those based in Lisbon and in the south of the country (Catroga 1991 vol. 2: 349; Ramos 1994: 483). The clergy opposed the Republic by passively resisting its anticlerical laws.

The persecution of the clergy was so oppressive that it shocked the diplomatic missions stationed in Lisbon and made headlines in the most prestigious international
publications, causing a major international uproar. As the historian Douglas Wheeler (1978: 68-69) says, “by mid-1911 what had been intended as religious reform had become religious persecution (...) [damaging] the young republic’s reputation abroad”.

In Portugal, English “diplomats became highly critical of the anticlerical campaign” (p. 70), due to disputes over property ownership and the rights of the English Catholic orders. The issue was so flammable that it delayed British recognition of the Portuguese Republic, with the British Minister in Lisbon at the time, Sir Francis Villiers, describing the Separation Law as “an arbitrary and inquisitorial measure, whose general provisions are wholly incompatible with its opening declarations in regard to freedom of religion and liberty of conscience” (cited in Wheeler 1978: 71). The British insisted that the Separation Law should exempt the English and Irish Catholic churches, forcing the Provisional Government to do a volte face on some of the harshest laws regarding “foreign churches served by ministers of foreign nationality” (Wheeler 1978: 71). After the approval of the 1911 Constitution and the election of the President of the Republic, the British finally recognised the Portuguese Republic on 11 September 1911. But by then, British “friends of the Republic” and even “Catholic-hating Protestants” had already been alienated by the way the Provisional Government had subjected the Church to “a slavery of the civil power” (Wheeler 1978: 71).

5.3. The Non-Inclusive Republican Nation

Despite the PRP’s best efforts to establish a top-down Republic through the state institutions, not everyone saw themselves reflected in the new official nationalism of the state. To begin with, the republican school system was not fully implemented and levels of illiteracy among the population living outside Lisbon and Porto remained high.
After the initial push to turn education into “a system of mobilisation and propaganda for the benefit of the republican state”\textsuperscript{87} (Ramos 1994: 421), the number of new schools opened after 1911-1912 stagnated. Between 1911 and 1926, only 700 new schools were opened (Ramos 1994: 613) and, in 1913, 12% of the existing schools were closed (\textit{A Capital 25 January 1913}). What is more, the rate of illiteracy remained high, decreasing only slightly. According to the historian Rui Ramos (1994: 615), from 1900 to 1930 the percentage of men and women over seven years old who could read and write increased from 26\% to 39\%. This was certainly more than what was achieved during the Constitutional Monarchy (see Section 1.5.), but still far less than what was expected from the new order.

The main reason for this discrepancy between the objectives laid out in the educational decrees and the reality on the ground had to do with the fact that Portugal remained a poor country with no economic means to seriously invest in a modern education system that hitherto had largely benefited from the assistance of religious charities and private contributions. Portugal was not the industrial modern state that Gellner (1983) had envisaged as the guarantor of a state-sponsored education and literacy system that would impose an inclusive, common and shared “high culture” upon society. In their use of the republican schools as a state tool to ensure that the national unit and the political unit remained congruent, the PRP had failed miserably.

Although education remained one of the central pillars of the republican doctrine until the end of the First Republic, balancing the state budget assumed priority over this in the initial years of the regime. During the Constitutional Monarchy, one of the PRP’s main criticisms, as we saw in Chapter Four, had been the negligent manner in which the state finances had been managed by the dynastic rulers. As a result, Afonso Costa, who was nominated finance minister and head of the PRP cabinet in 1913, pursued a

\textsuperscript{87} “A educação republicana significava, assim, um sistema de mobilização e de propaganda em benefício do Estado republicano.”
relentless fiscal and budgetary policy (Brake Law) that ensured that the public accounts were balanced in the third year of the Republic with a surplus of several contos. In the fiscal year 1912-13 and 1913-14 there were surpluses of £117,000 and £1,257,000, respectively (Oliveira Marques 1972: 125-126; Wheeler 1978: 96). However, this major achievement - unheard of in the final years of the Constitutional Monarchy – was accomplished at the expense of some of the most important projects defended by the republican ideologues, such as the republican schools and the national army.

Regarding the national army, once again, just as had happened with the republican schools, political intentions were not met with practical results and by the final years of the First Republic, the militia system was in utter shambles. As was mentioned above, Portugal did not have the financial means necessary to embark on such a gargantuan quest. What is more, public backing, public funding, enfranchisement and esprit de corps were also practically absent within the praetorian institution, contributing to the failure of the army reform (Wheeler 1978: 115, 173). But let us look into these four causes in more detail.

Firstly, mass conscription remained a chimera. Large numbers of conscripted men never served in the military. Not unlike the Constitutional Monarchy, the military draft fell largely on the poor and dispossessed as political influence and continued practices of caciquismo ensured that the wealthy kept buying their way out of the military service. Similarly, the number of young men who fled military service was still very high. In 1915, out of almost 70,000 young men called to appear before the draft examination board, 22,682 did not show up – a staggering 32.9% of the total number. Although the number of draft dodgers decreased by 10% on average as the years progressed, those who joined the military service faced horrible conditions in the barracks (e.g. used and scarce uniforms, poor hygienic habits, meagre rations and inadequate infrastructures) (Carrilho 1985: 208, 209). This kept the morale of the
draftees very low. As if that were not enough, as general malnutrition continued to
assail the lower classes, large numbers of potential draftees had to be discarded because
of their poor physical condition. In 1925, for instance, out of over 85,000 men eligible
for military service, only 55,875 appeared before a local draft examination board; and,
of these, only 21,794 were effectively conscripted (Carrilho 1985: 209; Wheeler 1978:
173). As a result, the idea of turning the Portuguese army into a national militia and a
school of literacy became less than attractive for those who could not escape the
mandatory military service and never reached the bulk of the population.

Secondly, the army reforms were too ambitious for a country like Portugal. The
army was let down by a regime that continuously failed to modernise and invest in the
institution. Whereas small countries like Switzerland, Holland and Belgium spent as
much as 25 per cent of their budgets on the army, Portugal only spent 13.1 per cent.
What is more, in the first years of the Republic, “[officers’] pay had not been raised
since 1896, and housing subsidies had remained the same since 1906. While favoured
civil servants – part of the Democrats’ [PRP’s] burgeoning electoral machine – received
raises, professional soldiers did not” (Wheeler 1978: 115).

But it was not only the army that was in shambles. The navy was not faring
much better either. Once they had been the unequivocal supporters of the PRP against
the Constitutional Monarchy, but as soon as the Republic was established they suffered
as badly as their army counterparts from a lack of public investment. The fleet inherited
from the monarchy was small, old, decrepit and outdated. During the First World War,
the navy confiscated a few German vessels stationed in the Lisbon harbour, but they
still were not enough to reinvigorate a branch of the armed forces that virtually put to
shame Portugal’s view of itself as an historical naval power (Wheeler 1978: 173).
Wheeler (1978: 174) recounts an episode that epitomises the dire state of the Portuguese
navy.
“In February 1922 when President of the Republic Almeida made an official visit to Brazil, the government required appropriate oceanic transportation. The president was informed that no warship was fit to make the transatlantic voyage. Instead, President Almeida was obliged to travel on a smaller steamer, which, once it reached Brazil, was confiscated by creditors. With no vessel, the chagrined president was forced to book his return passage as a regular first-class passenger on an English vessel”.

Thirdly, adding insult to injury, officers were for the first time discriminated in the electoral laws, which still failed to enfranchise regular soldiers despite the republican promises during the Constitutional Monarchy (Wheeler 1978: 116). In 1911, the Provisional Government maintained the status quo by issuing an organic electoral law (Decree of 14 March 1911), stating that enlisted men, non-commissioned officers and cadets were excluded from the right to vote (Croca Caeiro 1997: 96). Furthermore, in 1913, the Democrats issued a new law dictating that all military personnel on active duty were deprived of eligibility for the Congress and government, and all military personnel were ineligible to work in the civil service, something they had enjoyed during the Constitutional Monarchy. In the same year, an electoral law proposed by Afonso Costa’s government and passed on 3 July extended the restriction of the voting right to all soldiers and to those who were literate, male and at least twenty-one years old. Despite the fact that the electoral law was altered in 1915, the same principle continued to apply to the armed forces. The aim was to ensure that the high ranks of the military would stay out of politics at the same time that the political power of the conservative, Catholic and monarchist masses who lived outside of the more educated urban centres continued to be curtailed (Wheeler 1978: 96, 108). The electoral law
deeply aggravated the military leadership who, unlike the low ranks of the army and navy, were not strongly supportive of a republican regime that had been little preoccupied with their status in society since the 1910 Revolution. From the inception of the Republic, the PRP governments had implemented several measures with the purpose of weakening the general officers rank – the rank mostly associated with the previous regime – by diminishing their power and the number of generals on active duty. The PRP was aware that the army was not completely purged of its monarchist elements as only 14 monarchist officers refused to swear allegiance to the Republic while the majority of their comrades swore allegiance in order to keep their jobs. As a consequence, the PRP made sure that the number of senior officers dropped in the first years of the Republic. In fact, the number of generals decreased from 65 to 20 and by 1925 all generals serving in the army had been promoted after 1916. By contrast, the ranks of junior officers – who tended to be more supportive of the republicans – increased throughout the First Republic. For instance, by the end of the Constitutional Monarchy, there were only 118 colonels; but by 1911, the number had increased to 126 and after the end of the First World War, there were 206 colonels serving in the army (Medeiros Ferreira 1992: 43-44).

This issue takes us to the fourth cause that explains the failure of the national army: the lack of institutional esprit de corps, which was fostered and sustained by the PRP.

The PRP’s strategy to strengthen the middle ranks of the military at the expense of the high ranks created a schism within the army from the outset, favouring the radicalisation of those who felt they were closely associated with the revolutionary process, i.e. the enlisted men and the non-commissioned officers. As we saw in Chapter Four, the Republican Revolution was carried out by the latter in face of the neutrality and indifference of the rest of the military corporation. This, in itself, emboldened the
radical attitude of sergeants, corporals and privates who, convinced of being the “founders of the Republic”, believed that indiscipline was the best form of action against those who had been absent from the revolutionary coup (Croca Caeiro 1997: 94; Pulido Valente 1982: 175).

Although the PRP governments tried to control the situation, the influence that a few lieutenants, also known as the “Young Turks”, exercised over senior officers was disproportionate to their numbers and rank. However, the support they received from the Minister of War, Correia Barreto, ensured that they maintained control over the promotions and transfers of their superiors. As a result, several “suspicious” officers were transferred to barracks in the countryside or given administrative positions. Those who openly opposed the new regime suffered compulsory retirement, while the commanding posts of the Lisbon and Porto regiments were given to republican junior officers, barely qualified for the job. Hand in hand with the Carbonária, the Masonry and the battalions of voluntary men who patrolled the streets of the capital – ensuring that the Republic was safeguarded – sergeants, corporals and privates formed “republican committees” to keep a close eye on the “suspicious” officers to the point that the latter started living in fear of the former (Wheeler 1978: 112).

The republican army was as divided as the country. Indiscipline, insubordination, mutiny, physical harassment and a serious lack of respect for rank were endemic (Carrilho 1985: 250; Croca Caeiro 1997: 94-95; Pulido Valente 1982: 175-177; Telo 1980, Volume I: 126, 127). The political involvement of the Young Turks in the daily affairs of the Republic was so prevalent that the Secretariat of War had to circulate a memo, reminding “all military men that it is forbidden to subscribe to any manifestos and other publications in which one protests against the laws of the country or decisions made by the powers of the state”88 (cited in Carrilho 1985: 111). Artur Ribeiro Lopes
(1939), a member of parliament and a contemporary of the First Republic, described the life in the barracks in cautious terms:

“The majority of the officers are monarchists. Or at least they oppose the regime. The officers are spied on and their moves are watched by the Jacobins. The army has become, against the Republic, a dangerous organisation”89 (cited in Telo 1980 vol. 1: 127).

As the radical republicans, associated with the governing PRP, continued to impose on the country their definition of who and what constituted the Portuguese nation, no other question raised more controversy, acrimony and national division than that of the place assigned to the Catholic Church in the political life of the nation (e.g. Braga da Cruz 1980: 243-250). Just as had happened with the engineering of a republican school system and the creation of a national army, the republicans’ determination to construct an anti-clerical nation from the top-down was a major failure, dividing the country between the supporters of the republic, living in the large cities, and the Catholics living in the rural towns, especially in the north of the country.

Outside the cities, the majority of the Portuguese people felt openly affronted by the PRP’s anti-clerical policies, which only gathered support in the large urban centres, namely the capital. However, in the northern urban centres, as the Catholic Church started operating in a state of semi-clandestinity, sections of the middle class, who had strongly supported the PRP in the final years of the Constitutional Monarchy, showed signs of confusion and enraged towards a Republic that had promised freedom and order, but delivered religious persecution and anti-clerical radicalism (Pulido Valente 1982: 179).

89 “Os oficiais são monárquicos na sua maioria. No mínimo opõem-se ao regime. Os oficiais são espiados e observados em todos os seus movimentos pelos jacobinos. O exercito torna-se, contra a Republica, uma organização perigosa”. 

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By treading on the religious sensitivities of the majority, the PRP politicised a question that became tantamount to a deep feeling of national oppression. In the words of a contemporary integralist, José Manuel Quintas (2004: 276), “(...) the identification of the religious question with the national question was the real factor that led to the integralist political formulation”\textsuperscript{90} (author’s own emphasis). In the end, the PRP’s anticlerical policies succeeded in bringing together the Catholic and monarchist forces that had been defeated in 1910, as both movements found a popular raison d’être that morally legitimised their opposition to the newly established regime. From a merging sense of moral discrimination a new reactive contestation against the established authorities emerged, echoing the catholic and anti-clerical divisions of the Civil War.

Let us see how this happened.

After the 1910 Revolution a few thousand hardline monarchists had been sent into exile in France and Galicia (Spain). Under the leadership of Captain Henrique de Paiva Couceiro, several clergymen and monarchists – mostly miguelistas – got together in Spain, purchased weapons and started conspiring against the Republic. Their aim was to mount a monarchist incursion from Galicia, entering Portugal from the north, uprise the countryside with the help of the clergy and the local caciques and then hope that the rest of the country would follow suit. The army was expected to take their side or at least remain neutral as they had been in October 1910. Paiva Couceiro was convinced that it was time for the countryside to impose its will on Lisbon (de la Torre Gomez 1982; Pulido Valente 1982: 203; Ramos 1994: 458).

However, the incursionists were riddled with organisational problems. Although they enjoyed the implicit backing of the Madrid government (de la Torre Gomez & Sánchez Cervelló 1992: 99-100; Medeiros Ferreira 1989: 28; Severiano Teixeira 1999: 172), they lacked the support of the Portuguese military. Only 6 officers defected to join

\textsuperscript{90} “Terá sido, na verdade, a identificação da questão religiosa com a questão nacional o verdadeiro factor desencadeante da formulação política integralista”.

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them in the north of the country – as we mentioned above, at the time, the majority of
the army was being closely watched by the Young Turks. Furthermore, Paiva
Couceiro’s political goals were to protect the Catholic Church, re-establish discipline in
the army and destroy the secret societies that assured the survival of the new Republic.
He was not particularly concerned about the form of government that would come out
of his reactionary coup d’état, although he saw himself as a representative of the “real
nation” with no intention of reinstating Dom Manuel (de la Torre Gomez 1982; Pulido
Valente 1982: 202-203). The incursionists were convinced that the Monarchy had failed
to survive the 1910 coup due to the corruption, mismanagement and decadence
fomented by the rotativista parties in power. Consequently, they were eager to keep
anyone associated with the old regime outside of the incursionist movement, which
resulted in a fragmentation of the monarchist cause as well as a limitation of the funds

As a consequence, when Paiva Couceiro entered Portugal in the morning of 5
October 1911, only a thousand men accompanied him. They were mostly composed of
Catholic activists, peasants, a few aristocrats, former Municipal Guards, policemen and
 Sergeants discharged by the Republic (de la Torre Gomez 1982; Pulido Valente 1982:
201; Ramos 1994: 459). Most of them were recruited in the northern District of Vila
Real by priests. As they entered Portugal, only a quarter of them carried weapons
because they did not possess enough funds to acquire more. As expected, when the
incursionists entered Portugal, the locals failed to join them in their uprising. The people
remained passive, watching the incursionists being pushed back across the Spanish
 border by the republican forces dispatched from Lisbon. The incursionist attempt to
overthrow the government in Lisbon had fallen in disarray and did not even last a week
(Ramos 1994: 459-460). In retaliation, the people in Porto destroyed the headquarters of
monarchist and Catholic newspapers, looted shops owned by renowned monarchists,
attacked the Seminary and the Episcopal Palace and attempted to set the Catholic Association on fire. As the monarchist prisoners disembarked in Porto’s port, a crowd of *populares* insulted them, forced them to kiss the republican flag, punched them and kicked them around (de la Torre Gomez 1982; Pulido Valente 1982: 207).

But Paiva Couceiro remained fearless and quickly organised a second incursion after the Portuguese government succeeded in convincing the British to help persuade a reluctant Madrid to expel the incursionists (Medeiros Ferreira 1989: 28). On 6 July 1912, the incursionists entered Portugal again. On this occasion, they were better armed, better organised, more vicious – two county administrators were executed at close range – and more united than ever – the *manuelistas* and the *miguelistas* had reached an agreement on 30 January 1912 which translated into more funds and men for the monarchist cause (de la Torre Gomez 1982; Ramos 1994: 450; Pulido Valente 1982: 225). However, just as had happened in the previous year, the local population failed to join them in their efforts to overthrow the Republic and the second incursion quickly ran aground by 10 July 1912 (de la Torre Gomez 1982; Pulido Valente 1982: 226). Far from an interest in politics, it seemed that the peasants’ main preoccupation was with self-preservation. From 1910 to 1914, they migrated in vast numbers to Brazil in search of a better life. Although alienated by the Republic’s Separation Law and the Conscription Laws, the peasants failed to show an appetite for political militancy and remained largely indifferent to the monarchist cause (de la Torre Gomez 1982; Ramos 1994: 460).

The Republic, on the other hand, was not as relaxed regarding the incursions. Between 1911 and 1912, the regime arrested around 3,500 monarchists and sent another 2,000 into exile. Those who were arrested were punished with severe jail sentences in filthy prisons that led one English journalist to qualify them as worthy of a Dickensian description (Ramos 1994: 460). The prisoners, in general, complained about lack of
space. In the Relação do Porto Prison, for instance, 640 inmates lived in a space designed for only 400. They also protested against a serious lack of living conditions. In the Caxias Prison, the cells flooded when it rained. The inmates went hungry. Occasionally, they were fed mouldy bread. Hygiene conditions were below standard. Some cells did not have lavatories. International opinion was shocked by the accusations of severe maltreatment voiced by those who visited the prisons. Several cases of torture involving beatings and beard pullings were reported, as were cases of long solitary confinement and death threats (Pulido Valente 1982: 217). The squalid state of the Portuguese prisons caused so much outrage that even King George V asked the British minister in Lisbon to ascertain the veracity of the allegations. After visiting the Lisbon prisons, the minister reported back to the English court, confirming each one of them (Pulido Valente 1982: 217).

Throughout 1913, Costa’s government was put under further international pressure when Adelie Marie Russell, the Duchess of Bedford, published articles in the Times (5 April 1913) and in the Daily Mail (7 April) following her visits to the Portuguese prisons. Afonso Costa was obliged to answer the accusations made by the Duchess in an official pamphlet, but the conditions in the prisons remained the same.

The British humanitarian campaign reached a climax with a demonstration in London on 22 April 1913. Implicit in the British protest was a threat of British intervention and a severance of diplomatic relations if the Portuguese government did not relax its repressive measures (Wheeler 1978: 98). Booklets and pamphlets were circulated demanding an early amnesty for the political prisoners (Tenison 1913, 1914; Gibbs and Tenison 1914). One of those booklets reached at least five editions. In no uncertain terms, it called the treatment of political prisoners a “tyranny which is an insult to humanity and an outrage upon European civilisation” (Tenison 1913: 1-14). Philip Gibbs and E. M. Tenison’s report, The Tragedy of Portugal as Shown in the
Sufferings of the Portuguese Political Prisoners (1914), provided further details of the abuse suffered by the Portuguese political prisoners. After investigating the judicial status of the inmates, they declared that several political prisoners had been kept in isolation for more than forty days while some had been arbitrarily imprisoned without a trial for fifteen months (pp. 12-14). According to the Portuguese law of the time, no one should be imprisoned in solitary confinement for more than eight days without a trial.

In the meantime, Winston Churchill, the First Lord of the Admiralty, showed a strong dislike for the PRP and was of the opinion that England should never have consented to the overthrow of the Portuguese Monarchy. In fact, in the first years of the First Republic he ordered the boycott of the Portuguese ports – which remained in place until 1913 – and defended an alliance with Spain, thus replacing a privileged relationship with Portugal, even if that meant yielding to the Iberianist tendencies of the Spanish King, Dom Alfonso XIII. From 1907, the British had tried to keep Spain as part of the Anglo-French entente. In 1913, Dom Alfonso XIII told the Spanish Ambassador that Spain would happily remain under British influence if Spain reserved for itself the right to occupy Portugal in case England and Germany decided to split the Portuguese colonies in an agreement signed between both countries in 1912-13. Dom Alfonso XIII was a diehard Iberianist who believed that a republican Portugal could jeopardise his legitimacy in Spain. He had proved as much when he had allowed the Portuguese monarchists to mount two incursions from Galicia in 1911 and 1912. The English government remained ambiguous regarding this point, hinting that Britain would not oppose a Spanish intervention in Portugal as long as Madrid consulted London in advance. According to the historian Rui Ramos, who has done extensive research in the Foreign Office archives regarding this matter, it seems that Asquith’s cabinet only agreed to such an arrangement because he was convinced that Dom Alfonso XIII would
neither have the political clout nor the military and financial means to pursue his Iberianist goals (Ramos 1994: 496-498).

However, British condemnation of the regime and the British-Spanish rapprochement, ultimately resulted in the resignation of Afonso Costa in 1914, and the approval of an Amnesty Law by his successor, Prime Minister Bernardino Machado. This almost immediately released “between one thousand and two thousand political prisoners” from Portuguese prisons and ordered the deportation of only eleven monarchist leaders, most of them already living in exile (Wheeler 1978: 104). After Costa’s Jacobin attack on the Catholics and monarchists, Machado followed a “peace and reconciliation” policy. Convinced that Costa’s anticlericalism had gone too far, he relaxed the anticlerical policies and allowed several major religious figures, including the patriarch of Lisbon, to return from exile (Wheeler 1978: 104-105).

However, despite Bernardino Machado’s best efforts to appease the Catholics and the monarchists, his government continued to fall short from including the latter in the Republican institutions. From the beginning of the First Republic until the demise of the regime, the Republican Party continued to dominate, manipulate and control the destinies of the state, excluding from the corridors of power anyone who disagreed with their methods, tactics and goals. Catholics and monarchists were continuously labelled as the enemies of the nation and therefore kept at arm’s length from power, only succeeding to enter into governing coalitions when a military coup d’état temporarily overthrew the republicans from power (i.e. in 1915 and 1917).

However, the republicans’ tight grip on power and their version of anti-clerical republicanism, which verged on state-sponsored Jacobin terrorism – especially under Afonso Costa’s leadership – alienated not only the monarchists and the Catholics, but also caused major dissent and dissatisfaction among the republican moderates, especially among the PRP members, who supported the regime in power.
5.4. The Splitting of the PRP and the PD’s Democratic “Dictatorship”: Alienation of Moderate Conservatives

The PRP’s sudden rise to power created an identity crisis within the party that was manifested in the drafting of the 1911 Constitution. As soon as the Constitutional Monarchy was overthrown, the PRP’s initial version of the republican nation, as defended during the years in opposition, was reformulated and readjusted in accordance with the responsibilities that came with the sudden acquisition of power. With Afonso Costa at the helm, the ideological line of the party was redefined, alienating some of the most “purist” republicans who had fought for the overthrow of the Constitutional Monarchy. As we saw in Chapter Three, the PRP’s political programme had defended, among other things, the decentralisation of the state, municipalism and universal suffrage.

However, the Constitution that was approved on 18 August 1911 by the Constitutional Assembly, overwhelmingly led by the PRP under the influence of Afonso Costa, was very different from the one promised during the years in opposition. Although municipalism had been one of the trademarks of the PRP in opposition, once in power, all attempts to empower the municipalities were abandoned in favour of a unified and centralised state ruled from Lisbon. Outside of the capital, the countryside continued to be devoid of self-government.

In this sense, the 1911 Constitution was the first in the country’s history to explicitly establish a “unitary state”, whose dual chamber of parliament did not provide any representation of the municipalities. The 1911 Constitution contemplated a three-power system of central government with a congress, composed of a Chamber of
Deputies and a Senate directly elected by the people, a president and a cabinet. Wary of seeing the executive power being usurped again by the head of state as it had been during the Constitutional Monarchy, the PRP ensured that the Constitution considered the legislative power the most important sovereign power in the country. As a consequence, the president of the republic, elected by congress for one four-year term only, was neither legitimised by popular vote nor had the power to dissolve the parliament. However, even though this situation changed in 1919-1921, when a constitutional revision broadened the democratic credibility of the President by subjecting his mandate to popular election, from the inception of the Republic the President was given the power to appoint and dismiss governments as he wished, as long as the governments were based on parliamentary majorities. This idiosyncrasy resulted in the consecutive nomination of the same party to power at times of political instability but under a different leadership, as the majorities in parliament could not be dissolved until the following elections (Miranda 1984). Since the nomination of the ruling government was based on parliamentary majorities – the only source of power legitimacy – the PRP used every means at its disposal to win every single parliamentary election through disenfranchisement, vote rigging, electoral fraud, clientelism and state patronage of the civil service as we will see below.

Furthermore, contrary to what the PRP had strongly defended in the final decades of the monarchy, the party refused to expand the voting right to all citizens, undermining most of the democratic expectations created among their supporters. In 1911 the party passed the Electoral Law, which showed signs of innovation in the sense that it no longer applied the taxation requirement that had been enforced by the constitutionalist parties of the previous regime. However, the document continued to enforce most of the restrictions already in place regarding women’s rights and
continued to grant “the right to vote [only] to those aged 21 and over who could read and write or were heads of family” (Oliveira Marques 1972: 161).

As a result of the ideological discrepancies that characterised the party between its years in opposition and its first two years in government, the PRP started showing serious internal cracks. By February 1912, Afonso Costa’s radical approach to the religious question, the organisation of government, enfranchisement and the imprisonment of political opponents had lost support within the party. Between 24 and 26 February 1912, António José de Almeida and Brito Camacho, both considered more conservative than Afonso Costa, dissented from the party and created their own political platforms. Almeida founded the moderate left-leaning Evolutionist Republican Party (PRE) and used A Republica newspaper as its mouthpiece. Brito Camacho convened several republican intellectuals around his newspaper A Lucta and created the moderate right-wing Republican Union’s Party (PUR). In the face of both dissensions, Afonso Costa maintained his leadership of the PRP, and started addressing the party as the Democratic Party (PD).

Whereas the PD continued to attack the Catholic Church, the PRE and the PUR based their political programmes on a more conciliatory and moderate attitude towards the clergy and the Catholic institutions, calling for the humane treatment and release of political prisoners, the extension of suffrage to all males and females and for the decentralisation of power (Oliveira Marques 1978: 551-557; Pulido Valente 1982: 214; Wheeler 1978: 71-72, 83).

Faced with the competition of the unionists and evolutionists, Afonso Costa revised the Electoral Law in 1913, ensuring that the PD would retain a monopoly on power by reducing the representation of minority parties in Parliament to the PD’s advantage. Accordingly, electoral representation in Lisbon and Porto was turned into a proportional system, whereas in the rest of the country the “first past the post” method
was maintained (Costa Pinto 1999: 28). The vote was also restricted to *literate* males only, aged 21 and over. In a speech in parliament, Afonso Costa declared that the electoral vote would be more informative if it excluded the “uninformed” votes of “ignorant” men – “You are on your own if you want to make elections with illiterate votes, gentlemen, because I want to make them with conscious votes”91 (cited in Serra 1999: 115). “Individuals who neither know the boundaries of their parish nor have clear and precise ideas about anything or anyone, should not be allowed to vote, so that one cannot say that the Republic was confirmed by lambs”92 (cited in Ramos 1994: 493).

In reality, Afonso Costa wanted to take votes away from the rural towns, strong bastions of illiteracy but also of conservatism and Catholicism, and concentrate them in Lisbon and Porto, where the republicans found most of their supporters. In this respect, the PD seemed to be struggling with the same challenges faced by Italy, especially after the unification in 1870, vis-à-vis an opposing Catholic Church. Despite Massimo d’Azeglio’s determination to make Italians out of Italy (“We have made Italy: now we must make Italians”), the new kingdom of Italy was not so determined to “give the vote to more than one or two per cent of them until this seemed quite unavoidable” (Hobsbawm & Ranger 2004 [1983]: 267).

As a result, in a country of illiterates, the number of voters dropped dramatically from 846,801 in 1911 to 397,038 in 1913, more than 50% of the previous electorate (Serra 1999: 115). With the adjustment of the 1913 Electoral Law, only 10% of the total population and 30% of all males were enfranchised, while Lisbon and Porto became over-represented with 30% of all votes (Costa Pinto 1999: 29). Only during Sidónio Pais’s short-lived dictatorship (1917-1919) did the electorate numbers rise again. Sidónio Pais granted voting rights to all males, irrespective of their literacy levels,

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91 “Se quiserem fazer eleições com analfabetos, façam-nas os senhores, porque eu quero fazê-las com votos conscientes”.
92 “Indivíduos que não sabem os confins da sua paróquia, que não têm ideias nítidas e exactas de coisa nenhuma, nem de nenhuma pessoa, não devem ir às urnas, para não se dizer que foi com carneiros que confirmámos a Republica.”
raising the number of voters to 900,000 (Oliveira Marques 1972: 161). As the democrats had feared, during those years the conservatives gained a majority in the elections – but in this affirmation one should bear in mind that a conservative majority might also have been achieved due to the PD’s electoral abstention during the military dictatorship.

However, it was not only by means of the readjusting of the electoral laws that the PRP/PD maintained a monopoly on power. The party also rigge electoral results in the rural towns, ensuring successive overall victories. While in power, the PRP/PD used the state machinery at their disposal to advance their political hegemony. They falsified and forged electoral rolls, occasionally enrolling illiterate republican sympathisers and excluding enfranchised monarchists and socialists on account of deliberate bureaucratic mistakes. They dispensed political favouritism in case of electoral victory. PRP/PD supporters were systematically appointed to the most influential positions in the civil service, especially to those positions that could exert some effect on electoral results, such as district civil governors and county administrators. They nominated prefects in exchange for rural votes and party allegiance. For instance, in the 1913 elections, the PD threatened Espinho’s regional council with suspension if the party did not win the elections. In the 1921 elections, in Zenzibre, the caciques took possession of the electoral roll and escorted the local poll’s chairman to an unknown location on election day. In the 1922 elections, the Catholic electorate was received in the Algarve polls with chlorate bombs, insults and threats, while in Vieira de Leiria, the monarchist voters were bullied by the Republican Guard into voting Democrat. In the 1925 elections, bombs went off in Porto de Mós and Matosinhos, and in Figueira the electoral rolls of monarchist constituencies went missing. The Democrats turned erstwhile monarchist caciques into their own caciques, expanding their power in the countryside, to the point that in 1915, for instance, more people voted for the Democrats in the “reactionary”
northern district of Braga than in the city of Lisbon (Costa Pinto 1999: 29; Farelo Lopes 1994; Ramos 1994: 482; Wheeler 1978: 108). The PD effectively controlled the electoral machinery and the voters’ list, winning easily with absolute majorities in 1911-1913, 1913-1915, 1915-1918, 1919-1921 and 1925-1926. In 1922-1925, the PD won the elections with a simple majority. Only in 1918 and 1921 did the party lose the elections either because of absenteeism or a weak performance at the polls, respectively (Table 5.1).

**Table 5.1 - Parliamentary Majorities (1911-1926)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Parliamentary Majority</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1911-1913</td>
<td>PRP (97.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1913-1915</td>
<td>PD (52.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1915-1918</td>
<td>PD (65%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1918</td>
<td>PNR (69.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1919-1921</td>
<td>PD (52.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>PLR (48.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1922-1925</td>
<td>PD (44.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925-1926</td>
<td>PD (50.9%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Costa Pinto (1998: 52, 61, 64)

In parallel with the PD’s overwhelming victories at the polls, the party also dominated the state machinery, by distributing status, wealth and jobs in the civil and armed services to party supporters, namely lower class and lower-middle class groups. In fact, the party’s patronage system was so vast, it inflated a civil service that was disproportionate to the number of people employed, growing 50% in size during the First Republic. An administrative job was more often than not guaranteed if the applicant joined the Democratic Party and became a member of the Republican Centres. Usually, those who had most to gain were the lower level civil servants and the lieutenants and sergeants in the army, the main supporters of the PD upon whom the
party depended in times of general elections or political turmoil. As we mentioned above, they enjoyed higher pay rises than their senior rank comrades, creating serious political divisions within the services (Wheeler 1978: 85, 160-164).

More and more, the PD’s posse became mixed with the state administration, leaving no room for alternative political ideas or structures of power. The democrats’ dominance of the state machinery was so intrinsic to their grip on power that as soon as General Pimenta de Castro (1915) and, then, Major Sidónio Pais (1917-1918) overthrew the PD governments in their short-lived coups, the replacement of most civil servants was decreed. However, once “normality” was restored, the democrats resumed life as usual, reinstating previously dismissed democrat civil servants in a matter of weeks. On 10 May 1919, for instance, a few weeks after the democrats had defeated Sidónio’s New Republic, the Government Gazette (Diário do Governo) published 30 supplements and hundreds of pages restoring the democrat clientele to the civil service, causing much amazement among the parliamentary opposition (Farelo Lopes 1994: 106-107, 138).

From 1910 to 1926, the PRP/PD ruled over a seemingly “democratic dictatorship” which no political force seemed to be able to resist by legal means. Even the conservative moderates who had dissented from the PRP in 1912 felt incapable of challenging the PD’s hegemonic power which had unscrupulously misused electoral suffrage, the civil service and the caciques to successfully win all but two of the parliamentary elections. Neither were the conservative dissidents helped by the fact that their own party leadership was so personalised that all attempts to build a loyal conservative coalition fell apart. When they finally made it to power in the early 1920s, the PD quickly neutralised the rightist parliamentary coalition with the help of street vigilantes and radical members of the navy and of the Republican Guard, resulting in the assassination of the Liberal Premier António Granjo. As the leader of a dissident
conservative party declared after this political incident, “(...) [the Democratic party] is still not convinced that other republican parties also have a right to live in the Republic”\(^93\) (cited in Farelo Lopes 1994: 107)

In sum, the Portuguese Republic was a PRP creation composed of a legislative system within which the party ensured its own dominance through electoral rigging and political patronage. Party fractionalism did not upset the PD’s single-party hegemony, as the Democrats continued to enjoy majorities in Congress.

In their obstinate quest for the creation of the anti-clerical republican nation, the PRP/PD succeeded in bringing together the Catholic and monarchist forces that had been defeated in 1910\(^94\). This led to the emergence of a new nationalism of opposition as espoused by the conservative Integralismo Lusitano, the Miguelista heir of the 1828-1834 Civil War years and the main civic movement behind the 1926 Revolution (Braga da Cruz 1980: 250). The Republic failed to generate genuine popular resonance. In the face of a state-sponsored mass education system that failed to take off outside of the urban centres and a national army that was harassed by indiscipline, financial neglect and manipulation of the conscription process, the Republic remained largely an urban phenomenon. Furthermore, rather than including the majority of the population in the republican nation through the state’s legal framework, the PRP pushed them away, alienating them from their definition of who and what constituted the Portuguese nation.

As if that was not enough, caught in the midst of the extreme right and of the radical

\(^93\) “(...) [o Partido Democrático] ainda não está convencido de que os outros partidos republicanos também têm direito à vida, dentro da República”.

\(^94\) In the words of Braga da Cruz (1980: 250): “The fact is that the “religious question” was reopened with obvious political consequences: the Catholics’ approach to the forces that opposed the new regime resulted in the monarchic instrumentalisation of the offended religious conscience; the identification of the monarchic reaction with Catholic insatisfaction by the republican masses, led to an attack on the latter rather than the former; the collapse of the social Catholic organisation and the inevitable organic politicisation of the Catholic movement” (“O facto é que a “questão religiosa” estava reaberta, com as consequências políticas facilmente adivinháveis: a aproximação dos católicos das forças da oposição ao novo regime, com a consequente instrumentalização monárquica da consciência religiosa ofendida; a identificação por parte das massas republicanas da reacção monárquica com a insatisfação católica, atacando esta por aquela; o desmoronamento da organização social católica e a inevitável politização orgânica do movimento católico”).
left, the moderate conservatives that had seceded from the PRP also struggled to find popular support or even an opportunity to express their concerns through the state institutions, which remained in the hands of the Democrats. The republican nation, as “a daily plebiscite” (Renan 1994 [1882]: 17) was losing converts on a daily basis.

Ultimately, the PRP/PD’s reluctance to share power or seat one full mandate out eventually led to serious problems of power legitimacy that were further aggravated by the First World War. Not even Portugal’s involvement in the war on the side of the Allies managed to bridge the political differences espoused by Catholics, monarchists and moderate conservatives. Despite a brief moratorium on the religious, political and economic divisions that chastised the regime, two short-lived conservative military dictatorships erupted as mentioned above (i.e. the Swords Movement led by Pimenta de Castro in 1915; and the Sidónio Pais’ New Republic, 1917-1918), each one espousing anti-belligerent feelings towards the war effort and an openness to the Catholic Church. But both spurred a renewal of anti-clericalism and anti-monarchism among the radical sections of the Republic, plunging the country into further political chaos, which benefited the PD’s return to power. As Lipset and Rokkan have theorised in their book, *Sociologie Politique* (1967: 4), by taking over the state institutions and ensuring a monopoly on power, it seemed that the Democratic Party and the Portuguese state had become one. Any attack directed against the PD consequently became an attack on the regime itself.
6.1. Introduction

In the previous chapter we saw how a republican reconceptualisation of who and what constituted the Portuguese nation through the state institutions failed to find resonance among the masses and the high ranks of the military. The failure of the republican school system and of the national army hindered the spread of the nationalist ideology outside the urban centres and created divisions within the military ranks. Furthermore, the republican’s definition of the nation along radical anticlerical lines alienated republican conservatives, Catholics and monarchists from the newly established Republic. As these last two were persecuted and oppressed by the PRP/PD, resulting in the imprisonment or exile of the most reactionary fringe of Portuguese society, a moral alliance between monarchists and Catholics was fomented against the republic.

In this chapter we will see how a Catholic group of Coimbra graduates broke with official ideology and created Integralismo Lusitano as a nationalist ideology of opposition to the republican state. Although their conservative ideals and values appealed mainly to the rural elites, they were, nevertheless, paramount to the politics of opposition to the Republic. The purpose of this chapter is, therefore, to analyse Phase One of the three-phased theoretical structure used in this thesis to study Portugal’s early twentieth century regime overthrows – i.e. the formation of a nationalist movement of ideological opposition that broke with official ideology in an attempt to provide an alternative conceptualisation of who and what constituted the Portuguese nation.
In the coming sections, we will see how the Coimbra integralists initiated their ideological journey at the Academic Centres of Christian Democracy (CADC), forming an *exoteric* literary debate group. After participating in the monarchist incursions of Paiva Couceiro, some of the *exotélicos* were sent to exile in Belgium and France, where they became familiar with Charles Maurras’s ideas. Their study of Maurras’s *Action Française*, the *miguelista* literature and some of the works of the 1870 Generation, eventually resulted in the articulation of a neo-romantic nationalism of opposition and in the official creation of Integralismo Lusitano in 1913. Convinced they were “the soldier[s] of counter-revolution, religious counter-revolution and political counter-revolution”95 (António Sardinha cited in Teixeira Fernandes 2007: 163), the integralists devised an ideological programme that was first published in *Nação Portuguesa* in 1914.

In broad terms, Integralismo Lusitano was an anti-democratic and traditionalist ideology based on the establishment of a decentralised Catholic state, ruled by a strong king with the advisory support of a corporative assembly, representative of the *municipípios*, regions and the professional classes. Integralismo rejected the corruption and patronage of the liberal parties as well as the age of liberalism that Portugal had lived in since the end of the Napoleonic Wars. According to the integralists, the rescue of the Portuguese nation, in decay since the early 1800s, was dependent on ruralism, autocracy, a return to the past and on municipal decentralisation. As we saw in the last chapter, the latter was also voiced as a political demand by the republicans. However since municipalism was never put into practice once the PRP got to power, the integralists appropriated the rhetoric of the *município* and used it against the centralisation of the republican state.

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95 “(...)soldado[s] da contra-revolução, contra-revolução religiosa e contra-revolução política”.

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Overall, the integralists’ version of who and what constituted the Portuguese nation was in direct contrast with the official version of republican nationalism. From the emergence of this ideological discrepancy with all matters relating to the nation and the state, the politics of contention against the ruling regime adopted a radical undertone, which eventually resulted in the overthrow of the First Republic thirteen years later.

6.2. The Integralists

Integralismo Lusitano (IL) was born in 1913 at the height of republican anticlericalism and anti-monarchism among the Portuguese diaspora in Belgium and France. The movement revolved around a group of young Coimbra graduates – their average age only 24 (Quintas 2004: 155) – with strong reactionary views on Catholicism and state power.

The founders of IL were José Hipólito Raposo (1855-1953), Luís de Almeida Braga (1886-1970), António Sardinha (1887-1925), Alberto de Monsaraz (1889-1959), João Amaral (1893-1981), Pequito Rebelo (1892-1983) and Francisco Rolão Preto (1893-1977). João Amaral and Pequito Rebelo joined Integralismo Lusitano only after the movement had been formed. They were landowners, members of the rural bourgeoisie, aristocrats and academics. Most of them were monarchists and Catholics by political persuasion, except for António Sardinha, who converted to both in 1912 after becoming seriously disillusioned with the republican leaders for retracting on their promise to implement political decentralisation and municipalism (Quintas 2004: 118-124). Two of them, Hipólito Raposo and Almeida Braga, joined the monarchist incursions alongside Captain Paiva Couceiro, who also contributed to the future
Integralist journal, *Alma Portuguesa* (Quintas 2004: 80-92). Alberto de Monsaraz and Pequito Rebelo, who were wealthy landowners, were the main financial sponsors of the movement, providing funds and meeting venues for the integralist organisation (Quintas 2004: 254; Telo 1980 vol. 1: 59).

Never aspiring to be a mass movement, Integralismo Lusitano remained a movement of rural elites, appealing in greater numbers to large landowners, the old nobility and wealthy peasants. During their years as a primarily ideological movement, from 1913 to 1916, Integralismo Lusitano spread across Portuguese universities, becoming especially popular among Coimbra students (Telo 1980 vol. 1: 54, 58).

### 6.3. The Integralists’ Ideological Roots: The CADC and the Exoterics

The integralists’ ideological roots can be traced back to the Academic Centres of Christian Democracy (CADC). The CADC were first opened in Coimbra in 1901 as a consequence of Hintze Ribeiro’s 1901 Decree (see Sections 1.5. and 3.6.), but soon spread to Braga (1905), Lisbon (1909) and Porto (1909). The main preoccupation of the Catholic centres was to stall the spread of anticlericalism in the Portuguese universities, namely in the university of Coimbra, where the Centre was most firmly based, rather than the creation of a political movement (Braga da Cruz 1980: 154-155). The CADC was an academic association that convened every week to discuss social matters, whether of religious, moral, political or economic substance. Their membership was minimal – in 1904 it included 24 academics only and by 1909 it had increased to less than 100. However, it counted among its peers the future leading figures of the New State Regime (1933-1974) – namely, António de Oliveira Salazar, who joined the Centre during the First Republic (Braga da Cruz 1980: 154-173).
According to the Centre’s journal, *Estudos Sociais*, the CADC’s goals were “to
develop a fraternity spirit among its members, to promote the diffusion of the Catholic
social doctrines by way of conferences and common study, to favour a good press, to
propagate good readings, to assist charity institutions, especially the São Vicente de
Paulo Conference, and to provide valuable elements of propaganda and cooperation to
the CCO”. By its nature and ends, it is a practical school of Catholic social action”
(*Estudos Sociais*, 1 January 1905).

In the first years of the Republic, the future integralists frequented the Coimbra-
based CADC. They participated in the Centre’s public lectures and published articles in
*Estudos Sociais*. In parallel with their association with the CADC, the future integralists
also founded a literary academic group called the “Exotéricos”, which gathered several
students from Coimbra’s University Law Faculty, class of 1911. Monsaraz, Raposo,
Sardinha and Almeida Braga were some of the students who convened periodically to
edit the exoteric journal, *Dionysios*. In *Dionysios*, they published fiction, poetry,
theatrical reviews and other philosophical articles. The exoterics were characterised by
an appeal to the “(...) abandonment of the French models and the return to national
traditions, to the vigorous rusticism, to the ingenious popular manifestation and to the
vernacular” (Prado Coelho 1976: 711). They shared opposing views to republicanism
and to the ideology that had first supported the emergence of the PRP – positive
synthesis. In the articles published in *Dionysios*, the exoterics rejected the prominence

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96 CCO stands for Círculos de Católicos Operários (Circles of Catholic Workers). The CCO was a
Christian social charity that urged their members, mainly derived from the working class, to abandon any
action that fell outside the restrictions of the established public order, including strikes, demonstrations
and any litigation with the holders of the means of production with whom the workers should have an
“harmonious” relationship. The Circles’ aim was to re-Christianise the working class and to give it a
Catholic alternative to secular socialism by providing social services with a Christian orientation that
aimed to relieve poverty (e.g. education, entertainment, religious and medical assistance) (Braga da Cruz

97 “(...) desenvolve o espírito de fraternidade entre os seus sócios, promove a difusão das doutrinas sociais
católicas por meio de conferências e do estudo em comum, favorece a boa imprensa, propaga as boas
leituras, auxilia as instituições de caridade, especialmente a Conferência de São Vicente de Paulo, e
facultará aos CCO valiosos elementos de propaganda e cooperação. É, pela sua natureza e pelos seus fins,
uma escola prática de acção social católica”.

98 “(...) abandono dos modelos franceses e o retorno às tradições nacionais, ao rusticismo sadio, à
ingênua manifestação popular, à vernacularidade linguística”.
of scientific and utilitarian views of the nation, which had culminated in the rejection of all things metaphysical. Rather, they believed that metaphysics should be restored to the public imaginary and that the spirituality of the nation should be celebrated in a creative synthesis of science and philosophy. According to the exoterics, science and philosophy were part of the same essence and therefore one should not be conceived without the other (Costa Pinto 1982: 1411-1412; Pinto de Mesquita 1912: 71; Quintas 2004: 113-116).

However, the CADC’s theoretical indifference to the question of the regime and its decision to prioritise social intervention and the re-Christianisation of the Portuguese minds, rather than regime change, led to a division in the Catholic camp. From the very beginning, the CADC, and then its political arm the Catholic Union (UC), adopted a critical but institutional collaboration with the Republic, which was at loggerheads with the exoterics. Although, the UC’s semi-loyal opposition eventually brought some electoral “success” with the election of two deputies in the 1915 elections – the first elections opened to Catholics – the future integralists did not feel thoroughly represented in the CADC/UC, and in 1913 they created their own ideological organisation, Integralismo Lusitano (Amaro 1993: 88-131). The CADC and the integralists further diverged two years later, when the Catholic Union developed into the Portuguese Catholic Centre (CCP) with the intent of playing the electoral game full-time, as instructed by Pope Benedict XV. The Pope had appealed to a union of all Portuguese Catholics for the defence of their religious rights under the leadership of the CCP. Unlike the integralists, the CADC members, including António de Oliveira Salazar, were determined to abide by the papal bull confident that the electoral strategy would be more than enough to advance the interests of the Portuguese Catholics against the anticlerical measures dictated by the republicans (Braga da Cruz 1980: 241-242,

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99 A semi-loyal opposition is defined by Juan Linz (1978) as an opposition who justifies non-legitimate actions in terms of certain goals.
Incensed by the CADC’s determination not to question the legitimacy of the anticlerical regime openly, the integralists continued to follow their own ideological path, although they maintained amicable relations with the CADC until the end of the First Republic. António Sardinha, for instance, a prominent figure of Integralismo Lusitano, was a regular lecturer in the public debates organised by the CADC from 1922 to 1925, the year of his death (Avelãs Nunes 1993: 168-169). Reciprocally, the future Cardinal Manuel Gonçalves Cerejeira, a member of the CADC, continued to contribute with articles to integralist publications, while Salazar was considered by the integralists as “our dear friend”\(^{100}\) (Telo 1980 vol. 1: 57).

At the same time that ideological differences were emerging with the CADC, some members of the exoteric group joined the monarchist incursions led by Captain Paiva Couceiro. However, the failure of the incursions led them to seek exile in France and Belgium. Rolão Preto and Almeida Braga went to Louvaine, while Alberto de Monsaraz found refuge in Paris. Monsaraz enrolled in the Sorbonne University and, just like Rolão Preto and Almeida Braga, frequented the Action Française circles. There, they were introduced to Charles Maurras’s ideas, which were very popular in the French and Belgian academies of the day (Costa Pinto 1982; Lloyd-Jones 2003: 95; Quintas 2004: 79, 253).

Almeida Braga was the first intellectual to adopt *maurrasism*. His conversion happened at the same time as the Coimbra-based *Dionysios* was losing its vitality and António Sardinha was rejecting republicanism in favour of monarchism and Catholicism. According to the latter, the PRP did not differ from the *rotativista* parties of the Constitutional Monarchy inasmuch as it continued to pursue centralisation of power which went against the municipalist ideals defended in their years in opposition. Disenchanted by the republicans in power, Sardinha revised his historical enquiry on the

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\(^{100}\) “(...) nosso querido amigo”.
foundation of the Portuguese nationality in order to reflect his conversion to
monarchism. According to his new argument, Portugal had been a Republic of Councils
before approving and electing a royal dynasty in 1385 that was better suited to protect
the national destinies of the new kingdom (Quintas 2004: 252-253).

When the University of Lisbon announced new vacancies for the Faculty of
Letters, Sardinha applied with his dissertation, *O Valor da Raça – Introdução a uma
Campanha Nacional* (“The Value of Race – Introduction to a National Campaign”). By
presenting his dissertation to an examining panel of renowned intellectuals, including
Teófilo Braga with whom Sardinha had been corresponding (Ramos 1994: 541), he
hoped to use the venue to publicise the exoteric’s theories. As Sardinha said to his
friend Almeida Braga:

“I’m going to apply to a position at Lisbon’s Faculty of Letters, so that our
historical theories may be defended in public. In the dissertation you will see
how I use prehistoric data and data from modern eruditism in the formation of a
synthesis that works as our foothold”101 (Almeida Braga 1942: 431).

In his dissertation, Sardinha endeavoured to explain the means by which
Portugal had become an autonomous entity. He argued that a messianic form of
communal counties allied to the spiritual element of “hope” had been crucial to the
renewal and maintenance of the Lusitanian genius, which lived within a unique people
inhabiting a particular territory and sharing a common language. The *lusitanos*
were the descendants of Homo Atlanticus. To corroborate his claim, Sardinha borrowed Teófilo
Braga’s account of the ethnic elements that made the *lusitanos* a glorious and free
people. Sardinha considered Teófilo Braga the “master of the counter-revolution”

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101 “Vou concorrer à Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa, para em público defender as nossas teorias históricas.
Na dissertação tu verás como eu utilize os dados da pré-história e do eruditismo moderno na elaboração
duma síntese que seja o nosso ponto de apoio”.

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(Quintas 2004: 156), using his works to reiterate that the Portuguese had lived a golden age in the Middle Ages due to the successful adoption of a municipal form of government. However, Sardinha differed from Teófilo Braga by adding an extra element to the latter’s theory on the emergence of a Portuguese nationality. He added the role played by the Catholic King in the formation of Portugal, first against the Moors and then against the Castilians. According to Sardinha, the Portuguese had been able to live freely and in prosperity before the advent of the Enlightenment, due to the centripetal force resulting from the merging of Altar and Church. The only way to return to the apogee of Portugal’s history was, therefore, to decentralise power, establish an organic Monarchy and institutionalise the power of the Church over the nation (Quintas 2004: 179-183; Sardinha 1915a). By integrating both his old republican and new monarchist ideals, Sardinha went from one extreme of the political spectrum to the other. As Sardinha explained, “It is a spiritual evolution, for which greatly contributed a knowledge of the French mentality, which affirms, both in their literature and sociology, duly influenced by their youth, a powerful trend of imperialist aspirations, of antidemocratic attack”\(^\text{102}\) (Sardinha cited in Ramos 1994: 542).

However, most importantly, his conversion was a catalyst for the formation of Integralismo Lusitano as an intellectual movement independent of other catholic opposition movements (i.e. CADC). At the height of anticlericalism, Sardinha’s dissertation was unsurprisingly rejected by the examination panel. Contrary to his expectations, Teófilo de Braga and the rest of the examiners rejected Sardinha’s work on the basis that it did not possess enough “scientific strength” (F. Martins 2009: 133, 216). Sardinha was left with an increasing sense of disillusionment with the republican leaders who had promised decentralisation, intellectual tolerance and political

\(^{102}\) “É uma evolução do meu espírito, para que muito contribuiu o conhecimento da mentalidade francesa, que tanto na literatura como na sociologia afirma, com influência decisiva nas camadas novas, um largo movimento de tradicionalismo, uma corrente poderosa de aspirações imperialistas, de ofensiva antidemocrática.”
regeneration while in opposition. However, his dissertation gave a new urgency to the propagation of a solution to the “anti-clerical problem”, propelling Almeida Braga to use Sardinha’s research as ideological fodder against the official nationalism of the First Republic (Quintas 2004: 252-253).

It is relevant to note that the case of António Sardinha, but also of his peer, Hipólito Raposo who was also unsuccessful in his application for a teaching position at the same academic establishment for presenting a dissertation (Raposo 1914) that refuted the 1870s Generation’s views on Portugal’s decadence (Quintas 2004: 184-185), find a certain resonance in Elie Kedourie’s nationalism theory (1994 [1960]). Integralismo Lusitano emerged from a group of disenchanted young intellectuals, who could not find jobs in the state structures or academies of the First Republic; who were chastised and persecuted for their political convictions as we saw in the previous chapter; and, as a result, formed an ideological opposition movement that would develop their ideals into a political platform in order to contest the legitimacy of a regime that failed to deliver political regeneration.

With the support of Sardinha and his exoteric peers (i.e. Hipólito Raposo and Alberto de Monsaraz), Almeida Braga, at the time still living in Louvaine, founded the Integralismo Lusitano movement in 1913 with the aim of convening all members of the exoteric group and anyone else who shared their reactionary and monarchist ideals. The term Integralismo Lusitano appeared for the first time in Almeida Braga’s newly founded journal, Alma Portuguesa, published in Belgium. In his journal, several articles praised Charles Maurras’s works while many more studied the case of Portugal’s historical trajectory in light of Maurras’s ideas (Quintas 2004: 21, 115-116; Telo 1980 vol. 1: 52-53).

However, contrary to Dionysios, Integralismo Lusitano (IL) aspired to be more than a literary and philosophical project. As it adopted a strong political stance, it
became an ideological movement, opposed to the official version of who and what constituted the Portuguese (republican) nation. The integralist project eventually moved back to Coimbra, where Hipólito Raposo, António Sardinha, Simeão Mesquita and the newly arrived Alberto Monsaraz were based. The rest of the integralist diaspora joined them after Prime Minister Bernardino Machado signed the 1914 Amnesty Law (see Section 5.3.). Rolão Preto, who had fled Belgium and travelled to France after the beginning of the First World War, returned to Coimbra upon completion of his studies at the University of Toulouse. Pequito Rebelo and João do Amaral, two other prominent IL leaders and the latter a former republican, were later recruited by their friend Sardinha when the ideological movement had already been established. From Coimbra, the integralists published a set of reactionary leaflets, called *Aqui d’El-Rei*. Their first ideological programme was published in 1914 in the first volume of the Coimbra-based *Nação Portuguesa*, the new mouthpiece of Integralismo Lusitano (Quintas 2004: 21, 251, 253-254).

Pequito Rebelo and Alberto Monsaraz continued to finance the project, while António Sardinha’s *O Valor da Raça*, published in 1915, became the main ideological text of the movement (F. Martins 2009: 216; Telo 1980 vol. 1: 53). In the same year, the Integralists took their political project one step further, consolidating their ideological movement in a series of conferences on the Iberian question, hosted by the Liga Naval Portuguesa (Quintas 2004: 21). The Liga Naval conferences projected the IL’s alternative view of who and what constituted the Portuguese nation at a time when Portugal felt threatened by Spain, and delineated the movement’s ideological opposition to the ruling regime along nationalist lines that very much mimicked the ideological journey pursued by the 1870s generation during the Casino Conferences.

The Liga Naval conferences were organised during General Pimenta de Castro’s short-lived rule. His openness to the Catholic opposition allowed for the organisation of
meetings and gatherings. The main topic of discussion was the potential loss of national independence in the face of Spain’s neutrality during the First World War. The integralists, fiercely anti-iberialists during the 1910s, feared that the Spanish King Alfonso XIII would negotiate with England the annexation of Portugal as a reward for Spain’s neutrality. The Conference served to propel the ideological movement into the public eye by playing into the secular fears of a possible Spanish invasion. However, a day after General Pimenta de Castro was overthrown, the Conferences were suspended. The republican Municipal Guard entered the Liga Naval and destroyed the facilities, giving IL the same notoriety that the 1870 Generation had enjoyed almost fifty years before (Quintas 2004: 217-218, 263).

6.4. Ideological Influences

The nationalist ideology of Integralismo Lusitano was influenced by the 1870s Generation’s approach to the problematic of national decadence, Charles Maurras’s works and the Miguelista literature published around the time of the Civil War (1828-1834). IL aimed to re-educate the monarchists in the virtues of an organic monarchy and to stand as a traditionalist alternative to the existing catholic and monarchist oppositions. As Luís de Almeida Braga (1942: 423-434) said:

“Starting with the King, we need to teach the monarchists what a monarchy is, we have a precedent to that effect. The Miguelista literature. Rehabilitate it, and with the vulgarisation of the Action Française’s doctrine, utterly unknown amongst us, organise a counter-revolutionary theory that teaches the people that
democracy is an inferior social form, implies the denial of all collective concepts, which can only be solved by the monarchy (...)”

Regarding the miguelista literature, the integralists covered the works of Faustino José de Madre de Deus, António Joaquim da Gouveia Pinto, José Agostinho de Macedo, Frei Fortunato de S. Boaventura, José Acúrcio das Neves, José da Gama e Castro and Miguel Soto Maior. In their battle against liberalism and constitutionalism, these political theorists had resurrected the traditional political thought of the medieval institutions and practices, expressing absolutist ideas and defending the rights of the Church and of the traditional estates. According to them, royal authority should only be limited by the traditional estates of Church and nobility. Their reactionary thought went against the ideals of the French Revolution and the way they had abolished the use of all absolutist principles including those that the integralists saw as beneficial to the nation, i.e. corporativism, municipalism and a pyramid-shaped hierarchy of power (Quintas 2004: 176-179; Wiarda 1977: 62). In homage to their miguelista influence, the integralists republished the miguelista works in an anthology called Os Nossos Mestres ou o Breviário da Contra-Revolução (“Our Masters or the Counter-Revolution Breviary”) (de Campos 1924; Quintas 2004: 176-177; Ramos 1994: 543).

On a par with the republican municipal tradition, the integralists also recovered the works of the republican federalist José Félix Henriques Nogueira’s Estudos sobre o Município em Portugal and of Alexandre Herculano’s História de Portugal. Both bodies of literature were largely featured several times in the journal Alma Portuguesa and became part and parcel of the integralist ideology (Quintas 2004: 176-179). Sardinha was a defender of Alexandre Herculano’s work and of his emphasis on

103 “Ao principiar pelo Rei, é necessário ensinar aos monárquicos o que é a monarquia. Nós temos um precedente nesse sentido. É a literatura miguelista. Reabilite-se, e com a vulgarização do doutrinarismo da Action Française, completamente desconhecida entre nós, organize-se uma teoria contra-revolucionária, que ensine a esta gente que a democracia é uma forma social inferior, implica a negação de todo o conceito colectivo, que só a realeza pode solucionar (…)”
municipalism. “The primatial virtue of the Luso lies (...) in his localist predilection. The Council is thus the parent-cell of the Pátria”\(^{104}\) (Sardinha 1915a: I, III, VII, VIII, IX). However, Integralismo Lusitano based its ideology not only on these thinkers, but also on the 1870 Generation, departing from the same premises as Antero de Quental and Teófilo de Braga but arriving at very different conclusions.

Just like the republican 1870 Generation, the integralists were the product of the University of Coimbra. They strived just as hard as their republican counterparts to break with the preceding intellectual generation, the Romantics, accusing them of being pathologists. “Idealism, yes, romanticism no. Romanticism was a pathological state. We want to be healthy. We are idealists, but our idealism is called neo-romanticism, and sees in Roma the only condition for success” (author’s own emphasis, Alma Portuguesa, no. 1, May 1913: 18)\(^{105}\). In this respect, António Sardinha, acknowledged the crucial role played by the 1870 Generation in breaking with the romantic past by saying that the 1870 Generation was at the same time “destructive and renewing”; it was the first intellectual generation in Portugal to have extricated itself from the comforts of tradition, opposed “liberalism” and the “individualist chimera of romanticism” and prepared the “counter-revolution” for the re-emergence of the “old traditional pâtria” (Sardinha 1929: 27-28).

However, just like Teófilo Braga had done, the Integralists refuted the voluntarist theory on the origins of the Portuguese nation as proposed by Oliveira Martins (Vakil 1995: 141) – the Integralists believed that the Portuguese nation was a natural entity, defined by an “homogeneous Portuguese race, excluding only the ‘foreigner within’” (Campos Matos 2009: 221). In opposition to Oliveira Martins’s thesis, Sardinha believed that Portugal’s origins should not be interpreted as an

\(^{104}\) “(...) a virtude primacial do Luso reside, pois, na sua predileção localista. O Conselho é assim a célula-mãe da Pátria.”
\(^{105}\) “Idealismo, sim, romantismo não. O romantismo foi um estado patológico. Queremos ter saúde. Somos idealistas, mas o nosso idealismo chama-se neo-romantismo, vê em Roma a única condição de êxito”.
historical accident that happened by chance dependent on the contingent will of the Portuguese medieval aristocracy. Rather, the reactionaries believed that “the certainty of race” mattered more than any voluntarist mutual accord which might have led to the foundation of the Portuguese nation, for if the Portuguese were a “free people” it was because of their Lusitanian ethnicity and of their geographical surroundings which kept them apart from Spain and their peoples, the Celt-Iberians (Sardinha 1915a: xviii, xxix-xxx, 59, 107, 143-144, 174; 1916: 30-31, 70-71; 1924: 94).

Pequito Rebelo and other Integralists also joined Sardinha in his bashing of Oliveira Martins’s view of the nation. Race, geography, language and tradition were, according to them, the objective criteria that “assured the vitality and cohesion of the Portuguese nation” (Mauricio 2000: 65, 77-78; e.g. Cordeiro 1916: 234-235; Pequito Rebelo 1916: 149; Oliveira 1923: 385). In the view of these intellectuals, Oliveira Martins’s voluntarist view of the nation had not only taken away the most important objective component that ensured an understanding of Portugal’s continuous independence, but also encompassed a solution to the country’s decadence in the form of an Iberian Confederation that would inevitably lead to the nation’s demise, as Spain was a much larger and more powerful state than Portugal (e.g. Pequito Rebelo 1916: 149, 183-184; Raposo 1936: 438). Even though Sardinha and Pequito Rebelo later reconsidered their outright rejection of a possible “Hispanism” in the form of a “Peninsular Alliance” – as we will see in Chapter Eight – the rest of their integralist peers never put in question Portugal’s total independence from Spain.

Although the integralists rejected the voluntarist conception of the Portuguese nation, siding with Teófilo Braga’s teaching, they borrowed the work of Antero de Quental, Causas da Decadência dos Povos Peninsulares (1871), himself a defender of the voluntarist nation, to highlight the problematic of national decadence. As we saw in Chapter Two, Antero de Quental had attempted to pinpoint the historical reasons why
Portugal had fallen into a state of decadence while stating the necessary conditions for Portugal’s regeneration. Antero de Quental had argued that Portugal had fallen into decay around the time of the Discoveries due to the prominent place assumed by the Catholic Church in the affairs of the kingdom, the centralisation of absolute dynastic power and the corruption and squander of state resources brought on by decades of imperial expansion. The solution, according to Antero de Quental, was an end to the Discoveries and a return to a medieval form of government, whereby central power would be municipalised so that national liberties could blossom. In this respect, the integralists also saw Portugal’s imperial legacy as a burden on the country’s austere spirit and unity. Sardinha claimed that the Portuguese Empire should not have gone further than the conquest of Morocco. When Portugal turned its attention to the East it altered the course of the country’s “natural expansion”, which should have remained consonant with its medieval crusades. In accordance with Antero, but also with Oliveira Martins’s republican view of the nation, Sardinha believed that “ruralism” and “municipalism” could be more successful than the “Empire” as a collective legacy of the nation in uniting the Portuguese of the south and of the north, i.e. the Christians and the Moorish descendants, “in a moral unity that is associated with the idea of pátria”106. In 1917, Sardinha went so far as to say that Portugal could live without its colonies, as they were one of the root causes of the capitalist modernity that he so radically opposed in favour of a medieval, rustic and corporativist way of life. His position on the empire, however, was later retracted during his years in exile, as we will see in Chapter Eight, when the empire became in his eyes a Catholic and Hispanic crusade, used to counterpose the godless republican official discourse and its “betrayal of the true national traditions” (Ramos 1997: 138; Sardinha 1927a: 121-130; 1927b: 6; Sobral 2004: 275; Vakil 1996: 49).  

106 “(...) a unidade moral que se deve à ideia de Pátria”.
Although the end of the empire resonated with the integralists, the major role that Antero de Quental and the rest of the 1870 Generation attributed to anti-clericalism in ensuring equality and liberty to all citizens, regardless of their religious beliefs and upbringing, was vehemently opposed by the integralists. The Catholic reactionaries believed that religion should be brought back into politics and the secularisation of Portuguese society should be halted, lest the Catholic historical legacy that had given form to the Portuguese nation since the time of the medieval crusades disappeared. According to the integralists, the Catholic history of the country was part and parcel of their view of the traditional and perennial nation with an erstwhile civilisational mission. In other words, religion gave meaning to the nation.

In sum, although the Integralists departed from the same problematic as their republican counterparts and derived great inspiration from the ethnic conception of the nation as defended by Teófilo Braga and from the call to the end of the Empire as defended by Antero de Quental and Oliveira Martins, they arrived at very different conclusions. Just as the 1870 Generation, the Integralists shared the belief that a solution to Portugal’s problems lay in the Middle Ages. However, contrary to their republican predecessors, they were convinced that it was then that throne and altar had reigned in harmony before their political alliance had been irreparably damaged by the Enlightenment. As José Manuel Quintas (2004: 41) observed, “rather than copy an ‘advanced’ and ‘progressive’ Europe [as the republicans had done], it was necessary to find internally the right conditions for its ressurgimento”\textsuperscript{107}.

As a result, the integralists proposed a “tweaking” of the absolutist system that had reigned over Portugal, rather than dispensing with it altogether as Antero de Quental had proposed. The integralists defended the rule of a traditional king who assumed an arbitral position compliant with power devolution to the municipalities and

\textsuperscript{107} “(…) em vez de se copiar a ‘avançada’ e ‘progressiva’ Europa, era necessário encontrar internamente as condições para um ressurgimento”.
the provinces, so that local liberties could prosper. They also defended an end to the Empire, which had marked Portugal’s historical “detour” from its national mission\(^\text{108}\), and a return to the land wherein an autarkic economy, based on the exploration of national resources and manpower, would ensure the full employment of all national energies in the development of the country. Finally, the Integralists upheld the Church as a centre of national unification, arguing that Catholicism was an intrinsic part of Portugal’s regeneration (Quintas 2004: 274-275).

A divergence between republican nationalism and integralist nationalism at the ideological stage was also reflected in both movements’ choice of national heroes. According to the 1870 Generation, Portugal had been the land of the poet Luís de Camões and of Marquis of Pombal. In contrast, the integralists saw Portugal as the land of Nuno Álvares Pereira (1360-1431) – a Portuguese General, born in the Middle Ages, who stopped a Castilian invasion following the rise of Dom João I to the throne at a time when Portugal’s independence was very fragile. Álvares Pereira succeeded in his efforts to defeat the Castilians and as a result went down in Portugal’s history as the greatest hero of the decisive Battle of Aljubarrota. Towards the end of his life, Álvares Pereira turned to religion and became a devout Catholic. He founded the Carmelite Order at the Carmo Convent in Lisbon and joined the order after his wife’s death in 1423. He lived there until he died in 1431.

In the first years of the Republic, the integralists “rehabilitated” Nuno Álvares Pereira as a national hero and turned him into a mythical figure whose life could serve as a template for national regeneration. The integralist mouthpiece, Alma Portuguesa, defended this position from the beginning: “It is necessary that the wonderful land of Nun’ Álvares reemerges; occupies once again its rightful place; lives free, prosperous, honoured and happy under God’s blessing” (Alma Portuguesa, no. 1, May 1913, pp. 3-

\(^{108}\) In an initial phase, Sardinha went as far as to say that the Discoveries were a “tragic mistake” (erro funesto), a “fatal delusion” (enganter fatal) (Sardinha 1914: 118, 1942: 224, respectively).
The integralists’ determination to turn Álvares Pereira’s life into an example of national regeneration was, in fact, so strong that they managed to persuade the Vatican to beatify the “Portuguese hero” in 1918.

During the First Republic, as we will see in Chapter Eight, Nuno Álvares Pereira became a symbol of resistance for the conservative opposition. After the popularisation of the Portuguese hero by the integralists, the conservative wing of the Republic appropriated the “Saint” by forming a think tank under the name of Cruzada Nuno Álvares Pereira. This think tank, formed in 1918, soon turned into a strong political lobby, whose members were associated with several right-wing parties (e.g. Integralismo Lusitano, Causa Monárquica, Portuguese Catholic Centre, Partido Republicano Liberal). Their dogma in the 1920s was “Nationalism, Corporativism, Authoritarism and Imperialism” and their strategy of forming a political alliance with all conservative movements that contested the legitimacy of the Democratic Party created the background for the overthrow of the regime in 1926 (Castro Leal 1999).

Integralismo Lusitano was largely influenced by Charles Maurras’s ideas which had become very popular before the First World War among the European Latin countries: Italy, France, Romania, Belgium, Switzerland and Spain (Costa Pinto 1982: 1418; Telo 1980 vol. 1: 56). The association with the Action Française was seen with great pride by the Integralists. “Sardinha, for example, made explicit his debt to Action Française when he called for the ‘rehabilitation of the discredited Miguelist literature and, with the popular dissemination of Action Française’s doctrinaire programme... the organisation of a counter-revolutionary theory’” (cited in Lloyd-Jones 2003: 95).

Incidentally, IL’s close association with its French counterpart resulted in Portuguese historiography claiming, from the 1920s to the 1980s, that integralism was a carbon copy of Action Française (Lloyd-Jones 2003). Raul Proença (1884-1941), a left-

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109 “[É] preciso que a maravilhosa terra de Nun’ Álvares ressurja; que volte a ocular o lugar a que tem direito; que viva libra, próspera, honrada e feliz sob a bênção de Deus”
wing journalist and collaborator of the *Seara Nova* journal, was the first to claim that IL, as an ideological movement, was a cheap French import of Charles Maurras’s *Enquête Sur la Monarchie* ([1900] 1925). In a series of articles written for the *Seara Nova* (24 December 1921 –1 July 1922), he claimed that Integralismo Lusitano lacked “any internal nationalist coherence”, being an intellectual movement led by “apologists for a set of ideals designed by foreigners to be applied in an altogether different context” (Lloyd-Jones 2003: 94). Proença, and the historians who followed his historical assessment of IL into the 1980s, believed that both movements were identical because they shared very similar problematic roots, goals and principles. Both movements partook on a “common belief in the family as the ultimate social unit, the need for decentralisation and the need for an hereditary and absolute monarchy” (Lloyd-Jones 2003: 94; Proença 1921). Both movements also saw the issues undermining their respective societies rooted in liberalism and individual materialism, both of which had been pursued at the expense of religious morals and conservative values. In the same way, an increase in the liberal state’s use of power had also contributed to governmental corruption and incompetence. As a solution to their national problems, Action Française and Integralismo Lusitano made reference to a “golden past”, “a past of order and peace maintained by a strict and divinely ordained hierarchy – of a time when each person knew their place and accepted it without question” (Lloyd-Jones 2003: 97).

However, the similarities between both movements ended there. IL’s ideological nationalism was not a mere “pirated” version of its French counterpart (B. Anderson 1991). As other scholars have pointed out more recently (Braga da Cruz 1986; Costa Pinto 1982; Lloyd-Jones 2003; Quintas 2004), although Integralismo Lusitano shared a great deal with the Action Française, the former adapted Maurras’s works to the Portuguese context, using an identity map comprised of “symbols, rituals and
teachings” that was unique to the “Portuguese experience” (Lloyd-Jones 2003: 97; Costa Pinto 1994: 25).

For the integralists, the problem lay with the corruption of morality brought about by the French Revolution: a process in itself that had begun with the Portuguese Discoveries. The time of the Conquistas was therefore seen as the breaking point in Portugal’s natural evolution as an organic nation - a time when Portugal had been broken in two. “Split in half in its historical journey, Portugal is hindered from following the natural path of its formation by the cosmopolitan disturbance of the 1500s. The royalty became wealthy, the municípios became corrupted, the classes, the necessary nucleus to the nation’s resistance, turned into simple caryatids of power with the passage of time”110 (Sardinha 1924: cxxxi). As a result, Portugal could only redeem itself if it returned to a mythical golden age in which an “idyllic society that was agrarian, communal, self-sufficient, protectionist, paternalist and nationalist” was reinstated (Lloyd-Jones 2003: 98). The solution, therefore, lay not in a progressive future as the urban republicans had preached, but rather in a rural past where a connection with the land, the communes and old traditional values could bring national salvation.

Furthermore, although IL separated itself from their Portuguese conservative peers due to the emphasis it put on the establishment of an organic monarchy, the latter only came second to the nation’s interests, as IL defined itself first and foremost as a nationalist movement. In this respect, Integralismo Lusitano also distanced itself from the Action Française (AF) by putting national interests above royal interests. In other words, while the AF was primarily a royalist organisation with aspirations to the restoration of the rightful heir of the House of Capet, IL thought of itself as a strictly

110 “Cortado ao meio da sua jornada histórica, não pode Portugal, pela perturbação cosmopolita de Quinhentos, seguir a linha natural da sua formação. Abastardou-se a realza, corrompeu-se o Município, as classes, de núcleos necessários, à resistência da Nação, mudaram-se, com o andar dos tempos, em simples cariátides do poder”.

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nationalist movement with a *preference* for a monarchist system of government. “We do not profess the legitimacy of the king as a person”, said Sardinha, “we proclaim the legitimacy of the national interest. In a word; we are nationalists before being monarchists because only through the monarchy can we serve the Nation”\(^{111}\) (Sardinha cited in Braga da Cruz 1982: 106).

The IL’s hierarchy of priorities facilitated the development of the ideological movement into a political movement during the First World War. As we will see in the next Chapter, the integralists cooperated openly with Sidónio Pais’s New Republic as members of Parliament and as ideologues of the dictatorship. The IL’s willingness to enter into politics in alliance with other conservative groups is another key difference that separates the integralists from the Alliance Française. As Lloyd-Jones points out (2003: 100-101),

> “While Integralism clearly sought to achieve leadership of the Portuguese right, and were prepared to utilise any opportunity that came their way so to do, *Action Française* under Maurras preferred to maintain an aspect of intellectual superiority and separation from the political background. (...) where the French movement retained its intellectual disdain for active politics, *Integralismo Lusitano* threw itself headlong into the battle. (...) such opportunism, which would have been anathema to Maurras, was, according to the Integralists, essential for keeping their movement at the forefront of nationalist politics”.

Bearing this in mind, one can better understand why IL was not shy of “throwing itself headlong” into the 1919 monarchist uprising in Monsanto once Sidónio Pais’s rule collapsed. Even during Sidónio Pais’s rule, Integralismo Lusitano showed

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\(^{111}\) “Nós não professamos a legitimidade da pessoa do Rei, proclamamos a legitimidade do interesse nacional. Num a palavra; somos nacionalistas antes de somos (sic) monárquicos e somos monárquicos porque só pela monarquia podemos servir a Nação”.
how willing some of their members were to flex their ideological monarchical core at
the chance of exercising power. By supporting Sidónio Pais, the integralists were
allowed to maintain their newly created political party, Junta Central do Integralismo
Lusitano, run for elections for the first time, win several seats in the Parliament and be
part of the Cabinet. Sidónio’s openness to the IL was translated into the latter’s
reassessment of its ideology. By granting the title of “El Presidente-Rei” (“the
President-King”) to the republican dictator, IL accepted “the belief that certain strong
individuals could rise to assume the supreme position without holding any historic
claim to that position” (Lloyd-Jones 2003: 102). IL’s methods were definitely more
abrasive than the AF’s, enabling the formation of tactical alliances with other
conservative groups. As we will see in Chapter Eight, the tactics used by the integralists
resulted in the exercise of a certain influence over the political opposition that was not
proportional to its numerical support (Lloyd-Jones 2003: 102-103).

6.5. The Integralist Ideology

In sum, integralist nationalism defended an organicist, traditionalist, anti-
parliamentarian and monarchical version of the Portuguese nation that clashed directly
with the official version established by the PRP since the inception of the First
Republic. In their ideological programme, as articulated in the first issue of the Nação
Portuguesa (1:1, 8 April 1914, pp. 4-6), the integralists claimed, “What we want – an
organic monarchy, traditionalist, anti-parliamentary”112. In this monarchy, the
bourgeoisie, which the liberal state had brought to power, would be replaced by a ruling
aristocracy (Telo 1980 vol. 1: 56).

112 “O que nós queremos – monarquia orgânica, tradicionalista, anti-parlamentar – programa integralista”.
Politicians, foreigners and liberals were considered the enemies of the integralist nation. They were the “anti-nation”, a race apart from the “raça monárquica” (Sardinha 1927a: 133-141). In their oath of accession to the organisation, the integralists listed those who were part of the “anti-nation”. “The anti-nation is formed by the masons, the politicians, the plutocrats, the foreigners, who should have no place in the government. Against them the king will be supported by the nobility, who will be the moral elite, hereditary and open to all professions, exercising functions and services of public interest as a reward for certain honours and privileges”\(^{113}\) (cited in Telo 1980 vol. 1: 57). Sardinha went so far as to associate the masons with the Jews, also seen as the enemies of the nation due to their direct link to the First Republic. This connection was mostly featured in Sardinha’s first books, where he claimed that “our Republic, made up of masons, Jews and mullatos”\(^{114}\) had “denationalised” the Portuguese nation (my emphasis, Sardinha 1915a: 114, 115, 118-119). In fact that “(...) denationalisation [had started] with the progressive development of Liberalism, which is a spiritual form of Semitism, as a direct creation of the Masonry”\(^{115}\) (Sardinha 1927a: 137-138). The workers’ movement was also seen as a product of the freemasons and liberal politicians, so it was equally perceived as nefarious to the interests of the nation. Some integralists took their criticism of liberalism a step further and condemned everything that had happened in the world since the fifteenth century due to the rise of the bourgeoisie. One integralist in particular, Lemos Ferreira, was more explicit about the things that had poisoned the nation since then: the Protestant reformation, the Renaissance, the press, the geographical discoveries and the development of mathematics, which had created mental revolutions and multiplied unknown needs, industrialism and feminism. In the

\(^{113}\) “A anti-nação é formada pelos maçons, pelos políticos, pelos plutocratas, pelos estrangeiros, que nenhuma parte devem ter no governo. Contra eles o rei se apoiará na nobreza, que será o escol moral, hereditário e aberto a todas as profissões exercendo funções e serviços de interesse público como prémio de certas honras e regalias”.

\(^{114}\) “(...) a nossa republica de maçons, judeus e mulatos (...)”

\(^{115}\) “(...) a desnacionalização começa pelo desenvolvimento progressivo do Liberalismo, que é uma forma espiritual do Semitismo, como criação directa da Maçonaria.”
case of the latter, Lemos Ferreira considered feminism the climax of evil, as a woman, being a daughter, wife and mother should reflect the pure example of the Virgin Mary. Her place was at home rather than outside the house, competing for jobs (Telo 1980, vol. 1: 57-58).

Accordingly, the First Republic was seen as “an institutional embodiment of the destabilizing foreign influences being denounced” (Vakil 1995: 138), as a regime populated by the “republican race” (Sardinha 1927a: 133-141). In the face of this internal threat, it was necessary to “reaportuguezar Portugal”, to “renationalise” the state in a way that bound the people with the state (Vakil 1995: 139). According to the integralists, the time had come when the “monarchic race” should “gloriously resume the control of the destinies of the pátria, which is a product of [the monarchic race] and which will only continue to exist through its work”116 (Sardinha 1927: 133-141).

Following the same “triadic structure of nationalist rhetoric” (Levinger & Franklin 2001) pursued by Teófilo Braga in his definition of the Portuguese nation (see Chapter Two), in which a golden past, a present decadence and a utopian future feature prominently, the integralists elaborated a nationalist rhetoric that aimed to show how their version of Portuguese nationalism could save the nation from a national crisis brought about by the republican regime.

*The Golden Age*

As we saw above, the ideological framework of Integralismo Lusitano was broadly articulated on Sardinha’s *O Valor da Raça* (1915a). In the absence of a reactionary mystic that could challenge the existing republican mystic created by the PRP, Sardinha stressed the importance of giving voice to a conservative doctrine that

116 “(...) retomar gloriosamente a condução dos destinos duma pátria que é a sua obra e que só por sua obra continuará”.

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would undermine the dominant republican nationalism (Sardinha 1925: 193). In *O Valor da Raça*, Sardinha argued that the Portuguese shared one race, the Lusitanian race, which was the direct descendant of Homo Atlanticus. The Lusos were an ethnic group whose homogeneity gave legitimacy to an historical and political existence. This existence had reached its maximum point of perfection during the medieval First Dynasty, when an autarkic and rustic period had prevailed. However, the Discoveries had diverted Portugal from its medieval vocation, which had been Portugal’s Crusades in northern Africa and the expansion of the country to the Atlantic Islands, resulting in Portugal’s fall from grace (Costa Pinto 1982: 1418; Vakil 1995: 149). As Sardinha (1925: 138-139) argued, “There lies the beginning of Portugal’s ruin (...)”\(^{117}\).

But Sardinha not only blamed the Discoveries for corrupting the Portuguese rulers. He also blamed them for contaminating the Luso race, hitherto seen as “the main reason of our exaltation”\(^{118}\) (António Sardinha cited in Teixeira Fernandes 2007: 165). The Lusos had been tainted by racial impurities, which had not been fully controlled by the Portuguese Inquisition. In Sardinha’s own words, “(...) of the little scruple in which we appear to have Asian and African connections derives our own flat breakdown. By no other way is the dissolution of the whole collective idea amongst us justified or understood”\(^{119}\) (cited in Teixeira Fernandes 2007: 166). For that reason, only the purgatorial measures of the Holy Office could stop the implosion of the nation by restraining “the assault of hostile ethnies” onto the “indigenous population”, protecting their “renewal” (Sardinha 1915a: xvii-xviii).

Sardinha thus believed that a reactionary mystic had to be based on the time that preceded the Discoveries where Portugal’s golden age could be identified. The best way to resurrect the glorious past was to establish an anti-liberal regime, i.e. a corporativist,

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117 “Aí começa a ruína de Portugal (...).”
118 “(...) a razão principal de todo o nosso engrandecimento (...).”
119 “(...) do pouco escrúpulo em nos aparentarmos com ligações asiáticas e africanas deriva o nosso desfalecimento em linha recta. Não se justifica nem se compreende de outra maneira a dissolução entre nós de toda a ideia colectiva.”
decentralised, traditionalist, anti-democratic monarchy, for that was the political system that was better equipped to bring the necessary regenerative changes to the decadent republican nation. As the integralists had argued in one of the first articles published in the journal, *Nação Portuguesa* (“Anunciação, no. 1, 8 April 1914: 1): “For four centuries a raving opulent imperialism has cast us off; for a century, a disease has been treated with a false prognosis (...) let us return to the land, let us listen to its outcry”\(^{120}\).

**The Hierarchical, Organic, Corporativist, Monarchical Nation**

In an article published by Pequito Rebelo in *Nação Portuguesa*, the integralist doctrine was synthesised as an Integral Monarchy standing against a Democratic Republic (Pequito Rebelo 1914). Popular sovereignty was rejected in favour of an organised and hierarchical nation according to traditional values and practices of government. Universal suffrage gave way to a corporative representation of the traditional sectors – family, the trades and *municípios*. Parliament was replaced by a National Assembly with a technical and advisory role, representing all the “living forces” of the nation. A corporativist order of the nation was seen as the solution to class conflict and to a liberal economy. Opposed to the centralisation and urbanisation of the liberal state, which had turned the cities into “place[s] of perdition” – where “the family imploded”, “the race degraded” and individuals “degenerated” – the integralists proposed rural decentralisation with a focus on agriculture that would permit the fulfilment of Portugal’s historical mission\(^{121}\) (Costa Pinto 1982; Pequito Rebelo 1914). Overseeing this anti-democratic and traditional system of government was a strong king leading an organic monarchy (Costa Pinto 1994: 29).

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\(^{120}\) “Há quatro séculos perdeu-nos um desvario de imperialismo [sic] opulento, há um século que se trata uma doença com falso prognóstico (...) voltemo-nos para a terra, escutemos o seu clamor”.

\(^{121}\) “(...) local de perdição”; “(...) a familia se destruiá”; “(...) a raça se aviltava”; “(...) degeneravam”.

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The integralists intellectualised their ideal society as an hierarchical pyramid in their 1914 ideological programme. The programme, which was later turned into a more elaborate political platform, enunciated the general ideas of their envisaged organic monarchy. At the bottom of the pyramid was the family unit headed by the patriarch. Right above it was the parish where the families were represented by their patriarchs. Thirdly, came the municípios, representing the families and other important social organisms. In fourth place, were the provinces governed by an aristocratic nobility. Finally at the top of the pyramid was the King, who collaborated with the National Assembly. The former had mainly a consultative role on the applicability of laws elaborated by the cabinet and the technical advisory committees. The National Assembly consisted of representatives from the provinces and from all sectors of the nation, including scholastic, corporative, ecclesiastical, military and judicial delegates. In the same way that the patriarch was the head of the family, so the figure of the king was seen as the head of the nation. In this sense, the nation was a personified family as represented in the National Assembly which cooperated with a strong, hereditary and privileged leader who concentrated around himself all the living forces of the nation (JCIL 1921: 44-45; Pequito Rebelo 1914: 23; Telo 1980 vol. 1: 56).

As José Manuel Quintas, a present-day integralist points out, the political structure of the Organic Monarchy as defined by the integralist programme was, therefore, as much centralising as it was decentralising. The centralising tendency of the regime revolved around nationalism, as the king enjoyed strong personal power while the nation was placed above the interests of the individuals. In this sense the nation assumed precedence over its parts, denoting an organic conceptualisation. The decentralising tendency, on the other hand, manifested itself in the corporativist system of government, which devolved power to the parishes, municipalities and provinces, while all sections of the nation were represented by profession and vocation in a general
National Assembly. However, decentralisation was not synonymous with democracy. Democratic forms of government were excluded from the integralist state as political representation was not assured by political parties but rather by delegations and corporations (Quintas 2004: 272).

As far as the spiritual aspect of the Organic Monarchy was concerned, according to the 1914 ideological programme, the Catholic Church enjoyed protection, privilege and material assistance from the state. The Church also enjoyed freedom of teaching, social assistance and congregation. Catholic morals and dictates were accepted in the affairs of the state, schools and of the family unit. In direct opposition to republican nationalism, the position of the Catholic Church at the centre of the integralist nation was paramount, as the conceptualisation of the integralist Monarchy followed the sequence, God-Pátria-King. In other words, God was seen as the source of all power, which was transmitted onto the nation which transmitted it to the King (Quintas 2004: 273). However, according to the integralists, the King could only rule in association with the Church, which was associated with the Portuguese nationality since its origins, and from which the King derived his power. As Sardinha said, “the Cross and the Sword are the admirable supporters of our independence, attained at the cost of so much blood. (…) The Altar and the Throne are the two formidable disciplines that will keep [the nation’s balance] intact in the costly labour pursued in favour of a majority”\(^\text{122}\) (Sardinha 1915a: v-x).

The King that the integralists initially supported was Dom Manuel, the constitutionalist king overthrown by the republicans (Sardinha 1937). Although the integralists despised a return to the politics of the Constitutional Monarchy, aiming to establish an organic Monarchy, they saw in the silence of Dom Manuel an accomplice nod in favour of their reactionary programme, increasing their hope of eventually

\(^{122}\) “(…) a Cruz e a Espada são os admiráveis sustentáculos da nossa independência, alcançada a poder de tantíssimo sangue. (…) o Altar e o Trono são as duas formidáveis disciplinas que o [o equilíbrio da nação] hão-de aguentar intacto nos trabalhos custosos para uma maioridade”. 
getting the full support of the constitutionalists. As Sardinha argued, after “long years of national tranquillity” under the leadership of the constitutionalists during the Regeneration, the legitimacy of the monarch was an “old and useless problem”\footnote{“(...)‘longos anos depois de calmaria nacional (...)’, ‘(...) velho e inútil problema (...)’.”} (Sardinha 1975: 230). However, as we will see in the next chapter, that was not to be the case after the ideological purity of integralismo was tainted by the IL’s period in power during Sidónio Pais dictatorship. As was said above, the problem of hereditary rights became secondary to their nationalist interest and after the failure of the Monarquia do Norte and of the Monsanto uprising, Dom Manuel and the integralists mutually disavowed each other.
7.1. Introduction

In the last chapter we analysed the first phase of the political process which culminated in the successful overthrow of the First Republic (i.e. formation of an ideological nationalist opposition movement). We saw how Integralismo Lusitano emerged as an ideological movement among a group of exiled Coimbra graduates whose catholic persuasion and conservative ideals did not find political representation in the republican regime. We saw how their intellectual path first evolved from the catholic academic centres (CADC) to the formation of an exoteric group that questioned the political morality of the Portuguese Republic. In 1913, Integralismo Lusitano was formed as an ideological movement, largely based on a neo-romantic view of the nation which emphasised Charles Maurras’s work, the Miguelist literature and partially the works of Teófilo Braga and the 1870 Generation. The integralists differentiated themselves from other monarchist and Catholic opposition movements by voicing a willingness to act on their ideals, which emphasised an organicist, traditionalist, anti-parliamentarian, catholic and monarchic version of the Portuguese nation centred around a strong leader.

In this chapter we will see how Integralismo Lusitano, an ideological movement, turned into a political movement named Junta Central do Integralismo Lusitano, which openly supported and cooperated with the New Republic (1917-1918), gaining prominence among the reactionary elites. In this sense, we aim to shed light on Phase Two of the political process that successfully overthrew the First Republic (i.e. political
formation and agitation of a nationalist opposition movement aiming to overthrow the regime in power).

Bearing this in mind, in the following sections, we will examine the reasons that led the Democratic Party to push for Portugal’s participation in the European war front against the wishes of the high ranks of the military, who were determined to limit the war effort to the colonies, first demonstrating their disapproval in a short-lived military coup led by General Pimenta de Castro (28 January 1915 – 14 May 1915). We will see how the PD’s return to power and their successful campaign to persuade Britain to support Portugal’s formal entry in the war, resulted in the creation of the integralist political movement, Junta Central do Integralismo Lusitano (JCIL). The latter’s initial purpose was, among others, to support the Anglo-Portuguese alliance at a time when Portugal’s independence was deemed to be at risk. We will also analyse how the devastating consequences of the war effort to Portugal’s political and economic life resulted in another military coup, on this occasion led by Major Sidónio Pais, who went on to establish a new institutional framework called New Republic (8 December 1917 – 14 December 1918). Contrary to the democrats who had been suspicious of all conservative forces, Sidónio was receptive to the formation of right-wing parties and openly governed the New Republic in close alliance with the Catholic and conservative forces of opposition. By supporting Sidónio’s rule, the integralists consolidated the JCIL as a reactionary political party, contesting general elections and influencing the ideology and political institutions of the New Republic from within the regime. However, contrary to the wishes of the JCIL and other monarchist factions, Major Sidónio Pais refused to kowtow to demands for a monarchical restoration, frustrating the monarchists, who proceeded to declare the Monarquia do Norte after Sidónio Pais’ assassination and stage an uprising in Monsanto. The eventual defeat of the integralists and of the monarchists at the hands of the republicans produced a division within the
monarchist movement, which opened the way for internal differences regarding the strategy to follow. The JCIL broke with Dom Manuel II and swore allegiance to the legitimists, only to suspend indefinitely its political activity when both branches of the royal family signed the Pact of Paris in 1922, which settled the dynastic question. By the end of Phase Two, it seemed that Integralismo Lusitano had “committed suicide”.

7.2. The PD’s Determination to Enter the First World War (1914-1917)

On 7 August 1914, a few days after Austro-Hungary invaded Serbia, followed by Germany’s invasion of France and Belgium, and Russia’s attack on Germany, the republican Parliament reaffirmed the Anglo-Portuguese alliance without declaring war on Germany. In retaliation, Germany invaded northern Mozambique and southern Angola. On 11 September 1914, Portugal sent troops to the colonies to defend its territorial possessions against Germany. Over the next four years, some 35,000 Portuguese soldiers were deployed in Angola and Mozambique (Wheeler 1978: 132, 1999: 143).

However, despite the fact that Portugal and Germany were involved in open hostilities in Africa, both countries maintained an undeclared belligerent state towards each other (Ramos 1994: 494). This was not an ideal situation for Afonso Costa and for his Democratic supporters who pursued an aggressive campaign for Portugal’s formal entry in the war. Afonso Costa, who at the time had stepped down as Prime Minister – although he maintained a seat in the cabinet – believed that Portugal had more to gain by formally entering the war in Europe on the side of the British – even if by doing so, the Portuguese military incurred the risk of overstretching its scarce and inadequate resources over two continents – rather than by remaining neutral and heeding the
concerns of the high ranks of the military. These were of the opinion that Portugal should limit its war effort to Africa, where it actually was in danger of losing important strategic interests. But regardless of their views, Afonso Costa and his supporters were convinced that by joining Britain in the Great War, the republican regime would be able to legitimise and rehabilitate its image internationally. As we saw in Chapter Five, Afonso Costa’s anti-clerical policies and repressive measures had raised much criticism from Britain, while the country had suffered harsh reprimands abroad over the systematic and continued use of slavery and forced labour in Africa (Clarence-Smith 1985: 139; Wheeler 1999: 144-145). As the historian Rui Ramos points out, “the same men who had been willing to rise in arms against the ‘wicked Albion’ in 1890, now threw themselves at the feet of the English in unprecedented and limitless abjection”124 (Ramos 1994: 495). They were desperate to change Portugal’s image in Europe from the legendary “nightmare republic”, to the “equally legendary idealistic, civilised, and progressive Portuguese republic” the 1890 “generation had dreamed of and had worked to found” (Wheeler 1978: 129).

Furthermore, Afonso Costa hoped that by entering the war he would be able to create a government of “national alliance” that would bring a fractioned opposition under the democrats’ wing and put an end to any political competition that questioned their hegemony (Costa Pinto 1999: 34; Severiano Teixeira 1996, 1999: 174). Costa also hoped that by siding with the Allies, the democrats would be able to keep the Portuguese Empire safe from further attacks and geostrategic struggles. Once the war was over and Portugal took its seat next to Britain in the post-war agreements, the democrats hoped that the Allies would write off Portugal’s astronomical foreign debt, and recognise the integrity of Portugal's Empire, as opposed to using the Portuguese colonies as bargain chips between Britain and Germany, as both had initially planned to

124 “Os mesmos homens que em 1890 se tinham disposto a pegar em armas contra a ‘pérfida Albion’ atiravam-se agora aos pés dos Ingleses, numa abjecção sem precedentes nem limites”.
do in 1912-1913 (Ramos 1994: 172-173). These fears were not unfounded because, as the historian Rui Ramos points out again, after the War had started, Germany remained interested in the Portuguese colonies. In September 1914, the Germany Chancellor had told one of his Secretaries that a possible peace deal with the British should involve, among other things, the German occupation of northern Mozambique, Angola, Cape Verde, the Azores and Madeira Islands (Ramos 1994: 516).

Germany’s wish to annex the Portuguese colonies also played deeply on fears of a Spanish annexation. As General Norton de Matos, former General-Governor of Angola and future Minister of War in 1916, would say in that same year: “Our colonies’ destiny is at stake, and our colonies are the future of Portugal (...) Without our colonies, we are a weak country... [Without any colonies, Portugal] is destined, overnight, to be absorbed by Spain”125 (cited in Wheeler 1999: 145). By entering the war on the British side, the democrats hoped that Britain would acknowledge once and for all Portugal’s strategic importance in the Iberian Peninsula at the expense of Spain, especially after the recent Anglo-Spanish rapprochement (see Chapter Five). They feared that a strategic relationship between Spain and Britain would be very detrimental to Portugal’s interests and independence, so they worked fastidiously to reaffirm the Anglo-Portuguese alliance in order to ensure that Britain would never agree to Alfonso XIII’s Iberianist designs before consulting its devoted ally (Severiano Teixeira 1999: 173-174). Democrat João Chagas explained best what was at stake if Portugal did not enter the war when he said (Chagas 1929 Vol. I: 374-376):

“When Victory arrives, at the expense of the most tremendous human sacrifice ever known, civilisation will be fair to the efforts of those who serviced it, Spain will become the last country of Europe, and on this dark side of the peninsula

125 “É o destino das nossas colónias que está em jogo, e as nossas colónias são o futuro de Portugal (...) Sem as nossas colónias, somos um pequeno país sem força (...) [Sem colónias, Portugal] está destinado, de hoje para amanhã, a ser absorvido pela Espanha”.

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there will be a flash of light, which will be us. And our autonomy will become a fact which will never again be contested and never again will Spain dare to turn a greedy eye toward us. Our participation in the war is a new Aljubarrota, [a war] in which Spain will not enter but with its shadow, but in which it will remain defeated – once and for all!”

7.3. Integralismo Lusitano’s Position vis-à-vis the War

Alongside the democrats, the integralists had been strong enthusiasts of the war, greeting the news with sheer jubilation. Their enthusiasm for the war was as passionate as the enthusiasm expressed by Afonso Costa. However, the integralists’ allegiance lay with the Central Powers, not with the Allies, and while Afonso Costa showed a more pragmatic and strategic approach towards the war question, the integral nationalists saw the war as a poetic rendition of national salvation and national purification through bloodshed and sacrifice. In November 1914, António Sardinha (1914b) published “A Apologia da Guerra” (“War Apology”) in the integralist Nação Portuguesa, singing the praises of war. “Oh, but the war came – praise the war! (...) There is blood – opened the arteries, blood gushes like a fountain made of waterspouts. But blood is redemption, but blood is sacrifice, and we are the generation of atonement.”

Luís de Almeida Braga also claimed in his article “Tradição e Nacionalidade” (1915), “war is beautiful, because it contains in itself a highly moralising virtue, because it is a school of sacrifice. Let us

126 “Quando a Vitória vier, à custa do mais tremendo sacrifício humano que se conhece, a civilização hã-de dar o balanço dos esforços que a serviram, a Hespanha ficará sendo o último país da Europa, e do lado de cá da negra península haverá um clarão, que seremos nós. E a nossa autonomia será um facto nunca mais contestado e nunca mais a Hespanha ousará voltar olhos cobiçosos para nós. A nossa participação na guerra é um novo Aljubarrota, em que a Hespanha não entra senão com a sua sombra, mas em que ficará outra vez vencida – de vez!”

127 “Oh, mas a guerra veio – louvada seja a guerra! (...) Há sangue – abertas as artérias, jorra sangue como duma fonte que toda ela fossem bicas. Mas o sangue é resgate, mas o sangue é sacrifício, e nós somos a geração da expiação”.
accept it, not as a hard legacy of barbaric times, but as a restorative mission, which by exalting heroic feelings, enlarges civilisation”¹²⁸.

For the integralists, the war represented the ultimate sacrifice committed by the Portuguese so that the nation could rise again. The war was Portugal’s last chance to save itself from “effeminate utopias” brought on by the French Revolution. In this sense, the integralists differed radically from the democrats. Whereas the latter saw the war as a reaffirmation of the “Revolution’s unintelligible values” against “regressive and brutal imperialism”¹²⁹, the integralists saw the war as a confrontation against “effeminate utopias of an impossible universal pacification”. The war for the integralists was a process by which “the most ingrained nationalist mystics were resuscitated from a somnambulant abandonment” and the “supreme instinct of the Pátria” raised to the fore”¹³⁰ (Almeida Braga 1915: 316). For the integralists, Portugal’s position in the war chessboard was, thus, very clear. Portugal had to side with the Central Powers or with “old France”, but certainly not with a Protestant and Liberal England (Oliveira Marques 1972: 166; Quintas 2004: 218-225).

By siding with the reactionary forces of “old France”, Sardinha, for instance, longed to see Portugal mimic the values of Catholic France, “impermeable to the Reformation, to the Renaissance, to Romanticism, to Revolution”. He saw in “the anti-plutocratic France, as the Saint Louis and Saint Bernardette’s France”¹³¹ an example to follow (Sardinha cited in Quintas 2004: 218-219). João do Amaral agreed with Sardinha. France was part of “the Latin race, creator of the most noble civilisation that

¹²⁸ “A guerra é bela, porque tem em si uma alta virtude moralizadora, porque é uma esco de sacrifício. Aceitemo-la, não como um duro legado dos tempos bárbaros, mas como uma missão reparadora que, exaltando os sentimentos heróicos, aumenta a civilização”.
¹²⁹ “(...) os princípios intangíveis da Revolução que uma vez mais se afirmavam contra o imperialismo regressivo e bruto”.
¹³⁰ “(...) as utopias afeminadas duma impossível pacificação universal (...) as mais entranhadas místicas nacionalistas ressuscitavam dum abandono sonâmbulo (...) [levantava-se o] instinto supremo da Pátria”.
¹³¹ “(...) impermeável à Reforma, à Renascença, ao Romanticismo, à Revolução; da França anti-plutocrática; da França de S. Luís e de Santa Bernardette”.
the world had ever seen since the Classical Age” (do Amaral cited in Quintas 2004: 219). However, the war was not between a Latin race and a German race, as he clarified, but rather between Germany and England, the cradle of liberalism. Alfredo Pimenta also agreed with this premise. Germany, according to him, was an imperial nation which wanted to conquer its place in Europe, whereas England was an old nation which wanted to maintain its supremacy over Europe. Far from a conflict between Despotism (i.e. Germany) and Freedom (i.e. England), as the democrats had portrayed it, the war was, according to Alfredo Pimenta, a conflict between imperialist interests. In this context, Portugal should side with Germany, because behind Germany’s so-called “Despotism” was “Order” and “Discipline”, while England’s “Freedom” was nothing but “Anarchy” (Pimenta 1915). Furthermore, by siding with Germany, Portugal could release itself from the constraints of the old alliance and expect the reestablishment of an authoritarian monarchy with the help and consent of the Central Powers (Quintas 2004: 224). Sardinha (1915b), himself, also believed that ultimately Portugal would be better off on the side of Germany. In his own words:

“(…) I have expressed myself as a Francophile in public, now I vehemently wish Germany’s victory and only through the victory of the Central Empire we will see, with the defeat of the Masonry, the reestablishment of the legitimate order which will enable France to recover what was hers, and us to heal ourselves (…). Having united the national soul through the energetic commotion of the most painful catastrophe, the national soul will recover, expelling at the hour of reckoning the internal foreigner who opened the doors to the external foreigner.

132 “(...) a raça latina, obreira da mais nobre civilização que o mundo viu depois da idade clássica.”
As for the rest – non tollit Gothus quod Christus custodit! From the Vatican the Catholic Church will save once again the western civilisation”133.

7.4. Pimenta de Castro’s Military Coup (January-May 1915)

Despite the democrats’ best efforts to persuade Britain to allow Portugal to formally enter the war, His Majesty’s Cabinet was reluctant to extend an invitation to Portugal. Britain neither wanted to create tensions with Spain, nor did it want to finance the Portuguese intervention. Furthermore, Britain wanted to have leeway in any future peace talks with Germany and use the Portuguese territories as leverage in case it deemed it necessary. Any international obligations with Portugal were, therefore, seen by Downing Street as a limitation on the Liberal Cabinet’s post-war diplomatic strategy (Ramos 1994: 498).

However, Britain’s reluctance seemed to waver in the face of a strong German offensive against the French a month after the hostilities had started. In September 1914, the French command requested the use of Portugal’s artillery and infantry. The democrat government was overjoyed at the chance of making a contribution to the allies’ front-line. But in their ingenuity they demanded that the request came formally from London. In that way, the democrats would be able to justify Portugal’s entry in the war to the conservative opposition, who were vehemently opposed to it, by saying that the old British ally had requested their involvement. The Foreign Minister Edward Grey eventually relented and invited the Portuguese government to join the allies on 10

133 “(...) Francófilo que me mostrei já em público, eu desejo agora veementemente a vitória da Alemanha e só pela vitória dos Impérios Centrais nós teremos, com a derrota da Maçonaria, o restabelecimento da ordem legítima que permitirá à França ressarcir-se, a nós outros curar-nos (...) Unida a alma nacional pela comoção energentina (sic) da mais dolorosa das catástrofes, a alma nacional se recobrará expulsando na hora do ajuste de contas o estrangeiro do interior que abriu as portas ao do exterior. E quanto ao resto, - non tollit Gothus quod Christus custodit! De cima do Vaticano a Igreja Católica vai salvar mais uma vez a civilização ocidental”.
October 1914. However, the Portuguese senior officers immediately opposed the invitation. They knew that Portugal was incapable of fighting two wars in two different continents at the same time. When they visited their counterparts in London for a preparatory military meeting, they were determined to let them know just that. Back at home, their comrades occupied several barracks, declaring themselves against the war. Grey took advantage of the situation to immediately withdraw his invitation (Ramos 1994: 499-500; Costa Pinto 1999: 35).

In Portugal, opposition to the war became more and more vociferous. Even the democratic President Manuel de Arriaga had his reservations. Contrary to the PD, people in general did not see any reason why Portugal should be involved in the devastating hostilities assailing Europe. Even the decision to send troops to Africa antagonised the population. Every time a new contingent was sent to Africa, demonstrators berated the soldiers marching towards the seaports, so as to prevent or to delay their deployment to the colonies. The situation got so serious that a street militia called Formiga Branca, acting as an armed gang of the PD, came to the aid of the democratic government by disrupting the protests, causing much bloodshed in the process. President Arriaga feared that the uncontrolled agitation might escalate into a civil war, especially when Prime Minister Victor Hugo Azevedo Coutinho (not to be confused by the monarchist of the same surname) asked the President to sign a decree that would grant state of emergency powers to the government in order to crush the opposition forces (Wheeler 1978: 110-118).

In the midst of this agitation, rumours of a monarchist coup plot spread by the democrats backfired when, on 20 January 1915, Major João Carlos Craveiro Lopes was labelled a monarchist by the Formiga Branca and transferred to a different unit (Croca Caeiro 1997: 100; Wheeler 1978: 118). The transfer caused outrage among the officers stationed in Lisbon, who saw the involvement of the PD in the transfer and promotion
of officers as an abuse of power. Two days later, under the leadership of General Joaquim Pereira Pimenta de Castro, they marched to the presidential palace and surrendered their swords to the President of the Republic as a sign of defiance.

Faced with the opposition of the high ranks of the military, President Arriaga dismissed the democrat Premier and asked General Pimenta de Castro to form a new government with the aim of re-establishing order in the streets.

The General’s government was initially supported by monarchists, members of the clergy, the military and the working class, and by evolutionists and unionists alike, who had grown wary of the democrats (Medeiros Ferreira 1992: 55). It is important to highlight at this stage that the Swords Movement, staged by the senior officers, created a precedent in the First Republic that was later reproduced in Major Sidónio Pais’s 1917 military coup and in the 1926 military coup that overthrew the First Republic. The common thread that connects these three military coups is the fact that they were carried out by senior officers determined to replace the democrats in power with the support of the unions and of the catholic and monarchist forces of the country. However, as conservative policies were implemented by the officers in power and a growing number of right-wing politicians entered the cabinet, the unions inevitably withdrew their support and joined the opposition.

In this respect, as soon as General Pimenta de Castro was nominated Prime Minister in January 1915, he revoked the electoral laws of 1913-1915 and gave voting rights to officers and sergeants. He suspended mobilisation plans to deploy troops in Europe and in Africa, as initiated by his predecessors, and he even withdrew several troops from Africa. He appointed conservative sympathisers and a few monarchists to leadership positions in the police, the Republican Guard and in the army, replacing the democratic chiefs. He closed Parliament and released from jail the officers involved in the Swords Movement. He declared that the monarchists were also Portuguese, so he
gave them privileges and support, including the members of Integralismo Lusitano, who quickly organised the Conferences of the Liga Naval (see Chapter Six). General Pimenta de Castro legitimised the creation of monarchist political centres and in the space of one month, April-May 1915, he oversaw the opening of 55 monarchic centres. Finally, he gave full amnesty to the monarchist chiefs, including Captain Paiva Couceiro, allowing him to return to Portugal. (Croca Caeiro 1997: 100-102; Medeiros Ferreira 1992: 56; Ramos 1994: 507; Wheeler 1978: 118-120).

General Pimenta de Castro’s political decisions were intended to give voice and political enfranchisement to the catholic and conservative majority. However, his measures were interpreted by some people as permission to attack the Republic and those mostly associated with the regime. “In February 1915”, for instance, “a youth of fourteen, a member of the rising Catholic Youth Movement, attempted to assassinate Afonso Costa. In March 1915 a Democratic deputy was shot dead outside his home” (Wheeler 1978: 123).

In light of these attacks, the democrats and their urban and working class supporters reacted strongly against a seemingly Catholic and monarchist revival. They accused General Pimenta de Castro of being a dictator and of attempting to restore the Monarchy (Croca Caeiro 1997: 101-102). Organised by leading elements of the Democratic Party, the Junta Revolucionária, of which Formiga Branca was a member, mounted an armed insurgency against the General in downtown Lisbon on 14 May 1915 (Croca Caeiro 1997: 103; Wheeler 1978: 121). Republican vigilantes smashed the installations of monarchist newspapers and those publications that had been on the side of the military government. Policemen were murdered, and police stations, private houses and monarchist clubs were destroyed. Anarchy reigned over the city for almost four days, while the majority of the armed forces remained neutral. The republicans managed to overthrow the military government and re-establish the democrats in power.
However, when the new Premier João Chagas arrived in Lisbon to assume the leadership of a newly formed Democratic Cabinet, Senator João Freitas, a former member of the PRP’s Directorate and an evolutionist, jumped from the crowd and shot him three times. The Premier survived the attack but he lost his right eye. From then onwards, political leaders started walking around Lisbon with bodyguards (Wheeler 1978: 123). Even in parliament the polarisation of Portuguese politics was taken to the extreme as “deputies and senators carried pistols; there were fights and duel challenges in the aisles and in the foyer” (Wheeler 1978: 123). Faced with an imminent civil war, the President Manuel de Arriaga resigned on 29 May 1915 in favour of Teófilo Braga (Croca Caeiro 1997: 103).

There was no question that the country was split between a republican minority, based in the urban centres, and a conservative majority (monarchist and Catholic), living outside of Lisbon and Porto. These two ideological camps, which in many ways represented a continuation of the historical antagonism that had beset the country since the 1828-1834 Civil War, had never clashed so dramatically as during the days that saw the overthrow of General Pimenta de Castro. Their open antagonism would also continue for the remaining years of the First Republic. In a sign of the times, the Conferences of the Liga Naval organised by Integralismo Lusitano in the context of Pimenta de Castro’s liberalisation were brutally disrupted and closed down by the radical forces victorious on 14 May 1915 (Ramos Ascensão 1943: Chapter 5). Integralismo Lusitano would continue to be marginalised by the democrats in power until Portugal’s official entry in the war in March 1916.

7.5. Portugal’s Official Entry in the First World War
Two months after the democrats returned to power, they secured a majority in Parliament and renewed their efforts to enter the war. By now another pressing issue had taken over their minds – a shortage of cash. By convincing Britain that Portugal was a crucial ally in the war effort, the democrats hoped that the old ally would provide financial assistance to the devastating effects that the war had had on the Portuguese economy. There was a serious shortage of coal and wheat. Portugal imported the majority of the bread it consumed and it could not afford to subsidise the purchase of bread for much longer. The Republic was struck by famine and anarchy.

“Between 12 May and 22 May [1915] sporadic but increasingly serious food riots occurred in the Lisbon area, and the government called out troops and declared a state of martial law” (Wheeler 1978: 127). In Lisbon, bakeries and grocery stores were ransacked by crowds armed with guns and bombs. Workers took over the streets and confronted the Republican Guard in deathly clashes that resulted in several casualties and hundreds of arrests (Ramos 1994: 516, 523; Wheeler 1978: 127). By 1915, Lisbon and Porto “faced the possibility of famine” (Wheeler 1978: 126).

The wars in Africa were also draining the state coffers. Portugal did not have enough money to buy weapons and artillery to send to the colonies. The democrats repeatedly asked for Britain’s assistance, but the Liberal Cabinet refused to grant any further credits while Portugal remained officially out of the war.

Finally, in March 1916, Britain agreed to grant a loan to the Republic in exchange for the seizure of German and Austrian merchant ships stationed in the Lisbon harbour since the beginning of the war. Britain wanted to weaken Germany’s economic power and was determined to put an end to the use of Portuguese ports by the Central Powers. Once again, Afonso Costa, now the Premier, was adamant that the British submitted a formal request so that Portugal could officially enter the war and reap the financial benefits of joining the hostilities on the side of the allies. Britain gave in and,

The democrats immediately formed a Sacred Union government with the evolutionists and ruled over this arrangement for over a year (Ramos 1994: 514-515). However, in a gesture of political conciliation, Afonso Costa ceded the premiership to the evolutionist António José de Almeida, although he still kept control of the government by being appointed Finance Minister (Oliveira Marques 1972: 167-168).

Contrary to the democrats’ expectations, although the country was officially at war with the Central Powers, the nation did not rally around. Opposition to the war continued throughout the country. The military were joined by the unionists, who had refused to take part in the Sacred Union government after Brito Camacho accused Afonso Costa of defending the participation of Portugal in the War as a way of safeguarding his position in the government (Ramos 1994: 515).

7.6. The Formation of the Junta Central do Integralismo Lusitano (1916)

Against this political background, in April 1916, after the democrats showed some tolerance towards the formation of political groups that supported Portugal’s entry in the Great War, the intellectual core of Integralismo Lusitano formed the political wing of the movement, the Junta Central do Integralismo Lusitano (JCIL).

Portugal’s official entry in the war was perceived by the integralists as the perfect opportunity to create a political organisation out of their intellectual movement. According to the first manifesto published in April 1916 (JCIL 1921: 17), the JCIL was created with the explicit aim of intervening in the political life of the country once the war was over.
The Junta Central do Integralismo Lusitano deems necessary, in this hour of collective danger, to define its political attitude, justifying it before the monarchical public opinion, that is, before the country. We are living a very serious moment, perchance one of the most serious moments lived in eight centuries of patriotic history. No Portuguese can claim the right to hush their ideas in anti-patriotic and degrading self-indulgence. The very existence of the Nationality is perhaps at stake. It is essential that at the end of this War, if by the mercy of god the external foreigner does not win, the internal foreigner does not win either. (…) May the good willing Portuguese listen to us and the Pátria shall not perish.”

The integralists intended to change Portugal’s gloomy destiny. As far as they were concerned, the only way they could achieve this was by turning their ideological movement into a political movement. The JCIL was therefore founded by the original members of Integralismo Lusitano and some other integralists who had joined IL in the previous years, namely, Xavier Cordeiro (1880-1919) and Rui Ulrich (1883-1966). The latter was a former professor of some of the integralist founding members at Coimbra University and the owner of one of the largest fortunes in Portugal (Ramos Ascensão 1943: 22).

But the 1916 manifesto did not limit itself to announcing the creation of the JCIL. In its pages one can also read a long justification for the integralists’ change of heart regarding the Anglo-Portuguese alliance. Despite the Germanophile position defended by IL at the beginning of the Great War, once Germany declared war on

134 “A Junta Central do Integralismo Lusitano julga necessário, nesta hora de perigo colectivo, definir a sua atitude política, justificando-a perante a opinião pública monárquica, isto é, perante o País. É um momento gravíssimo o que estamos vivendo, dos mais graves porventura que oito séculos de História Pátria têm presenciado. Nenhum português pode alegar o direito de calar as suas idéias, num comodismo anti-patriótico e degradante. Acha-se talvez em jogo a própria existência da Nacionalidade. É indispensável que, no fim desta Guerra, caso mercê de Deus não vença o estrangeiro do exterior, o estrangeiro do interior não possa também vencer. (…) Queiram ouvir-nos os portugueses de boa vontade e a Pátria não morrerá.”
Portugal, the JCIL accepted Dom Manuel II’s appeal to forget all differences and side with the patria against the Central Powers in the context of the Anglo-Portuguese alliance. As a result, the Integralists changed their rhetoric against the English alliance, now depicted as a guarantor of national autonomy through which the monarchist ideals would eventually prevail (JCIL 1921: 18-21).

As soon as Portugal entered the war, the integralists’ desire to see all Portuguese men fight for the patria (even if on the side of England), regardless of their political allegiance, was taken very seriously by the Junta Central to the point that some of its members, such as Pequito Rebelo and Aníbal de Azevedo, set an example by serving in the frontlines under the command of republican officers (JCIL 1921: 18; Quintas 2004: 230).

After the creation of the Junta Central, according to the statutes of the party as published in November 1916, several Provincial, Regional and Municipal Juntas opened in the rural areas. Integralist labour unions and scholastic juntas were also opened in the large urban centres for the mobilisation of building, trade, metallurgic and trade workers, as well as university students, respectively (Braga da Cruz 1986: 23-24; Costa Pinto 1994: 32). However, despite an attempt to recruit new members to the integralist cause, the JCIL remained a party of elites only, appealing to wealthy landowners, old nobles and students affiliated with the Coimbra University (Telo 1980 vol. 1: 54). As the Portuguese sociologist, Manuel Braga da Cruz (1986: 24-25), tells us, “(...) the ‘parish committees’ or the ‘centres of action and propaganda’ could be formed by one person only and the municipal juntas by ‘a minimum of three and a maximum of nine members’, which attests for the organisation’s scarce expansion expected at the beginning as well as the elitist character of the movement”\textsuperscript{135}. This was due to the fact that Sardinha was very suspicious of mass popular movements, preferring to keep the

\textsuperscript{135} “(...) as ‘delegações de freguesia’ ou ‘núcleos de acção e propaganda’ podiam ser formados por um elemento só e as juntas municipais por ‘um mínimo de três e um máximo de nove membros’, o que atesta a escassa expansão organizativa prevista à partida e o caráter elitista do movimento”.

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JCIL as an exclusive political club composed of hard-core integralists and monarchists. As the JCIL’s first manifesto said, “The Junta Central do Integralismo Lusitano deems necessary, in this hour of collective danger, to define its political attitude, justifying it before the monarchic public opinion, that is, before the country (...) May the good willing Portuguese listen to us and the Pátria shall not perish”\(^{136}\) (my emphasis, JCIL 1921: 17). By all effects, according to the integralists, “the good-willing Portuguese” who made up the country were the monarchists. In Part VIII of the party’s statutes one can also read:

> “Integralismo Lusitano, different, by its nature and goals, from all other existing monarchist parties, abstains itself from all practical cooperation or political demonstrations of solidarity with people or collectivities who are not integralist, except in the case of national interest, duly appreciated by the Junta Central, or in the case of obedience to directions given by the King”\(^{137}\) (cited in Ramos Ascensão 1943: 21).

As António Costa Pinto (1994: 33) argues, the integralists’ reluctance to include all Portuguese in their political project might be one of the reasons why, despite its reactionary ideology, Integralismo never gave way to fascist tendencies.

As far as the printed press was concerned, A Monarquia replaced the Nação Portuguesa in February 1917 as the JCIL’s mouthpiece (Costa Pinto 1982: 1416). The aim of A Monarquia was to criticise the actions of the republican politicians, to indoctrinate and to propagate the integralist ideology (Ramos Ascensão 1943: Chapter 6). According to the “instructions of the organisation” published a few years later in the

\(^{136}\) See footnote 154.

\(^{137}\) “O Integralismo Lusitano, diverso, por natureza e fins, de todos os partidos monárquicos que possam existir, abstém-se de toda a cooperação prática ou de manifestações de solidariedade política com pessoas ou colectividades que não sejam integralistas, salvo os casos de interesse nacional, devidamente apreciados pela Junta Central, ou de obediência a indicações de El-Rei.”
same journal (*A Monarquia*, 20 April 1921), “Integralismo Lusitano as the perfect expression of the national aspirations, is nationalist by principle, syndicalist (corporativist) by means, monarchist by conclusion. It is not a new party that prepares itself to attain power, on the contrary, it is a current of opinion that seeks to liberate the Nation from the party clienteles (...)”138. Other integralist periodicals were also created around this time, such as the *Guardunha* in Fundão, *Pátria Nova* in Coimbra, *Restauração* in Setúbal, *Gazeta do Lima* in Viana do Castelo, *Realista* in Funchal, *Tradição* in Lisbon and *Reacção* in Águeda. Once again, their goal was to spread the integralist ideology and to turn it into a far-reaching current of opinion, not only by the publication of these periodicals but also of books, manifestos, pamphlets and the organisation of conferences (*JCIL* 1921: 44; *Telo* 1980 vol. 1: 54).

7.7. The New Republic (1917-1918)

As was expected, Portugal’s official entry in the European war was marred by disappointment and ridicule. As we saw in Chapter Five, the republican national army was a failure. During the conflict, the Portuguese forces were dependent on Britain and France for transportation, arms, strategic planning and even winter clothing (*Wheeler* 1978: 177). Against the resistance of the Portuguese senior officers, the democrats agreed to send 55,000 soldiers (4,000 monthly) and 1,000 gunners to the English and French sectors in the Western Front, respectively. These soldiers were part of the Portuguese Expeditionary Corps (CEP), which was largely organised and led by officers loyal to the democrats (*Costa Pinto* 1999: 35).

138 "O Integralismo Lusitano como expressão perfeita das aspirações nacionais, é nacionalista por princípio, sindicalista (corporativista) por meio, monárquico por conclusão. Não é um novo partido que se prepara para assumir o poder, pelo contrário é uma corrente de opinião que procura libertar a Nação das clientelas partidárias (...)".

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At home, strikes, mutinies, lootings and upheavals continued throughout the country. The price of bread kept increasing while the supply remained insufficient. Portugal was starving and labour unionists were out in the streets in large numbers. In April 1917, the evolutionists decided to leave the Sacred Union, allowing Afonso Costa to form an all-Democratic Cabinet. On 12 July 1917, the Premier declared a state of siege and repressed a tentative general strike (Costa Pinto 1999: 35). By September 1917, 400 labour unionists had been sent to jail (Ramos 1994: 524). The population was living in misery and the economy was getting worse by the day. Inflation, public debt and the depreciation of the currency continued to rise dramatically (Wheeler 1978: 126). The Great War had disrupted Portugal’s foreign trade which was largely dependent on the exportation of colonial goods to Europe. Military expenses had brought the budget to its knees.

The first members of the CEP were shipped by the British in January 1917 under opposition from several garrisons and the local population (Medeiros Ferreira 1992: 62-63). In December 1916, for instance, the Tomar garrison revolted with the support of officers associated with General Pimenta de Castro, refusing to embark to the Western Front. Other shipments followed in the coming months but they came to an end soon after Britain announced that it needed the battleships in tactical operations elsewhere. As a result, after October 1917, the CEP forces were stranded in Flanders for long periods of time. Devoid of further reinforcements, the Portuguese soldiers stationed in the Western Front endured long tours away from home. The Premier Afonso Costa worsened the situation by shortening their leave and banning them from using the railroads to return home. As there was only one monthly maritime service connecting the Flanders to Portugal, carrying no more than 150 men at a time, the CEP forces were virtually exiled in the Western Front (Ramos 1994: 516-519). Desertions among the Portuguese Expeditionary Corps increased while indiscipline remained palpable. The
military courts sentenced 372 soldiers to jail for treason and one of them was even sentenced to death (Dias Santos 2010: 371).

One by one, Afonso Costa lost his supporters. The man who had secured a budget surplus in 1912-1914 as Finance Minister, could not overcome the financial problems brought on by the Great War. His inability to respond effectively to the food riots, the industrial strikes and general anarchy that had left the urban centres in a latent state of war, isolated him from the support of the middle and working classes (Telo 1999: 14, Wheeler 1978: 127).

With two-thirds of the Portuguese army stationed overseas, including Afonso Costa’s most loyal army officers, Major Sidónio Pais started to conspire against the democrats, showing that the grievances felt by the high ranks of the army since the inception of the Republic (see Chapter Five) and first articulated by General Pimenta de Castro had not been completely addressed (Medeiros Ferreira 1992: 63; Wheeler 1978: 138).

Sidónio Pais was a conservative army officer, a former professor at the University of Coimbra, a two-time minister and former PUR senator, who had served as Portugal’s ambassador in Berlin between 1912 and March 1916, when Germany declared war on Portugal (Costa Pinto 1999: 35; Wheeler 1978: 142). His co-conspirators were the revolutionary “hero” Machado Santos, who had also participated in the 1915 military coup d’état, and Captain Feliciano da Costa (Medeiros Ferreira 1992: 64). Behind them, as Wheeler (1978:138) tells us, they had the support of “(…) elements from the armed-forces officer corps who were either dismissed by the previous governments or were about to embark for war service in France and Africa; disgruntled monarchists and Catholics; large groups of industrial, Lisbon-area workers, many of them in anarcho-syndicalist organisations that had suffered severe repression and
persecution under the PRP-dominated governments since early 1913” (Wheeler 1978: 138; also Costa Pinto 1999: 35-36).

On 5 December 1917, Major Sidónio Pais occupied the Rotunda with a group of lieutenants and army cadets, and, while armed civilians ransacked the shops in search of food and primary goods, Sidónio defeated the few navy units that remained loyal to the democrats. Afonso Costa was arrested in Porto and sent to exile in France (as were other democrats), where he stayed for the rest of his life, even after Sidónio Pais’s assassination in December 1918 (Costa Pinto 1999: 36; Croca Caeiro 1997: 107; Medeiros Ferreira 1992: 70; Ramos 1994: 527, 616; Telo 1977: 135-139).

In the coming days, Sidónio Pais established himself in power with the support of Britain, who turned a blind eye to the accusations of Germanophilia made against him by the democrats now in exile (Telo 1977: 146-147, 1999). Sidónio Pais formed a Junta Revolucionária which included three unionists, two centrists from Machado Santo’s Centro Reformista (dissident of the Evolutionist Party), and an independent republican (Wheeler 1978: 141). Sidónio Pais then proceeded to break with the 1911 Constitution and to design a new political framework for the republic, known in Portuguese historiography as the New Republic (República Nova) (Costa Pinto 1999: 36). He was determined to “expel the Democrats and to ‘purify’ the republic” of the most radical elements and policies imposed by the PD (Wheeler 1978: 138).

By imposing a “new idea” (hence the name “New Republic”) of what the republican regime should be – that is, a presidential regime (Pais & Castro 1924: 50) – Sidónio aspired to build a national consensus around the republican regime by attracting the support of the monarchists and Catholics, who saw in the conservative Major a more desirable alternative to the democrats (Dias Santos 2010: 378-379). Sidónio Pais attracted the Catholics’ support by resuming relations with the Holy See in July 1918, and revoking or modifying the most radical anti-clerical legislation passed by the

As far as the monarchists were concerned, Sidônio wanted to ensure that his military coup implemented “a new regime in which monarchists and republicans can live together”\(^\text{139}\) (Pais & Castro 1924: 48-49). With this purpose in mind, he pardoned a number of monarchists who had been previously convicted by the democrats. He also managed to attract the support of the integralists by placing more emphasis on the strengthening of the structures and functions of the state rather than on the denomination and the nomination of the supreme representative of the nation. By doing so, Sidônio Pais led the integralists to believe that his conservative leadership was a stepping stone to the restoration of the throne, while in the meantime the interests of the landowners and the wealthy peasantry were advanced within the framework of the new political institutions (Telo 1977: 145, 1999: 20; Wheeler 1978: 143). As a consequence, the question of the regime was momentarily forgotten by the integralists, even though Sidônio continued to defend his republican beliefs in public. In the proclamation of the Junta Revolucionária, published on 8 December 1917, for instance, the “command of the revolutionary forces” announced to the “citizens” that the “republic had won over demagogy”. The military coup “represents the republic generously proclaimed on 5 October and miserably betrayed by a political caste that explored power for their own benefit and with great damage to the country”\(^\text{140}\) (Pais & Castro 1924: 40-41). On 14 January 1918, Sidônio Pais admitted in public that among his supporters there were monarchists, but only in the capacity of “honest people”. “Regardless of what people say, regardless of who it pleases, the government is republican”\(^\text{141}\). “I have never and I

\(^{139}\) “(...) a revolução se fez para implantar um regime novo em que monárquicos e republicanos possam viver.”

\(^{140}\) “(...) representa a República generosamente proclamada em 5 de Outubro e miseravelmente atraíada por uma casta política que audaciosamente conquistou o poder e o explorou em proveito próprio e com grave dano do País”.

\(^{141}\) “Diga-se o que disser, agrade a quem agradar, o governo é republicano”.

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shall never betray my principles, my republican faith… As a republican, I would relentlessly oppose any attempt to restore the monarchy”

His aim was only to “put an end to the hatred that divided the Portuguese family” (my emphasis, Pais & Castro 1924: 46-47).

As a result, Major Pais censored the Democratic Party (Telo 1977: 144) and founded a new catch-all party called the National Republican Party (PNR) in which all the social classes were meant to be represented under his leadership. As he said in a speech made on 14 May 1918, “from the noble to the more plebeian all social classes are united, all beating in the same patriotic feeling, because they recognised that it was important to save the nation. (...) In all circumstances I will always be the representative of the nation” (Pais et al 1924: 60).

With this goal in mind he decreed a presidential form of government (Electoral Law of 30 March 1918) that gave predominance to the role played by a charismatic leader, elected by male universal suffrage, in the context of an interventionist and corporativist state. On 28 April 1918 he legitimised his presidential rule in a plebiscite (Costa Pinto 1999: 36; Dias Santos 2010: 378; Oliveira Marques 1972: 168-169; Serra 1999: 119; Telo 1977: 150-151, 1999). The President-King, as the integralists called him, was the charismatic leader of the nation and the person who held authority over all matters of the state. In this political scheme, the interests of the collective nation took precedence over the interests of the individual. The state reserved for itself the right to intervene in security, economic and welfare matters by the indiscriminate use of “exceptional measures”, which were approved to suppress the oppositional activity of so-called state enemies (Telo 1999).

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142 “Nunca traí nem trairei os meus princípios, a minha fé republicana. Eu me oporia implacavelmente como republicano a qualquer tentativa de restauração monárquica”.
143 “(...) acabar com os ódios que dividem a família portuguesa”.
144 “Todas as classes sociais se encontram unidas desde o nobre ao mais plebeu, pulsando todos no mesmo sentimento pátrio, por terem reconhecido que era necessário salvar a nação. (...) Serei sempre em todas as circunstâncias o mandatário da nação”.

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The presidential system that Sidónio Pais created derived its influence from several sources, namely from Integralismo Lusitano, whose members felt comfortable within the political structures of the New Republic. The integralists saw in Sidónio Pais the reaffirmation of conservative values, such as authority and order, and the consecration of their anti-liberal, anti-democratic and, to an extent, anti-republican ideology (Dias Santos 2010: 380). They collaborated openly with Sidónio Pais by entering into a coalition with the newly formed Monarchist Party (PM) while António Sardinha, Hipólito Raposo and Nobre de Melo offered advice on several legal texts, including the Electoral Law of 30 March 1918 (Ramos Ascensão 1943: Chapter 5, Telo 1977: 151; 1980 vol. 1: 60-61). Members of the Junta Central assumed positions of power in the public administration and in the cabinet. Martinho Nobre de Melo and Azevedo Neves, two integralist sympathisers, were appointed Minister of Instruction and Minister of Trade, respectively (Braga da Cruz 1986: 20; Ramos Ascensão 1943: Chapter 5).

The integralists also influenced Sidónio Pais concerning the establishment of a corporative system of representation that reflected the organic political structure defended in their political manifesto (Dias Santos 2010: 380; JCIL 1921: 29, 45). In this sense, the New Republican system maintained both chambers, but turned the Senate into a chamber of provincial and corporative representation, whereby 49 members were elected by the provinces and 28 members by the liberal professions, trade unions, employers, agricultural and industrial associations (Costa Pinto 1999: 36; Serra 1999: 120). Of these 28 members, ten were assigned to the agricultural sector, while only five were assigned to the industrial sector, denoting the influence of the integralists (Telo 1977: 151). The purpose of the new Senate was to give substance to the organic representation of the nation by denying the political parties ideological skirmishes over the corporative interests of the nation (Telo 1999: 21).
While Sidónio Pais and his supporters were busy redesigning the institutions of the new republic, the Unionist Party withdrew their support, deeming Sidónio Pais’s tendencies too dictatorial and demagogic – especially after Pais introduced male universal suffrage, extending the electoral vote to illiterate people. According to the leader of the unionists, Brito de Camacho, the enfranchising of the illiterate majority would result in the right taking over the republic and perhaps in a future restoration of the monarchy (Oliveira Marques 1972: 169, Santos Dias 2010: 381; Telo 1977: 143-144, 154-155; Wheeler 1978: 144). The evolutionists followed the same example. In the first trimester of 1918, they severed relations with the New Republic, accusing it of favouring the monarchists and disrespecting the 1911 Constitution (Telo 1977: 155). As Machado Santos’s Centro Reformista barely managed to attract “able people”, Sidónio Pais became more and more dependent on his reactionary allies, whose support distanced him from the republican public opinion, despite his attempt to reassure the republicans, in a 9 May 1918 speech, that he would defend the republic “until the last drop of blood” (cited in Telo 1977: 189 and also Oliveira Marques 1972: 169).

As a consequence, the three republican parties (PD, PUR and PRE) boycotted the general elections of 28 April 1918. Sidónio’s PNR (in partnership with the Centro Reformista, and with several unionist and evolutionist dissidents) won an overwhelming majority and the monarchists and Catholics won between themselves 42 seats in Parliament and 9 seats in the Senate (see Table 7.1). The integralists, in coalition with the constitutionalist PM, managed to elect António Sardinha, Pequito Rebelo and the Viscount of Sardoal to Parliament and Xavier Cordeiro to the Senate (Costa Pinto 1999: 36; Dias Santos 2010: 379; F. Martins 2009: 216; Oliveira Marques 1972: 169; Telo 1977: 156-157; Braga da Cruz 1986: 20).

145 Because of their boycott, over 60% of the electorate in Lisbon abstained from voting in the general elections (Telo 1977: 189)
Table 7.1 - The Sidonista Congress (1918)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parties</th>
<th>Parliament</th>
<th>Congress (provincial senators)</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Seats</td>
<td>Percentage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independents</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholics (Centro Católico Português)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sidonistas (Partido Nacional Republicano)</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>69.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monarchists (Partido Monárquico)</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>23.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>155</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
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From the legislative chambers, the integralists contributed to the formulation of laws that were akin to their ideological beliefs and used the pulpit to disseminate their reactionary views to a larger audience (Ramos Ascensão 1943: Chapter 5). In the northern towns, such as Braga, Mortágua, Régua and Santa Marta de Panaguião, monarchists took over the administration of councils. They joined the administrative commissions of districts, municipalities and parishes (de Magalhães 1925: 14-21; Dias Santos 2010: 384). Networks of informants, composed of monarchists and marginal elements of society, infiltrated factories and trade unions in the south of the country. They arrested, interrogated and even tortured several trade unionists. For the first time in the history of the Republic, republican vigilantes were under the surveillance of the integralists and the monarchists. The latter harassed republican leaders, attacked the masonry and the headquarters of the republican parties and raided the republican newspapers every time they dared to criticise the government. In the north of Portugal, they acted like a paramilitary organisation, biding their time until the monarchy was restored (Dias Santos 2010: 384; Telo 1977: 187-189; Wheeler 1978: 152). In the army, monarchist officers, punished by the previous democratic government (see Chapter Five), were rehabilitated and re-entered the officer corps in various garrisons. While
republican officers were purged, monarchists officers and cadets, supportive of Sidônio’s coup, were nominated to chief positions in the administration and command of the Republican Guard and the army, while the CEP, still overwhelmingly republican, remained in France (de Magalhães 1925: 14-21; Dias Santos 2010: 384-385; Telo 1977: 183-185; 1980 vol. 1: 132-133). The monarchist Lieutenant-Colonel Álvaro Mendonça, for instance, was nominated Secretary of State for War; the monarchist Admiral João do Canto e Castro was appointed Navy Minister and Major Sinel de Cordes (the future co-conspirator of the 1926 Revolution) was assigned to the command of the Lisbon garrison (Wheeler 1978: 143).

7.8. The End of the New Republic: The Monarquia do Norte and the Monsanto Uprising

However, after Sidônio Pais lost the support of the republican parties, the New Republic started showing deep fissures.

On the war front, the CEP was almost decimated in the Battle of Lys on 9 April 1918, while the remaining Portuguese troops continued to be stranded in Flanders. The New Republic had stopped sending troops to Western Europe, as the war effort became concentrated in Africa (Alves de Fraga 2003, Gomes da Costa 1920). Some army corps did manage to return home but they were not deployed again, while those who dared to defend Portugal’s intervention in the face of a strong presence of pacifists and Germanophiles in cabinet, were defamed, tried and arrested (Oliveira Marques 1972: 169; Telo 1977: 146-147; Telo 1980 vol. 1: 132-133).

At home, the cost of living rose more than the wages, as agricultural products suffered steep inflation. The urban workers who had been excited to see the democrats
go, now realised that Sidónio Pais’s policies were just as intransigent or more intransigent than the PD’s to the point that trade unionists refused to accept their seats in the Senate. After the labour unions deemed the New Republic as no different than “the others that went before” (cited in Wheeler 1978: 149), social unrest became rampant. As a result, Sidónio Pais assumed control of the legislative process, by sending the Congress on a long recess on 6 August 1918 and thus preventing it from issuing a single law or decree during the New Republic (Robinson 1999: 101-103; Wheeler 1978: 147-148; Telo 1977: 192).

Outside the chambers of power, the labour unions organised 63 major strikes from April to October, as the União Operária Nacional exerted the workers to unite and act “outside the action and influence of any political party” (cited in Wheeler 1978: 149). Over time brutal repression was used to pacify the growing anarcho-syndicalist and republican opposition. The Republican Guard and the army were called in to pacify the streets, firing on people and killing several strikers. Labour newspapers and associations were persecuted “by means of arrests, banishments, police searches” (Costa Pinto 1999: 36; Oliveira Marques 1972: 169; Telo 1977: 161-165, 185-186, 195-208; quote from Wheeler 1978: 148).

On 14 October 1918, after an unsuccessful attempt organised by the democrats (in a tactical alliance with the evolutionists and unionists) to overthrow the sidonistas from power, Sidónio Pais forbade any demonstrations or meetings, and declared a stage of siege (Dias Santos 2010: 387; Wheeler 1978: 149). Soon afterwards, a general strike was announced by the anarcho-syndicalists for 18 November 1918, but the sidonista government reacted immediately by detaining hundreds of people, some of them preventively, and putting them in overcrowded jails where they were subjected to physical punishments and maltreatment. Several labour unionists were deported to Africa, trade unions were shutdown and the labour newspapers were censored (Dias
The New Republic was in a latent state of political turmoil as jails were filled with political prisoners. Law and order – what Sidónio had promised to the country when he overthrew the democrats on 5 December 1917 – were nowhere to be found.

In parallel with these events, Catholics and monarchists fell out over the nature of the regime. Whereas the Catholics maintained their neutrality as they hoped to improve their situation within the legal structures of the republican regime, the monarchists, most of them practicing Catholics, kept pressing for the restoration of the monarchy. With the end of the Great War in November 1918, the integralists and the monarchists joined forces in insisting that only the monarchy could put an end to the political crisis, that the republican uprising of October 1918 had made urgent. As far as the integralists were concerned Sidónio Pais’s rule had been a “transitory formula” only “bearable” due to the belligerent circumstances that Portugal had endured. But with the beginning of a new era, only the crown offered the necessary stability for the reconstruction of Portugal (Dias Santos 2010: 387). What followed was the estrangement of the integralists and Sidónio Pais, against whom the former now conspired with other monarchist forces (F. Martins 2009: 216; Wheeler 1978: 149).

With the New Republic on the verge of imploding, Sidónio Pais supported the creation of two pro-government Military Juntas, the Northern Junta and the Southern Junta, dominated by monarchist officers and conservative republicans, respectively. Faced with public disorder in the streets and in the corridors of power, the Juntas agreed on a programme that declared allegiance to Sidónio Pais, rather than the regime, and aimed to restore order at any cost, preventing any “revolutionary acts” that led to the reestablishment of demagogy, i.e. the Democratic Party. They acted as “vigilant sentinels of events”, as Luis de Magalhães, a contemporary of the Juntas, described them. In the event of Sidónio Pais’s overthrow the Juntas also committed themselves to
the organisation of a strong military government (de Magalhães 1925: 14-21; Dias Santos 2010: 393-416; Sollari Allegro 1988: 125; Telo 1977: 192).

Soon after the creation of the Juntas, on 14 December 1918, the “President-King” was assassinated in Lisbon’s Rossio train station by a 24-year old Jacobin unionist “who had been brought up on radical republicanism by his father” in the southern region of Alentejo (Costa Pinto 1999: 36; Croca Caeiro 1997: 108; Serra 1999: 121; quoted from Wheeler 1978: 153). The sidonista Admiral and former Navy Minister, João do Canto e Castro, succeeded Sidónio Pais as the President of the Republic, even though he never hid his monarchist convictions (Oliveira Marques 1972: 170; Serra 1999: 121). During his time in power, Canto e Castro resisted two major attempted coups. The first one, staged in Santarém, days after the assassination of Sidónio Pais, was led by the sidonista Francisco da Cunha Leal and the republican Álvaro Xavier de Castro, who wanted to re-establish the “pure republican ideals” of the 1910 Revolution. The coup was quickly put down. The second one was carried out on 19 January 1919 by the former incursionist Captain Paiva Couceiro who proclaimed the restoration of the monarchy in Porto with the support of the Northern Junta Militar (de Magalhães 1925: 14-21; Costa Pinto 1999: 37; Dias Santos 2010: 417-446; Ramos 1994: 619). Unlike the first coup, the proclamation of the monarchy faced no resistance from the republican forces stationed in that city and gained the immediate support of the neighbouring northern regions (Sollari Allegro 1988: 141-163; Wheeler 1978: 196).

As news of the proclamation of the monarchy in the north (known in Portuguese historiography as the Monarquia do Norte), reached Lisbon, the sidonista government declared a state of siege and managed to rally the support of the southern Junta, who swore allegiance to the ruling institutions. Under the “Pacto do Corpo de Tropas”, the Southern Junta, mainly composed of conservative republicans, guaranteed the safety of the President of the Republic and of the newly appointed sidonista government led by
Tamagnini Barbosa (Medeiros Ferreira 1992: 80-81; Sollari Allegro 1988: 168-169; Wheeler 1978: 196). In a public statement to the country, the Premier exerted the Lisbon population to join the battalions of volunteers and take up arms, given away by the government, to fight the monarchists. The democrats quickly organised an historical republican front with thousands of volunteers – “students, workers, clerks and soldiers” – committed to the defence of the “Old” Republic. Among them were the republican officers who had returned from Flanders and felt betrayed by the monarchists who had refused to deploy more contingents in the war front. The democrats also managed to convince the sidonista government to free the political prisoners involved in the December uprising (Costa Pinto 1999: 37; Serra 1999: 122; Sollari Allegro 1988: 172-174; Wheeler 1978: 196).

Threatened by the republican battalions and the Southern Junta, the monarchists based in Lisbon took refuge in the Lanceiros de Belém barracks. Several integralists, monarchist officers (mostly captains and lieutenants) and monarchist civilians eventually moved to Monsanto where they hoped to be in a better position to defend themselves and to declare the restoration of the monarchy in the south (Dias Santos 2010: 447-457; Sollari Allegro 1988: 179-186, 188). Upon their arrival in Monsanto on 23 January 1919, Colonel Aires de Ornelas was nominated the head of the monarchist uprising. As King Manuel’s chief representative in Portugal, the leader of the constitutionalist Causa Monárquica, a former member of the General Staff and of the Cortes during the Constitutional Monarchy and the leader of the monarchists in the sidonista Parliament, Ornelas was seen as the uncontested representative of the monarchist cause (Sollari Allegro 1988: 169-170, 186).

The skirmishes lasted less than two days but claimed the lives of 39 people (Sollari Allegro 1988: 200). The monarchists were quickly vanquished as they had underestimated the strength of the republicans in the capital, even though several
garrisons remained neutral and refused to take sides in the conflict (Costa Pinto 1999: 36; Sollari Allegro 1988: 188, 191).

However, three days after the end of the hostilities Tamagnini’s Government fell due to the Premier’s perceived benevolence towards the monarchists, allowing them to seize Porto, while refusing to appoint democrats to the cabinet once the Monsanto uprising had been put down (Wheeler 1978: 196).

On 13 February 1919, days after a republican independent, José Relvas, had been appointed the new Prime Minister, the Monarchy of the North collapsed at the hands of the Republican Guard and of the Northern Junta, which had been dissuaded by the government to continue their support for the monarchist uprising (Ramos 1994: 619; Sollari Allegro 1988: 239, 245, 249, 252-255). With the monarchists defeated, the new government was composed of independents and republican elements only. They originated from the democratic, sidonista, unionist, evolutionist and socialist parties who governed briefly in coalition (Serra 1999: 122; Sollari Allegro 1988: 201; Telo 1977: 235-236; Wheeler 1978: 196).

On 11 May 1919, the democrats returned to Parliament with an overwhelming majority in the general elections, winning 53% of the seats (Costa Pinto 1998: 52, 61, 64; 1999: 37; Sollari Allegro 1988: 269). By the end of June 1919, they had taken over the cabinet, re-established the Old Republic, forced Paiva Couceiro into exile, sent Aires de Ornelas to prison, and purged the armed forces of its monarchist elements, expelling as many as 1,000 officers from the ranks (Medeiros Ferreira 1992: 103; Sollari Allegro 1988: 262, 271, 275-277; Telo 1977: 244).

7.9 The Defeat of the Monarchists in 1919 and the Apparent Demise of the JCIL
The integralists were involved in the *Monarquia do Norte* and the Monsanto uprising. After the assassination of Sidónio Pais, during whose leadership the Junta Central had reached the apogee of its political activity within the structures of the state, the integralists turned their attention to the urgent restoration of the Monarchy, lest the democrats might return to power as the latest December coup had threatened.

The conspiratorial plans in the North were organised by Paiva Couceiro with the support of the northern Junta Militar, but it was Hipólito Raposo who wrote the memorandum that was presented to Aires de Ornelas, seeking his support for the proclamation of the monarchy in Porto. In the memorandum (14 January 1919), Hipólito Raposo asked the chief of the constitutionalists based in Portugal to approve the creation of a monarchist military movement that would propose to the people a plebiscite on the political regime. Aires de Ornelas replied to the request by writing on the sidelines of the memorandum, “Go on, King’s words!”¹⁴⁶ and “I do not see the need for a plebiscite”¹⁴⁷ (“Memorando”, reproduced in Sollari Allegro 1988: 127-128).

However, due to the fact that the troops that had been sent to Santarém in December 1918 still had to return to the capital, the integralists António Sardinha and Luís de Almeida Braga asked Captain Paiva Couceiro to delay the proclamation of the monarchy by a few days, so that the Lisbon garrisons could also pronounce themselves simultaneously. By then, Aires de Ornelas had also sent his own envoy to Porto in order to dissuade Paiva Couceiro from proclaiming the monarchy. According to Aires de Ornelas, the King’s “Go on!”, which had been made public to the monarchists, was only an acceptance of a preparatory conspiratorial plan that should not be acted upon in the near future until the right conditions, left unsaid, had been created (JCIL 1921: 34; Sollari Allegro 1988: 171).

¹⁴⁶ “Go on Palavras d’El Rei!”
¹⁴⁷ “Não vejo razão para plebiscito.”
Paiva Couceiro, however, opted to interpret the King’s words differently and purposefully ignored the integralists’ request and Aires de Ornelas’s clarification. On the following day he proclaimed the restoration of the Monarchy and declared Dom Manuel II, King of Portugal (António Sardinha’s report of his trip to Porto cited in Sollari Allegro 1988: 134, 172, Ramos Ascensão 1943: Chapter 7). The King in exile, however, waited for the results without formally denying his support as he would do later, when he openly condemned the monarchist intervention (letter from Dom Manuel II to Aires de Ornelas, published in Diário de Notícias in November 1919 and cited in JCIL 1921: 9; Report of the Integralist Mission Sent to London published in A Monarquia 4-6 December 1919 and cited in JCIL 1921: 13-37).

On 19 January 1919, a Provisional Governing Junta (Junta Governativa Provisória) was immediately formed in Porto in which the integralists were not included. The Monarquia do Norte revoked the 1911 Constitution and the anticlerical legislation promulgated after 5 October 1910 (Decree No. 3 and Decree No. 8). In their place, the 1826 Constitution was reinstated and the Catholic religion became the official religion of the state (Sollari Allegro 1988: 148, 205-207).

Although the integralists did not agree with the restoration of the liberal Carta, preferring to have an integralist monarchy established, they supported the Monarquia do Norte in the face of the fait accompli, as the main priority became the overthrow of the “anti-nation” government. The question of the regime was therefore postponed as the integralists collaborated with the monarchist uprising. In this sense, Luís de Almeida Braga and António Sardinha cooperated with the Junta Provisória in the North, while in Lisbon, Alberto Monsaraz, Pequito Rebelo and Hipólito Raposo fought in Monsanto alongside the monarchist officers and the constitutionalists, namely Hintze Ribeiro, the former regenerationist Premier. At Monsanto, Pequito Rebelo, a veteran of the Great War, even accepted Aires de Ornelas’s appointment as his field adjutant. However, the
integralists’ cooperation with the constitutionalists came at a personal cost. Both Alberto Monsaraz and Pequito Rebelo were seriously wounded during the Monsanto uprising, and Hipólito Raposo was captured and put on trial in a military court. When the republicans defeated the monarchists, António Sardinha went into self-imposed exile in Spain where he stayed until 1921 (Campos Matos 2009: 221-223; JCIL 1921: 45; Ramos 1994: 546; Ramos Ascensão 1943: Chapter 7; Sollari Allegro 1988: 184-187; Telo 1980 vol. 1: 62).

With the defeat of the monarchists in 1919, the Junta Central do Integralismo Lusitano suffered serious repercussions. Their members had been expelled from Parliament, living on the margin of the now democrat-dominated regime, in exile, wounded or in jail. However, their determination to proceed with the integralist struggle resulted in the reopening of the newspaper *A Monarquia* in August 1919 under the direction of Hipólito Raposo who was serving a two-year jail sentence (Ramos Ascensão 1943: Chapter 8; Telo 1980 vol. 1: 62-63). In the articles of the integralist mouthpiece, they distanced themselves from Paiva Couceiro and implied that the constitutionalist officers had been responsible for the failure of the monarchist restoration (Telo 1980 vol. 1: 62-63).

Imbued with both a sense of intellectual superiority over the constitutionalist conspirators – who had dismissed António Sardinha and Luís de Almeida Braga’s advice to postpone the monarchist coup in Porto – and with a sense of martyrdom for the blood they had shed in Monsanto for the constitutionalist cause, the integralists sent Pequito Rebelo and Luís de Almeida Braga to London to meet with Dom Manuel II on 16 September 1919 (JCIL 1921: 3-4, 14). Their mission was to obtain the King’s assent for the formation of a monarchist military movement led by a newly appointed military chief that would establish an integralist monarchy by force. As the integralists argued,

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148 Xavier Cordeiro had died in September 1919 (JCIL 1921: 13).
“the only thing left as a means to restore the Monarchy is an act of our own strength, a revolution of the Nation against republican tyranny” (JCIL 1921: 34). They also wanted the King to support their leadership position in the Causa Monárquica at a time when many constitutionalists were in exile or in jail, such as the constitutionalist leader, Aires de Ornelas. Finally, the integralists also sought the King’s acceptance of their integralist doctrine by keeping a closer relationship with Integralismo Lusitano (JCIL 1921: 3, 5-6; Report of the Integralist Mission Sent to London published in *A Monarquia* 4-6 December 1919 and cited in JCIL 1921: 13-37).

However, the King in exile interpreted the integralists’ audience as an “ultimatum” and refused to support their revolutionary plans. Siding with his constitutionalist ideals, Dom Manuel II refused to refute the 1826 Constitution and to support the integralist programme, deeming it “absolutist” (JCIL 1921: 36) and therefore *contranatura* to his liberal legacy. If the monarchy was restored in Portugal, he claimed, the 1826 *Carta* should be reinstated. He also declined to engage in military plans to overthrow the republic as he thought the latter could jeopardise the ongoing efforts to obtain an amnesty for the monarchists still in incarceration or in exile. Furthermore, the King thought that the Republic should be undermined from within the existing legal institutions and questioned at the polling stations – that is why he had disavowed the monarchist coups (Report of the Integralist Mission Sent to London published in *A Monarquia* 4-6 December 1919 and cited in JCIL 1921: 13-37). As a result, the King decreed “the Junta Central do Integralismo Lusitano my adversary, and in view of its resolutions no longer is part of the monarchist party [Causa Monárquica]” (letter from Dom Manuel II to Aires de Ornelas, published in *Diário de Noticias* in November 1919 and cited in JCIL 1921: 9-12).

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149 “(...) só nos resta como meio de fazer a Monarquia um acto da nossa própria força, uma revolução da Nação contra a tirania republicana”.
150 “(...) de hoje em diante, considero a Junta Central do Integralismo Lusitano como minha adversária, deixando em vista das suas resoluções de fazer parte do partido monárquico”.
In light of the King’s response, the integralists decided that it could no longer recognise a king who did not support their integralist programme, which in their own words was “renovating” and “representative” of the corporations and municípios, not absolutist (JCIL 1921: 5, 26). The integralists also felt they could no longer remain linked to a king who pursued a conciliatory strategy with the Republic, especially after the bloodshed in Monsanto, and who wanted to restore the 1826 Carta, considered by the integralists as a “factor in the definitive ruin of the Pátria”151 (JCIL 1921: 28). As a result, the integralists also cut relations with the head of the constitutionalists on 19 October 1919 (JCIL 1921: 6) and, by doing so, they abandoned the Causa Monárquica, which was in itself largely dominated by the constitutionalists.

Soon afterwards they entered into negotiations with the legitimistas, representatives of the descendants of the absolutist King Dom Miguel, who saw in the establishment of an integralist monarchy a chance to return to power in Portugal. As the integralists argued, “Monarchists, for being nationalists and not out of loyalty to the person of the King – according to our principles, historical tradition and the succession laws, we will serve as King of Portugal the Prince of Portuguese blood, who best personifies the interest of the Nation and whose legitimacy will be recognised by the Cortes Gerais, that is by the National Assembly of Municipal, Provincial and Corporative representatives”152 (JCIL 1921: 7).

On 2 September 1920, the integralists Alberto Monsaraz and Luís de Almeida Braga signed the Bronnbach Agreement with Dom Miguel II and his Legitimist Party. The integralists swore allegiance to the legitimista heir to the throne, the underage Dom Duarte Nuno de Bragança, as his father, Dom Miguel II, renounced any rights to the

151 “(...) não serviríamos a Carta Constitucional por considerarmos a sua Restauração como factor da ruína definitiva da Pátria”.
152 “Monárquicos por sermos nacionalistas e não por lealdade à pessoa do Rei – segundo os nossos princípios, a tradição histórica e as leis de sucessão, serviremos como Rei de Portugal aquele Príncipe de sangue português, que melhor personificar o interesse da Nação e cuja legitimidade venha a ser reconhecida pelas Cortes Gerais, ou seja pela Assembleia Nacional dos representantes de Municípios, das Províncias e das Corporações.”
throne in order to appease those who accused him of being a Germanophile, for having served in the Germany Army during the Great War. In return, the legitimistas pledged to uphold the integralist principles as defended by the JCIL once the monarchy had been restored\(^{153}\) (JCIL 1921: 47-53).

However, in 1922, unbeknownst to the integralists and without the support of the Legitimist Party, Dom Manuel II and the successors of Dom Miguel reached an agreement in Paris regarding the dynastic question. Still suffering the political backlash that followed his collaboration with the German Army during the Great War, Dom Miguel II abdicated his right to the throne in favour of Dom Manuel II and accepted, along with the constitutionalists, the decision that the monarchic form of government as well as the heir to the throne should rest with the future Cortes (“Pacto de Paris” cited in Ramos Ascensão 1943: Anexos IV; Braga da Cruz 1986: 22-23). By doing so, the legitimists aimed to put an end to the dynastic question, and reap the immediate advantages laid out by the fact that Dom Manuel II had no descendants. Upon the latter’s death they hoped to be proclaimed the rightful heirs to the throne rather than wait for the integralists to impose a monarchy by force. In the meantime, a secret section of the Pact of Paris that had promised the miguelistas several leadership positions in the Causa Monárquica and in the monarchist newspapers, anticipated a reassertion of their authority within the monarchist movement (Telo 1980 vol. 1: 72; 1980 vol. 2: 65).

In light of the new turn of events, the JCIL decided to suspend indefinitely their political activity, as well as the publication of the integralist newspaper *A Monarquia* (Ramos Ascensão 1943: Chapter 12). In a communiqué dated 4 May 1922, the JCIL declared that “it immediately suspends its political organisation activity until the

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\(^{153}\) Not all integralist supporters followed the decision of the JCIL. Alfredo Pimenta and Caetano Beirão, who had written several articles for *A Monarquia* although they had never officially belonged to IL, remained loyal to Dom Manuel II and formed the Acção Tradicionalista Portuguesa, later called Acção Realista Portuguesa, which stayed in touch with the Causa Monárquica after the integralists split with the constitutionalists (Braga da Cruz 1986: 22; Costa Pinto 1997: 34).
circumstances demonstrate that only the processes and doctrines of Nationalism may ensure the certainty of restoration”\textsuperscript{154} (cited in Ramos Ascensão 1943: Anexos V).

At a time when the integralists had managed to elect Rui Enes Ulrich to the Parliament in the 1921 elections – Pequito Rebelo and other integralists’ electoral bids had not been successful (Braga da Cruz 1986: 26) – they felt unable to maintain their loyalty to the young legitimist heir, after his father had abdicated in favour of Dom Manuel II. The integralists also felt they could not rejoin the constitutionalist faction after Dom Manuel II had publicly renounced the integralist doctrine and refused to disavow the 1826 Constitution. The restoration of the monarchy was of no interest to them if it did not break with the constitutionalist past (Ramos 1994: 546). As the historian, António José Telo concludes, “in this way, at a time that was favourable to their development and with an organisation already strong, the JCIL ‘committed suicide’ (…)”\textsuperscript{155} (Telo 1980: 63-65). It seemed like the integralist movement, as a nationalist political movement, had come to an end.

However, as we will see in the next chapter, just as had happened with the PRP at the end of Phase Two after the unsuccessful 1891 Porto Uprising (see Chapter Three), appearances were deceiving. One only has to bear in mind that the same communiqué that put an end to the political activities of JCIL, also stated that the party “affirms the purpose of continuing the fight against the republic, for the defence and doctrinal propaganda of Integralismo Lusitano’s principles”\textsuperscript{156} (my emphasis, cited in Ramos Ascensão 1943: Anexos V).

\textsuperscript{154} “(…) suspende imediatamente a sua actividade de organização política, até que as circunstâncias demonstrem que só os processos e doutrinas do Nacionalismo podem assegurar a certeza da restauração”.
\textsuperscript{155} “Assim, numa altura favorável ao seu desenvolvimento e com uma organização já forte a JCIL ‘suicida-se’ (…)”.
\textsuperscript{156} “Afirma o seu propósito de continuar o combate à república, pela defesa e propaganda doutrinária dos princípios do Integralismo Lusitano (…)”.

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8.1. Introduction

In the last two chapters we analysed the first two phases of the revolutionary process that resulted in the successful overthrow of the First Republic. In Chapter Six we saw how Integralismo Lusitano was firstly created as an ideological movement of nationalist opposition to the established anticlerical Republic (Phase One). In Chapter Seven we saw how the ideological project evolved into a nationalist political movement of opposition in the context of Portugal’s entry in the Great War (Phase Two). The PD’s determination to enter the war opened the way for the formation of political opposition movements, such as the Junta Central do Integralismo Lusitano (JCIL), and eventually resulted in the government’s overthrow by Major Sidónio Pais. Once established in power, Major Pais created a new political framework within the boundaries of the existing regime, called the New Republic. The newly created JCIL reached its apogee in this period. The integralists influenced the creation of a presidential system of government, based on the leadership of a supreme national chief, who oversaw a corporative political structure, representative of class interests. The integralists also took their seats in the sidonista Congress (in coalition with the Monarchist Party) and in cabinet. However, their time in power came to an end after Sidónio Pais’s assassination. The JCIL’s involvement in the failed Monarquia do Norte and in the Monsanto uprising sent several integralists into exile and to jail. Despite the party’s renewed efforts to create a revolutionary coalition against the First Republic with the support of the constitutionalists, their intents ended in disaster when
Dom Manuel II disavowed their revolutionary plans and their ideology. Without the support of the constitutionalist Causa Monárquica, the integralists turned to the legitimist Dom Miguel II who gave them his support. However, after the *miguelistas* reached an agreement with the constitutionalsists over the dynastic question, the integralists were left in a limbo. In 1922, the JCIL suspended their political activity, at a time when the democrats had reconsolidated their hegemonic grasp on the military cadres and on the civil service.

However, as we will see in this chapter, although the JCIL had disbanded, the integralists did not cease their politics of opposition to the First Republic. In the following pages we will turn our attention to the third phase of the revolutionary process that overthrew the First Republic (i.e. recruitment to the revolutionary cause). We will see how the integralists, as nationalist intellectuals of prestige, revised their strategy away from the monarchist centres and played a leading role in the way they organised and conducted the politics of opposition to the ruling regime within the organisation of other conservative political centres, such as the Cruzada Nuno Álvares Pereira and the União dos Interesses Económicos. We will also see how the integralists infiltrated the high ranks of the military and recruited senior officers to their revolutionary cause.

After the Great War, Portugal fell into a deep economic and social crisis which had threatened the democrats’ hold on power. As the democrats continued to alienate the high ranks of the military and reverted to practices of brutal repression, the military became increasingly more interventionist, while the trade unions ultimately refused to intervene to stop the conservative coup of 28 May 1926 as they had on previous occasions. Political instability, inefficiency and lack of power legitimacy marked the final years of the First Republic. A high turnover of governments in power, political fractionalism and the PD’s hegemonic control over the republican institutions failed to
inspire stability and order. The democrats’ failure to solve the economic crisis, as well as their reluctance to accommodate the conservative demands, eventually resulted in the formation of a civil-military revolutionary coalition, where the integralists found a central position. In the morning of 28 May 1926, as monarchists and conservative republican officers marched on Lisbon, unopposed by the working and middle classes, the republicans, who had successfully overthrown the Constitutional Monarchy sixteen years earlier, were themselves ousted by a disloyal civil-military coalition with counter-nationalist aims. By overthrowing the First Republic, the revolutionary coalition finally managed to remove the democrats from power.

8.2. The Integralist Path to Revolutionary Overthrow

During his years in self-imposed exile (1919-1921), António Sardinha revised his position on Spain, amending the integralist ideology in the process. While in Madrid, he came into contact with Spanish history and culture, showing undisguised admiration for Portugal’s neighbour, to the point that he adopted the concept of Hispanism in his writings. As Sérgio Campos Matos (2009: 221) tells us, “The concept of Hispanism corresponded to the idea of new social order shaped by a Christian spirituality and worldview, within which the Iberian nations would be the standard-bearer”. According to Sardinha’s revised position on Iberianism, Portugal was part of an Hispanic conception of the world, whereby the Iberian Peninsula was “the leading example of Christian civilization” with a “global mission to fulfil” (Campos Matos 2009: 222). “Hispanic Catholicism, including the nations of Latin America” (Campos Matos 2009: 222), was, therefore, a cultural manifestation of a political duality existing in the Iberian Peninsula. In this view, Portugal and Spain should not be politically
unified as the liberal freemasons had “subversively” postulated, but rather they should join efforts in order to project onto the world their catholic values as they had done for centuries through their empires (*A Monarquia*, 12 December 1919; Sardinha 1924: xxiii-xciii, 94-104; 1943). Incidentally, in Sardinha’s revision, the Discoveries were no longer considered a *desvio* (diversion). Rather, they stood “for the very essence of the national character” (Vakil 1995). Pequito Rebelo also reiterated Integralismo Lusitano’s new purpose by claiming in an article published in *A Monarquia* (7 January 1922) that:

“For integralism to triumph it is necessary that it remains in a certain way a religious movement, a crusade, not only national, but human, not only human, but religious. (…) We should seek a doctrine that exceeds and at the same time fulfils integralism, because only that doctrine can give us life, victory and salvation. That doctrine is the crusade. (…) we defend humanity itself against the democratic barbarism and God himself against the satanic pride of the [French] Revolution. (…) there are multiple reasons to believe that Portugal, once its institutions have been reorganised, would give Europe a living model of new order, which for Europe would be the solution to its bloody problems”.

By adopting the concept of a political crusade for Catholicism around the world, the integralists armed themselves with a new ideological purpose after the dissolution of the political centres. They saw themselves as the holders of God’s covenant – “as there was a man, sent by God to give testament of the Truth, so among us our generation was

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157 “Para que o integralismo triunfe é preciso que ele seja em certa maneira um movimento religioso, uma cruzada, não só nacional, mas humana, não só humana, mas religiosa. (…) devemos procurar uma doutrina que exceda e ao mesmo tempo realize o integralismo, porque só essa doutrina pode dar-nos vida, vitória e salvação. Esta doutrina é a da cruzada. (…) defendemos a própria humanidade contra a barbárie democrática e o próprio Deus contra o orgulho satânico da Revolução. (…) são causas múltiplas de acreditar que Portugal, uma vez reorganizado nas suas instituições, daria à Europa um modelo vivo da nova ordem, que à Europa seria a solução dos seus sangrentos problemas.”
sent by God to give Testament to the Portuguese truth\textsuperscript{158} (author’s emphasis, Sardinha cited in Vakil 1995: 153; Sardinha 1943: Preface). In order to spread the Portuguese truth (i.e. the integralist doctrine), Sardinha reopened the Nação Portuguesa in June 1922 and edited the periodical until his death in 1925 (Telo 1980 vol. 1: 66-67).


Not only admired by the conservative flanks of the Republic but also by progressive left-wing thinkers, such as the social critics associated with the Seara Nova periodical, the integralists formed a short-lived scholarly collaboration with the searistas and other monarchist and anarchist groups, called the “Free Men” (“Homens Livres”). For a couple of months, at the end of 1923, they presented themselves as an intellectual front against a “common enemy – plutocracy and partisanship” (António Sardinha cited in Ramos 1994: 551-552; de la Torre Gómez & Sánchez Cervelló 2000: 230-232; Telo 1980 vol. 2: 63).

However, the integralists’ most influential work was effectively done after 1924 within other conservative centres of ideological vindication, such as the Cruzada Nuno Álvares Pereira, and conservative trade associations, such as the Liga Católica dos Agricultores Alentejanos, the Associação Central da Agricultura Portuguesa and, most

\textsuperscript{158} “[c]omo houve um homem, mandado por Deus para dar testemunho da Verdade, também entre nós a nossa geração foi mandada por Deus para dar Testemunho da verdade portuguesa”.
importantly, the União dos Interesses Económicos, where they advanced their reactionary and agrarian interests (Costa Pinto 1994: 34-35).

The Cruzada Nuno Álvares Pereira, was a right-wing study group created in 1918 with the purpose of “promoting the moral unity of the nation” across the conservative elite, through periodicals and conferences (cited in Costa Pinto 1994: 64 and in Telo 1890 vol. 1: 73-74). The members of the Cruzada used the name Nuno Álvares Pereira to represent their conservative values, after the integralists had resuscitated the medieval knight-monk as a national hero of the right in 1913, as we saw in Section 6.4. The conservative trade association União dos Interesses Económicos (UIE), on the other hand, was a political party founded in 1924 by influential landowners, industrialists, financiers and other businessmen with “the explicit purpose of political intervention in government” (Schwartzman 1989: 148). Frustrated with the economic policies defended by the democratic governments and with the latter’s inability to crush “social subversion” perpetrated by the anarchist faction of the labour movement (the Red Legion), the oligarchs aimed to overthrow the PD from the chambers of power through both legal and illegal means. As an openly disloyal party, the UIE allied itself with the disgruntled high ranks of the military and provided financial support for the failed 18 April 1925 military coup. A few months later, the UIE won 3.7% of the vote in the November 1925 general elections. However, the PD’s overwhelming victory strengthened their determination to continue to finance the ongoing conservative conspiracies. According to Wheeler (1978: 239), “the UIE was the only known group” to have given financial assistance to the successful 28 May 1926 military coup. Their goal was the unification of the reactionary “living forces” in an anti-democratic platform, fighting for the establishment of a corporate assembly representative of economic interests (O Século, 21 February 1925; Costa Pinto 1998:}

Through the Cruzada and the UIE, the integralists intended to restore the true essence of the Portuguese nation and they thought that the only way to do so, especially after the monarchist defeats in Lisbon and Porto, was by reforming the mentalities of the conservative elites who were members of these centres. Their purpose, therefore, was to ensure that the political and economic institutions, where the national interest was being safeguarded, could be better informed by the reactionary spirit of their nationalist ideology. In this sense the integralists broke with past resolutions (see Chapter Seven) and followed a new strategy of political collaboration with other like-minded conservatives. They also suspended any discussions on the establishment of a dynastic regime and appealed to a military intervention that would establish an “extraordinary national government”. By creating a pro-integralist conservative bloc against the Republic, they wanted to pave the way for a nationalist revolution that found in the integralist doctrine the ideological guidelines for the establishment of a new regime (Ramos 1994: 629-630; Ramos Ascensão 1943: Chapter 13; Telo 1980 vol. 1: 68).

In this sense, within both organisations, the integralists encouraged the formation of a conservative union made of political and economic interests, influencing greatly the reactionary ideas being discussed there. Pequito Rebelo, himself a landowner, played an important role in the UIE. He also joined his fellow integralists, Hipólito Raposo, António Sarmento Brandão and Afonso Lucas on the board of the Cruzada Nuno Álvares Pereira. Alongside other nationalists and monarchists, the integralists managed to drive out the conservative republicans associated with the study centre – such as the unionist António José de Almeida and the democrat President Teixeira Gomes – by espousing an increasingly reactionary position based on strong
authoritarian values. In the last year of the Republic, as Capitan Filomeno da Câmara and Martinho Nobre de Melo – also members of the UIE – assumed the leadership of the movement, the Crusade became openly reactionary, even prone to fascist ideas, calling for a military coup to overthrow the regime. Through the UIE’s mouthpiece, the newly-acquired O Século, and the Cruzada’s mouthpiece, the Reconquista, the integralists and their conservative allies – including Colonel João Sinel de Cordes – incited the military to intervene in the style of Spain’s Primo de Rivera. A few days before the 28 May Revolution the Reconquista even printed a photo of conservative General Gomes da Costa – also a member of the Cruzada and a close ally of Captain Filomeno da Câmara and Nobre de Melo – with the caption, “The national leader?” (Castro Leal 1998; 1999: 180-182, 198; Costa Pinto 1994: 64-66; Telo 1980 vol. 1: 74-76; vol. 2: 67, 75-77, 167; Wheeler 1978: 209).

In March 1926, the integralists resumed the activities of the JCIL, after the miguelista regent renounced the Pact of Paris in November 1925, arguing that the secret section of the Pact of Paris had never been fulfilled (see Section 7.9) (Ramos Ascensão 1943: Chapter 13 and Anexo VII; Telo 1980 vol. 1: 72; vol. 2: 64). However, by this time, a second generation of post-war integralists had appeared on the horizon. Not all of them joined the newly reinstated JCIL, as they disagreed with the old integralists on the necessity to establish a monarchist regime in Portugal (Costa Pinto 1994: 36). As Wheeler (1978: 238) tells us, “though many of the younger Integralists were monarchists, their monarchism was sentimental rather than ideological; since the monarchist failure of early 1919, the restoration of the monarchy had come to be considered less and less practicable.” For the young integralists, “Republican integralism” was a more feasible political project.

Some of them, such as Dias Magalhães (n.d.), Marcelo Caetano (1906-1980) – the future leader of the New State regime after Salazar’s death – Manuel Múrias (1900-
1960), Pedro Teotónio Pereira (1902-1972) and Leão Ramos Ascensão (1903-1980) galvanised the academic students and founded the periodical *Ordem Nova* (*New Order*), where they gave more prominence to the role played by a strong leader within the framework of an authoritarian state, regardless of the form of government. The young integralists showed unconditional admiration for Italian fascism as they defined themselves as being “reactionary, anti-liberal and counter-revolutionary”. Eventually, their position prevailed as the old integralists announced a brief suspension of their monarchist demands\(^{159}\). However, after the military coup of 28 May, the young integralists broke with the old integralists and joined the structures of the New State regime, collaborating openly with the Catholics with whom they had enjoyed a close relationship through the CADC, while the old integralists slowly joined the ranks of the opposition, still fighting for the restoration of the monarchy (Braga da Cruz 1986: 60-72; Telo 1980 vol. 1: 67; vol. 2: 64-66).

In any case, the doctrinaire reformulation and the political resuscitation of Integralismo Lusitano after 1922 saw the integralists siding with any conservative officers who were disgruntled with the Republican regime, and taking part in conspiratorial plans for the creation of a revolutionary coalition (Costa Pinto 1994: 36; Ramos Ascensão 1943: Chapter 13). By briefly suspending their monarchist demands, old and young integralists were able to work in unison against the Republic, joining forces with other anti-democratic forces – who became more receptive to a republican version of their integralist ideology – and with senior officers, such as Colonel Sinel de Cordes and General Gomes da Costa.

\(^{159}\) This temporary stance was clarified after the 1926 Revolution in a communiqué published by the integralists on the *Nação Portuguesa* (15 July 1926): “(…) in this extremely serious juncture of [our] political life, we do not abdicate from our political pretension, but we want to suspend it, so that the Country and History may clearly attribute to whom it is due the glory of a ressurgimento or the shame of a catastrophe”. “(…) nesta conjuntura extremamente grave da vida nacional, nós não abdicamos da nossa reivindicação política, mas queremos suspendê-la, para que o País e a História possam claramente atribuir a quem devam, a glória de um ressurgimento ou do opróbrio de uma catástrofe”. 

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Inspired by the examples of Mussolini in Italy, Primo de Rivera in Spain and Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in Turkey, integralists and other conservative thinkers appealed openly for a military intervention (Medeiros Ferreira 1992: 127; Telo 1980 vol. 1: 87-94). They acclaimed the army as an institution that should not serve private political interests but the interests of the nation, especially at a time when the Portuguese society was under threat of dissolution (Wheeler 1978: 211). On 18 April 1925, as conservative rebels led by Captain Filomeno da Câmara and Colonel João Sinel de Cordes staged an insurrection in Rotunda, the *Nação Portuguesa* praised the military coup, while it incited the military to “press on” against the Republic so that “the pátria could be saved” (cited in Telo 1980 vol. 2: 66). In preparation for the uprising, Hipólito Raposo wrote the revolutionary manifesto, while on the day of the coup, several integralists and leading businessmen associated with the UIE assisted the revolutionary soldiers in Rotunda, serving as liaison and support officers (Braga da Cruz 1986: 26; Costa Pinto 1994: 36; Wheeler 1978: 210). The uprising ended in disappointment due to the rebels’ failure to win the support of the Lisbon working class, the Republican National Guard and most of the Lisbon garrisons (Wheeler 1978: 212). But one year later, as the historian António José Telo (1980 vol. 2: 66-67) tells us, “the integralists were mainly responsible for the outbreak of the 28 May Revolt and for a short period they practically dominated the situation, even though their positions were divided”\(^\text{1}\)\(^\text{6}\).

### 8.3. An Increasingly Interventionist Military

In general terms, the military became more involved in politics after the end of the First World War. As the democrats consolidated Portugal’s Empire in the Versailles

\(^1\)\(^\text{6}\) “Os integralistas foram os principais responsáveis pelo desencadear da revolta a 28 de Maio e houve um curto período em que praticamente conseguiram dominar a situação, embora as posições integralistas se tenham dividido”.

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Peace Conference (Severiano Teixeira 1999: 175), high rank officers returned to Portugal on a wave of prestige and popularity. From 1918, high rank officers on leave presided over almost half of the cabinets and took seats in Parliament, as the people “saw in them the saviours of the country and eagerly supported them against the civilians” (Oliveira Marques 1972: 171-172).

The democrats, however, viewed the military’s soaring reputation with fear. They knew that the military was not entirely devoted to the Republic, especially after the Monarquia do Norte and the Monsanto uprising (see Sections 7.8 and 7.9). As a result, the democrats took advantage of the factionalism that divided the armed forces and played the republican soldiers against the conservative and monarchist soldiers. Unlike other European countries, the PD did not demobilise the conscripted soldiers after the end of the War (see Table 8.1). The conscripted soldiers were originally from the urban centres and more sympathetic to the democrats. They had also played a crucial role in the defeat of the monarchist uprisings in 1919 upon their return from the battlefront. The democrats, as we will see below, feared that a full demobilisation of the militia would result in more unemployment and unrest in the streets and in an effective control of the army by the professional conservative officers. As a result, in 1919, 4,500 regular officers were incorporated in the military cadres as opposed to 2,600 in 1915. In 1921, the 23 November Decree-Law also gave full pay to a large number of militia officers and sergeants integrated in the regular army (Carrilho 1985: 242-243; Costa Pinto 1999: 41; Medeiros Ferreira 1992: 95, 101; Ramos 1994: 612; Telo 1980 vol. 1: 135-136; Wheeler 1978: 181).

Table 8.1 - Size of Regular Portuguese Army. Number of Mobilised Men, 1910-1926.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Mobilised Men</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>12,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1911 | 11,690  
1914 | 12,000  
1920 | 23,000  
1925 | 30,000 (approx.)  
1926 | 27,255  


Such a measure, however, increased dissatisfaction among the professional senior ranks, as their wages took a serious tumble and, when compared to the wages that the democrat-supporting enlisted men received from the state, failed dismally to keep up with inflation (Table 8.2) (Carrilho 1985: 244-246; Costa Pinto 1999: 41; Ramos 1994: 598-599; Telo 1980 vol. 2: 160-161; Wheeler 1978: 111, 189-191). As the historian Oliveira Marques (1972: 174) tells us, “the upper and the middle ranks of the Army (…) had their purchasing power reduced to a half of what it had been in 1910”. In the end, in an attempt to weaken the power of the conservative senior ranks, the democrats managed to push them further into the arms of the nationalist opposition.

**Table 8.2 - Annual Wages in the Military by Rank in Pounds and Escudos (1911, 1925)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>1911</th>
<th>Escudos</th>
<th>1925</th>
<th>Escudos</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General</td>
<td>480</td>
<td>2,400</td>
<td>267</td>
<td>26,786</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonel</td>
<td>264</td>
<td>1,320</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>18,344</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant-Colonel</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>1,044</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>16,416</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>960</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>15,265</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capitan</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>780</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>13,224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>10,998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second-Lieutenant</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>480</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>9,676</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff Sergeant</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>8,314</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sergeant (Primeiro)</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>7,898</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Furthermore, in order to fend off future monarchist uprisings and the corporativist resentment that was increasingly being expressed by the professional officers against the democrats, the PD armed the Republican National Guard (GNR) with heavy weaponry and gave them extensive powers. As a result, from 1919, the GNR “practically made and unmade governments for two years” (Carrilho 1985: 258; Croca Caeiro 1997: 112-113; quote from Oliveira Marques 1972: 172; Telo 1980 vol. 1: 136).

As we saw in Chapter Five, the democrats had created the GNR in 1911 as a republican military police. The GNR was given policing duties (Decree-Law of 3 May 1911, Chapter I). Its members had the same rights and duties as those of the army and its leaders originated from the officer ranks (Decree-Law of 3 May 1911, Chapter I, art. 4). However, as Wheeler explains:

“The GNR did not play the role planned for it in 1911: that of a largely rural police force like Spain’s Guarda Civil. Instead, this small second army was a largely urban force, chiefly in Lisbon, Oporto, and Coimbra, a plaything of streets and barracks politics. For certain periods, the GNR even assumed the role of a Lisbon Praetorian Guard for the government in office. (...) It served as a counterforce for an army of questionable loyalty and ability.” (Wheeler 1978: 186, 203).

Supplied with heavy artillery and a more generous budget, the GNR gained power and influence, while it created resentment and jealousy in the army. Its close
association with the PD also ensured that the corporation enjoyed a more privileged status when compared to the regular army. By 1921, the GNR had reached a prominent position with the Lisbon governments, taking part in coups that restored law and order to the streets and the PD to power. However, the authority of the GNR soon got out of control to the point that even the PD struggled to restrain them. In 1921, democrat Premier Bernardino Machado took a drastic measure. He planned to transfer key officers and reduce heavy armament in order to curtail the increasing power of the GNR. However, when Bernardino Machado dismissed Colonel Liberato Pinto (his predecessor and the GNR’s chief of staff) and the latter was summoned before a military court to answer accusations of misconduct while in command, the GNR rebelled against Bernardino Machado and the Premier was deposed. In the ensuing elections, for the first and only time in the history of the First Republic, the PD only managed to get a minority of the votes. António Granjo, head of the Republican Liberal Party – a new party created out of the unification of the unionist and the evolutionist parties – was appointed Premier of a new liberal government. But the GNR was still not ready to relinquish its powers. On the night of 19 October 1921 the radical leftist faction of the GNR went on a bloody rampage, alongside other radical civilian vigilantes associated with the PD, killing five politicians, including the Premier António Granjo and Naval Commissioner Machado Santos, the “hero” of the 1910 Revolution. From then onwards the number of GNR officers and effectives decreased dramatically, as the PD finally managed to curb their power (Table 8.3) (Croca Caeiro 1997: 113-120; Telo 1980 vol. 1: 244-245; Wheeler 1978 203-206).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of Officers</th>
<th>Total Number of Effectives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1915</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>2,687</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1916</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>2,936</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8.3 - Number of GNR forces (1925-1926)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1917</th>
<th>1918</th>
<th>1919</th>
<th>1920</th>
<th>1921</th>
<th>1922</th>
<th>1923</th>
<th>1924</th>
<th>1925</th>
<th>1926</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>122</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>418</td>
<td>384</td>
<td>417</td>
<td>288</td>
<td>306</td>
<td>312</td>
<td>313</td>
<td>274</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4,429</td>
<td>4,575</td>
<td>11,131</td>
<td>13,187</td>
<td>14,341</td>
<td>9,959</td>
<td>9,627</td>
<td>10,168</td>
<td>10,572</td>
<td>9,787</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Carrilho 1985: 215

In face of a weakened GNR, and convinced by the nationalist opposition that the army had to embody and give expression to the interests of the nation, which were no longer aligned with those of the PD, several radical and conservative *pronunciamentos* shook the Republic, especially between 1924 and 1926 (i.e. 27 April 1924, 4 June 1924, 28 August 1924, 8 September 1924, 5 March 1925, 18 April 1925, 19 July 1925, and 1-2 February 1926) (Carrilho 1985: 261; Ramos 1994: 628; Wheeler 1978: 224, 231). Of these *pronunciamentos* the ones that prepared the conservative groundwork for the successful 28 May Revolution were undisputedly the 18 April and 19 July 1925 uprisings.

On 18 April 1925, several conservative officers, led by reactionary Captain Filomeno da Câmara and monarchist Colonel João Sinel de Cordes, heeded the opposition’s appeal for a military intervention aimed at establishing a short-lived military dictatorship. The army rose against the leftist forces of the Republic, imbued with a sense that they represented the interests and the will of the *nation* rather than of a particular political party. However, their attempt to overthrow the PD ended in disappointment when the GNR, the Lisbon working class and several Lisbon garrisons, still close to the democrats, managed to abort the uprising. On 19 July 1925 another coup, this time led by republican Admiral Mendes Cabeçadas and other officers implicated in the 18 April uprising – who had managed to escape from the Forte de São
Julião da Barra – attacked the PD government. Although, the rebel troops also met the same outcome as their predecessors, their political credibility did not suffer with the failure of the coup (Carrilho 1985: 261; Costa Pinto 1999: 41; Medeiros Ferreira 1992: 114-115; Telo 1980 vol. 2: 95-98, 163-165).

The officers involved in the 18 April and 19 July rebellions were court-martialed in late 1925 but their defence, taken up by former sidonista Premier Tamagnini Barbosa and former golpista and former Premier Captain Cunha Leal – both members of the newly created semi-loyal Nationalist Republican Party – found much sympathy in the streets and in the military tribunal, boosting their popularity and their credentials as the “saviours” of the nation (Carrilho 1985: 261-262; Telo 1980 vol. 2: 86-87; Wheeler 1978: 221). In the course of the judicial proceedings, it was alleged that several members of the jury had themselves been involved in the 18 April uprising, while the defendants used their testimonies to incite future revolts (Telo 1980 vol. 2: 166-167). During the trial, not only the jury, but also the chief prosecutor, General António Óscar Fragoso Carmona, thought the actions of the insurgent officers had been justifiable and worthy of absolution. In fact, Carmona went so far as to declare at the end of the trial, “Their professional records are splendid. Why are they sitting in the dock? Because the Pátria they belong to is sick and charges and sends to trial its dearest children.”

As predicted, the conspirators were acquitted by their military peers and sent back to the barracks as heroes while General Carmona was discharged from the command of the Fourth Army Division by the democrats, pushing him into an effective alignment with the army conspirators (Carrilho 1985: 262; Croca Caeiro 1997: 134; Wheeler 1978: 221-222). The military trials had embodied the symbolic moment when the insubordinate officer

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161 “As folhas de serviço de todos eles são brilhantíssimas. Porque é que se sentam no banco dos réus? É porque a Pátria a que pertencem está doente e manda julgar e acusar os seus filhos mais diléctos”
corps had declared the executive powers of the republic illegitimate and therefore worthy of displacement.

The conservative officers’ determination to push for a third military coup came after the November 1925 general elections, in which several army chiefs ran for a seat in parliament. Filomeno da Câmara and Mendes Cabeçadas ran as members of Cunha Leal and Tamagnini Barbosa’s Nationalist Republican Party, Sinel de Cordes as an independent and Gomes da Costa as a member of the Radical Republican Party. However, although Câmara and Cabeçadas managed to be elected, the fact that the PD won an overwhelming majority convinced the military rebels that the only way for the conservatives to attain power was to overthrow the democrats by force (Castro Leal 1999: 186, Telo 1980 vol. 2: 140-141).

All they had to do was to learn from their past mistakes and play their cards right.

First, they would have to unite all the conservative conspirator that populated the military at the time, republican and monarchist alike, and start a military uprising in the rural areas, where they had the support of the people (Telo 1980 vol. 2: 173-174). As on cue, the 28 May Revolution started in the northern town of Braga, a bastion of Catholicism and conservatism – where incidentally and very symbolically a procession was taking place at the time (Braga da Cruz 1980: 351; Carrilho 1985: 195) – and continued southwards towards Lisbon, which was still perceived as the centre of Portuguese republicanism and anticlericalism.

Secondly, it was understood by the monarchist Sinel de Cordes and the republican Mendes Cabeçadas that all the differences that prevailed among the conservative circles within the military regarding the type of regime (republican vs. monarchist and liberal vs. authoritarian) would have to be tackled later, as the most urgent matter at hand was to put an end to the PD’s hegemonic hold on power and to
“bring prestige to the Pátria” (Quintão Meyreles 1951). In this sense, General Gomes da Costa was invited by the monarchist faction, represented by Sinel de Cordes, to lead the movement (Paxeco 1937: 121-126). He was a republican, but also an integralist sympathiser and a member of the Cruzada and of the Partido Republicano Radical. He was a staunch critic of the First Republic and a First World War hero who commanded the admiration of most officers.

Finally, in order to give the impression that the military coup was a national revolution carried out in the superior interests of the nation, the military conspirators were determined to stay above the rivalries and divisions of the existing political parties by arguing that the revolutionary movement had been strictly planned and carried out by the armed forces (Telo 1980 vol. 2: 180-184). With these elements put in place, the 28 May revolutionaries created a unified front that the democrats were not able to defeat.

8.4. Republic in Crisis: An Assessment of Instability, Inefficiency and Lack of Power

Legitimacy

As Chapters Six and Seven have argued thus far, regarding the crises that led to the end of the First Republic, one can already surmise how the institutionalisation of an anticlerical regime alienated the conservative and pious majority, while the declining prestige and status of the officer corps led to the successful 1926 Revolution.

However, it is important to reiterate how crucial the dominance of the PD was to an increasing sense of political illegitimacy that eventually served as a justification for the overthrow of the regime. From the inception of the First Republic, the PD became an hegemonic force behind a much-divided nation, using every means at its disposal to stay in power (see Sections 5.3 and 5.4). Any electoral attempts by the loyal
conservative parties to wrestle power from the PD by legal means – including the attempts by the moderate Evolutionist Party and Unionist Party, who had dissented from the PD in 1912 – were undermined by the democrats. Even when the evolutionists and the unionists merged and formed the Republican Liberal Party, eventually winning the 1921 elections with 48.5% of the vote – the first time the PD lost its majority in parliament (see Table 5.1) – they were forced out of power by a popular uprising instigated by the GNR and elements associated with the PD, which ended in bloodshed, as we have already mentioned above (Oliveira Marques 1972: 173; Ramos 1994: 623-624; Serra 1999: 126; Telo 1980 vol. 1: 199-200).

In the electoral game, the monarchists and the Catholics were the biggest political losers. They were banned from running in the 1911 and 1913 elections, when the Republican Congress was off limits to Catholic and monarchist parties. Except for Sidónio Pais’s military dictatorship, when they won seats in parliament and became part of an executive coalition, they never enjoyed power on their own as a separate political grouping. Although they managed to elect several members to parliament and to the senate after the 1915 elections, as far as they were concerned, the institutional path to political power was legally hindered by the electoral system, leaving them no other choice, especially in the case of the monarchists and the integralists, but to embrace disloyal means of political intervention (see Table 8.4).

Table 8.4 – Catholic and Monarchist Members of the Republican Assembly after 1915

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Electoral Year</th>
<th>Congress</th>
<th>Catholics</th>
<th>Monarchists</th>
<th>Democrats</th>
<th>Others</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1915</td>
<td>Parliament</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Senate</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1918</td>
<td>Sidonista</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>37 (in coalition with the integralists)</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sidonista</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8 (in coalition with the integralists)</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


As was pointed out elsewhere (Farelo Lopes 1994: 163-164), in a blocked regime, “any attack on the political leaders or on the dominant party tends to turn into an attack on the political system itself. Quarrels over particular policies or particular incumbencies immediately raise fundamental issues of system survival” (Lipset & Rokkan 1967: 4). In the republican context of acute electoral corruption and fiddling (see Section 5.4), it comes as no surprise that the excluded Catholic and monarchist opposition – but mostly the monarchist opposition – became more belligerent against the established authorities and that the Portuguese military, when called upon to intervene, eventually assumed a more forceful attitude whereby displacement of a government in power turned into the supplantment of the whole republican regime (Finer 2002 [1962]: Chapter Eight). The “democratic dictatorship”, as a Portuguese historian calls the First Republic (Pulido Valente 1982), led to an association between the dominant party and the regime itself, resulting in the emergence of a consensual idea within the most conservative sections of society and the military that the only way to displace the first was to overthrow the second by force.

What is more, the fact that the First Republic was plagued by political instability in the shape of a high turnover of governments in power, mostly presided over by the PD or by a coalition including the PD, also contributed greatly to a palpable sense of political illegitimacy, not only among the opposition, but also among the population in relation to the republican parties.
Throughout the First Republic a total of 45 governments were appointed in the space of sixteen years, lasting on average 93 days each (Table 8.5). Of these 45 cabinets, fifty-one per cent were dismissed by parliamentary conflict, through explicit vote of no confidence or scheduled elections; twenty per cent ended through cabinet resignation and thirteen per cent were overthrown by a military coup. The remaining cabinets were dismissed due to popular uprisings, presidential dismissals and the death or assassination of the head of government (Schwartzman 1989: 34-35, 131-132, 135).

Table 8.5 - Presidents, Prime Ministers, Cabinets of the First Republic and Days in Power

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>President of the Republic</th>
<th>Political Party</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Prime Minister</th>
<th>Political Party</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Teófilo Braga (Provisional)</td>
<td>PRP</td>
<td>5 Oct 1910 – 24 Aug 1911</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Teófilo Braga (Provisional)</td>
<td>PRP</td>
<td>5 Oct 1910 – 3 Sep 1911</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Augusto de Vasconcelos</td>
<td>PD</td>
<td>12 Nov 1911 – 16 Jun 1912</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Duarte Leite</td>
<td>PD</td>
<td>16 Jun 1912 – 9 Jan 1913</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Afonso Costa</td>
<td>PD</td>
<td>9 Jan 1913 – 9 Feb 1914</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Bernardino Machado</td>
<td>PD</td>
<td>9 Feb 1914 – 23 Jun 1914</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Bernardino Machado</td>
<td>PD</td>
<td>23 Jun 1914 – 12 Dec 1914</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Vitor Hugo de Azevedo Coutinho</td>
<td>PD</td>
<td>12 Dec 1914 – 23 Jan 1915</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Joaquin Pimenta de Castro</td>
<td>Military</td>
<td>23 Jan 1915 – 14 May 1915</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
<td>José Ribeiro de Castro</td>
<td>PD</td>
<td>17 May 1915 – 18 Jun 1915</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>11</td>
<td>José Ribeiro de Castro</td>
<td>PD</td>
<td>18 Jun 1915 – 29 Nov 1915</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Afonso Costa</td>
<td>PD</td>
<td>29 Nov 1915 – 15 Mar 1916</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>13</td>
<td>António José de Almeida</td>
<td>PD / PRE (União Sagrada)</td>
<td>15 Mar 1916 – 25 Apr 1917</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>14</td>
<td>Afonso Costa</td>
<td>PD</td>
<td>25 Apr 1917 – 8 Dec 1917</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Sidonio Pais</td>
<td>Military-PNR</td>
<td>11 Dec 1917 – 14 Dec 1918</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>16</td>
<td>João do Canto e Castro</td>
<td>PNR</td>
<td>14 Dec 1918 – 23 Dec 1918</td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
<td>17</td>
<td>João Tamagnini Barbosa</td>
<td>PNR</td>
<td>23 Dec 1918 – 7 Jan 1919</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>18</td>
<td>João Tamagnini Barbosa</td>
<td>PNR</td>
<td>7 Jan 1919 – 27 Jan 1919</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>19</td>
<td>José Relvas</td>
<td>Gov. of Concentration</td>
<td>27 Jan 1919 – 30 Mar 1919</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Domingos Pereira</td>
<td>PD</td>
<td>30 Mar 1919 – 29 Jan 1919</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>21</td>
<td>Alfredo Sá</td>
<td>PD</td>
<td>29 Jun 1919 – 21 Jan 1920</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Political Party</td>
<td>Term Start – End</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>António José de Almeida</td>
<td>PRE – PLR</td>
<td>5 Oct 1919 – 5 Oct 1923</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Domingos Pereira</td>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>21 Jan 1920 – 8 Mar 1920</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>António Maria Baptista</td>
<td>PD</td>
<td>8 Mar 1920 – 6 Jun 1920</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>José Ramos Preto</td>
<td>PD</td>
<td>6 Jun 1920 – 26 Jun 1920</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>António Maria da Silva</td>
<td>PD / PS / PP</td>
<td>26 Jun 1920 – 19 Jul 1920</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>António Granjo</td>
<td>PLR / PRRN / PP</td>
<td>19 Jul 1920 – 20 Nov 1920</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Álvaro de Castro</td>
<td>PRRN / PP / PD</td>
<td>20 Nov 1920 – 29 Nov 1920</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>Liberato Pinto</td>
<td>PD / PRRN / PP</td>
<td>29 Nov 1920 – 2 Mar 1921</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>Bernardino Machado</td>
<td>PD / PRRN / PP</td>
<td>2 Mar 1921 – 23 May 1921</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>Tomé de Barros Queirós</td>
<td>PLR</td>
<td>23 May 1921 – 30 Aug 1921</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>António Granjo</td>
<td>PLR</td>
<td>30 Aug 1921 – 19 Oct 1921</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>Manuel Maria Coelho</td>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>19 Oct 1921 – 5 Nov 1921</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>Carlos Maia Pinto</td>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>5 Nov 1921 – 16 Dec 1921</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>Francisco Cunha Leal</td>
<td>PLR</td>
<td>16 Dec 1921 – 6 Feb 1922</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>António Maria da Silva</td>
<td>PD</td>
<td>6 Feb 1922 – 30 Nov 1922</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>António Maria da Silva</td>
<td>PD</td>
<td>30 Nov 1922 – 7 Dec 1922</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>António Maria da Silva</td>
<td>PD</td>
<td>7 Dec 1922 – 15 Nov 1923</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Manuel Teixeira Gomes</td>
<td>PD</td>
<td>5 Oct 1923 – 11 Dec 1925</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>António Ginesdal Machado</td>
<td>PRN</td>
<td>15 Nov 1923 – 18 Dec 1923</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>Álvaro de Castro</td>
<td>PRN / PD / Searistas</td>
<td>18 Dec 1923 – 6 Jul 1924</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>Alfredo Rodrigues Gaspar</td>
<td>PD</td>
<td>6 Jul 1924 – 22 Nov 1924</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>José Domingues dos Santos</td>
<td>PRED</td>
<td>22 Nov 1924 – 15 Feb 1925</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>Vitorino Guimarães</td>
<td>PD</td>
<td>15 Feb 1925 – 1 Jul 1925</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43</td>
<td>António Maria da Silva</td>
<td>PD</td>
<td>1 July 1925 – 1 Aug 1925</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44</td>
<td>Domingos Pereira</td>
<td>PD</td>
<td>1 Aug 1925 – 17 Dec 1925</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Bernardino Machado</td>
<td>PD</td>
<td>11 Dec 1925 – 31 May 1926</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45</td>
<td>António Maria da Silva</td>
<td>PD</td>
<td>17 Dec 1925 – 30 May 1926</td>
<td></td>
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However, as Kathleen Schwartzman (1989: 38-43, 164-170) observes, in the midst of this political instability, it was not so much the constant shifts in power that resulted in a withdrawal of legitimacy from the regime on the part of the people, but the
shifts in policy that accompanied the rise of a new government. In this sense, what was decreed by one cabinet was overruled by the next. For instance, illiterates and the less well-off were given the vote by one government, only to have it removed by a successor; the separation of church and state and the expulsion of religious orders decreed at the beginning of the Republic was revoked by the short-lived dictatorship of Sidónio Pais; taxes levied by one government were abolished by another; and the exchange rate set by one cabinet was reset by another. The 1920s cabinets also followed different financial strategies to tackle the post-war economic crisis. On the one hand, the PD focused on the trade deficit. In their attempt to appease the workers and the civil servants, they levied taxes on industrialists and financiers, raised export barriers, expanded state payroll and increased the circulation of printed money, irritating the bourgeoisie in the process. On the other hand, when the Republican Liberal Party and the Republican Nationalist Party were given a chance to rule (30th, 31st, 34th and 38th cabinets), they invariably implemented a different strategy, making the state budget and the debt crisis their main priorities. As a solution to Portugal’s financial crisis, they advocated a cut in state expenditure. Their time in power was, therefore, always shorter than three months as their financial policies infuriated the urban lower classes who, duly supported by the PD, responded with immediate civilian uprisings. This constant change of social and economic policies aggravated the upper middle class as much as it galvanised the working class.

Furthermore, one can also argue that political factionalism – i.e. the creation of several new political parties loyal to the regime – also contributed to the overthrow of the First Republic. In sixteen years, the party spectrum expanded from one political party, the PRP, to more than twenty political parties and groupings that strived to undermine the democrats’ hegemony. In this respect, it is important to add something to Juan Linz’s theory on the breakdown of democratic regimes (Linz 1978). Linz, himself,
seems to believe that only disloyal or semi-loyal political parties can appropriate the “crisis rhetoric” for political gain. Once the combination of political legitimacy, efficacy (i.e. solutions to the basic problems facing any political system) and effectiveness (i.e. capacity to implement policies with the desired results) is put in jeopardy, the survival of the democratic regime becomes vulnerable – since only a combination of the aforementioned dimensions can maintain the stability of a democratic regime. As a result, a democratic regime breakdown tends to happen when a shift in loyalty by citizens of weak or apolitical commitment – in the face of a crisis of legitimacy, efficacy and effectiveness – strengthens the popularity of the disloyal and semi-loyal oppositions, who in their turn have questioned the existence of the ruling regime by appropriating a rhetoric of crisis. Through a variety of extra-legal means and an intense and effective mobilisation process, the disloyal and semi-loyal oppositions can then take power or at least divide the allegiance of the population. In Linz’s own words (1978: 50), democracy “breakdown is a result of processes initiated by the governments’ incapacity to solve problems for which disloyal oppositions offer themselves as a solution”.

Having said that, in the case of the First Republic, it is important to note that loyal opposition parties also used the same rhetoric of crisis in order to win elections. Republican middle and working class factions split into several opposition parties, who although loyal to the regime in power, inadvertently contributed to a growing sense of illegitimacy that eventually resulted in the demise of the First Republic (see Diagram 8.1.). No sooner had the republican constitution been approved, those conservative elements who were mostly involved in the 1910 Revolution were the first ones to disassociate themselves from the revolutionary and increasingly radical PRP. As we saw in Section 5.4., the PRP’s internal split began in 1912, when moderate and conservative factions of the Republican Party formed the Unionist Party (PUR) and the
Evolutionist Party (PRE). However, in 1919, yet another conservative faction of the now renamed Democratic Party seceded and joined the Republican Liberal Party (PLR), which was created after the unionists merged with the evolutionists. In 1920, another conservative faction of the PD broke with the party and founded the National Reconstitution’s Republican Party (PRRN). This party later joined the Republican Liberal Party and Sidónio Pais’s semi-loyal Republican National Party (PNR) – which maintained the dictator’s legacy alive after his assassination – and formed the semi-loyal Nationalist Republican Party (PRN). This party was created with the sole purpose of defeating the Democratic Party in the general elections in order to bring the conservatives back to power. On the left spectrum, the radical Radical Republican Party (PRR) was created in 1922 by the former evolutionist Alberto da Veiga Simões who converged under the same political umbrella the outubristas and the Popular Party. Their purpose was to shift the republic towards the left, establishing a de facto socialist programme of government (Castro Leal 2008). In 1925, yet another left faction of the PD seceded, and formed the Democratic Left’s Republican Party (PRED) led by the former Premier José Domingues do Santos.
Diagram 8.1 - Political Fractionalism during the First Republic

Based on Oliveira Martins (1972) & Telo (1980). The diagram aims to show the fractionalism of the political parties as well as the political spectrum in which each party falls by way of indentation. Regarding this, it is important to bear in mind that this sort of political diagram may not present the most accurate picture of the extremist or moderate approach pursued by each party. Rather the aim is to provide a broad illustration of where each party falls within the political spectrum. Note: Outubristas and União Cívica resembled more a political grouping rather than a political party.
All in all, several political parties were created from PRP secessionist factions – most of these after the First World War had worsened a major economic crisis – showing that, contrary to what Linz argued, not only “disloyal” or “semi-loyal” parties (e.g. PRN) can appropriate the crisis rhetoric in their quest for power, but parties “loyal” to the regime (e.g. PUR, PRE, PLR, PRRN, PRR and PRED) can also aggravate an already palpable crisis of political efficacy by using an inflamed rhetoric of national decadence to dislodge the hegemonic party from power.

It is also important to bear in mind that, due to practices of caciquismo and gerrymandering (see Section 5.4), the loyal, disloyal and semi-loyal oppositions did not have a strong electoral backing during the First Republic – not even after the First World War, when they ruled over short-lived cabinets. Nor did they have, for that matter, the support of the working class which tended to side with the PD and the labour unions in moments of political agitation. Contrary to what Linz argues, the fact that the PD was neither able to bring solutions to the basic problems facing the political system nor to implement economic policies that would bring prosperity to the country, did not diminish the apparent popularity of the party at the polls. In May 1926, the party was still in power, as it had been for most of the First Republic, ruling alone or in coalition with other parties.

Furthermore, neither did the PD’s dismal political performance translate into a shift in loyalty among “citizens of weak or apolitical commitment”. A shift in partisan loyalty took place only among those who were already politicised and associated with the PD, namely the working class in the last year of the Republic; while a need to intervene and change the political course of the country grew among senior officers, duly instigated by the militant reactionaries and the integralists, as we have already seen.
Ultimately, the PD’s monopoly on power ended with a military coup, as the First Republic, and the party mostly associated with it, the PD, lost legitimacy in the eyes of the common urban working class citizen who, despite his strong republican ideals, remained neutral when senior officers and reactionaries overthrew the regime.

So why did the staunchest allies of the PD not react to the demise of the First Republic?

The most obvious answer that springs to mind is the fact that in an age of pronunciamentos, the working class (and all the other loyal and semi-loyal parties), were convinced that the military coup of 28 May 1926 was just another praetorian demonstration of dissatisfaction with political instability and popular unrest. After all other unsuccessful attempts had been pursued between 1924 and 1926, in order to bring the conservatives or the left radicals to power. They thought that once the democrats had been overthrown and a new republican government had been appointed, the interventionist goal would have been achieved and the military would retire to the barracks.

However, other reasons are also important to bear in mind. Throughout the First Republic, the working class saw the cost of living increase exponentially (Table 8.6.), unemployment soar and their leaders persecuted and oppressed to the point that in 1925 the labour unions were left powerless and a shadow of what they used to be.

Table 8.6 - Cost of Living by Year (1914-1926)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Index</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1914</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1915</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1916</td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1917</td>
<td>162</td>
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<tr>
<td>1918</td>
<td>293</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1919</td>
<td>317</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>552</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>817</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1922</td>
<td>1,128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1923</td>
<td>1,720</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1924</td>
<td>2,652</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925</td>
<td>2,286</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926</td>
<td>2,148</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Schwartzman (1989: 155)
The democrats had hoped that Portugal’s entry in the war would improve the economic situation of the country by securing financial help from Britain and war reparations from the defeated states (see Section 7.2.). However, at Versailles, despite Portugal’s request for a sum to cover the economic expenses and damages inflicted by the war (£342 million), the democrats only managed to secure a small portion of what they had requested (£37 million) (Costa 1976: 396-398; Schwartzman 1989: 157, Severiano Teixeira 1999: 175). As a result, the country was not able to pay its foreign debt, which was aggravated by a galloping trade deficit and inflation that outpaced salary rises (Telo 1980 vol. 1: 106). In order to cope with a shortage of cash, the PD cabinets of the 1920s continued to secure further foreign credits and increase monetary circulation, contributing to a debt, production, market, state deficit and currency exchange crisis (Table 8.7) (Ramos 1994: 597-601; Schwartzman 1989: 158, 154).

**Table 8.7 - Value of the British Pound in Portuguese Escudos (Based on Average Monthly Escudo-Pound Exchange)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Exchange</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Exchange</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1919</td>
<td>167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>1920</td>
<td>396</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1912</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>1921</td>
<td>804</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1913</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>1922</td>
<td>1,377</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1914</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>1923</td>
<td>2,169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1915</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>1924</td>
<td>2,661</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1916</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>1925</td>
<td>2,272</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1917</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>1926</td>
<td>1,899</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1918</td>
<td>157</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Schwartzman (1989: 156)

Facing economic chaos, the democratic governments were quick to make some concessions to the labour movement immediately after the Monsanto uprising had been crushed with their help – e.g. anarcho-syndicalists who had been arrested after the 18
November 1918 general strike were released from prison; a Ministry of Labour was established; the 8-hour day was introduced; salary raises were announced; and a socialist politician was appointed Minister of Labour (Freire 2002; Telo 1980 vol. 1: 146-147, 165). However, as the working class continued to be afflicted by the post-war economic crisis, crowds of famished workers ransacked shops and warehouses, while the Red Legion, a small anarchist terrorist group created in 1919, unleashed a series of bomb attacks in Lisbon that would continue until 1925 (Telo 1980 vol. 1: 154-155, 159, 322-323). Strikes reached a peak in 1919 (Table 8.8), as large numbers of workers joined the General Confederation of Labour (CGT). It is estimated that by 1922-1923, 130,000 manufacturing workers had joined the CGT (Telo 1980 vol. 1: 154-159).

The democratic governments, unable to control the labour movement through their alliance with the Socialist Party – who had little influence over the proletariat – reacted with brutal repression in order to reassure the trade associations. The CGT was temporarily shut down, its newspapers censured and its leaders and militants deported or arrested (Freire 1999; Freire 2002; Telo 1980 vol. 1: 151-155, 179, 336-342). By the end of 1924, the PD governments had abandoned their policy of concessions to the labour movement and the labour unionists became demoralised, divided and weak (Telo 1980 vol. 1: 162). The CGT lost power and the monopoly over the workers’ movement. Internal disagreements between radical anarchists and moderates led to the secession of several trade unions from the CGT. They sought ideological refuge in the small and equally divided Communist Party (Freire 1999; Freire 2002; Telo 1980 vol. 1: 171-176, 329-336). In 1924, the CGT had 90,000 members only and their strikes, although high in number, no longer drew the same numbers as previously, while workers, exhausted by years of labour conflict, retreated in their demands and accepted solutions proposed by industry owners (Schwartzman 1989: 182-183; Telo 1980 vol. 1: 154, 315).
### Table 8.8 - Number of Strikes by Year (1910-1925)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Strikes</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Strikes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>1918</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>1919</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1912</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>1920</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1913</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>1921</td>
<td>10</td>
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<tr>
<td>1914</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1922</td>
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<tr>
<td>1915</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1923</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1916</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1924</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1917</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>1925</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Despite the weakness of the labour movement, after the failure of the 18 April 1925 coup, the PD made the workers the scapegoat of the conservative uprising and in the process managed to alienate even more one of its erstwhile class supporters. Although several labour unionists had taken up arms against the conservative *golpistas*, the democrats unleashed a wave of repression against the unions with the aim of putting an end to the most radical expressions of labour activism. The PD thought that by cracking down on labour radicalism, namely anarcho-syndicalism, they would be able to appease the conservatives and remain in power, as the latter accused the government of not being able to control the attacks perpetrated by the radical Red Legion against several oligarchs.

However, the PD’s strategy backfired once it turned its attention to moderate labour unionists. The democratic cabinet deported not only dozens of anarchists, but also CGT leaders, to the Azores Islands and to Portuguese Guinea and arrested hundreds more. By July 1925, the moderate CGT newspaper, *A Batalha*, declared the
Prime Minister António Maria da Silva “the noble enemy of the working class” (Telo 1980 vol. 2: 103-116). As the Portuguese historian António José Telo summarises:

“[From 1925] Until the establishment of the military dictatorship, one would not see anymore the unions appealing for the defence of the Republic and the workers taking up arms in the streets, as happened on 18 April. On the contrary. The labour press took the dominant position that whatever happened could never be worse than what already existed. (...) The Democratic Party’s futile attempt to once again win over the petite bourgeoisie, fearful of labour terrorism, consciously consummated the estrangement of the organised proletariat.”163 (Telo 1980 vol. 2: 108).

Finally, following the brutal repression of the labour unions, two scandals managed to undermine any remaining confidence that the struggling working class might have had in the ruling establishment, crystallising the unions’ disassociation from the regime. In December 1925, the PD government was struck with a “bombshell of embarrassment” when the Angola-based entrepreneur Alves Reis convinced the official government currency printer, an English firm, that he represented the Bank of Portugal and asked them to print two million pounds worth of escudo notes. The notes were supposed to have the word “Angola” overprinted on them so that Alves Reis could use them for his personal benefit in his own bank, Angola e Metropole. However, the overprinting was never done and the notes ended up being circulated in Portugal. When the UIE’s mouthpiece, O Século, revealed the scandal, the democrats in power,

163 “Até à implantação da ditadura militar não mais se veria, como aconteceria a 18 de Abril, os sindicatos apelarem para a defesa da República e os operários saírem para a rua com as armas de ocasião. Pelo contrário. O espírito dominante na imprensa sindical passa a ser o de que venha o que vier nunca poderá ser pior do que o que já existe. (...) O Partido Democrático ao tentar inutilmente reconquistar a pequena burguesia atemorizada pelo terrorismo operário, tinha consumado conscientemente o divórcio com o proletariado organizado”.
oblivious to what Alves Reis had done, suffered a terrible backlash as accusations of corruption and mismanagement of the colonial affairs were hurled at the Premier from all sectors of society, including the labour unions (Wheeler 1978: 229-230).

A couple of months later, in April 1926, another scandal struck the democrat government. The tobacco monopoly, an arrangement by which a company, at the time the Burnay & C.ª, processed all tobacco under a legal agreement with the government, was due to expire. In February 1926, the democrat Minister of Finance proposed a government monopoly over the production and sale of tobacco to replace the then current arrangement. The opposition in the Assembly immediately attacked the proposal by using the same argument that the PRP, curiously enough, had used during the Tobacco Question in 1906 (see Section 4.3): a government monopoly would only benefit the party in power (i.e. the PD), increasing its political leverage through an extended network of clientelism and revenue. The opposition feared that if the tobacco monopoly was left in the hands of the ruling party, they would never be able to form a government (Wheeler 1978: 233).

After a heated debate in the Assembly, the PD forsook the intention of seeking a vote on the proposal and instead issued a ministerial order by which the government monopoly was instituted on 1 May 1926. In the face of this arbitrary act, the left opposition and the unions questioned the PD’s democratic credentials and abandoned their campaign against the dangers of an imminent fascist dictatorship. Rather, alongside the nationalist and moderate oppositions, they started appealing in early May 1926 for a military intervention that would put an end to the democrats’ dictatorship. Although the left (e.g. PRED, CGT) and the social classes they represented would largely remain neutral during the revolution, after the Tobacco Question, their political
slogan had become “resignation of the government or revolution”\(^\text{164}\) (Queirós 2008: 159-169; Wheeler 1978: 233; Ramos 1994: 148-150).

8.5. The Overthrow of the First Republic: An Exclusive Military Revolution? The Revolutionary Conservative Coalition

When the Revolution came on 28 May 1926, the democrats were left alone to fend for themselves and for the first time in sixteen years almost no one rose up in arms to defend them. Even though the Communist Party still called for a general strike against the revolutionary coup, most of the unions had become indifferent to the conservative attacks against the regime in power (Queirós 2008: 166-170; Telo 1980 vol. 2: 111-112). The CGT adopted a neutral stand for five days and then eventually declared a general strike, which was sparsely attended. General withdrawal of support and legitimacy from the Republic had eventually resulted in massive apathy when the armed forces, overseen by Colonel Sinel de Cordes, marched on Lisbon under the command of General Gomes da Costa and Admiral Mendes Cabeçadas.

In contrast to the indifference of most of the working class to the revolution, the reactionary civilian movements (i.e. Integralismo Lusitano, UIE and the Cruzada Nuno Álvares Pereira), closely associated with the rebel conspirators, participated actively in the course of events. However, in accordance with one of the lessons learned by the revolutionaries from their previously failed military coups, the involvement of civilians in the 28 May revolutionary coup was not acknowledged officially until 1937. A few weeks after the First Republic had been overthrown, some of the military protagonists, namely General Costa Gomes and his integralist supporters in the military, attempted to

\(^{164}\) “Demissão do governo ou revolução”.
cast a different version of who had been involved in the preparation and execution of the coup, refusing to mention any civilian participation. General Gomes da Costa, who started a march against the Republic from Braga to Lisbon and was seen as the true leader of the coup d’état and the front man of the “Integralist inner core” (Wheeler 1978: 242), was adamant to keep any mention of civilians out of the revolution. The goal was to give the impression that the nation could only find salvation if it allied itself with the military’s “best talents”, which were lacking among the civilian politicians. This was a solution that General Gomes da Costa and his partisans were convinced was in the best interests of the nation, as his Revolutionary Proclamation suggested:

“Portuguese! The Nation wants a national military government, surrounded by the best talents, in order to bring to the state administration, the discipline and honor lost long ago… It wants a strong government which has as its mission to save the Fatherland” (28 May 1926 Braga Proclamation, General Manuel Gomes da Costa cited in Wheeler 1978: 234)

Gomes da Costa’s reluctance, nonetheless, created a schism between him and the moderate co-conspirator Admiral Mendes Cabeçadas, who had attacked the Republic from the outskirts of Lisbon. This eventually resulted in the Cabeçadas downfall once the Military Dictatorship was declared (Medeiros Ferreira 1992: 117-119; Wheeler 1978: 242). After toppling Mendes Cabeçadas, Gomes da Costa was able to officialise his version of events in order to legitimise his short-lived rise to power (June-July 1926) (Medeiros Ferreira 1992: 144).

The idea that the 1926 Revolution was exclusively conducted by the military, above partisan politics, was also further propagated by the Military Dictatorship (1926-1933). The aim was to legitimise what its supporters saw as the glorious deed
perpetrated by the brave military men “at the service of the pátria” who rose above political factionalism and division in order to bring “dignity to power” and “prestige to the country” (Quintão Meyreles 1951). A country which, according to the official account of events, had been condemned to an inevitable death by the immoral and corrupt civilian politicians of the First Republic (e.g. 1936 Celebration of the 1926 National Revolution, Exposição Comemorativa: X Ano da Revolução Nacional).

However, in 1937 a list compiled by a Diário da Manhã journalist, Óscar Paxeco (1937), provided for the first time the civilian names of those who had intervened in the military coup, showing that the “official” version espoused by the Military Dictatorship was very incomplete. It should be noted, however, that Paxeco’s book was published with the official support of the then established New State regime at a time when Salazar had reached the pinnacle of his political recognition as a legitimate statesman. As Wheeler (1978: 234) notes, “praise for Dr. Salazar as the true ‘savior’ of the 1926 Revolution was clearly one of the motives behind publishing Óscar Paxeco’s official approved collection of interviews with the coup participants”.

Although the New State regime did not dispute the patriotic intentions of the Revolution, some saw it as lacking “a great leader or idea, which was rescued by the expertise of Dr. Salazar”. Paxeco’s book defended this stance by providing a more encompassing interpretation of past events that took into consideration the role played by civilians in the conspiracy plans and in the events on the ground, hitherto left unmentioned.

Although Paxeco’s historical source might sound dubious to some, due to its political connotations, it nevertheless sheds light on the contribution given by opposition movements to the success of the 1926 Revolution, namely Integralismo Lusitano. In the present-day historiography, this version of events is also corroborated in several scholars’ works, which tend to affirm that any claim that the military acted
alone is reductionist and does not provide a complete assessment of the situation. In this sense, the works published by scholars of the First Republic, such as Oliveira Marques (1972), António José Telo (1980), Costa Pinto (1994) and Manuel Braga da Cruz (1986) have validated Óscar Paxeco’s claim.

In his book, Paxeco (1937) starts by saying that, “The revolution was initially supported by several factions, anarcho-syndicalists, and Catholics, as well as seareiros, integralistas, conservative republicans and monarchists, but” – so he went on to explain why the civilians had been forgotten – “their leaders were successively devoured (first Cabeçadas and then Gomes da Costa), until stability was achieved with General Óscar Carmona, the former prosecutor of the 1925 rebels, largely due to the support granted by the Minister of Finance, Oliveira Salazar, who gradually emerged as the true leader”.

Among the most prominent civilian conspirators named by Óscar Paxeco were Cunha Leal, Francisco Rolão Preto and Henrique Trindade Coelho. Cunha Leal, as we have already mentioned, was a former sidonista and a former army captain (Carrilho 1985: 262), who had been involved in the failed December 1918 coup. He was appointed Prime Minister between December 1921 and February 1922. At the time of the Revolution he was the leader of the Republican Liberal Union, a republican conservative party created in the months that preceded the revolution after the PD won the 1925 general elections once again, and who counted with Admiral Mendes Cabeçadas among its members.

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165 “The coup of 28 May 1926 was not only a military intervention of the praetorian kind in the political life [of the country]. It was not the established military hierarchy that decided to overthrow another government, but an heterogeneous coalition of military men with the unfailing support of several parties and pressure groups” (Costa Pinto 1994: 67). “O golpe de Estado de 28 de Maio de 1926 não foi apenas uma intervenção militar de tipo pretoriano na vida política. Não foi a hierarquia militar estabelecida que decidiu derrubar mais um governo, mas uma coligação heterogênea de militares, com o apoio decidido de diversos partidos e grupos de pressão.”

166 “A revolução recebeu inicialmente apoio de variadas fações, de anarco-sindicalistas a católicos, passando por seareiros, integralistas, republicanos conservadores e monárquicos, mas cujos líderes foram sucessivamente devorados (primeiro Cabeçadas e depois Gomes da Costa), até se atingir a estabilidade com Carmona, muito devido ao apoio do Ministro das Finanças, Oliveira Salazar que, pouco a pouco, emergiu como verdadeiro líder”.
Rolão Preto, as we saw earlier, was involved in the foundation of Integralismo Lusitano. He replaced Hipólito Raposo as the editor of *A Monarquia* and joined the IL effectively in 1922. He wrote the revolutionary manifesto distributed in Braga at the start of the military uprising, which promised the end of party politics and the establishment of national representation of all living forces. His peers, Hipólito Raposo, Pequito Rebelo and Afonso Lucas also masterminded the so-called “28th May Retroactive Programme”, published a few days later (*O Século*, 14 June 1926). This revolutionary programme introduced the corporativist political system of government that the integralists were keen to see Gomes da Costa impose on the country. It is also important to note that Gomes da Costa ceded an interview to integralist Manuel Múrias in the latter’s house on the eve of the Revolution before making his way to Braga – where the barracks were dominated by integralists – alongside the integralist Lieutenant Pinto Correia, his field adjutant. Furthermore, several integralist civilians were involved in the 28 May Revolution, “as messengers, agents of lição [liaison officers], and press propagandists”. Some of them, as we said earlier, such as Manuel Múrias, Pedro Theotónio and Marcello Caetano, would later assume important positions in the political structures of the New State regime (Croca Caeiro 1997: 137-138 and footnote 18; Castro Leal 1999: 211; Ramos 1994: 613; Telo 1980 vol. 2: 178; Wheeler 1978: 236-237, 239).

Trindade Coelho was one of the founders of Cruzada Nuno Álvares Pereira. He instigated the military to intervene by using his newspaper, *O Século*, which was also the mouthpiece of the UIE. Trindade Coelho’s reports prepared the public opinion for the imminent revolution. Even democrat Prime Minister António Maria da Silva was aware of the 28 May conspiracy (Cunha Leal 1967: 458).

As for the revolutionary officers, they were not immune to ideological influence either, as their association with conservative political movements attested. As we saw
above, Admiral Mendes Cabeçadas was a member of Cunha Leal’s Nationalist Republican Party/Republican Liberal Union and General Gomes da Costa was a member of the Radical Republican Party. The revolutionaries Colonel Sinel de Cordes and General Luís Charters de Azevedo, another golpista, were monarchists. They had the support of the Causa Monárquica and the backing of Dom Manuel II to intervene in the conservative uprising, while the first was also linked to Integralismo Lusitano, being considered an integralist by the American historian, Douglas Wheeler (1978: 238). Both were part of the main faction of the military that masterminded the conspiracy. However, since the Portuguese army was largely republican by 1926, the monarchist faction knew that their support for the reestablishment of the monarchy had to be downplayed in favour of a more nationalist approach to the coup d’état (Telo 1980 vol. 2: 167). With that goal in mind, Sinel de Cordes said that “under no circumstances should he [Sinel de Cordes] appear to be the chief, even if accidentally, as his monarchist faith would only bring harm [to the conspiracy plans]” (Sinel de Cordes cited in Telo 1980 vol. 2: 171).

As a result, the monarchists chose to abandon any initiatives that did not include other non-democratic factions of the military, which also held grudges against the regime, while they appointed a republican General, Gomes da Costa, as their poster man (Croca Caeiro 1997: 137-138). It was another lesson that the monarchist officer corps had learned from previously failed conspiracies as we saw earlier in the Chapter. If this coup was going to be successful, they needed to yield some ground on the divisive ideological front that still assailed the military in favour of a more encompassing strategy that had the “fair interests” of the Portuguese at heart. As General Charters de Azevedo told Paxeco (1937: 121-126):

167 “(...) em caso algum deveria aparecer como chefe, mesmo acidentalmente, porque a sua profissão de fé monárquica só poderia prejudicar [a conspiração]”.

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“I served the objectives of the movement: to establish a nationalist regime that would free the country from the democratic yoke and that would give all Portuguese victims of the demagogic dictatorship, whether they were republicans or monarchists, their fair reparation. With that goal in mind, one would establish a Military Dictatorship of the transitory and purging kind, consequently of short rule, before consulting the country so that the latter could freely choose the government it wanted.”

It should be noted, however, that not only the military insurgents were involved with several political parties of opposition. They were also keen to get their support. During the conspiracy process, for instance, when the monarchist officers were still looking for a “republican hero” to be the face of the Revolution, they approached Cunha Leal, the leader of the conservative party in opposition, even before they approached their republican army comrades. Their aim was to include the civilians in their conspiratorial efforts and to build a bridge between both spheres so as to ensure that a true nationalist movement was set in motion. In the words of Cunha Leal (1967: 456):

“(…) the monarchist leader Aires de Ornelas (…) categorically proposed that we congregated our efforts in order to overthrow the government in a revolutionary action. I asked him, then, what would happen after a possible, if not probable, victory. His irrevocable answer: ‘after that, after that, whoever holds the best cards plays the deck. My answer: ‘As I’m sure that you, gentlemen, are better organised than we are, in these conditions I am reluctant to join the game’.”

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168 “(…) eu servia os objectivos do movimento: implantar um regime nacionalista que libertasse o pais do jugo democrático e desse a todos os portugueses vítimas de injustiças da ditadura demagógica, quer eles fossem republicanos ou monárquicos, a reparação a que tivessem jus. Para isso far-se-ia uma Ditadura Militar de aspecto transitório e função depuradora, por consequência de curta direcção, depois do que se consultaria o País para que este escolhesse livremente o governo que quisesse…”
the following day I summoned Mendes Cabeçadas to let him know of this suggestive conversation”\textsuperscript{169}.

What ensued between Cunha Leal and Mendes Cabeçadas was the realisation that they would have to join the monarchist and integralist officers in their conspiratorial plans, if they wanted to ensure that the imminent coup was to remain a republican uprising. By opening a second flank of the military attack in the capital’s outskirts, they took their place in the revolutionary effort. Unsurprisingly, their decision was welcomed by the monarchists.

Thus two factions of the revolution came to the fore.

“A Republican one, with Republican armed-forces officers in the lead, which proposed to ‘save the country’ by means of financial reforms and a cleanup of corruption and waste, with a continuation of civil liberties. The leader of this element of the conspiracy was the naval commander, hero of the Fifth of October 1910 Revolution, Cabeçadas. A second element was essentially an Integralist army and navy officers’ conspiracy, which planned to reform the government using the ‘sword’ of the armed forces. This group planned a thorough curtailment of civil liberties including the closing of parliament and the employment of censorship. The question of whether Portugal should be a republic or a monarchy, they left open for discussion.” (Wheeler 1978: 237-238)

\textsuperscript{169} “(…) o chefe monárquico Aires de Ornelas (...) fez-me a categórica proposta de congregarmos esforços no sentido da queda do Governo por uma acção revolucionária. Perguntei-lhe, então, o que é que se seguiria a uma vitória sempre possível, se não provável. Resposta terminante do interpelado: “depois, depois, quem melhores as tiver, melhor as jogue. Ao que retorqui: “como estou certo de que os senhores têm uma organização melhor do que a nossa, nessas condições não me abalanço a entrar nesse jogo. (…) no dia seguinte convoquei Mendes Cabeçadas para lhe dar conta desta minha sugestiva conversação.”
In the end, the second faction won the ideological battle. As mentioned above, on 17 June 1926, Cabeçadas was ousted by the integralists using Gomes da Costa as their front man. A few days later, Gomes da Costa met the same destiny. In spite of the fact that he had aligned himself with the integralists, he was still a member of the left-leaning Radical Party. As a consequence, the integralists came to believe he had no “desire or competence to institute a complete Integralist program” (Wheeler 1978: 242). Gomes da Costa was eventually toppled and sent into exile in the Azores Islands. On 9 July, General Carmona became Prime Minister and Sinel de Cordes was appointed Minister of Defence (Wheeler 1978: 243). A more conservative phase of the Military Dictatorship ensued before Salazar rose to power and proceeded to purge the regime of any overtly integralist members that refused to be assimilated into his new Catholic version of the Portuguese republican nation.

However, it was not only an attempt to bridge the differences between the military and political opposition movements that attested to an existing alliance between both spheres in the conspiratorial plans that led to the overthrow of the First Republic. As we saw above, one should also be careful when dismissing the role played by the labour unions on 28 May 1926, especially when their actions ensured the success of the revolution. The labour unions either remained neutral or helped the insurgents by calling strikes, as was the case of the railway, telegraph and post-office unions. They “refused to transmit governmental orders by telephone and telegram” (Wheeler 1978: 241). They sabotaged several railways in an effort to isolate the capital from the rest of the country so that the assault on the democratic stronghold could be done without the interference of loyal republican troops stationed in the outskirts (Wheeler 1978: 241).

This in itself is very interesting, especially if one takes into consideration the fact that, all over Europe, liberal regimes were being overthrown as a backlash against the emergence of workers’ organisations that brought much tumult and upheaval to the
lives of the middle-class. In the case of Portugal, as we saw earlier, labour confrontation was on the decrease after a post-war high in the years that preceded the revolution. As Schwartzman (1989: 182-183) remarks, in the eve of the Revolution, the working class was not on the offensive, but rather on the defensive.

As a result of the unification of conservative forces, the neutral stance adopted by the leftist forces and the general disenchantment felt by the most liberal sections of the middle-class, the Republic was overthrown with no bloodshed, which in its turn facilitated public approval of the Revolution (*The New York Times*, 31 May 1926, “Not a Shot Fired in Revolt”)

8.6. Conclusion

In light of everything that was said above, it is important to bear in mind that civilian opposition movements, namely those that espoused an alternative nationalist ideology that differed from the official nationalist discourse, need to be brought into the equation when studying the 1926 Revolution. Among these civilian movements, Integralismo Lusitano played a decisive part in the coalition formed between the military and the conservative forces that were dissatisfied with the ruling regime, as they produced a strong ideological framework that served as a political alternative to the First Republic. IL’s political importance appears, at first glance, to have been of no consequence, once the New Regime was established, as the incoming regime neither established a monarchy nor personified power strongly, preferring to institutionalise it around a dominant party, the National Union (Braga da Cruz 1986: 59-72; F. Martins 2004, 2009, Telo 1980 vol. 1: 59). However, it is important to note the relevance that

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170 “(...) the only shot fired was that fired by a desperate young army lieutenant who committed suicide when he saw that the revolt was victorious (...); other military casualties were three deaths in road accidents” (Wheeler 1978: 243).
Integralismo Lusitano – as an ideological group (Phase One), turned into a political movement (Phase Two), turned into a revolutionary conspirator (Phase Three) – had in shaping the preparation and the outcome of the 1926 Revolution and the importance the nationalist movement had in providing an ideological basis for the New State Regime (1933-1974), defined elsewhere as an “integralist republic” (Medina 1979).

The New State regime that succeeded the Military Dictatorship (1926-1933) was characterised by several integralist political principles. For the first time, Portugal was defined as a “National State”, “social and corporative”. The ideology of the authoritarian regime lay in anti-democratic nationalism, traditionalism and on social corporativism – the same doctrinal elements espoused by the integralists. In the political manifesto that launched the National Union party in 1930, as Braga da Cruz (1986: 62-72) points out, the integralist doctrine was also represented in the defining basis of the incoming New State regime. The power of the state was limited by morals and law; the family core was considered a “primary political element crucial to the preservation, discipline and progress of the Nation”[171]; the executive power was granted the utmost strength and authority; and the administrative power was meant to be gradually decentralised in favour of the widest functions possible, exercised by the municipalities.

The same might not be said of the Catholics though. Despite the repression they suffered at the hands of the PRP/PD, those affiliated with the Academic Centres of Christian Democracy (CADC) and the Catholic Union (see Section 6.3) maintained a non-revolutionary attitude throughout the First Republic and the 28 May coup d’état. This is an interesting fact in itself, as these Catholic centres represented part of the people who were persecuted by the Republic, yet tended to be the most apathetic to the regime. However, once the Catholic Union was asked by the leaders of the Military Dictatorship to serve in their cabinets, they became a crucial part of the political life of

[171] “(...) elemento político primário da conservação, disciplina e progresso da Nação”.
the country. Under the supervision of one of its most prominent members, António de Oliveira Salazar, the Catholics’ version of who and what constituted the Portuguese nation, slowly but surely, became the official nationalism of the New State regime alongside some ideological traits of Integralismo Lusitano as we saw above (i.e. the organicist, traditionalist and Catholic nation whose interests were represented by a corporativist assembly).

True to his CADC roots, Salazar was determined that the question of the regime should be secondary to the “reconstruction” of the nation in face of the economic and social problems that still troubled the country. In this respect, and to the irritation of the integralists, he maintained the republican principle in the new constitutional order and a façade of democratic legitimacy by holding the electoral principle in conjunction with the corporativist principle of state organisation (Braga da Cruz 1986: 67-72).

In 1932, when King Dom Manuel II died, Salazar refused to recognise the legitimist contender, Dom Duarte Nuno, as the heir to the throne, making clear that he had no intention of restoring the Monarchy. Rather, he invited the monarchist forces to join the legal institutions of the state and to work alongside the conservative republicans for the nationalist rehabilitation of Portugal (Braga da Cruz 1986: 63-65). As was mentioned earlier, several members of the Catholic Union and Integralismo Lusitano were co-opted by the civilian dictatorship, taking place in the official cadres of the new regime. However, their process of assimilation did not go smoothly. The monarchist question and the personalisation of power by Salazar continued to raise much contention between both Catholic movements, eventually resulting in the persecution and exile of several old integralists and in the disbandment of JCIL after 1933. Rolão Preto and Alberto Monsaraz still maintained a ferocious opposition to the new regime as leaders of the disloyal national-syndicalist Blue Shirts movement, but by 1935 their
members had either been assimilated by the National Union, arrested or sent into exile (Costa Pinto 1994).
The purpose of this thesis was to study Portugal’s early twentieth century regime overthrows from the point of view of the nationalism literature, taking into consideration a three-phased theoretical framework devised with that goal in mind.

The existing literature on nationalism has overlooked the role played by opposition nationalist movements in the demise of ruling regimes in homogeneous, but ideologically divided, nation-states. The literature on nationalism has largely assumed that “genuine” nation-states, such as Portugal, have been characterised by political, intellectual and historical uniformity due to its ethnic, linguistic and cultural homogeneity. Portugal is a case of a homogeneous nation-state, where the state political boundaries have coincided with the ethnic boundaries since medieval times. However, when Portugal entered the age of modern nationalism in the late nineteenth century, the country was confronted with an unresolved ideological issue that had been latent since the 1828-1834 Civil War. John Hutchinson (2005) claims that clashing interpretations of a past event may give rise to different conceptions of the same nation, thus turning it into an internal subject of discord. During the 1828-1834 Civil War, two opposing ideologies, absolutism and liberalism, siding with two factions of the royal family, fought for power. Although liberalism triumphed in the end, the conflict created an ideological divide that continued until the twentieth century and served as the basis for the emergence of two anti-systemic nationalist projects. In order to understand Portugal’s regime overthrows in early twentieth century, one needs to take into consideration the fact that even though Portugal has been defined as an homogeneous
nation-state with no apparent historical and political divisions in its conceptualisation of the nation, the 1828-1834 Civil War produced the ideological background for the emergence of two opposition nationalisms – a republican nationalism and an integralist nationalism – that aimed to redefine the state conceptualisation of the nation, eventually managing to overthrow the Constitutional Monarchy in 1910 and the First Republic in 1926, respectively.

The political process by which the nationalist opposition movements pursued a revolutionary path in their quest for power was studied throughout this thesis by taking into account a three-phased theoretical framework which is present in both cases.

In broad terms, Phase One (Intellectuals) saw both movements emerging as opposing intelligentsias, espousing a new nationalist ideology that broke with the past and contested the official rule of the governing regime. Their ideological work contributed to the reconceptualisation of the Portuguese nation by the incoming regimes. During the Constitutional Monarchy, this phase (1870-1876) was embodied by the 1870 Generation and, during the First Republic, this phase (1910-1916) was personified by Integralismo Lusitano, officially formed in 1913.

Phase Two (Political Mobilisation and Agitation) saw both ideological movements give rise to political opposition movements that competed at the electoral level, albeit with little success, and that propagated their own nationalist alternative to the ruling institutions. The political movements tried to gain political legitimacy by mobilising popular/elite support for their cause through a strategy of nationalist contention against the established authorities. During the Constitutional Monarchy, this phase unfolded from 1876 to 1903. The positivist writings of Teófilo Braga, a member of the 1870 Generation, led to the creation of the Portuguese Republican Party (PRP) in 1878. During the First Republic, this phase occurred from 1914 to 1922. The integralists turned their ideological movement into a political movement called Junta Central do
Integralismo Lusitano (JCIL) in 1916. Both movements were unable to keep a consistent presence in the legislative chambers, due to state-sponsored practices of *caciquismo*, electoral fraud and political persecution. In the case of the JCIL, the party was only integrated in the state structures during Sidónio Pais’s short-lived dictatorship. The PRP’s and the JCIL’s radical pursuit of a nationalist strategy of contention against the established regimes also resulted in both movements’ apparent downfall.

Finally, Phase Three (*Recruitment to the Revolutionary Cause*) saw the reorganisation of both nationalist movements and the creation of a civil-military revolutionary coalition, at a time when economic and political crises had questioned the legitimacy of the regime. In the final years of the Constitutional Monarchy, from 1903 to 1910, the PRP reformed its party structures, returned to the election campaigns and abandoned the exclusivity of its electoral strategy. From 1908 to 1910, the PRP formed a revolutionary coalition with the lower ranks of the military, the Masonry and the Carbonária. From 1922 to 1926, their First Republic counterparts revised the integralist doctrine and allied themselves with the higher ranks of the military and other like-minded conservative groups (i.e. União dos Interesses Económicos and the Cruzada Nuno Álvares Pereira). Ultimately, both civil-military coalitions succeeded in overthrowing the regimes in power when the defensive forces, loyal to the regime, adopted a neutral position regarding the belligerent attack of the opposition nationalists.

When turning our attention to a comparison of both nationalist movements in each phase, one can also discern several similarities and differences in the political trajectory they pursued, eventually resulting in the overthrow of the ruling regime.

In Phase One, one can see that both *intelligentsias* had studied at the University of Coimbra and both came from different social backgrounds. The 1870 Generation emanated from or joined the Lisbon bourgeoisie in the course of their lives. The
integralists came from the rural middle and upper classes and some of them were landowners.

Both generations differed in their integration in the ruling regime. The 1870 Generation held jobs in the civil service and in the universities of the Constitutional Monarchy. The integralists, in contrast, were alienated by the First Republic due to their Catholic and monarchist convictions and some of them were in exile when Integralismo Lusitano was formed. In this sense, Elie Kedourie’s theory on the emergence of nationalism among a disgruntled and alienated intelligentsia seems to find resonance in the case of the integralists, but not in the case of the republicans.

Regarding their nationalist doctrines, the 1870 Generation broke with the past and with the official ideology of the state. The republicans questioned the extent of the liberal reforms carried out by the Constitutional Monarchy and defended republicanism and anti-clericalism against the official ideology of the liberal regime. In their redefinition of the Portuguese nation they used socialist and positivist ideas, basing their writings on Proudhon’s and Comte’s theories.

In comparison, the integralists aimed to break with the liberal institutions established in Portugal since the end of the Civil War. They based their traditionalist, organicist, Catholic and monarchist conception of the Portuguese nation on the miguelista literature of the Civil War, on Charles Maurras and on some of the works of the 1870 Generation. Incidentally, the integralists seemed to have pursued a certain continuity with the intellectual work of the previous nationalist generation, as they adopted Teófilo Braga’s ethnic/racial definition of the nation and some of the historical premises introduced by the 1870 Generation in their assessment of Portugal’s decadence.

Both intelligentsias adopted a triadic structure of nationalist rhetoric that saw Portugal’s Middle Ages as the golden age of the nation. The Middle Ages was seen as a
time when the political organisation of the state had been decentralised and focused on local municípios. Furthermore, both generations – with the exception of Teófilo Braga and António Sardinha after his time in exile – saw the Discoveries as the main culprit for Portugal’s ruin. Not only Portugal’s economic survival had been jeopardised by the wealth imported from the colonies, but Portugal had also been usurped by a shift in political power since it had embarked on an imperial mission. However, whereas the 1870 Generation saw the rise of absolutism and Jesuitism as a consequence of the Discoveries, the integralists saw the advent of Enlightenment as a consequence of Portugal’s imperialism.

In order to counteract the decadent state of the nation, the 1870 Generation saw in the local autonomy of the medieval municípios the power that would curtail the centralisation of power and the influence of the Church. The 1870 Generation also argued that only an anti-clerical republican regime could guarantee the most basic political liberties and rights that everyone should enjoy. With this nationalist project in mind, the republican intellectuals appropriated the historical importance of Marquis of Pombal and Camões.

The integralists, in contrast, saw in the medieval municípios a time when ruralism had thrived and autarky had maintained Portugal’s independence intact. Based on the political autonomy that Portugal had supposedly enjoyed at the time, the integralists argued that the most vital interests of the nation could only be safeguarded by a pyramid-shaped power structure, at the top of which the king would enjoy absolutist powers and the national living forces would be represented in an advisory corporative assembly. Following the lead of the republicans, the integralists appropriated the historical significance of Nuno Álvares Pereira’s life for their cause.

Both intelligentsias publicised their theoretical work in public conferences. The 1870 Generation organised the Casino Conferences and the integralists organised the
Liga Naval Conferences. Both events served to project to the public their alternative view of who and what constituted the Portuguese nation. However, as the topics became increasingly controversial, the conferences were disbanded by the official authorities, propelling these ideological movements into the public eye.

Finally, both intelligentsias differed in their cohesiveness as nationalist ideological movements. The 1870 Generation was divided in its approach to the establishment of a republic. Antero de Quental and Oliveira Martins defended a top-down approach, working closely with the constitutionalist parties. Teófilo Braga defended a bottom-up strategy of mass mobilisation, distanced from any coalitions with the parties in power. The integralists, in contrast, maintained a unified front in their elitist approach to the establishment of an integralist monarchy and formed Integralismo Lusitano as an official ideological movement in 1913 – something that the 1870 Generation never did.

In Phase Two, both political movements were created in a context of national fear over Portugal’s strategic interests. Teófilo Braga’s positivist writings led to the creation of the PRP, at a time when the Portuguese Empire was perceived to be in danger due to the interests of the old ally Britain. The integralists formed the JCIL in 1916 in the context of Portugal’s entry in the First World War.

In terms of the leaders’ backgrounds, the PRP Directorate was largely populated by intellectuals and members of the liberal professions, who claimed to defend the interests of the disenfranchised urban working and middle classes. The party was established in the urban centres, namely in Lisbon. In comparison, the JCIL was largely led by wealthy landowners, intellectuals, members of the liberal professions and financiers, who claimed to represent the interests of the disenfranchised and alienated Catholic and monarchist sections of society. The political movement was more influential in the rural areas and among the University of Coimbra students.
Both political parties attempted to change the regime from within the structures of the state by competing in elections. The PRP was more successful in its electoral strategy than the JCIL, electing more deputies to the legislative chamber and maintaining a presence in the Cortes for several years. In contrast, during this phase, the JCIL was only able to take a seat in the National Assembly during Sidónio Pais’s dictatorship. Both political movements were largely hampered from running in fair elections due to continued practices of caciquismo, electoral corruption, spells of authoritarianism and restrictive laws that saw them being occasionally banned from competing at the polls or taking their seats in parliament.

In parallel with their electoral strategy, both political movements pursued a strategy of political contention against the regimes in power. The PRP invented anti-clerical traditions (Hobsbawm & Ranger [1983] 2004) and protested against the Treaty of Lourenço Marques and the British Ultimatum. The JCIL revised their antagonism against Portugal’s alliance with Britain and used the Great War as an opportunity to voice their opinions against the enemies within – i.e. republicans, Jews, secularists and grand-masons. Both political movements used their electoral campaigns, their public speeches and their mouthpieces – the republican *O Século* and the integralist *A Monárquia* – to propagate their views. However, their politics of contention radicalised the nationalist political movements, as they became openly anti-systemic. Opposition to the British Ultimatum saw a faction of the PRP staging a coup d’état in Porto. The assassination of Sidónio Pais and the imminent demise of the New Republic saw the integralists joining forces with other monarchists in the Monarquia do Norte and the Monsanto uprising. In both instances, the established authorities replied with a repressive campaign of censorship and political persecution that resulted in the apparent demise of the PRP and the JCIL. The PRP decided to abstain from competing in elections for several years and the JCIL, having been disavowed by the
constitutionalists and sidetracked by the *miguelistas*, declared the suspension of its political activities.

In Phase Three, the republicans and the integralists restructured their movements. The PRP reformed the party structures and returned to the polls. The integralists revised their ideology. For the first time in the history of the movement, they agreed to put off their views on the form of regime and to form a coalition with like-minded conservative groups who expressed a wish to overthrow the PD from power (i.e. União dos Interesses Económicos and Cruzada Nuno Álvares Pereira). In 1926, they reopened the JCIL. Following Franco’s dictatorship and the regicide, the PRP approved a revolutionary alternative to power attainment. The party also allied itself with like-minded organisations, i.e. the Carbonária and the Masonry, and captivated the support of the urban bourgeoisie and of an increasingly militant working class.

In the meantime, a series of crises undermined the political legitimacy of the Constitutional Monarchy and of the First Republic. Both regimes were assailed by political fractionalism, as splintering parties were created from the dominant parties. Both regimes were also shaken by economic and political instability, state corruption, continuing practices of clientelism and *caciquismo*. Both regimes’ institutions lost legitimacy due to the tobacco question. In the case of the Constitutional Monarchy, the regime was further impaired by the cash advances question, Franco’s Dictatorship, the regicide, the bankruptcy of Crédito Predial and the increasing influence of the Church in public matters. In the case of the First Republic, the PD’s hegemonic rule, a high turnover of governments in power, post-war economic and financial crisis and the Angolan Bank note scandal distanced the moderators from the regime.

These crises consolidated the revolutionary coalitions and gave meaning to their revolutionary goals. In both instances, factions of the military aligned themselves with the conspirators, creating *de facto* civil-military coalitions against the established
authorities. The senior ranks of the monarchist forces, who had been sidelined by the ruling elites after the regicide, assumed a neutral position, as their junior comrades adhered to the republican cause. In contrast, the republican army saw its prestige increase after the end of the First World War and became more interventionist in the political life of the country. The conservative senior ranks staged several military pronunciamentos in the final years of the Republic and assumed a messianic posture after the 1925 trials. They formed a coalition with their civilian counterparts, namely the integralists, the UIE and the Cruzada Nuno Álvares Pereira, who had managed to gain the support of catholic reactionaries, monarchists, landowners, oligarchs and factions of the urban bourgeoisie.

Both revolutionary movements were successful in their attempt to overthrow the regime in power when the loyal forces adopted a neutral position. In the case of the Constitutional Monarchy, with few exceptions, the senior ranks of the army remained disinterested in the face of the republican attack. In the case of the First Republic, PD supporters - namely leftist republicans and the labour unions – remained indifferent while the National Republican Guard was too weak to defend the regime against the conservative coup.

Once the regime was overthrown, the PRP established itself in power. The party effectively created the First Republic and maintained an hegemonic control over the republican institutions throughout the regime’s life. The integralists, in turn, failed to establish an integralist monarchy. They supported the reactionary Military Dictatorship that ensued the demise of the First Republic and influenced the ideological framework of the incoming Catholic New State regime, which has been defined elsewhere as an “integralist republic” (Medina 1979).

A few years into the First Republic, the PRP split, but the republican dissidents remained loyal to the regime. The party only collapsed when the regime was
overthrown. In the case of the New State, the JCIL disbanded in 1933 once it realised that the new Premier, António de Oliveira Salazar, had no intention of restoring the monarchy. Some of its members were absorbed by the political structures of the New State, but others reverted to their pre-revolutionary role as members of the opposition, disloyal to the regime in power.

In sum, although both opposition nationalisms followed the state three-phased political trajectory in their quest for revolutionary power, they were characterised by certain similarities and differences that distinguished them from each other as each phase unfolded. These particularities need to be taken in consideration not only when comparing the essence of both opposition nationalisms, but also their political quest for power.

It is important to note that the three-phased theoretical structure introduced in this thesis was only devised with the case of early twentieth century Portugal in mind. However, it would be interesting to see whether the civilian groups that supported the military movement that overthrew the New State regime in April 1974 can also be analysed in light of the same theoretical structure and whether the role played by them was more prominent than the Third Republic historiography seems to give them credit for. It would also be interesting to confirm whether Portugal in 1974 remained as divided as in 1910 and 1926. At the time of the April Revolution, was Portugal still ideologically split between a Catholic reactionary north and an anti-clerical and leftist south? Was the military still ideologically divided between conservative senior officers and leftist junior officers and enlisted men? Were these ideological differences, inherited from the Civil War, still present in the nationalist goals and beliefs of those who overthrew the New State regime? In other words, was Portugal, an homogeneous nation-state, still fractured by conflicting definitions of who and what constituted the nation a century after the emergence of the 1870 Generation?
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