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
MORALITY AND PLANNING

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Part I: Overview

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Part I: Overview

Prelude

It is obviously premature to characterize today's growing dissent with any finality, but it is reasonable to suggest that it is moral in character, just as all great revolutions are. Technology has created for some of us an enormous affluence, and affluence tends to create a vast disturbance of the moral order. It is not only the immorality of the privileged wealthy vs. the underprivileged starving; it is a kind of vicious hypocrisy that manifests itself so clearly to the young. In order to guard the possessions of the affluent, it is necessary to use police force. The use of such force is defended on moral grounds--righteously to suppress those who do not respect their fellow men. But the use of police force is also attacked on moral grounds, because it is the use of force to suppress those who have a moral right to the kind of life they rightfully deserve.

I was struck--both physically and mentally--by the force of this dilemma of emerging morality, when I was riding in the club car of a train which was passing a playground in a black ghetto of New York City. A young black hurled a rock which partially smashed the window next to me. After we in the club car had recovered from the shock and

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refreshed our drinks, an older woman across from me kept repeating, "They ought to be punished! They ought to be punished!" None of us disagreed, although we might have, had someone asked: who is "they"? Now that morality is speaking to us in such forceful terms, few can doubt that "they" should be punished.

Another view of an emerging morality is a very common reaction to emerging technology. In a course I gave to Chemical Engineering students on science and society, the students were asked to respond to a list of "breakthroughs" reported in R. Taylor's The Biological Time Bomb. The list included such items as brain-to-computer, brain-to-brain linkages, cloning humans (replicating humans from the same cell), and so on. One student wrote: "The news of a human heart transplant and the amazing success of Apollo 8 had given me a great pleasure and satisfaction. . . . I talked to some of my friends and all of them had the same gay feeling. None objected to these glorious breakthroughs. When I first read Taylor's predictions I was shocked. The upsetting point was that when I was looking through the list each one of the glorious discoveries by itself was as great and deceiving as the Apollo project, but taking the list as a whole and trying to project a picture of society in the year 2000, say, was intolerable. . . . I did the same test on my friends and not a single person had a smile on his face when he was through reading the list."

But are these examples concerned with morality at all--or rather just another civil war between those who have and those who have not, or those who decide and those who do not? If morality is "emerging," where has it been? Does it speak to us only at times? Then why is it silent at other times? And how does it happen that it speaks in

different, contradictory ways to different people, or to the same person at different times? Is it an irrational force that knows no logic?

But the chief concern here is with another, and far deeper aspect of morality. Many conscientious people have become very concerned with the plight of their less fortunate neighbors, both in their own countries and abroad, and have decided to devote a significant part of their lives to "doing good," by reducing poverty, pollution, crime or urban sprawl. Is it possible that there is an immoral aspect of these devoted and sincere people? Is it immoral for one man to decide what is good for another, and to influence decision makers to make the "appropriate" changes? I take this to be a meaningful and serious question, which first needs to be amplified and clarified. Although the question is addressed to all those who devote a part of their lives to changing society "for the good," politicians, managers, administrators and demonstrators, I'll single out one such group, the planners, for special attention, since planners work through ideas, and this essay is essentially an exploration of ideas.

It will be seen, then, that the issue of morality with which I am concerned is not the usual one of identifying dishonesty or political corruption, or invasion of privacy, which I take to be surface problems arising out of individual deviations from a recognized moral code. I am concerned with what might be called "systemic morality," the immorality that originates from a desire to steer the ship of state "for the good of all."

Now there can be little doubt that morality is a mysterious idea of the human race, and that there are many diverse opinions about its nature, opinions that are often held with an incredible stubbornness.

Thus some positivists, like Ayer (1946), take it for granted that moral utterances are meaningless grunts of the disgruntled, while others with an equal assurance say that moral laws are the unalterable word of God as revealed in some holy script.

In order to obtain some basis for the following discussion, I'll attempt to use both the contributions of psychology and system planning to arrive at some hypotheses about the nature of morality. To this end, I'll begin by posing four questions, which if we could understand them better would cast some light on the moral confusions of our times.

The Basic Questions

1. How are morality and reality related?

This question takes a number of different forms, but at the outset we can understand its intent by asking ourselves whether, as we humans gain knowledge of the real world, we can thereby expect to gain knowledge of the moral world. Consider, for example, the awesome question whether the immensity of the real universe which we have come to appreciate in the last few centuries diminishes to zero the importance of morality. Did man, in abdicating his role as the center of the real universe, also abdicate his role as a moral being? To answer this question in the affirmative is to become rather negative at the very outset. It is not difficult to point out that the immensity of the universe is of our own making; it is more a feeling than a sensation, and may indeed be a moral feeling. In any event, in this introductory discourse I shall take it for granted that morality is real and is immensely important.

2. What is the role of reason in our understanding of morality?

Of course, this question depends a great deal on what we take reason to mean. If, for example, we were to equate reason to what Jung (1959) calls the "rational" functions (thinking and feeling), then we might expect to find the answer readily at hand. All of us know by direct experience that when we are moved to moral utterances or moral behavior, intuition is playing a central role. Indeed, moral principles are often taken to be non-debatable ("non-negotiable" in today's world of student dissent), and this seems to imply that thinking by itself cannot be the determinant. We shall want to say some things about feeling, of course, but it would be a false move at the outset to expect that moral duty has its origin solely in the feeling function.

The option I'll adopt is to equate "reason" with "scientific method," so that the question now becomes the question of the relationship between morality and science. Not that this option clarifies the question; if anything, given the confusion about what "the" scientific method is, the suggestion makes the question more complicated but perhaps at the same time more rewarding.

3. How are morality and planning related?

As I said earlier, I am interested in the possible immorality of the conscientious planner. But I am also interested in the planner's often implicit concept of morality, namely that if we plan for the appropriate goals, and act in accordance with the optimal plan, then we are acting morally. So the question is really a form of the older question whether the fully prudent society must not also be a moral society, for in truly looking after its own interests it must willy nilly

look after the interests of all others.

In more specific terms, I am asking whether such efforts as operations research, systems analysis, urban and regional planning, the development of "change agents," and so on, have created the basis for human morality. They have indeed attempted to create a science of prudence, as Bentham long ago suggested (1948). Is such a creation moral, immoral, or amoral?

4. What is the relationship between morality and psychology?

The "psychology" I am chiefly interested in is psychoanalysis, and in particular Jung's version of it, since Jung and his followers have spent so much time on the meaning of the pair good-and-evil, a pair which presumably makes up the fibre of the moral world. But I shall be interested not only in the psychological character of morality, but also in the even more puzzling question of the moral character of psychology.

These are four themes that will help to cast some light on the meaning of morality, but themes by themselves are rather empty: they supply the plot but not the drama. The drama consists of a cast of four characters, with a number of subsidiary walk-on parts. The characters are the young Plato of the early dialogues, the mature Kant writing his Critique of Practical Reason, Edgar A. Singer, and Jung. Singer is perhaps the unknown of this cast; he was a student of William James, and, in my opinion, the creator of the most comprehensive and precise philosophy of science of the twentieth century.

It is necessary, however, to say something about the dramatic style of the dialogue between these characters. I am certainly not interested in providing a scholarly appraisal of the writings of each

of these men on the subject of morality. Rather, I want to use their words as responses to the questions just posed, and in several cases I'll go well beyond what each has said to what I infer from their statements. Thus the dialogue is a kind of story in which the four discuss morality.

Now each of the characters plays a somewhat different role. The young Plato's role is to help us understand better the ^{meaning of the} four questions by providing us with the clearest, simplest and most optimistic answers. His is the voice of enthusiasm. Kant is the central character, and his tortuous experience in writing the second Critique is both the psychological and philosophical episode the story seeks to describe. All four questions were the burning issues of this Critique. Singer plays the role of a modern Kantian providing the arguments for equating morality and the science of prudence. Jung, of course, gives us the insights regarding psychology and morality.

Before I begin the drama, I need to do one other thing required of drama producers: I need to advertize. I have to say who I think my audience will be. It certainly includes the psychologists, who are bound to be interested in good-and-evil, its origin, its manifestation, its role in the psyche; most psychologists would agree with Jung that there is very much that we don't know about this subject. Jung in his Memories (1963) recalls how the devil whispered in his ear not to mention the then unpopular Freud when he was publishing his early papers about his experiments on association. The question of the nature of that whispering devil never disappeared in Jung's writings, and to the last remained one of the deepest mysteries of Jungian thought.

As I remarked at the outset, my audience should include all those concerned with today's dissent, because the dissent of youth is moral

in character: the dissenters believe in courage, fairness to all people regardless of race, honesty, and they have a healthy abhorrence of hypocrisy. Many of them are claiming that their parents' generation lost its morality in its greedy pursuit of affluence. Well, if we did, then the more reflective among them and their elders need to understand what it is that we lost and how it is that we can find it again. The do-gooders, managers and planners, are also to be in the audience, of course.

Plato

So the potential audience is large and motley. If the few that turned up will be seated, we can begin.

We begin the dialogue with Plato in the Phaedo, who inherited from Socrates, Pythagoras, and others the doctrine that reality is to be found fundamentally in ideas, a doctrine our hardheaded thinkers of today tend to scorn without bothering to reflect on its meaning. It has only been recently that some mathematicians, like Gödel, have come out strongly for the Platonic doctrine, arguing that numbers have a reality in and of themselves, and are not derived from conventional axioms, as so many mathematicians believe without reflection. It is certainly a valid speculation that Platonic idealism will never die, any more than will the materialism of his philosophical enemy Democritus.

For our purpose, Plato's theory of ideas provides a coherent and simple answer to the four questions already posed:

1. How are morality and reality related? The answer is that the good is an idea, indeed the pinnacle of all ideas, and hence is real. Moral actions are "simulations" of the idea of the Good, much as a computer program is a simulation of some organization.

2. What is the role of reason in morality? Reason, says Plato, can be interpreted as the process by which the mind (psyche) comes to learn that which in some prior state it already knew. The process is dialectical, and Plato illustrates it over and over as Socrates discourses with Athenian youth on the meaning of courage or friendship, or the proof of geometrical theorems. There is no clear definition of this dialectical process either in Plato or the later commentators. Furthermore, there is a deep mystery about its basic assumption, namely, how the mind can know something and yet not know it, a mystery that is very pertinent to our discussion and will have to be explored.

3. How are morality and planning related? If planning means seeking one's own pleasure to the exclusion of the good, then the two are opposites; the selfishly prudent man or society, according to the Phaedo, must expect an afterlife in some kind of hell, or in some lower form of life

4. What is the relation between morality and psychology? Plato's theory of the psyche, in the early dialogues, is largely told in the form of myths. Every soul has had the opportunity of viewing pure reality, and hence knows the ideas, but when encased in a body a great deal of its original psychic power is lost. In general, the relationship between morality and psychology is explained in the accounts in the Phaedo or Republic, of the soul's relationship to the world of ideas. Thus morality (as represented by the idea of the Good) is essentially above and independent of the psyche, which it shapes. Morality in the shape of the virtues is not a manifestation of psychological processes, but rather psychological processes are manifestations of morality.

For today's student of psychology, this Platonic theory may appear as quaint as the notion that numbers are real appears to today's mathematician. Is it possible to imagine that morality exists "out there", as a being independent of our own minds? Of course, if morality is the law of God, the idea becomes reasonable. We can also think of Jung's many treatments of good-and-evil, both of which can be conceived as realities existing independently of our own minds, and thus one could treat morality as the force used by good to combat evil. But this interpretation would certainly fail to capture Plato's concept. In Jung, good-and-evil are correlatives: neither has meaning without the other, and both are "equally" real. But in Plato, the idea of the Good does not exist because there is also an idea of Evil. Evil, says Plato, is a negation, a lack of completeness. Hence Platonic Evil is much more like the Jungian notion of the incomplete self. Indeed, were Plato to be reborn as a Jungian student, he would see in Jung's concern for the "completion" of the self a clear manifestation of the idea of the Good. The answer to the question "Why should I go through the tortures and joys of analysis?" is "Because thereby you learn the idea of the Good." To ask why one should learn the idea of the Good, is to ask a question which provides its own answer directly: this is what "should" means.

Whether Jung feels satisfied with the young Plato's conclusions remains an open question, even to the end of these deliberations. For Jung, the question is whether the desire to learn about the self, to find self completion, originates from a moral force. Is the Socratic "know thyself" a moral law? If so, where did it come from?

We can leave this question for the time being, in order to look more deeply into Plato's great mystery; how can a mind both know and not know something at the same time? In the early dialogues, the youths incorrectly answer Socrates' questions about the meaning of a virtue like courage. Hence they don't know what "courage" means. And yet when Socrates points out a difficulty in their proposed definition, they recognize the difficulty, and in effect propose a "better" definition. Hence they do know what courage means, in some sense. The myths of the Phaedo and Republic, referred to earlier, try to explain how this happened, how the true idea of the virtue was forgotten.

Now there may seem to be no mystery to Plato's doctrine at all, because remembering and forgetting are among the most common experiences. I once learned how to extract a square root. Now I've forgotten. If I look up the method in a text, I will be reminded. Hence I both know and don't know how to extract a square root. What is the mystery?

The mystery lies not so much in the meaning of a submerged unconscious knowledge, as in the meaning of the "supermerged" conscious mind. Analogies seem to be the only method we have of explaining the idea that a piece of knowledge hidden in the unconscious is "drawn up" to consciousness. Thus we think of icebergs, wells, mines, computer memories, to help explain this very mysterious idea of becoming aware of that which we already know. Interestingly enough, the analogy seems to concentrate on explaining the unconscious, the part of the iceberg underneath the surface, the depths of the water in the well, and so on. But what is this other part, the conscious mind? And how is it possible that the conscious mind is not aware of what the unconscious mind knows?

The question is a very serious one, because as we shall see, all four characters of our drama, as well as almost everyone else who has thought about the matter, agree that the conscious mind "listens to the voice of morality." If this is so, then clearly we are as obliged to explain the listener as we are to explain what is listened to. I do not mean to deny the validity of the rich literature on repression and other mechanisms of forgetting. Indeed, some recent work by Dr. Kenneth Colby at Stanford University shows how one can design a computer program in such a way that it suppresses information fed into it because of an induced "anxiety complex." Such a simulation provides a very precise answer to my question, because "conscious mind" is what the computer prints out as a result of a query one makes to it, while "unconscious mind" is what the computer programmer knows is stored in computer memory in some form. But it is precisely because most students of psychology (psychoanalysis) would reject this precise definition of the relationship between conscious and unconscious mind that my question needs more attention. This will have to come later, after we have explored morality in more depth.

Kant

Our next episode shows Kant at that period in his life when he was writing his second Critique of Practical Reason, which deals primarily with morality and which will be depicted as a deep and troublesome event in Kant's thoughts. Some background of the drama is essential in order to understand its significance in Kant's intellectual life. Kant had been brought up in the tradition of Leibniz, which itself followed the great tradition of rationalism. Not only does reason dominate the

world, but reason resides within each of us in such a manner that we can eventually expect to unravel the deepest mysteries of the world. In Leibniz, reason is capable of telling us whether God exists (He does), what the fundamental nature of reality must be, how God designed the best of all possible worlds. According to Kant, it was that implacable Scotchman David Hume who awakened him from his dogmatic slumbers, because Hume argued convincingly that man only learns from experience, and with such a teacher he cannot expect to learn the basic secrets of the universe, if there are any. Hume's most telling indictment of rationalism is his attack on the idea of causality. All rationalists believed that the world is made up of causes, that A causes B, and is caused by C, and so on. Spinoza, in fact, believed that the events of the world follow in sequence with the same force with which a theorem of geometry follows from the postulates.

But, says Hume, explain to me how experience could ever have taught us that one event causes another? Oh, you say, it teaches me by repetition. Every child "learns" that flames are hot and "cause" pain, so that after awhile he does not touch the flame. Not so, says Hume. What the child has learned is that every time it touches the flame, a hot and painful sensation occurs. But it cannot have "learned" that this sequence of events will occur, because experience is silent on the subject of the future. Some of the audience may find this piece of philosophical argument a bit strange, but it is a very important one for psychology. Imagine, for example, what would happen to Jungian theory if causality were to drop out of it. Among other things, we would be forced to be thoroughly sceptical about the concept

of what Jung calls the archetypal influence, because the idea that archetypes influence unconscious behavior is based on a causal model.

It is interesting to note that Hume was forced to generate a bit of psychological theory himself, to explain how it happens that most of us do believe in causal forces, if in fact we never learned of their existence through experience. His theory is an early version of the "conditioned response": frequent experience of the sequence "A then B" leads to a conditioning of the mind to expect B when A appears. I might note in passing that Hume is thus driven to introduce a bit of causality himself at a higher level, since he evidently means that the appearance of A causes the expectation of B in the mind of the conditioned individual. But philosophers, like everyone else in this world, tend to be consistently inconsistent at times; otherwise, they couldn't be creative.

It was Kant's great insight to see that "learning from experience" is not simple, but is rather a highly complex psychological phenomenon. It is true, says Kant, that the mind does receive impressions through sensation, but these would remain wholly meaningless if the mind were not able to shape them into an intelligible form. Thus "experience" for Kant is a combination of two essential ingredients, the original sensuous intuition and the forms supplied by the mind, which for Kant are space, time and the "categories." It is to be noted that Jung gives Kant credit for one of the earliest insights into the archetypes, for the categories are universally "in" all minds, and presumably in an anthropological or genetic theory (which Kant does not develop) are inherited.

The categories in effect make experience intelligible, so that, among other things, we humans are able to talk about it. If I can say, "This is an apple," I've made use of an amazing assortment of concepts (categories). The subject, "this," assumes that there is some individuated object in space, which has a unity, a substance, and is related to other objects of my perception. Furthermore, the "is" asserts that the apple is real. Finally, implicit in this simple assertion is the notion that experiencing an apple is taking place within one mind. Kant calls this latter very mysterious happening, the "transcendental unity of apperception." To psychologists, this idea of collecting of the manifold parts of experience under one unified consciousness is a significant historical event, because Kant saw it as the primary function of the "ego." Thus with one gigantic effort, Kant differentiated between the ego and the self, a differentiation not possible within the earlier empiricist school of John Locke. The ego is the instrument whereby the various elements of experience are unified in one self.

For the present purposes I am more interested in the categories than in the ego, and especially the category of causality. Kant, in his "theory of archetypes," had an answer to Hume, namely, that linking events or objects together by causal law is an archetypal process, absolutely essential if experience is to become intelligible. He argues for this idea in various ways, but perhaps the most convincing is that all minds must be able to "tell time," i.e., to distinguish between a past, present, and future. They could not do this if they did not have an inbuilt clock, because the flow of time is to be recognized only by such a psychological clock. Material clocks, in fact, are

representations of the basic psychological clocks each of us has within him a priori. But clocks operate in accordance with causal principles, and specifically in accordance with mechanical law. Hence, we do not learn about causal linkages through experience, but rather we assume causal linkages in order to tell time, and we need to tell time in order for our experiences to be intelligible. Thus Kant's famous dictum, "We should not have found regularity in nature, had we not first put it there." It is to be noted in this regard that what Osterman (1968) calls the "tendency" toward patterning and order in matter and in the psyche is as much an aspect of the observer for Kant as it is of the outside or inside world. Indeed, for a neo-Kantian it is tremendously difficult to discern what the observer has put into theories (patterns) and what he has "discovered."

This rather brief account of many lengthy arguments of Kant's first Critique of Pure Reason will have to suffice for the moment without our attempting further defense, in order to bring out as quickly as possible why causality is so important with respect to morality in Kant. In the first Critique Kant devotes a section to what he calls the "transcendental dialectic." It was his contention that the human mind has a natural tendency to extend Reason beyond the domain where it is intended to work, i.e., beyond its proper domain of organizing sensations in an intelligible manner. Just why the mind likes to do this kind of thing would be a fascinating question for a Kantian psychologist to explore, but Kant merely takes it for granted that attempts to step beyond the proper limits of Reason are all too human. He certainly had plenty of empirical evidence for his contention, considering how many of his contemporary philosophers on the Continent were engaged in

metaphysical speculations which used Reason to explore the non-phenomenal world.

In order to show the futility of trying to apply Reason to the non-sensuous areas of inquiry, Kant developed a number of "antinomies." His purpose was to show that equally strong, convincing arguments can be made for opposite theses. Consider, for example, the question of whether the world had a beginning in time, or whether it has always existed. The question, I might note, is not the same as the one that now concerns cosmologists, i.e., whether there was a "Big Bang" that exploded the universe into galaxies, nebulae, quazars, and the like, because the Big Bang theory assumes that something existed before the Bang. Rather, Kant's question is whether the real world had a beginning in time. His point is that Reason cannot appropriately address itself to such a question, because the subject of the question lies beyond the scope of experience, which is the only proper domain in which Reason does its work. And when the human mind does try to apply Reason to such a question, it runs smack into paradox: both answers can equally well be defended. Thus Kant introduced the philosophical shocker of his time: limitations on Reason. Of course, this was only shocking to his rationalist contemporaries. Today, as happens to most creative ideas, it is a platitude to say that human reason is limited. We are even proud of the role that non-reason plays in our lives. It would be shocking to suggest that reason is not bounded after all, although much can be said in defense of such a thesis.

For our present interest, it was Kant's third antinomy which is the most important. The thesis and antithesis are as follows:

Thesis: The causality which has its origin in the laws of Nature is not the only causality which operates in the phenomenal world. There is also the causality of freedom of choice which is required to explain fully certain phenomena.

Antithesis: There is no freedom of choice; rather all events in the world happen solely in terms of the laws of nature.

The "equally forceful" arguments for the thesis and antithesis which Kant gives are of some interest historically. The thesis, which declares that freedom of choice is required to explain events, depends on showing that every event requires a cause to explain its occurrence, and this cause in turn requires another cause; the chase up the chain of causes cannot go on forever, because otherwise we never have a complete causal explanation, which is what is required if the category of causality is to make experience intelligible. You will note that of all the arguments which people use to prove that they have free wills, Kant chooses the purely logical deduction from the concept of completeness. He has to do this because of his meaning of "pure reason." The consequence is that even if you were to agree with the thesis, it could have small psychological solace for you, because it by no means says that you are free to choose spontaneously.

The spirit of the argument for the antithesis can best be captured in some later history of the nineteenth century, in the almost bitter debate over determinism and vitalism. The vitalists, many of whom were biologists, never seemed to understand why their notion of spontaneous choice, or of a force that operates through a basis other than mechanical law, evoked such strong opposition. The same kind of puzzlement occurs today in the case of extrasensory perception. Why are so many psychologists almost violently opposed to the idea? The

answer is quite simple: if you introduce pure spontaneity of choice, or forces that create perceptions but can't be sensed, then you ruin the entire game of science. This is why Lucretius is so naive in his De Rerum Natura. He believed that if all atoms behaved in a deterministic manner, then they would all fall forever in parallel lines. To explain how they collide, which experience tells us they obviously do, he injected into some of them a tiny bit of freedom to deviate from their chosen path. By so doing, he completely ruined the fine atomic model which Leucippus and Democritus constructed. Why? Because now the physicist must state his laws in terms of an intolerable qualification: the law of gravitation holds universally except when one of Lucretius' free atoms is about, or except when there is an élan vital in the vicinity, or except when an unsensed force is coming through. And how do we know when one of these things is happening? The proponents of freedom and extrasensory perception say that we can't know; if we did know then we'd know what caused the freedom or what caused the extrasensory perception, in which case freedom is no longer free, and extrasensory perception is no longer extra. The violence of the determinist, his scorn and derision, are rooted in his healthy psychological response to the irresponsible antics of people who try to ruin other people's livelihoods and act as though they were unaware of it!

For Kant, then, both thesis and antithesis can be defended by an equally strong argument, though I am inclined to think that the antithesis runs away with the honors. But for the moment, suppose we accept Kant's argument that Reason alone cannot address itself to the question of whether there is such a thing as free will. At this point,

one should say that "pure" Reason cannot do so, because as we shall see Kant had another kind of Reason, the "practical," waiting behind the scenes to come on in the next act. Within the domain of experience, causality is always at work, linking together all events in a regular, and hence determined manner. Hence, as far as experienced human behavior is concerned, all behavior is determined in principle. Behavioral science is basically deterministic for Kant.

Thus it might seem that Kant had once and for all put morality and free will outside his philosophy. If the first Critique explains how men come to know, then one must conclude that they can never come to know anything about free will, and that if morality requires freedom of choice, why then morality too is a basic mystery that no amount of evidence can ever clear up.

And yet it was far from Kant's intent to leave matters in this shape. Indeed, the first Critique itself provides a possibility for saving morality. In the Critique, Kant is mainly concerned with the phenomenal world, which is a world constructed out of sensuous intuitions and the a priori forms and categories. This is a very real world, where events happen in a regulated manner. But Reason can easily see that there could be other worlds, which Kant calls "noumenal." One such world is the purely intelligible, where Reason alone predominates. "Things" can happen in this world too, if it exists, and the things that happen need not in any way interfere with the phenomenal world.

Thus Kant believed to his own satisfaction that he had reconciled the problem of freedom and determinism which inevitably plagues every

philosopher who wants to preserve both morality and science in his system. The problem explains why in contemporary philosophy we find such a bifurcation of positions. The logical positivists, strong admirers of science, are generally quite willing--indeed eager--to give up morality in any absolute sense of the term. They "explain" moral utterances as meaningless grunts of disgruntled humans. On the other hand, the more literary philosophers, who see little or no good in the game of science, find no difficulty whatsoever in giving up science and its need for regularity in Nature; they can create a world of freedom without a blush of hesitation.

But the problem is a severe one for any thinker who wants to keep both science and morality. This desire is the one that holds for all four of the heroes of this essay, and it makes the central theme of our discussion. Plato, Kant, Singer, and Jung were all convinced of the ultimate value of science and of the reality of morality. None are willing to make unexplained exceptions in the world of regularity in order to sneak in a bit of freedom here and there. They are all absolutely committed to the soundness of the scientific method. Plato had the easiest task, because for him scientific method in its purest form (e.g., in geometry) deals with ideas, and there is no trouble whatsoever in having the idea of the Good coexist with all the other ideas. There is, of course, the question of whether the soul is free in Plato's philosophy; in the myths it does appear to have free choice, and one is led to wonder how a world dominated by the Good would permit an immoral choice.

It was Kant who enunciated the problem of science and morality in the modern form, where scientific method means the use of observation to learn about the natural (phenomenal) world. But we have seen that Kant also realized what many contemporary philosophers and psychologists still fail to see, namely, that observation requires a firm adherence to the notion of regularity in Nature. The scientist is not someone who hopes to find regularity, or who should be amazed to discover that it exists. Rather, he must assume that Nature behaves according to strict laws, because otherwise he cannot observe. For example, without the assumption of regularity, he could not calibrate his instruments, and without calibration the whole fabric of controlled observation disintegrates into intellectual dust. One should note that the Kantian position is not changed one bit by modern quantum mechanics; the determinism of statistical law is just as rigid as the determinism of classical mechanics.

On the other hand, Kant was equally convinced that a free will does exist, and because it does, that absolute morality is also a reality. Just why he and the other three were so convinced is a matter for speculation. One could easily find the answer, if he were so inclined, in Kant's relationship to his mother. When Kant was thirteen that dear lady died as a result of having administered to the needs of a young woman in dangerous fever. Kant's mother could not induce her young friend to swallow the horrible medicine prescribed in those days, and so, in an attempt to persuade her patient, she took the medicine herself. The result was a nauseous attack, followed by the delusion that she herself had the fever, a delusion which led to her death in a few days.

The pure unselfishness of his mother's behavior could not have helped but impress the young Kant, who was already deeply impressed by one who, he says, "planted and fostered the first germ of good in me." Add to all this the fact that Kant remained a bachelor all his life, and that he strongly resembled his mother in facial features and his singularly contracted chest (see Abbott, 1889) and you have enough Freudian evidence to convict Kant of falling victim to his mother's morality.

But I see no reason why Kant's belief in absolute morality has to be explained while his belief in scientific method does not. Both his beliefs are deep mysteries of the human psyche, and are not to be explained by biographical data. Those who resort to biography to explain morality have to explain why the beliefs are so universally held. They are, in fact, obliged to embark on an endless voyage of causal links, for one needs ask why Kant's mother was so selflessly bound by moral duty, only, say, to discover a dominating duty-bound father in her life, and so on goes the merry chase towards infinity or a first cause.

In this drama we take it for granted that morality is archetypal in Jung's sense, i.e., morality is some aspect of the real psyche. Thus Kant was motivated to introduce morality into his philosophy because of a fundamental conviction that philosophy must account for the existence of morality, and that the real world which science creates cannot include this reality, which Kant calls the Good Will. Thus, for Kant the archetype of the Good Will is not derivable from the world-view of science. This conviction, I take it, was a legitimate one and is not to be explained as a consequence of Kant's own biography. Still, the psychic origin

of the conviction remains as our mystery: why do men believe in morality when there is no "evidence" for its existence, where evidence consists of the findings of objective science?

To explore this mystery a bit further, we need to see what Kant had to say about morality, and to this end we can return to our four questions.

1. How are morality and reality related? The answer in Kant is that there are two, causally independent worlds, the scientist's world of phenomena, and the intelligible world of the Good Will. The latter exists just as much as the former. The scientist's world is created out of experience, and reveals to us the immensity of our universe. The world of the Good Will is created by what Kant curiously calls "postulates." To us today a postulate often means an assumption in a formal science, e.g., in geometry. In this sense, postulates are "taken for granted" in order to play the game; indeed, they bear a close resemblance to the rules of a game like chess. But Kant obviously intended a much stronger meaning, which is never made clear in the tortuous second Critique. Instead of following Kant's text, I'll suggest a meaning derived from the etymology of the word. Postulate comes from "postulare," to demand. Kant's postulates about the world of morality are therefore demands made on the human psyche. But who or what is doing the demanding? Here is our mystery again: where does the voice of morality come from? Like any good mystery, we'll attempt to keep it around until at least the last scene, if not beyond.

Kant and Jung

If we return, for the moment, to our earlier speculation about the immensity of the physical universe and the immanence of morality, we find a nice parallelism between Kant and Jung in this regard. Kant's well known statement runs as follows: "Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration and awe, the oftener and the more steadily we reflect on them: the starry heavens above and the moral law within. We don't have to search for them and make fantasies about them as though they were veiled in darkness . . . ; I see them directly before me and connect them directly with my consciousness of my own existence. The former [the starry heavens] begins from the place I occupy in the external world of sense, and enlarges my connection therein to an unbounded extent to worlds upon worlds and systems of systems The second begins from my invisible self, my personality, and exhibits me in a world which has true infinity The former view of a countless multitude of worlds annihilates my importance as an animal creature The second, on the contrary, infinitely elevates my worth as an intelligence of my personality"

(Kant, 1788, p. 313)

And Jung: "In my picture of the world there is a vast outer realm and an equally vast inner realm; between these two stands man, facing now one and now the other, and, according to temperament and disposition, taking the one for the absolute truth by denying or sacrificing the other." (Jung, 1961, Par. 777)

Thus both Kant and Jung were fully convinced of the reality of the psyche, but, of course, were far apart on their idea of what this reality is. For Kant it is fairly simple, "pure intelligence," i.e., a moral will. The search for simplicity was a hallmark of Kant's age. For Jung it is vastly complex. The discovery of complexity is a hallmark of our age.

Kant

2. What is the relationship between reason and morality? This question is answered by Kant in what seems to be a very curious manner, until one understands his whole system. A Good Will must be "free," i.e., not caused by anything else. This is Kant's first postulate. If the Will were good because it acted to serve one's own or another's happiness, it would be caused by the phenomenal events that bring on happiness. Kant's own way of putting it is as follows: "As my concern is with moral philosophy, my question is this: whether it is absolutely necessary to construct a pure moral philosophy, perfectly devoid of the empirical, e.g., of behavioral sciences like anthropology? That such a philosophy must be possible is evident from the common idea of duty and of the moral laws. Everyone must admit that if a law is to have a moral force . . . it must carry with it absolute necessity; that, for example, the precept, 'Thou shalt not lie,' is not valid for men alone, as if other rational beings had no need to observe it Hence the basis of moral obligation must not be sought in the nature of man, or in the circumstances of the world in which he is placed, but a priori and simply in the conceptions of pure reason." (Kant, 1785, p. 5) The end of this passage is very important, because in it Kant once and for all severs the relationship between morality and prudence (planning):

"Although any other precept which is founded on principles of mere experience may be in certain respects universal, yet in as far as it rests even in the least bit on empirical bases, perhaps only as to motive, such a precept can never be called a moral law, although of course it may be a very useful rule." (Kant, 1785, p. 6)

This is all very beautiful in its purity, and reason seems almost to have taken on a Platonic reality. But what is this pure reason which Kant alludes to? The somewhat disappointing answer is that it is the function of arguing universally and consistently--or, as Jung would put it, it is introverted thinking.

It is certainly true that introverted thinking types tend at times to go overboard and try to make logic, and especially consistency, do all their work for them. A good example is Charles Babbage, the first inventor of a computing machine in the nineteenth century. Babbage must have been aware of the fact that "reason" and "ratio" have the same origin. In a letter to Tennyson about his couplet "The Vision of Sin," "Every minute dies a man,/ Every minute one is born," Babbage (1961) wrote: "I need hardly point out to you that this calculation would tend to keep the sum total of the world's population in a state of perpetual equipoise, whereas it is a well-known fact that the said sum total is constantly on the increase. I would therefore take the liberty of suggesting that in the next edition of your excellent poem the erroneous calculation to which I refer should be corrected as follows: 'Every moment dies a man/ And one and a sixteenth is born.' I may add that the exact figures [ratio] are 1.167, but something must, of course, be conceded to the laws of metre." (Babbage, 1961)

Kant's version of logical manipulation, if less absurd, still carries the same flavor. Above all, the Good Will must act according to an unexceptionable principle, i.e., must be absolutely consistent. The result is the unfortunate categorical imperative: act so that thou can will the principle (maxim) of thy action to become a universal law. Out of this piece of logic-playing Kant hoped to derive all the moral code. The argument goes as follows: "A man decides that he must borrow some money. He knows that he will not be able to repay it, but he sees that no one will lend him a penny unless he forcefully and convincingly promises to repay in a definite time Suppose, now, he resolves to borrow and promise to repay; then the maxim of his action would be expressed thus: whenever I think myself in want of money, I will borrow and promise to repay, though I know I'll never be able to do so. . . . Now what would this maxim be like if it were a universal law? We see at once that it could never hold as a universal law of nature, because it would contradict itself. For if we suppose it to be a universal law that everyone when he thinks himself in a difficulty should be able to promise whatever he pleases, with the intent of not keeping his promise, the promise itself would become impossible, as well as the end that one might have in view of it, since no one would believe that anything was promised to him, but would ridicule all promises as vain pretenses." (Kant, 1785, p. 49)

Most people whose orientation is towards feeling would quite naturally suspect this account of morality, and might be justified in labeling it "logical doggerel". They might, indeed, find James Tate's (1969) version more palatable:

The Book of Lies

I'd like to have a word
with you. Could we be alone
for a minute? I have been lying
until now. Do you believe

I believe myself? Do you believe
yourself when you believe me? Lying
is natural. Forgive me. Could we be alone
forever? Forgive us all. The word

is my enemy. I have never been alone;
bribes, betrayals, I am lying
even now. Can you believe
that? I give you my word.

But even introverted thinking types can easily find the defect in Kant's logic. Deception is a strategy in the game of life. Thus, according to game theory, one deceives another by playing a mixed strategy of honesty and lying. There is nothing inconsistent about universalizing the maxim of this mixed strategy: i.e., all persons can play their life's moves in an optimal (min-max) manner in which deception plays an integral part. (For details, see, for example, Luce and Raiffa, 1957.) Thus, not surprisingly, introverted thinking can destroy what introverted thinking creates.

As another example, Kant believes that it is immoral to commit suicide, because "we see at once the self-contradictoriness of a system of nature in which there is a law which says that life should be destroyed by the very spirit-of-life whose special nature is to improve life." (Kant, 1785, p. 48) It only took the cleverness of a Schopenhauer to make a whole philosophy out of the "nature" which Kant took to be self-contradictory.

But, though Kant fell victim to his thinking function in this regard, his thinking nonetheless led him to a beautiful and convincing

concept of morality, and is as good a reading of morality as one can find in the whole literature. It is best expressed in his Fundamental Principles: "So act as to treat humanity, whether in your own person or that of another, in every case as an end withal, never as a means only." The immorality of suicide and deception now appear in a clearer light: "Firstly, under the head of necessary duty to oneself: He who contemplates suicide should ask himself whether his action can be consistent with the idea of humanity as an end in itself. If he destroys himself in order to escape from painful circumstances, he uses a person merely as a means to maintain a tolerable condition up to the end of life. But a man is not a thing, that is to say, something which can be used merely as means, but must in all his actions be always considered as an end in himself. I cannot, therefore, dispose in any way of a man in my own person so as to mutilate him, to damage or kill him

"Secondly, as regards necessary duties, or those of strict obligation, towards others; he who is thinking of making a lying promise to others will see at once that he would be using another man merely as a means without the latter containing at the same time the end in himself. For he whom I propose by such a promise to use for my own purposes cannot possibly assent to my mode of acting towards him, and therefore cannot himself contain the end of this action. This violation of the principle of humanity in other men is more obvious if we take in examples of attacks on the freedom and property of others. For then it is clear that he who transgresses the rights of men, intends to use the person of others merely as means, without considering that as rational beings they ought always to be esteemed also as ends, that is, as beings who

must be capable of containing in themselves the end of the very same action" (Kant, 1785, p. 58).

This very significant piece of morality is enough for our purposes, even though we may not be able to say exactly what it means. But we can say many things that it could mean, each very rich in its psychological implications.

In its most direct form it says to me that whenever someone uses someone else in exactly the same way that he would use an inanimate object, he is being immoral. Consider, for example, that American past-time called "urban redevelopment." Slums are ugly, dirty places. So the planners have gone into the business of cleaning them up. To this end in the past they knocked down the walls and hauled away the boards and stones. They also hauled away the inhabitants. They never asked the boards and stones how they felt about it all, how they want to exist; neither did they ask the inhabitants. The slum dwellers are treated in exactly the same manner as the inanimate objects, as means, not as ends.

But the drama of this sort of planning arrogance is much more significant than appears at first sight. Nowadays, planners are more sophisticated, and do try to determine how people in the slums feel, and in general how the whole community benefits by a change. Suppose, for example, the slums are being cleared in order to build a hospital, which is desperately needed by the city. Then, says the planner, a few slum dwellers will be inconvenienced but to the benefit of a great many other people. The total social benefit will be maximized if we build the hospital. Furthermore, if we are wise planners, we will see to it that the inhabitants are housed in even better dwellings than they left,

i.e., are placed in more appropriate quarters. So where is the immorality? It is there, nonetheless, no matter how benevolent we are. Because when we looked at the old and filthy boards and stones, we said to them: "There's a better place for you to go, rather than to remain here. We will haul you off to more appropriate quarters." In other words, we treat our slum dwellers in exactly the same way in which we treat the inanimate objects, as means, not ends.

The apparent conflict between Kantian morality and social necessity is nowhere so clearly expressed as in the military. In a spring 1969 issue of Life magazine, the following description of the philosophy of the military career man is given: "In the Washington Office of Lt. General Lewis W. Walt, hero of three wars and Assistant Commandant of the U. S. Marine Corps, hangs a bronze plaque. Entitled 'The Leader's Code,' it sets forth the principles by which General Walt and a vast majority of other U. S. military men try to live.

"'I become a leader,' it begins, 'by what I do. I know my strength and my weakness, and I strive constantly for self-improvement I know my job and I carry out the spirit as well as the letter of orders I receive.'

"Perhaps its key sentences are these: 'I estimate the situation and make my own decision as to the best course of action' and 'I see that [my men] understand their orders, and I follow through to insure that their duties are fully discharged.'

"Decisions, in short, are the exclusive province of the leader. All his men need understand are the orders deriving from them--not how or why or by whom the decision was reached."

This description is followed by a soldier's reactions:

"'So many of our people were dead at the end of each week,' recalls Ken Willis. 'You begin to feel you've been in Vietnam all your life. You're a machine, only capable of reacting to booby traps. You feel you're hanging on a string and somebody may cut that string. Emotionally and psychologically you're running away from the situation, but physically you're stuck there.'"

Of course, the whole problem of the draft in America is well known to have moral overtones: many citizens believe that the draft laws are immoral, because they "use" young men who have no say in the matter to serve as means only for society's "good", as seen by some of the elders.

Much the same conflicts have occurred between those who wish to maintain "law and order" and those who have other aims in life. Recently, I was teargassed during class at the University of California at Berkeley, because the National Guard wished to disperse the dissident students; I was describing Kant's moral thesis as the gas poured into the classroom. No more dramatic illustration could have been devised.

Another way to state Kant's thesis is to point out that morality knows no trade-offs--no calculus of benefits here minus costs there. One does not make up for evil by doing more good; once the immoral act is done, it is there, and remains there forever.

There are actually a number of versions of Kant's theory. Thus a "mild version" would say that so long as a person agrees to being treated as a means only, then no immorality occurs. In the quotation above, Kant himself seems to imply that "assent" on the part of another may remove the immorality. A strong version, which I'll adopt here, says that the immorality is independent of a person's wishes; or, put otherwise, it is immoral to act or assent to another's acting so that

you are treated as a means only.

The challenge of the strong version of Kant's theory of morality is pervasive and inescapable. For example, I'm probably being immoral in the manner in which I've written this essay, for I've "used" four people as a means to an end, by translating their works to serve my own purposes. I could try to defend this act on prudential grounds, by arguing that the risk of misrepresentation of their ideas is well compensated by the richness of material and strength of idea one gains by the dramatic method. But the issue is whether one can resolve apparent immorality in this manner. Is the strong version of Kant's moral theory tenable, or can we show that all that is contained therein is adequately captured by a thoroughgoing prudential philosophy?

Thus we owe it to ourselves to see whether we can hear the voice of individual morality through the loud-speaker of social morality (prudentiality). We need to see what social morality really is. This is the third question, which now takes the form: can we evolve a plan of serving the needs and wants of mankind which will at the same time provide us with a sound morality? If mankind is thoroughly prudent in seeking his own happiness, will not morality emerge as a by-product? For Kant, the answer was, "only in the limit". At any stage, seeking happiness, either social or individual, is at variance with the moral law. One cannot simultaneously be a benevolent planner and be completely moral.

Kant and Jung

We need to understand this point more thoroughly. But before we start this philosophical investigation, we should look at our fourth question: how are morality and psychology related? We see that Kant postulated the purest of archetypes, the Good Will, as the dominating

force in his morality. The archetype is so pure, in fact, that it is timeless. "Time," for Kant, is the archetype of his first Critique, as we have seen, and it helps individuate the objects of the phenomenal world. As Kant puts it: "Now, in order to resolve the apparent contradiction between freedom and the determinism of nature in one and the same action, we must recall what was said in the Critique of Pure Reason, or what follows therefrom, namely, that the necessity of nature, which cannot co-exist with the freedom of the subject, pertains only to the properties of the thing which is subject to time-conditions. In other words, the necessity of nature applies only to the subject as a phenomenon. . . . But the very same subject, who on the other side is conscious of himself as a thing-in-himself, also considers his existence insofar as it is not subject to time conditions, and thinks of himself as being determined by laws which he gives himself through reason. In this aspect of his existence, nothing comes temporally before the determination of his will. . . ." (Kant, 1788, p. 229).

Hence, in the noumenal world of the second Critique, time and its correlate, causality, do not exist. Furthermore, the Good Will even transcends anthropology as a behavioral science, as we have seen, and becomes the archetype of the pure moral law.

However, Kant leaves us with a deep puzzle vis-à-vis the psychological individual. In the first Critique, he argued that things may be individuated in one of two ways--by a space-time framework, or by minute description. Both methods have been used by science from its very beginnings. The planets are individuated by their orbits in the heavens, i.e., by space and time. Men are often individuated by their fingerprints, i.e., by minute description.

But now we come to the world of the Good Will. What individuates one Will from another? Not space and time, as we have seen. Nor minute description either, because all the categories of rich experience have nothing to do with the Good Will. What then? Although Kant may have been aware of this problem, and somehow thought of a Good Will as being related to a specific space-time individuated human, no really satisfactory story is forthcoming. But Jung can help, because he was inventing a new theory of psychological individuation as he went along. The individual is the self, but the self in a unique form. The point is a very subtle one, but suppose we try it this way. That two leaves in the forest cannot be exactly alike is almost certainly true. But as Kant pointed out, in principle they could be: there is no logical or physical reason for the impossibility of two leaves being the same. Furthermore, even though two leaves are not exactly alike, they may be very much more alike than they are like other things; there are degrees of likeness, so to speak. But in the case of the unique individual, we must say that in principle he is not exactly like anyone else, and there are no degrees of likeness: he isn't more like this individual than that individual. We see the similarity in this last point between uniqueness and morality. In morality there are no degrees of goodness, no trade-offs of good for evil; in uniqueness there are no degrees either, no comparisons. Grammatically, we can't say, "You're pretty unique," but most important, psychologically we can't either.

But remember all along we are trying to speak to the scientific mind, which will want to know what this uniqueness really is. And the answer is not readily at hand, because we lack a logic of uniqueness.

Nevertheless, there are a number of very helpful as well as radical ideas which Jung presents. First, individuation is a process for Jung, and in this regard he differs from Kant and all the rest of science. At a given moment of time, a body is individuated for Kant and for all physics, even including modern quantum mechanics, where statistical distributions of the position of a particle do not in the least negate the static nature of its individuation. But what does Jung mean by a process of individuation? Does he mean we move toward uniqueness? But, then, aren't there degrees of uniqueness after all?

Kant and Jung

Thus, as so often happens with one's reactions to Jung, we have both an insight and a deep puzzlement. The insight is the idea that psychological individuation is a process, and not a completion. Another way to put the matter is to say that individuation by space and time is essentially dependent on the object's relationship to other objects, just as is individuation by minute description. But the kind of individuation Jung seems to have in mind seems not to have this essential property; although relationships are very important, especially relationships to other psyches, the individuation itself is not essentially built out of such relationships.

Further to deepen the insight and confound the perspective is Jung's elevation of the process of individuation to the pinnacle of the good, so that the process is alike to Plato's soul contemplating the pure idea, and Kant's Good Will motivated by the moral law within. Here are the comparisons.

Jung and Plato

In the Platonic myths, not all souls reach the blessed state; indeed, it seems apparent that the great mass of them do not. And here is Jung on the same topic: "These proceedings [of therapy] rest on the assumption that a man is capable of attaining wholeness, in other words, that he has it in him to be healthy. I mention this assumption because there are without doubt individuals who are not at bottom altogether viable and who rapidly perish if, for any reason, they come face to face with their wholeness. Even if this does not happen, they merely lead a miserable existence for the rest of their days as fragments or partial personalities, shored up by social or psychic parasitism. Such people are, very much to the misfortune of others, more often than not inveterate humbugs who cover up their deadly emptiness under a fine outward show. It would be a hopeless undertaking to try to treat them with the method here discussed. The only thing that "helps" here is to keep up the show, for the truth would be unendurable or useless." (Jung, 1953, p. 109)

Jung and Kant

The moral principle that emerges in Jung is "thou shalt undergo the process of individuation". If we apply Kant's principle of treating every man as "an end withal", what seems to emerge is "thou shalt never interfere with the process of individuation of thyself or another". Jung seems never to state the principle in this form, but he comes close to it: "Here one may ask, perhaps, why it is so desirable that a man should be individuated. Not only is it desirable, it is absolutely indispensable because, through his contamination with others,

he falls into situations and commits actions which bring him into disharmony with himself. From all states of unconscious contamination and non-differentiation there is begotten a compulsion to be and to act in a way contrary to one's own nature. Accordingly a man can neither be at one with himself nor accept responsibility for himself. He feels himself to be in a degrading, unfree, unethical condition. But the disharmony with himself is precisely the neurotic and intolerable condition from which he seeks to be delivered, and deliverance from this condition will come only when he can be and act as he feels is conformable with his true self. People have a feeling for these things, dim and uncertain at first, but growing ever stronger and clearer with progressive development. When a man can say of his states and actions, 'As I am, so I act,' he can be at one with himself, even though it be difficult, and he can accept responsibility for himself even though he struggle against it. We must recognize that nothing is more difficult to bear with than oneself. ('You sought the heaviest burden, and found yourself,' says Nietzsche.) Yet even this most difficult of achievements becomes possible if we can distinguish ourselves from the unconscious contents. The introvert discovers these contents in himself, the extravert finds them projected upon human objects. In both cases the unconscious contents are the cause of blinding illusions which falsify ourselves and our relations to our fellowmen, making both unreal. For these reasons individuation is indispensable for certain people, not only as a therapeutic necessity, but as a high ideal, an idea of the best we can do. Nor should I omit to remark that it is at the same time the primitive Christian ideal of the Kingdom of Heaven which 'is within you.' The idea at the bottom of this ideal

is that right action comes from right thinking, and that there is no cure and no improving of the world that does not begin with the individual himself. To put the matter drastically: the man who is pauper or parasite will never solve the social question." (Jung, 1953, p. 223).

We see from this passage that if we define individual morality as the obligation to undergo the process of individuation, and social morality (planning) as the obligation to satisfy people's needs and wants, then Jung makes individual morality a necessary condition that must be satisfied before social morality can exist. Here we have one answer to the relationship between morality and (social) prudence. But a certain amount of uneasiness with this answer must occur.

The uneasiness arises out of the need, for Jung, to create an environment for the process of individuation, e.g., the sessions where the analyst and his "patient" interact. Of course, any specific environment is not required, and Jung does state that many people have gone through the process of individuation without any clearly recognizable professional help. But there can be no question that many others desperately require such aids, or else they run into a deep danger of following pathways that run out in a dry and rocky wilderness from whence there is no return. Thus it apparently follows that there are some, and perhaps a very large number of souls who can become blessed only if the social environment provided them aid. In this regard, Kant seems to be on safer ground, for there is no indication in Kant that a particular social organization would significantly aid men in being motivated by the Good Will. But even for Kant the matter is not

at all clear. It is reported that he criticized on moral grounds a poor man's stealing bread for his starving family; somehow, obeying the moral law "thou shalt not steal" does seem a bit easier for the affluent than for the deprived.

Hence, we owe it to ourselves to see whether the opposite of Jung's thesis is not more correct; individual morality presupposes the solution of social morality. That is, we ask whether there is some social institution which would help bring about everything Kant wanted to have happen in his Kingdom of Ends, or Jung in his Kingdom of Heaven. Otherwise expressed, the question is this: "Can we extend social morality--i.e., social prudence, far enough so that it will provide us with all we need for a code of individual morality?" If we can, then perhaps the need for uniqueness will also disappear.

Singer

Our spokesman now is Edgar A. Singer. We note first of all that Singer's program (of defining all morality within what I am calling social morality) needs to reintroduce purpose. For Kant (but not necessarily for Jung), the moral law is not valid because it serves some purpose; it is valid in-and-of itself. In other words, Kant's morality is ateleological, while Singer's is teleological. Singer characterizes ateleological goods as follows:

"And so, to make a beginning--a convenient rather than a forced one--any definition of the good must do one of two things: it must either imply or not imply reference to an end and a means. So much in the way of classification logic alone may effect, but only the historian can say which of these possibilities the thought of the past has accepted, or whether its opinion lies divided between the two. One will, in fact,

find the latter to have been the case; and moreover find the alternative ways of defining to have been called from an early day the 'teleological' and the 'ateleological' respectively. For reasons that will appear as we advance, we may let the historian provide us first with examples of 'ateleological goods'.

"These ateleological goods are the easiest of all to find, for they cost no thought to formulate and still less to follow; together they make up the world's treasure of maxims. 'Let justice be done though the heavens fall,' the Roman saying had it, and no wording could have been better conceived to bring out the virtue to which all maxims pretend--that of setting forth practices universally good; not good as means to one end and not to another, nor yet ends for which now one means and now another is good, but practices certain to be good 'whatever happens'. Primitive taboos, sacred customs, decalogues, unwritten laws of heaven, categorical imperatives are all of this character; they all purport to be universal and necessary rules of conduct issued in the name of virtue or of piety or of both. The authority accorded them by the mind accepting them never differs greatly from that acknowledged by Antigone in her hour of trial: all that man may devise 'must yield unto the changeless, unwritten word of God; for this is not of today or yesterday, but lives forever; and no man knows when first it came to be'. As for the theory of contentment that goes with this conception of purposeless goodness, Antigone again best suggests the essence of it: not to live by the unwritten word is to suffer an inner discontent so incurable that a life lived in the torment of it would not be worth the living." (Singer, 1936, p. 125)

But for Singer, the question of whether we should pursue an ateleological ethics is quite simply answered in today's world, because ateleological goods have no place:

"Of the many simplicities and sincerities of the past there is none the modern mind feels itself more confidently to have outlived than such as seek contentment in a life of obedience to purposeless laws, laws for which no more can be said than that 'no man knows when first they came to be' or why or wherefore. To more experienced thought the whole history of the part played by such laws (written or unwritten) in the lives of men is likely to be viewed as presenting a problem of interest to the anthropologist and psychologist, but to no other. In so far as these scientists have found explanation for the phenomena involved, the origin of the law and of the fear to break it are given a common reason: the law represents a general principle of practice that once served the common purpose of those who felt bound to observe it. Their bondage, enforced by social sanctions slow to change, long outlived the purpose that bound them, with consequences anything but happy to those whose morality must in the end have become an inexplicable slavery. Evidently this explanation will hold as true of the 'moral bondage' of today as of any that ever withheld the past from intelligent self-emancipation. So far as one can observe, the faith that still abides in inviolable principles is a source of anything but content, even to those who live by it." (Singer, 1936, p. 127)

For Singer, if we are to search in a rational manner for the good, it must be found in our purposes, i.e., our goals or ends. One might conclude immediately that Singer is on his way to relativism, that very dull philosophy which answers all questions with "it depends." If the good is to be found in our purposes, then doesn't it follow that one man's good is inevitably another's evil, and there is no absolute good?

But Singer does not end up in relativism at all, but instead in a very modern form of absolutism. He does so by borrowing an idea directly from Kant, namely, the notion of an "ideal". An "end", he tells us, is a goal that in principle can be attained, e.g., the goal of eating a meal, or reading a book, or defeating an enemy. But an ideal in principle is unattainable, but in principle can be approximated within any prescribed limit. The concept of "ideals" is no empty abstraction, for Singer has an example of his notion of ideals in modern science. Consider, for example, the velocity of light in a vacuum. In 1875 it was calculated with a standard error of plus or minus 300 kilometers per second; in the 1950's, it was calculated with a standard error of plus or minus 0.5 kilometers per second. Singer's point is that this physical constant has an exact value which does "exist", but no man will ever know what it is. According to Singer, the answer to any question anyone can meaningfully pose is always an ideal; the statements we make in response to questions about the natural world are always approximations. Singer's philosophy is an idealistic realism: the real is always an ideal.

Singer used the whole community of ideal searching scientists as a model for his theory of the good. But he is much too close to modern culture to equate the good with the true, i.e., to say that our moral obligation as humans is solely to approximate the answers to questions more and more closely. There must be a more fundamental ideal which explains why truth-approximation is a good. If we can find such an ideal, then we have an absolute good, not a relative one. But it is an absolute good that we can only know imperfectly, even though it exists absolutely.

Singer is very much like Kant in that he uses his introverted thinking to do the job for him. Were he more an extravert he might pose his question as follows: "Is there anthropological evidence that man is an ideal seeker, and if so, what ideals does he seek?" Such a question might have led him on a search over cultures and ages for the basic patterns of ideal seeking, as Jung searched for evidence of archetypes. Instead, he saves himself the cost of this trip, at least temporarily, by some thought. As we shall see, in the end he still has to attempt the hero's voyage with a different mission in mind. His thought is this:

"Everyone will have heard a certain slangy sentiment with which the man of our day is given to toasting the fellow of whose projects he approves: 'More power to his arm!' This toast will have been raised to a thousand undertakings, different enough and even contradictory; yet the wish of him who proposes it will always be the same. Well, but there is always one fellow of whose projects a man is bound to approve, one man to whom each of us is ready at every moment to raise this toast: from the beginning of life to the end thereof every mortal man will constantly want for himself increasing power of arm. Is there not then this unchanging wish that runs like an unbroken thread through all life's moments, on which are strung the vari-colored beads of desire? And yet there is such treachery in words one must not accede in haste. Here, for example, it is certain that there is an ever-repeated wish, a wish that always expresses itself in the same form of words, but is it certain that these same words always mean the same thing? Indeed, do they ever twice denote the same thing? If their prayer were twice granted, would the two increments of power accorded the petitioner add

up to one increment by which his power was enhanced? Of one who has been granted a wish to become a more powerful chess player and thereafter his wish to become a more powerful flute player, what would one say in the end; has he been increased in power, or multiplied in powers? With no more than this to guide us the latter no doubt is all we should feel justified in affirming; but if we were asked, not which of the two we had prayed for but for which of the two we should pray, could we hesitate? Not if there is any soundness to the 'ancient wisdom of childhood,' learned from a thousand fairy godmothers who have left no godchild untested on this very point. Their lesson is always the same: 'With only one wish to be had, choose rather the power to get whatever you may come to want than the pleasure of having any dearest thing in the world.' Our modern at any rate takes this ancient wisdom to have touched the bottom of things; he takes the deepest wish in any man, the common wish of all men, to be no other than the wish for more power--the wish to grow more powerful." (Singer, 1936, p. 145).

The word "power" in this passage is rather unfortunate, because the meaning of the term has been changing radically in the last few years. To a nineteenth century mind (and a part of Singer was nineteenth century), there could be nothing wrong with each individual's having more power, because it meant that he had an increased ability to cope with life and its environment, and in particular, to aid his fellow man. The same remark can be made about "control." When Singer writes on the idea of progress he concludes that it is "the measure of man's cooperation with man in the conquest [i.e., control] of nature measures progress." But "conquest" or "control" of nature did not mean

exploitation of nature to the nineteenth century mind. However, for today's youth, "power" and "control" both have strong negative connotations and are in a sense antithetical to the emerging morality of the individual. Thus to appreciate Singer we will have to be tolerant of his language as well as his introverted thinking. As far as the latter is concerned, we can see the trick it has played on us. If we are teleological creatures, as Jung and Singer both believed, then we seek goals; if we seek goals, then all of us must also want the power to attain them, and this therefore is our common ideal. Thinking tells us so. It tells us that if anyone wants X, he also wants the power to attain X.

Now one question which it is always appropriate to ask an introverted thinker when he is being very introverted and thoughtful is whether his pronouncements are tautologies; he above all will recognize the fairness of this question, because he is intensely interested in tautologies. Leibniz, for example, believed that God thinks only in tautologies, i.e., that tautological thinking is perfect knowledge. So we ask Singer whether the sentence "if A wants X, A also wants the power to attain X" is a tautology, and I suspect that his answer must be "yes". Indeed, the evidence we use to establish the fact that a person "wants X" is the fact that he seeks the power to attain X, so that "wanting X" operationally means "seeking the power to attain X". But I remember in one of his seminars on Hegel, a colleague asked Singer whether one of Hegel's statements was a tautology. Singer looked at it for awhile and said, "Yes, but it's a very good one." He wasn't being altogether facetious, either. You see, it's always possible to make fun of the superior function of any psychological type whenever the function reveals itself in a more or less pure form.

But the critical point is not the direct behavior itself, but what is created by it. So Kant's "discovery" of the categorical imperative by pure thought is somewhat absurd. But something very beautiful and powerful came out of it, namely, his Kingdom of Ends. So, too, Singer's bit of "deducing" the moral law, "thou shalt seek power" is also somewhat absurd, but what comes out of it is one of the deepest and most significant accounts of social morality that has ever been written.

Singer's story of social morality is divided into two parts, which can be labeled positive and negative, provided, like good Jungians or Hegelians, we recognize the positive side of the negative as well as the negative side of the positive.

The positive side draws heavily on the nineteenth century optimists, Bentham, Mill, etc., but vastly enriches their concepts of social utility. The general idea, which emerges from his basic tautology, is to develop an "enabling" value theory, i.e., to categorize those activities which increase an individual's chances of gaining what he wants. These are rather easy to enumerate: (1) a richness of means at his disposal, i.e., "plenty". (2) an awareness of the appropriate means to select, i.e., "knowledge", and (3) a desire for goals that are consistent with the goals of others, i.e., "cooperation". This trilogy of ideals neatly summarizes all that is contained in Singer's concept of power. A member of a community which progressed towards such a combination of ideals would find himself rich in opportunities, skillful in the selection of the right one, and not only free of interference by others, but enjoying their help and his own helpfulness.

But the simple listing of these ideals is not enough, because the

important point is the dynamics of their pursuit, which is most complicated. One clear story that history tells us, and especially recent history, is that societies which become reasonably successful in creating plenty at the same time become dangerously non-cooperative. Indeed, a social philosopher like Jacques Ellul (1964) has taken affluence to be a degrading form of human life, and has recommended the destruction of technology so that we can escape its determinism. The implication of his theory is that as a race we cannot successfully pursue all three ideals. But his evidence is weak, because there has been so little inquiry into the dynamics of ideal pursuit. It seems likely that a strong technological society tends to produce indifference to others, and especially those who are deprived. But if we could better understand what brings about a cooperative society, e.g., a scientific community or an artist colony, then we might better understand how plenty and cooperation can coexist.

I have been perhaps overly brief in describing the first part of Singer's idealism, to which he devoted most of his life, in order to have more room for the second part, which is more germane to our drama. The question that any reasonable man will raise who is aware of his own self-interest is this: why should I pursue these ideals to any extent beyond what serves me best? Or, why not seek to find just that modicum of plenty, knowledge and cooperation which will make a comfortable life, free of anxiety and want? The answer is, because the ideal of life is not to seek comfort, but contentment. The spirit of this reply is to be found in a number of sources, e.g., in Thomas à Kempis, "My son, I ought to be thy supreme and ultimate end if thou would be truly blessed". Or, in Chateaubriand's description of a static

heaven as "dreariness" (froideur). Singer's word for the ideal seeker is the "hero," who is the blessed: "If to persevere in a progressive life is a necessary condition to contentment, then to win contentment one needs all the qualities of the hero." (Singer, 1964, p. 34).

Singer and Jung

Here again there will be some confusion of terminology, because the archetype of the hero in Jung is only one among many, and the heroic is often taken as a description of one stage of development, rather than a description of all development, as in Singer. But Jung does on occasion refer to the whole process in this manner: "Not for nothing is the individuation process said to be an analogy of the 'quest of the hero'" (J. Jacobi, 1965, p. 47).

One senses a parallelism of discovery of Jung and Singer, each independently searching out the same mystery. The quality of mind that makes a person seek his own individuation for Jung is that same quality which makes him a "hero" for Singer. Of course, the descriptions are different, or, rather, complementary. The key concept in Singer is "renewal," the renewal that brings on a mood of dissatisfaction with oneself and one's surroundings. It is the very same psychic force which drives one through the "stages" of individuation. Indeed, the same image, the spiral, is used to describe the process. Compare, for example, these two accounts of disciples of Singer and Jung:

"The point of view we have tried to develop in this essay is that the time has come to recognize the circularity, or spiral form of science, and the complete interdependence of the sciences. It is perfectly proper to consider one phase of nature as though it were known, while we

develop another phase, as long as we do not make this a permanent state of affairs." (Churchman, 1948, p. 216).

"The individuation process, as the way of development and maturation of the psyche, does not follow a straight line, nor does it always lead onwards and upwards. The course it follows is rather 'stadial', consisting of progress and regress, flux and stagnation in alternating sequence. Only when we glance back over a long stretch of the way can we notice the development. If we wish to mark out the way somehow or other, it can equally well be considered a 'spiral', the same problems and motifs occurring again and again on different levels." (Jacobi, 1965, p. 34).

For both pathfinders, Jung and Singer, there is the need to explain the psychic energy that drives the process, of individuation or the heroic life. And the answers are alike. Here is Singer's:

". . . man is not inherently heroic, or if he be, yet is he not easily stirred to display his heroism in action. Seeing which, we cannot but reflect that if there were any source from which man could draw new heroism, new power to carry on the fight for power, how invaluable to his contentment would be the discovery of this source! But if, indeed, the only one to whom man can turn for help is man, and if all a man can do for himself and all his neighbor can do for him is exhausted in the scientific and moral equipment already organized into the texture of a progressive community, he cannot turn at the moment of acting to any living being for additional help. Such help as the living are able to give has already been given. What remains? Beside the living, what other humanity is there to turn to, except the dead?" (Singer, 1948, p. 34)

And the help that the "dead" may provide the hero is, for Singer, through art, through the creation of an heroic mood, which is his "fourth ideal":

"Among the states of being commonly, and, as I think, properly classed as moods is one we call the heroic. Under its sway we see things neither in rosy red nor somber black, face things neither with emotionally drunken courage nor emotionally stricken fear. The hero looks on the chances that lie before him with all the clarity of vision his intelligence can command; he faces the known risk with neither fear nor fury in his heart; he accepts the dangerous game for but one reason; realising that some objective dear to himself and his kind is only to be won by someone taking the inevitable risk of trying for it, he offers himself as that one, or quietly accepts at the hands of fate the role for which fate has cast him. Such heroism as this has no biological past. It is not a biologist's category; the hero did not come into being until the artist, the tragic artist, created him. And since he, with the mood to which he gives his name, is essentially a work of art, is it not into such as he that the artist makes us when he moves us out of ourselves? When he moves us out of our ordinary humdrum selves into a newness of being strange to us?" (Singer, 1948, p. 54)

Jung's concept of renewal is based on the "collective psyche," which, in spirit, is exactly what Singer meant as well: "Access to the collective psyche produces a renewal of life in the individual, whether the sensation resulting from it be agreeable or disagreeable. One would like to hang on to that renewal, in some cases because the

vital feelings find themselves thereby fortified, in others because it promises the mind a rich harvest of new knowledge. In both cases, those who are unwilling to renounce the treasures buried in the collective psyche will try to retain, by any means possible, the new elements whose advent has added something to their primary reason for living. The best means would seem to be identification with the collective psyche, for the dissolution of the personal positively invites one to plunge into that 'ocean of divinity' and, losing all memory, to merge oneself with it. This mystical phenomenon, which is a propensity of all mankind, is as innate in everyone of us as the 'desire for the mother', the longing to return to the source from whence we came.

"As I have shown elsewhere,* there lies at the root of the regressive nostalgia which Freud regards as 'infantile fixation' or incestuous desire, an essential value to which the myths, for example, bear witness. It is precisely the best and the strongest among men, the heroes, who give way to their regressive nostalgia and purposely expose themselves to the danger of being devoured by the monstrous primal cause. But if a man is a hero, he is a hero because, in the final reckoning, he did not let the monster devour him, but subdued it--not once but many times. It is in the achievement of victory over the collective psyche that the true value lies; and this is the meaning of the conquest of the treasure, of the invincible weapon, the magic talisman--in short, of all those desirable goods that the myths tell of. Anyone who identifies himself with the collective psyche, or, in symbolic language, lets himself be devoured by the monster and becomes absorbed in her, also attains to the treasure defended by the dragon,

*Cf., The Psychology of the Unconscious.

but he does so in spite of himself and to his own great loss."

(Jung, 1953, p. 280)

I think I have said enough to establish a close relationship between Singer and Jung with respect to the process of individuation, even though both were working independently and knew little or nothing of the other's efforts. But now something needs to be said about the difference between the two, which is also striking. Jung's basic exhortation is towards the psyche as a reality, and towards the individual psyche, while Singer's is towards the collective "mankind", and towards the most general psyche. Jung's hero seeks the completeness of the Self, Singer's the completeness of all Selves.*

Jung devotes most of his life work to the scholarly examination of the sources history provides of the myriad of pathways of individuation, while Singer devoted most of his life's work to the philosophical study of science and society. Singer has made social morality a necessary condition for individual morality; individual morality only gains its meaning in the context of a service to mankind. Jung does the opposite; only when the individual has attained a degree of maturity will he adequately respond to social problems. But I suspect that the children of such parents would find their differences to be one of life style rather than basically important. It is certainly natural that an introverted thinker would in his later years regard service to mankind as the most relevant aspect of the world, for thereby he can introvertedly explore his extroverted side. The young Jung of the early

*The distinction is a subtle but important one. In Jung the "Self" is a collective, but is not the "sum" of all individual selves, while for Singer it is: nothing more can be added to the concept of Self than what is contained in all "selves".

experiments strikes me as being extroverted thinking, and if this guess is accurate, one can account for his second stage of life as a search for the inner life.

But where has all this left us with respect to morality? Did Singer successfully solve the problem of Kant's second Critique by "reducing" individual morality to social morality? In one sense "yes", because he did, I think, show how determinism and freedom are consistent with one another,* and thus avoided the awkward metaphysics of Kant's two worlds. Indeed, my guess is that since 1940, with the publication of Rosenbleuth's, Bigelow's, and Wiener's classic paper (1943), apparently written independently of Singer's, the scientific community recognizes that teleological freedom and mechanistic determinism are fully compatible ways of viewing the world.

But neither Jung nor Singer really solved Kant's basic problem, namely, the origin and nature of an ateleological moral law. The moral question is, why undertake the heroic quest? For Jung, the answer is, because you will be complete, and for Singer, because thereby you will help approximate mankind's completeness. But why be complete, or why try to complete mankind? Jung could scarcely say that a man who had lived only one side of himself is inevitably unhappy. Some men have an immense capacity to live out their lives as a puer aeternus, continually excited by the very process of life, and can be quite eloquent at age sixty about the value of such a life. And as for Singer, there are thousands of obvious instances of comfortable, contented do-nothings who also can wax eloquent on the excellence of doing nothing.

*For a further discussion of this point, see, for example, Churchman (1960) as well as Singer (1946).

Plato, Kant, Singer, Jung

The task before us seems clear, in the light of the dialogue we have just witnessed. We can summarize what has been said as follows:

1. Morality and reality

Kant and Plato argue that the reality of morality is a different kind of reality from the behavioral phenomena of mankind, and Singer disagrees. For Kant, the "postulates" of morality arise from the nature of this independent existence. For Singer, the "postulates" are demands the future makes on present choices: if you like, the postulates of morality are in part what our progeny would request of us were they alive today. The "voice of morality" is our estimate of what they would wish. As we shall see in the next chapter, Jung in his later years suggested an hypothesis of an independent, "acausal" psychic reality, which might serve as a modern version of Kant's or Plato's ontological hypotheses. In any event, today is an excellent occasion for raising again the question of the reality of morality, because with the "new" physics and psychology, and an increased interest in reconciling oriental and occidental science, the whole subject of reality is under review.

It is clear that Singer's viewpoint is the soundest one from the point of view of the academic community, since it does not require our going beyond accepted ways of conceptualizing reality. It is also clear that the Platonic viewpoint is far more acceptable to a great many people who believe in some "greater reality," e.g., a god, as the origin of morality. (God, Freedom and Immortality)

2. Morality and reason

Here three of our four disputants fundamentally agree: morality is "rational," though they differ about what "reason" means. For Plato, reason is a characteristic of the real world; for Kant, in his second Critique, it is pure consistency, while for Singer it might be described as the scientific method. In Jung, reason is a confusing term, and one has a number of choices. It could describe a psychological function, which has its real opposite, the irrational. There is no apparent requirement that one link morality with either kind of function. But Jung believes that there is a science of the psyche, which can account for its reality and its manifestations, one of which is morality. Hence Jung could agree with Singer that the "rationality of morality" is the ideal of a scientific explanation of morality, an ideal that all four would certainly believe in.

3. Morality and planning

In its general form, this question asks whether morality can be understood in a teleological framework. Singer says yes, Kant says no. Plato probably says yes, because morality for him means the prescription to seek higher forms of life, e.g., to seek to contemplate the Good, and hence it is explained teleologically. As we have seen, if Jung means that "morality" is the prescription to go through the process of individuation, then morality is teleological. Hence the burden is with Kant: to defend a philosophy of life which is basically ateleological.

4. Morality and psychology

For each one of our four this is the central issue and the puzzle, the middle and the muddle. For Plato, the journey of the psyche is the main point of his moral philosophy, only to be told in myths. For Kant,

the mystery is the psychological nature of the Good Will; how can it at one and the same time be universal and individuated? For Singer, the psychological urge to go beyond satisfaction is both the strength and mystery of his philosophy. Perhaps only in Jung do we see a glimmer of understanding of the role that morality plays in the psyche, in the interplay of good and evil. More needs to be said about his insight.

The next act must be mainly Kant's, with the others contributing as they see fit. We need to bring Kant into our age, to develop a modern theory of ateleological morality. Only then can the dialogue meaningfully proceed.

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