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**Media, Memory, and Minority: The Russian-
Language TV Channel ETV+ and its Role in the
Long-Lasting “War of Memories” in Estonia**

MA thesis

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I have written this Master's thesis independently. All viewpoints of other authors, literary sources and data from elsewhere used for writing this paper have been referenced.

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ABSTRACT

This research evaluates the role of public minority language television as an agent of memory and actor in the achievement of the social cohesion. More precisely, it is focused on the case of the Estonian public television channel in the Russian language ETV+ and its coverage of commemorations in Estonia. This thesis analyses representations and interpretations of historic events in order to define how it deals with the conflict of memories between the Estonian and Russian-speaking communities.

The theoretical framework and research methodology refer to studies of media, memory, and minorities. Specifically, this study uses a combination of qualitative methods: from the one side it analyses the narrative indicators in the coverage of anniversary ceremonies; from the other side, it evaluates these narrative indicators, interprets meanings and draws the conclusion on this basis. The research defines three major categories of indicators: “self”/ “other”, shared Estonian-Russian history, and representation of the 'Russian' element in the local Estonian history.

On the empirical level, this study deals with materials produced by the television channel ETV+ during official and unofficial commemorations. It focuses on the coverage of four official Estonian anniversaries: the Estonian Independence Day (the 24th of February in 2016 and 2017), the Estonian Victory Day (the 23rd of June 2016), and Day of Restoration of Independence (the 20th of August 2016). In addition, it includes the 'Russian Victory Day' (the 9th of May 2016) and its commemoration in Estonia. The research period is from February 2016 to February 2017, because the work of the thesis was finished before the other dates of anniversaries. The research concludes that the public television in minority language can be a platform for the negotiation of the shared memory of majority and minority populations.

Keywords: memory, minority, media, public television, anniversary journalism, Russian-speaking minority, Estonia, ETV+.

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INTRODUCTION

Twenty-five years have already passed since the collapse of the Soviet Union, but its legacy still has a serious impact on the socio-political situation in post-Soviet countries. Estonia is a vivid example of such political development. During the Soviet time, Estonia suffered from the active “sovietization” and “russification”, which radically change the demographic situation in the country. Post-war reconstruction and the Soviet idea of the industrialization were combined with the mass migration of workers from all over the Soviet Union. However, despite the fact that many of these migrants originated from different parts of the Soviet Union, most of them spoke Russian, because this language was a *lingua franca*, i.e. it was used for intercultural communication within the Soviet Union. Many newly-arrived migrants had a low cultural and educational level since they do not strive for the Estonian language learning (Simonyan 2009, p.106; Kasekamp 2010, p.154). Soviet migrants felt comfortable with knowing the Russian language because all services were available in this language.

At the same time, many Estonians had to flee abroad during the war period to save their lives. According to estimations in 1934, the share of the Estonian population had been around 88%, and the main minorities had been Russians, Germans, Swedes, and Latvians, making up the remaining 12 % of the population. After the war, almost all national minorities in Estonia disappeared due to important war events, e.g. Germans left for Germany as their historic homeland in 1939, Swedes moved to Sweden, and Latvians suffered from German and Soviet deportation (Tammaru and Kulu 2003, p.106). Thus, the Estonian population increased as a share of the total population; however, Soviet times brought new demographical changes and decreased the share of

the Estonians within the total population, because of several active immigration flows during the post-war reconstruction period and active industrialization in the 1960s and 1970s. As a result, by the end of Soviet rule and the last Soviet census in 1989, the share of the Estonian population was equal to only 61 % of total population of Estonia. At the same time, the minority population was 39 % of the total population (Tammaru and Kulu 2003, p.107). Accordingly, the socioeconomic and ethnocultural structure of the Estonian society radically changed during this time, bringing new problems and challenges.

After the restoration of independence, Estonia had to deal with the serious problems triggered by the language and cultural division of the majority and minority communities within the country: the Estonian and Russian-speaking communities. In this way, Estonia illustrates the case of a “divided society” (Brüggemann and Kasekamp 2008, p.429). The social division is partially based on the distinct view of history and an assessment of the Soviet time. The Estonians and the Russian-speakers perceive historic events differently and even sometimes in contrast to each other. This factor is reflected in the identity formation of these communities since one of the key elements of identity is collective memory. In other words, the identities of the Estonian and Russian-speaking communities were based on different memories of the Soviet (era). Furthermore, these memories are bound to mutually exclusive interpretations of the history of the twentieth century, leading to the conflict or “War of Memories” (Brüggemann and Kasekamp 2008, p. 426; Pääbo 2008, Ehala 2014 p. 100). Consequently, it leads to the tense situation within Estonian society.

This conflict has a long-lasting nature (Pääbo 2008), and most of the time it has been hidden. However, there was a sharp escalation leading up to April 2007 and the so-called “Bronze Night”, when the unrest of the Russian-speaking community was expressed in open confrontation. In addition, these events were marked by the apparent intervention of Russia in the domestic affairs of Estonia, e.g. attacks on the Estonian embassy in Moscow and accusations against the Estonian government. These actions were explained by the Kremlin as a protection of Russian compatriots in Estonia. Almost a decade after the conflict in Estonia, the conflict in Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea became a vivid example of such Russian foreign policy in the “near abroad”. In many ways, the political developments in Ukraine were a result of

Russia's information work with the Russian-speakers. In other words, Russia and pro-Russian media channels manipulated public opinion in order to legitimize their actions (Laruelle 2015; 2015a; 2016). As a result, these events triggered concerns about security issues and the territorial integrity of many post-Soviet countries with Russian-speaking minorities. Concerns about protection from the Russia's disinformation campaigns raised a wide-ranging discussion among decision-makers. The Baltic countries were also actively involved in this discussion because they have common borders with Russia and some regions with a prevailing Russian-speaking population. However, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania chose a different pattern in their response to the Russia's threat of disinformation. As an example, Latvia and Lithuania had restricted access to some Russian TV channels to defend themselves from Russia's "hybrid warfare". At the same time, Estonia followed an alternative path of development and established the public Russian-language channel ETV in September 2015.

This study is focused on the case of ETV and its shows as sources of the historical narrative because it provides an understanding of how minority language public television deals with the conflict of memories. Basically, the minority language media has two major choices. The first is to produce an inclusive or integrative narrative to encourage social cohesion. The second is to present the narrative of "diaspora", i.e. to present the memory narrative, which is only shared by the minority. In some ways, such a path is isolationist, because, on the one hand, it preserves some sort of social order, but on the other hand, it prevents the communication between communities, making them more distant from each other. In this sense, ETV is a good choice to understand this process, because the Estonian case has all necessary elements for the observation of this phenomenon. Furthermore, ETV channel is quite a unique case among the Baltic states, which contributes to the search for new ways to overcome the social conflict between minority and majority of the population.

The topic of this research mainly overlaps with several groups of studies. For instance, it refers to researchers of collective memory, the intersection of memory and media, and memory and minorities. Moreover, the research is partly connected with the studies of minority language media and studies of minority identities. It is possible to combine several groups of researchers according to their topics. The first group deals

with memory and how it is presented. These studies define how memory elements are present in various sources, e.g. media, literature, school curricula and etc. The study of history as a part of the education system is an important agent of collective memory construction and reshaping. Historical narratives in school textbooks are an important element for understanding the official politics of memory. For example, J. Wertsch (2004) conducts wide-ranging research focusing on the understanding of collective memory and its implications for the structure of narratives. The author analysed materials from Soviet and post-Soviet Russia. More precisely, Wertsch evaluates the official textual resources, for instance, history textbooks. The conclusion of this research indicates the shift of the official state narrative in post-Soviet Russia. However, in broader sense, Wertsch defines the structure and functions of certain narrative templates and their place in the process of the remembering (Wertsch 2004, p. 176). At the same time, the structure of narratives is widely discussed for divided societies in ethnic or cultural terms. Y. Papadakis (2008) evaluates narratives in Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot history textbooks. The author indicates that the historical textbooks applied the new model, which is less focused on the nation and “national self”. Furthermore, the author argues the new pattern of school textbooks has further implications for understanding social trauma (Papadakis 2008, p.143).

In addition to education, popular culture and media are also significant for the collective memory. An important step in the study of the relationship between memory and history in media sources was made by W. Kansteiner (2004). He analyzes the representation of history on German television, examining the case of channel ZDF from 1963 until 1993. This research shows changes in the coverage of and in the public interest in the history of the Third Reich and Nazism. In this work, W. Kansteiner argues that the television triggered self-reflection about the past, however it happened gradually between the 1960s and 1990s. In this way, it contributes to understanding how German collective memory deals with the Nazi past (Kansteiner 2004, p.597). Another study was conducted by T. Ebbrecht (2007), who evaluates the role of the history on the television in the public debates about the past in Germany. More precisely, he explores docudrama and finds that the historic coverage on television encouraged intergenerational exchange because it brings the history into “family conversation” (Ebbrecht 2007, p.232). Nevertheless, the popular

culture and perception of narratives are highly connected with the issue of personal and collective identity. In the case of the Baltic states, research makes an attempt to understand the major elements of identity formation.

As an example, the second group of studies explores the Russian-speaking minority and identity formation in the Baltic states. As an example, T. Vihalemm and A. Masso (2007) trace the way in which collective identities were constructed and reconstructed during the post-Soviet era. The research deals with identity patterns of the Russian-speaking minority in Estonia. The authors consider that the Russophones¹ have several identity patterns referring to the global, post-Soviet, local, and ethnolinguistic elements. Meanwhile, M. Ehala and A. Zabrodsкая (2014) examine the “hot” and “cold” ethnicities in the Baltic states, using evidence from a social survey and focus-group interviews. It analyses the majority population in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and the Russian-speaking and the Polish minorities in these countries. In this way, the research deals with the inter-ethnic relations in the region. The findings indicate the difference in these relations, e.g. Lithuanians are “hotter” towards the Polish minority, at the same time the Estonians and the Latvians are “colder” towards their Russian-speaking minorities (Ehala & Zabrodsкая 2014, p.93). Some works consider the interaction of memory and identity in the case of the Baltic states. I. Gruzina (2011) evaluates the place of history in the self-identification of Russian-speakers in Latvia. This research uses a social survey as the means of analysis. The author argues that the personal self-identification of the Russian-speakers is highly dependent on belonging to the commemoration of the community, e.g. Victor Day (Gruzina 2011, p.424). Accordingly, the identity of the Russian-speaking minority in the Baltic states is interconnected with the collective memory of the past and with the way the official state narratives treat and present this past. As a result, this issue attracted a huge attention of social scientists.

Thus, the third group of studies deals with the politics of memory in the Baltic states and its impact on the relations between majority and minority populations. E.C. Onken (2007) outlines a framework for the analysis of the interaction between

¹ The research uses the terms “Russophones”, “Russian-speakers”, “Estonian Russians” for the description of the Russian-speaking population living in Estonia. Accordingly, it does not suggest that the Russian-speakers in Estonia were originated from Russia. Instead, it includes any native Russian-speakers regardless ethnic differentiation.

memory and politics. This study used the case of the Baltic states as empirical examples. Mostly, the analysis deals with the public debates and the commemoration of the end of the Second World War. More precisely, the author explains decisions of the Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian presidents to either attend or not attend the (60th) anniversary in Moscow in 2005. The analysis shows that this discussion was an important step in the shifting of the attitude to the memory of Eastern Europe within European institutions, because it attracted broad attention to the problem of the communist past in the region (Onken 2007, p.43). The state politics of memory was a significant element of the post-Soviet transformation in the Baltic states. Moreover, the official memory politics has an impact on the development of these societies. M. Tamm (2013) summarizes the memory politics in Estonia from 1991 to 2011. The analysis includes different aspects of memory politics, e.g. legal, institutional, commemorative and monumental. The author concludes that memory politics in Estonia was focused on the restoration and the establishment of unified notion of historic events (Tamm 2013, p. 667). The conflict around the Bronze Soldier monument in Estonia in April 2007 encouraged many specialists to analyze the phenomenon of conflict memories in post-communist Europe and definitely (especially?) in the Baltic states. K. Brüggemann and A. Kasekamp (2008) reveal major reasons and elements of dispute about the memory of the Second World War. In detail, the authors analyses major factors contributing to the tensions in Estonia. Furthermore, they suggest that dialogue and openness are solutions to the memory conflict in Estonia. H. Pääbo (2008) also examines the war of memories in Estonia. The author suggests the differentiation between domestic and international levels of the war of memories. Further, this research explains that the tensions in Tallinn in April 2007 and conflict around the Bronze Soldier was not a one-time event, but it was an escalation of long-lasting conflicts of memories. The author suggests that this conflict is possible to overcome through a new understanding of the past in the European context and in the Estonian case by the de-securitization of the nation-building process (Pääbo 2008, p. 25). At the same time, Lehti, Jutila, and Jokisipilä (2008) also try to interpret the conflict of memories under the influence of the April 2007 events in Estonia. More specifically, this research evaluates the nature of commemorations and performances in the collective memory. The authors concluded

that the public and politicized commemorations leave no room for personal memories and emotions; however, the major conclusion is the fact that the Russian-speaking community is “doubly marginalized” by the Russian and the Estonian discourses (Lehti, Jutila & Jokisipilä 2008, p. 409). Additionally, A. Cheskin (2012) tries to define and specify the collective memory of the Russian-speakers in Latvia. The author argues that the basic understating of collective memories, where the majority and minority have a different view, is generalized in some aspects. The research uses evidence from social surveys and other materials. It concludes that there is a difference in the collective memory within the Russian-speaking community, and to some extent, this factor refers to generational differences because the young generation of Russian-speakers perceives the past differently from their parents (Cheskin 2012, p. 578). The collective memory of Russian-speakers in was many ways influenced by media sources, and accordingly, the understanding of the memory process is partly related to the issues of the minority and their sources of information.

Thus, the fourth group of studies deals with media and minority issues in the Baltic states. V. Jakobson (2002) focuses on the Russian-language media and its place in the integration of the Russian-speakers in Estonia. More precisely, the research used various approaches and sources in order to reveal the role of the Russian-language media in Estonia. The author concludes that the Russian-language media did not clearly articulate the element of integration or opposition to assimilation. Instead, it shows that both elements were presented, but neither prevailed at the expense of the other. (Jakobson 2002, p.51). T. Vihalemm and V. Jakobson (2011) reveal the historical narrative of the Estonian Russian-language media. Their research analyses the perception of historic events in the Estonian and Russian-language newspapers. The authors underline the existing difference in the evaluation of events. It not only refers to the memory about the Second World war, but this tendency is broader and includes other significant historic events such as the Northern War and the role of Peter the Great. A. Jõesaar, S. Rannu, and M. Jufereva (2013) examine another side of the Russian-language media. Their research evaluates the economic and social conditions of the work in Estonia in the time period from 1990 to 2012. Authors made a conclusion that the Russian-language media cannot exist without state support because do not have a wide enough audience to be a commercially competitive. In

other words, the Russian-language media is not able to be profitable. With the lack of the local Russian-language media in Estonia, Russia's state media became the most important source of information for the Russian-speaking minority. Thus, J. Dougherty and R. Kaljurand (2015) analyze the preference of Russian-speaker viewers on the basis of personal interviews with the Russian-speakers. The authors explore some key principles of the Russophones' behavior, e.g. scepticism toward all news sources and the dominance of entertainment over news segments.

This overview of the literature underscores the fact that issues of minority, memory, and media in the Baltic states are both widely and deeply investigated. Nevertheless, this study contributes to the understanding of the conflict of memories in societies divided by ethnocultural factors. More precisely, it explores functions of the public media in minority language as a memory agent and an instrument to achieve social cohesion in conditions of long-lasting memory conflict. In addition, this research has a wider implication on the understanding of social relationships in the post-Soviet countries with significant Russian-speaking minority populations – especially after the annexation of Crimea.

This research seeks to define how the idea of a new Russian-language TV channel deals with the conflict of memories in Estonia. In other words, how the ETV depicts historic events and anniversaries, taking into account the social and political background. On the one hand, it is necessary to avoid the strong contradictions with the already well-established view of the Russian-speakers and not to alienate the audience. On the other hand, the TV channel was created to be a platform for communication between the Estonians and the Russian-speaking minority and to provide an increase in social cohesion. In this way, it has to change some memory and identity premises among the Russian-speaking community, but such changes can be too radical and estranged viewers.

Hereby, the major research question of this thesis is the following: How does minority language public television perform as a memory agent in divided societies with a conflict of memory? For this purpose, this study seeks to answer several sub-questions: 1) How do the TV presenters of ETV present the “self” and the “other” in the description of the historic events? 2) How do TV presenters explain and narrate

the shared history of Estonia, the Russian-speakers, and Russia? 3) How do the TV presenters describe the role of Russian-speakers in the history of Estonia?

However, answers for these sub-questions are more evident during the days of the national anniversaries, because most TV shows (or TV coverage is) are devoted to commemoration and explanation of the historic events (Gray and Bell 2013, p.100). Thus, the research analyzes the TV shows during the Estonian anniversaries. Additionally, it includes one anniversary, which is mainly commemorated by the Russian-speakers in Estonia, and this day is an essential part of the collective memory of the Russian-speaking minority. In detail, this thesis explores Estonian Independence Day (the 24th of February), Estonian Victory Day (the 23rd of June), the Day of Restoration of Independence (the 20th of August) and Russian Victory Day (the 9th of May). The research covers all of these anniversaries in 2016, and the Estonian Independence Day in 2017.

This thesis is divided into one theoretical, one background and one main chapter. The first theoretical chapter explains the conceptual framework of the study and gives an overview of the research methodology. The second chapter reveals the background of the Russian-language media in Estonia and factors behind the launch of ETV. The third chapter examines TV programs and makes a summary of findings.

The research has some limitations regarding the evaluation of public perception, because the research does not pose the available evidence explaining how Russian-speakers perceive the historical narrative of ETV. In other words, current research is a one-way street, because it has the opportunity to examine what sort of narrative is offered to the public, but does not examine a wide and clear response from the Russian-speaking minority. Another significant limitation is the time scale since the study only deals with a one year period due to the time of ETV+ functioning (since September 2015), thus it limits the analysis. A longer period of study would give more precise and structured information with which to answer the research question.

CHAPTER 1: MEMORY, MEDIA, AND NARRATIVE

The research deals with elements within an intersection of several fields of studies: memory, identity, and media. The analysis includes concepts of collective memory and identity, remembering and commemoration, narratives, and media. Firstly, it reveals the concept collective memory and how it is involved in the identity formation. Secondly, it explains the remembering and commemorations in this process. Thirdly, it presents the role of media as a memory agent in the collective memory. Finally, it discovers the structure and functions of narratives.

1.1. Collective Memory and Identity

Many researchers refer to French sociologist Maurice Halbwachs as a founder of 'collective memory' concept (Wertsch 2004, p.19). In his theoretical explanations, Halbwachs argues that 'collective memory' has a social nature and has multiple nature. Consequently, 'collective memory' exists in the process of social interactions and based on certain group identity (Halbwachs 1980, p.83-84). Although, apart from collective memory, there is also individual one, however, both of them are highly dependent on social interactions or “social frameworks”. In other words, memory is a highly social phenomenon, which reinforces a sense of belonging to one or another social group. Thus, memory is multiple and can be combined in different ways, e.g. individual memory shaped by a set of agents or carriers (e.g. family, education, professional networks).

Nevertheless, Halbwachs's perception of memory structure is general and does not able

to explain empirical evidence in a full-scale, which is revealed in other investigations. Hereby, concepts of collective and individual memory were lately specified and developed. As an example, Jan and Aleida Assmann significantly contributed to the more detailed conceptualization of memory aspects. J. Assmann follows some theoretical premises of M. Halbwachs, however, he tries to elaborate distinct concepts such as 'communicative' and 'cultural' memory'. He argues that this distinction is more useful to define the borderlines between memory and tradition since “basic” concept of memory does not explain cases of flexible traditions (Assmann J. 2010, p. 31). Furthermore, according to J. Assmann. the process of shift from memory to history does not have time scale as it was considered by M. Halbwachs. In the theoretical framework of J. Assmann “communicative” memory is connected with the social interactions during the recent past (Assmann J. 2011, p.36). At the same time, “cultural” memory accentuates on the past, but this past is expressed and anchored to symbolic figures or elements (Assmann J. 2011, p. 37).

Aleida Assmann emphasizes that structure of cultural memories is highly dependent on the political and social factors. It means that cultural memories changes according to interests in the present (Assmann A. 2011, p.396). As an alternative to Halbwachs's structure of memory, A. Assmann takes into account three distinct terms: social, political and cultural memory (Assmann A. and Conrad 2010, p. 41). Social memory (or communicative) is experienced by individuals within society, changing during the life and disappear with the death (Assmann A. and Conrad 2010, p.41). At the same time, political and cultural memory mediated and contributed by memory carriers with symbols and material representations. (Assmann A. and Conrad 2010, p. 42). Political memory uses narratives bringing the certain emotional message and also it attached to “performative actions” (Assmann A. and Conrad 2010, p. 43). “Political memory” is partly employed in this study as one of the concepts for the research, although the term of collective memory is also used as a general term for different types of memories, forming some group identity. The memory as a social concept has a diverse structure, including itself different elements of individual and social behavior, e.g. process of self-identification, and participation in collective actions such as commemoration rituals and ceremonies. The conceptualisation of memory developed by J. Assmann and A. Assmann allows investigating of issues related to the interaction between memory and

history more precisely. In other words, this theoretical presumption provides a basis for the operationalization of memory and its further analysis.

In classical Halbwachs's framework, memory differs from history, since history begins, when memory is over (Halbwachs 1980, p. 143). However, the border between memory and history is not so precise as it seems to be, and it is often crossed, for instance, when history is eliminated in favor of memory (Megill 1998, p. 56). In this case, “usable past” is employed by some interest groups, individuals or other possible actors. Sometimes past events are used to formulate certain memory, which has an impact of identity construction. Generally, relations between identity and memory can be recognized by the state as an actor, in this situation, it 'uses' and promotes certain account of the past through different state institutions, e.g. museums, media, 'commemorative organizations' (Wertsch 2004, p.68). The idea of “commemorative organizations” is partly aligned with the concept of social interactions as the basis of memory. Perhaps, these institutions are ground for the social interaction regarding issues of history and memory. However, it is necessary to be attentive in order to avoid the overestimation of these institutions in the promotion of certain elements of collective memory, because other influential elements are also involved in the process of memory negotiation, as an example, family, where individuals are primarily socialized before the involvement under the influence of education system and other actors.

The perception and account of the past are important factors in group identity formations because it has a clear message about individuals who shared or do not share the common perception of the past. Consequently, it means inclusion or exclusion in/from a certain group, e.g. nation or community. Obviously, it also demonstrates that different view of the past constructs different self-identification (Gruzina 2011, p.418). Perhaps, patterns of self-identification are partly based on the notion of shared memory or collective memory accepted in the community of personal attribution. In some situations, incompatible stories of the past can lead to the conflicts between social groups referring these conflicting perceptions of the past. Thus, collective memories can be mutually exclusive (Torbakov 2011, p.213) and in this case, one account of the past and some groups sharing this idea can be an “external other” for another group. In other words, each group defines “self” taking into account common values or perception of the past. Nevertheless, the mutual exclusiveness is significantly related to the previous

intergroup relations and experience. The main example of this kind of experience is the conflict between groups, where mutually exclusive accounts of events were formed.

Furthermore, “other” in the identity formation can be as positive as negative. Negative “other” relates often to contradicted stories, memories or any kind of “discursive practices” (Neumann 1999, p.30), however, if groups do not have points of contradiction, these are able to perceive each other in a positive way. However, in general, “self” in the identity formation needs “other” as some point of reference (Neumann 1999, p.34). As a result, memory is an important element of identity construction, because it makes limits of “self” and “other” using the shared past as a reference in order to define belonging to the certain group in present (Mälksoo 2015, p.224). However, for memory itself, the remembering is an essential element of the collective memory because it is the constant process, where individuals share their common group memory.

1.2.Remembering and Commemoration

The remembering helps to recollect group memory and to promote a feeling of belongings to the community. In this way, identity and memory have points of interaction. From the one hand, identities precede collective memory, but from the other hand, collective memory reshapes an identity (Megill 1998, p.44). However, this mutual interaction is difficult to measure and analyze, because there is not a clear instrument to measure the impact of memory on the identity. Usually, social surveys suggest this memory-identity link on the basis of self-identification of individuals, their awareness, and attribution of memory. Although, in some sense, the identity is based on the unconscious attribution to some group memory due to the impact of social factors. In this way, it is really difficult to measure and to test the hypothesis about the direct impact of the collective memory of the self-identification and at the same time the impact of the self-identification on the “choice” of collective memory.

Moreover, any kind of memory can not exist without remembering, because it constantly reshapes and contributes to memory, thus remembering is an essential element in the nature of memory. The remembering is realized through traditional or

ritual ceremonies, where the common view of the past is shared and reinforced by other members of certain groups (Winter 2010, p.15). These ritual ceremonies or performances are commemorations, where participants exercise some act of remembering as a sort of habit common for their group (Connerton 1989, p.70-71). In this way, ritual performances as a habit contribute to the perception of unconsciousness of collective memory, i.e. rituals of remembering can be exercised without a clear and “rational” understanding of its values. In other words, rituals of commemorations exploit the emotional feelings of individuals composing certain groups. Thus, remembering is emotional and contrast process, since the commemoration is not only related to a group or national pride, but it also includes commemoration devoted to victims and traumatic events (Kratochwil 2006, p.20). Commemorations are exercised during days, weeks or years, and the internal social links within the community, i.e. it increases feels of belonging, solidarity, and consensus (Onken 2007, pp. 23-24). These activities reinforce some memory about the past, which is important for maintaining of unity within the group (Gruzina 2011, p.405). It provides a ground for inclusion or exclusion of individuals in the group formation. That is the reason why sometimes states as actors and politicians are interested in the commemoration because it creates some legitimacy or unity within the nation as a social group. Moreover, states are able to create some behavioural patterns using museums, media and commemoration ceremonies in order to construct social order (Wertsch 2004, p. 68). In other words, the state creates a network of commemoration and provides the basis for communication between group members (Melchior & Visser 2011, p. 35). Nevertheless, it does not necessarily mean that the state exists as actor penetrating some images into the collective memory of nations. In contrast, the state as a certain system of governance is highly connected with the individual values of decision-makers. It means that decision-makers also have some individual memories and self-identification, which are formed and reshaped under the impact of memory regimes in the process of their socialization.

Consequently, remembering and commemorations are social phenomena, involving a various level of memory (individual and group) (Gillis 1996, p.5). In addition, since commemoration attracts also different groups of interest, thus the commemoration is also a political phenomenon. As a result, memory is susceptible to commodification and political manipulations (Gillis 1996, p.19-20). Although, commemorative events are

“inevitably multivocal”, i.e. using symbols, signs, and rituals, constructing view or interpretation of past and present reality (Bodnar 1993, p. 16). In this way, the multivocality and social nature of remembering and commemorations indicate that it would be a mistake to consider this process as a top-down hierarchy, where some political groups use “state” institutions as a tool of manipulation with public opinion. It is barely important that the society is implicitly ready to follow any rituals of the remembering suggested from one or another group with political power. Instead, it is possible to consider the establishment of rituals as a process. Hereby, another important characteristic of remembering is its longitudinal nature, i.e. remembering is not given, but is the process of evolving. This understanding contributes to the dynamic notion of memories since it is not constants and constantly changes under the impact of social and political factors (Wertsch 2004, p. 17).

Furthermore, J. Gillis argues that the nature of commemorations and memories has been changing. It means that traditional holidays and monuments less their influence to control memories and reinforce the single version of the past. Gillis suggests that during the transition societies should be publicly open for different memories and identities (Gillis 1996, p. 20).

In sum, the remembering is the social process, using various elements providing a ground for commemoration, museum, ceremonies and media coverage. However, there is a tendency for decreasing of monuments and holidays impact on a construction of a single image of the past. Nevertheless, the development of media as mean of communication has also changed the process of remembering and commemoration, opening a new ground for exercising of ritual and new type of capacity for a memory storage.

1.3. Media as a Memory Agent

The interaction of history, memory, and identity in the global age widely presented in media sources. Thus, many scientists developed a further understanding of relations between media and memory. In the contemporary world, media is an important tool providing multiple constructions of images, perceptions, and interpretation of reality,

thus journalists have a significant impact on memory. Nevertheless, according to Barbie Zelizer, journalists do not recognize clearly their influence on memory as it is considered in memory studies (Zelizer 2008, p.79-80). At the same time, journalists reconstruct and recollect “the Past” in an own way, ruling by some present agenda (Zelizer 2008, p. 81). Thus, their narratives tend to simplistic explanation and “a minimization of nuances” (Zelizer 2008, p. 82). Although, it is necessary to expand the focus on the simplification because this problem is wider than journalists' indifference to details of stories about the past. The simplification is a natural attribute of the narrative, since it is based on the reproduction of story, and it is “like water following the path of least resistance” (Edy 2006, p. 150). It is possible to suggest that roots of narrative patterns are originated from the preliterate era when stories transmitted orally from one person to another. Consequently, this is also common for the contemporary world, when journalists exercise the similar function as poet in the Middle Ages, who wrote manuscripts of songs and stories about epic heroes, e.g. *La Chanson de Roland* [The Song of Roland], which appeared much earlier than it was written, and exists in different versions.

Thus, it is possible to suggest also that media partly preserved and reiterate some narratives about the past in the collective memory. As a result, journalists exploits stories, which are understandable and acceptable by one or another audience. Moreover, in some cases journalists employ the past and connect it with the present, e.g. they create “historical analogs”, comparing present and the past, and finding similar elements of the story (Zelizer 2008, 83-84). However, this is not only for the legitimation of some agenda (Röger 2009, p.193), in contrast, the reference to the present helps to deliver the story using symbols comprehensible to the audience.

Furthermore, these symbols can be highly diverse, since media products are carriers of memory images with high capacity because, in the global world, television and film production are influential and can spread information messages to the wide audience (e.g. local, national, global) (A. Assmann and Conrad 2010, p.114). As an example, a cinema representation creates a framework, structuring the collective perception of the past (Winter 2006, p. 186). In this way, cinematography mediates this perception and dissemination of images, creating shared collective memory (Winter 2006, p.185).

However, in the contemporary world, television is one of the most important memory

agents, i.e. it makes the historic events to be social and incline in the social memory (Ebbrecht 2005, p. 37). In other words, it uses a real-time system of communication with the audience in order to deliver the certain story. As a result, new media brought pressure on cultural memory. New technologies changed storage capacities and way of information distribution, i.e. communication networks became dense and more spread. Furthermore, limits of cultural memory changed significantly and TV images ousted writing “as the central medium of memory” (Assmann A. 2011, p.202).

Media sources as agents are able to construct memory, which shifts from individual to collective (or social) remembering. In other words, personal memory transforms into the national or supranational memory, however, it is not always the case and involves different factors, such as political decision and development of institutions providing a framework for this shift (A. Assmann and Conrad 2010, p.103). Media sources are constantly involved in the memory production or storage, however, in some days collective memory functions of media are expressed clearly than usually. During anniversaries journalists provide a wide coverage of the commemoration ceremonies. In some ways, it uses special tools and methods presenting the historic events and general historical narrative. Consequently, the real-time nature of television provides the ground for the development of certain genres changing the process of remembering and its structure. In other words, this journalism became the part of remembering rituals during anniversaries.

However, each type of media has own features and functions regarding the issue of memory. The public television and the public broadcasting, in general, is possible to demonstrate the communication between the state and the audience negotiating the national unity or identity.

1.4. Public Broadcasting and Collective Memory

The concept of the public broadcasting developed under the significant impact of the British experience in this sphere. From the 1960s to 1990s the public broadcasting this concept evolved much time under the impact of social and political changes. The research refers to the notion of public broadcasting developed from the British

approach. In this way, the public broadcasting is a service provided by the Government for citizens on the basis of certain principles: universality (availability to all citizens), diversity (to present different elements of social interests), independent (with the freedom of expression), distinctiveness (innovative approach to the production of new programmes and genres) (Price and Raboy 2003, pp. 6-7). Among the scholars exists different opinions about the presence and future of the public broadcasting. From the one side, there is an opinion that the public broadcasting suffers from the crisis due to the liberalization of media policies and increase of private entertainment broadcasting (Curran 2002, p. 178). From the other hand, an opposite view is based on the argument that the public broadcasting is still taking a good position within the European countries and it is not in crisis, but in the process of renewal (Curran 2002, p. 179).

Furthermore, speaking about the functions, the public broadcasting is responsible for the public dialogue and negotiation of the public opinion (Curran 2002, p.196). In this way, it promotes some elements of common identity through the representation of common values (Curran 2002, p.193; Cardiff and Scannell, p. 157). Thus, the public broadcasting does not have the pressure of market as private stations offering some commercial product. As a result, the public broadcasting has more opportunity to try different formats or genres (Curran 2002, p.193).

In addition, the public broadcasting has an important function in the reshaping of the collective memory. Firstly, it has wider opportunities to represent official state commemorations. The coverage of commemoration ceremonies is an important part of the broadcasting. Again, this is possible due to the partial absence of market pressure. It does not necessarily mean that, for instance, the public television is not interesting in the increase of the audience, although this goal is less important in comparison to some private stations, where it is a reason of existence. Secondly, the public broadcasting has advantages in the production historical materials (shows, documentaries) in cooperation with the other public institutions (archives, museums and etc.). In some cases, it can even have a unique access to materials, which are stored in archives.

Nevertheless, the function of public broadcasting in the domain of collective memory is not completely free of obligations or external influence. There is an opinion that the state organization is limited some autonomy by default, because of the funding system

and choice of projects to be realized on the public broadcasting (Winter 2006, p. 204).

In sum, the public broadcasting is important institution provided by the state, having some impact on the formation of national identity through the promotion of certain values, views, traditions or rituals. Accordingly, it is supposed to be an important actor shaping of the collective memory, since television has a potential to construct and spread certain view on the past. Moreover, the public broadcasting can be used by the state as a platform for the communication in case of conflicts, however, in some cases, the public broadcasting does not function in this way, representing some biased view without taking into consideration of different minorities (e.g. ethnic or social) (Knoetze and Dhoest 2016, p.267).

During anniversaries journalists provide a wide coverage of the commemoration ceremonies. In some ways, it uses special tools and methods presenting the historic events and general historical narrative. Consequently, the real-time nature of television provides the ground for the development of certain genres changing the process of remembering and its structure. In other words, this journalism became the part of remembering rituals during anniversaries.

1.5. Anniversary Journalism

Generally speaking, the anniversary is commemoration ritual when community reinforces own identity through the public expression of common values (Kitch 2002, p.48; Winter 2010, p.15). During anniversaries, historic events attract public attention and at the same time media has a chance to fulfill this demand (Ebbrecht 2007, p.223). Thus, “anniversary journalism” has an impact on “mnemonic synchronization of particular communities”, because it creates a communication field for a community, bringing together common national and cultural feelings (Kõresaar and Harro-Loit 2010, pp. 324-325). Furthermore, media representation of events consists itself narrative templates, rituals, and myths (Kõresaar and Harro-Loit 2010, p.337). 'Event-television' applies set of narratives and strategies, combining realism and artificial images, which transforms into the certain image of history (Ebbrecht 2007, p.231). Television follows interests of groups and actors in the presenting of historical events, e.g. public television

can follow the official historical narrative, however the role of state in this process should not be overemphasized, because television is a complex element taking into account multiple factors (public interest, journalists' perception and etc.) (Wijermars 2016, pp.84-85).

In a time of anniversaries, broadcasts of ceremonies, using a diverse set of channels, are able to “electrify very large audiences—a nation, several nations, or the world” (Dayan and Katz, p.8-9). In other words, a media broadcast can spread commemorations all over the world and in some ways contribute to a collective memory construction as a memory agent. Although, this is not compulsory that the anniversary as media event creates the wide range communication between the media and audience (Couldry 2003, p. 67). In some ways, every audience is free to define own preferences and this is obviously that some events can be more important than other. In this sense, any story needs some elements attractive the audience and increasing its understanding. The structure of information is an important part of the transmission process. The story has a certain structure by default, ensuring its logic and coherence. Consequently, the structure of the story is more important than event by itself, because event exists only for eyewitnesses and their personal perception without the structural story allowing to spread the knowledge about it. Thus, the narrative as a structural form of the story allows using the event as a source for the collective memory.

1.6. Narratives: Structures and Functions

Diverse network of media brings a various messages or narratives, bearing some account of the past and having an impact on the collective memory. As an example, television provides a viewer with all palette of information constituting narratives (Ebbrecht 2007, p.232). In general, memories can exist in forms of narratives and exercises through commemoration ceremonies. In this way, any influential actors can promote certain 'usable past' as elements of identity formation through a narrative, as a result, it creates emotional links with some identity (Ehala 2014, p. 98).

Narratives are present in different forms, e.g. visual and textual (written and oral). In the contemporary world, mass media is one of the most influential carriers of narrative to

the public. It gives a framework for the representation of some events using images and symbols (epic, heroic, realistic, ironic and etc.) in order to reenact the past and bring this message to the collective memory. Consequently, narratives in media is an example of interaction between memory and history (Winter 2010, p.199)

A narrative is a tool for transfer and dissemination of certain images of the past events (Wertsch 2004, p.55-56). Narratives are involved actively in the process of remembering because this process is based on social interaction combined with constant reproduction of the perception of the past. The certain narrative has two major functions: “referential and “dialogic” (Wertsch 2004, p. 7). The referential function is needed to refer to actors and events and also to bring together separate events and represents in the form of the single plot (Wertsch 2004, p.57). At the same time, the “dialogic’ function is interaction with other narratives (Wertsch 2004, p. 59).

Narratives follow some patterns (or templates), referring some perception and interpretation of past events. As an example, J. Wertsch defines that Russian narrative has a template “triumph-over-alien-forces”, it characterized by four stages: “initial situation” (“in which the Russian people are living in a peaceful setting where they are no threat to others”), further, as a result of “initiation of trouble or aggression by an alien force”, “a time of crisis and great suffering” begins and finally it overcomes by “the triumph over the alien force by the Russian people, acting heroically and alone”. Wertsch argues that narrative template may refer to different events, dates, and characters, but the general plot is the same (Wertsch 2004,p. 93). This kind of templates indicates that narratives are often referred to a binary interpretation of the past, which has 'heroes' (Self) and 'enemies' (Others, aliens). Thus, neutral actors do not present in this narrative templates (Wertsch 2004, p. 95). Moreover, these boundaries self/other and us/them are significant for collective identity construction (Bell 2003). Narratives mediate history and transform it into collective memory, in other words, it allows historic event became socially remembered and embedded in memory (Ahonen 2001, p. 180). This mediation reflects the interpretation of the past on the basis of present experience (Winter 2010, p. 12). Thus, the audience shares this certain perception of the past rooted in the narrative and individuals suggests that this interpretation is true (Winter 2010, p.13), however, it is not necessarily the truth. Furthermore, according to Wertsch, textual resources reflect certain social reality, thus narrative can not be a

clearly objective and neutral (Wertsch 2004, p.172). In other words, neutral narrative brings a message about the neutrality, and it means the representation of some perspective, which undermines neutrality or objectivity by default.

However, if the narrative tries to be neutral or simplistic, it misses the attention of the audience, because neutrality can eliminate all points of references and this narrative will not attract the public interest (Winter 2006, p.220). That is the reason why national narratives use binary symbols and images, attracting individuals (Winter 2006, p.221). For individuals, the reference to the national narrative is the basis for the national self-identification (Lehti, Jutila & Jokisipilä 2008, p.411)

National narratives employ contrast images of the past making a distinction between good and bad, heroic and evil. Thus, it simplifies the perception of the past in order to promote certain view in the present (Lehti, Jutila & Jokisipilä 2008, p.411). Usually, two major patterns are employed in narratives about wars: glorification and victimization. Heroes and victims are main actors in the stories about the war because the common proud and mourning encouraged a unity within the nation (Lehti, Jutila & Jokisipilä 2008, p.412).

The official and collectively shared narrative has dominance over another narrative, in this sense, it is master narrative. Individuals connect their personal memories with memories suggested in the master narrative and in such way they involved in the master narrative (Melchior & Visser 2011, p.35). In general, the master narrative creates a basis for the construction of national state identity. Common memory generates links between generations and different groups in the society, and at the same time, it helps individuals to identify themselves (Gruzina 2011, p.404).

Nevertheless, in some situation the master narrative can be exclusive, e.g. to exclude some groups from the common memory due to some social or political reasons (Ahonen 2001, p.190). Consequently, this group can have an alternative or counter-narrative, which tries to challenge the existing master narrative (Burke 2010, p.108). As a result, in the divided societies with several ethnic identities, this contention of narratives triggers the tension between communities and reinforces borders in mutual communication (Ehala 2014, p.100). Thus, this conflict has longitudinal effects and it can influence social and political development, however, since the media has an impact

on the shaping of collective memory, it can contribute to the overcome or escalation of the conflicts. In this way, this research proceeding to the development of the empirical case, but first of all, it introduces the methodology of the analysis.

1.7. Methodology

The research considers the role of minority language public television in “war of memories”. It suggests that in days of public anniversaries the function of this media as the memory agent is more apparent, in case if an anniversary is not equally commemorated by communities in conflict and implies different collective memory. In this way, it seeks to find inclusive or exclusive elements of the historical narratives, which contributes to the collective memory and the self-identification of the minority. In an empirical way, the research is aimed to trace the functioning of ETV+ and its historical narrative during the commemorations in Estonia. More precisely, it defines the how TV presenters explain the historic events, evaluate the problematic points and indicates the role of the Russian-speaking minority in the Estonian history according to speakers. Interpretations of historic events given by journalists during the national anniversaries can give an idea about the narrative patterns, ideas and cultural peculiarities constituting the narrative presented to the audience (Kõresaar and Harro-Loit 2010, p.337).

In this sense, the research analyses speeches of journalists and experts, who is responsible for presenting some TV shows and coverage of ceremonies. In other words, it is necessary to mention that most of these persons are journalists of ETV+, but there is also one exception when historian participates in coverage and in TV shows equally with journalists and his involvement is not different from another journalist. This exception means that the research includes the speeches of experts if they are not considered as interviewees.

At the same time, the analysis excludes the text of event by itself, since this text is not the product of ETV+, but this is emphasized by other actors, e.g. speeches by individuals (officials) during ceremonies and interview with guest speakers. Although, the research pays attention to the choice of interviewees by ETV+ without deep qualitative analysis of their speeches, because they express personal their own personal

opinions. The research focuses on textual elements, which are expressed by TV presenters. In this way, text (written and oral) is “a basic organizing unit that structures meaning, communication, and thought” (Wertsch 2004, p. 14).

Thus, this research tries to deconstruct and analyze the narrative of ETV+ during anniversary events on 24th of February (Estonian Independence Day), 23rd of June (Estonian Victory Day), 20th of August (Day of Restoration of Independence). The choice of these certain dates was conditioned by one major principle: the national holiday with the reference to historic events. Moreover, the research includes the 9th of May (“Victory Day” in Russia). There are two main reasons: this is an essential part of the collective memory of the Russian-speaking minority and this day is actively used by the Kremlin as a part of wide politics of memory (Wertsch 2004; Wijermajers 2016). However since the 9th of May is an exception, in this case, it also takes into account representations of commemoration ceremonies in news shows, because there are not official public ceremonies during the day.

In this way, this research principle has been suggested before this event were covered by ETV+ and as a result, different dates provide a diverse amount of material for the analysis. In other words, some anniversaries were covered more widely, than other, thus it is clear from the analysis. Nevertheless, this difference also gives an idea, which commemoration is more important for ETV+ as a public broadcaster in Russian-language.

The textual analysis covers different categories of TV shows during anniversaries: 1) broadcasts of ceremonies; 2) TV shows, where journalists invite guest speakers important for anniversary; 3) documentary episodes devoted and produced specially for certain anniversary; 4) news programs. However, the research also takes into account general elements of TV broadcast during the anniversary such as background screened movies and invited guest speakers, in addition to the storyline order (what was mentioned earlier and later in TV shows).

These sources for the analysis provide a necessary basis for the research question. Hereby, the major research question is to define how does minority language public television perform as a memory agent in divided societies with the conflict of memory?

The research applies the qualitative analysis combining various qualitative methodological tools. From the one hand, it reveals and quantify the most often used

indicators in the text. From the other hand, it conducts a precise evaluation of examples in order to depict contextual peculiarities. In general term, the methodological approach refers to the previous studies of memory in the Russian-language media in Estonia (Vihalemm and Jakobson 2011; Jakobson 2013). However, these studies tend more to the content analysis, because of the focus on the printed materials. At the same time, the research uses a elements of narrative analysis, presuming that human-beings organizes their experience in the form of narrative and presented through various “mediums”, e.g. verbal accounts, written, movies and etc. Thus, it is possible to detect narratives in different sources. The narrative analysis is based on the evaluation of certain data in context. As a result, it reveals how every story is constructed and presented to reader or viewer (Owens 2016).

Furthermore, the research approach is based on theoretical assumptions offered by J. Wertsch in his works about the narrative and its structures (Wertsch 2004). It also includes other basic premises about the binary perception of the “self” and the “other” during the process of self-identification according to O. Neumann (1999). Finally, some indicators were drawn according to previously existed literature about majority-minority relations and the existing conflict of memories in Estonia.

Theoretical premises leads to several categories of indicators: 1) “self”/“other” opposition; 2) reference to the common (conflictual) historic events; 3) and the inclusiveness or exclusiveness of the Russian-speakers into/from the description of historic events in Estonia.

“Self”/“other” nexus indicates how narrative explains the belongings to the social or other groups, and which labels and how often were used in order to present self in the narrative. Often it emphasized by possessive pronouns in oral or written language, e.g. “my”, “our”, “their” and etc. In some sense, it expresses some proud for group, nation or state. Furthermore, it makes a limit of self, because “our” is “self”, because it is not “their” as belonging to some “other”. This category is divided into several code indicators exploring “self”/“other” distinctions. The tables below present these indicators. These indicators were drawn on the basis of studies about the Russian-speaking minority, memory politics and conflicts in Estonia.

Table 1. Indicators of the “Self”

Indicators of the “Self”	Explanation of Indicators
S1 The Estonian Russians	This indicator presents the Russians speakers in Estonia independently, i.e. they are not the Estonians and the Russians, but the Estonian Russians developed somewhere between two major groups.
S2 the Estonians	This is a reference to clear perceptions and descriptions of the Estonians, or the Estonian people with the focus on ethnic attributes.
S3 Estonia/Estonian state/country	This illustrates points, where the self-identification is based on certain loyalty to the Estonian state without considering ethnocultural characteristics.
S4 The Europeans	This indicator can present the reference to the European system of values, e.g. the European nation or our culture is European, it means that „self” is European.
S5 Baltic people	It reveals the identity related to the Baltic states and the Baltic region in the broad sense.
S6 The local identification (Tallinn, Narva resident)	This marker can present an idea about the local pattern of identification. Thus, it refers to the Russian-speakers, who identify themselves with certain regions.

Table 2. Indicators of the “Other”

Indicators of the “Other”	The Explanation of Indicator
O1 Russia/the Russians [ethnocultural]	This indicator underlines the ethnic and cultural peculiarities of “other”, i.e. the focus on these attributes is suggest to express some critics of the Russians in general, thus, this point can be expanded to the Russian-speakers in Estonia. For example, the Russian-speakers wanted to russification Estonia and current Russian-speakers living in Estonia are blamed for the russification.
O2 Soviet Russia/ the Bolsheviks/the Communists/the Soviets/the Red Army	This indicator describes the social and political attributes, but avoid to mention ethnic and cultural peculiarities, i.e. this explanation provides an opportunity to avoid awkward questions about the ethnic characteristics in order to prevent the shift of this discussion to the Russian-speakers in Estonia.
O3 Baltic Germans/the Germans [refer to the WWI and the Estonian Independence War]	These indicators refer to the Baltic Germans historically living on the Estonian territory and also to the German Empire existed until 1918. Generally, it concerns with any German element during the Estonian Independence war.
O4 Nazi Germans/Wehrmacht [refer to WWII]	These indicators reveal the description of the Nazi Germany as an external power in Estonia.
O5 Other states/countries/nations	These markers give an idea about the role of other states in the presented storyline.

In a similar way, the second category of indicators reveal how common Estonian-Russian history is described; especially it concerns experience of the World War II and the Soviet occupations of Estonia. It considers histories of Estonia and Russia and episodes when these histories interact. The choice of Russia can be explained due to the self-identification of Russian-speakers in Estonia with Russia as “external homeland” (Brubaker 2004, p. 5). In other words, it is external actor supporting own “ethnonational kin” outside the country. Furthermore, these conflictual points were defined on the basis of previous studies about the conflicts of memory between the Estonians and the Russian-speakers in Estonia. This category of indicators is important for an explanation

how conflictual points are presented on ETV+ and how these elements are explained. The table below describes these indicators and interpret meanings.

Table 3. Indicators of the Shared History/Conflicts

Indicators of the Common [conflictual] Estonian-Russian history	The Explanation of Indicator
C1 The Soviet occupation/annexation of Estonia [political attribute]	It reveals the negative attitude to the inclusion of Estonia into the Soviet Union.
C2 The Russian occupation [ethnocultural attribute]	This indicator emphasizes the guilt of the Russians in the illegal occupation of Estonia.
C3 Soviet repressions against the Estonians	It illustrates the focus on the Estonian national suffering.
C4 Soviet repressions as the common disaster	This indicator presents an open narrative of suffering.
C5 The Legitimate and voluntary inclusion of Estonia into the Soviet Union	This marker positively evaluates the Soviet past in Estonia.
C6 The Soviet Union is the liberator of Estonia	It reveals a positive perception of the Soviet Union and its role in the WWII. In some sense, this indicator mutually exclusive with a narrative about the illegal annexation or occupation of Estonia.
C7 The Second World War	This indicator reflects the neutral perception of the war without the focus on the Soviet role and avoids the glorification of external powers.
C8 The Great Patriotic War/ Soviet/Russian Victory Day	These indicators reveal the glorification of the Soviet Union, which is currently widely accepted in Putin's Russia.

Finally, the third category deals with the inclusiveness/exclusiveness of the Russian-speakers in the narrations about the Estonian history. In some sense, it reveals the way how Russian-language media perceives the historic “fate” of the Russian-speaking community in Estonia. Hereby, it contributes to the understanding to what extent the narrative on ETV+ is inclusive or exclusive for Russian-speakers. Accordingly, to this suggestion, indicators are binary defined, i.e. the Russians and the Russian language/culture are positively or negatively evaluated, and “natural” or “alien” element of the Estonian society. The table below presents a more specific explanation of these indicators.

Table 4. Indicators of the "Russian

Indicators of the “Russian” within the Estonian history	The Explanation of Indicator
R1 The Estonian Russians are positively evaluated as a part of the Estonian history	It uncovers the positive perception of the Russian-speakers in Estonia.
R2 The Estonian Russians are negatively evaluated as a part of the Estonian history	It indicates that the Russian-speakers are perceived negatively in Estonia.
R3 The Russian language/culture is the natural part of the Estonian society	It presents the positive perception of the Russian culture
R4 The Russian language/culture is the alien part of the Estonian society	It reveals the negative perception of the Russian culture in Estonia, for example, under the impact of russification.

These coded markers is a general example including the most important details for all

anniversary evaluated in this study. Thus, such codification help to systematize the information, where one or another marker is presented and where it is not.

Consequently, at the first, this research outlines the number of references to selected indicators. At the second, it goes to another level and tries to interpret the most used examples. At the third, it summarizes the information about attributes of the narrative. As a result, this three-step analysis provides an answer for the research question and reveal certain narrative(s) on ETV+ during days of anniversaries.

It is worth to mention about limits of this analysis due to peculiarities of sources. Firstly, examples of speeches for the analysis are transcribed from video sources and translated into the English by the author of this thesis. In this sense, the author is aware that the translation can bring certain unconscious meanings into the original text, i.e. every language has own system of symbols and meanings, that is the reason if some meanings became less obvious after the translation. Secondly, the author also recognizes that every interpretation carry on certain author's perception, as well as each reader can find own interpretations according to his/her background and perceptions.

CHAPTER 2: RUSSIAN LANGUAGE TV IN ESTONIA AND ITS PRECONDITIONS

2.1. The Russian-Ukrainian Conflict and General Concerns about the Disinformation

The Russian-Ukrainian crisis in 2014, the annexation of Crimea and war in Donbass raised the significance of the Russian-language media sources in the post-soviet space. During the conflict in Ukraine, Russia actively exercised the hybrid warfare and the capability of media channels to influence the public opinion. The vivid example is a discussion about the referendum in Crimea when Russian mass media contributed to the escalation of conflict between Russian-speakers and other people living in Ukraine. Thus, this crisis is an example of widely-mentioned Russia's "hybrid warfare" (or "non-linear war" or "full-spectrum warfare") in post-Soviet sovereign states. It means that Russia uses the wide set of tools in economic, political, informational fields, e.g. using non-state actors sometimes even without direct links to official Russia's institutions (Galeotti 2016).

In May 2014, the US congress released the bill Russian Aggression Prevention Act², which is aimed to prevent "further Russian aggression toward Ukraine and other sovereign states in Europe and Eurasia, and for other purposes". One of its sections suggests an idea to expand Russian-language broadcasting in post-Soviet countries, e.g. in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania and due to these reasons, it supposed \$7,5 billions of investments in the period from 2014 to 2017.

In November 2016, the European Parliament approved the resolution "EU strategic

² (2014, May 01). Text - S.2277 - 113th Congress (2013-2014): Russian Aggression Prevention Act of 2014. Retrieved April 17, 2017, from <https://www.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/senate-bill/2277/text>

communication to counteract anti-EU propaganda by third parties”³, it states that Russia's media tries to undermine “the coherence of the EU foreign policy” and has the capacity to destabilize situations in other countries. These documents confirm concerns among the European and US politicians about the spread of Russia's activity in Europe, increasing the international tensions. This factor takes an important place in the international agenda and the idea how to protect from Russia's “hybrid warfare” became an especially important in security frameworks of Central and Eastern European states.

However, in a similar way and an almost decade before the civil conflict in Ukraine, Estonia faced with comparable methods of Russia's foreign policy. This event was called the Bronze night (April 2007)⁴. This conflict was triggered by the decision to relocate the monument of the Bronze soldier in Tallinn. The monument was encircled by fierce debates about symbolism, which it presented to the public perception. Many Russian-speakers preferred the Russia's narrative about the World War II (the Great Patriotic war) and the liberation of Estonia from Fascist (or Nazi) invaders. At the same time, for the majority of the population in Estonia, this monument was considered as a symbol of almost 50 years of the Soviet occupation (Brüggemann and Kasekamp 2008, p. 429). Furthermore, this clash was partly escalated by Russia's media broadcasting in Estonia and having a wide audience among the Russian-speakers (Pääbo 2008, p.22). Russia's TV channel devoted a huge amount of TV shows to this issue, despite the fact that this conflict was the part of the domestic policy in the sovereign state. Consequently, the Russophones were more likely to accept the Russia's point of view, because they do not have a clear idea about another side of this conflict.

2.2. Estonia and Russia’s Disinformation

In the case of Estonia, Russia's disinformation campaign seeks to increase tensions between Estonian and Russian-speaking communities as it has been already practiced during the Bronze Soldier events. In many ways, Russia's news tends to employ the

³ (2016, November 23) MEPs sound alarm on anti-EU propaganda from Russia and Islamist terrorist groups. Retrieved April 17, 2017, from <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/news-room/20161118IPR51718/meps-sound-alarm-on-anti-eu-propaganda-from-russia-and-islamist-terrorist-groups>

⁴ (2007, April 26). Russia Rebukes Estonia for Moving Soviet Statue. *The New York Times*. Retrieved April 17, 2017, from http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/27/world/europe/27end-estonia.html?_r=0
(2007, May 02). Friction Between Estonia and Russia Ignites Protests in Moscow. *The New York Times*. Retrieved April 17, 2017, from <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/03/world/europe/03estonia.html>

historic issues as a 'bone of contention' in relations between two communities in Estonia. Last year, Russian TV channel Rossiya presented a story⁵ about the huge demonstration during “Victory Day” in Sillamäe (a small town in the North-Eastern Estonia). In fact, this demonstration was significantly smaller, than it was present on TV in Russia. Another example relates to the death of young Russian person Dmitry Ganin during the Bronze Soldier events and investigation of the criminal case.

In April 2017 Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Russian embassy in Estonia, *Sputnik Estonia* and *RT* channel launched a campaign blaming Estonian officials because of poor investigation of this case⁶. In addition, pro-Russian activists made a suggestion to erect the monument devoted to Arnold Meri⁷, according to them he is considered as a Great Patriotic War hero. However, it also contributes to memory tensions between communities, since according to the Estonian officials Arnold Meri was suspected of the participation in the deportations of Estonians in March 1949.

In this sense, these news shows how Russia’s media from time to time contributes to the old conflict of memories in order to undermine the international reputation of Estonia, e.g. on the eve of the presidency in the European Union. However these informational attacks have been already expected by the Estonian Prime Minister Jüri Ratas and the Estonian foreign intelligence service, who has already claimed a few months ago that Russia can intensify its activity due to “the NATO deployment; Estonia's European Union presidency in the second half of the year; local elections due in October; and Russian military exercises codenamed Zapad (West)”⁸.

In general, Russia's state TV channels strive to depict the Estonian states as “xenophobic” and “intolerant” and at the same time it tries to trigger some nationalist

⁵ (2016, May 06) Скандальный видеосюжет телеканала «Россия»: почему власти Прибалтийских республик хотят переписать историю Победы? *Postimees*. Retrieved April 17, 2017, from <http://rus.postimees.ee/3683959/skandalnyy-videosyuzhet-telekanala-rossiya-pochemu-vlasti-pribaltiyskih-respublik-hotyat-perepisat-istoriyu-pobedy>

⁶ (2017, April 17). Годовщина Бронзовых ночей: посольство РФ запустило кампанию памяти Ганина. *Sputnik News.ee* Retrieved April 17, 2017, from <https://ru.sputnik-news.ee/society/20170414/5395489/godovshhina-bronzovyh-nochej-posolstvo-rf-zapustilo-kampaniju-pamjati-ganina.html>

⁷ (2017, April 3). «Защищали единую Родину»: памятник советскому воину - эстонцу могут установить в Таллине. *RT*. Retrieved April 17, 2017, from <https://russian.rt.com/ussr/article/374607-pamyatnik-voinu-estoncu-sssr>

⁸ (2017, February 28). Estonia braced to resist 'fake news:' PM. *Reuters*. Retrieved April 17, 2017, from <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-estonia-pm-idUSKBN1671S2?il=0>

legitimization inside Russia (Dougherty & Kaljurand 2015, p.21) Nevertheless, the Russia's activity is only one side of this process, another one is the Russian-speaking minority, which can be fertile ground or not for this kind of activities.

The TV stations transmitted from Russia have still been a major source of information for many Russophones in Estonia (Vihalemm, Lauristin and Kõuts 2012, p. 26; Dougherty & Kaljurand 2015, p. 16). Although, it would be incorrect to generalize the Russian-speaking community as a homogeneous entity. There are many distinctions in patterns of self-identification and integration within the community (Dougherty & Kaljurand 2015, p. 16).

2.3. Russian-Speakers in Estonia and Their Identities and Perceptions

Russian-speakers in Estonia have at least three identification patterns: local-cultural pattern (“as an inhabitant of Estonia or the Baltic”), supra-national and global pattern (“as European or World citizen”), nostalgic post-Soviet pattern (“as a Soviet person or an inhabitant of the former Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic”) (Vihalemm and Masso 2007, p. 84). Although the nostalgic pattern is more associated with some “ideological” or “political” protest, than “nostalgic lifestyle-related longings in the mental structures of Russian-speaking Estonians” (Vihalemm and Masso 2007, p. 85). At the same time, self-identification as “citizen of the Republic of Estonia”, does not have “deeper cultural-historical context” and relations with other elements of identification (Vihalemm and Masso 2007, p. 84), but many Russian-speakers in Estonia considers themselves culturally distinct from Russians in Russia and perceive positively a cultural association with Estonia as a country. In addition, they do not consider a deeper inclusion in Estonia society as a threat to their “Russian heritage” (Fein 2005, p. 343).

Furthermore, among the Russian-speaking minority in Estonia, there are several identities referring to 'national', 'imperial' and 'linguistic' characteristics (Ehala 2015, p. 188). Sometimes wars and other conflicts actively influence the process of the identity construction, e.g. identity of a Russian-speaking minority does not only include the memory about the Second World but has some features concerns about their existed status as the minority. In other words, Russophones in Estonia tend to challenge their

status in the society (Ehala and Zabrodskaja 2014, p. 92). Thus, the “othering” of the majority population is an important element of the Russian-speaking identity, although this identity considers Russia as “other” instead of “self. Consequently, it means that existing identity of Russian-speakers in Estonia indicates their position in-between.

Additionally, generational changes in the perception of the majority discourse are common for the Russian-speakers in Estonia. The young generation tends to accept the national narratives and discourse easily than their parents (Cheskin 2013, p. 308). Consequently, it indicates the wide changes or evolution in perceptions of the national majority discourse, since the young generation in Estonia have different thought patterns in comparison with the oldest and middle-aged persons (Vihalemm and Kalmus 2009, p.109-110). However, despite generational changes, another important characteristic of the minority population is the lack of upward mobility among Russian-speakers in Estonia. (Vihalemm and Kalmus 2009, p. 111).

Turning to the point of principles how Russophones in Estonia watch Russian TV station, some specialists underlines several major elements on the basis of the social survey. Firstly, the entertainment is more important than the news shows. Speaking about the popular culture, the Russian-speaking minority is more included in Russia's cultural spaces, because they have the same sources of information and entertainment (Nielsen and Pääbo 2015, p.133). Secondly, the Russian-speakers tend to be sceptic about all news sources. Thirdly, young generation of Russophones prefers more the Internet sources, than classic TV broadcast. Fourthly, the audience is more interesting in the local news, than international events. Finally, the watching of Russian TV does not definitely mean the political loyalty to Russia's point of view (Dougherty & Kaljurand 2015, pp.16-17). Thus, it is certainly incorrect to claim that the public opinion of Russian-speakers in Estonia is only dependent on the narrative of the Russia's state TV channels (Kivirähk 2014, p.26; Cheskin 2012a, p.336).

Nevertheless, according to the Monitoring of Integration in Estonia, the Russian TV channels are the most important source of information for many Russian-speakers in Estonia (Seppel 2015, p. 88).

2.4. Estonia and Alternative Response to Russia's Media Influence

The results of social surveys and other investigations indicate that Estonia and other Baltic states have been still under the possible Russia's threat, e.g. disinformation campaign. However, these countries choose the different measures in order to neutralize the threat. Latvia and Lithuania several time tried to restrict an access to Russia's state-owned media channels to the media market. Last restrictions in Latvia and Lithuania were introduced in 2015 and 2016. The Lithuanian officials banned the retransmission Rossiya-RTR channel as a response to law violations and disinformation. The same measures were conducted by the Latvian state institutions in 2016. In contrast, since the beginning of the conflict, the Estonian government suggested that better to provide an alternative view, than restrict Russia's TV channel in Estonia. This decision refers to ideas to accept the Russian language in public space and create the source of state information available in Russian language (Pääbo 2008, p. 25).

Furthermore, this decision demonstrates changes in the official perception of Russian language in the Estonian society, because decision-makers and the public opinion became more open and tolerant to an idea to provide a source of information for Russian-speakers (Pääbo 2015, p.136).

During the previous decades, Russian-language information channels have several major obstacles: to find a reliable source of financing in time (public or private) and to compete with “big” TV channels transmitted from Russia (which have large budgets and well-developed TV production) (Jõesaar, Rannu and Jufereva 2013).

Nevertheless, despite all negative preconditions the Estonian government decided to launch the public TV channel in the Russian language in order to provide these public opinions, which are important in the counteracting of Russia's “hybrid warfare”. This process is obviously politically motivated and faced as with positive so negative opinions. In this way, the establishment of TV channel was not a smooth process, since it provoked a wide-ranging discussion about aims, funding, and reasons to create the new TV station.

The idea to launch the new channel was criticized from the polar sides of the Estonian political party system. The Deputy Chairman of the Riigikogu and the member of the

Reform Party Laine Randjärv called to avoid the useless spending (“püüdes vältida mõttetuid kulutusi”)⁹, in the issue of the seeking of the common information field, such as the launch of new TV channel.

Similarly, Yana Toom, a member of the Central Party, who is often associated with the protection of Russian minority's rights, argued against the idea of the channel, because it seems useless and expensive to counteract “Russian propaganda”. Furthermore, she criticized editor-in-chief Darja Saar and her position in the interview to Russia's media, which asked provocative questions about Crimea and Donbass¹⁰.

In general, the idea to establish the new channel was criticized in two ways. The first is nonsense to compete with Russia's TV channels, which are deeply rooted in the Russian-speaking community and to change the situation is impossible. The second relates to the additional budget expenditures without any real reason. At the same time, the Russia's media perceived it as a competitor and tried to undermine the reputation of the new channels, even before the official beginning of the broadcast.

In addition to huge criticism, this new channel, which is called ETV+, faced with some “path dependency”, taking into account the long story of social contradiction between the Estonians and the Russian-speakers.

2.5. “War of Memories” as an Obstacle for ETV+

Another important precondition is “war of memories” and different perception of historic events among the Estonian and the Russian-speaking communities. The editor-in-chief of ETV+ Darja Saar has been actively claimed that essential tasks are to involve the Russian-speakers into the local Estonian agenda and to erase the imagined border between Estonian and Russian communities¹¹. However, the communication

⁹ (2014, June 10). Laine Randjärv kritiseerib ETV3 loomist: 6,5 miljonit - millisel eesmärgil ja kellele täpselt? *Delfi.ee*. Retrieved April 17, 2017, from <http://www.delfi.ee/archive/laine-randjarv-kritiseerib-etv3-loomist-6-5-miljonit-millisel-eesmargil-ja-kellele-tapselt?id=68847025>

¹⁰ (2015, September 01). Yana Toom ETV venekeelsest kanalist: „Vene propaganda Vene propagandat minnakse lööma mütsiga. Lohutuseks on see, et müts on kallis”. *Eesti Päevaleht/Delfi.ee*. Retrieved April 17, 2017, from <http://epl.delfi.ee/news/arvamus/yana-toom-etv-venekeelsest-kanalist-vene-propagandat-minnakse-looma-mutsiga-lohutuseks-on-see-et-muts-on-kallis?id=72215223>

¹¹ (2015, October 05) Редактор канала ETV : «Мы не можем ждать, пока русские выучат эстонский язык». *TVNET.lv*. Retrieved April 17, 2017, from <http://rus.tvnet.lv/novosti/obschjestvo/340124->

between communities has been problematic for a long time due to these conflictual historic views. More precisely, the collective memory and conflict of narratives have been significantly contributing to the social tensions in Estonia. This problem divides the society according to the perception of historic events, mostly the Second World War and time of Soviet rule in Estonia.

Generally speaking, individual and collective memories play an important role in the identity formation. Thus, the distinction between the memory of majority and minority population in the Baltic states significantly impact the political situation within country. In some cases, it even has a certain impact on the foreign policy of the Baltic countries, e.g. international relations with Russia and decisions of the Baltic presidents to attend or not the official commemoration ceremony in Russia (Onken 2007). During the restoration of independence and the transitional process, the Estonian memory politics was focused on attempts to construct a unified narrative of Estonian history and was a part of the legislative process (Tamm 2013, p. 667). Furthermore, the Estonian master narrative shifted toward the European civilization, “which is also Russia’s major significant Other” (Pääbo 2014, p. 201). In this situation, historical narratives are significant for the relations between minorities. Consequently, in the case of similar narratives, the majority and minority populations would be co-existed peacefully, but distinctions create tensions between majority and minority (Ehala 2014, p. 99). It is worth to mention that different perceptions of memory are not necessarily dependent on the ethnic element because contradiction of memories is also present in perceptions of various socioeconomic groups, e.g. 'winners' and 'losers' of the transition period (Onken 2010, p. 290).

In Estonian case the negotiation of memories is problematic because apart from basic differences in narratives, the Estonians employ defensive identity “to “Big Russia” (including the Russian community in Estonia)” and this factor contributes to the ethnic tensions (Brüggemann and Kasekamp 2008, p. 441-442). At the same time, Russia's official politics of memory employ the Second World War in order to provide certain political legitimization. It widely used in supporting of the social consensus (Laruelle 2011, p.236). Moreover, the Russian officials actively involve symbols and ceremonies

from the Soviet time, e.g. military parade on the Red Square on Victory Day. Consequently, the Russian-speaking minority in Estonia is also impacted by the myths of the Second World War, because the Russian TV stations actively promote these myths to the audience, including Russophones in the post-soviet countries. In general, the Soviet past is an important part of the official narrative in Putin's Russia (Wijermars 2016, p.84). Therefore, the Soviet past is historic friendly “Other”, and this identity reference can create tensions between many Russian-speakers in Estonia, who also considers the Soviet past in a positive way, and the Estonians perceiving the Soviet time more negatively.

Thus, the interval between Russian and Estonian informational spaces has contributed for a long time to the “war of memories” (Laruelle 2011, p.238). Nevertheless, Victory Day is highly politicized in Russia, however, for many Russian-speakers in Estonia this day does not relate to political symbols, but it has an association with family memories. In other words, it is less political but more emotional in terms of memory and association with symbols (Lehti, Jutila, & Jokisipilä 2008, p.409).

Moreover, researchers argue that division of memory is still present in Estonian Russian-language media and cover not only the history of XXth but generally memory about the past events, e.g. the Northern war and the Swedish rule, the World War II. Generally speaking, scholars consider that Russian-language press follows the diaspora and the local identity (Vihalemm and Jakobson 2011). The conflict of memories placed the Russian-speakers in a problematic position, because the acceptance of the national master narrative means that they identify themselves as “occupants” and alienate further from the majority of the population (Cheskin 2013, p. 298). Consequently, the Russian-speaking minority takes some place in between Estonia and Russia, since they have not already been Russian, but at the same time, they have not still been Estonian in terms of identities (Pääbo 2008, p.16).

Accordingly, ETV+ does not start from *tabula rasa* but has to overcome some obstacles such as 'war of memories', existing identities and patterns of integration. From one side, Darja Saar as an editor-in-chief of new channel suggested a peaceful dialogue between communities, and from another side, these communities have a long and well-developed story of conflicts and contradictions. In terms of collective memory, the function of

memory agent was attributed to this channel “by default”, because it supposed to present acute historic events taking into account both sides in the conflict and became a solid ground for the development of cohesive society.

During the first year of production, ETV+ is supposed to get €4 millions for the first year of the work¹². This TV channel is funded by the state budget, however some projects are partly invested by third parties, e.g. in 2015 the Nordic Council of Ministers initiated the funding plan for Russian-language media in the Baltic countries, including ETV+ in Estonia¹³; in 2016 the US State Department offered a grant of \$60,000 to train camera operators for ETV+¹⁴.

ETV+ became a pioneer in the full-time public Russian-language television in the Baltic states, therefore it received a lot of attention and expectations from various groups and individuals. Perhaps, most of the expectations are related to the counteracting of Russia's disinformation campaigns and providing a proper information for Russian-speakers in Estonia and in the Baltic countries in general. This point of view is common for foreign observers, at the same time ETV+ domestically should create a platform for local news agenda in the Russian-language, discussing the local problems, which are not presented in other media. Prior to the launch, Darja Saar emphasized a point that new channel is not a tool of anti-propaganda, but including of Russians in Estonian media space allows eliminating any possible threat from Russia's disinformation campaigns in the region and overcoming the tensions in the society.

First results indicate that the media preferences of the Russian-speakers have not changed radically since the establishment of ETV+. The table 5 demonstrates the share of TV viewers of ETV+ (among all viewers in Estonia) during recent fourth month in 2017.

¹² (2015, August 02) ETV hakkab ligikaudu 4 miljoni eurose aastaeelarvega tööd pakkuma 60-70 inimesele. *Delfi.ee* Retrieved April 17, 2017, from <http://www.delfi.ee/news/paevauudised/eessti/etv-hakkab-ligikaudu-4-miljoni-eurose-aastaeelarvega-tood-pakkuma-60-70-inimesele?id=72035759>

¹³ (2016, April 11) Nordic Council of Ministers continues to fund independent Russian-language media in the Baltic continues in 2016. Retrieved April 17, 2017, from <http://www.norden.org/en/news-and-events/news/nordic-council-of-ministers-continues-to-fund-independent-russian-language-media-in-the-baltic-continues-in-2016>

¹⁴ ETV+ Media Training - DOSEST-16-GR-002. Retrieved April 17, 2017, from <http://open-grants.insidegov.com/1/44266/ETV-Media-Training-DOSEST-16-GR-002>

Table 5. The Daily Share of ETV+ in % and Number of Unique Visitors

	January	February	March	April
The Daily Share of TV audience in %	0.7	0.6	0.6	0.6
The Number of Unique Visitors of the home page ETV+ (in thousands).	79	91	79	N/A

Source: Kantar Emor. Teleauditooriumi Mõõdikuuring¹⁵

In conclusion, traditionally, the Russian-language TV had two major obstacles in the region. The small size of the audience has not been able to attract private investors and at the same time, it has not gotten the sufficient support from political elite in order to create a public funding TV station in the Russian-language. However, the establishment of ETV+ channel was triggered by political and security challenges appeared in Europe after the Ukrainian-Russian crisis and annexation of Crimea. Consequently, the Estonian idea to launch the Russian-language TV channel received support from other members of the European Union, and the United States. However, expectations are quite scattered and only the time will answer how ETV+ will be able to response to the Russia's threat and contribute to the cohesion of the society. ETV+ has to deal with many existing obstacles, for instance, “war of memories”. At some extent, the way how ETV+ and its narrative is able to manage this conflict, depends on their presentation of historic issues, especially during commemoration days, which are not common for the Estonian and Russian community and bearing different and sometimes even contrast meaning.

¹⁵ . (n.d.). Teleauditooriumi ülevaade aprillikuus 2017. Retrieved May 21, 2017, from <http://www.emor.ee/teleauditooriumi-ulevaade-aprillikuus-2017/> (2017, March 06). Telekanalite vaadatavus 2017. aasta veebruaris. Retrieved May 22, 2017, from <http://info.err.ee/v/statistika/530f8c3d-1ba3-400c-8e9b-76322a61c4db/telekanalite-vaadatavus-2017-aasta-veebuaris> (2017, April 05). Telekanalite vaadatavus 2017. aasta märtsis. Retrieved May 22, 2017, from <http://info.err.ee/v/statistika/0a2db708-4b1f-46d4-a23f-142b06bfb8e8/telekanalite-vaadatavus-2017-aasta-martsis>

CHAPTER 3: ETV+ AND HISTORICAL NARRATIVES IN DAYS OF PUBLIC COMMEMORATIONS

This chapter is devoted to the analysis of anniversaries and its media representation on ETV+. The chapter is divided into several sub-parts according to the date of the anniversary. Firstly, it explores the way how the Independence Day celebrations are presented on 24th of February 2016 and 2017. Secondly, it gives an idea how the 9th of May and the commemoration of the World War II in general. Thirdly, it evaluates the celebration of the Estonian Victory day on 23rd of June 2016. Finally, the chapter explicates certain memory narrative on 20th of August 2016.

The overview of the anniversary and TV shows, which were screened on ETV+ during that day, is given at the beginning of each subpart. Furthermore, it quantifies references to suggested indicator and after that it proceeds to the qualitative analysis of examples.

3.1. The 24th of February 2016. The Estonian Independence Day

The Estonian Independence Day has been celebrated since the restoration of the national independence in 1991. In the Estonian official politics of memory, this day is considered as the most important national holiday because it legitimizes the national and state continuity after the collapse of the Soviet Union. More precisely, this anniversary is devoted to the day, when the Estonian national day was proclaimed in 1918 (Tamm 2013).

During the whole tradition of celebration, this day has never been broadcast in Russian-language in a full scale. In this way, many Russian-speakers were probably excluded from these traditional ceremonies mainly due to the language barrier. Hereby, on 24th of

February in 2016, at the first time in the whole history of its celebration, the official ceremonies were available with the Russian-language explanations on television. Generally, the whole schedule of ETV+ at that day was completely devoted to different stages of the anniversary. Official ceremonies were accompanied by movies and interviews about the history of the Estonian Independence¹⁶.

The broadcast of the 98th celebration of the Estonian Independence started from the hoist of the Estonian national flag on the tower Tall Hermann (Pikk Hermann). The live air was delivered with Russian-language explanations and complete translation of all speeches presented during the ceremony. At the beginning of the broadcast, presenters put an emphasize that this is the first time in Estonia when all ceremonies during the Independence Day are presented in Estonian and Russian languages. The live transmission was started with the introduction by two journalists: one from ETV (Indrek Treufeldt) and another from ETV+ (Elena Solomina). Although both of them were speaking in Estonia, the commentator (Dmitry Pastukhov) translated their talks for Russian-speaking viewers. The official commemoration was continued at the Independence War Victory Column, where the laying of wreaths was arranged as a commemoration of the Independence war victims. During this ceremony, the narrator Dmitry Pastukhov was accompanied by a professional historian Igor Kopytin. An essential part of the ceremony was allocated to the historical details of this event. Further, the television broadcast continued with a military parade, which was commented by ETV+ journalists Nikolay Loschin and Artur Zakharov. It was the end of the morning part of the Independence Day celebration, however, it was also continued with the official state awards presentation, concert and presidential reception at the evening.

Thus, the historical interpretations and explanations were mostly included in the morning part of anniversary. In addition, ETV+ also demonstrated other television shows, related to the Independence Day, for instance, the movie Names in Marble [Nimed marmortahvlil, 2002] about the Independence War and interview with the director of that movie Elmo Nüganen.

In general, this day became sort of reconnaissance for ETV+, every element of the

¹⁶ The TV schedule is attached to the thesis in the Appendix I

broadcast in Russian-language was practiced for the first time. However, ETV+ used the same live air as it was on ETV, however, all these materials were combined with simultaneous translation into the Russian-language. In other words, Estonian and Russian viewers saw the same visual representation of ceremonies, and the only difference was in language. Commentators and presenters paid attention to the general information about events, e.g. how the Independence have been proclaimed, what are major traditions of this anniversary. In this way, they tried to provide information about a background of the anniversary.

Speaking more precisely about the narrative, the table below reflects how often one or another marker were used during the journalist's reports, comments and opinion of invited historians.

Table 6. Indicators of the "Self" (The Independence Day 2016)¹⁷

Indicators of the Self	Quantity of References
S1 The Estonian Russians	2
S3 Estonia/Estonian state/country	7

The investigation shows that the only two categories of the “self” were used by TV presenters. The most mentioned marker is „Estonian state/country”. This is the most common point of reference in the explanation of historic events, in some way, it includes all people living in Estonia and loyal to the Estonian state. For this category, the loyalty and self-identification with the Estonian states are the essential features. Further the research presents more detailed explanation using examples.

[S3] *“Today [day of the Estonian national independence] is the time when you can be proud of the Estonian state, however, it is also time to discuss the Estonian state [to discuss major problems]. **We must not forget that together we are Estonia.**”*

[Journalist Elena Solomina speaks before the hoist of national flag]

¹⁷ Hereinafter tables demonstrates only mentioned indicators.

This statement clearly refers to the self-identification related to Estonia as a state and it further means that national (in sense of ethnocultural unity) does not play an essential role in the process of the identification. Moreover, it does not clearly specify that there is a distinction between Estonians and Russian-speakers in Estonia, it tries to underline the central role the state as a common point. Thus, this introductory statement before the ceremony of commemoration is also meant that from the point of collective memory, the Estonians and the Russian-speakers are the part of the Estonian history, since both communities composed it and influenced development of this state. At the same direction, several other times television presenters refer to the Estonian state as a major point of unity.

[S3] *“At the present time, names of more than six thousands people who lost their lives in the fight **for freedom of our country.**”*

[Historian Igor Kopytin during the ceremony of commemoration of victims in the Independence war]

This opinion of historian Igor Kopytin during the ceremony of commemoration presents a clear idea that the Estonian country is above all and the loyalty to this country is an important element from the point of collective memory perspective. In other words, he suggests that the commemoration is for all victims, fighting for the freedom of Estonian without the reference to their mother tongue or ethnic characteristics. Similarly, ETV+ journalist Dmitry Pastukhov uses „we”, when he refers to the events of the Independence War and the Estonian independence.

[S3] *“The war started only, if we refer to the history, in 1918. On 28th of November, the war has just begun, and on 24th of February, every year on the independence day, **we lay wreaths...**how to explain this fact?”*

[Journalist Dmitry Pastukhov asks historian Igor Kopytin during the ceremony of commemoration of victims in the Independence war]

This example is also linked to the commemoration ceremony of the Estonian state since the speaker discusses certain official dates and uses 'we' underlining the common involvement in this commemoration. Another example is how televisional presenters refer certainly to the Estonian Russians in their comments and questions.

[S1] *“The Independence War is a controversial historical moment for the Russian-speakers in Estonia because the Soviet people are used to perceive it as part of the Civil war and there are many questions and discussions about it, and, what do you think about it?”*

[Elena Solomina in the interview with Elmo Nüganen, the director of movie Names in Marbles]

This question was also asked by Elena Solomina, but it is characteristics and reference is interesting, since it presents some unconscious use of the reference to the Russian-speakers in Estonia. Elena Solomina tried to push the discussion about the self and other, and problem of self-identification with the traditional Estonian events such as the Independence War. However, she equates the Russian-speakers in Estonia and the label Soviet people [Советские люди]. In this sense, the Estonian Russians have problems with understanding of certain events, due to their Soviet background. Thus, she made a generalization that the Russians in Estonia often have Soviet perspective, which is the main obstacle to the communication with the Estonian part of the society. Perhaps, this suggestion is an example how journalists trying to speak with „self” of the audience and offer the way of its reshaping.

Thus, these several examples illustrate how TV presenters speak about the „self” and how they consciously or unconsciously refer the “self” of audience. The major characteristic of the „self” for TV presenters is the Russian-speaker living in Estonia with the loyalty to the Estonian state (loyalty in term of self-identification with the Estonian state as their own). Nevertheless, from the theoretical perception of this research, the “self” rarely exists without the “other”. Consequently, the further element of analysis is a reference to the “other” during the anniversary ceremonies and shows. The next table presents how often ETV+ speakers uses different markers of the „other” in their stories and comments.

Table 7. Indicators of the "Other" (The Independence Day 2016)

Indicators of the "Other"	Quantity of References
O1 Russia/the Russians [ethnocultural]	1
O2 Soviet Russia/ the Bolsheviks/the Communists/the	1
O3 Baltic Germans/t the Germans	1
O5 Other states/countries/nations	1

Results demonstrate TV presenters have rarely referred to the "other" in their speeches. Two of mentions are concerned with the Independence War and another two is used to show that the Estonian state is a „young" state in the comparison with other traditions of the state. However, all other times, even speaking about the Estonian Independence War, TV presenters did not make an emphasis on the opposite side of this conflict, focusing mainly on the heroic and suffering „self". For instance, historian Igor Kopytin refers to the German occupation as important part of the story about the Independence War.

[O3] *"The Manifest of the Independence, it also relates to the Independence war, since the proclamation of independence was followed by German occupation and the events of the war."*

[Historian Igor Kopytin during the ceremony of commemoration of victims in the Independence war]

In this sense, the Germans are definitely considered to be the "other", since their "occupation" put under the danger the existence of the newly proclaimed the Estonian state.

Likewise, elements of the conflictual, overlapping or common narratives were not widely applicable in the case of the Independence Day. Only once it uses the indicator about the "Soviet repressions as common disaster" in the explaining of the preservation

of memory about the Independence war. Although, even this example refers to the problematic points of common past, but it is rather “smooth, unifying the Estonian and Russian-speakers suffering from repressions conducted by the Soviet authorities.

The next category is expressed by elements of 'Russian' in the history of Estonia. TV speakers used indicators from this category, but rather seldom. The table below demonstrates the number.

Table 8. Indicators of the "Russian" (The Independence Day 2016)

Indicators of the “Russian” within the Estonian history	Quantity of References
R1 The Estonian Russians are positively evaluated as a part of the Estonian history	2

Furthermore, as an example of this reference, it is possible to use the reference made by Igor Kopytin. He has underlined the characteristic of “Russianness” in his account of the Independence War.

[R1] *“Well, it is necessary to admit that **the Russians were also awarded this high award** [The Estonian state award for the participation in the Independence War].”*
 [Historian Igor Kopytin during the ceremony of commemoration of victims in the Independence war]

This statement is interesting for the analysis since special clarification according to the ethnocultural attribute gives an idea that speaker tries to find the common ground for the commemoration and provide the inclusiveness of his narrative using this detail. In other words, it claims that the Russian-speakers in Estonia has also a common point of commemoration, because Russian-speakers were also involved in the Independence War and were important for the Estonian independent state. Thus, this point indicates that the Russian-speakers can freely consider the Estonian state as their own in the same way as the Estonian population.

In sum, speaking about an anniversary, it is possible to assume that the narrative

presented on ETV+ during the 98th anniversary of the Estonian Independence is highly inclusive. In general, the narrative includes itself basic elements of Estonian master narrative (perception of the national independence and sense of belonging to Estonian state) (Tamm 2008, p.505-506), however, it underlines some elements, suggesting a shared ground for Estonian and Russian-speaking communities. Firstly, it provides a high level of inclusiveness through an integration of viewers to traditional details of Estonian history, e.g. the representation of the Estonian Independence manifest and the Independence war. Secondly, it overcomes the barrier to the mutual understanding of communities, emphasizing that ethnic or cultural characteristics do not play an essential role in the self-identification with the Estonian state. Finally, it legitimizes the role of Russians in Estonia, underlining the fact that Russian-speakers took also an important part in the establishment of the Estonian independent state.

3.2. The 24th of February 2017. The Estonian Independence Day

The 99th Anniversary of the Estonian Independence and its coverage on ETV+ were organized in a similar way as the year before. The live broadcast began with a hoist of the Estonian national flag in the morning. The organization of a broadcast was almost identical to the previous year, although with minor distinctions, for instance, this year, another reporter presented a live footage from the ceremony: Anna Gavronski (ETV) and Dmitry Kukushkin (ETV+). The official celebration traditionally proceeded at the Independence War Victory Column with the commemoration of the Independence War victims. This ceremony was commented in Russian-language by Artur Tjulenev and historian Igor Kopytin. Finally, the morning part of the celebration was concluded with the parade of military forces, which were narrated by Nikolay Loschin and Artur Zakharov. At the same time, the evening part traditionally contained with an awards presentation, concert, and presidential reception.

Despite a similarity of television schedules, it is worth to notice that the 99th anniversary of the Estonian Independence was more widely presented than it had been a year before. In addition to the traditional ceremonies, ETV+ showed many other television programs and movies related to Estonian history. The most prominent and important for ETV+ as

TV channel was an originally produced documentary show “Portraits of Independence” [Портреты независимости]. In several episodes, it narrates about persons, who in one or another way participated in the establishing of an independent Estonian republic, among them Jaan Poska¹⁸, Konstantin Päts¹⁹, Johann Laidoner²⁰, Aleksey Sorokin²¹, and Nikolay Yudenich²². This show was created by journalist Artur Tjulenev and historian Igor Копытин with the assistance of historical re-enactors and Estonian museums. This show is interesting for the further analysis because it was produced purposely for ETV+ and its audience. In addition, ETV+ screened a famous Estonian silent movie Young Eagles [Noored kotkad], which was originally produced in 1927 and telling a story about the Independence War. Apart from ceremonies, documentary and fiction movies, ETV+ journalists in Narva invited Ivika Maidre the head of museum in Sinimäe for an interview in order to explain some details about monuments in Estonia and in Narva. In a similar way, as it had been a year before the most of the presented information was devoted to the explanation of history and traditions referring to the Independence Day. In some way, it helps to develop a better understanding of traditions, which are important for the Estonian national identity, among the Russophones.

Further analysis presents how the coverage was organized in terms of reference to the historic details. First of all, it deals with the notion of “self” in the speeches. The following table shows how often TV presenters referred to specific indicators of “self”.

¹⁸ Jaan Poska (1866-1920) is the Estonian lawyer and politician, who also worked as a the first Estonian Minister of Foreign Affairs

¹⁹ Konstantin Päts (1874-1956) is the Estonian politician and head of the state during the interwar period of Estonian independence

²⁰ Johann Laidoner (1884-1953) is the Estonian General, who was the chief of army during the Independence War and later

²¹ Aleksey Sorokin is the politician who is actively participated in the affairs of the Russian minority in Estonia during the interwar period

²² Nikolai Yudenich (1862-1933) is the general of the Russian Imperial Army and later one of the anti-communist the “White” army leaders.

Table 9. Indicators of the "Self" (The Independence Day 2017)

Indicators of the "Self"	Quantity of References
S1 The Estonian Russians	4
S2 the Estonians	4
S3 Estonia/Estonian state/country	5
S4 The Europeans	1
S6 The local identification (Tallinn, Narva resident)	3

The analysis shows several patterns of reference to the "self". It is difficult to define the most important indicator among speeches, because results are diverse. Nevertheless, it gives an idea that the single storyline is absent in the narrative during the Independence Day. However, better understanding of results is possible with certain examples. The next statement indicates how the reference to "self" is made through the identification with the Estonian country.

[S3] *"As I said, the wreath laying ceremony in memory of victims of the Independence war is a very important symbol of historical memory, a symbol that we honour not only victims of the Independence war, but also **all citizens and inhabitants of Estonia**, who lost their lives in sake of **the independence of our country**, for **the freedom of our people** [народа]."*

[Historian Igor Kopytin during the ceremony of commemoration of victims in the Independence war]

This example has two important elements for the analysis. From the one hand, it has distinctions between "citizens" and "inhabitants" of Estonia. From the other hand, it emphasizes that the all these people were struggling for the independence of Estonia and the freedom of "our people". Perhaps, "our people" is also used to depict all people living in Estonia. In this sense, the whole this statement shows that the self-

identification is built through the reference to the Estonian state or country.

A further interesting example is how the self is constructed for the local identification. Yuri Nikolaev journalists from a studio in Narva asked journalist in almost in a provocative manner asked Ivika Maidre, the head of Sinimäe museum about the monument of freedom in Narva and claimed that many people often compare this monument with the Nazi Cross (or the Iron Cross).

[S6] *“Ivika, how often [people] ask you [the question] **why do we erect the monument to Nazis or Nazi Cross on the banks of the Narova river?**[...] What is your very simple explanation, if you have to explain to the Russian people living in Narva or Narva-Jõesuu...What do you think? **Is it possible to make that monument closer to the local people?** Does some unifying story of this monument exist? Do the Russians have? Do the Estonians have?”*

[Journalist in Narva studio Yuri Nikolaev in the interview with Ivika Maidre the head of Sinimäe museum]

Yuri Nikolaev refers to the Russian-speaking inhabitants of Narva and Narva-Jõesuu. The statements precisely indicate that TV presenter as representative of Russian people in Narva refers to the local identification of the “self”. In other words, this self-identification model is based on the local pattern. However, he also pointed out that some of the Estonian collective memory elements are not understandable for local Russians. Consequently, according to Yuri Nikolaev, “self” is depicted as “Russian-speaker” living in Narva and this “self” does not identify itself with important elements of the Estonian identity.

The next point of analysis is how “other” is presented in accounts of TV presenters. The table indicates what type of the “other” is more often used in the speeches of TV presenters on ETV+.

Table 10. Indicators of the "Other" (The Independence Day 2017)

Indicators of the "Other"	Quantity of References
O1 Russia/the Russians [ethnocultural]	2
O2 Soviet Russia/ the Bolsheviks/the Communists/the Soviets/the Red Army	7
O3 Baltic Germans/t the Germans	2
O5 Other states/countries/nations	1

The results show that the most common "other" in the stories related to the Estonian Independence is "O2 Soviet Russia/ the Bolsheviks/the Communists/the Soviets/the Red Army". This marker generally describes the Bolsheviks as a part of the Estonian Independence war, and the treaty with them confirmed the Estonian independence. However, "O3 Baltic Germans/t the Germans " were also mentioned as occupiers of Estonia after the proclaimed independence. For example, journalist Artur Tjulenev in the documentary about Johan Laidoner indicated both of these elements.

[O3] "After the German occupation of Estonia Laidoner went to Petrograd, as he was under the threat of arrest. He returned to Estonia in December 1918, when the German army left the country and the Red Army start to the offense." [O2]

[Journalist Artur Tjulenev in the documentary episode about Johan Laidoner]

This suggests the point that stories of journalists depicts Estonia as a country in between struggling for its independence with different counterparts. In other words, the "self" related to the independent Estonian state is opposed to the German and Red Army aggressors.

Furthermore, interestingly, but in the description of the historic events of the Independence Day, journalists found the place for the reference to the first Soviet

Occupations and repressions. The table below indicates points of shared history, which can be conflictual.

Table 11. Indicators of the Shared History/Conflicts (The Independence Day 2017)

Indicators of the Common [conflictual] Estonian-Russian history	Quantity of References
C1 The Soviet occupation/annexation of Estonia [political attribute]	3
C3 Soviet repressions against the Estonians	2
C8 The Great Patriotic War/Soviet-Russian Victory Day	1

The results show that the Soviet occupation was mentioned several times. Furthermore, it has some reference to the Soviet repressions to Estonians after the beginning of the occupation. Although, this topic does not apply directly to the anniversary of the establishment of the Estonian Independence because it deals with different periods of time. As an example of such reference, Artur Tjulenev claimed about the illegitimate annexation of Estonia by the Soviet Union.

[C1] *“In 1939-1940, the Soviet Union has placed on the territory of Estonia a large military contingent by pressure and then changed the government.”*

[Journalist Artur Tjulenev in the documentary episode about Konstantin Päts]

This argument is interesting since it challenges the idea Russian-speakers about the voluntary inclusion of Estonia into the Soviet Union, which was widely accepted during the Soviet time. Artur Tjulenev underlines that the Soviet Union used military forces in order to change the political system in Estonia. In this way, these events are perceived negatively by the speaker. Another important element is the description of repression organized by Soviet authorities.

[C3] “*He [Konstantin Päts] was arrested by the Soviet authorities and deported with his family to exile in Ufa, even before the official annexation [присоединения] of the state [Estonia] to the Soviet Union.*”

[Journalist Artur Tjulenev in the documentary episode about Konstantin Päts]

In this example, Artur Tjulenev also negatively evaluates the Soviet repressions in Estonia. Moreover, he even underlines that the Soviet authorities organized first repressions before the official annexation of Estonia. In this sense, this details indicates the illegitimacy of the Soviet interference.

In addition, both these examples present the Soviet Union as a political actor without details about ethnical or cultural attributes, i.e. it is not considered as “Russian occupation” because the political affiliation in these events was more important than ethnic and cultural background. Another reference to the shared and contradicted history was made by Yuri Nikolaev in his interview with the head of Sinimäe museum Ivika Maidre.

“*Basically, there are monuments devoted to [C8] the Great Patriotic war, as our people [наши люди] understand it. What do you think? Is it possible to make that monument closer to the local people? Does some unifying story of this monument exist? Do the Russians have? Do the Estonians have?*”

[Journalist in Narva studio Yuri Nikolaev in the interview with Ivika Maidre the head of Sinimäe museum]

This example again illustrates the generalization made by journalists of ETV+ about the collective memory of the Russian-speakers in Estonia. He uses an example the Great Patriotic war as a name of the Second World War, which has been widely accepted in the Soviet Union and typical for contemporary Russia. Generally, with this question, he underlines the contradiction between the Estonian narrative and the collective memory of Russian-speakers in Estonia.

The next element of the narrative is a representation of Russian-speakers and Russian culture in Estonia. This was quite common for the stories about the time when the Estonian gained independence. The table reflects how many times and in what context Russian element was presented on in the historical narrative on ETV+.

Table 12. Indicators of the "Russian" (The Independence Day)

Indicators of the “Russian” within the Estonian history	Quantity of References
R1 The Estonian Russians are positively evaluated as a part of the Estonian history	2
R2 The Estonian Russians are negatively evaluated as a part of the Estonian history	1
R3 The Russian language/culture is the natural part of the Estonian society	3

The evaluation shows that the idea to describe the Russian-speakers as a positive part of the Estonian society. Sometimes journalists and historians underlined the importance of the Russian language and culture for the famous Estonian personalities: Jaan Poska and Johann Laidoner. Moreover, they made an effort to find a famous Russian person in the Estonian political elite during the first years of independence.

Speaking about examples, it is typical for TV presenters on ETV+ to clarify and provide details referring to the place of the Russian-speaking during the important events of the Estonian history. Moreover, these details are often positive and show the Estonian Russians as an inherent element of the Estonian society. For instance, Igor Kopytin telling about the Estonian Declaration of Independence accentuated the Russian people in Estonia.

[R1] *“They [Konstantin Päts, Konstantin Konik, Jüri Vilms] took part in the Estonian Salvation Committee, and have ensured that important document of constitutional significance such as a Manifest [Estonian Declaration of Independence] addressed to all peoples [народам] of Estonia, including the Russians, was created and published in Parnu, and then in Tallinn.”*

[Historian Igor Kopytin in the documentary episode about Konstantin Päts]

Thus, this statement indicates again that the Russian-speakers were a part of the Estonian society even before the Soviet occupation and the Second World War. Furthermore, another example indicates that some Russian-speakers were even among the Estonian political elite.

[R1] *“Sorokin was appreciated [by Estonian political elite] as a good staff member, who did all the best for every started affair. He [Alexei Sorokin] was a sincere Russian patriot, who had gone so far in his patriotism that being a member of the Constituent Assembly did not sign the Estonian Declaration of Independence and [taking into account]all of this, [he] was quite European [был вполне европейцем], it was possible to work with him even despite the difference in opinions”.*

[Journalist Artur Tjulenev in the documentary episode about Alexei Sorokin]

The reference to this person is unusual since Alexei Sorokin is barely known by the wide audience. Nevertheless, ETV+ devoted the documentary episode to his personality. Interestingly, that in this example Artur Tjulenev underscores that the Estonian and the Russian-speaking elite in Estonia peacefully coexisted despite contradictions. In parallel, Artur Tjulenev introduced an interesting detail about the Russian-language in the life of one of the most Estonian honourable person Johann Laidoner.

[R3] “*Johan Laidoner met a Polish girl Maria Kruszevska in Wilno, later he has met her again in Petersburg. The young persons fell in love and married. **Interesting detail, that the language of communication at their home was the Russian**”.*

[Journalist Artur Tjulenev in the documentary episode about Johan Laidoner]

Consequently, these details were not necessary at all from the logic of the story, nevertheless, Artur Tjulenev used it, perhaps, in order to find some inclusive elements for Russian-speakers.

In general, the narrative of ETV+ on the Estonian Independence day in 2017 has some key characteristics, however, many of them are similar to the previous year. The only big difference in the amount of TV programs and materials devoted to the Independence Day increased and picture became more diverse. However, as it was in 2016, many times TV presenters propagate the story about the common identity according to the state (or country) loyalty, for instance, journalists uses various pronouns expressing the unity between different people living in Estonia, e.g. “we”, “our” and “us”. Perhaps, these words are supposed to construct the identity of the common country, where live people speaking not only in the Estonian but also in other languages, for example, in the Russian.

Moreover, speaking about the common historic event for Estonia and Russia, journalists does not equate the Russians and the Soviet Russia in the Independence war, since define that the Russians in Estonia sympathized as to the Whites and as to the Red Army during the Russian Civil war. Furthermore, the documentary series *Portraits of the Independence* underlines that the Russian Civil war was also an important part in the achieving of the Estonian independence. Thus, the general description of these events indicates that this was a time of troubles both for the Estonians and the Russians. In additions, *Portraits of the Independence* touched upon some details, which is not directly involved to the Estonia Independence Day, but definitely, concerns with the Estonian independence. It reveals a view on the Estonian-Soviet relations in the late 1930s and the Soviet annexation of Estonia. Journalists and historians clearly articulate that the Soviet Union annexed Estonia, using the military pressure. In this way, it is at odds with the typical Soviet perception that Estonia voluntary joined the Soviet Union.

Finally, the narrative on ETV+ explains the role of the Russian-speakers in the Estonian history. From the one hand, it emphasizes that the Russian community in Estonia were very fragmented and were not interested in the local affairs of the Estonian republic. From the other hand, the Russians and the Russian cultural played important role in the Estonian history. Also, the story underscores that the Russian group was in the first Estonian parliament and some Russian politicians were in good standing with the Estonian politicians, even despite they had some different opinions.

3.3. The 9th of May 2016. The Victory Day in Russia

The 9th of May is an interesting example of anniversary without the state in Estonia. This day is one of the most important days for the Russian-speaking community, however, it does not commemorate officially in Estonia. Many Russophones refers to this day as “Victory Day” in the “Great Patriotic war”. Since the Soviet times, this day is the most revered day in many post-Soviet areas. However, in Putin's Russia, this day is the important part of the official politics of memory and the master narrative. Russia's state media actively promotes this day among viewers, readers, and listeners. The Russian-speaking minority is also part of this process because it has been under the influence of Russia's information sources, since the early post-soviet times. At the same time, the Estonians do not have the same perception of these historic events. In contrast, the Estonian master narrative does not consider this day as “Victory Day” or the end of the “Great Patriotic War”. Instead, it perceives that the Nazi occupations were substituted by the Soviet and the war does not end with this day.

Thus, the memory about the Second World War and the perception of the Red Army is highly different and event contested in Estonia. In this way, it is curious how ETV+ tries to deal with this conflict of memories. On the one side, this is the public TV channel in Estonia and it cannot be radically different from the widely accepted opinion. On the other side, ETV+ is basically a channel for the Russian-speakers, and it has to treat the memory of them the respect in order to prevent the alienation of the potential audience.

Even despite the absence of the official ceremonies on the 9th of May, ETV+ journalists

in the morning show Coffee+ [Кофе+] mentioned about this day and its symbolism. Moreover, TV broadcast was thematically devoted to the events of the war and memory about it. As an example, they invited the representative of veteran's organizations, produced documentary episodes about the war "In the Line of Fire" (На линии огня). This show was created by Artur Tjulenev with the assistance of re-enactors' club and Estonian museums. It tells of the most important battles in Estonia. However, this documentary episodes about the war were screened during the week prior to the anniversary. Furthermore, journalists of ETV+ created show "Written about the War" [Написано о войне] with readings of some poems and books about the war. Additionally, ETV+ also demonstrated the Russian-Ukrainian biographical movie "Battle for Sevastopol" [Битва за Севастополь, 2015]. This film tells a story about the Soviet sniper Lyudmila Pavlichenko in the Second World War. This movie has a controversial background, because from the beginning it should be Russian-Ukrainian project, but after the political changes in Ukraine, this movie was finally made with the funding by the Russian Ministry of Culture²³. Finally, it screened the documentary movie "Breakthrough" [Прорыв, 2013] and interview with its director Oleg Besedin. He also has a controversial background, because he was marked by the Estonian Internal Security Service as associated with Russia's anti-Estonian propaganda²⁴. This movie is about the relocation of the Baltic fleet from Tallinn to Kronstadt and Leningrad in 1941.

However, speaking in details about the description of the 9th of May on ETV+ is impossible without the analysis of a number of references made in TV shows to events corresponding with the commemoration of this day among the Russian-speakers.

The table below indicates how often and which examples of "self" were used by TV presenters in their stories about the Second World War.

²³ Киев отказался финансировать общий с РФ проект по съемкам фильма "Битва за Севастополь". (n.d.). TASS. Retrieved May 21, 2017, from <http://tass.ru/kultura/1076008>

²⁴ (2017, April 17) Беседин ответил КаПо: имею право говорить вслух правду об «угрозах Эстонии». *Rus.Postimees*. Retrieved May 21, 2017, from <http://rus.postimees.ee/420022/besedin-otvetil-ka-po-imeyu-pravo-govorit-vsluh-pravdu-ob-ugrozah-estonii>

Table 13. Indicators of the "Self" (The Victory Day in Russia)

Indicators of the "Self"	Quantity of References
S2 the Estonians	5
S3 Estonia/Estonian state/country	4

The results show that the most common examples of "self" is S2 Estonians and S3 Estonian state/country. It is interesting that most of the stories do not refer at all to the Russian-speakers in Estonia. However, more detail interpretation is possible in the analysis of examples.

For example, in the description of the Second World War on the Estonian territory, journalist Artur Tjulenev refers to the Estonian state borders and use the possessive pronoun underlining the attachment to the Estonian state.

[S3] *"Saaremaa, Sinimäe, Porkuni, Mehikoorma are only some of places, where were blazing flames of the Second World War **on the territory of our country.**"*

[Journalist Artur Tjulenev in the documentary episodes about the battle on Mehikoorma]

More precisely, this statement indicates that Estonia was not a participant actor in this war, but events happened on its territory. Similarly, Artur Tjulenev mentioned in other parts of the same documentary that the war happened to be on the Estonian territory, and the Estonians did not have any choice.

[S3] *"The battle of Porkuni in 1944 was one of the most vivid moments of the Second World War **on the Estonian territory.** In this battle, the Estonians, who were in different of fighting armies, fought against each other... The feature of the battle for Porkuni was in fact that [S2] **the Estonians fought against other Estonians: The Estonian Rifle Corps against the Estonian Legion.**"*

[Journalist Artur Tjulenev in the documentary episodes about the battle on Porkuni]

Moreover, this example indicates that the Estonian “self” faced with the external threat of the “other”. Hereby, it leads to the markers of “other” in the narrative about the Second World War. The table before indicates the presence of “other” in this story.

Table 14. Indicators of the "Other" (The Victory Day in Russia)

Indicators of the “Other”	Quantity of References
O2 Soviet Russia/ the Bolsheviks/the Communists/the Soviets/the Red Army	31
O4 Nazi Germans/Wehrmacht [refer to WWII]	18

Basically, all these references are related to the description of battles on the Estonian territory. In general, the story is based on the confrontation between Soviet and German forces. Although, the interpretation and attitude of the narrator are possible to derive from the examples. The most common kind of perception is based on the presumptions about the Estonian people in-between two big powers.

[O2/O4] *“One of the bloodiest battles in the history of Estonia was here [in Sinimäe]. It is quite usual for the Soviet and for the German military historiography, nevertheless, it has left a bloody trail in the memory of the [S2] Estonian people [народа] for decades.”*

[Journalist Artur Tjulenev in the documentary episodes about the battle on Sinimäe]

This statement by Artur Tjulenev presents an argument that for the Soviet and the German side of the conflict, Estonia was only one small point in the long list of great battles. Nevertheless, , these events were catastrophic for the Estonians and had an impact on the further developments. Thus, the Estonian “self” is opposed to the Soviet and German “other” during this war. The further example describes these events in a

similar way.

[O2/O4] *“At the beginning of the war, the tragedy was that due to the fast advance of the German troops, recruit from Estonia could be as in the Red Army and as in the Wehrmacht...Sometimes brother fought against brother...Countrymen [Земляки] and peers who probably even played in the same yard, and loved their home and their parents suddenly found themselves dressed in different military uniforms.”*

[Journalist Artur Tjulenev in the documentary episodes about the battle on Porkuni]

This example also presents the “self” referring to Estonia or recruit from Estonia was exploited by “others” during this war. However, the storyline about small Estonia oppressed by big powers in some parts of TV broadcast tends to perceive Soviet forces more positively, than German ones.

Table 15. Indicators of the Shared History/Conflicts (the Victory Day in Russia)

Indicators of the Common [conflictual]	Quantity of References
Estonian-Russian history	
C6 The Soviet Union is the liberator of Estonia	4
C7 The Second World War	6
C8 The Great Patriotic War/ Soviet-Russian Victory Day	5

Results demonstrate interesting tendency, in few components. First of all, despite the fact that in some TV shows, the Estonian “self” is opposed to Soviet and German, several times the Soviet forces or Red Army is described as a liberator, i.e. in a positive way. Secondly, TV speakers on ETV+ use different names for the war, without a clear distinction or clarification. In other words, sometimes, it refers to the Victory Day and the Great Patriotic war and this is completely aligned with the Red Army image as a

liberator. However, at the same time, it also often refers to the position, where all external forces in Estonia are perceived negatively and in this way, it uses a reference to the Second World War. Although, sometimes journalists are consciously or unconsciously confuse both kinds of stories. As an example, the morning TV show Coffee+ started with the announcement that the 9th of May is “Victory Day”.

[C8] *“Today is also a very serious, very big and very heartwarming anniversary is celebrated. The 9th of May is “Victory Day” in the Great Patriotic War in Russia, former Soviet republics and many countries of Europe.”*

[Journalist Dmitry Pastukhov in the show Coffee+]

However, this statement is really messed, since from the beginning it rightly attributed this day to Russia, but further journalist Dmitry Pastukhov expands anniversary with this name to all former Soviet republics and many countries of Europe (without an actual explanation of these countries). Furthermore, another example at the same TV show reveals even more confusion.

[C7/C8] *“Why is the 9th of May celebrated? The plane LI-2 landed at the Central Airport Frunze and delivered the Act of the Capitulation of Nazi Germany on the 9th of May. Well, basically, of course, this is “Victory Day”, the end of the Second World War. It is important for everyone, probably for many countries in Europe. Definitely, today we will commemorate this day and will come to this topic again.”*

[Journalist Elena Solomina in the show Coffee+]

In this statement, Elena Solomina called the 9th of May as the Victory Day, and at the same time refers to the Second World War. This approach is strange, since the Estonian Victory Day is on the 23rd of June, and its refers to other events. In addition, Estonian state was not the winner in the Second World War. In this sense, this attribution of commemoration is clearly connected with the public perception of this day among the

Russian-speakers. Even if such statement have been made unconsciously (although Elena Solomina read this announcement from a paper), it still brings a Russian-speakers tradition in Estonia to commemorate this day. The same morning show really used a lot of different “language” referring to the Second World War. Another example is also from the speech of Elena Solomina. She asked a question from the representative of war veterans and used certain terms for it.

[C8] *“Already 71 years have passed since **the victory over fascism**, what out the war times was tough for you? What was most difficult to go through?”*

[Journalist Elena Solomina in the show Coffee+ in the interview with the representative of war veterans]

In this example, Elena Solomina label the 9th of May as “the victory over fascism”. This sort of statements is clearly related to the old Soviet style and contemporary Russia's public perception of this event. In order to show it, just a small off topic example, which although shows that the statement has been made by Elena Solomina is completely aligned with Russia's language of the 9th of May. “The victory over fascism” is a common term among Russia's officials and journalists during this day, for instance, from the Sputnik news²⁵. Thus, in the statement, Elena Solomina due to some reasons used the term, which is more common in Russia, than in Estonia. Additionally, it underlines the role of Soviet army as liberators.

Speaking about the Russian element in the Estonian history, this side of the narrative is completely absent in the speeches of TV presenters on ETV+, probably because this period of time is more connected with the Soviet attribution of Russian-speakers.

To sum up, the narrative of ETV+ has several interesting features. Primarily, it tries to be neutral in a sense that the war was a catastrophe for ordinary people. Although, it

²⁵ (2017, May 09). Soviet Union Victory Over Fascism to Forever Remain in History - Putin. Retrieved May 21, 2017, from <https://sputniknews.com/russia/201705091053409219-russia-uss-victory-fascism-parade/>

(2017, May 10). Victory Day: World Order Created by Defeat of Fascism 'Inconvenient' for West. Retrieved May 21, 2017, from <https://sputniknews.com/world/201705101053444564-victory-fascism-sovereignty-inconvenient/>

uses typical ideas about the war as a victory over fascism, but does not openly speak about the liberation of Estonia as in the Soviet or Russian narrative. In some sense, the neutrality of ETV+ narrative is a mixture of other narratives from the Estonian and the Russian side. ETV+ proposes a medium idea between two narratives, but sometimes journalists use elements of the Russian (Soviet) narrative about the war, however, it does not clear intentionally or not.

Nevertheless, the decision to devote the whole TV schedule on the 9th of May to the memory about the Second World War is a step towards the collective memory of the Russian-speaking minority, which considers this day as an important part of their personal identification.

3.4. The 23rd of June 2016. The Estonian Victory Day

The 23rd of June is celebrated in Estonia as the Victory Day when the Estonian army together with allies defeated the forces of the German-Baltic Landeswehr in the Battle of Võnnu in 1919. At this day the main ceremony is a military parade and the handover ceremony of the flame from the President of Estonia to the representatives of all Estonian counties.

The military parade was organized in Võru in 2016 and ETV+ showed the official ceremony with the Russian-language translation. Again this new ceremony for Russian-speaking viewers was commented by Artur Tjulenev and historian Igor Kopytin. Furthermore, ETV+ presented a documentary episode of the TV show “In the Line of Fire” devoted to the Independence War, which also was produced by Artur Tjulenev and Igor Kopytin. Texts in these shows were mostly devoted to the explanation of traditions to commemorate the Victory Day in the Battle of Võnnu. Igor Kopytin tried to explain the most important details about the Independence War in this day.

Thus, the military parade and the documentary episode about the Independence war are only TV shows devoted to the celebration of the Victory Day in Estonia. The reason is obvious because the summer period is a usual break in the TV production. In this way, due to a few TV shows and special features of this anniversary does not allow to evaluate the narrative of this day in a full-scale. Nevertheless, it is possible to define

some elements, which can reveal the particular knowledge of ETV+ and its narrative of the Estonian Victory Day.

First of all, the TV shows and coverage of commemorations reveal two sorts of “self” in the story about this event. These are S2 Estonians and S3 Estonian state/country. The table below reflects a number of such mentions.

Table 16. Indicators of the "Self" (The Estonian Victory Day)

Indicators of the “Self”	Quantity of References
S2 the Estonians	5
S3 Estonia/Estonian state/country	7

Results clearly present the emphasis on the Estonian state as a central element of the self-identification in the story. Furthermore, an important part of the storyline is devoted to the Estonians struggling for the independent state. Further examples illustrate both of these elements. The first is from the episode from the documentary show devoted to the Independence War. As an example, Artur Tjulenev stated that Estonia was attacked of the Red Army, i.e. it follows some narrative pattern that the peacefully living “self” faced with the external “other”, bringing a threat.

[O2] *“The attack of the Red Army on Narva was organized on [28 November 1918]. It was the beginning of the military conflict between [S3] Estonia and Soviet Russia, which got the name the Estonian Independence War [Эстонской Освободительной войны] and it lasted until February [1920].”*

[Journalist Artur Tjulenev in the documentary episodes about the Independence war]

At the same time, “other” is also an important part of the story about the Independence War. The table below presents how often each type of marker was used.

Table 17. Indicators of the "Other" (the Estonian Victory Day)

Indicators of the "Other"	Quantity of References
O1 Russia/the Russians [ethnocultural]	1
O2 Soviet Russia/ the Bolsheviks/the Communists/the Soviets/the Red Army	8
O3 Baltic Germans/ the Germans	3
O5 Other states/countries/nations	1

As a result, most of the time, it refers to O2 Soviet Russia/ the Bolsheviks/the Communists/the Soviets/the Red Army, and O3 Baltic Germans/the Germans. This is not surprising since the Estonian state was under the threat from the Soviet Russia and Baltic German Landeswehr as counterparts in the Independence War.

For instance, Artur Tjulenev describes this event as the Soviet eager to regain the control over Estonia.

[O2/O3] *"The German troops left Estonia at the end of [1918], and the leadership of the Soviet Russia defined a plan to bring Estonia back into its [Soviet/Russian] zone of political influence."*

[Journalist Artur Tjulenev in the documentary episodes about the Independence war]

Accordingly, the Soviet Russia is clear "other", which started interference after the withdrawal of German "other". As a result, the Soviet Russia using the Red Army attacked Estonia. Another example refers to the Landeswehr as "other". During the military parade historian and commentator, Igor Kopytin claimed about Baltic German Landeswehr and its place in the war.

[O3] “The victory over *the Landeswehr* is a triumph over centuries of oppression by the *Baltic Germans* and the liberation of the Baltic states [Прибалтики] from *the Baltic Germans, the landowners.*”

[Historian Igor Kopytin during the military parade]

This statement introduces that the Soviet Russia was not the only one counterpart in the Independence war. In this way, such statement is in favour of interpretation, where Estonia is located in between of hostile actors.

Unfortunately, speaking about the “Russian” element, there is no mention underlining the role of the Estonian-Russian in events of the Independence War. This is unusual since during the Independence Day several times referred to the Russian-speakers in the the Independence War, but there is no mentions about it on the Victory Day.

In sum, due to the lack of available materials, the notion of the narrative on ETV+ during the anniversary of the Estonian Victory Day is quite segmented. The narrative during the Victory day does not have some anchors for the Russian-speaker viewers because it presents only the tells the story about the war against the Baltic Germans, and the Soviet Russians, but does not suggests certain elements for the Russian-speakers in Estonia to be involved. Journalists have tried to tell the story about the war in order to inform the Estonian Russians with the tradition. Probably, this narrative is constructed in this way, because television did not pay much attention to this anniversary.

3.5. The 20th of August 2016. The Day of Restauration of Independence

The 20th of August 1991 is commemorated as the day when the Estonian independence was restored after the few decades of the Soviet regime. The year 2016 is the 25 anniversary of events, official ceremonies had begun since the morning and from the hoist of the national flag on the tower Tall Hermann (Pikk Hermann) and speeches of the Estonian elite. The ceremony was commented in the Russian language by Dmitriy Pastukhov. Later, the official ceremony was continued in Riigikogu with the meeting of

the “Club of the 20th of August” [Клуб 20 августа] members. It consists of members of the Estonian Supreme Council, who signed the resolution of the Estonian independence from the Soviet Union. The broadcast of this meeting was combined with the simultaneous translation to the Russian-language by Artur Tjulenev and Dmitry Pastukhov. The celebration ended with the concert and presidential reception in the evening.

During the whole day, ETV+ also presented interviews with all the Estonian Prime ministers since the restoration of independence. However, these interviews were not created especially for the Russian-speakers and mostly targeted at the Estonian audience. In these interviews, politicians thought about their past and the development of the Estonian state.

Additionally, ETV+ screened several Estonian movies about the struggle for independence from the Soviet Union. The first was the documentary movie “In the Underground” [Põranda all]. This movie is about the dissident struggle in Estonia. The second was drama movie August 1991 [August 1991]. This drama is about events of 1991 when Estonia took the independence back.

All TV shows screened during this day was originally produced for the Estonian audience, and it does not have some special features for the Russian-speaking minority. That is the reason why this anniversary does not comply with the suggest markers of narrative, simply because ETV+ journalists did not present an own account of the events in 1991. In this way, they did not produce a new narrative, but just provide a translation to the Russian-language of the Estonian narrative produced by ETV. However, general organization of the TV schedule gives some important ideas. Firstly, the whole story of the anniversary was almost identical on ETV and on ETV+, it means that the major ideas devoted to the audience about the perception of the events in 1991 are basically the same. ETV+ does not treat the Russian-speakers as considering the restoration of independence in another way. However, it provides an access in the Russian-language in order to ensure the understanding of the anniversary. Obviously, the point was not to present some special view of the historic events for Russian speakers but to involve them into the Estonian traditions and commemorations. Secondly, the availability of a translation of the same events, which are covered by the

Estonian-language channels, is the narrative by itself. It argues that the native language is not important to be loyal to the Estonian state and commemorate the same anniversaries as the majority of the population in Estonia.

Unfortunately, these are only two major conclusions, which is possible to made on the basis of material presented by ETV+ during this anniversary.

3.6. The Summary of Narratives

The two-step analysis reveals several features of ETV+ and its coverage of anniversaries in Estonia. Primarily, it is worth to mention that most of the TV shows with the reference to the historic events were made by two persons: ETV+ journalist Artur Tjulenev and historian Igor Kopytin. Their cooperation was the most productive in terms of materials with references to the historic events. Interestingly, that Igor Kopytin is not only historian constantly invited during anniversaries on ETV+, he is also a head of the expert group on the Estonian national identity issue, according the to the newly accepted strategy “Integrating Estonia 2020”²⁶ by the Estonian Ministry of Culture.

During anniversaries the important part of speeches with the reference to the past on ETV+ was devoted to explanations of commemoration, i.e. what is the tradition, why and how it is usually commemorated. Thus, ETV+ coverage provided a necessary historical background for all viewers, even if some of them was not involved in these commemorations before. Furthermore, 2016 was the first and trial year for ETV+ and its TV broadcast. As a result, many ideas have not been fully explored yet, although examples with the Estonian Independence day in 2016 and 2017 demonstrates the tendency to increase of TV materials devoted the historical issues during anniversaries. Nevertheless, it is obvious that some of the anniversaries are more important, than other in terms of their coverage and TV production, for instance, according to the annual budget for 2017, the most important anniversary on ETV+ is the Estonian Independence Day, because it even has own reasons for spending²⁷. At the same time, some events

²⁶ Integrating Estonia 2020. Retrieved May 21, 2017, from http://www.kul.ee/sites/kulminn/files/integrating_estonia_2020.pdf

²⁷ Eesti Rahvusringhääling. Eelarve 2017. Retrieved May 21, 2017, from http://files.err.ee/files/EELARVE_2017-kinnitatud.pdf

were less presented on ETV+, e.g. the Victory Day (on the 23rd of June) and the Re-Independence Day (on the 20th of August). In addition, it can be also explained that these anniversaries are during a summer break period on TV.

More specifically, ETV+ and its broadcast during the Estonian Independence Day (in 2016 and 2017) demonstrate that the self-identification is mostly focused on Estonia as the state. However, other patterns are also presented, e.g. the Estonian Russians (the Russian-speakers living in Estonia and different from the Estonians and the Russian Russians), as well as local identification related to the region of residence (areas, with the high share of Russian-speakers in the population). These anchors completely correspond with major features of ETV+, since this is the Russian-language channel and with the Russian-speaking target audience, it has self-identification patterns in some ways reflecting suggested characteristics of the audience. The coverage of the Estonian Independence Day in 2016 does not clearly emphasize “other” because most of the speeches were devoted to the “self” fighting for the independence, but there is no explanation about the opposite side of this fighting. However, the broadcast on the Independence Day in 2017 has a better-developed notion of “other”, because the history of the Independence War was presented in more TV shows. According to sources, speakers often refer to the Soviets or the Communists as an opposite side in the war. It is necessary to notice that in this sense the story avoids mentioning of the national attributes of the enemy in the war, and uses only political preferences distinctions. In other words, the war had been provoked by the Soviet Russia and the Bolsheviks, but it was not the war between the Estonians and the Russians (as a majority of the population in the Soviet Russia). Further, during the Independence Day in 2016 and 2017, some TV presenters touched some events of the conflictual past. For example, the key argument was that the Soviet Union pushed the political changes in Estonia by military force and illegally annexed Estonia. In addition, TV presenters also told about the Soviet repressions in Estonia and its impact on the society. Hereby, it underlines that repressions and this period of time, in general, were a catastrophe for all people, despite their ethnic or cultural identity. Additionally, TV speakers draw attention to the role of Russian-speakers and the Russian culture in general within the Estonian society, e.g. for example journalists tell about the Russian-speakers in the Independence War and the “special attitude” of key Estonian figures to the Russian-language and culture. In this

way, TV speakers several times underlines that the Russian-speakers and the Russian-language were the natural part of the Estonian society.

The anniversary of the 9th of May (as Victory Day) was not officially organized, although ETV+ paid a lot of attention to this anniversary. Many TV shows were devoted to the history of the Second World War and its events in Estonia. During this day, ETV+ offered stories, where self-identification is mostly expressed through the label of Estonian (person, people). Interestingly, but speeches does not have any direct references to other elements, which were typical for the Independence Day, e.g. the Estonian Russians or Estonia as a state. In the story about the Second World War, the center is the Estonian people suffering from the pressure of external powers. Consequently, external powers such as Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union are depicted as “others”. In addition, it is important that many TV speakers have a different explanation of events, e.g. some of them equally and negatively refer to the external powers, but some people praises the Soviet Union and its “victory over fascism” and the liberation of Estonia. Furthermore, speaking about the conflictual episodes of history, TV presenters also do not have a single storyline and set of notions. Many times journalists are confused with the difference between the Second World War and the Great Patriotic War, in some cases, they even combine the Second World War as a commemoration and the Victory Day. Another important detail is a choice of guest speakers during this day and movies for screening. Some of the invited guest speakers have a controversial background in Estonia, e.g. film-director Oleg Besedin suspected by Estonian officials as a participant in the anti-Estonian activity. Furthermore, it also showed the Russian-Ukrainian movie “Battle for Sevastopol”, which was also an object of controversies in Russia and Ukraine and was financed by the Russian Ministry of Culture at the end. Finally, during the 9th of May TV presenters did not refer to specifically the Russian-speakers and their place in the Estonian society and history. Probably, this is because of difficulties to draw the line during the Soviet time.

Next anniversary is the 23rd of June and the Estonian Victory Day. This anniversary was not fruitful for the analysis as the Independence Day and the 9th of May. However, it also reveals some important aspects of the narrative. Firstly, the self-identification refer to the Estonian state as a central element. In other words, during the anniversary different stories offer Estonia as a “self” fighting the Independence War and achieving

the victory. Secondly, “other” is divided again for two major categories Soviets and Germans. In this case, it speaks about the Baltic Germans and the Estonian struggle against them. In addition, the story also uses the reference to the political orientation (Communists, Bolsheviks and etc.), as a result, it is similar to the Independence Day when TV presenters narrate the story in the same way. However, during the Victory Day, there is no mention of the conflictual Estonian-Russian history and the role of Russians in the Independence war. Probably, this is because of a small amount of TV broadcast devoted to this anniversary. In other words, TV presenters did not have enough time to cover such many aspects as during the Independence Day. In general terms, the narrative about the Estonian victory day avoided speaking about the Russian-speakers in Estonia and their common ground with the Estonians.

The last anniversary in the analysis is the Day of Restoration of Independence (on the 20th of August). Unfortunately, the coverage of this anniversary on ETV+ does not give an opportunity to evaluate specific stances of ETV+ journalists due to the absence of material for analysis. During this day, ETV+ mostly used materials from ETV with translation into the Russian-language without own production of materials referring to the past. However, some general structure of ETV+ coverage suggests that ETV+ mostly follows the pattern of ETV, using almost the same structure of TV schedule during that day. Thus, it is possible to suggest that basic of the narrative is the same as delivered by the Estonian-language TV channel.

In sum, assembling this jigsaw puzzle into the single picture, it is worth to notice that the main features of the historical narrative of ETV+ are its openness to different opinions and arguments without binding to the one or another story of the past. Sometimes different TV presenters use even mutually exclusive statements. Thus, the historical narrative is diverse in terms of ideas and references to the past, at the same time this narrative is uniform in some other aspects. First of all, this is inclusiveness of the Russian-speakers to the events in Estonian history. As an example, it tends to speak about the Estonian Russians and their participation in the development of the Estonian states as it is. Secondly, it helps to grasp the Estonian traditions and reasons why anniversaries is commemorated. Thus, the historical narrative on ETV+ is open for interpretations, but at the same time, it offers some ideas or example how to maintain the communication on the basis of positive elements of the common past for the

Estonians and the Russian-speaking community.

As a result, the empirical example of ETV+ presents an illustration of theoretical concepts. More precisely, it is possible to see how the public broadcasting television channel is able to create a ground for the further negotiation of the collective memory, especially in the native language of the minority. Thus, the public broadcasting television realizes one of its functions, providing a communication between the state and audience. This kind of communication has potential to influence the feelings of belonging and self-identification of the audience. However, evidence of such changes is difficult to define in a short run. Furthermore, the case of ETV+ presents also other features of the public broadcasting. First of all, this is “universality”, i.e. ETV+ provides an access to the information about anniversaries in the minority language. Secondly, ETV+ reveals a diversity of views, regarding the history and its interpretations. As a result, ETV+ and its coverage of anniversaries demonstrate the “democratization of memory”. Thus, memory about the past and the rituals of commemoration are changing, i.e. the process of remembering became less monopolized by the state or some groups. It means that the open discussion about the conflictual past is possible.

The evolving of the public broadcasting in Estonia and the launch of ETV+ demonstrate the argument that minority language public television in divided societies with the conflict of memory can be one of the examples how the “democratization of memory” is realized in practice. Consequently, it illustrates how the state can do a step towards the development of communication between communities using the public broadcasting as a platform. Furthermore, ETV+ is a good example how to deal with the social conflict for other post-Soviet countries with the significant share of the Russian-speaking population and for such states, where conflictual memory about the past is “sacred” and closed for discussions.

Finally, from the one hand, ETV+ does not have a big story of success to be a road map for other countries. From the other hand, it proves that nothing awful will happen if to communicate publicly with the Russian-speakers in the Russian-language and allow the discussion about the painful common past on the public television.

CONCLUSIONS

This thesis analyses the role of public minority language television as an agent of memory in the societies divided by the conflict of memories. The research question refers to the theoretical framework of memory, minorities and media studies. At the same time, on the empirical level, it assesses the case of the Estonian public television channel in the Russian language ETV+ and the way how this channel covered anniversaries in Estonia. More specifically, the author conducts a two-step qualitative analysis in order to reveal characteristics of historical narratives presented on ETV+ during official Estonian anniversaries: the Estonian Independence Day (the 24th of February in 2016 and 2017), the Estonian Victory Day (the 23rd of June 2016), and Day of Restoration of Independence (the 20th of August 2016). Furthermore, it evaluated the representation of 'Russian Victory Day' (the 9th of May 2016) on ETV+. In general, the research is focused on the period from February 2016 to February 2017. This study is supposed to reveal how this channel deals with the conflict of memories in Estonia.

The first stage of the analysis indicates that the overall picture of used indicators or references to the past is highly varied from speaker to speaker. In other words, there is no evident dominance of one or another stance on the historical events. The second stage of analysis, evaluating the most used examples within the context, reveals that TV speakers used details, emphasizing the inclusiveness of the Russophones to the Estonian history.

This research is only a small step toward the full-scale analysis of ETV+ and its experience. The case of ETV+ contributes to the better understanding of relations

between the Estonians and the Russian-speakers in Estonia. Further investigations can consider the comparative perspective in the evaluation of memory relations and historical narratives presented on ETV+. For instance, it is possible to compare the narrative of ETV and ETV+ during some anniversaries or commemorations. This kind of research has a strong potential to develop a more precise understanding of the difference between the functioning of the public majority and minority language television in the field of collective memory.

Unfortunately, the research has nothing to deal with the perception of the audience, thereby, it is the main limitation. Although for further studies, ETV+ is a good case for the analysis of the audience behavior and choice of media sources. For example, there is an option to conduct a research how the audience perceives commemorations on ETV+ and how it corresponds to their socio-economic profiles. However, this investigation demands a lot of sources, time, efforts and it is barely available for the individual researcher. Despite the fact that the Russian-speaking minority in Estonia and its features have been investigated for a long time, although the introduction of new practices such as Russian-language public TV channel reveals many possible topics for further research.

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APPENDIX I. The TV Schedule during Anniversaries

This appendix presents the TV schedule during anniversaries in the research²⁸.

The 24th of February 2016

08:30 98 лет Эстонской Республике. Церемония подъема государственного флага на башне Длинный Герман [The 98th Anniversary of the Estonian Republic. The Ceremony of Hoisting of the National Flag on the Tower Pikk Herman]

09:00 Vox Populi, 1/6: Столица Эстонии

09:05 Мультсериал Алиса знает, что делать!, 17/24 (Россия 2013)

09:30 Мультсериал Белка и Стрелка. Озорная семейка, 28/52 (Россия 2011)

09:40 Музыка ETV+

09:55 98 лет Эстонской Республике. Возложение венков к подножию Монумента победы в Освободительной войне [The 98th Anniversary of the Estonian Republic. The Laying of Wreaths to the Monument of Victory in the Independence War].

10:25 Документальный фильм Ландшафтные узоры (Maastiku mustrid, Эстония 2014)

10:55 Специальное интервью ETV+: Элмо Нюганен [ETV+ Special Interview: Elmo Nüganen]

[Interview with the film director of “Names in Marble” about the history of its creation and its story].

11:20 Драма Имена в граните (Nimed marmortahvlil, Эстония 2002) [Movie Names in Marble]

12:50 Vox Populi, 2/6: Подростки

12:55 98 лет Эстонской Республике. Парад сил обороны на площади Свободы [The 98th Anniversary of the Estonian Republic. The Parade of the Defence Forces at the Freedom Square]

14:05 Vox Populi, 3/6: Дети

²⁸ The TV schedule in Russian-language, although names of some programmes examined in the research are translated by the author.

14:10 Музыка ETV+

14:15 Фильм детям Тайное общество Супилинна (Supilinna salaselts, Эстония 2015)

16:00 Vox Populi, 4/6: Эстонская еда

16:05 Танцуют Аге Окс и Тоомас Эдур (Эстония 2009)

16:15 Фильм о природе Природа Бразилии, 3/5: Лабиринт озер (Brazil - A Natural History, Австрия 2014)

17:05 Музыка Твоего вечера: Koit Toome i All star Band. Imagine (2015)

17:15 Эстония благодарит 2016. Вручение государственных наград

18:20 Vox Populi, 5/6: Президент Эстонии

18:25 Музыка ETV+

18:30 98 лет Эстонской Республике. Праздничный концерт

20:15 98 лет Эстонской Республике. Торжественный прием Президента Республики и госпожи Иевы Ильвес

21:00 Актуальная камера [Daily news]

21:14 Vox Populi: Пожелания жителей Эстонии по случаю дня рождения Республики

21:15 98 лет Эстонской Республике. Продолжение торжественного приема Президента Республики и госпожи Иевы Ильвес

23:15 Драма Фехтовальщик (Vehkleja, Эстония, Финляндия, Германия 2015)

00:50 ETV представляет: Свята Ватра (Эстония 2010)

01:53 Новости rus.err.ee

The 9th of May 2016

06:55 Кофе+ [Coffee+]

[The morning TV show]

08:30 Написано о войне [Written about the War]

[ETV+ special projects about with the literature about the Second World War]

08:35 Телесериал Женский доктор 2, 50/60: Бракованный товар (Украина 2013)

09:20 Кофе+

10:55 Актуальная камера+

11:25 Твой вечер

12:28 Новости rus.err.ee

14:30 Мультсериал Катя и Мим-Мим, 37/52: Черепаши бег (Канада 2013)
14:40 Мультсериал Катя и Мим-Мим, 38/52: День смешивания игр (Канада 2013)
14:50 Мультсериал Книга джунглей 1, 7/52: Сокровище Холодной Пещеры (Германия 2014)
15:05 Кофе+
16:40 Сад мечты 1, 6/12 (Love Your Garden with Alan Titchmarsh, Великобритания 2011)
17:05 Документальный сериал Анатомия монстров, 3/4: Вертолет (Россия 2013)
17:50 Написано о войне
18:00 Актуальная камера
18:05 Телесериал Женский доктор 2, 50/60: Бракованный товар (Украина 2013)
19:00 Твой вечер
20:00 Актуальная камера [Daily news]
20:30 Написано о войне
20:35 Драма Битва за Севастополь (Россия, Украина 2015) [Battle for Sevastopol]
22:30 Написано о войне
22:40 25-й кадр: Олег Беседин
[Interview with the film director Oleg Besedin about his films]
23:00 Документальный фильм Прорыв (Эстония 2013) [The Breakthrough]
[Documentary film about the redislocation of the Soviet Baltic flee from Tallinn to Kronstadt and Leningrad in 1941].
23:55 Криминальный сериал Острые козырьки 2, 2/6 (Peaky Blinders, Великобритания 2014)
00:55 Новости rus.err.ee

The 23rd of June 2016

07:45 Лучшее от ETV+
09:00 Телесериал Мужчина во мне, 23/63 (Россия 2011)
09:45 Фунт liha: Вера Копти (Эстония 2016)
10:15 Мультсериал Букашки (Minuscule, Франция 2011)
10:30 Документальный фильм Протокол (Protokoll, Эстония 1996)

10:45 На линии огня. Освободительная война [In the Line of Fire. The Independence War]

[The documentary episode about the Estonian Independence War].

10:55 Парад в честь Дня победы в Освободительной войне [The Parade in honor of the Victory Day in the Independence War]

12:05 25-й кадр: Лембит Ульфсак

12:30 Драма Мандарины (Tangerines, Эстония, Грузия 2013)

13:50 Фильм о природе Водный мир реки Эмайыги (Emajõe veemaailm, Эстония 2015)

14:50 Мультсериал Катя и Мим-Мим, 50/52: Поимка Зверька (Канада 2013)

15:00 Мультсериал Лесси 1, 17/26: Стальной конь с Большой горы (Германия 2014)

15:25 Лучшее от ETV+

16:35 Истории из эстонской жизни: Поющая Надежда (Eesti lood, Эстония 2011)

17:05 Документальный сериал Правила жизни 100-летнего человека, 3/7: США (Россия 2014)

17:50 Приглашение на танец: Фокстрот (Let's Dance, Великобритания 2010)

18:00 Телесериал Мужчина во мне, 23/63 (Россия 2011)

18:45 Парад в честь Дня победы в Освободительной войне

19:50 На линии огня. Освободительная война

20:00 Актуальная камера [Daily news]

20:10 Без обид 1, 1/12: Ведущий, историк моды Александр Васильев (Латвия 2016)

20:40 Музыкальный вечер Oleg Pissarenko Band. Наяву (Эстония 2016)

21:40 Приключенческий сериал Изгнанники, 4/7 (Vanished, Великобритания, Австралия 2015)

22:30 Кинокомедия Мечты сбываются (One Chance, США 2013)

00:14 Новости rus.err.ee

The 20th of August 2016

06:55 25 лет со дня восстановления независимости Эстонии. Торжественная церемония поднятия государственного флага на башне Длинный Герман [25

Years since the Restauration of the Estonian Independence. The Ceremony of Hoisting of the National Flag on the Tower Pikk Herman]

07:35 Кинокомедия Венская почтовая марка (Viini postmark, Эстония 1967)

09:00 Интервью с экс-премьер-министром Эдгаром Сависааром

Эдгара Сависаара, находившегося в должности премьер-министра в период восстановления независимости, интервьюирует Индрек Тройфельдт.

09:25 Документальный фильм В подполье (Põranda all, Эстония 2015)

[The documentary movie about the Estonian dissidents and their struggle]

10:00 Фильм о природе Водный мир реки Эмайыги (Emajõe veemaailm, Эстония 2015)

11:00 Интервью с экс-премьер-министром Тийтом Вяхи

11:25 Без обид 1, 7/12: Бывший главред Коммерсанта Андрей Васильев (Bez obid, Латвия 2015)

12:00 Интервью с экс-премьер-министром Мартом Лааром

12:20 25 лет со дня восстановления независимости Эстонии. Прямая трансляция с заседания "Клуба 20 августа" [25 Years since the Restauration of the Estonian Independence. The live from the meeting of "Club of the 20th of August"]

[This club consists of members of the Estonian Supreme Council, who signed the resolution of the Estonian independence from the Soviet Union].

13:00 Интервью с экс-премьер-министром Андресом Тарандом

13:25 Эстония в сердце. Летний концерт ERSO (Эстония 2015)

14:00 Интервью с экс-премьер-министром Мартом Сийманном

14:25 Драма Август 1991-го (Эстония 2005) [August 1991]

16:00 Интервью с экс-премьер-министром Сиймом Калласом

16:25 25 лет со дня восстановления независимости Эстонии. Праздничный концерт'

17:00 Интервью с экс-премьер-министром Юханом Партсом

17:25 25 лет со дня восстановления независимости Эстонии. Праздничный концерт

18:00 Интервью с экс-премьер-министром Андрусом Ансипом

18:20 25 лет со дня восстановления независимости Эстонии. Прием Президента Республики в розовом саду Кадриоргского дворца

20:00 Актуальная камера [Daily news]

20:10 Спортивные новости

20:30 RIO 2016: Бокс

21:30 RIO 2016: Художественная гимнастика

23:50 RIO 2016: Футбол. Мужчины, финал

02:02 Новости rus.err.ee

The 24th of February 2017

08:30 99 лет Эстонской Республике. Торжественная церемония подъема государственного флага на башне Длинный Герман [The 99th Anniversary of the Estonian Republic. The Ceremony of Hoisting of the National Flag on the Tower Pikk Herman]

08:55 99 лет Эстонской Республике. Праздничная студия ETV+ [The 99th Anniversary of the Estonian Republic. ETV+ Studio]

09:50 Портреты независимости: Яан Поска [Portraits of Independence. Jaan Poska]

[The documentary episodes about the important persons for the first Estonian independence]

09:55 99 лет Эстонской Республике. Возложение венков к подножию Монумента победы в Освободительной войне. [The 99th Anniversary of the Estonian Republic. The Laying of Wreaths to the Monument of Victory in the Independence War]

10:20 99 лет Эстонской Республике. Праздничная студия ETV+

10:30 Документальный фильм Угодить всем (Et meeldiks kõigile, Эстония 2011)

12:00 Документальный фильм Снег в Красной поляне (Lumi Punasel Lagedal, Эстония 2017)

12:45 Портреты независимости: Константин Пятс [Portraits of Independence. Konstantin Päts]

12:55 99 лет Эстонской Республике. Парад Сил обороны на площади Вабадузе [The 98th Anniversary of the Estonian Republic. The Parade of the Defence Forces at the Freedom Square]

14:05 99 лет Эстонской Республике. Праздничная студия ETV+

14:30 Драма Орлята (Noored kotkad, Эстония 1927) [Young Eagles]

[One of the first Estonian movie about the Independence War]

16:00 Фильм детям Путешествие Лотте на юг (Lotte reis Lõunamaale, Эстония 2000)

17:05 Портреты независимости: Йохан Лайдонер [Portraits of Independence. Johann Laidoner]

17:15 Эстония благодарит 2017. Вручение государственных наград

В канун Дня независимости президент Эстонии вручит государственные награды эстоноземельцам, чьи профессиональные достижения или общественная деятельность изменили жизнь страны к лучшему. Комментируют Дмитрий Кукушкин и София Демченко.

18:30 Портреты независимости: Николай Юденич [Portraits of Independence. Nikolai Yudenich]

18:40 99 лет Эстонской Республике. Праздничная студия ETV+

18:55 99 лет Эстонской Республике. Праздничный концерт

20:10 99 лет Эстонской Республике. Торжественный прием Президента Республики и господина Георга-Рене Максимовского

21:00 Актуальная камера [Daily news]

21:15 99 лет Эстонской Республике. Торжественный прием Президента Республики и господина Георга-Рене Максимовского

22:50 Портреты независимости: Алексей Сорокин [Portraits of Independence. Aleksei Sorokin]

23:00 Драма Георг (Georg, Эстония 2007)

00:45 99 лет Эстонской Республике. Парад Сил обороны на площади Вабадузе
Парад комментируют Артур Захаров и Николай Лощин.

01:58 Новости rus.err.ee