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**MIGRANTS IN THE PUBLIC DISCOURSE: BETWEEN MEDIA, POLICY AND PUBLIC OPINION.****Alberta Giorgi & Tommaso Vitale****Abstract**

The chapter focuses on the public and political discourse on “migrants” in Europe, which frames the relationship between migrants and trade unions, and offers an overview of the main issues at stake. We develop an original analysis of European citizens’ attitudes towards migrants using ESS data. These data show that hostility towards immigrants is related primarily to individual attitudes, characteristics and behaviour: age, education, residential area and, especially, political affiliation as well as the level of commitment and engagement in associations and charities. Therefore politics, political cultures and political behaviour are key factors to understand racism and intolerance. In the chapter, attention is paid to the factors influencing migration policy-making, including the role of the mass media in shaping interpretations and policy instruments on the topic. We subsequently explore how migrations are framed in the public domain and policies. Finally, we look at how migrants are imagined as members of society, exploring the main narratives used to talk about their integration.

**Keywords:** Attitudes; Discursive Opportunity Structure; Integration; Migrants; Political Sociology; Xenophobia.

**1. Introduction**

The previous chapters dealt with the changes in the European economy and the labour market, while the following chapters will be devoted to the transformation of the unionism dynamic. In this chapter, we focus on the ‘social and cultural changes’ which Penninx and Roosblad identified as the third and fourth sets of factors that influence the relationships between workers, unions and migrants in European States (see chapter 1). We look especially to the overall political climate, political parties agenda and alignments, master frames and major dynamics of public opinion, which provide the background for the other chapters of this book. While ‘mobility’ is increasingly conceptualized as a ‘fourth freedom’ (Favell 2014), migration is a politicized and polarized issue worldwide. Moreover it is immigration, rather than emigration, that figures in the debate. Migration-related discourse revolves around the forms of integration in the economic, cultural, and political spheres, as well as around issues of security, welfare opportunism, women’s rights, multicultural coexistence and lifestyles. The wide literature on migrations in Europe shows a rise in xenophobia, with political parties built around the central tenet of anti-immigration feeling, the rise of Islamophobia and racism, the so-called new right-wing feminism (Cousin & Vitale 2014), and, more broadly, negative attitudes towards migrants (especially towards citizens of countries that are not part of the European Union).

This chapter sets out a critical overview of the literature, studies and research dealing with the social and political changes that have impacted on the status of migrants in Europe. The first section presents data on European citizens’ attitudes towards migrants, showing how hostility is related to individual variables: not only class and education, but also political attitudes and behaviour. In the second section, attention is paid to the factors influencing the political framing of migration, looking both at policy-feedback (how policies outcomes influence voters attitudes), and at the increasingly relevant role of mass media. The third section deals with the question of

how migration is framed in the public domain and in policy. The last section asks how migrants are imagined as members of society, exploring the framing of their integration.

## 2. Attitudes towards immigrants in Europe

Hostility towards immigrants, racism and xenophobia are all on the rise in Europe<sup>1</sup>, as demonstrated by much research – including the reports of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance<sup>2</sup>, and the shadow reports of the European Network Against Racism<sup>3</sup>. In this section, we present an original analysis of the attitudes of individual Europeans towards immigrants based on data from the sixth round of the European Social Survey (ESS - 2012). This aims to understand country differences in attitudes towards immigrants.

Hostility can be defined as an attitude of enmity composed of two different dimensions. The first one is the degree of acceptance of the other, related to political issues of identity demarcation. This requires measuring whether individuals accept and welcome everyone, or just people of the same race/ethnicity, and the degree of rejection and aversion towards people coming from poor countries (Zick et al. 2010). The second dimension is related to how people anticipate the impact of immigration. Hostility is not only an attitude of immediate rejection and animosity towards unwanted groups or individuals. It is also an attitude related to the individual's projections of their future and how they evaluate and appreciate the consequences of newcomers on the economy, culture and their quality of life. Using this conceptual definition, we have built a general index of hostility. The index distribution in different European countries describes the level of aversion to migrants in each country, as illustrated in figure 1 below.


Fig. 1. Proportion of people strongly hostile to foreigners by country (2012)

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<sup>1</sup> Even if in some countries, since 2014, we see a moderate decrease of intolerance and racist attitudes (i.e. France, see Mayer et al. 2017)

<sup>2</sup> ECRI, permanent url: [www.coe.int/ecri](http://www.coe.int/ecri)

<sup>3</sup> ENAR, permanent url: <http://enar-eu.org/>. Shadow reports are a method for NGOs to supplement or present alternative information.



Source: European Social Survey, 2012..

As the figure shows, northern countries are generally less hostile to immigrants, while central Europe is divided, with the UK, France, Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary showing a medium-high level of hostility, and other countries, such as Germany and Switzerland, aligning instead with the northern European states. Southern Europe ranges between the medium level of hostility expressed in countries such as Italy, Spain and Bulgaria; and Portugal and Cyprus, where the level of hostility rises to 30-40% of the population.

How can this variation in the level of hostility across European countries be explained? First of all, we considered individual-level variables, and more specifically: age, gender, education, confidence, political affiliation (left, centre, right), social and political participation, income, social position and residential area (large city, rural village, farm or home in countryside, suburbs or outskirts of large city, and town or small city). According to our results, gender is hardly relevant: all other variables being equal, men and women do not appear to vary in their levels of hostility. Education has a negative impact on hostility, but its significance is fairly low. On the other hand, age, income and political affiliation have significant impacts on the level of hostility: a rise in age is associated with a higher hostility index, while a lower income is associated with a higher level of hostility; and in terms of politics, self-positioning on the centre or left reduces the hostility level. Social and political participation and commitment appear to be particularly significant: controlling for all other variables, both *social* and *political* participation are crucial factors in predicting less hostile attitudes towards migrants (Vitale et al. 2017).

Participation is in fact a proactive social behaviour that expresses a certain level of commitment towards society. Indeed, participation acts as a socializing agent towards cosmopolitanism and openness towards others; although obviously there are groups and associations which have racist and exclusionary attitudes (Froio, Castelli Gattinara 2016). However, participation in trade unions does not have a specific effect, once controlled for its interaction with other broader forms of participation.

The last individual variable we considered is residential area. In addition to individual attitudes, hostility can in fact be related to the context in which people live (Biorcio & Vitale

2011). While there is no significant difference between a town and a rural village, living in a large city or in the suburbs reduces the hostility index, while living on a farm or in the countryside increases it. This is consistent with a similar finding in the USA (Wuthnow, 2013).

In order to take account of country-level differences, we considered the possible impact of the average rate of participation in a country, the average rate of religious affiliation (that is people considering themselves as belonging to a religion) and the GDP per capita in 2012. None of these variables appear to have a significant impact on the level of hostility of the population. Therefore, the results of our analysis underline the fact that ‘religious’ differences seldom play a role in predicting the level of hostility of the population towards immigrants. Not even country wealth seems to have an impact. We conclude that while trade union policies towards immigrants are influenced by contextual factors (see chapter 1) – especially the unemployment dynamic (see chapter 2) – individual hostility towards immigrants is related primarily to individual attitudes, characteristics and behaviour: political affiliation, age, education, residential area and, especially, the level of commitment and engagement.

### **3. The institutional sphere: the complex field of ‘migration policies’.**

‘Migration’ is a complex and multifaceted category related to many different issues, dealt with by a variety of institutions, and involving a variety of administrative levels (Penninx 2013 and 2014). As stated in the chapter 3 of this book, we prefer to talk of migrations instead of migration. The migrations issues interact with topics related to labour, social policy, inter-religious dialogue and education, to name but a few. The field of migration and integration in European states is therefore governed by a complex interaction of legal and policy provisions at supranational and national levels. The European Union (EU) has created the free movement of workers and citizens within Europe, but in doing so has also had to establish common policies towards third country nationals as a consequence of abolishing internal borders (King et al. 2017). Such communitarian policy-making on migration and asylum was officially initiated with the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997. These policies focus particularly on regulating third-country national migration, combating so-called “illegal immigration”, and to a certain extent, improving the legal position of “authorized” migrants (see chapter 2 for a discussion). The regulation and settlement of migrants is instead governed primarily at national level, in conjunction with local government – regional and municipal – as the previous chapter explains. While the empirical dimensions of migration have been studied since the 1980s, the analysis of migration policy is a much more recent field of study (for an analysis of European policy-making, and a comparative multilevel analysis, see also Penninx et al. 2006; Zincone et al. 2011; Hepburn & Zapata-Barrero 2014). In this section, we focus particularly on two comparative research studies which investigated the factors that may explain patterns of convergence and divergence in policy-making related to migrations.

#### *3.1 Explaining migration policy divergence*

In comparing migration policy making in Europe, Giovanna Zincone (2011) highlighted a series of intervening factors to explain the pattern of relative non-convergence of policies (which are closely related to the factors influencing trade unions attitudes – see chapter 1). Historical and institutional legacies, such as the colonial past or the modes of integrating the working class into society, shaped the context of policy-making and limited change. In the same vein, those countries with a colonial past, such as Spain, Portugal, Britain, France and the Netherlands, often gave special legal status to incoming nationals of their former colonies. On the other hand, “past incorporation models of national working classes affected the first steps of the immigrant policies” (Zincone 2011: 389). This means that countries in which the working class has a long history of political presence, such as Sweden, are more likely to be inclusive than those in which incorporation is more recent and in which the state has played a dominant role, such as

Germany. Policy inertia and aversion to change is also related to actors and factors that moderate changes, such as ineffective party systems: highly fragmented and polarized political spheres make it difficult to find a general consensus for radical change, as was the case in Italy. Possible external homogenizing factors – such as EU policies – have proved to have had a limited impact in terms of convergence in the case of integration policies for refugees and asylum seekers (King et al. 2017), and even in the case of European citizen migrants, where special transitory measures to retard and delay their settlement and integration have been implemented (Casella & Vitale 2015).

Koopmans *et al.* (2012) also studied the development of migrant rights in ten western European countries between 1980 and 2008, in order to understand whether they followed a common pattern<sup>4</sup>. Their results also show that cross-national differences increased in the period considered. Sweden and the UK maintained their profile of relative inclusiveness. Austria and Switzerland remained, on the contrary, quite restrictive, while Denmark, Norway and France are situated in the middle of the spectrum. In contrast, the Netherlands, Belgium and Germany increased their inclusiveness between 1980 and 2008. Electoral factors have played an important but ambivalent role in shaping immigrant rights. On the one hand, the growth of the immigrant-origin electorate is positively related to an expansion of rights. On the other hand, the success of right-wing populist parties involves restrictions in the areas of naturalization and cultural rights<sup>5</sup>. In this respect, path-dependency is a relevant factor to understand the changes over time: “Countries that had restrictive policies in 1980 were more likely to also be the countries where right-wing populist parties were subsequently successful. The strength of these parties, in turn, negatively influenced extensions of immigrant rights and thus kept these countries on restrictive paths” (Koopmans *et al.* 2012: 1236). Indeed, the results showed that, at least in Western Europe, ‘immigrants’ rights are still very much a national affair’ (Koopmans *et al.* 2012: 1238), in line with the consideration that trade unions attitudes towards immigrants are a national affair, too (see chapter 1). In order to understand the overall context in which trade unions deal with migrations; therefore, to combine a comparative political economy analysis (as in chapter 5 of this book) with an analysis of the country’s political sphere is of paramount importance.

### *3.2 How did politics change? The role of the political sphere*

Among the many explanatory factors of migration policy divergence, we focus here on changes in the political sphere, which shape the opportunity structure of migrant inclusion and voice in host societies (and, therefore, trade unions’ attitudes – see chapter 1). Policies dealing with migrants are, of course, the result of political choices. The wide literature on European politics and public policy underlines a set of crucial factors to be taken into account when dealing with political choices related to migrants in Europe, which are related to the transformation of the political sphere, in terms of actors, territory and content of decision-making processes.

First of all, there has been a change in the composition of the relevant actors. While we used to live in a ‘party-democracy’, in which political parties were the key intermediaries between citizens and national government decisions (though not the only ones), the situation has changed over the last twenty years (Kriesi 2008). The role of political parties as intermediaries has been

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<sup>4</sup> The study focused on immigrants (regardless of their nationality status) from outside the EU who do not belong to the special categories of undocumented migrants, asylum seekers, or refugees. As for “rights” the authors collect 41 indicators related to citizenship rights, which cover: “(1) nationality acquisition; (2) marriage migration rights; (3) protection against expulsion; (4) antidiscrimination provisions; (5) access to public service employment; (6) political representation rights; (7) cultural and religious rights in the education system; and (8) other cultural and religious rights” (for a discussion, see Koopmans et al. 2012; Koopmans et al. 2005).

<sup>5</sup> Although the analyses included in this book cover the period between the 1990s and 2015, it is worth noting that in relation to the so-called “migration crisis” started in 2015 anti-immigration political stances gained another political momentum (see the Brexit referendum and the Trump election).

decreasing, while that of the mass media has increased. The public sphere has undergone a process of “mediatization” (Bennett & Entman 2001; Mazzoleni & Schultz 1999; Swanson & Mancini 1996), interacting with the changes in form and shape of political systems and processes. Academics have developed concepts including audience democracy (Manin 1995), post-democracy (Crouch 2003), post-politics (Mouffe 2005), de-parliamentarisation (Mény & Surel 2000), and partyless – and/or populist – democracy (Mair 2002 and 2000), in order to underline the pivotal role of a media-centered public sphere, the process of personalization of politics, cartel parties<sup>6</sup>, citizen distrust towards traditional political institutions and the increasing role of the courts (see also Kriesi 2008, Rosanvallon 2008, Cirulli and Gargiulo 2014, Matthijs 2014). This does not mean that political parties have lost their relevance, but their organizational form (personalization), their identity (closer and closer to the cartel party model), and their relationships with their constituency (direct appeal of leaders, through the media) have changed – particularly because of the pervasive influence of the mass media. Indeed, the media has changed the relationship between politicians and voters (Mair 1997). The media is also shaping the discourse on migrations and therefore having an impact on the overall context in which the actors operate.

A second factor is related to the fact that a variety of authorities, at local, national, and international level, have the power to decide an increasing number of issues. Courts, both national and international, have entered the field of regulation in a pro-active and performing way, not only enforcing respect of the law, but also setting priorities in terms of what is enforced (thus implemented) and what is ignored. The space of politics has changed, affecting the power of the vote – which is territorially bound. Indeed, the voters’ power has diminished, because the vote is territorially bound, while the policies are increasingly less so. Electoral dynamics remain important but the vote has a limited impact on transnational and international authorities, as well as on several subnational regulatory authorities and quangos. The Europeanization of politics and the introduction of the principle of subsidiarity has rescaled political competences (Guiraudon 2010); a number of legally-binding decisions are now taken by unelected actors and independent regulatory authorities; and policy-making increasingly takes place in policy sub-systems that lack transparency and accountability (Kriesi 2008). Comparative research provides clear evidence of the growing link between the fragmentation of political power and the enhanced empowerment of the courts and other unelected institutions in promoting legally-binding decisions, especially in relation to migrations (Cichowski 2006, 2007; Guiraudon 2000; Jacquot and Vitale 2014). From this perspective, the legal and political framework in which actors operate is shaped by different scales of government and types of authority. These changes in the political sphere heavily impact upon how political and social representations are conceptualized, thus influencing the discursive context in which trade unions address the dilemmas outlined in chapter 1.

### *3.3 Politics, policies and the media*

As we have seen, a variety of actors intervene in migration policy-making. Due to the process of “mediatization” of politics (see above), what happens in the public sphere is particularly relevant in defining the opportunity structure, that is the context in which the actors operate.

Native population’s aversion to religious and cultural differences of migrant is in fact decreased by an effective welfare state and the political inclusion of migrants (Kirchner et al. 2011; Crepaz & Damron 2009). But effective access to welfare rights does not depend only by generosity of welfare state for natives: anti-discrimination policies enforce immigrants’ welfare rights and their integration. Indeed, inclusion requires a consequent political commitment and precise political

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<sup>6</sup> Katz and Mair 1995 label as ‘cartel’ a type of party characterized by the interpenetration of the state and by a tendency towards inter-party collusion. Cartel parties do not compete on policies but on the provision of spectacle, election campaigns are capital-intensive and centralized, distinction between party members and non-members tends to disappear. .

willingness, which are rare resources, strictly related to attitudes and public discourse. The policies related to migration are, indeed, particularly controversial. Research has highlighted the relevant factors influencing the visibility and resonance of migration in the public discourse (Koopmans et al. 2005, 242; see also Cinalli & Giugni 2011 and 2013). These factors are the political context, the overall discursive opportunity structure, and social structure factors, such as inequalities in the labour market, the segregation in access to the best academic institutions, the overall rate of residential segregation and other structural parameters related to cross-cutting or isolated ethnic circles (Bilgili, Huddelston & Joki 2015; Kogan 2016). Once again, the analysis of the discursive context is crucial: how do controversies over migrations unfold in the public sphere? As the sociologist Hanspeter Kriesi explains, “the information is always ambivalent and the selection, presentation, and interpretation of information by the media and the political elites plays a key role. There’s always room for ‘framing’ the political problems.” (Kriesi 2008: 151). Words matter in the current political scenario.

#### **4. The public sphere and migration framing**

The number of institutions playing a role in the migration issue, their complex hierarchy, together with the different questions these institutions address and their territorial (and normative) boundaries of actions have given rise to a huge variety of institutional definitions of ‘who’ is a migrant, and for how long. The issue of ‘institutional definition of migrants’, as bookish as it may seem, has various and heavy consequences. Firstly, it affects measurement of the phenomenon: depending on the adopted definition of ‘who’ is a migrant, the figures change (Busso 2007)<sup>7</sup>. In this sense, data is socially and politically constructed: it produces representations first and then real effects. Secondly, the institutional definitions come with rights and entitlements. In this respect, some definitions have more consequences than others. This is the case, for example, in the distinction between ‘legal’ and ‘illegal’ migrants, or between ‘economic migrants’ and ‘asylum seekers’/‘refugees’. Thirdly, the institutional definitions have symbolic power. Merely developing policies addressing migrants, even when these policies cannot be effectively implemented, sends a signal from the government to citizens.

Analysis of the discourse of exclusion, racism and migrations have revolved around two aspects. The first aspect is the analysis of how migrants are described in the media and how and why migration becomes a public issue. These studies underline the mechanisms of the politicization of migration, that is how migrations enter the public agenda, and for what reasons (see, the pioneering studies on racism and the press by Van Dijk 1991, Mehan 1997, Wodak 1997, and, more recently, Bennett et al. 2013, Parkin 2013; Triandafyllidou 2013). The second aspect regards the migrant voice in the mass media of host countries and, more broadly, the discursive opportunity structure on migrations.

In one of the few comparative studies on the discursive opportunity structures for migrants in Europe, Koopmans et al. (2005) demonstrated that migration policies are contested issues mainly in relation to how migration flows and ethno-cultural diversity impact on the core elements of the nation-state: the control of external borders, the regulation of access to citizenship, and national identity. Facing economic globalization, the control of entry is in fact one of those few domains in which the nation-state can display its capacity of action. From this perspective, migrations are potentially truly global and transnational issues that paradoxically are shaped by the nation-state in a dual sense (Casella & Vitale 2015): by the interplay of political

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<sup>7</sup> The representativeness of the institutional figures on migration is made more complex by the virtual impossibility of measuring what is defined as ‘illegal’ migration – which is, by definition, absent from official data sources – and the rapid dynamics of migration, which make it difficult to have updated and reliable data. The recent debate over the Frontex data on migration exemplifies such difficulties (permanent url: <http://www.euronews.com/2015/10/14/migrant-crisis-confusion-how-many-are-entering-the-eu/>).

parties at national level (Kriesi et al 2012), and government institutions at European level (the so-called “new inter-governmentalism”, see Puetter 2014).

Similar results are demonstrated by the 2013 Comparative Pilot Study on Media Coverage of Migration, a joint project of the European Journalism Centre (EJC) and the United Nations Alliance of Civilizations (UNAOC)<sup>8</sup>. The study shows how the way in which ‘migrants’ are depicted – whether considering their legal or minority status, for example – is related to the specific debates prevailing in the countries under scrutiny and, more broadly, to the interests of the host country. Furthermore, the key topics in discussing migrants are ‘citizenship’ and ‘law’.

In fact, whom are we talking about when we talk about migrants? Migration statistics are highly misrepresented in the public sphere, as many studies have shown (see Hjerm, 2007; Sides & Citrin, 2007) and the media fails to represent European diversity (Niessen & Huddleston 2010)<sup>9</sup>. Moreover, in a pioneer study, Blinder explored the ‘imagined migrants’ in Britain, showing the divergence between public opinion and statistical data, and analysing how and to what extent the attitudes towards migrants are shaped by ‘imagined migrants’, rather than the reality of migrations (Blinder 2015<sup>10</sup>). In his essay, Blinder convincingly argues that: “Public perceptions of immigrants are highly differentiated, meaning that policies directed to officially defined immigrants as an undifferentiated category are less directly responsive to public opinion than they might appear” (Blinder 2015: 97). At the same time, policy-making is strictly related to the political agenda, which in turn is strictly related to public opinion.

Many different definitions of migrants have emerged in the public sphere over recent decades. Some labels are strictly related to specific national contexts – such as the word ‘beur’ in France<sup>11</sup>. In countries with longer-established ethnic or post-colonial minorities, the media presents a more nuanced variety of labels (ter Wal 2002). The media sphere of European countries is mainly national (Koopmans & Statham 2010; Bärenreuter et al. 2009). Nonetheless, considering migrants, many labels and frames appear to be common to all European countries. Broadly speaking, the negative media attitude towards – or incorrect information about – migrants, for example, is an issue in many European countries and a variety of monitoring bodies and ethical journalistic codes have been established in recent years, to develop guidelines and best practices against hate speech and for the fair treatment of migrants in the press and wider media sphere (Pasta 2016). As we will see in the chapter 5 of this book, unions have participated in bottom up anti-discriminatory policy, promoting language training and information on migrants’ social and civil rights, as well as creating coalitions with community and religious groups to promote anti hate-speech campaigns.

In the academic literature on the topic, four main trends stand out. Firstly, migrants are usually represented by group designation – such as ‘Arabs’, or ‘Immigrants’ – and negative labelling. Secondly, migrants are usually portrayed as either victims, who have survived terrible events and are in need of support, or as a threat to host societies, stealing jobs and corrupting host societies’ culture (see Anderson 2008). A third trend, underlined by several studies, regards the systematic absence of a direct migrant voice in the press. Finally, national media usually discusses migrants within the specific local context, without a broader European perspective (Bennett et al. 2013, pp. 249-250). This last trend, however, has in fact been changing over recent years, due to what the mass media labels as ‘the migration crisis’.

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<sup>8</sup> The study, supported by the Open Society Foundation, is available at: <http://www.slideshare.net/ejc/unaoc-data-journalism>. A summary of the study can be found at: [http://www.emnbelgium.be/sites/default/files/publications/unaoc.ejc\\_study\\_summary.2013.pdf](http://www.emnbelgium.be/sites/default/files/publications/unaoc.ejc_study_summary.2013.pdf)

<sup>9</sup> See the European project: Media for Diversity and Migrant Integration: Consolidating Knowledge and Assessing Media Practices across the EU, <http://mediva.eui.eu>

<sup>10</sup> See also Turper et al. (2015); on specific hyper-mediatized cases like Roma migrants in Western Europe see (on Italy) Vitale, Claps, Arrigoni 2012; (on France) Ram 2014; and (on the UK) Richardson 2014; Powel, Lever 2015.

<sup>11</sup> Beur is a colloquial term to designate European-born people whose parents or grandparents are immigrants from North Africa. It derives from the inversion of the syllables of ‘arabe’ in the French Verlan argot.



In the media discourse, the ‘typical’ migrant comes from outside Europe and ‘migration’ is a permanent feature: indeed, usually migrants’ offspring are depicted in the news as ‘migrants’, irrespectively of their actual nationality or status. If not, they are usually labelled as ‘second (and even third) generation’ or *‘issue de l’immigration’*. Furthermore, when discussing migrants in many European countries the topic is framed in terms of danger and risk (Maneri 2009), so that migration is often criminalized (see the concept of ‘crimmigration’, Coutin 2011).

Many discussions revolve around so-called ‘economic migration’. Migrants are labelled as ‘guest workers’ (*Gastarbeiter*) or ‘economic refugees’, whose presence is supposed to be temporary and related to their economic activity<sup>12</sup> (as discussed in chapter 2). The semantics and the arguments put forward in the public discourse are therefore related to the role of migrants as workers in the receiving countries. In this frame, migrants can be ‘job stealers’ or ‘economic resources’, often employed in the “3D jobs” – dirty, dangerous and demanding (Kosic and Triandafyllidou, 2005). At the same time, the work dimension is often moralized in the discursive dichotomy ‘good v bad’ migrant, where the ‘good’ migrant is the working one, as opposed to the unemployed, implicitly criminal, ‘bad’ migrant (for a nuanced and detailed discussion, see Ambrosini 2016).

A second category of labels is related to the legal status of migrants in the receiving country: ‘undocumented’, ‘illegal’, ‘clandestine’, *‘sans papier’* on the one side, and ‘refugee’ or ‘asylum-seeker’ on the other. Either way, third country nationals who do not hold EU documents are usually in the most precarious situation (Bennett et al. 2013), with some significant exception, such as in the case of domestic workers, usually tolerated, regardless of their citizenship status (Ambrosini 2016). The semantics of this second category are often related to the moralization of the public discourse, with a negative meaning associated with the situation of migrants without ‘documents’, and a debate around the ‘honesty’ of asylum requests (‘bogus refugees’). Research shows how, in the mass media, these analytical categories are in fact frequently overlapping. In both categories, the underlying idea is that of ‘hosting’. Migrants are judged about their reasons for moving: the economic reasons, war and persecution are usually mentioned when arguing against entry restrictions, through a mechanism of dichotomous classification: on one side deserving immigrants (who are victims and deserve to be accepted), and on the other side undeserving immigrants (who must be blamed, because they are opportunistic, dangerous and need to be expelled). Migrants can access Europe only and insofar as they are victims – especially of wars and destruction, and less so, of economic distress. The arguments mobilized in the public discourse are related to the hosting capacity of the receiving country (‘invasion’, ‘social welfare problems’...) and the threats to social cohesion – because migrants are depicted as different, mainly due to their religious convictions (Islam, above all). In the best-case scenario, migrants are ‘folklorized’ and ‘exotized’, in the worst, they are stereotyped according to their country of origin or their religion: either way, they are ‘otherized’<sup>13</sup>.

A third, residual, category of labels is related to mobility, rather than migration, implicitly separating the processes. Mobility is related to intra-European mobility, or highly-skilled third country nationals’ incoming mobility, fostered by the EU and related to the frame of innovation, Erasmus generation, expats, ‘brain circulation’, etc. (Recchi 2015; see also chapters 2 and 3). Migration, on the contrary, is implicitly related to low-skills, under-qualification and working class choices. More broadly, the label of migrant is often related to other processes that result in the construction of differences and distances between ‘us’ and ‘them’, and in the reduction of possible internal differences among ‘them’. The otherization and homogenization process may be based on various characteristics, among which religion plays an increasingly important role. In

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<sup>12</sup> A less diffused – although interesting – label related to economic migration is ‘International retirement migration’.

<sup>13</sup> In the media coverage of migration, the sex of migrants plays a major role. Migrant women have specific profiles (the maid, the poor and ignorant mother, the prostitute, the exotic beauty, the mother) and are usually victimized (Giorgi 2012). Male migrants are usually threatening and criminalized.

recent years the labelling of migrants on the basis of religion has increased while that on ethnic or national identity has decreased (Bennett et al. 2013). Indeed, recognition of the religion of ‘others’ has elicited a much more extreme reaction than the recognition of migrant rights, especially when considering Islam (see Bail 2014; Cousin & Vitale 2012; Giorgi 2012). In Tariq Modood’s words: ‘[t]here is an anti-Muslim wind blowing across the European continent. One factor is a perception that Muslims are making politically exceptional, culturally unreasonable or theologically alien demands upon European states’ (Modood 2003: 100). Muslims came indeed to represent the ‘complete other’, in the European context, coupling religious and political identities. In the political field, it is often assumed that there is a clash between Muslim and democratic values – so that women’s rights, for example, are instrumentally used to counter the Muslim (migrant) presence. In turn, these ‘natives’ expectations’ also triggered the re-discovery of national, ethnic, and religious identity during the migratory paths.

In a recent study, Timothy Peace analysed the political role of Muslims in the Global Justice Movement in Britain and France, showing the difficulties political parties and non governmental organisations (NGOs) have in recognizing and valuing political activists of Muslim faith. The author points out a number of assumptions at work, even in the anti-racist movements. For example, Muslims ‘defend the interests of their own community, rather than universal principles’ and they don’t respect ‘gender equality’ (Peace 2015: 123). More broadly, he demonstrates the role of the internal structures of the actors dealing with migrants in stimulating their openness or lack of openness towards them and outlines the importance of the national discursive opportunity structures in Muslims’ active political participation.

## 5. ‘The others’: philosophies of integration

In the third chapter of this book, we have seen the distinction of three migration and integration regimes: the north-western European regime, the southern European regime, and the central and eastern European regime. These three regimes have been analysed looking at main policy choices used to integrate immigrants into host society: regulation of admission of foreigners and access to the labour market, so analysing residence permits and work permits. Here we move forward adding also an analysis based on cross-national variations in how the ‘migration issue’ unfolds are related to the different concepts of national identity, and therefore the underpinning philosophies of integration that deal with diversity (Favell 1998).

In this respect, Koopmans et al. (2005) suggest an interesting model to analyse similarities and differences in the various concepts of citizenship emerging in Europe, by paying attention to both the cultural dimension of group rights – for example, allowances for religious practices outside the public institutions – and individual rights – such as, for example, voting rights. Four models emerge: segregationism, assimilationism, multiculturalism and universalism (*ibid.*, pp. 9-16). The first model, segregationism, is related to a strong focus on cultural diversity, preventing assimilation, coupled with strict limitations in individual access to citizenship. None of the European countries examined is representative of the segregationist model. Multiculturalism, on the other hand, which retains attention to cultural diversity, but it is characterized by an easier access to citizenship, has been quite successful. Both Britain and the Netherlands, for example, introduced specific multicultural policies, trying to balance individual inclusion with respect for group rights. The assimilationism regime couples an easier individual access to citizenship with limitations on group rights to cultural diversity, in order to prevent the formation of ‘parallel societies’. This is the case, for example, in Switzerland and Germany (until the mid-1990s). Finally, universalism is related to policies and citizenship requirements detached from ethnicity and culture, addressing instead undifferentiated groups of, for example, socially disadvantaged classes. This model is clearly exemplified by French universalism. The four models configure a

conceptual typology in which European countries may be positioned in relation to their specific citizenship requirements and cultural diversity policies (but see also chapter 3 in this book).

The categories framing the ‘migration issue’ are in fact related to the ‘philosophies of integration’ (Favell 1998, see also 2015), whose basic, underlying issue regards how societies deal with diversity and balance diversity and cohesion (Bader 2007, Ozzano & Giorgi 2016). According to the sociologist Steven Vertovec, diversity “is not what it used to be” (Vertovec 2007: 1): in contemporary societies, there are more people moving from more places and new and significant interactions between the different dimensions of diversity, for which reason he proposed the category of ‘super-diversity’. In addition to ‘quantitative’ increase of diversity, we can also highlight its ‘qualitative’ transformation: public debates make clear how diversity is in fact becoming a relevant frame for understanding reality. Dealing with diversity, therefore, implies two processes: firstly recognizing and assessing differences, and secondly regulating diversity (or super-diversity).

Cultural and/or religious dimensions of the multifaceted concept of diversity are especially put forward with respect to migrations. According to Anna Triandafyllidou, the various ways of dealing with religious (and cultural) diversity can be placed along a conceptual-theoretical continuum that ranges from tolerance to fully-fledged political multiculturalism (Triandafyllidou 2009). The concept of multiculturalism has both an *empirical* dimension, describing the social phenomenon and, in some cases, the specific multicultural policies in place, and a *normative* dimension, in relation to the evaluation of pluralism and diversity and the philosophical debate over the best way of treating countries’ internal cultural differences (Wieviorka 2001, Modood et al. 2005). Broadly speaking, multiculturalism regards the idea that in conditions of cultural diversity ‘one size does not fit all’, and therefore citizens’ equality should be guaranteed by a regime of minority rights: in other words, effective equality is based on inequality (see Gutmann 1993; Kymlicka 2001; Young 1990).

The concept of multiculturalism, even within this broad definition, has triggered various concerns. To begin with, critics argue that different/unequal treatment of majority and minority groups may have negative consequences for countries’ social cohesion and integration processes, and warn against the risk of fragmentation and ‘Balkanization’. A second concern regards the possible perverse effects that the implementation of minority rights could have on members of minorities. A wide, mainly feminist, literature focuses on minorities within minorities (Okin 1998 and 1999; for literature reviews, see Cohen et al. 1999; Phillips 2009; Ponzanesi 2007; Volpp 2001; Woodhead 2008). The main issue at stake, in this strand of literature, revolves around the possibility of giving voice and recognition to cultures’ internal differences, focusing on their internal heterogeneity. A third objection focuses on the concept of culture, ‘representing it as a falsely homogenizing reification’ (Phillips 2009, p. 14). Indeed, while some dimensions of diversity – for example, diversity of countries of origin – can be easily traced, the empirical identifiers of ‘cultural difference’ are far more complex (see Triandafyllidou 2009). In which case how, and under what circumstances do the differences cease to be individual characteristics and become cultural traits? And who has the authority to decide? From this perspective, the main issue at stake is the recognition of possible differences without building monolithic, binding and inescapable identities<sup>14</sup>.

In times of globalization and cultural hybridization, the deep political implications of the complex processes of defining cultural identities and constructing ‘otherness’ are even clearer. This is especially relevant when considering the role of religion in the recognition of cultural-ethnic differences, which risks being either overemphasized or completely neglected. Recent studies focusing on migrant women and especially religious migrant women, highlight the difficulties in recognizing the political voice of subjects who play along norms of political

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14 This point is also at the heart of the debate that gave shape to the European Convention on National Minorities.

behaviour than are different from those in place in Western European societies. For example, commenting the political discourse concerning the Islamic veil, Bilge (2010) underlines how in Europe interpretations of women's reasons for wearing the veil touch upon 'false conscience', unable to recognize the oppression, or the 'fierce resistance' of women against discrimination. It also shows that most of the public discourse neglect how religious motivations contribute to women struggle against gender inequalities (Bilge 2010), as well as a sincere desire among many Muslims women to participate in the public sphere (Göle 2017).

At the same time, an increasing number of academics point out how religious agency is inherently considered 'defective', and, therefore, conceptualized with difficulty (Asad 2003; Bracke 2008; Mahmood 2005). In this respect, Tariq Modood maintains that the crucial challenge of multiculturalism is in fact to integrate the differences by taking into account minorities' self-representations, and in particular, their account of the role of religion in their cultural identity. More specifically, he argues for including 'the right not just to be recognized but to debate the terms of recognition': when dealing with religion, this implies the 'acknowledgement of the importance of religious identity to some non-white ethnic minorities' (Modood 2013: 122; see also Modood 2010).

At the opposite pole of multiculturalism, which includes forms of recognition and integration of differences, Triandafyllidou (2009) places tolerance. In her essay "Regulating Aversion", Wendy Brown proposes an in-depth analysis of the contemporary discourse on tolerance, outlining how the prominence of the tolerance category in fact 'reduces conflict to an inherent friction among identities and makes religious, ethnic, and cultural difference itself an inherent site of conflict, one that calls for and is attenuated by the practice of tolerance' (Brown 2008: 15). She underlines the possible depoliticizing effects of the tolerance discourse that risks crystallizing differences, seeing identities as mutually exclusive and immutable, paying maximum attention to narratives but neglecting the material sources of political contention. In the same vein, Suzanna Danuta Walters analyses and criticises tolerance as an incremental strategy to promote minority rights, and to create political space for playing with identities and creating community. Nevertheless, she argues that minority rights may be more effectively protected by means of enhancing equal rights to housing, employment, health care, education, political participation for everyone, and promoting a "deeper sense of belonging", so that minorities can feel included in society (Walters 2014).

Indeed, the various dimensions of diversity are intertwined with one another and the sensitive issues of tolerance and multiculturalism are related to the normative conundrum of equality, belonging and identity. The guarantee of equality, the promotion of the sense of belonging to a community, and the definition of cultural identities are themselves political acts. This is not without relations with what we saw in the first section of this chapter, that individuals committed in associations and community based organisations are less likely to be hostile and xenophobic.

## **6. A permanent transition: stereotypes and identity mobilization in the public sphere**

Current discourses on mobility and migration easily reify migrants as passive entities, turning a transitional process into a permanent condition (and even into a burdensome legacy for the children of migrants). Hate speech of government bodies and public intellectuals, as well as media coverage and resonance of xenophobic claims contribute to confirm stereotyped frames and conversation stigmatising immigrants, producing caricatures of their supposed collective identities. In the previous sections of this chapter, we discussed hostility towards migrants, how it is reflected in the public and the political spheres, and how it is anchored in the institutional sphere of migration and integration policies.

In this final section, we point out three intervening factors that filter the impact of the discursive and political framing upon the migrants themselves, as active agents. First, the public and political discourse are dynamic processes, influenced by specific events that can change the

narratives. In his analysis of Muslims' activism in France and the UK, for example, Peace locates in the 1990s the period in which the 'Muslim' identity appears on the political scene in both countries, in relation to specific turning-point events that in fact changed the narratives on migration (Peace 2015, see also Mahamdallie 2007, Triandafyllidou 2009).

Second, social practices filter the effects of the public narratives on the legal status of migrants. Starting from his analysis on domestic workers in southern Europe, for example, Ambrosini (2015) identifies four categories of migrants, according to their legal status and social recognition. While, broadly speaking, 'undocumented' migrants are excluded and depicted as threatening invaders, other 'illegal' migrants (notably, domestic workers) are in fact tolerated and considered as 'deserving'. On the other hand, in addition to 'integrated' (socially accepted and regular) migrants, some 'legal' migrants – namely, asylum seekers and socially undesirable minorities, such as Roma – are in fact stigmatised. The selective treatment of regular and irregular migrations impacts upon the transition dynamic of migrants' status.

Third, the public and political relevance of ethno-cultural and/or religious identities is deeply influenced by the processes of mobilization, construction, and deconstruction of these identities in the public sphere: migrants are also active agents in the receiving countries and their activism and participation are related to their identity and the internal structure of their group (see also Vanhala 2009). Broadly speaking, in contemporary societies actors are characterized by multiple identities, whose importance in terms of self-identification is highly variable for individuals and groups (Triandafyllidou 2009). In their study on Islam in the public sphere, for example, Cinalli and Giugni point out how, in addition to the salience of cultural issues related to Islam, the debates' outcomes are deeply influenced by the collective mobilization of Muslims as actors of claim-making – that is, by the identity and the forms of action activated in the public and the political spheres, in a process of continuous negotiation between externally constructed and internally mobilized identities (Cinalli & Giugni 2011 and 2013)

In conclusion, together with the labour market trends described in chapter 2, the migration processes discussed in chapter 3, and the trade unions dynamics addressed in chapter 5, the public discourse and the political sphere changes are relevant factors influencing the relationship between trade unions and migrants, as well as the broader background in which trade unions address the three dilemmas outlined in chapter 1.

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We confirm that we do not use any material that is not original in our chapter.