ABSTRACT: Departing from the postulates of Ruiz de Mendoza and his collaborators on metonymic anaphora (Ruiz de Mendoza 1997, 1999; Ruiz de Mendoza; Otal 2002; Ruiz de Mendoza; Díez 2004), this paper analyzes some of the most outstanding cases of anaphoric reference to a metonymic antecedent in four best sellers. Antecedent selection turns up problematic in certain cases. These difficulties are considerably reduced, however, by means of the distinction between simple and double metonymies, and some constraints and principles that govern the selection of the anaphoric referent: Constraint on Metonymic Anaphora, Domain Availability Principle, Domain Combinability Principle, and Domain Precedence Principle. The operation of mappings and principles is described through the analysis of real language examples. The phenomenon of metonymic anaphora is surveyed along with cases of implicative reference, through which these scholars account for otherwise problematic cases of anaphoric reference. Ruiz de Mendoza’s is a highly comprehensive approach as far as metonymic anaphora is concerned, but further research should be carried out regarding its relationship with implicative reference.

Keywords: metonymy, anaphoric reference, implicative reference, CMA, DAP, DCP, DPP.

RESUMEN: Partiendo de los postulados sobre anáfora metonímica de Ruiz de Mendoza y sus colaboradores (Ruiz de Mendoza 1997, 1999; Ruiz de Mendoza; Otal 2002; Ruiz de Mendoza; Díez 2004), el presente artículo analiza algunos de los casos más significativos de referencia anafórica a antecedentes metonímicos en cuatro best sellers. La selección del antecedente se muestra problemática en algunos casos; sin embargo, estas dificultades se ven reducidas considerablemente con la distinción entre metonimias simples y dobles, así como con varios constricciones y principios que gobiernan la selección del referente anafórico: Restricción de Anáfora Metonímica, Principio de Disponibilidad de Dominios, Principio de Combinabilidad de Dominios y Principio de Precedencia de Dominios. La operabilidad de estos mapeos y principios se describe detalladamente en este artículo mediante una selección de ejemplos reales. El fenómeno de anáfora metonímica se analiza en conjunción con casos de referencia implicativa mediante los que estos académicos dan cuenta de casos de
referencia anafórica que podrían llegar a ser problemáticos. El enfoque de Ruiz de Mendoza demuestra ser exhaustivo y completo en lo que respecta a la anáfora metonímica, aunque parece necesario llevar a cabo más estudios versados en su relación con casos de referencia implicativa.

Palabras clave: metonimia, referencia anafórica, referencia implicativa, CMA, DAP, DCP, DPP.

1. Introduction

The study of metaphorical and metonymic ICMs as conceptual organization devices has brought the attention of many ever since the emergence of the cognitive paradigm (Lakoff; Johnson, 1980; Lakoff, 1987). Since then, ICMs have been tackled from rather different perspectives. Ruiz de Mendoza; Díez (2002: 490), for their part, define ICM as:

A cognitive structure, which is idealised for the purpose of understanding and reasoning, and whose function is to represent reality from a certain perspective. […] The term ICM, in being all-encompassing, designates any concept constructed on the basis of what we know about the world.

The study of metaphor early became the focus of many studies. Interest in metonymy, however, had a later awakening with a focus on the typology of metonymies, their definitional traits, their differences with metaphors (Lakoff; Johnson, 1980; Lakoff, 1987; Lakoff; Turner, 1989; Langacker, 1993; Croft 1993; Kövecses; Radden, 1998; etc.), as well as on the potential of metonymy to explain inferential processes and implicated-explicated meaning (Panther; Thornburg, 1998; Ruiz de Mendoza; Otal, 2002).

Nevertheless it has been claimed (Ruiz de Mendoza, 1997; Ruiz de Mendoza; Otal, 2002; Ruiz de Mendoza; Díez, 2004) that the distinction between metaphor and metonymy has not been clearly drawn by many authors, as most studies provide just “working definitions” that fail to fully provide thorough distinguishing criteria between them. This group of scholars developed their own account of metonymy with a high predictive potential on the grounds of a series of rather simple distinctions and constraints. These distinguishing criteria stem from a single distinction based merely on domain internal-external mappings. All other criteria proposed previously by authors like, say, Lakoff (1987), Lakoff; Johnson (1989) – e.g. predicative metaphors vs. referential metonymies – or Croft (1993) – e.g. domain highlighting – become thus side-effects of this domain internal-external distinction.

Ruiz de Mendoza (1999), Ruiz de Mendoza; Díez (2002), and Ruiz de Mendoza; Otal (2002) define metonymy as a conceptual mapping within a single domain, which establishes a strong opposition with metaphor – this requires domain-external mappings.

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On the grounds of this domain-subdomain inclusion relationship, these scholars put forward two kinds of metonymies that encompass all instances found in discourse: *source-in-target* and *target-in-source* metonymies.

In *source-in-target* (S-IN-T) metonymies the source domain is a subdomain of the target domain. The source domain provides a point of access for the mapping that, via a domain expansion process, ends in the target domain.

In *target-in-source* (T-IN-S) metonymies the target domain is a subdomain of the source domain. The latter provides a point of access for the mapping that, via a domain reduction process, ends in the target domain. In both cases, the main domain is known as the matrix domain.

Besides having a communicative import (e.g. being intentionally vague, saving the speaker/hearer extra processing effort, etc.), this dichotomy clearly shows the impact of metonymies on all linguistic levels. For example the T-IN-S/S-IN-T distinction is relevant to provide explanation for linguistic phenomena like cases of anaphoric reference to metonymic antecedents. As shown in this study, Ruiz de Mendoza’s account on metonymy demonstrates that the principles underlying anaphoric reference are not totally *grammatical*, but work on the basis of conceptual processes.

### 1.1. Metonymy and Anaphora

The scientific community has attempted to offer solutions for most intricate examples of anaphoric reference to metonymic antecedents, but many of them remain at a surface descriptive level as no proper explanations for the motivation of the analysed phenomena seem to have been provided yet (Ruiz de Mendoza; Otal, 2002). In this regard, Ruiz de Mendoza; Otal (2002) and Ruiz de Mendoza; Díez (2004) overcome the shortcomings of previous accounts on this topic (e.g. Nunberg, 1995; Stirling, 1996) by putting forward a further distinction between simple and double metonymies (i.e. metonymies working with one and two matrix domains respectively) and propose a series of constraints and principles that govern the use of anaphora with both kinds of metonymies, namely: *Constraint on Metonymic Anaphora* (CMA), *Domain Availability Principle* (DAP) (both working for simple and double metonymies), *Domain Precedence Principle* (DPP), and *Domain Combinability Principle* (DCP) (which apply in double metonymies). Furthermore, they include the notion of *implicative reference*, which allows them to account for apparently problematic cases.

Their contentions are substantiated through a wide series of examples (Ruiz de Mendoza, 1997, 1999; Ruiz de Mendoza; Otal, 2002; Ruiz de Mendoza; Díez, 2004). Nevertheless, most of them may not be considered “real” in that they are created *ad hoc* to illustrate their proposals, which might be envisaged as a shortcoming in attesting the empirical value of their approach.

It will be the main aim of this paper, then, to provide their approach with empirically attested evidence by probing their contentions through a series of usage-based real English language examples.

Further evidence will also be provided regarding how this T-IN-S/S-IN-T distinction and the domain-inclusion relationship allow Ruiz de Mendoza to account for virtually
any instance of anaphora to a metonymic antecedent. In order to do so, this study will draw on his theory of metonymy and his postulates on the principles that govern metonymic anaphora in single and double metonymies.

Both kinds of metonymies and their underlying working principles will be analyzed with the help of a series of examples of metonymic anaphora extracted from a corpus made up by four best sellers. The instances presented in this paper are thus real samples of metonymic anaphora involving demonstrative, personal, possessive, relative pronouns, and possessive adjectives. Our examples, therefore, can be considered real-language-use pieces of evidence of the comprehensiveness and predictive potential of this account of metonymy.

2. Method

A total of 77 examples containing instances of anaphoric reference to a metonymic antecedent and implicative reference of anaphoric devices to specific frame elements were compiled in order to substantiate our claims. Cases of simple and double metonymies wherein one matrix domain or subdomain work as the antecedent of any of the anaphoric devices listed above were searched in Michael Moore’s Stupid White Men (SWM), Dude, Where’s My Country? (DWMC), and Dan Brown’s The Da Vinci Code (TDVC), Deception Point (DP), which compose the corpus of real written language used in this study.

3. Results and Discussion

The principles postulated by Ruiz de Mendoza and his collaborators must be understood as general rules underlying the relationship between metonymies and anaphora in cases which an anaphoric pronoun makes reference to a metonymic antecedent. These principles interact with one another in a way that, when more than one hold in the same example, they may render it more acceptable than in cases where only one of them applies. This interaction becomes even more obvious when double metonymies are involved. In these cases, although the DAP continues to apply, the DCP and DPP play a crucial role.

3.1. DAP and CMA. Simple Metonymies

The DAP is the strongest principle and the only that applies in single and double metonymies. It states that “only the matrix domain of a metonymic mapping is available for anaphoric reference” (Ruiz de Mendoza; Díez, 2004: 304). The matrix domain is preferred in anaphoric reference because it is usually more clearly profiled, unambiguous, and informationally richer. The CMA is a general restriction to metonymic mappings that applies in terms of economy and relevance for the hearer, as it prevents
cases of metonymic anaphora from entailing an excessive processing effort. According to the CMA:

Whenever anaphoric reference is made to a metonymic noun phrase, the anaphoric pronoun cannot have an independent metonymic interpretation, different from the one assigned to its antecedent. In most cases this formulation of the CMA amounts to stating that the anaphoric pronoun cannot be metonymic itself. (Ruiz de Mendoza; Díez, 2004: 308).

Generally, the CMA caters for cognitive economy by avoiding the activation of two different metonymic mappings in cases of metonymic anaphora. More specifically, it prevents cases wherein a metonymy works as the antecedent for an – in turn – metonymic anaphoric pronoun whose metonymic interpretation is different from that of the antecedent in question.

Consider the following examples; (1) is the original example extracted from SWM, and (1'), (1''), and (1''') are further developments of the metonymy proposed in order to show how DAP and CMA work:

(1) He [Bush] bombed civilians in Iraq, just like Daddy did. (SWM)
(1') Bush bombed civilians in Iraq, just like Daddy did, then he discovered Hussein’s hiding place.
(1'') *Bush bombed civilians in Iraq, just like Daddy did, then he came back to the air base.
(1''') *Bush bombed civilians in Iraq, just like Daddy did, then they came back to the air base.

(1) conveys a T-IN-S RULER FOR ARMY metonymy where the ruler (matrix domain) is selected for anaphoric reference as predicted by the DAP (cf. Figure 1). Although (1') presents a metonymic anaphoric pronoun, it is not ruled out by the CMA, as the metonymic mapping in the antecedent is not different from that of the pronoun. It could be stated that as long as the same metonymy develops in the same stretch of discourse (including anaphoric pronouns) anaphoric pronouns can be metonymical themselves. (1') also follows the DAP, as the reference is still made to the matrix domain of the metonymic mapping (Bush). On the contrary, even though (1'') follows the DAP (the pronoun draws on the same RULER FOR AIR FORCE metonymy), the sentence is not acceptable because it flouts the CMA: the anaphoric pronoun would require a different metonymic reading from the one developed by its expected antecedent so as to be compatible with the extended sentence. Thus, in this kind of metonymies, the DAP and CMA also govern the compatibility of predicates with such pronouns (Ruiz de Mendoza; Díez, 2004). Finally, (1''') is not acceptable because, despite it follows the CMA, it makes reference to the target domain, i.e. to the subdomain of the metonymic mapping, thus flouting the DAP. In this regard, and as far as the English language is concerned, the DAP proves indeed a rather valuable tool to determine which of the metonymic components operates as the matrix domain. In this example, “Bush” cannot count as a subdomain of the air force – that is, the commander-in-chief as a part of the whole US air force – because it is the only metonymic antecedent eligible for anaphoric reference.
Since the CMA is a constraint rather than a principle *per se*, it will not be further referred to in the remaining of this paper so as to devote special attention to the actual principles at work in each example – it must be born in mind, nevertheless, that it still applies in the examples tackled in this section.

In the rest of it, a series of examples illustrate the functioning of the DAP in simple metonymies in order to ascertain whether their acceptability is predicted by Ruiz de Mendoza and his co-workers’ account on metonymic anaphora.

Examples (2) to (5) convey T-IN-S metonymies wherein personal and relative pronouns act as anaphoric devices referring to the matrix domain of the metonymic antecedent (that is, the source domain), thus following the prescriptions of the DAP:

(2) No, I’m talking about a perceived notion that we Americans are supporting *Israel* in *its* oppression of the Palestinian people. (DWMC)
(3) It took the bankruptcy of *Enron* before thousands of *its* conservative employees […] woke up. (DWMC)
(4) That’s why, on behalf of 234 million Americans held hostage, I have requested that *NATO* do what *it* did in Bosnia and Kosovo… (SWM)
(5) Thanks to those who helped me research and pull *this book* together and keep *it* as timely as possible. (SWM)

Example (2) involves a COUNTRY FOR ARMED FORCES T-IN-S metonymy in which the matrix domain (Israel) is selected as the antecedent of the anaphoric pronoun, thus following the DAP. Example (3) is an instance of a COMPANY FOR MANAGEMENT T-IN-S metonymy whose matrix (source) domain is selected as the referent of the anaphoric pronoun in compliance with the DAP. Example (4) works according to an ORGANIZATION FOR ITS MEMBERS T-IN-S metonymy. The fact that the anaphoric pronoun here refers to the matrix domain – the organization – and not directly to its representatives – e.g. by using *they* – indicates that (4) follows the DAP. Finally, (5) instantiates a T-IN-S metonymy (BOOK FOR CONTENTS) where the matrix-source domain is the physical book and the target domain is identified with the book contents (comprehensively written, elaborated, and “pulled together”). In accordance with the usage of *book* in (5), this metonymy – which also develops in the pronoun – makes reference to the contents, but the anaphoric pronoun – following the DAP – still makes reference to the matrix domain.
The following examples convey S-IN-T metonymies (cf. Figure 2) active in the antecedent of different kinds of anaphoric reference devices. Notice that the matrix domain corresponds to the target domain in S-IN-T metonymies. Consider first examples (6) and (7):

(6) […] he flagged down a gypsy cab and offered him a hundred dollars to take him home. (DWMC)

(7) Assuming this was just another one of those talking ex-military heads who had sprung up all over our networks, I was ready to keep flipping. (DWMC)

In (6) the DAP applies in a S-IN-T metonymy (CAR FOR DRIVER) whose matrix domain (the taxi driver) becomes the antecedent of the anaphoric personal pronoun him. The use of him – in compliance with Kövecses and Radden’s (1998) principles of general cognitive saliency via the “controlling entity over controlled entity” pattern – rules out the taxi itself as eligible for the matrix domain. It is important to note how this metonymic mapping paves the way for a simple and quick inferential process from taxi to its driver within our frame knowledge of taxies in particular and vehicles in general. Example (7) shows a HEAD FOR LEADER S-IN-T metonymy where the target domain (leader) is identified with the matrix domain. This example follows the DAP, as it is the target domain that is used for anaphoric reference; hence the use of the relative pronoun who instead of which (which would make reference to the source domain).

Figure 2. S-IN-T mapping

Now consider example (8), which presents two different metonymies that work together to yield the full sense of the Texan’s utterance:

(8) A telephone rang sharply behind her, shattering the silence of the hallway. Startled, Gabrielle turned. The sound was coming from the closet in the foyer – a cellphone in the pocket of one of the visitor’s coats. ‘Scuse me, friends,’ a Texas drawl said in the den. ‘That’s me’ (DP)

The use of that in (8) might be regarded as a common case of deictic reference through which the demonstrative calls for the ringing cell phone. However, it might also be argued that the demonstrative makes reference to the sound (the ringing of the cell
phone), as it is a perceptually outstanding feature in the context of the example: The cell phone is in the hallway, and its ringing sound becomes more relevant in that it is what actually reaches the room where the Texan and other people are reunited, thus interrupting their conversation and making the Texan utter his statement. This second interpretation entails a high-level effect for cause S-IN-T metonymy wherein the target-matrix domain (the cell phone) is identified with the cause of the sound, whereas its effects (the ringing) remain as the source-subdomain. Even though the matrix-cause domain is usually preferred as the antecedent for anaphoric reference, the instance under analysis is somehow more intricate given that the demonstrative seems to make reference instead to the subdomain (that is, the ringing sound). This seems possible because, in accordance with the contextual information, both domains are available for the anaphoric reference expressed by that. Finally, the fact that the effect and not the cause is selected as the antecedent for the demonstrative is corroborated by the local perceptual prominence acquired by the sound of the telephone (source and subdomain of the mapping) over its origin (the cell phone).

According to this line of reasoning, that triggers an effect for cause metonymy that leads us to the cause of the sound – i.e. the cell phone. This referent is still active in our mind when we reach the pronoun me, thus paving the way for the inferential process required for the correct understanding of the owner for possession T-IN-S metonymy activated by the personal pronoun in the example. In this metonymy, as predicted by one of principles of general cognitive saliency (owner prevails over the possession in the selection of matrix domain of a metonymic mapping), the source domain identified with the owner acts as a point of access leading to the target domain – that is, the possession or cell phone.

3.2. Double Metonymies. DAP, DCP and DPP

Simple metonymies are not the only kind of metonymies in common discourse. Some more complex examples involve two mappings from two sources to two targets connected by one shared domain. These are cases of double metonymies (Ruiz de Mendoza; Otal, 2002; Ruiz de Mendoza; Díez, 2004), and can be regarded as two intertwined simple metonymies with one common domain but with two different matrix domains.

Although the DAP also applies in double metonymies, this principle on its own fails to fully account for the relationship and hierarchy among domains, especially when determining which is the matrix domain available for anaphoric reference. In this respect, Ruiz de Mendoza and his co-workers have proposed two additional principles to predict the matrix domain selection for anaphoric reference in double metonymies: the DCP and the DPP. These principles are arranged in a hierarchy at the top of which there lies the DAP (as it is the only one that applies to both kinds of metonymies and rules the matrix domain selection in all examples of metonymic anaphora), followed by the DCP and then by the DPP. The degrees of acceptability of particular examples may depend on the principles they meet or override, and the hierarchical rank of such principles (Ruiz de Mendoza and Díez, 2004). The prevalence of the DCP over the DPP seems to be due to
its semantic nature, as opposed to the more formal grounds of the DPP. Both of them predict the selection of the matrix domain available for anaphoric reference in double metonymies, but on different grounds. The DCP states that:

Whenever two domains are available for anaphoric reference to a metonymic noun, we intend to select the domain that is semantically more compatible with the predicate of the sentence containing the anaphoric pronoun. (Ruiz de Mendoza; Díez, 2004: 311).

According to the DPP:

In cases of double metonymic mappings, unless the predicate combines better with the final matrix domain, reference is preferably made to the initial matrix domain. (Ruiz de Mendoza; Díez, 2004: 312).

The importance and applicability of these principles is better perceived through specific examples. In (9), two metonymic mappings are necessary to account for the intended meaning of the italicized words:

(9) “Captain,” Sophie said, her tone dangerously defiant, “the sequence of numbers you have in your hand happens to be one of the most famous mathematical progressions in history.” Fache was not aware there even existed a mathematical progression that qualified as famous, and he certainly didn’t appreciate Sophie’s off-handed tone. “This is the Fibonacci sequence,” she declared, nodding toward the piece of paper in Fache’s hand. “A progression in which each term is equal to the sum of the two preceding terms.” (TDVC)

Example (9) presents a demonstrative pronoun acting as a cataphoric referential device. According to the context provided in the example, this makes direct reference to the piece of paper in Fache’s hand (“This is the Fibonacci sequence,” she declared, nodding toward the piece of paper in Fache’s hand). However, Sophie’s words also seem to identify this with the Fibonacci sequence – the inferential process necessary for the understanding of this example requires a double metonymical mapping exemplified in Figure 3.

Firstly, the piece of paper referred to by Sophie becomes the source-matrix domain of a T-IN-S metonymy (CONTAINER/PIECE OF PAPER FOR CONTENT/Writing) that entails a domain reduction process whose target is the actual inscription in the paper. Secondly, the target domain of the first T-IN-S metonymy becomes the source domain of a different S-IN-T metonymy wherein the writing is conceived of as a sample of the actual progression (SAMPLE FOR SEQUENCE). This second metonymy entails a domain expansion process leading to the actual sequence (the second target-matrix domain).

The existence of two matrix domains poses a problem in determining which of them is selected as the actual referent for the cataphoric this, as both of them might at

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2. In The Da Vinci Code, Sophie is a cryptographer who has just deciphered a sequence of numbers and has identified it as the beginning of "the Fibonacci sequence". Sophie wrote the sequence of numbers on a piece of paper and, as described in the example, hands it in to Fache, the captain of Paris police department.
first sight qualify as proper referents. The explicit reference to the piece of paper in the example ("nodding toward the piece of paper in Fache's hand") suggests that this may select the first matrix domain (the piece of paper) as its referent, thus following the prescriptions of the DPP, but flouting the DCP. Albeit the DCP ranks hierarchically higher than the DPP, the context makes explicit the reference to the initial matrix domain, thus sanctioning it as semantically acceptable in this example.

Figure 3. PAPER FOR WRITING/SAMPLE FOR SEQUENCE

Now consider the double metonymy involved in (10):

(10) The wealthy did everything they could to encourage this attitude. Understand that in 1980, only 20 percent of Americans owned a share of stock. Wall Street was the rich man's game and it was off-limits to the average Joe and Jane. And for good reason — the average person saw it for what it was, a game of risk, and when you are trying to save every dollar so you can send the kids to college, games of chance are not where you place your hard-earned money. (DWMC)

(10) involves two T-IN-S metonymies linked by the target subdomain of the first mapping, which becomes the source domain for the second one as shown in Figure 4:

Figure 4. PLACE FOR INSTITUTION FOR ACTIVITY DEVELOPED IN IT
Wall Street is a street in lower Manhattan where the New York Stock Exchange is located. However, in the example, Wall Street is not conceived as the physical place but rather as a game, an activity (the stock exchange) that is not available for the average middle-low class due to the high amounts of money necessary to get involved in it. The double metonymical mapping develops as follows: The first metonymical mapping goes from the physical street onto the financial institution physically located in this street. The mapping in question is embodied in a PLACE FOR INSTITUTION T-IN-S metonymy wherein the physical street is the source and first matrix domain, and the institution (Stock Market) qualifies as the target subdomain. In the second T-IN-S metonymical mapping (INSTITUTION FOR ACTIVITY DEVELOPED IN IT) the institution becomes the source domain and qualifies as the second matrix domain available for the anaphoric reference of the pronoun it. Hence, this second domain-reduction process leads to the actual intended meaning of Wall Street, i.e., the activity developed in such an institution – e.g., the Stock Market movements and exchanges – which is, in turn, conceptualized metaphorically as a game of chance. Due to the specific way in which Wall Street is used in this example, the first matrix domain (place) is discarded as the antecedent selected for the anaphoric reference of it, which flouts the DPP. The DCP applies instead, as the institution (second matrix domain) seems more semantically compatible with the predicate of the sentence in which Wall Street and it are found.

3.3. Implicative Reference

Ruiz de Mendoza and his collaborators have proposed what they call implicative reference to account for apparently problematic cases when dealing with some examples of metonymy and anaphoric reference under their approach (Ruiz de Mendoza; Díez, 2004). According to their postulates, a first look at this kind of examples may (mis)lead us to regard a metonymy as the antecedent of an anaphoric device which, instead of referring to the matrix domain, appears to make reference to one subdomain – thus flouting the DAP. They suggest that, very often, in these cases no metonymic reference is made to either domain: a closer examination reveals that the antecedent of the anaphoric pronoun does not refer to the metonymy (the DAP does not apply and thus cannot be flouted), but to an element in a frame previously activated in the sentence. In order to describe the importance of implicative reference in explaining these cases, a series of these “problematic” examples ((11)-(14)) will be analyzed in accordance with their proposals.

(11) The New York Times reported that they were quickly called together by officials from the Saudi Embassy… (DWMC)

Accordingly, in (11) there is no anaphoric reference to a metonymic antecedent, for the pronoun they does not refer to the subjects reporting the information in question, which would qualify as the target – and subdomain – of a T-IN-S metonymy, thus flouting the DAP. Instead, they refers to the group of professionals working at The New York Times. By mentioning The New York Times, the author automatically activates a frame
wherein all elements become potential referents for the anaphoric pronoun. Hence, *they* sanctions only one of these implicated frame elements (i.e. the group of professionals) as its intended antecedent.

It seems common to find cases of implicative reference when collective nouns are used as potential antecedents for anaphoric reference devices (Ruiz de Mendoza; Díez 2004). This is corroborated in many of the examples extracted from Moore’s books, as instantiated by (12) and (13) below:

(12) The United States Congress tried to put economic sanctions on Hussein’s country, but the White House quashed the idea. *Their* reasons? According to [...]. (DWMC)

(13) The right knows this because *they* look at the numbers, *they* read the reports, and *they* live in the real world that has become increasingly liberal in the last decade or so. And *they* hate it. So, in the tradition of all propagandists, *they* lie. (DWMC)

In these examples the antecedent for *they* is not the target of the three T-IN-S metonymies of the kind INSTITUTION FOR PERSONNEL-IN-CHARGE ((12)), and ORGANIZATION FOR ITS MEMBERS ((13)). The DAP is not overridden because no reference is made to a metonymic element, but to a frame element activated by the White House and the right respectively. These personal pronouns take the antecedents personnel-in-charge of the White House and the members of the right; however, these are not referentially available via metonymic mappings but via implicative reference. Notwithstanding this, metonymic anaphoric reference might have been rightfully used in these examples by using its instead of *they*, thus referring to the source and matrix domains of each metonymy and following the DAP. It follows then that metonymy and implicative reference may be used interchangeably as evidenced in examples (12’) and (13’).3

(12’) The United States Congress tried to put economic sanctions on Hussein’s country, but *the White House* quashed the idea. *Its* reasons? According to [...]. (Modified from DWMC)

(13’) The right knows this because *it* looks at the numbers, *it* reads the reports, and *it* lives in the real world that has become increasingly liberal in the last decade or so. And *it* hates it. So, in the tradition of all propagandists, *it* lies. (Modified from DWMC)

Implicative reference occurs not only with personal pronouns, but with other kinds of anaphoric devices like, for example, relatives as in (14) and (15):

(14) There would be no pipeline. The Taliban were out the loot, and *the companies who* supported you had now lost millions themselves on all the prep that went into this lucrative pipeline. (DWMC)

(15) Most of these were *countries* (such as Tonga, Azerbaijan, and Palau) who always get picked last for United Nations volleyball games [...]. (DWMC)

As in previous examples, in (14) the use of *who* hints at the fact that the item sanctioned as its antecedent is not an element of the UNION FOR ITS MEMBERS T-IN-S

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3. The metaphor underlying the right has been left unexplained to focus on the main concern of this study.
metonymy underlying the use of companies. Note that for the matrix domain of the metonymy to be licensed as the antecedent in compliance with the DAP, which should have been employed instead. However, the use of who, which in case of a metonymic interpretation would break the DAP, suggests that this is a case of implicative reference to a frame element activated by companies: Our frame knowledge of company structures (particularly their power distribution and tasks) allows us to pick the management committee of those companies as the antecedent for who. Similarly, in (15) the U.N. representatives of each country constitutes the antecedent of who, which is accessed through implicative reference.

The discussion above shows how Ruiz de Mendoza and his collaborators’ theory explains these apparently problematic cases by way of the activation of two alternative operations; it seems possible that speakers or writers may select as the antecedent for anaphoric reference either the matrix domain of a metonymy or an implicated element of a frame activated by the use of certain terms.

3.3.1. Metonymy and Implicative Reference in Interaction

However, it is also possible to find metonymy and implicative reference in interaction within the same stretches of discourse. The following example shows how a metonymy and a case of implicative reference may draw on the same antecedent, albeit through different inferential paths:

(16) The New York Times reported that they were quickly called together by officials from the Saudi Embassy, which feared that they might become the victims of American reprisals. (DWMC)

The use of which here might seem grammatically incorrect, as its expected antecedent should be officials from the Saudi Embassy, which compels the use of who. The fact that which is used instead suggests that the actual antecedent is not officials from the Saudi Embassy, but only the Saudi Embassy. Nevertheless, they is used immediately after making clear reference to the officials. This apparent contradiction poses no problem and has indeed a simple explanation. Metonymy and implicative reference are combined in this example. Which makes reference to the source of a T-IN-S metonymy of the kind INSTITUTION FOR ITS MEMBERS, and follows the predictions of the DAP. They, however, does not make reference to the target domain of the metonymy (i.e. the officials). It is a case of implicative reference to an element of the frame activated by the Saudi Embassy and thus does not involve any metonymical antecedent.

Examples (17) to (20) below show how anaphoric phenomena may help to uncover different conceptualizations of reality in the same piece of discourse:

(17) Reluctantly, they finally agreed — but then they sought to block the investigative body from doing its job by stonewalling them on the evidence that they sought. (DWMC)

(18) […] what if, during the late 1990s, the Republicans had let the FBI do its real job — protecting the lives of our citizens — instead of having them spend countless hours investigating the sex habits of the president […]? (DWMC)
These examples show how the source domains of these two ORGANIZATION FOR ITS MEMBERS T-IN-S metonymies (the investigative body in (17), the FBI in (18)) become the antecedent of the possessive adjective its. These metonymies, however, do not seem to work as reference points for the third person plural pronouns in the examples. These pronouns make reference to the members working in each organization/association; namely, the members of the investigative body and the FBI agents. This is so because, whereas its refers anaphorically to the matrix domain of a metonymic mapping, they and them take their referent from an element of the particular frame activated by the investigative body and the FBI respectively.

In the light of these examples – provided that anaphoric reference to a metonymic antecedent and the implicated reference to a frame element are accepted as two distinct and complementary processes –, Ruiz de Mendoza’s proves a highly comprehensive approach with compelling explanations for many examples of anaphoric reference that could not be easily tackled before.

Nonetheless, further reflection on the nature of both phenomena might lead us to consider an alternative option. It could be contended that most – if not all – of the discourse items that purportedly activate a given frame in the mind of the interlocutors might also count as the source of a metonymic mapping in most of these examples. Take, for instance, example (11’):

(11’) The New York Times reported the case in all detail.

The analysis of The New York Times in (11’) would “normally” call for a T-IN-S COMPANY FOR EMPLOYEES metonymy wherein the source-matrix domain is the company and the target domain is the actual employee or employees in charge of the report. As far as this sentence is concerned, there seems to be little doubt about The New York Times acting as a metonymic device. However, consider again example (11):

(11) The New York Times reported that they were quickly called together […]

The New York Times here is no longer regarded as the source and matrix domain of a metonymic mapping potentially eligible for anaphoric reference, but as a discourse stretch activating a given frame (e.g. journalism) of which certain elements (the journalists) are sanctioned as the anaphoric antecedent.

It is certainly arguable whether the expansion of these examples to facilitate the introduction of an anaphoric device might be a reliable test for the application of the DAP; and hence for the classing of the sentence as a case of metonymic anaphora (if the DAP holds and reference is made to the matrix domain) or implicative reference (if the DAP is flouted). The point here, however, is that the classing of certain examples as cases of implicative reference seems to be made somehow “a posteriori” once the DAP does not hold, which entails an a priori consideration of the item referred to as a metonymic mapping. That is to say, in certain examples, as (11’) and (11), it seems as if cases of implicative reference were classed as such once the anaphoric device in hand does not take on the matrix domain of a potential metonymic antecedent.
Perhaps it might be necessary to develop a bit further the nature of the connections between metonymic anaphora and implicative reference to a frame or script element (as well as their most common appearance loci in discourse).

Some examples are indeed plain cases of implicative reference, as in “The mushroom omelette was too spicy. He left without paying” (Ruiz de Mendoza; Díez, 2004: 306; Ruiz de Mendoza; Otal, 2002: 129), which these scholars quote from Stirling (1996: 82). In it, the use of *he* in the second sentence is licensed by the activation of the *restaurant* script. However, there are more obscure cases of implicative reference, for example: “I called the garage and they will have the car ready by tomorrow” (Ruiz de Mendoza; Díez, 2004: 314). While no metonymy seems to be involved in the first example, these scholars propose that, in the second one there is indeed a T-IN-S metonymy; nevertheless, they hold that *they* does not select it for anaphoric reference, but rather one part of the frame activated by *garage*.

Another noteworthy point here is that it might be possible to contend – just as in Koch’s (1999) approach to metonymy, which basically proposes that metonymic mappings take place within frames – that further metonymic mappings may underlie these cases of implicative reference. These metonymic mappings, however, would not be active until the very moment of the use of the pronoun in the sentence.

In the case of (11), for example, it could be argued that *The New York Times* triggers off the frame of *journalism*; nevertheless, no metonymic mapping might be active as far as the use of *The New York Times* is concerned. The metonymy would apply once the anaphoric pronoun *they* was used. This frame might thus be taken as the domain over which metonymic operations are performed. After all, the selection of the subjects in charge of the reporting is but the selection of a part (or parts) of the frame-matrix domain.

Consequently, this process might be considered as a T-IN-S PART FOR WHOLE metonymic mapping. Interestingly enough, since *they* still makes reference to the subdomain of the relationship, the DAP does not apply either. The important issue to be born in mind here is that it might be possible that the phenomenon of implicative reference to a frame element does not hold the same cognitive status as metonymic mappings.

Ruiz de Mendoza’s approach is fairly powerful and comprehensive, and it easily explains many previously troublesome cases; all the examples analyzed in this study as cases of implicative reference may well be accepted as such, which allows for a neat explanation of these phenomena. Nonetheless, it might be interesting to provide a thorough sketch of the cognitive processes that yield the activation of (i) a metonymy (with one of its elements being sanctioned as the antecedent of an anaphoric device) and (ii) a frame element working as the antecedent of an anaphoric device.

A detailed description of the processes (both cognitive and linguistic) that underlie both phenomena might cast some more light on this issue. It might be useful to draw finer distinctive lines between the functioning of cognitive operations like metonymic mappings or the triggering of frames, and the way in which they are actually reflected in language. This description, besides, might yield some conclusions concerning whether there is some kind of cognitive or linguistic gradation as regards “metonymic anaphora” and “implicative reference”.
That linguistic structure does not reflect conceptual structure in full detail should be taken into account in this regard, as the aforementioned principles might apply to language, but may not necessarily do so in such a strict way in our minds.

4. Conclusion

In compliance with the aims of this paper, empirical evidence regarding the comprehensiveness and systematicity of Ruiz de Mendoza’s approach to metonymy and anaphora has been provided by means of the analysis of a series of real examples in English extracted from a database of four books.

The distinction between T-IN-S and S-IN-T metonymies proposed by Ruiz de Mendoza has shown highly functional to account for certain examples that would have posed problems for other accounts on the same phenomena. Likewise, this approach shows indeed how metonymy has an impact on grammar – i.e., how the principles underlying anaphoric reference are not fully grammatical but deeply grounded on conceptual processes.

The theoretical contentions and analytical procedures proposed by these scholars regarding the application of a metonymic antecedent or an element of a previously activated frame in certain cases of anaphoric reference have also been illustrated with commented examples. The relationship between metonymic anaphora and implicative reference – as well as their interaction in discourse – has been dealt with in more detail, with the resulting conclusion that further research is needed in this particular area, as the borderlines between both phenomena seem to overlap in a number of cases.

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