ABSTRACT: In current research on discourse analysis and on metonymy there is an idea that is missing: the study of the discourse potential of metonymic activity. The reasons for this are to be found, in all likelihood, on the one hand, the still dominant idea that text coherence (also called text cohesion at the lexical level) does take place propositionally and on the other hand, on the also prevalent idea (tightly complementary to the first one) that metonymy is simply a local cognitive phenomenon, of a mainly referential nature. However, the evidence suggests, as will be extensively demonstrated in this paper, that metonymy is pervasive in much of our cognitive and discourse activities. Thus, metonymy may underlie the generation of conversational implicatures and the interpretation of indirect speech acts. It is through the cognitive approach and the application of frame semantics that we are in the position to offer a more plausible explanation of the discourse coherence phenomenon. After introducing the various approaches to semantics and justifying the convenience of a maximalist approach, I discuss the role of metaphor and above all the role of metonymy in discourse, as a pervading source of inferencing and coherence.

Keywords: metonymy, metaphor, discourse coherence, implicature, ICM.

RESUMEN: En la investigación actual sobre discurso y metonimia todavía no existe una investigación importante sobre el potencial discursivo de la metonimia. Las principales razones hay que buscarlas en la perspectiva proposicional predominante en que se explica el fenómeno de la coherencia y por otro lado el papel de la metonimia, que se encuentra relegado a un fenómeno cognitivo simplemente local. Estas dos perspectivas se complementan y refuerzan para presentarnos un panorama incompleto. Sin embargo la evidencia nos demuestra que la metonimia tiene un papel predominante en la generación de implicaturas conversacionales y en la interpretación de actos de habla indirectos. La lingüística cognitiva, la semántica de marcos, nos ofrecen los instrumentos para una explicación más plausible de la relación entre discurso y metonimia. Una vez justificada la conveniencia de elegir un enfoque maximalista en semántica, se discuten el papel de la metáfora y más en profundidad el papel de la metonimia en el discurso, como fenómenos que impregnan las actividades de inferencia y coherencia discursivas.

Palabras clave: metonimia, metáfora, coherencia discursiva, implicatura, ICM.
1. Introduction: Semantics and Discourse

There are many ways of doing semantics. We have formal semantics, which makes use of principles of logic in looking at concepts in terms of classes of items subject to logical operations and definable in terms of intensional and extensional meaning. We have interpretive semantics, in which lexical items can be arranged according to their capability to combine with one another on the basis of selection restrictions (e.g. such atomic concepts as +/- human, +/-living, etc.). There are also paradigmatic approaches like Coseriu’s lexematics whereby lexical items are arranged onomasiologically according to their inherent semasiological structure. Other approaches, like Wierzbicka’s analysis and the cognitive semantics approach come closer to providing rich semantic characterizations for each lexical item or for the conceptual constructs associated with them. Wierzbicka believes that the essentials of world knowledge can be captured in definitions by means of a set of universal, atomic concepts that she calls “semantic primitives” (e.g. small, big, kind, good, do, etc.). Cognitive semantics has taken two forms: idealized cognitive models theory (Lakoff, 1987), and frame semantics (Fillmore; Atkins, 1992, 1994). In cognitive semantics concepts are complex structures consisting of a number of elements and their associated roles (e.g. in a buying frame, we have a buyer, a seller, a market, merchandise, and money).

It is possible to divide all these different ways of dealing with semantics into two basic approaches: one, we will call the minimalist view, and the other the maximalist view. Only cognitive semantics fits the latter category, since it tries to capture all the complexities of conceptual organization. I will argue that, precisely because of these ambitious goals, only a maximalist approach can be productively used to account for discourse activity.

2. The Maximalist Approach

Let us consider Lakoff’s account of the notion of mother (Lakoff, 1987). By way of contrast, we will start by providing Wierzbicka’s definition of the same concept as created on the basis of her set of primitive universals (Wierzbicka, 1996: 154-155):

\[
X \text{ is } Y\text{'s mother. } = \begin{align*}
&a \text{ at one time, before now, } X \text{ was very small} \\
&b \text{ at that time, } Y \text{ was inside } X \\
&c \text{ at that time, } Y \text{ was like a part of } X \\
&d \text{ because of this, people can think something like this about } X: \\
&\quad \text{“} X \text{ wants to do good things for } Y \\
&\quad \quad \text{} X \text{ doesn’t want bad things to happen to } Y\text{”}
\end{align*}
\]

Wierzbicka’s definition, although apparently strange, has the value of being couched in terms of (primitive) universal notions like ‘at one time’, ‘before’, ‘now’, ‘part of’, ‘small’, ‘inside’, ‘good’, and others. It provides us with a way to identify the notion of the relation mother-child without making direct use of non-universal concepts like
‘birth’ or ‘taking care of’. However, the definition, as it stands, misses a lot of the richness of what we know about mothers, as evidenced by a number of extensions of the concept: ‘surrogate mother’ (i.e. a woman that gives birth to a baby on behalf of another woman), ‘biological mother’, ‘foster mother’, ‘adoptive mother’, ‘stepmother’, etc. While biological mothers and surrogate mothers carried their babies inside their wombs, foster mothers and adoptive mothers only take care of them. Still, in a sense the different kinds of mother are mothers, although they do not comply with all the aspects of the definition. A surrogate mother bears a baby, but there is no reason why she should want good things to happen to the baby just because at one time the baby was inside her. However, a foster mother, who has not had the baby inside her, is expected to love and care for her child.

A maximalist approach also takes into account metaphorical and metonymic uses of concepts. For Lakoff (1987, 1993) a metaphor is a set of correspondences (what he calls a conceptual mapping) between two discrete conceptual domains: one of them, called the source, allows us to understand and reason about the other called the target. Thus, in ARGUMENT IS WAR we see people arguing as contenders in a battle who plan tactics, attack, defend, counterattack, gain or lose ground, and finally win or lose (e.g. *She had been gaining ground throughout the debate, but then she faltered and her opponent was able to beat her*). A metonymy is considered a domain-internal conceptual mapping, as in *She loves Plato*, where “Plato” stands for Plato’s work.

Now consider these sentences:

(1)

(a) My wife mothers me.
(b) She mothers her children well.
(c) Necessity is the mother of invention.
(d) Spanish is my mother tongue.
(e) My mother is not married to my father.
(f) She’s my grandmother on my mother’s side.

Sentences (1.a) and (1.b) are based upon the idea that mothers take care of their children. The difference is that (1.a) is a metaphorical use of the notion whereas (1.b) is a literal use. In fact, in (1.b) it is taken for granted that the protagonist is the biological mother of the children that she takes care of (on some interpretations, there is the possibility that she is not the biological mother). In (1.c) the idea that mothers give birth to children is used metaphorically to help us reason about the relationship between necessity and invention (necessity is at the origin of invention). In (1.d), the mother tongue is the language that you learn from your mother as a native speaker: again there is a metaphor that exploits the birth connection between mother and child. In sentence (1.e) the speaker seems to take for granted that most people think that children are usually born within the bonds of marriage and it is in this context that his remark makes sense. Finally, (1.f) calls upon the idea that one’s mother is the closest female ancestor.

The full meaning impact of all these sentences can only be accounted for on the basis of a richer description of motherhood than the one provided by a minimalist analysis. A maximalist analysis, like the one provided by Lakoff (1987), postulates at
least five cognitive structures that seem to cluster in our minds to account for all aspects of our understanding of the notion of mother: the birth model (cf. biological mother, mother tongue, Necessity is the mother of invention), the nurturance model (cf. adoptive mother, foster mother, She mothers me), the marital model (cf. My mother is not married to my father), the biological model (cf. surrogate mother), and the genealogical model (cf. She’s my grandmother on my mother’s side). What is more, there are important pragmatics and discourse consequences of this form of maximalist analysis. Take the following extensions of the previous examples:

(1’)

(a) My wife mothers me; in fact, she spoils me and I just love that!
(b) She mothers her children well; while she prepares their meals, she bathes and puts them to bed.
(c) Necessity is the mother of invention, and, as everybody knows, a skinny woman named Poverty is the mother of Necessity.
(d) Spanish is my mother tongue but for me English is like a mother tongue too.
(e) My mother is not married to my father, but I don’t care much.
(f) She’s my grandmother on my mother’s side, but in my mind she’s closer to me than my own mother.

Mothers in taking care of their children often give them everything they ask for. This is generally regarded as negative since children also need discipline (note that mothering well is incompatible with spoiling a child); but this negative association does not carry over to the metaphorical extension (1’.a), since in the context of adults the discipline element is not present. Example (1’.b) makes some relevant connections with the standard notion of mothering a child well. However, note the impossibility of:

(1’’.b) She mothers her children well; in fact she spoils them!

Explaining why (1’.b) is possible while (1’’.b) is not requires a maximalist account in which genuine motherhood is connected not only to nurturance but also to the discipline of children. This apparently trivial aspect of the semantic organization of linguistic expressions, i.e. that metaphorical extensions of concepts only make use of partial conceptual structure for the metaphoric source, has important discourse consequences in terms of an account of the discourse potential of expressions.

3. The Role of Metonymy in Discourse Meaning and Structure

The study of metonymy is also part of the maximalist approach to meaning to the extent that it is possible to argue that metonymic connections are part of our conventionalized knowledge of the world. Think of the metonymic association between hands and labourers (We need two more hands here), instruments and players (The piano has the flue), customers and orders (The ham sandwich is waiting for his bill), authors and their works (I like Shakespeare), a controlling entity for the entity that is controlled
(e.g. *The buses are on strike*), and actors and their roles (*Hamlet was superb last night*), among many others.

One of the main concerns of cognitive linguists working on metonymy has been to provide clear definitional and typological criteria which separate metonymy from metaphor and from literal uses of language (cf. Barcelona, 2000; Ruiz de Mendoza, 2000). More recently, some work has been devoted to the connection between metonymy and pragmatic inferencing (cf. the collection of papers in Panther; Thornburg, 2003). Some of the crucial findings in these studies are the following:

1 Metonymy is a pervasive phenomenon in language that goes beyond cases of referential shifts commonly attested the literature (e.g. ORDER FOR CUSTOMER, INSTRUMENT FOR PLAYER, CONTROLLER FOR CONTROLLED, etc.). Thus, it is proposed that there are several kinds of non-referential metonymy: (i) predicative metonymies like *Mary is just a pretty face* (meaning ‘Mary has a beautiful face’ and implying that her beauty is her only relevant attribute to the exclusion of others like intelligence; cf. Ruiz de Mendoza, 2000); (ii) propositional metonymies like *She waved down a taxi* (meaning that she stopped a taxi by waving at it) (cf. Lakoff, 1987); (iii) illocutionary metonymies (e.g. *I can buy you a bicycle*, where the speaker’s ability to buy an item stands for his guarantee that he will buy the item; cf. similar proposals in Thornburg; Panther, 1997; Panther; Thornburg, 1998); (iv) and situational metonymies (e.g. *The poor dog left with its tail between its legs*, where part of a conventional scenario stands for the full scenario in which the dog is beaten and probably humiliated in such a way that the animal has to leave to avoid further harm; cf. Ruiz de Mendoza; Otal, 2002).

2 Kövecses; Radden (1998) introduce for the first time the notion of high-level metonymy, where both source and target are generic cognitive models (e.g. INSTRUMENT FOR ACTION as in *He hammered a nail into the wall*). Ruiz de Mendoza; Pérez (2001) and Ruiz de Mendoza; Otal (2002) have studied the full semantic import of many grammatical phenomena on the basis of possible underlying high-level metonymies. Thus, it is possible to explain some asymmetries in the use of resultative predicates on the grounds of the semantic constraints imposed by high-level metonymic mappings. Consider the application of the high-level metonymy RESULT FOR ACTION (first identified by Panther; Thornburg, 2000) to account for the infelicity of *Fall asleep* versus *Don't fall asleep*. The difference in meaning between the two sentences (and their degree of felicity) is evident from the following respective paraphrases based upon the proposed metonymy: ‘act in such a way that as a result you will fall asleep’ (which is hardly feasible), and ‘act in such a way that as a result you won’t fall asleep’. It is also possible to find a metonymic motivation for such phenomena as the subcategorial conversion of nouns (e.g. *There were three Johns at the party*, ENTITY FOR COLLECTION), the recategorization of adjectives (e.g. *blacks*, nobles, PROPERTY FOR ENTITY), and modality shifts (POTENTIALITY FOR ACTUALITY, as in *I can see the mountain from my window*, where “I can see” means ‘I actually see because the conditions allow me to see’).
3 Metonymy interacts with metaphor in significant ways. Goossens (1990) was the first cognitive linguist to address this issue in his article “Metaphonymy”. However, he used limited evidence coming from a small body-part corpus and his findings have only partial value. Ruiz de Mendoza; Díez (2002) have provided the most detailed and systematic account of interaction patterns in which metonymy plays a role. Their proposal is based upon the formal distinction between two basic metonymy types and the conceptual operations which hinge upon them. In *Nixon bombed Hanoi*, “Nixon” stands for the United States air force under his command, a subdomain of ‘Nixon’; this is a case where the metonymic target is a subdomain of the source, or a target-in-source metonymy. In *The ham sandwich is waiting for his bill*, the order is a subdomain of the customer who has placed the order; this is a source-in-target metonymy. In the first case, we have a cognitive operation of reduction of the amount of conceptual material that is needed to find the right referent for the expression (since the actual referent is a subdomain of the source, the target is conceptually smaller for the purposes of the Metonymic operation). In the second case we have an operation of conceptual expansion (the source gives us access to a conceptually richer target). Within the framework of a metaphoric mapping, Ruiz de Mendoza; Díez (2002) postulate that metonymy plays a subsidiary role. It may either expand or reduce the metaphoric source or the metaphoric target. These examples will illustrate the four patterns (there are of course a number of subpatterns, since the reduction operation may work on the whole source and target or on just part of it):

- Metonymic expansion of the metaphoric source: *He beat his breast*, uttered in a situation in which the protagonist has not actually beaten his breast. The source has the underspecified situation in which a person beats his breast as an open show of sorrow about something wrong that he has done.

- Metonymic reduction of the metaphoric source: *She’s my soul*, where “soul” stands for a subdomain of ‘soul’, i.e. ‘the essence of my existence’, in the metaphoric source. The target has the person that we are talking about.

- Metonymic expansion of the metaphoric target: *She caught my ear*, where ‘ear’ in the metaphoric target is the instrument of hearing that stands for ‘attention’; catching an object is a way of getting hold of it and maps onto the idea of obtaining someone’s attention.

- Metonymic reduction of the metaphoric target: *She won my heart*, where ‘heart’ stands for a cultural subdomain of heart, i.e. ‘love’. The source has a person that wins a prize while the target has a lover that obtains someone’s love.

What is missing in current research on metonymy is the study of the discourse potential of metonymic activity. The reason for this is to be found, in all likelihood, in the still dominant idea that metonymy is simply a local cognitive phenomenon, of a mainly referential nature. However, the evidence suggests, as pointed out above, that
metonymy is pervasive in much of our cognitive activity. Thus, it may underlie the generation of conversational implicatures and the interpretation of indirect speech acts:

(2)

(a) How did you go to the airport? -I stopped a taxi.
(b) It’s getting colder here [addressee closes an open window]

In (2.a) the answer “I stopped a taxi” does not fully address the first speaker’s question. But we know that it is part of a conventional scenario (or idealized cognitive model) pertaining to the use of taxi services: within that scenario, stopping a taxi is a precondition to take the taxi and ask the driver to take you to your destination. From the point of view of metonymy, the act of stopping a taxi provides us with a point of access to the whole scenario, in such a way that the person asking the question may reason:

[1] ‘If he stopped a taxi, this means he took a taxi and he gave the driver instructions to take him to the airport; so, he took a taxi to go there’

In (2.b) we also have a conventional scenario that differs in quality from the one specified for (2.a). In effect, what we have in (2.b) is an action scenario based upon what Leech (1983) called the pragmatic cost-benefit scale, i.e. the idea that, because of accepted social norms, we are required to minimize cost and maximize benefit for others while maximizing cost and minimizing cost to selves. In the context of that action scenario, the addressee of an utterance like (2.b), which seems to point to the speaker’s discomfort, is expected to do all he can to change the situation to the speaker’s benefit. What speech act theorists call the “illocutionary force” of this utterance is ultimately calculated on the basis of a metonymic operation whereby part of an action scenario stands for the whole of it. The reasoning process may take the following form:

[2] ‘If the speaker makes a remark about a costly state of affairs that affects him negatively, this means that he wants to draw my attention to such a state of affairs so that I have the opportunity to act in such a way that cost to the speaker is minimized even if I have to maximize cost to myself; since I think it is an open window that makes him feel cold, the speaker expects me to close the window for him’.

Gricean pragmaticists, (cf. Bach; Harnish, 1979; Grice, 1989) would address the problem of the inferential process used by the first speaker in (5.a) by postulating a pragmatic principle or maxim that regulates the process and produces an implicature. In this case, the maxim of relation (‘be relevant’) would apply and direct the addressee to look for a relevant answer connected to the information explicitly given.

Neo-Gricean pragmaticists, like Levinson (2000) would deal with this implicature-derivation process on the basis of some sort of conventional heuristics that is part of our reasoning equipment. More specifically, Levinson (2000: 31-35) proposes three heuristics (i.e. reasoning systems) that lie at the basis of implicated meaning:
(i) First heuristic: “What isn’t said, isn’t”; e.g. in There is a blue pyramid on the red cube, this heuristic licenses inferences like these: ‘There is not a cone on the red cube’; ‘There is not a red pyramid on the red cube’.

(ii) Second heuristic: “What is simply described is stereotypically exemplified”; e.g. in The blue pyramid is on the red cube, this heuristic licenses inferences like the following: ‘The pyramid is a stereotypical one, on a square, rather than, e.g., a hexagonal base’; ‘The pyramid is directly supported by the cube (e.g. there is no intervening slab)’; ‘The pyramid is centrally placed on, or properly supported by, the cube (it is not teetering on the edge, etc.)’; ‘The pyramid is in canonical position, resting on its base, and not balanced, e.g. on its apex’.

(iii) Third heuristic: “What is said in an abnormal way, isn’t normal; or marked message indicates marked situation”; e.g. in The blue cuboid block is supported by the red cube, this heuristic licenses the inferences: ‘The blue block is not, strictly, a cube’; ‘The blue block is not directly or centrally or stably supported by the red cube’.

Examples like (2.a) and (2.b) above would seem to be explainable by the third heuristic, since they are marked messages that call for a special interpretation procedure.

Relevance theorists, following Sperber; Wilson (1995), would account for (2.a) and (2.b) in a different way. For them, the answer “I stopped a taxi” is meaningful in context provided that the second speaker has the intention of putting particular emphasis on the fact that he had to take a taxi. There may be a number of reasons. Imagine a context in which the speaker would have preferred to be given a lift by a friend and felt frustrated that he had been turned down. The sentence “I stopped a taxi” is more meaningful (i.e. it creates a broader range of what Sperber; Wilson call “contextual effects” in the addressee’s mind) in this context than simply stating the less marked form “I went by taxi”. In Relevance Theory it is taken for granted that when we communicate we try to strike a balance between processing economy and contextual effects (i.e. modifications of the addressee’s cognitive environment by adding, taking away or changing the information that is manifest to him). An utterance like “I stopped a taxi” requires greater inferential activity than the more straightforward “I went by taxi”; the greater effort involved has to be compensated by extra contextual effects.

Even this brief account of the Gricean and post-Gricean standard explanations of inference reveals one fundamental problem: the three accounts are capable of accounting for the outcome of inferential activity, but have nothing to say about the nature of such an activity. Thus, in all cases we know (because a conversational maxim is violated, or because there is a conventional heuristic, or because the speaker tries to achieve relevance) that we have to engage in special interpretative procedures when faced with examples such as (2.a) and (2.b), but we are not told what those procedures are like. I suggest that metonymic mappings, like those postulated by cognitive linguists, are a clear case of such procedures.

This proposal is consonant with another previous proposal made by Ruiz de Mendoza; Pérez (2001) in the sense that metaphor and metonymy are to be listed among the cognitive mechanisms used by speakers to produce explications. In standard Relevance Theory, it is postulated that explications are derived on the basis of the
development of the initial assumption schema provided by the utterance. Thus, in *We are ready*, finding a referent for “we” (e.g. ‘my brother and I’) and completing the utterance to specify what it is that the protagonists are ready for (e.g. ‘for the show’), is part of the explicature-derivation activity. Implicatures, on the other hand, require more complex reasoning schemas with implicit premises and implicated conclusions, as in the following exchange uttered in the context of a party:

(3) What time is it? -Most of the guests are leaving now.

The answer to the first speaker’s question is relevant only if we bring into the reasoning schema the implicit assumption that guests will leave when they feel that it is getting too late for them or they have had enough. The conclusion is that it is time to finish the event.

Ruiz de Mendoza; Pérez (2001) have argued that metaphoric and metonymic mappings produce explicatures based on the blueprint provided by the linguistic expression. Thus, the shift from ‘shoe’ to ‘shoelaces’ in *He didn’t tie his shoes well*, would be a development of the initial assumption schema provided by the expression and would not need to import implicit premises from the context to fill in a reasoning schema.

However, in my proposal, even implicature-derivation is a matter of metonymy. The difference is that the metonymy is not of the referential kind, but simply a situational metonymy. In the case of reasoning schema [1], it is a low-level situational metonymy, based on a specific scenario with specific conventional information about taking taxis. However, in the case of [2] we have a high-level situational metonymy based on a generic action scenario, i.e. the result of abstracting away common structure from many situations in which speakers are directed (requested, order, suggested, etc.) to do things.

Understanding metonymy is also crucial in order to explain some phenomena of discourse cohesion. It may be useful to consider the GENERIC FOR SPECIFIC and the EFFECT FOR CAUSE metonymies, which have been identified by Panther; Thornburg (2000) as a high-level metonymies with an impact on English grammar. Compare:

(4)

(a) A: What’s that bird?  
B: It’s a robin.

(b) A: What’s that noise?  
B: It’s a burglar.

As Panther; Thornburg (2000) point out, the *What’s that N?* construction, when used metonymically, has two senses, the taxonomic, as in example (4.a), and the causal, as in (4.b). The taxonomic sense is regulated by the metonymic GENERIC IS SPECIFIC: this allows us to paraphrase A’s utterance in (4.a) as ‘What kind of bird is that?’. The causal sense has a metonymic grounding in the EFFECT FOR CAUSE mapping, which yields a different kind of paraphrase for A’s utterance in (4.b): ‘What’s
the cause of that noise?’. Panther; Thornburg note that while the English grammar makes
it possible to repeat the Noun Phrase instead of making use of the anaphoric pronoun in
(4.a), this is not the case for (4.b), and correlate this difference in grammatical behaviour
with the difference in the underlying metonymic mappings:

(5)

(a) That bird is a robin.
(b) *That noise is a burglar.

To Panther and Thornburg’s account, it is possible to add one more observation in
terms of discourse connectivity. Cohesion has often been treated as a grammatical
phenomenon, in contrast to coherence that was based on world knowledge (e.g. frames)
and was therefore purely conceptual. However, the fact that anaphora, one of the
procedures to create cohesion (Halliday; Hasan, 1976, 1989), may depend on metonymic
activation, seems to point to a different treatment of the issue, one in which cohesion is
seen as being conceptually grounded. This may apply to all other cases of anaphora:

(6) I love my family. They do all they can for me.

It is very well known that singular words which refer to groups of people (e.g. police, family, government, team) can often be used as if they were plural. They can also be used in the singular form, depending on how we want to think of them. Note that using the singular anaphoric pronoun in (6’) would not be as appropriate:

(6’) I love my family. *It does all it can for me.

However, the singular form is better on other occasions:

(7) My family is great (cf. ? My family are great)

There is a relationship between the foregoing discussion and one crucial finding in
the context of what has been called metonymic anaphora (e.g. Stirling, 1996), i.e.
anaphoric reference to a metonymic noun phrase. The finding was first made by Ruiz de
Mendoza (2000) and has been considerably refined in Ruiz de Mendoza; Otal (2002). It
is the fact that anaphoric reference to a metonymic noun phrase always makes use of the
matrix (or most encompassing) domain of the metonymic mapping. Ruiz de Mendoza;
Otal (2002) have coined the label Domain Availability Principle (or DAP) to capture this
idea: only the matrix domain of a metonymic mapping is available for anaphoric
reference.

The issue of anaphora in connection to metonymy was first raised by Fauconnier
(1985) and Nunberg (1995) who give partial answers to the problem. Thus, Fauconnier
believes that there is a pragmatic function that connects a metonymic source and its
corresponding target, and that anaphora usually selects the metonymic target (i.e. the
intended mental representation), especially if the target is animate (e.g. in The ham
sandwich is waiting for his bill, the target is animate and would be selected as the antecedent for an anaphoric pronoun, as in *The ham sandwich is waiting for his bill and he is getting restless*. If the source is animate, then it serves as the antecedent (e.g. ‘Napoleon’, rather than ‘Napoleon’s navy’, is the antecedent in *After Napoleon lost at Waterloo, he was banished to St. Helena*). However, this analysis is incapable of determining the potential antecedent when both source and target are either animate or inanimate:

(8) Terminator (i.e. Arnold Schwarzenegger) has just been elected governor of California. Will he be up to the job?

(9) I love the book (i.e. its contents). I’ll read it a second time.

Nunberg (1995) tries to come to terms with the issue of metonymic anaphora by making a distinction between two different types of linguistic mechanism: “deferred indexical reference” and “predicate transfer”. The former is the process by means of which an indexical is used to refer to an object that corresponds somehow to the contextual element chosen by a demonstrative. The latter occurs whenever the name of a property that applies to something in one domain is used to refer to the name of a property that applies to things in another domain (Nunberg, 1995: 111). He gives the following examples:

(10)

(a) This is parked out back.

(b) I am parked out back.

The two sentences are produced while the speaker is holding out a key. Sentence (10.a) is a case of deferred indexical reference, where the demonstrative pronoun “this” is used to refer to a car. Sentence (10.b) illustrates predicate transfer since a property of cars (i.e. cars may be parked) is attributed to a person. According to Nunberg, the distinction between deferred indexical reference and predicate transfers is enough to explain cases of metonymic anaphora:

(11)

(a) This is parked out back and may not start.

(b) *This only fits the left front door and is parked out back.

(c) I am parked out back and have been waiting for 15 minutes.

(d) *I am parked out back and may not start.

In deferred indexical reference, a conjoined predicate must be semantically connected to the deferred referent, like ‘the car’ in (11.a), whereas in predicate transfer the conjoined predicate must express a property of the element that receives the property, i.e. the driver/owner in (11.c). However, this account cannot be applied to all cases of metonymic anaphora. The main problems lie with the notion of predicate transfer:
(12)
(a) Shakespeare (i.e. a book by Shakespeare) is right there on the top shelf. Could you please hand it over to me?
(b) The kettle (i.e. the contents; the water in the kettle) is boiling; please, turn it off.

In (12.a) we have a case of what Ruiz de Mendoza; Otal (2002) have called double metonymy, AUTHOR FOR WORKS FOR MEDIUM, where AUTHOR and MEDIUM are matrix domains, so “it” in (12.b) refers back to the medium of presentation of Shakespeare’s works (e.g. a book). It must be borne in mind that semantic compatibility between the metonymy and the predicate of the expression is what makes us select the second and not the first matrix domain for the anaphoric operation (cf. Shakespeare is on the top shelf; I would read him/it if I were you, where “him” has the matrix ‘Shakespeare’ as its antecedent, and “it” the book, but in the two cases we mean ‘Shakespeare’s work”). If we wanted to apply Nunberg’s analysis to (12.a) we would have to postulate a predicate transfer whereby a property of books (i.e. being stored on shelves) is applied to Shakespeare. The adjoined predicate ‘hand over’ would have to express a property of Shakespeare, since it is ‘Shakespeare’ that has received the new property. But evidently this is not the case. The adjoined predicate expresses a property of books (books can be handed over).

In (12.b) the predicate transfer would give the property of ‘boiling’ to the kettle; the adjoined predicate ‘turn off’ would have to express a property of kettles. However, it is not kettles but the fire that we use to heat the water that is turned on or off.

The Domain Availability Principle captures all cases of metonymic anaphora. In the case of Nunberg’s example This is parked out back and may not start, “this” points to an object (the key) that is to be considered a subdomain of the car to which it belongs, the car being the matrix domain. In this interpretation, (it) may not start makes use of the matrix domain for the anaphoric operation. Note that because we have deferred reference, it would be impossible to say *This key is parked out back.

The case of I am parked out back and have been waiting for 15 minutes is different. The car is a subdomain of the owner of the car, so we have a metonymy from owner to possession, where the matrix domain ‘owner’ is referred to anaphorically in the conjoined sentence.

Example (12.a) is a clear case of the DAP: one of the two the matrix domains, i.e. the one that combines with the predicate ‘be on the top shelf’ (the medium of presentation of Shakespeare’s work) is used for the anaphoric operation.

Finally, (12.b) is a more complex case. In principle, it is the matrix domain ‘kettle’ that is referred to by “it” in “turn it off”. However, when we say “turn the kettle off” what we mean is turn the heating source off (e.g. the fire). However, the concept ‘kettle’ still retains its status as the matrix domain in the case of the conceptual association between ‘kettle’ and ‘fire’, so the use of “it” is appropriate and abides by the DAP.
4. Conclusion

In this paper I have tried to outline what may be a productive and ‘bridge building’ approach to research in discourse studies. The combination of the most relevant pragmatic principles, from which discourse studies should never divert, with the insights of cognitive semantics, mostly the application of the immense potential of metonymic grounding, as shown in the last section of this paper, can result in a very fruitful set of discoveries that affect discourse in its central issues.

Works cited


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