Sociomoral Reasoning in Children and Adolescents from Two Collectivist Cultures

Belén López-Pérez and Michaela Gummerum
University of Plymouth, UK
Monika Keller
Max Planck Institute for Human Development, Germany
Elena Filippova
Moscow State University, Russia
María Victoria Gordillo
Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Spain

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Abstract

This study compared the sociomoral reasoning of 7-, 9-, 12-, and 15-year-old children and adolescents of two collectivistic cultures in the 1990s: Spain (horizontal collectivism; N = 208) and Russia (vertical collectivism; N = 247). Participants reasoned about choices and moral justifications of a protagonist in a sociomoral dilemma where participants can focus on different moral and non-moral concerns (e.g., going with their best friend, going with a new classmate or trying to do something with both). Results support previous research in western societies: Participants tend to choose the option “visiting the best friend”, and self-interest tends to decrease with age whereas altruism tends to increase. Moreover, Spanish participants tended to consider all parties involved in the dilemma (i.e., old friend and new classmate), whereas Russian participants did not. These results are discussed in light of their differences as horizontal and vertical collectivistic societies. Overall, the results open an avenue for new studies when comparing the effects of culture on children’s and adolescents’ development.

Keywords: Friendship, Moral Reasoning, Culture.
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Most of children’s bedtime stories and tales teach a moral lesson on what is right and just. Often these stories (e.g., little red-riding-hood) depict a moral choice in which the protagonist has to make a decision (e.g., obeying parents’ norms vs. doing what they wish) and face possible consequences (e.g., get to the grandmother’s house safely, being eaten by a wolf). Thus, children start reasoning and learning about moral behaviour and possible moral dilemmas, and whether morality is based on the principle of justice (i.e., understanding of moral duties or obligations) or the principle of solidarity or care (i.e., understanding others’ feelings). Already Kant (1781/1979) differentiated between “negative moral duties” (e.g., promise-keeping, truth-telling) that are obligatory for and owed to everybody, and “positive moral duties (e.g., helping, benevolence), that regulate sympathetic concern, empathy, and altruism which we do not owe to everybody equally. Kohlberg’s (1984) theory based morality on the principle of justice or the understanding of negative moral duties. Research on the development of positive moral duties (e.g., Eisenberg, 1986) has shown that even young children are able to anticipate the psychological consequences of moral violation for the feelings of others, the self, and for the relationship. Studies by social domain theory (e.g., Turiel, 1983) found that preschool children have a genuine moral understanding that goes beyond obedience to authority and cost-benefit calculations.

Friendship has been regarded as a special relationship where people have to integrate knowledge about positive and negative moral duties (Turiel, 1983), as it involves understanding of the moral rules governing this relationship and being concerned about each other’s welfare (Keller, 2004). Through establishing and maintaining intimate friendships, children come to comprehend and emotionally share the perspective of another person, which is a prerequisite for morally mature cognitions and behavior (Keller, 2004).
Friendship, and moral reasoning about friendship, is influenced by cultural beliefs, as interactions between friends are based on culture-specific social norms and perceptions (Chen, French & Schneider, 2006). Keller and collaborators (1998) interviewed children (7, 9 years) and adolescents (12, 15 years) in Iceland and China about a friendship dilemma where the main character has promised to visit his/her best friend. Later, the protagonist receives an attractive invitation from another classmate (going to the last showing of a movie and having pizza afterwards for children; going to a pop concert for adolescents). Several issues complicate the situation: The friends have known each other for a very long time, they always meet on the same day, and the friend does not like the new classmate. The friend wants to show a new toy or CD to the protagonist but also wants to talk about something important. The new classmate just moved to the area and does not have friends yet (Keller, 2004; Keller, et al. 1998). Participants were asked to reason about what the protagonist decided to do (practical decision) and what was the right thing to do in that situation (moral judgment). Results showed a complex interaction of moral development and culture. Choosing the option “old friend” increased with age across cultures. When reasoning about their choices, across ages, the majority of Chinese participants emphasized the moral quality of close friendship as a reason for choosing the “old friend”, whereas reasons referring to promise-keeping increased with age in China. Conversely, Icelandic participants of all ages mentioned promise-keeping as the main reason for visiting the old friend, while concerns about friendship quality increased with age. Thus, certain (moral) concerns gained more importance with age and supplemented “cultural defaults” (friendship quality in China, promise-keeping in Iceland) in the respective cultures. When reasoning about why one should choose the new classmate, Chinese participants of all ages referred to altruism towards the third person, whereas, across ages, Icelandic participants mainly referred to self-interest (Keller et al., 1998).
These findings are in line with other research showing that children’s and adolescents’ (moral) reasoning about friendship differs according to the *individualism* or *collectivism* of societies (Santana, Silot & Schneider, 2004). Individualistic cultures tend to promote individual goals, which may be inconsistent with the responsibilities of an intimate relationship such as friendship (Entralgo, 1985). Conversely, collectivistic cultures value respect for others and maintenance of harmonious relationships, which may be inconsistent with individual goals (Markus & Kitayama, 1991).

The unidimensionality assumption of the “individualism-collectivism” concept has received much criticism as these terms have been used pejoratively and their meaning may present negative connotations across cultures (Kagitçibasi, 1997). As an alternative, Triandis (1995) described individualism and collectivism as polythetic constructs: Individualism and collectivism may be either horizontal (emphasizing equality) or vertical (emphasizing hierarchy). Horizontal individualism emphasizes uniqueness, vertical individualism achievement orientation, horizontal collectivism cooperativeness, and vertical collectivism dutifulness with the in-group.

Spain has traditionally been characterized as a collectivistic society with a strong emphasis on kinship and family (Caro-Baroja, 1992; Fischer, 1999). While more recent results from Hofstede’s (2010) research have placed Spain as in the middle of the collectivism and individualism dimension (scoring 51, see Hofstede centre webpage; 49 being an indicator of no clear preference), the data for this study was collected during the 1990s when Spain was a collectivistic society. Considering collectivism as a polythetic construct, Spain in 1990 would be defined as a horizontal collectivistic society (Gouveia, Clemente & Espinsosa, 2010), as relationships were understood as being egalitarian. Social relationships in Spain were based on communal sharing (e.g., frequently giving presents,
behaving altruistically, being generous, perceiving relationships as being eternal) which instils a sense of belonging to a social group (Fiske, 1992).

Previous research on the development of moral reasoning in friendship conducted in Spain showed that when interviewed about different moral dilemmas (e.g. involving behaviours such as lying, cheating, etc.), younger children tended to reason based on self-interest, whereas older children’s and adolescents’ moral reasoning was based on societal or universal principles (Laorden, 1995; Medrano, 1998).

Russia seems to be clearly collectivistic (score 39 in this dimension, Hofstede centre webpage). As part of socialist ideology collectivism was “implanted” and children were supposed to learn not to transgress rules and to take into account the needs of the group rather than of oneself (Vinogradoba, 1989). Considering collectivism as a polythetic construct Russia would be defined as vertical collectivistic (Umpleby, 1990, cited in Triandis, 1995): Members of a group show high cohesiveness and cooperation with ingroup, but not outgroup members (i.e., in-group favouritism), and this in-group cooperation is an important duty to fulfil.

Kon and Losenkov (1978) showed that Russian 14- to 17-year-olds considered intimacy, confidentiality, and stability as very important for an ideal friendship. Gummerum and Keller (2008) investigated friendship understanding in children and adolescents from Iceland, China, Russia, and the former East Germany. Overall, Russian children and adolescents were more likely to define close friendship in terms of positive feelings and trust and helping each other than their peers from individualistic societies, particularly Iceland.

To our knowledge, the current study is the first one that compared the moral reasoning of children and adolescents from a horizontal-collectivist culture (Spain) and a vertical-collectivist culture (Russia). This is a clear innovation to most previous research on
CULTURE AND MORAL REASONING

moral development which compared children and adolescents from cultures that can be seen as rather individualistic (e.g., Iceland, USA) with peers from rather collectivistic cultures (e.g., East Asia).

Hypotheses

This study drew on the methods used by Keller et al. (1998). Participants were asked about their practical decision, moral judgment, and their reasons for their decisions. Concerning their decisions, as both Spanish and Russian societies were classified as collectivistic, we expected participants from both cultures to choose visiting “the old friend” over the “new classmate”, due to the importance of maintaining group well-being and relationship harmony in collectivistic cultures (Triandis, 1995). We further expected that adolescents would decide to visit the old friend more often than children and would also be more likely to regard this as the morally right decision because of the great importance of close friendship in adolescence (Berndt & Savin-Williams, 1993). Although previous research has shown how Spanish participants tend to integrate the different parties in a social dilemma, we expected that the importance of friendship for adolescents might override the Spanish participants’ desire to integrate the old friend and new classmate. Therefore, we expected that whereas Spanish children might choose the options of “old friend” and “old friend and new classmate” equally often, the “old friend” would be chosen more often by Spanish adolescents.

Concerning participants’ reasons for their choices, in line with previous research (Keller et al., 1998), we expected that participants from both cultures would be more likely to justify the choice of visiting the “old friend” with reference to friendship obligations rather than promise obligations, particularly in the context of moral judgment. However, we expected that the use of promise obligations would increase with age (Kohlberg, 1984).
Concerning participants’ reasons for choosing the “new classmate”, we expected that the use of self-interested reasons would decrease and the use of altruistic reasons would increase with age (Eisenberg, 1986). Furthermore, selfish reasons should be used more in the context of practical decision, whereas altruistic reasons should be used more in the context of moral judgment. Gummerum and Keller (2008) showed that Russian children and adolescents were more likely to define their friendships in terms of altruistic help than peers from Western Europe. Therefore, Russian participants should refer altruistic reasons more than their Spanish peers. Finally, in line with previous research (Keller et al., 2008), we did not expect gender differences.

**Method**

**Participants**

Four-hundred and fifty two 7-, 9-, 12- and 15-year-old children and adolescents participated: 208 from Spain (26 females, 26 males per age group) and 244 from Russia (30 female and 30 male 7-year-olds, 30 female and 32 male 9-year-olds, 32 female and 30 male 12-year-olds, 30 female and 30 male 15-year-olds). Data was collected in the 1990s. Participants were recruited from public schools in Madrid and Moscow, which served middle-class communities (e.g., white-collar employees, self-employed, public-sector employees). Parental consent was prior to the study.

**Procedure**

Participants were interviewed individually at their school for about 20 minutes by trained researchers and graduate students. All interviews were tape-recorded and transcribed. Participants’ moral reasoning was assessed with a hypothetical dilemma situation that conceptualized a morally relevant conflict in a friendship relationship (Keller et al., 1998). As discussed before, the main protagonist has promised to visit his/her best
friend. Later, the protagonist receives an attractive invitation from another classmate. The gender of the characters in the story was matched to the gender of the participant.

A number of norms or obligations and subjective interests conflict in this story: the normative aspect of the promise given to the friend; interpersonal and empathic/altruistic responsibilities for the friend (the friends always meet on the same day, friend wants to talk) and for the new classmate (classmate just moved and does not have any friends); hedonistic self-interests (new toys/CD of friend vs. the attractive offer by the new classmate). From a more comprehensive interview two questions were selected. They could be reworded to get a full understanding of participants’ reasoning:

**Practical decision.** What does the protagonist decide to do? Why?

**Moral judgment.** What is the right thing to do in this situation? Why?

**Coding**

Participants’ answers concerning their practical decision and moral judgment were coded into the categories “visiting the friend”, “going with the new classmate,” or “doing something with both friend and new classmate.” Justifications for participants’ practical decision and moral judgment for the option “visiting the friend” were coded according to the following categories (see Keller et al., 1998).

- **Friendship obligations.** Refers to the special characteristics of the friendship relationship in terms of shared feelings (e.g., “they have known each other for a long time”, “they have always trusted each other”) and the expectations and ideas of how one ought to treat each other in a friendship (e.g., “one should not leave the old friend behind”, “one should always be faithful to an old friend”).

- **Promise obligation.** Refers to the normative expectations relating to the promise given (e.g. “because she promised”, “he shouldn’t break his word”).
Justifications for the practical decision and moral judgment of “going with the new classmate” were coded into the following categories (Keller, et al., 1998).

- **Self-interest.** Refers to the attractiveness of the material offer (e.g., “she wants to see the movie”, “it’s the last showing”) or the new classmate and relationship (e.g., “she wants to play with the new classmate”, “he wants to get a new friend”).

- **Altruism.** Refers to the specific situation, needs, and feelings of the new classmate and a desire to alleviate his/her situation (e.g., “must help someone who is new”, “show consideration for the new students”).

Participants’ statements could be coded into more than one category, if it contained more than one of the reasons mentioned above. Thus, the unit of analysis was the number of exclusive reasons a participant mentioned in his or her answer to the interview questions.

Two independent coders coded 10 interviews per age group and culture. Inter-rater agreement was very good with Cohen’s κ = .78.

**Statistical Analyses**

We computed a set of log-linear analyses (see Wickens, 1989). First, a saturated hierarchical log-linear (hi-log-linear) procedure was run to find the most parsimonious final model. A final model having a value greater than \( p = .05 \) is considered to be fitting. The model fit (\( \chi^2 \)) of the hi-log-linear procedure is presented in the text. To estimate single parameters (\( z \) values), a log-linear model was computed.

**Results**

As the cell frequencies for the use of some categories were rather low, participants were pooled, creating the variable “age” with values “children” (7- and 9-year-olds) and “adolescents” (12- and 15-year-olds).

**Decisions**
As shown in Table 1, the majority of participants chose visiting the old friend over going to the movie with the new classmate. Many Spanish participants picked the integration option (“both old friend and new classmate”), whereas none of the Russian participants did. Because of observed cell frequencies of zero for the integration option for Russian participants, we ran hi-log-linear and log-linear analyses separately for both cultures. For the Spanish sample, variables included in the analyses were decision [friend (r), new classmate, both friend and classmate], age [children (r), adolescents], gender [females (r), males], and context [practical decision (r), moral judgment], with r indicating the reference category of each factor for the z value. The hi-log-linear analyses produced the final model of Decision × Age and Decision × Context, \( \chi^2 = 5.43, df = 3, p = .14 \). Table 2 presents the significant effects (partial chi-squares) and corresponding parameter estimations (z values) for the log-linear analyses. As shown in Figure 1, in the context of practical decisions, a majority of Spanish participants, and particularly adolescents, chose the option “old friend” over “new classmate” and the integration option. However, in the context of moral judgment, all Spanish participants, but particularly adolescents, were more likely to choose the option “both friend and new classmate” over the two other options.

For the Russian sample, variables included in the analyses were decision [friend (r), new classmate], age [children (r), adolescents], gender [females (r), males], and context [practical decision (r), moral judgment]. The hi-log-linear analyses produced the final model of Decision × Age, \( \chi^2 = 6.72, df = 12, p = .88 \). Adolescents were more likely to choose the option “old friend” than children (Tables 1, 2).

**Reasons for decisions**

Variables included in the hi-log-linear and log-linear analyses were content category [not chosen (r), chosen], age [children (r), adolescent], culture [Spain (r), Russia], gender [females (r), males], and context [practical (r), moral judgment], with r indicating the
reference category. Table 2 displays the significant effects (partial chi-squares) and corresponding parameter estimations (z values) for the log-linear analyses.

**Reasons for choosing “old friend”**. Participants from both cultures and age groups used friendship obligations more often than promise obligations when justifying why the protagonist opted for visiting the old friend (Table 1).

The hi-log-linear analysis for friendship obligations produced the final model of Friendship obligation × Age × Context × Culture, $\chi^2 = 6.91$, df = 16, $p = .98$. The category friendship obligations was used relatively infrequently in the Spanish sample, except for Spanish adolescents in the context of their practical decisions. In Russia, participants used the category friendship obligations rather frequently, except for children in the context of moral judgment (Figure 2). Regarding age, adolescents referred to friendship obligations more often than children. Concerning culture participants from Russia referred to friendship obligations more often than participants from Spain. Finally, concerning context friendship obligations were used significantly more often in the context of practical decisions than in the context of moral judgment (Figure 2).

The hi-log-linear analysis for promise obligation produced the final model of Promise obligation × Age × Context × Culture, $\chi^2 = 7.44$, df = 16, $p = .96$. However, the log-linear analyses did not produce any significant interactions with the variable promise obligation. Inspection of Table 1 reveals that promise obligations were used to a similar degree across age groups and cultures.

**Reasons for choosing “new classmate”**. Concerning self-interested reasons, the hi-log-linear analysis produced the final model of Self-Interest × Age × Context, and Self-interest × Culture, $\chi^2 = 16.34$, df = 21, $p = .75$. Both Spanish and Russian participants referred to self-interest more often in the context of practical decisions (Figure 3). Regarding age, self-interested reasons were used more frequently by children than by
adolescents. Concerning culture, Russian participants referred to self-interested reasons much more frequently than Spanish participants in their practical decision-making (Tables 1, 2). Finally, regarding context self-interested reason were used more frequently in practical decisions than moral judgment.

Concerning altruistic reasons, the hi-log-linear model produced the final model of Altruism × Age, Altruism × Context, and Altruism × Culture, $\chi^2 = 4.58, df = 8, p = .80$. The log-linear analysis (Table 2) showed that regarding age altruistic reasons were used significantly more often by adolescents than by children. Concerning culture, Russian participants referred to altruism more often than Spanish participants. Finally, regarding context, altruistic reasons were used more often in the context of moral judgment than practical decision.

**Discussion**

This study examined whether children’s and adolescents’ practical decisions and moral reasoning about a friendship dilemma would be affected by culture. We investigated this question in two cross-sectional samples of 7- and 9-year-olds (children) and 12- and 15-year-olds (adolescents) Spanish and Russian participants. Spain and Russia have been described as integrating different features of collectivism. Specifically, Spanish culture has been labeled as horizontal collectivistic and Russian culture as vertical collectivistic (Triandis, 1995).

Participants’ cultural background affected their practical and moral choices. In line with the assumption of vertical collectivism, which is characterized by keeping strong bonds between the members of the in-group (in that case, the old friend) but not with members of the out-group (i.e., the new classmate; Triandis, 1995), Russian participants chose the option “old friend” significantly more often than the option “new classmate”, and none of the Russian participants chose the integration option of “both old friend and new classmate”.

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Furthermore, consistent with the growing importance of friendship for adolescents (Berndt & Savin-Williams, 1993), the preference for the option “old friend” increased in adolescents. Spanish participants were more likely than their Russian peers to integrate the concerns of the old friend and the new classmate (Medrano, 1998). Hence, in line with the assumption of “horizontal collectivism” Spanish participants strive to seek a solution for all involved parties and try to create harmonious relationships between the three peers. The integration option (“old friend and new classmate”) thus represents the “cultural default” for Spaniards. While we expected that this cultural default would be overridden by a preference to choose the old friend in Spanish adolescents, our actual results were more complex. Specifically, in the context of moral judgment, the majority of Spanish children, and particularly adolescents indicated that the cultural default (integrating the concerns of old friend and new classmate) was the morally right choice. Only in the context of practical choice did a majority of Spanish children, and particularly adolescents, opt for the old friend. As discussed by Keller et al. (1998), individuals do not just passively adopt the norms and “defaults” of their culture, but they actively construct them on the basis of their experiences and interactions. Actual experiences with peers and friends might modify cultural defaults and may have led Spanish adolescents to choose the old friend in their practical decisions. It would be interesting to investigate whether those who acted against the cultural default and their moral judgment and chose the old friend in their practical decision might experience negative emotions because of this cultural norm violation (e.g., Malti & Keller, 2009).

In addition to their practical decisions and moral judgments, we asked participants for the reasons for their choices. As expected, visiting the “old friend” was mainly justified with reference to friendship obligations. Keller et al. (1998) showed that children’s and adolescents’ moral reasoning and decision-making in collectivistic cultures is strongly
motivated by social duties towards close others. This sense of obligation towards the old friend increases in adolescence when friends and peers become the most important people in adolescents’ lives (Brown, 1990). Compared to their Spanish peers, Russian participants’ more frequent use of friendship obligation reasons may be explained by them understanding friendship relationships as being based on the duties of loyalty and faithfulness, which is coherent with Russia’s classification as a vertical collectivistic society. While previous research (e.g., Keller et al., 1998) has also found that friendship obligations were more often used in the context of practical decision than moral judgment, this is still a surprising result. It is possible that a reference to friendship obligations can be seen as a “good enough” reason in the practical decision-making context, whereas additional (normative) reasons might have to be employed in the context of moral judgment.

The decision to visit the “old friend” was rarely justified with reference to promise obligations in both samples. On the one hand, this is in line with previous studies which have shown that general normative concerns, such as promise keeping, are more likely to be employed as justifications by children and adolescents from individualistic than collectivistic societies (Chaparro et al., 2013; Keller et al., 1998). On the other hand, this research reported, also in collectivistic cultures, an increasing use of general normative concerns with age, a result we could not replicate in this study. Clearly, practical and moral decision-making in friendship is strongly based on principles of solidarity, loyalty, and care in Spain and Russia. This might be due to how friendship is conceptualized in these societies. Krappmann (1996) points out that the Spanish word for friendship (“amistad”) has its roots in the Latin word for love; thus the word “friendship” in Spanish implies a basic and intense affection. Similarly, the Russian “drujba” implies closeness, comradeship, and company. Thus, at least linguistically, friendship in both Spain and Russia was based on affection and closeness and less on normative aspects.
Only a minority of participants from both societies picked the new classmate in their practical choice and moral judgment. The use of altruistic reasons for these choices tended to increase with age, whereas self-interest decreased (Eisenberg, 1986; Kohlberg, 1984). Consistent with our predictions, choosing the new classmate was mainly justified with self-interest in the context of practical decision and with altruism in the context of moral judgment. Furthermore, while for Russian participants going with the new classmate might sometimes be morally defensible for altruistic reasons, their practical decisions were more strongly based on self-interest. It might be that the prospect of going to a movie/pop concert might have been much more attractive to Russian than to Spanish participants in 1990, given the different economic states of the two countries at the time (see Gummerum & Keller, 2012).

This study highlights the fact that moral reasoning is affected by cultural differences. One interesting finding in this paper is the clear difference in the choice of the integration option between the Russian and the Spanish participants. However, this result might also be explained by social desirability. As discussed before, relationships in Spain are understood as egalitarian and based on communal interest (Fiske, 1992). It would have been interesting to include other questions (e.g. ‘what do you think other people may think about your decision?’) to test whether decisions were based on self-interest (i.e., social recognition) or altruism. Furthermore, we cannot know whether the differences found for participants’ socio-moral reasoning correspond to their real behaviour when interacting with friends. Therefore, future research should use a multi-method approach (e.g., interviews, observations, behavioral tasks) to elucidate cultural and age differences in moral reasoning and its relationship to behaviour, and to overcome a possible social desirability bias.

Another interesting venue would be the collection of current data to study if there are differences with the data of the current study (collected in the 1990s). It is possible that
Spain and Russia may have evolved into a more individualistic society. Such results were found in previous research (e.g., Gummerum & Keller, 2012) where the sociomoral reasoning of East German children and adolescents was compared in 1990 and 2005.

The main goal of this study was to understand differences in moral reasoning in two cultural contexts which have been described as collectivistic. In line with polythetic conceptions of collectivism (Triandis, 1995), we found that Spanish participants tend to consider both parties involved in the dilemma (i.e. old friend and new classmate), whereas Russian participants did not. Both Spanish and Russian participants used friendship obligation reasons. However, Russian participants used self-interest and altruism reasons more when justifying the choice of ‘going with the new friend’. These results emphasize the importance of conducting more fine-grained analyses when comparing the effect of culture on children’s and adolescents’ (moral) development.
References


Table 1

*Frequencies (Percentages) of Content Categories Used in Practical Decision and Moral Reasoning in Friendship Dilemma*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Spain</th>
<th></th>
<th>Russia</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Children</td>
<td>Adolescents</td>
<td>Children</td>
<td>Adolescents</td>
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<tr>
<td>Choosing option “old friend”</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Practical decision</td>
<td>24 (46%)</td>
<td>38 (73%)</td>
<td>40 (64%)</td>
<td>48 (79%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moral decision</td>
<td>18 (35%)</td>
<td>14 (27%)</td>
<td>41 (66%)</td>
<td>51 (84%)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Reasons for option “old friend”</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Friendship obligation</td>
<td>21 (20%)</td>
<td>43 (41%)</td>
<td>86 (69%)</td>
<td>101 (83%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promise obligation</td>
<td>12 (15%)</td>
<td>9 (9%)</td>
<td>18 (15%)</td>
<td>17 (14%)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Choosing option “new classmate”</td>
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<tr>
<td>Practical decision</td>
<td>15 (29%)</td>
<td>6 (12%)</td>
<td>20 (33%)</td>
<td>10 (17%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moral decision</td>
<td>4 (8%)</td>
<td>2 (4%)</td>
<td>15 (24%)</td>
<td>5 (10%)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Reasons for option “new classmate”</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-interest</td>
<td>14 (14%)</td>
<td>6 (6%)</td>
<td>52 (42%)</td>
<td>43 (35%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Altruism</td>
<td>3 (3%)</td>
<td>4 (4%)</td>
<td>21 (17%)</td>
<td>6 (5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Choosing option “both friend and new classmate”</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Practical decision</td>
<td>13 (25%)</td>
<td>8 (15%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moral decision</td>
<td>25 (48%)</td>
<td>36 (69%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 2

**Results of Log-Linear Analyses for Decisions and Reasoning in Friendship Dilemma**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Effects and interactions</th>
<th>$Df$</th>
<th>Partial $\chi^2$</th>
<th>$p$</th>
<th>$z$ value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Decision in friendship dilemma - Spain</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decision $\times$ Age $\times$ Context</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6.51</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decision $\times$ Context</td>
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<td>38.69</td>
<td>.001</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Decision in friendship dilemma - Russia</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Decision $\times$ Age</td>
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<td>8.75</td>
<td>.003</td>
<td>-2.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Reasons for option “old friend”</strong></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Friendship obligations</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Content Category $\times$ Age $\times$ Culture $\times$ Context</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4.95</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>3.56</td>
</tr>
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<td>17.63</td>
<td>.001</td>
<td>4.01</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-interest</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td>4.95</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>-3.03</td>
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<td>Content Category $\times$ Culture</td>
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<td>.001</td>
<td>6.13</td>
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<tr>
<td>Altruism</td>
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<tr>
<td>Content Category $\times$ Age</td>
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<td>6.65</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>-2.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effects and interactions</td>
<td>Df</td>
<td>Partial $\chi^2$</td>
<td>$p$</td>
<td>z value</td>
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<tr>
<td>----------------------------------</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>Content Category × Culture</td>
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<tr>
<td>Content Category × Context</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8.75</td>
<td>.003</td>
<td>-2.53</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note:* Note that the number of z values corresponds to the degrees of freedom of the tested effects; z values with absolute values greater than 1.96 are significant ($p < .05$).
Figure Captions

*Figure 1.* Spanish children’s and adolescents’ option choices for the contexts of (a) practical decisions and (b) moral judgments.

*Figure 2.* Use of reasons referring to friendship obligations when choosing the option “old friend” in (a) Spain and (b) Russia.

*Figure 3.* Use of reasons referring to self-interest when choosing the option “new classmate” across cultures and contexts.
Figure 1
Figure 2

(a) Practical decision vs. Moral judgment for Children and Adolescents.

(b) Practical decision vs. Moral judgment for Children and Adolescents.
Figure 3