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Contest for hegemony: The dynamics of inland and maritime cultures relations in the history of Java island, Indonesia

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Abstract The main purpose of this article is to analyze the dynamics of relation between inland and maritime cultures in an insular region by taking Java island, Indonesia, as an object of study. Java island is located in the midst of Indonesian archipelago which is geographically recognized as the “maritime continent” and the widest insular region in the world. During the history, Java has been one of the most important islands not only in the Indonesian archipelago but also in Southeast Asian region. It is interesting that Java has not only varied maritime cultures but also feudalistic inland culture. Moreover, during the course of history there has been a latent contesting relationship among the two different types of culture, which has been coloring the history of Indonesia at large till the present day.

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Introduction

By taking Java island as the focus of the study, this article tries to construct a reality of cultural plurality developing in the Indonesian archipelago as an area which is geographically rec-

ognized as the widest insular region in the world (Lapian, 1996; Tangsubkul, 1984).¹ Many people possibly think that the culture which develops in Indonesian islands must have


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¹ See P. Tangsubkul, *The Southeast Asian archipelagic state: Concepts, evolution, and current practice* (Honolulu: East-West Environment and Policy, Research Report No. 15, 1984) pp. 2–3. Indonesia is considered as an archipelagic state or *negara kepulauan*. The term *archipelago* refers to a group of islands or *kumpulan pulau* separated by an expanse of seawater. There is a fundamental difference in meaning between *kepulauan* and *archipelago*. The term *archipelago* originates from the Italian, *archipelagos*, which dates back to the Middle Ages and was derived from *archi*, meaning most important, and *pelagus* meaning sea. This actually refers to the Mediterranean Sea. Therefore, the original meaning of *archipelago* was not “a group of islands” but “a body of water containing islands”. According to Lapian, the concept of archipelagic state for Indonesia should refer to the later meaning, i.e. Indonesia as *negara laut* or *negara bahari* or “sea state”, not “island state”; see A.B. Lapian, “Laut, pasar, dan komunikasi antar-budaya”, Paper presented at National History Congress 1996 (Jakarta: 1996) p. 1.



been a maritime culture, i.e. a culture that is born and develops as a response to ocean potential. But in fact, not only maritime culture develops in this insular region but also agrarian culture that is feudalistic in character. Even the influence of feudalistic culture is still lasting until the present period of modern Indonesia. The spirit of feudalism, especially Javanese culture, is still influencing bureaucratic relations in modern Indonesia (Claire, 1972).² But there is always a certain element of Indonesian society that wants to try to revitalize maritime culture in developing modern Indonesia in the future (Cribb and Ford, 2009).³ It gives rise to a contestation both in discourse and symbol between a feudalistic system based on feudalistic agrarian culture and a more democratic system based on utilizing ocean resources (Dahuri, 2009).⁴

It is possibly an odd situation that there is an inland culture that develops in a maritime area. This phenomenon, therefore, needs to be explained not only anthropologically for shedding more light on the present condition but also historically for getting the past explained. Historical explanation is very important considering the fact that in Indonesia such contestation originates from past experiences. It is preconditioned by both internal dynamics and external influence. For this purpose, this article intends to study the ups and downs in the relation between inland and maritime cultures in Java island. First, the geographical fact of the Indonesian archipelago being dominated by maritime elements will be discussed. The next part will discuss the emergence of cultural diversity in Indonesia which also stems from the historical development. Likewise, during the course of history there has been a formation process of both inland and maritime cultures which both can be found in Java. It is very interesting that there have always been conflicting phenomena between inland and maritime cultures in this most populated island in the world.

² See for example Benedict R. O'G Anderson, "The idea of power in Javanese Culture", in: Claire Holt (ed.), *Culture and politics in Indonesia* (Ithaca & London: Cornell University Press, 1972) p. 1.

³ Robert Cribb & Michele Ford, "Indonesia as an Archipelago: Managing islands, managing the seas", in: Robert Cribb & Michele Ford (eds), *Indonesia beyond the waters's edge* (Singapore: Institute of South East Asian Studies, 2009) pp. 1–27.

⁴ Rokhmin Dahuri, "WOC and RI's sustainable ocean development", *Image Indonesia* Vol. XVI (5) (May 2009) p. 16. He is former Minister of Marine and Fisheries Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia, 2001–2004.

Java: the nucleus of the Indonesian archipelago

Java island is situated in the middle part of the Indonesian archipelago. It stretches across the tropical waters of the Indian Ocean and the Pacific, from South-eastern Asia to Northern Australia. Its length from east to west is greater than the distance from London to Moscow or from New York to San Francisco. This vast archipelago has a land area of approximately 1.92 million km², archipelagic waters and a 12 nautical mile territorial sea of 3.1 million km², and a 200 nautical mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of 2.7 million km². Its coast line is about 81,000 km long which makes Indonesia the country with the longest tropical coast line in the world (Purwaka, 1989).⁵

The insular character of the Indonesian archipelago has stimulated cultural variety and, at the same time, has offered easy access to foreign influences. The fact that the Archipelago produced plentiful commodities attracted traders and conquerors; it consequently made the islands and the sea a battle field of many contesting powers. This means that the international significance of the Indonesian archipelago is based upon its location and its resources. It might be comparable with the two other great crossroads of world shipping, i.e. the Panama and the Suez Canals. In addition, the economic significance of the Indonesian archipelago is due to the fact that it has abundantly produced commodities that are so needed by the industrial countries (Broek, 1942).⁶


Internally, the insular character of the Indonesian archipelago also causes great variation stemming from climate and volcanic activities. These factors greatly influence human habitation and cultural development. The islands situated near the equator, such as Sumatra, Kalimantan and Papua, have abundant rainfall throughout the year, whereas those in the south-east of the Archipelago have less rainfall and a longer dry season. The climate in the south-eastern part is similar to that of Australia. Since Java has a favorable climate for vegetation and a fertile-volcanic soil, it is not surprising that

⁵ T.H. Purwaka, "Indonesian interisland shipping: An assessment of the relationship of government policies and quality of shipping service" (*Ph.D. Dissertation*, University of Hawaii, 1989) pp. 3–5.

⁶ See, for example, J.O.M. Broek, *Economic development of the Netherlands Indies* (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1942) p. 3.

Java's economy has benefited historically from such geographical advantages.

Fertile soil can also be found in the islands of Sumatra, Bali, Lombok, Sumbawa, Flores, Wetar and Banda, as well as a part of Sulawesi since these areas are volcanic regions. The remaining islands, such as Papua and Kalimantan, have not demonstrated any recent volcanic activities although there are high mountains. Two types of climate and geology provide a variety of tropical commodities in the Archipelago.



In the Indonesian archipelago, tropical wet climates are very dominant. Climate change mainly depends on the monsoon. There are only two seasons, dry season and wet (rainy) season. The wet season lasts from October to April and results from the northwestern monsoon (wet monsoon), which begins to blow in September. The wet season comes to an end when this monsoon stops. It is followed by the dry south-eastern monsoon starting in June and ending in September (Cribb, 2000).⁷

Regular shipping and trade activities benefited from those periodic changes brought on by monsoons. The monsoons blow calmly along the Straits of Malacca, not interrupted by the Sumatra highland and the Malay Peninsula. Traders usually benefited from the northwestern monsoon by voyaging from Malacca to Riau, Johor and Batavia (in Java Island) and then to Makassar (in Sulawesi Island) and to the Spices Islands (the Moluccas or Maluku). They used the route from Malacca to the Maluku Islands along the east coast of Sumatra, the north coast of Java (Banten, Jakarta, Cirebon, Gresik, etc.) then to Bali, Lombok, Sumbawa, Makassar and the Maluku islands. But they could also use the trading route via the southern coast of Kalimantan to reach Makassar.⁸ The voyage from Makassar to the Maluku islands was made by following one of two routes. The first route is available during the northwestern monsoon of October–December. Ships were able to sail southward to Buton Island and then turn left to reach Banda and Amboina. The second route was used during the southeastern monsoon of June–August for travelling from Makassar to North Maluku, then on to Papua via Manado in North Sulawesi, Ternate and Seram. On this route, ships also used the landward and seaward winds from the mainland

of Sulawesi, which blew during July–September. On the westward home voyage from Papua and the Maluku islands, ships generally benefited from the northeastern monsoon of May–September. But this journey required that one called at some ports since this monsoon is weaker when crossing the Flores and the Java Sea in June under the influence of the southeastern monsoon of June–August. Ships were able to continue their westward voyage during the northeastern monsoon of August when the current moves in the same direction as the

wind. It is very difficult to sail against the wind and the currents (Poelinggomang, 1991).⁹

Ships sailing along the north coast of Java were greatly influenced by land and sea breezes. During the eastern monsoon, a vessel travelling from Batavia (west Java) to Surabaya (east Java) had to take every possible advantage of the land and sea breezes and should sail not too far from the coast. Leaving Batavia in the evening or at night, a northeasterly wind will carry the ship to a latitude of approximately 5° 42' S, where sea breeze may be expected. By following land wind, the vessel will reach the area of the Cheribon Reef. After that, sailing vessels should keep at least 10 miles off the coast to avoid the Pemalang and Korowelang Rocks as well as the Bapang Reef until approaching Semarang. Having passed through Semarang, the vessel can use the sea breeze to reach Surabaya (Knaap, 1996).¹⁰ During the north-western monsoon, when a vessel has passed the Mandalika islands, it is advisable not to sail too close to it, as the easterly current will carry the ship speedily past the Surabaya Strait. In such circumstances, a sailing ship trying to reach the Surabaya Strait could find itself in great danger, beat against westerly winds and contrary currents (Findlay, 1889).¹¹


⁷ See, for example, Robert Cribb, *Historical atlas of Indonesia* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2000).

⁸ Dewan Redaksi Puspindo, *Sejarah pelayaran niaga di Indonesia jilid I: Pra sejarah hingga 17 Agustus 1945* (Jakarta: Yayasan Puspindo, 1990) p. 46.

⁹ E.L. Poelinggomang, "Proteksi dan Perdagangan Bebas: Kajian tentang Perdagangan Makassar pada Abad ke-19" (*Ph.D. Dissertation*, Free University of Amsterdam, 1991) pp. 19–20.

¹⁰ Gerrit J. Knaap, *Shallow waters rising tide: Shipping and trade in Java around 1775* (Leiden: KITLV Press, 1996) p. 2. In November 1776, the VOC sailing ship 'Renswoude' spent a week voyaging from Jakarta to Semarang. At that time the ship benefited from the northwestern monsoon. Approximately 100 men manned the ship.

¹¹ A.G. Findlay, *A directory for the navigation of the Indian Archipelago and the coast of China from the Straits of Malacca and Sunda, and the passage east of Java to Canton, Shanghai, The Yellow Sea, and Korea* (London: Laurie, 1889) p. 649.



A voyage by sailing ship from Surabaya to Jakarta in the western monsoon is also difficult, especially when the wind blows violently.¹² It would be safer to take advantage of every slight veering of the westward wind. Vessels should avoid the disadvantage of high seas and easterly currents. Upon the approach of a gale, it is necessary to take shelter in a harbor, since such bad weather does not last long. Most of the shipping routes along the north coast of Java are unsafe in this monsoon. But it could also be used to reach the eastern islands of Bali, Lombok, Timor, etc.¹³ Voyaging during the eastern monsoon is easier and safer than in the western monsoon. Ships propelled by steam and/or engines have no problem with this monsoon. In the nineteenth century, the voyage by steamship from Batavia to Semarang took 36 h by calling at the port of Cirebon and Pekalongan (Boom, 1963).¹⁴

The northwestern and northeastern monsoons are not so strong and irregular when Borneo blocks the winds. This made sailing on this water safe and free from gales as well. The influence of sea and land breezes, either those coming from Sulawesi or from Kalimantan Island were also dominant here. Land breeze from Sulawesi blows during the southeastern monsoon of July–September and the sea breeze moves during the northwestern monsoon of October–April, while the land breeze from Kalimantan blows during the northwestern monsoon and the sea breeze in the southeastern monsoon. This enabled a trade connection between Makassar and the ports along the west coast of Sulawesi, such as Pare-pare, Suppa, Majene and Kaili and the trading centers along the south-east coast of Kalimantan such as Banjarmasin, Samarinda and Bulungan.

On the south coast of Kalimantan, the southeastern monsoon blows from May to September, accompanied by a good deal of rain. During the northwestern monsoon (from October to April) westerly winds prevail, with continual rain and frequent storms. On these waters, the currents generally follow the direction of the prevailing winds (van Marine, 1903).¹⁵

The influence of the southeastern and the northern monsoons also enabled shipping connections between Indonesian islands and northern countries such as the Philippines, Japan and China. Seafarers from China, Sulu and Luzon arrived in Makassar by using the northern monsoon. Even before the presence of Westerners, the shipping route between China and the Indonesian archipelago had already developed. This route covered China-Java-the Lesser Sunda islands and the Maluku islands. Following the northern monsoon, they sailed along the west coast of Kalimantan. This monsoon was also used by Makassarese to cross the Flores Sea to the Lesser Sunda Islands; they were even able to reach the northern coast of Australia. The homeward voyage was made during the southeastern monsoon (Cense, 1952; Hall, 1985).¹⁶

Thus from the above explanation, it can be recognized that the cycle of monsoons on the Indonesian archipelago's waters facilitated interregional shipping and trade among islands in the Indonesian archipelago. It also provided the means of interconnection between the Indonesian archipelago and the areas beyond. This brought the Indonesian archipelago into an open system of world shipping and trade network. Climate diversity and differences in soil fertility among the islands stimulated both interregional and international trades.


¹² See Knaap, *Shallow waters*, p. 1. An indigenous trader from Sumenep (Madura) sailed from this city to Semarang in the middle of October 1776. It took him almost one and a half months to reach Semarang, although he also anchored in one or more roadsteads in between for commercial reasons.

¹³ Knaap, *Shallow waters*, p. 1.

¹⁴ E.H. Boom, *Nederlandsch Oost Indië: Overlandreis naar Batavia; zeereis naar Batavia; Batavia en omstreken; van Batavia naar Padang, naar Singapore, naar Sinkawang, naar Semarang en Surabaya, naar Banjermassing, naar de Molukken; verschillende landreizen op Java, enz.* (Zutphen: Platenga, 1863) p. 92.

¹⁵ Findlay, *A Directory*, p. 703. See also Ministerie van Marine, *Zeemansgids voor den Oost Indischen archipel* (The Hague: Mouton, 1903) pp. 2–4.

¹⁶ Poelinggomang, *Proteksi dan perdagangan*, pp. 20–21. See also K.R. Hall, *Maritime trade and state development in early Southeast Asia* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1985) p. 24. See also his work "The opening of the Malay world to European trade in the sixteenth centuries", *Journal of the Malayan Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society* 58 (2) (1985) p. 89. For the role of seafarers from South Sulawesi see for example A.A. Cense, "Makassarsche-Boeginese pruwvaart op Noord-Australië", *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde* 108 (1952) pp. 248–265.



Competitions and conflicts

The economic situation of the population in the Indonesian archipelago varies. Likewise, the commodities produced by different regions also varied which attract foreign traders. Since ancient times Java was a major exporter of rice commodity. The islands in the eastern archipelago were known as the producer of spices. Meanwhile, Sumatra produced pepper which was much needed in the trade between the West and East. Java in this case played an important role as a catalyst between the islands of the archipelago (east) with the countries in the West.

Indonesia has a strategic geographical position along international maritime trade routes (Silk Road) between the two superpowers at that time, namely India and China. It was therefore not a coincidence that the population of the archipelago actively took part in the trade. Trade relations between the Indonesian archipelago and India developed earlier than trade relations with China. Historical evidence shows that since the 2nd century AD there had been trade relations between Indonesia and India. Furthermore, since the 5th century various states in the archipelago had sent trade envoys to China. Products traded at the time were pepper, cloves, nutmeg, sandalwood, rice, cloth, and so forth. The ethnic groups involved in activities were Javanese, Malay, Ambon, Ternate, Bugis, Makassar, Banjar, Indian, Arabic, and so forth. Some of the important ports in the islands of Indonesia in the 16th century were Ternate, Tidore, Hitu, Palembang, Jambi, Pasai, Pidie, Aceh, Gresik, Tuban, Demak, Jepara, and Banten. Malacca was also an important transit port in Southeast Asia (Iskandar, 1967; Reid, 1993a; Wilkinson, 1912).¹⁷

At that time India and China were the two advanced and rich superpowers. Among them was a close trading relationship which in turn also involved the surrounding countries, including the kingdoms of the archipelago. Spices (pepper, cloves, nutmeg) of Maluku, Aceh, South Sumatra, West Java, were a popular commodity everywhere. Sandalwood of Nusa Tenggara, benzoin from Sumatra and the frankincense from Borneo, Sumatra, and Sulawesi were well-demanded by the people of India and China for the sake of religious ceremonies. In contrast, trade commodity of China was also demanded by

the people of the Indonesian archipelago, especially for the sake of prestige among the elites. Commodities from China which were very popular in the Indonesian archipelago were the porcelain items such as plates, bowls, cups, vases and so forth. In addition, the most famous Chinese product in the archipelago was silk. But its price was very expensive so only the nobility and the rich could afford it. Meanwhile, Indian traders sold good quality of cloth. It can be said that there was a kind of specialization in goods production among the regions between India and China. This trade was also enlivened by other nations in Asia such as the Arabs, Iranians, Turks, and so forth (Curtin, 2002; Soeroto, 1976).¹⁸

One of the dynamic forces of interregional shipping and trade was the interdependence of supply and demand between regions in the Indonesian archipelago. This created a kind of symbiosis relationship. Since the pre-colonial era, Java supplied rice to the Outer Islands such as the Maluku Islands and even Malacca. The Outer Islands produced cash crops, such as spices and many kinds of forest products (camphor, kemenyan,¹⁹ gambier,²⁰ sandalwood, etc.). People in Java did not consume these commodities on a large scale but these goods were re-exported to Western countries. A kind of barter took place, in which local people obtained textiles, metal goods, jewellery, etc. in exchange for spices. Thus, before the arrival of Portuguese in the 16th century there were no trading commodities sent directly from the Maluku islands to Western Europe. Java's essential position is shown here, not only as a supplier of commodities to other regions but also as the main entrepot of trade between the Maluku Islands and Malacca. Java acted as a warehouse of imported commodities before they were distributed to the surrounding regions of the Outer Islands such as Palembang, Lampung, Banjarmasin, Bali and Lombok, and the Maluku islands. Ports along the northern coast of Java became a rendezvous for traders of the Outer Islands as well as their foreign fellows. Shortly, there had been a certain degree of specialization in supply and demand in trading system among regions in the Indonesia archipelago.

The maritime trade system underwent adjustments after the advent of Westerners in the Archipelago. An armed-trading system developed by Western seafarers struck a big blow to the local traders, who had been established there for centuries

¹⁷ Anthony Reid, *Southeast Asia in the age of commerce, vol. II: Expansion and crisis* (New Haven, London: Yale University Press, 1993) pp. 1–61. See also T. Iskandar, "Three Malay Historical Writing in the First Half of the 17th Century", *JMBRAS* 2 (40) (1967), pp. 38–53. See also R.J. Wilkinson, "The Malacca Sultanate", *JMBRAS* 61 (1912) pp. 5–71.

¹⁸ See for example Philip D. Curtin, *Cross-cultural trade in world history* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002) pp. 109–127. See also Soeroto, *Sriwijaya Menguasai Lautan* (Bandung, Jakarta: Sanggabuwana, 1976) p. 11.

¹⁹ *Kemenyan* is incense derived from gum benzoin.

²⁰ *Gambier* is ingredient use in betel chewing, tanning, and dyeing.

(Manguin, 1993a; Reid, 1993b).²¹ Although the intervention of the Western powers was very complicated, it did not change the basic pattern. The conquest of Malacca by Portuguese in 1511 only provoked the emergence of discrete Muslim-trading centres on the Straits of Malacca such as Aceh, Johor, and Brunei. At the same time, the militant Christianity of the Portuguese had also a certain role in stimulating the growth of many emporiums along the north coast of Java such as Demak, Banten, Cirebon, Surabaya, etc. for challenging the inland kingdom of Majapahit. The presence of the Portuguese as competitors of the Muslim traders in Southeast Asia indirectly helped the Javanese revival after the fall of the Majapahit kingdom at the end of the 15th century. But economic growth of coastal states along the north coast of Java was not only viewed suspiciously by the Portuguese in Malacca but also by the Mataram Kingdom, heir to Majapahit, the newly emerged powerful inland kingdom of Central Java.

Mataram began to conquer these city-states in the early 16th century with the exception of Bantam (Siddique, 1977; Sulistiyono, 1994).²² Mataram destroyed almost all the economic resources of those coastal states, resulting in an exodus of traders to various ports in the Outer Islands, such as Makassar and Banjarmasin (Burger, 1975; De Graaf and Pigeaud, 1989).²³ Later the economic development of these coastal states was too costly. All trading cities along the north coast of Java, except Bantam, were weak when the Dutch began to expand their monopoly here in the 17th century. Eventually this western power controlled the trading centers of the Java Sea region. In 1619, the Dutch VOC seized Jayakarta city, followed by port cities along the north coast of Java. In the middle of the seventeenth century, the Dutch controlled almost all port cities east of Jayakarta. Only through a bitter war and *divide et impera* tactic did the Dutch finally succeed in controlling Bantam in 1682. Other main trading ports in the Outer Islands underwent a similar tragic fate. A bitter war also marked the end of the supremacy of Makassar kingdom in South Sulawesi, seized by the Dutch in 1667. Makassar was viewed as the greatest enemy in the eastern part of the archipelago for establishing their trade monopoly. Various efforts were taken by the VOC to destroy the shipping and trade hegemony of Makassar. Only after bloody conflicts did the Sultan of Makassar, Hasanuddin, finally sign the Bongaese Agreement. The VOC ultimately succeeded creating their Makassar monopoly. Several decades earlier, the VOC had successfully established its monopoly over

the Maluku islands such as Ambon and Ternate in 1605, Banda in 1609. The seizure of small ports of the Outer Islands such as Palembang, Lampung, Pontianak, and Banjarmasin followed. Malacca, the chief port of the Malay Peninsula, was taken by force in 1641 from the Portuguese.²⁴

Initially, the VOC actually wanted to control the Strait of Malacca as a traditional gateway to the trading connections between the West and the East, but the presence of the Portuguese in Malacca was an obstacle. The VOC then tried to eliminate the main trading partners of Malacca by weakening it. The Maluku islands, producing spices, and thereafter port cities in Java and other ports in the Outer Islands were then the primary targets of the VOC. Almost in every trading centre, the VOC built a fortress to protect their business interests. Corresponding with the increasing competition among the Westerners and between the Dutch and the local people, the VOC stepped further into controlling the trade network and production areas in the archipelago (Ricklefs, 1981).²⁵ However, they also tried to lessen the role of independent trading ports in the archipelago by making them part of the VOC trading system. In many cases, they tried to impose treaties guaranteeing their monopoly either in production, trade, or in import markets at fixed prices (Cowan, 1968).²⁶ The role of Aceh as a trading power in the Straits of Malacca in the 17th century was also discouraged by the VOC. Dutch sea power eventually dominated the key trade routes of the archipelago. The Dutch could control shipping traffic on the Straits of Malacca and Sunda, since they already had occupied Batavia (for the Straits of Sunda) and Malacca (for the Straits of Malacca) as the main gates to Europe, as well as the Maluku Islands as the main producers of spices.

Their policy of monopoly was imposed on both other Westerners and the indigenous people, following their general trade policy. The VOC also imposed their right of purchasing commodities for the Amsterdam market on local peasants and traders, particularly as there was no free market where local people could sell their products at a higher price. Here, the VOC was an arbitrary power in determining the selling price of local products. The VOC prohibited the sale of spices to other Europeans under the threat of punishment. In this way, the VOC impoverished the Outer Islands (Nagtegaal, 1996).²⁷ In this period, the VOC crippled the potential indigenous traders and made them a necessary element in the trade of the archipelago. The spices and forest products of the Outer Islands were sent to Javanese ports and then shipped to Europe by the VOC. This preconditioned the emergence of a triangular pattern in the trade network of the Java Sea region. Exported commodities of the Outer Islands were sent to Java before being exported to the Western markets, in which Java functioned as an entrepot of the archipelago.

²¹ See, for example, Pierre-Ives Manguin, "The vanishing *jong*: Insular Southeast Asian fleet in trade and war (Fifteenth to seventeenth centuries), in: A. Reid (ed.), *Southeast Asia in the early modern era: Trade, power, and belief* (Ithaca-London: Cornell University Press, 1993) pp. 198–199.

²² The Cirebon coastal state was not destroyed, but it was gradually transformed into feudal state by Mataram. This city-state finally was drawn into the orbit of Mataram and changed to a coastal-feudal state. See S.T. Sulistiyono, "Perkembangan pelabuhan Cirebon dan pengaruhnya terhadap kehidupan sosial ekonomi masyarakat kota Cirebon 1859-1930" (*M.A. Thesis*, Gadjah Mada University, Yogyakarta, 1994) pp. 135–139. See also Sharon Siddique, "Relics of the past? A sociological study of the sultanates of Cirebon, West Java" (*Ph.D. Dissertation*, University of Bielefeld, 1977).

²³ See De Graaf & Th. Pigeaud, *Kerajaan-kerajaan Islam di Indonesia* (Jakarta: Grafiti Pers, 1989) pp. 24–26. See also D.H. Burger, *Sociologisch-economische geschiedenis van Indonesia I* (Amsterdam: Royal Tropical Institute, 1975) p. 26.

²⁴ Burger, *Sociologisch-economische I*, p. 28.

²⁵ M.C. Ricklefs, *A history of modern Indonesia c. 1300 to the present* (London: Macmillan, 1981) pp. 27–46.

²⁶ C.D. Cowan, "Continuity and change in the international history of maritime South East Asia", *Journal of Southeast Asian History* 9 (1968) (1) p. 9.

²⁷ See L. Nagtegaal, *Riding the Dutch tiger: The Dutch East Indies Company and the Northeast Coast of Java 1680-1743* (Leiden: KITLV Press, 1996) p. 21. The seizure of Makassar by the VOC in 1667, for example, caused a large scale migration of traders from South Sulawesi to the north coast of Java.

In their early presence in the archipelago, the VOC aspired to supply the main trading network of Southeast Asia centered in the Straits of Malacca (port of Malacca) and the Straits of Sunda (Batavia), but by the end of the 17th century, this began to change. From 1677 onwards, the Dutch were actively involved in a series of succession disputes and dynastic struggles in Java.²⁸ Exploiting such conflicts, the Dutch then took advantage of the opportunity to reduce the indigenous powers to a state of dependence. Not until the third quarter of the 18th century, did the Dutch gradually succeed making Mataram, Banten and to a certain degree Cirebon vassals of the VOC. Moreover, in Java they gained economic control over the most productive areas of this island by means of tax levies and many kinds of tribute from their vassals. The VOC also introduced new crops such as coffee. In so doing, they gradually transformed their system into a Java-based polity, concentrating more and more on the exploitation of natural resources of Java, while their maritime power and grip on trade in the Outer Islands areas declined (Bruijn and Gaastra, 1993; Gaastra and Bruijn, 1993) (Gaastra, 2002).²⁹

Java flourished as an entrepot of imported goods from the Outer Islands. In the case of import trade, the VOC opened up Batavia for foreign ships to unload imported goods. With special permission from Dutch authorities, Semarang and Surabaya were also accessible to foreign ships, where they had to arrange all documents related to import activities. They were not allowed to anchor at any other ports. As a result, the main ports of Java functioned as transshipment ports of exported commodities from the Outer Islands to be sent to foreign lands. Trade connections between Java and the Outer Islands were legally imposed and enforced (Sulistiyono, 1995).³⁰ The fall of indigenous trading centers compelled indigenous traders to adjust to the new situation. This happened at least in most port cities on the north coast of Java. There had been a process of feudalization in the Javanese society because of the collapse of their trading activities.³¹ In the meantime, some indigenous traders shifted their profession and became pirates. There was a parallel between the domination of the VOC on the sea and the burgeoning piracy on the archipelago's waters (Lapian, 1987).³² Of course, piracy occurred along the busy trade routes. Pirate's targets were not only foreign ships but also indigenous traders. Sometimes they robbed coastal villages, capturing villagers and selling them as slaves (Reid, 1983).³³ Nevertheless, indigenous traders still existed and con-

tinued to carry out interregional shipping and trade as they did before the presence of the Westerners. In fact, there was a new trend in which prahu shipping functioned solely as a supplementary service of the Dutch shipping. They acted as distributors of imported goods from large to small ports, and conversely they transported exported products from small to large ports so that they may be shipped to foreign countries. A policy of tight control and attentiveness allowed the Dutch to capitalize on opportunities and thus dominate shipping and trade in the archipelago.

Inland and maritime cultures relations during the pre-colonial period

The geographical conditions and historical background of the Indonesian archipelago have preconditioned both its maritime and inland cultures. In general, the Outer Islands and Malay Peninsula are usually recognized as the representation of maritime culture while the inland culture is represented by Java island where feudalistic kingdoms developed during the course of history. The dynamic relation between maritime and inland cultures in the past is closely linked with the never-ending competition between the Malay world centered in Sumatra (and Malay Peninsula) and the Javanese world centered in Java.

It began with the emergence of Srivijaya as Malay maritime kingdom (located in Sumatra Island) and the rise of the inland feudalistic kingdom Mataram in central Java. This development closely linked with the burgeoning trade along the maritime Silk Road network between India and China, between the Malay region and China, and intra-regional trade in Southeast Asia. One of the most significant factors in the rise of Srivijaya as the pre-eminent Southeast Asian maritime trading centre was its ruler's political acumen: their ability both to consolidate their own Sumatran hinterland and to dominate rival ports and thus indirectly their hinterlands. This control enabled Srivijaya to concentrate agricultural, forests, and ocean products of Indonesian archipelago in its own ports. Besides, Srivijaya also developed a political system which was based on loyalty and control toward trading resources (Manguin, 1993b).³⁴ The location of Srivijaya itself was actually not strategic as it was located far from the Straits of Malacca. By benefiting its fleet Srivijaya could finally control shipping and trade at the western part of the Indonesian archipelago. Besides, they were also able to protect their waters against piracy and possible attacks from other countries. It is very interesting that for the sake of its trade, Srivijaya acknowledged China as the protector. By taking such kinds of policy, Srivijaya felt safe from the dangers of Chinese military expansion which had reached as far as Vietnam and Fu-Nan. Besides, Srivijayan ships would get a better treatment when they were anchoring at Chinese ports (Wolters, 1967).³⁵ This explains Srivijaya was able to control trading centres at the Malay Peninsula (Braddell, 1936).³⁶

As a maritime state, Srivijaya implemented its strategy for survival and expanded its power. For its survival, Srivijaya

²⁸ See Burger, *Sociologisch-economische I*, pp. 26–37.

²⁹ Cowan, *Continuity and change*, p. 10. Gaastra & Bruijn also state that the 17th and 18th centuries witnessed the VOC transformed into a territorial power; see F.S. Gaastra & J.R. Bruijn, "The Dutch East India Company's shipping, 1602-1795, in a comparative perspective", in: J.R. Bruijn & F.S. Gaastra (eds), *Ships, sailors and spices: East India Companies and their shipping in the 16th, 17th and 18th centuries* (Amsterdam: NEHA, 1993) pp. 178. See also F.S. Gaastra, *De geschiedenis van de VOC* (Zutphen: Walburg, 2002) pp. 57–65.

³⁰ Singih Tri Sulistiyono, "Politik kolonial terhadap pelabuhan di Hindia Belanda", *Lembaran Sastra* 18 (1995) p. 86.

³¹ M.C. Rickefs, *A history of modern Indonesia since ca. 1300* (London: Macmillan, 1981) p. 66.

³² See, for example, A.B. Lapian, "Orang laut – bajak laut – raja laut: Sejarah kawasan Laut Sulawesi abad XIX" (*Ph.D. Dissertation*, Gadjah Mada University Yogyakarta, 1987).

³³ Lapian, *Orang Laut*, 293–304. For more detail about slavery in Southeast Asia, see A. Reid (ed.), *Slavery, bondage and dependency in Southeast Asia* (St. Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1983).

³⁴ Pierre-Yves Manguin, "Palembang and Sriwijaya: An early Malay harbour-city rediscovered", *JMBRAS* 1 (66) (1993) p. 33.

³⁵ O.W. Wolters, *Early Indonesian commerce: A study of the origins of Srivijaya* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1967) p. 152.

³⁶ R. Braddell, "An introduction to the study of ancient times in the Malay Peninsula and the Straits of Malacca", *JMBRAS* 14 (1936) pp. 1–71.

established international diplomatic ties with two “superpowers”, i.e. China and India which were seen as the potential threats. Diplomacy with India, for example, was constructed by establishing a *vihara* at Nalanda during the reign of Balaputadewa. Diplomacy with China was constructed by sending tribute to the Chinese emperor. Every time Srivijaya got a threat from its enemies, it always asked for protection from China. On the other side, regionally Srivijaya strengthened and expanded its power to surrounding regions in the Malay world. Gradually Srivijaya could control surrounding trading centres and traffics by military power (Christie, 1999).³⁷

The burgeoning of Srivijaya in Sumatra was in line with the development of political power in Central Java (Mataram Kingdom). Competition and conflict between Srivijaya and kingdoms in Java showed a high tension when the centre of Mataram kingdom moved from Central Java to East Java. The king Sendok (929–947 AD) moved the palace and is acknowledged as the founder of a new dynasty (Isyana) that reigned in east Java until 1222. One of the motives of this removal was to avoid a bitter conflict with Srivijaya. The emergence of political powers in East Java gave a significant impact to the economy of the Java Sea regions and the Indonesian archipelago at large. Different from the Mataram kingdom in Central Java which greatly relied on established wet-rice agriculture economy, coastal and basin regions of East Java were not yet surplus agricultural areas which could support political power of this new kingdom. From the early period, therefore, the kings of Eastern Java gave more attention to maritime trade. Trade connections were established with the eastern part of the Indonesian archipelago (such as the Moluccas) and the western part (such as those with Sumatra and Malay Peninsula which at that time were still under control by the Srivijaya kingdom) (Quaritch Wales, 1978; Wolters, 1979).³⁸

During the reign of king Dharmawangsa (985–1006), there was an increasing tension of political and economic conflict between Java and Srivijaya. The attacks of Dharmawangsa troops on Srivijaya placed this maritime kingdom in a “dangerous position”. Only by establishing good relationships with Chola kingdom (India) and China Srivijaya could finally counterattack the Dharmawangsa troops. A conspiracy masterminded by Srivijaya (with one of Dharmawangsa vassals) destroyed Dharmawangsa palace and killed him in 1006 in an incident popularly called as *pralaya*. The good relationship between Srivijaya and Chola did not last long. By 1007 Chola kingdom began to attack eastern regions. In 1025 the capital of Srivijaya was attacked. During the next aggression in 1027, the king of Srivijaya (Sanggramawiyot-tunggawarman) was captured. There is no record about the fate of this king. After the fall of the Srivijaya palace, the next attacks were directed at Srivijaya regions in the Malay Peninsula (Hall, 1988).³⁹

The weakness of Srivijaya following the aggression by the Chola kingdom has had two significant impacts. *Firstly*, the successor of Dharmawangsa, i.e. Airlangga (1019–1042) could

seize back lost regions following the *pralaya* in 1006. *Second*, a set of Chola attacks possibly gave consciousness to Srivijaya rulers that good partnership with the Chola kingdom could at any time change to war and subjugation. This explains the emergence of some kind of gentlemen agreements among the main powers in the Malay world and the Javanese world. This situation crystallized when these two powers allied for confronting against the Chola kingdom by political marriage between Airlangga (successor of Dharmawangsa) and a sister of the Srivijaya king. There was a kind of consensus in which Srivijaya controlled the western part of the Malay archipelago, while the eastern part was under control by Airlangga. But in fact Java still had trading connections with the western part of the Malay archipelago.⁴⁰

The wave of Javanese expansion again became increasingly tense when Kertanegara came into power in 1268 as the king of Singasari (East Java). By continuing the Javanese political tradition of anti-Sino domination, he tried to widen his influence by establishing political and military alliance among Malay powers. He realized that China was the giant power that should be faced together. He wanted to establish Singasari as a new power in the Malay archipelago (including the Malay world and the Javanese world). He replaced all officials who were not in line with his ambitions. The Srivijaya kingdom which was traditionally in a good relationship with China was forced to be the alliance of Kertanegara by means of the Pamalayu Expedition in 1273. It seems that Kertanegara tried to unite the Javanese and Malay worlds for facing China.

During the period of the Singasari kingdom, the alliance of political powers in the Malay archipelago took place in a relatively peaceful way, but during the Majapahit kingdom (since 1292) the unity was formed more stringent by military power. Whereas king Kertanegara’s effort to unite the Malay world was mainly to face the dangers of external expansion (from China), the Majapahit unity was mainly motivated by internal ambition to subjugated local political power under the banner of Majapahit integration. By implementing this policy, Majapahit could ‘inherit’ most parts of the former Srivijaya territory (Lapian, 1984).⁴¹ Despite that Majapahit seems never to have been able to exert any continuing control over the Straits of Malacca, this empire was by far the greatest and most

⁴⁰ After that period Srivijaya underwent a declining process. According to Chinese sources the last Srivijaya delegations were sent to China in 1178. This proves that by the 12th century the Srivijaya Kingdom had been very weak. The vassals of this kingdom began to send their own delegation to China.

⁴¹ Indigenous sources from the mid-fourteenth century, such as Pararaton (1350) and Negarakertagama (1365), provide much information about various places claimed and controlled by the Majapahit kingdom. These places included Palembang, Jambi, Kampar, Siak, Rokan, Lamuri, Barus, Haru in Sumatra; Pahang, Kelang, Sai and Trenggano in the Malay Peninsula; Sampit, Kapuas, Barito, Kutai and Sedu in Borneo; Butung, Luwuk, Banggai, Tabalong and Sedu in Celebes; Wanda in the Moluccas; Seran in Irian; and Sumba and Timor in the Nusatenggara islands. Although the list of Majapahit’s vessels is doubtful, there is strong evidence that the places mentioned in those sources were linked by a maritime network. This network was chiefly centred in the Java Sea where the important ports were located. See A.B. Lapian, “The maritime network in the Indonesian archipelago in the fourteenth century”, in: SEAMEO Project in Archeology and Fine Arts SPFA, *Final report: Consultative workshop on research on maritime shipping and trade networks in Southeast Asia* (Cisarua, West Java, Indonesia: 20-27 November 1984) pp. 71–80.

³⁷ J.W. Christie, “Asia sea trade between the tenth and thirteenth centuries and its impact on the states of Java and Bali”, in: H.P. Ray (ed.), *Archeology of seafaring: The Indian ocean in the ancient period* (Delhi: Pragati, 1999) pp. 221–222.

³⁸ O.W. Wolters, “Studying Srivijaya”, *JMBRAS* 2 (52) (1979) p. 6. See also H.G. Quaritch Wales, “The extent of Srivijaya’s influence abroad”, *JMBRAS* 1 (51) (1978) p. 5.

³⁹ D.G.E. Hall, *Sejarah Asia Tenggara* (Surabaya: Usaha nasional, 1988) p. 66.

powerful of the Javanese states, and had no rival within the archipelago for more than a century.

Internal dissension in the Majapahit kingdom during the end of the 14th century preconditioned a tendency among its vassals to become independent. One of its former vassals located in the heart of Malay world, i.e. Malacca, cut ties with Majapahit. The emergence of Malacca as an independent state at the end of the 14th century was immediately followed by its function as the trading centre of the Malay world. The rise of Malacca can be assumed to replace the role formerly played by Srivijaya. Its emergence was on one hand in line with the deterioration of the Majapahit kingdom and on the other hand it got protection from the Chinese emperor against the threat coming from Ayutthaya which began to expand its military forces to the south. During that period, China was active to patrol *Nanyang* (southern sea) led by commander Zheng He.

Besides, the burgeoning of Malacca was in conformity with the increasing role of Muslim traders who had a significant role along the maritime Silk Road between the Middle East and Southeast Asia. By embracing Islam, the authority of Malacca succeeded to pull political endorsement and economic support from Moslem traders. In short time Malacca became the centre of trade activities in Southeast Asia. This port immediately functioned as the transit point of commodities from the Indonesian archipelago that were distributed to the east and/or to the west.

In the meantime, Java also experienced an interesting development. Islam began to penetrate political and social life, making the maintenance of Majapahit's overlordship in the Island of Java more difficult. Since the 15th century, the balance of power in the archipelago swung against the Majapahit kingdom and the north coast of Java ports were one by one converted to Islam and drawn into the commercial orbit of Malaccan entrepôt. This was in line with the arrival of the Portuguese in the beginning of the 16th century when the Majapahit kingdom survived only as a small inland state in the eastern part of Java.

In connection with the development of Malacca as the trading center of Southeast Asia, also several other trading centers emerged in the eastern part of the Indonesian archipelago such as Makassar, Ternate, and Tidore. These ports were initially sub-networks of the Malay world centered in Malacca. Besides, the extension of the Malay trading network also reached Southern Philippine, i.e. the Sultanate of Jolo and Mindanao. This kind of structure was relatively strong in facing the Western colonialists. The seizure of Malacca by the Portuguese in 1511, therefore, did not end the trade of the Malay world. The fall of Malacca immediately strengthened trading centers and its networks such as those of Aceh, Makassar, Sulu, Ternate, Tidore, and coastal cities along the north coast of Java. During this period, Malayness and Islam increasingly developed as identity traits of Malay people. Buginese people from Celebes even spread out the Malay network, not only in Southeast Asia but also towards the north coast of Australia. By the beginning of the 16th century the centrality of the Malay network began to fan out with trading centers in almost all regions in Southeast Asia.

During the course of history, the dynamics of maritime and inland cultures in the Indonesian archipelago were characterized by economic, political, and cultural competition and conflicts between the "Javanese world" (inland culture) and the "Malay world" (maritime culture). In the meantime, the role

of Java in shaping the identity of the Java world, therefore, can be easily understood historically. Before the presence of Westerners some elements of the Javanese culture had spread out to the regions around the Java Sea. This was in line with the expansion of political influence of the Javanese kingdoms before the domination of Western colonialism. It seems that this political process tended to be a process of political integration rather than of political centralization.

In line with the political process of integration, social and cultural diffusion were also taking place. Besides benefiting the channel of political influence, cultural diffusion also took place through trading activities, migration, Islamic education, the use of Javanese language in Islamic boarding schools (*pesantren*), and so on. The Java Sea trading network traversed from Ternate to Malacca including Ambon, Makassar, Bali, Nusa Tenggara, Banjarmasin, Pontianak, and ports of south and east Sumatra. Hall addresses it as the Java Sea zone.⁴² Political expansions and trade activities enabled migration among ethnic groups in the Java Sea region. In this connection, not only the Javanese migrated to regions around the Java Sea but also other ethnic groups. In the pre-colonial Makassar for example, Javanese, Banjarese, Madurese, Malays, and Balinese could be found easily. Besides, ethnic groups from the Outer Islands could also be easily found in most harbor cities along the north coast of Java such as those of Banten, Cirebon, Demak, Tuban, Gresik, and Surabaya. In those cities, Buginese, Madurese, Malays, and Makassarese settlements were not a strange thing. Internal migration was actually one of the most important basics for getting cultural understanding among social groups in the region around the Java Sea.

Islamic education and missionary also became the cultural foundation of Javanese influences in the Outer Islands. Beside Aceh and Minangkabau, the influence of Islam from Java in the region around the Java Sea was also significant. Although the existence of Islam in Java itself was younger compared to Islam in Aceh (Samudra Pasai) for example, the institutionalization of Islamic education in Java, i.e. Islamic boarding schools (*pesantren*), was more developed than elsewhere in the archipelago. Since the 15th century one of the cities in the north coast of Java, i.e. Gresik (*Pesantren Giri*) became an important center of Islamic education in the archipelago. The pupils of this *pesantren* were not only from Java but also from various regions in the Indonesian archipelago, even from the Malay world. This *pesantren* was established by Sunan Giri (Raden Paku), one of the "nine holy people" (*wali songo*) of Java.

It is very interesting that the Javanese language, not Malay, was used as the medium of instruction in *pesantren*. Pupils (*santri*) from various regions in the Malay archipelago had to learn Javanese language previously before studying Islamic laws in the *pesantren*. This means that more people from outside Java learned Javanese culture including the way Javanese people think and behave. When the pupils went back to their own homeland after completing the study, they spread out Islamic knowledge by mixing local language and Javanese. If Malay is recognized as the lingua franca for business activities, the Javanese language was used for lingua franca of Islamic education in the Malay archipelago.

⁴² Hall, 1985.

It is important to note that the conflict and “subjugation” carried out by Javanese kingdoms in the regions outside Java did not really inflict a painful injury on local communities. This explains why Hall prefers to speak of political integration with tributary system rather than centralization and conquest.⁴³ Different from inscriptions issued by the Srivijaya kingdom which were much colored by threat and curse against local powers who wanted to resist the central power, there has not been found yet a similar inscription in the overseas regions issued by Javanese kingdoms. Javanese inscriptions in the overseas mostly connected with the king’s gifts to the local kingdoms, political marriage, recognition and act of giving praise towards the glory of Javanese kings, and so on.

It seems that politically, the process of integration carried out by the Javanese kingdoms, in some cases, was understood by local elements as an external power which could give proud and authority to the local powers. They felt being legitimated by big political and military power from Java. Some traditional and local historical sources from the region around the Java Sea tell about the local political powers proud of being part of the Javanese integration. Besides, some local rulers in the region around the Java Sea were also proud if they could get married to members of the Javanese royal family and receive a nobility title from the Javanese king. This can be read from *Sedjarah Melaju*, which was possibly written in Malacca after the fall of Malacca Sultanate in the 16th century (Abdullah, 1958).⁴⁴

It is important to note that Tome Pires who visited cities along the north coast of Java in the early 16th century heard by his own ears that the glory of the Majapahit kingdom was commonly known by the people. He says that Majapahit used to rule as far as the Moluccas on the eastern side and (over) a great part of the west (Colless, 1975; Cortesao, 1944).⁴⁵

It is also very interesting that the presence of Javanese cultural elements in the regions outside Java were not only accepted for enriching local cultures but also became a kind of prestigious symbol. Even, things that in Java were just used as coins were used as amulets in Kelantan. Local people mentioned it as Javanese Amulet or *fetis Jawa* or *jimat Jawa*. It was believed to be able to cure various illnesses (Rentse, 1936).⁴⁶

The above description depicts that the rise and fall of the Javanese political integration did not give impact to the elimination of local powers. The character of relationship between Javanese political powers and political powers of the surrounding regions was decentralist. This explains that the diffusion of the feudalistic Javanese culture in the surrounding regions was smoothly making the Javanese culture an identity which was different from that of the Malay world.

Maritime and inland cultures relations in colonial context

During more than three hundred years, the Dutch colonial rule saw the important role of Java in the Indonesian archipelago, politically, economically as well as culturally. It was not a coincidence that the Dutch East Indian Company or VOC (Vereenigde Oost Indische Compagnie) soon began to move their center of activities from the Moluccas Islands to Batavia (in West Java) in the first quarter of the 16th century just 17 years after its establishment. Batavia even functioned as the management center of the company in Asia and Africa.

From 1677 onwards, the Dutch were actively involved in a series of succession disputes and dynastic struggles in Java.⁴⁷ Exploiting such conflicts, the Dutch then took advantage of the opportunity to reduce the indigenous powers to a state of dependence. Not until the third quarter of the 18th century, did the Dutch gradually succeed making the kingdom of Mataram, Banten and to a certain degree Cirebon in Java vassals of the VOC. Moreover, in Java they gained economic control over the most productive areas of this island by means of tax levies and many kinds of tribute from their vassals. The VOC also introduced new crops such as coffee. In so doing, they gradually transformed their system into a Java-based polity, concentrating more and more on the exploitation of natural resources of Java, while their maritime power and grip on trade in the Outer Islands areas declined until its bankruptcy in 1799.⁴⁸

Entering the 19th century, Java became increasingly the center of political and economic activities of the Dutch in the Indonesian archipelago. In the second quarter of the 19th century, the Dutch colonial government opened up several ports in the Outer Islands as free ports for international trade. Nevertheless, the production potential of the Outer Islands could not be easily recovered. At the same time, the Dutch colonial government focused on the establishment of infrastructure in Java, building such things as roads, railways, telegraphs, bridges, and irrigation systems in order to encourage Java to produce more profitable commodities for the European market. The implication of this policy was that the Outer Islands were ignored, while Java was increasingly developed as the favorite. Batavia was projected to become the centre of shipping and trade in Southeast Asia, first competing with and then replacing the role of Malacca as the center of the previous Malay world (Marks, 1959).⁴⁹

A new equilibrium in the maritime world in Southeast Asia emerged. The new centers of the maritime network were Penang and Singapore, thus succeeding Malacca as the centre of the maritime network system three centuries earlier.⁵⁰ This network

⁴³ Hall, *Maritime trade*, p. 2.

⁴⁴ Abdullah (ed.) *Sedjarah Melayu* (Djakarta: Djambatan, 1958) p. 145.

⁴⁵ A. Cortesao, *The Suma Oriental of Tome Pires: An account of the east, from the Red Sea to Japan, written in Malacca and India in 1512-1515* (London: Hakluyt Society Series, 1944) p. 174. See also B.E. Colless, “Majapahit revisited: External evidence on the geography and ethnology of East Java in the Majapahit period”, *JMBRAS* 2 (1975) pp. 124-161.

⁴⁶ A. Rentse, “Majapahit amulets in Kelantan”, *JMBRAS* 14 (1936) pp. 300-304.

⁴⁷ See Burger, *Sociologisch-economische geschiedenis I* pp. 26-37.

⁴⁸ Cowan, *Continuity and change* p. 10. Gaastra & Bruijn also state that the 17th and 18th centuries witnessed the VOC transformed into a territorial power; see F.S. Gaastra & J.R. Bruijn, “The Dutch East India Company’s shipping, 1602-1795, in a comparative perspective”, in: J.R. Bruijn & F.S. Gaastra (eds), *Ships, sailors and spices*, p. 178. See also F.S. Gaastra, *De geschiedenis* p. 57-65.

⁴⁹ See H.J. Marks, *The first contest for Singapore 1819-1824* (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1959) pp. 252-256. Malacca was conquered by the Dutch from the Portuguese in 1641. But they found the trade of this port had decreased due to the long rivalry against Aceh in the middle of the 17th century and the Dutch blockade since 1633. Based on the Treaty of London 1824, Malacca was ceded to the British and in return the British handed over all their possessions in Sumatra.

⁵⁰ Penang was in British hand since 1786, see Poelinggomang, *Proteksi dan perdagangan* p. 55.

involved European, Indian, Chinese and Indonesian traders. During the 19th century, this new system in the peninsula absorbed most of the trading regions in the archipelago. Singapore stimulated the trading revival of the Outer Islands from its long collapse caused by war, conquest and destruction launched by the Dutch VOC and other Western trading companies.

One of the most important British policies intended to revive the maritime network system in the Southeast Asian waters was to establish Singapore as a free port in 1819 (Poelinggomang, 1993).⁵¹ Although there had been elements of free trade in the Indonesian archipelago before the coming of the Westerners, the opening up of Singapore as the freest port in the world gave new vitality to the maritime world in Southeast Asia, although this was also meant to challenge Batavia, the centre of the Dutch maritime network. Moreover, the British authorities had succeeded in creating Singapore as the principal distributing centre of industrial products from Western countries. The British thus also succeeded in setting up both intense political and commercial connections with European industrial countries. This negatively affected Dutch efforts to make Java the centre of maritime networks in Southeast Asia. Even during the first half of the 19th century, the Dutch role in the maritime activities in Southeast Asia was marginal compared to the British. Hence, the Dutch tended to concentrate on their activities in Java, making it the main producer of cash crops for the international market, while the majority of the trade of the Outer Islands was under the influence of Singapore. The Dutch had passed up the opportunity to grasp the maritime network system in the Indonesian archipelago and in Southeast Asia when they had control over Malacca and Batavia.

In the 17th and the 18th centuries, the Outer Islands trade suffered from the VOC's destruction, followed by the Dutch restriction on foreign shipping and the colonial government's negligence of this region; all this affected the less developed Outer Islands until the second half of the 19th century. The economy of the Outer Islands fell behind since Java became the economic and political centre of Dutch activities in the archipelago.

Unlike their policy in Java, the Dutch colonial government applied a policy of abstention toward the Outer Islands during the first quarter of the nineteenth century (Dick et al., 2002; Lindblad, 2002; Wesseling, 1988).⁵² The Dutch conquered the Outer Islands to establish trade monopolies, not to use

their hinterlands to produce cash crops. As a result, Dutch authorities were limited to port cities. The hinterland of the Outer Islands was sparsely populated and thus did not attract the VOC, because most commodities from the hinterland were just taken from forests.⁵³ On the other hand, the VOC not only dealt with the port cities but also Java's hinterland from the beginning, knowing that these hinterlands were fertile and densely populated. Applying both conflicts and accommodation, the VOC finally became the "landlord" in Java. Even when the assets of the VOC were taken over by the Dutch government and the elements of trade vanished and were replaced by non-government groups, the Dutch power as "landlord" became yet stronger, at least under the Cultivation System (1830–1870). Indeed, it became a strong state during the late colonial state period.⁵⁴

From this point of view, it is clear that from the early 18th century until the second half of the 19th century, there had been a dichotomous economic development between Java and the Outer Islands. Although the surface area of Java and Madura was only nine per cent of the whole surface area of the Netherlands Indies, it played a chief role as the centre of economic activities (Boomgaard and Gooszen, 1990).⁵⁵ In 1900, Java and Madura were inhabited by 69 per cent of the total population of the Netherlands Indies (Touwen, 2001).⁵⁶ The most populous provinces among the Outer Islands were South Sulawesi, West Sumatra, Bali, East Sumatra, and Timor. In 1930, these five provinces were inhabited by 55 per cent of the total population of the Outer Islands. The least populous provinces were Belitung, Bangka, Jambi, Riau and Bengkulu, all with less than 2 per cent each.

Still for their own interests, the Dutch colonial government actually viewed the Java world, which might be represented by the Java Sea region, as a medium for benefiting colonial integration. The Dutch recognized the Java Sea as the Mediterranean Sea of Indonesia (*Indië's Middellandsche Zee*) (Boissevain, 1909).⁵⁷ In fact the regions around the Java Sea

⁵¹ E.L. Poelinggomang, "The Dutch trade policy and its impacts on Makassar's trade", *Review of Indonesian and Malaysian Affairs* 27 (1993) p. 64.

⁵² The argument of the policy of abstention refers to the reluctance of the colonial government to extend the area under its effective control outside Java. But this argument is still in debate. Convincing is Wesseling and others' "continuity hypothesis". They argue that throughout the modern imperialism era, the Dutch colonial government in the Indonesian archipelago remained reluctant to intervene militarily unless provoked; see H.L. Wesseling, "The giant that was a dwarf or the strange history of Dutch imperialism", *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 16 (3) (1988) pp. 58–70. This is contrasted with the "contiguity hypothesis" which argues about an extension of authority from a territory already under control; see J.Th. Lindblad, "The Outer Islands in the 19th century: Contest for the periphery", in: H.W. Dick et al., *The emergence of a national economy: An economic history of Indonesia, 1800-2000* (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2002) pp. 109–110.

⁵³ Special case occurred in the Maluku Islands where the VOC did not hesitate to massively cut down clove trees in order to stabilise the price. The "hongi tochten", which is the process of massively cutting down trees, was also aimed at controlling the quantity and volume of spice production and to restrain the local people from selling spices to other Western competitors. It was also intended to prevent the oversupply of spices to Europe that would cause the price to fall.

⁵⁴ See, for example, V.J.H. Houben, "Java in the 19th century: Consolidation of a territorial state", in: Dick et al., *The emergence* pp. 56–81.

⁵⁵ P. Boomgaard and A.J. Gooszen, *Changing economy in Indonesia, Vol. 11: Population trend 1795–1942* (Amsterdam: Royal Tropical Institute, 1990) p. 243. The total surface area of the Netherlands Indies in 1930 was 1,904,159 km²; the surface area of the Outer Islands was 1,772,186 km² and Java and Madura was only 181,973 km².

⁵⁶ L.J. Touwen, *Extremes in the archipelago: Trade and economic development in the Outer Islands of Indonesia, 1900-1942* (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2001) p. 330. In 1930, the total population of the Netherlands Indies was 60,727,236. 19,008,869 people lived in the Outer Islands and 41,718,364 in Java and Madura.

⁵⁷ C. Boissevain, *Tropisch Nederland: Indrukken eener reis door Nederlandsch-Indië* (Haarlem: Tjeenk Willing, 1909) p. 50.

are also recognized as the heart of Indonesia. Many kinds of marketable commodities are abundantly produced by this region (Lapian, 1991).⁵⁸ This explains why most important ports in the Indonesian archipelago are located on the Java Sea shores, such as Jakarta, Surabaya, Semarang, Palembang, Makassar, and Banjarmasin (Sulistiyono, 2003).⁵⁹ These ports have been the centers of shipping and trade networks embracing all regions in the Indonesian archipelago as well as parts of the global shipping network. During the Dutch colonial period, Batavia was projected to be the most powerful port city in the Indonesian archipelago to compete with a new British Malay maritime world, as Malacca had been previously to Majapahit or Srivijaya to Mataram and Singasari.

Based on the above explanation, it is understandable, therefore, that the Dutch for their own interests interpreted the relationship between Java and the Outer Islands as a centralistic relationship, i.e. a relationship between the center and the periphery. This kind of Dutch perception was possibly influenced by the way the inland kingdom of Mataram viewed foreigners. During the Mataram period, the Javanese viewed the people from the Outer Java as “*orang sabrang*” (*foreigner from across the sea*) and “*ora nJawa*” (not being Java, non-Javanese). Like the Mataram kingdom, the Dutch colonial government used the “Java centric” way of thinking (Houben et al., 1992).⁶⁰ All of colonial official reports, colonial statistics, official publication, correspondence, and so on used terms such as *Buitenbezittingen*, *Buitengewesten*, *Buiten Java en Madoera*, to refer to the Dutch colonies in the Indonesian archipelago that were located beyond Java and Madura. This way of thinking showed the general acceptance of the core-periphery model, considering Java a congested nuclear core and the Outer Islands as a periphery. This way of thinking is, therefore, culturally and historically conditioned.

Conclusions

It is very interesting that the post-colonial period witnessed the continuing way of thinking that considers Java with its inland culture heritage as the “center” of Indonesia and the Outer Islands with its maritime character as the periphery. This kind of centralistic perspective and perception was still continued by modern Indonesian government, at least until the end of the New Order government (1998) which benefited Java as the center of Indonesian politics and economy.

In the present time when Indonesia is entering the reformation era following the fall of the New Order government, the role of the mental map of the Java Sea in the context of national integration in Indonesia is being questioned. Central-

istic integration as inherited from the Dutch colonial regime is criticized and is accused as the source of current disintegration problems in Indonesia. Various provinces, especially those which are located outside Java, demand a more relaxed regional autonomy. Several movements even demand independence, free from Indonesian unity. The perspective on the role of Java with its complexity of inland culture as the center and significant factor of national integration in Indonesia is also criticized. That is viewed as the symbolic legitimation of Javanese domination (domination of feudalistic culture) over the rest of Indonesia. Even the present time is witnessing an increasing consciousness for treating the Outer Islands, especially the border areas, not as a periphery by applying the concept of “centering the margin”.⁶¹ It closely links with the development strategy of a maritime state to benefit border areas as growth center for facing external intrusion.

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⁵⁸ Lapian points out that Indonesia as a sea system is formed by three heart seas, i.e. Java Sea, Flores Sea and Banda Sea. See A.B. Lapian, “Sejarah Nusantara sejarah bahari”, *Pidato Pengukuhan Guru Besar Fakultas Sastra Universitas Indonesia* (Jakarta: 1991).

⁵⁹ See Singgih Tri Sulistiyono, “The Java Sea network: Patterns in the development of interregional shipping and trade in process of national economic integration in Indonesia, 1870s–1970s” (*Ph.D. Dissertation*, Leiden University, 2003).

⁶⁰ The analysis concerning the idea of “wong sabrang” in the Javanese literature (*Serat Panji Paniba*) can be read in W. van der Molen, “Wong Sabrang”, in V.J.H. Houben, H.M.J. Maier, W. van der Molen (eds.), Houben, V.J.H., H.M.J. Maier & W. van der Molen (eds), *Looking in odd mirrors: The Java Sea* (Leiden: Vakgroep Talen en Culturen van Zuidoost-Azië en Oceanië, 1992) pp. 163-176.

⁶¹ Marsetio, “Konstruksi marginalitas daerah perbatasan: Studi kasus Kepulauan Natuna” (*Ph.D. Dissertation*, Gadjah Mada University, 2012) p. 217.

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