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SCREDDENT: Scalable Real-time Anomalies Detection and Notification of Targeted Malware in Mobile Devices

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Abstract

The ubiquitous availability of Android devices has led to increasing malicious mobile attacks targeting the Android mobile operating system. In recent times, adversaries leverage situational awareness, user and device context to create targeted malware for mobile devices. Several mobile security tools such as Mobile Sandbox, TargetDroid, and ANANAS focus on tailoring the detection schemes for individual users and suffer from scalability by analyzing individual user's activities. To the best of our knowledge, these tools do not incorporate user group profiling in their automated user-behavior driven dynamic analysis. In addition, adaptive and location-based alerts are not provided to mobile users. We propose SCREDDENT: Scalable Real-time Anomalies Detection and Notification of Targeted Malware in Mobile Devices, to provide a scalable system to classify, detect, and predict targeted malware in real-time. SCREDDENT incorporates behavior-triggering probabilistic models and user grouping to minimize the number of parallel dynamic analysis instances needed. SCREDDENT leverages container technology to perform dynamic analysis and allow for modularity as emulation technology improves. SCREDDENT uses adaptive, location-based notification principles to create a geographical fence which warn users of malicious attacks. Finally, SCREDDENT provides proactive, adaptive alerts to individual users if at least one of the group members has triggered malicious activities in an application currently used by the individual.

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1. Introduction

About 84% of all smartphones, worldwide, are Android devices²⁸ and the majority of these devices are unprotected²⁹. Given Android's prominence and general smartphone vulnerability, it is not surprising that the majority malicious mobile attacks are designed for the Android mobile operating system. Lately, mobile malware that use contextual device and user behavioral data to avoid detection and observation have emerged. This targeted malware only executes when certain conditions are met^{22, 15, 5}. Several analytic tools such as Mobile Sandbox, TargetDroid, and ANANAS have been developed to take a hybrid approach to identifying targeted malware^{18, 9, 2, 4}. There are also tools such as DREBIN, Marvin, and Draco which have mobile applications to provide static on device analysis^{17, 12, 11, 7, 18, 21, 24}. Draco, though, combines its on-device static analysis with remote dynamic analysis remotely¹¹. These tools analyze individual mobile/user activities to detect malware. In the presence of a large number of mobile devices and users, even distributed analyses will not be sufficient to provide efficient and timely detection. To the best of our knowledge, these tools do not integrate group user profiling with their automated user-behavior driven dynamic analysis to perform targeted malware detection. The profiling of groups of mobile users will provide efficient analyses, significantly reduce redundancy and increase probability of adaptive alerts. Further, the tools suffer from usable alert system which informs the user of potential attacks based on user context and location.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the SCREDDENT architecture. Section 3 describes the machine learning strategies SCREDDENT employs. In Section 4, we conclude and discuss future work.

2. SCREDDENT Overview

SCREDDENT collects user behaviors and contextual data from real users. Next, it creates probabilistic models to represent the data to be executed on a cloud-based targeted malware testbed. The models are used to emulate user group behaviors during the dynamic analysis of Android malware. Risk factor is then determined and an adaptive, location based alert is sent to the end user. If a user is entering an area known for malicious attacks, SCREDDENT sends a proactive alert. SCREDDENT is a system of systems comprised of three individual subsystems we developed using a top-down systems engineering approach (see Figure 1). The key subsystems of SCREDDENT are: User Behavior Modeling and Profiling for Smartphones (UMAPS), DockerDroid, and Targeted Malware Alert and Notification System (TAMANOS).




Fig. 1. SCREDDENT Architecture.

2.1. UMAPS: User Behavior Modeling and Profiling for Smartphones

SCREDDENT’s user monitoring system, UMAPS, contains two components: logging and mapping (see Fig. 2). The logging component consists of a native Android application which logs replicable contextual and user behavioral data temporarily on the device until a Wi-Fi connection is established (see Table I). The user may change the default settings to upload immediately or whenever mobile data is available. The information logged is then uploaded from the device to the cloud for modeling and dynamic analysis. The native application further performs lightweight static analysis on recently installed application manifests using a remotely trained support vector machine (SVM)¹⁶. The SCREDDENT logging application also uploads the results of the static analysis for applications that are flagged as false positives by users. This allows for amore insightful modifications of the SVM as well as SCREDDENT’s alert system.

The mapping component then analyzes the uploaded log files, mapping behaviors and probabilities, to create or update stored markovian models for each user (see Figure 3). Then, SCREDDENT forms user groups to allow intelligent storage of the models created. Using K-means clustering, intelligent storage decreases the overall number of markov models stored by allowing SCREDDENT to flush older model data upon update without losing valuable knowledge of past models⁸. SCREDDENT also monitors conceptual drift between each temporarily stored individual model and its corresponding group model. When an individual user model varies too greatly from its corresponding group model, SCREDDENT performs K-means clustering again to create new groups (see Figure 3).




Fig. 2 . UMAPS Architecture.

Table 1. Replicable events in TargetDroid.

Available Events					
Accept call	Change battery status	Uninstall App	Set time zone	Receive SMS	Activate 3G
Change wallpaper	Turn on GPS	Install APKs	Sensor: Accelerometer	Turn of GPS	Change clock
Turn on Airplane mode	Set ringer	Sensor: Gyroscope	Turn off Airplane mode	Cancel Call / Hang up	Turn on screen
Set volume	Sensor: Rotation/Pitch	Turn of Terminal	Connect AC	Send SMS	Get location
Go Home	Lock Terminal	Turn of 3G	Bright auto	Set bright auto	View SMS

2.2. DroidDocker

In the distributed analysis subsystem, DroidDocker, SCREDDENT performs both static and dynamic analysis in the cloud (see Figure 4). Here, the on-device SVM model, used to analyze application manifest files, is trained remotely. The SVM classifier uses manifest features identified in recent work^{12, 16, 3}. Benign application samples were collected from Google Play and malware samples were collected from Contagion mobile malware minidump. The on-device application is then updated with the resulting SVM. This SVM is regularly updated. These updates leverage information regarding false positives from users to improve the SVM.

The distributed analysis system also executes dynamic analysis. Currently, we employ TargetDroid to perform dynamic analysis⁹. Targetdroid is an Android malware analysis tool that employs behavior-triggering markovian models to detect targeted smartphone malware. It is built around Droidbox, an out-of-the-box Android malware dynamic analysis tool¹³. TargetDroid uses the stochastic models to modify the standard Android emulator settings, like the battery being half full, to aid in triggering malicious behaviors by injecting these events. DroidDocker further facilitates automatically injecting the stored user-triggered events into the emulated environment in a scalable fashion²⁰. By modifying TargetDroid, DroidDocker is able to scale its dynamic analysis to fit within the SCREDDENT framework. DroidDocker is able to surpass the standard emulator instance limitation and managing event injection with monkeyrunner for each dynamic analysis instance running in parallel^{20, 32}. We store the results of SCREDDENT’s dynamic analysis for subsequent risk analysis and user notification.




Fig. 3. (a) Markov Model of Battery Status; (b) K-means Group Clustering, k=5.




Fig. 4 . DroidDocker Architecture.

SCREDDENT implements scalable analysis using Docker's container technology as the testbed platform¹⁰. SCREDDENT manages the creation, scheduling, and execution of virtual clones in the cloud using Docker. SCREDDENT's modular distributed analysis subsystem connects to standalone databases of contextual or user behavior data to a desired analysis tool's docker image. As stated previously, SCREDDENT currently uses TargetDroid for dynamic analysis. Since TargetDroid is out-of-box, it shares the 15 emulator instance restriction that the standard Android emulator possesses⁹. Using Docker allows SCREDDENT to easily surpass this limitation and do so with a lower overhead than starting a new virtual machine each time an instance limitation is reached¹⁰. SCREDDENT creates or executes TargetDroid instances according to a longest match algorithm to pair user group models with the emulators that best match the real devices of user group members.

4. Limitations

SCREDDENT requires access to Wi-Fi or mobile data at some point to conduct its deeper analysis. If the user never enables either, then SCREDDENT cannot perform its needed updates. Similarly, SCREDDENT requires access to the network GPS in order to perform location-based notifications. SCREDDENT shares several attack surfaces, such as man-in-the-middle attacks when uploading log files or attacks to the containers^{25, 15, 1}. Additional efforts need to be taken to minimize these surfaces. SCREDDENT's dynamic analysis testbed framework allows for a different analysis tool to be substituted as the state of the art progresses. However, SCREDDENT currently uses TargetDroid for analysis and inherits TargetDroid limitations⁹. SCREDDENT also only replicates a limited amount of interactions as limited by the standard Android SDK. This replication limitation may be remedied by using alternative emulators, such as QEMU-based, or Google releases newer standard emulators²⁷.

5. Conclusion and Future Work

The increase of next generation mobile malware has inspired the development of next generation malware detection tools. These tools often focus on individual users and fail to provide customized alerts. We presented SCREDDENT as a targeted malware classification, detection, and alert tool. SCREDDENT uses user group profiling to increase the scalability of data collection and storage. SCREDDENT also leverages real time processing to improve analysis performance and user experience.

Although the SCREDDENT framework has been implemented, there are optimizations that need to be made. For instance, large scale, long term, end to end testing of SCREDDENT needs to be completed. The observations made from real world deployment will provide information regarding improving the models used in each subsystem and how they can be modified for increased accuracy. Large scale testing will also reveal key areas for performance optimizations throughout the system, such as algorithms reducing dynamic analysis runtime. Further, user testing can be done to improve the adaptive user notification experience.

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