

# A Neural Representation of Categorization Uncertainty in the Human Brain

Jack Grinband,<sup>1,2,3,\*</sup> Joy Hirsch,<sup>1,2</sup>  
and Vincent P. Ferrera<sup>1,3</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Center for Neurobiology and Behavior

<sup>2</sup>fMRI Research Center

<sup>3</sup>David Mahoney Center for Brain  
and Behavior Research

Columbia University

New York, New York 10032

## Summary

The ability to classify visual objects into discrete categories (“friend” versus “foe”; “edible” versus “poisonous”) is essential for survival and is a fundamental cognitive function. The cortical substrates that mediate this function, however, have not been identified in humans. To identify brain regions involved in stimulus categorization, we developed a task in which subjects classified stimuli according to a variable categorical boundary. Psychophysical functions were used to define a decision variable, categorization uncertainty, which was systematically manipulated. Using event-related functional MRI, we discovered that activity in a fronto-striatal-thalamic network, consisting of the medial frontal gyrus, anterior insula, ventral striatum, and dorsomedial thalamus, was modulated by categorization uncertainty. We found this network to be distinct from the frontoparietal attention network, consisting of the frontal and parietal eye fields, where activity was not correlated with categorization uncertainty.

## Introduction

Categorization of objects into distinct classes is central to decisions that affect survival. To categorize an approaching animal as “dangerous” or “innocuous,” for example, may depend on the animal’s distance. In this case, one attends to the relevant dimension (distance) and then compares it to an internal criterion demarcating “danger.” Furthermore, the categorical boundary must be sensitive to context: is the tiger three feet away in a jungle, or in a zoo? Categorization is thus a critical and dynamic aspect of decision-making, yet the neural mechanisms by which this comparison process occurs are not well understood.

One of the challenges in decision-making research in general has been to determine which variables are neurally encoded, and how this information is then used. Single unit studies in nonhuman primates have focused on cortical areas that are part of a frontoparietal attention network (Posner and Petersen, 1990), particularly the lateral intraparietal area (LIP) in the posterior parietal cortex (PPC) and the frontal eye fields (FEF) in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC). These studies have identified decision variables related to signal

detection, accumulation of evidence, response selection, and outcome evaluation (Schall and Hanes, 1993; Hanes and Schall, 1996; Kim and Shadlen, 1999; Shadlen and Newsome, 2001; Mazurek et al., 2003; Platt and Glimcher, 1999). Studies that have looked explicitly at categorization (Freedman et al., 2001, 2003) have found evidence for category-specific neuronal responses in the lateral prefrontal cortex; it is possible that the role of such neurons is to establish a categorical boundary or to be involved in the comparison process necessary for making a categorical decision.

To identify neural activation related to stimulus categorization, we developed an event-related fMRI task (Figure 1) in which subjects categorized a stimulus, which varied continuously along a single dimension, into one of two categories. To accurately perform this categorization, subjects had to compare the stimulus to an abstract categorical boundary, such that the difficulty of the comparison process was inversely proportional to the distance of the stimulus from that boundary. In other words, the closer the stimulus was to the boundary, the greater the categorization uncertainty became. We hypothesized that BOLD activity related to the comparison process would be proportional to categorization uncertainty. We provide evidence that the neural substrate for comparing a stimulus to a categorical boundary includes the medial frontal gyrus (MFG), anterior insula (AI), ventral striatum (VS), and dorsomedial thalamus (dmTh).

## Results

Subjects performed a task in which they judged a vertical line segment to be long or short relative to one of two criterion lengths. The criterion lengths were not shown explicitly to the subjects but were learned through feedback. On each trial, one criterion was chosen at random, and this was represented by a symbolic cue (colored circle) presented at the beginning of the trial. To characterize a psychophysical variable related to categorization, we constructed psychometric functions (Figure 2A; Figure S5A in the Supplemental Data available with this article online) for subjects’ evaluation of line lengths, sorting responses according to length and cue color. Rectifying the psychometric functions around the point of subjective equality (PSE) created a function that provided an estimate of subjective uncertainty (the uncertainty function) (Figure 2A; Figure S5A).

This function could reflect uncertainty either at the signal detection stage or at the categorization stage of the decision-making process. We hypothesized that the latter was more likely the case, as the stimuli were all highly discriminable. To confirm this, we asked subjects to perform the same categorization task with the red/green cue (*symbolic criterion condition*) replaced by a line segment equal in length to the categorical boundary (*explicit criterion condition*).

If the ability to detect changes in stimulus length (i.e., signal detection) had been the primary source of decision uncertainty in the subject’s performance, then the

\*Correspondence: [jg2269@columbia.edu](mailto:jg2269@columbia.edu)




Figure 1. Experimental Design

(Top) Subjects were presented with one of two cues. After a delay, a line segment was presented, and subjects indicated whether the line appeared “long” or “short” relative to the categorical boundary (CB) indicated by the cue. The line remained on screen until the subject responded. A tone indicated whether the response was correct or incorrect. (Bottom) The black circle (actual cue was red) represented a CB located between stimulus 5 and stimulus 6 (dashed line); the gray circle (actual cue was green) represented a CB between stimulus 11 and stimulus 12. For example, if the gray cue is presented, stimuli 1–11 are “short,” while stimuli 12–16 are “long.” To minimize learning effects in the scanner, subjects learned to associate the cue with its CB over the course of 1000 prescanning practice trials.

psychometric functions would be the same in the explicit and the symbolic criterion conditions. If, however, the representation of the internal decision criterion had been the primary source of decision uncertainty in performance, then the psychometric functions of the explicit criterion task would be characterized by smaller Weber fractions than in the symbolic criterion task. In fact, across all subjects, the largest Weber fraction observed in the explicit criterion task was three times smaller than the smallest Weber fraction in the symbolic criterion task, indicating that the limiting factor in the main task was indeed the representation of the decision criterion, not the visual discrimination of the stimulus itself.

We predicted that cortical areas containing categorization-related neurons would present BOLD responses with magnitude modulated by per-trial uncertainty. This signal should represent processes related to the comparison of a stimulus against an abstract categorical boundary, including categorization-specific attention, category rule application, and category-related memory retrieval processes. In contrast, non-categorization regions involved in processing other aspects of the decision—such as signal detection, non-decision-related attention, motor planning, etc.—should have constant response magnitudes across all trials, reflecting the stability of these variables.

Neural activity during the decision was modeled using two regressors. One regressor, the *unmodulated response time regressor*, was aligned with stimulus onset and had a duration equal to the subject’s response time on each trial. Prior to convolution with the hemodynamic response function (HRF), the height of this regressor was constant across all trials (Figure S2). The other regressor, the *uncertainty regressor*, was also equal in duration to the response time but varied in amplitude from trial to trial depending on the value of the uncertainty function for the given stimulus. Thus, after convolution with the HRF, the amplitude of the uncertainty regressor reflected both the response time and the uncertainty for each trial.


Activity that was significantly correlated with the unmodulated regressor was widely distributed across the entire brain (Figure S4A). In contrast, activity modulated

by categorization uncertainty was found in MFG and AI, and VS and dmTh (Figure 3), but not in the PPC or DLPFC.

To confirm that PPC and DLPFC were not related to categorization uncertainty, we identified regions of interest (ROIs) in the frontoparietal oculomotor/attentional network (Posner and Petersen, 1990) using a center-out saccade task (Figure 4A). These ROIs fit within the “empty” or uncorrelated regions of the uncertainty activation map (Figure 4B). This result suggests that the MFG-AI-VS-dmTh network is spatially and functionally distinct from the frontoparietal attentional network.

The regression model used to identify activation correlated to decision uncertainty is sensitive to the correlation between individual regressors. Because subjects’ response times were partially correlated with psychophysical uncertainty (Figure 2B;  $r = 0.342$ ;  $n = 10$ ), it was impossible to construct a model in which uncertainty and reaction time were not correlated. We therefore performed an alternate analysis that did not depend on linear regression. In this analysis, we computed event-triggered averages of the HRFs aligned with stimulus onset within ROIs identified by the regression model. To break the correlation between uncertainty and response time, we restricted this analysis to trials with response times confined to a 200 ms window (Figure S5B). Since typical response times ranged from 500 ms to 2500 ms, the use of a small response time window minimized the correlation between response time and uncertainty ( $r = 0.094$ ;  $n = 10$ ), allowing us to evaluate the effect of categorization uncertainty on the BOLD response while effectively holding response time constant.


We created ROI masks from the thresholded activation maps and measured time-dependent BOLD changes within those masks for the response time-constrained subset of trials. The trials were further subdivided into low (0–0.33), medium (0.34–0.66), and high (0.67–1.0) psychophysical uncertainty. Figure 5A shows the percent signal change for each trial type. Whereas the BOLD response in the categorization network was modulated by uncertainty, no such relationship was observed in the oculomotor/attentional regions.



**Figure 2. Psychometric and Uncertainty Functions**  
(A) Trials were sorted to create percent “long” responses as a function of stimulus length in pixels (top panel). The two curves correspond to the two cues (black and gray), respectively, for one typical subject. The psychophysical data were acquired simultaneously with the fMRI data. To create uncertainty functions (bottom panel), each psychometric function was rectified around the PSE and normalized such that the range varied from 0 to 1. Thus, by definition, the PSE has maximum uncertainty and the endpoint stimuli have minimum uncertainty. Each stimulus can have variable uncertainty depending on which cue preceded it (although the biggest differences in uncertainty between the two cues are near the categorical boundaries).  
(B) The mean linear correlation coefficient between RT and uncertainty is 0.342 ( $n = 10$ ). The relationship between uncertainty and reaction time, however, is not linear. There is no significant difference in this relationship between the two cues. Error bars represent standard error across ten subjects.


### Discussion

Decision-making is often treated as a unitary cognitive function; however, it is likely that even simple decisions involve an aggregation of several distinct subprocesses



**Figure 3. Activity Correlated to Categorization Uncertainty**  
Group (mixed effects) analysis of ten subjects, ~750 trials/subject (Z threshold at  $p < 0.05$ , resel corrected). (A) The network of uncertainty-related areas consists of the medial frontal gyrus (MFG), anterior insula (AI), ventral striatum (VS), and dorsomedial thalamus (dmTh). (B) The unthresholded Z statistic map demonstrates the underlying correlational structure of the brain activity. Blue indicates negatively correlated activity ( $Z < -1.6$ ), red indicates positively correlated activity ( $Z > 1.6$ ), and black/white indicates the 95% confidence interval ( $-1.96 < Z < 1.96$ ), which contains voxels that are not correlated to uncertainty. This figure illustrates that the result in (A) is not a product of fortuitous thresholding. Cross hairs intersect at the same point in all slices (MNI152: 0, 30, -4). The unthresholded map is superimposed on a gray outline of an average brain; the solid gray represents regions that were not scanned in all subjects.

that includes signal detection, categorization, motor planning, and outcome evaluation. In the context of sensory-motor behavior, categorization may be an essential stage linking signal detection and motor planning, particularly when the mapping between stimulus and motor response is contingent on behavioral context. Several prior studies have used functional imaging to




**Figure 4. Attention and Categorization Networks Are Spatially Dissociated**

Activation map ( $p < 0.05$ , resel corrected) for a simple center-out saccade task (left) shows that eye movements elicit activity in the frontal eye fields, supplementary eye fields, and parietal eye fields. The outlines of the activation clusters are overlaid on the unthresholded Z statistic map of the uncertainty regressor, in which blue indicates negative correlation ( $Z < -1.6$ ), red indicates positive correlation ( $Z < 1.6$ ), and gray indicates the 95% confidence interval ( $-1.96 < Z < 1.96$ ) in which activity is not correlated to uncertainty. The saccade activity overlay fits almost perfectly into the gray regions of the unthresholded activation map, indicating that the areas involved in directing spatial attention/oculomotor control are not correlated to categorization uncertainty and are therefore not involved in making categorical judgments.

investigate the role of uncertainty in decision-making, though none has specifically focused on uncertainty related to categorization (Huettel et al., 2005; Volz et al., 2003, 2004; Critchley et al., 2001; Paulus et al., 2002). These studies have instead demonstrated that, by varying the probability with which a stimulus or response occurs, one can modulate activity in several regions of the frontal and parietal cortex (including LIP, MFG, AI, FEF, SEF, ACC, DLPFC, and VMPFC). The present work, however, distinguishes categorization uncertainty from other decision variables and provides evidence that this form of uncertainty modulates activity in a frontal-striatal loop.

To the extent that decision uncertainty is correlated with response time, our results are consistent with previous reports. In the present study, however, we took several steps to dissociate the categorical act from non-categorization processes present during the response time. By explicitly modeling response times, we accounted for non-categorization-related differences between trial types. Furthermore, we segregated activity with constant intensity across trials (unmodulated regressor) from activity with intensity modulated by categorization uncertainty (uncertainty regressor). While the former consists of a variety of cognitive processes, the latter is likely to represent the comparison process itself.

The network of brain regions where activation was correlated with uncertainty after controlling for response time (MFG, AI, VS, dmTh) represents a classic basal



**Figure 5. Hemodynamic Responses**

(A) Percent BOLD signal change for trials within a 200 ms response time window. The response time window for each subject was chosen so as to maximize the total number of high-uncertainty trials. However, the results were the same for three other nonoverlapping windows (see Figure S6). Black, brown, and red represent low, medium, and high uncertainty, respectively. Error bars represent standard error. The oculomotor/attention brain regions show no significant modulation by categorization uncertainty. However, AI, VS, and MFG all show a positive correlation with uncertainty.

(B) To quantify this relationship, we computed the area under the BOLD response curve over the first 8 s. The integral of the BOLD response as a function of uncertainty clearly shows a monotonically increasing relationship in AI, VS, and MFG.

ganglia-thalamocortical loop (Alexander and Crutcher, 1990). Converging neuropsychological and neuroimaging evidence has been used to construct a model of category learning that involves the prefrontal cortex, basal ganglia, anterior cingulate, and thalamus (Maddox and Ashby, 2004; Ashby and Maddox, 2005). Freedman et al. (2003) have suggested that the mapping of a stimulus to abstract categories occurs throughout the frontal cortex, whereas the temporal lobe is involved in the processing of the physical properties of the stimulus. We found that two areas in the frontal cortex are involved in processing categorical information, MFG (BA8) and AI. BA8 has been shown to be active in a variety of tasks that involve cognitive control, preresponse conflict, and decision uncertainty (Ridderinkhof et al., 2004). In fact, these types of tasks show increased activity throughout the medial wall of the frontal cortex, including areas






Figure 6. Extended Diffusion Model

The model explicitly represents three state variables. Proximity to categorical boundary is encoded as the rate of the diffusion process. Accumulated evidence is the time integral of the diffusion rate. Decision uncertainty is the time integral of the accumulated evidence. The model predicts that response times are proportional to decision uncertainty and explains how response times can vary when stimulus strength remains constant.

BA6, BA8, BA24, and BA32. In our case, we found that the unmodulated regressor shows increased activity in all of these regions; however, the uncertainty activation was found only in BA8. The anterior cingulate (BA24; Figure 3B), the supplementary eye fields (BA6; Figure 4), and the DLPFC (BA46/9; Figure 4) showed no activity correlated with uncertainty after taking response time into account.

The AI is part of the orbitofrontal cortex and has widespread efferent and afferent projections to and from both the frontal and parietal cortices (Mesulam and Mufson, 1982a, 1982b), suggesting that it participates in the integration of multimodal information. It has been suggested to be involved in the processing of reward value and hedonic experience (Kringelbach, 2005). Studies have shown that the AI is correlated with subjective pleasantness ratings of food (Kringelbach et al., 2003), predicted reward value of odors (Gottfried et al., 2003), intensity of pain (Wager et al., 2004), and fairness of economic offers (Sanfey et al., 2003). All of these studies modulated the reward value of the stimulus, but subjects were also required to categorize the stimulus along a given dimension. Furthermore, a number of studies of decision-making have shown insular activity in the absence of reward modulation and/or minimal integration demands (Huettel et al., 2005; Volz et al., 2003, 2004; Critchley et al., 2001; Paulus et al., 2002). Thus, there are at least two hypotheses for explaining activity in the AI. In our task, AI activation was correlated with categorization uncertainty even though reward value was not modulated.

The VS has been shown to be modulated by predictability of reward. Berns et al. (2001) showed that VS increases activity when rewards became less predictable, a result consistent with models of dopamine release (Schultz et al., 1997). Category learning models have also involved the basal ganglia (Maddox and Ashby, 2004). It is possible that the VS provides an instructive signal necessary for the adjustment of a categorical boundary when uncertainty is high. Such a strategy would allow subjects to minimize errors by maintaining accurate category boundaries.

### Relationship of Imaging Results to Single Neuron Studies

Single neuron recordings in behaving animals have been used to identify activity associated with a number of decision processes. An emerging theme has been that decision-making is correlated with sustained neural activity that is integrated over time. Studies in inferior parietal lobule (Shadlen and Newsome, 2001) and DLPFC (Kim and Shadlen, 1999), for instance, have shown that activity accumulates over time, with a rate proportional

to signal strength; and this build-up activity is a good predictor of oculomotor response times (Hanes and Schall, 1996).

These results have lent support to models in which binary decisions are treated as a random walk or a race between two competing signal accumulators (Usher and McClelland, 2001; Ratcliff and Smith, 2004; Ratcliff et al., 2003): when enough evidence has been collected by one of the accumulators, a response is selected. This type of model correctly predicts that response times are negatively correlated with signal strength. Signal detection models predict that general decision regions of the brain should become more active as the decision becomes easier (Heekeren et al., 2004). Indeed, a positive correlation between signal strength and neural activity is expected for brain regions involved in signal detection.

However, these types of models have not been able to explain how response times can vary when signal strength is constant, nor do they account for neural activity that is positively correlated with response time. Categorization-related brain regions, however, should show a different pattern of activity, especially when signal strength is constant and above threshold. In fact, single cell recordings have shown the existence of category selective neurons that fire earlier and with higher frequency the closer the stimulus is to the categorical boundary (Freedman et al., 2001; Miller et al., 2003).

Our data suggest that decision uncertainty can be dissociated from stimulus discriminability, both psychophysically and neurally. Our data also provide evidence for neural activation that increases with response time. To account for these observations, we propose a simple extension of the standard diffusion model (Figure 6). By integrating the accumulated evidence over time, it is possible to create a variable that we call decision effort, which increases as the rate of evidence accumulation decreases. Such a model can explain how response times can increase while stimulus strength remains constant and how decreasing information can create more neural activity (i.e., a larger load on the categorization process). This extension of the standard diffusion model is natural because it involves nothing more than the repeated application of neural time integration, a well-established neurocomputational principle (Aksay et al., 2001; Mazurek et al., 2003). The model provides a means for monitoring the rate of evidence accumulation, which may be important in assigning confidence to the outcome of the evidence accumulation process.

### Experimental Procedures

Experiments were performed on ten adult subjects (five females; ages: 18–34) who provided informed consent according to guidelines approved by the Institutional Review Boards of Columbia

University and the New York State Psychiatric Institute. All had normal vision.

### Psychophysics

Prior to scanning, each subject was trained on the task outside the scanner. Stimuli were presented on a calibrated 21 in CRT monitor with a resolution of 1600 × 1200 pixels and frame rate of 75 Hz. Subjects were seated comfortably with their head in a chinrest at a viewing distance of 36 in. Subjects responded by pressing a key on a numeric keypad (USB interface). Both the identity of the key and the time at which it was pressed were recorded. Stimulus generation and response collection were managed using the Psychophysics Toolbox running under Matlab 5.2 on a G4 Macintosh computer (OS 9.2). This combination of software and hardware was tested to ensure precise timing control over stimuli and responses. Auditory feedback was provided to indicate a correct (high tone) or incorrect (low tone) response.

Subject's responses were sorted to produce psychometric functions indicating the percentage of trials on which the stimulus was categorized as "long" as a function of physical stimulus length in pixels. The psychometric functions were fit with Weibull (Quick, 1974) functions of the following form:

$$(1) \text{ percent long} = 1 - 2^{-(x/\mu)^\epsilon}$$

The parameters  $\mu$  and  $\epsilon$  were fit by maximum likelihood estimation. The uncertainty function was defined as follows:

$$(2) \text{ uncertainty} = \frac{\left| 0.5 - 2^{-(x/\mu)^\epsilon} \right| - 0.5}{j}$$

where  $\phi$  was equal to the value of the uncertainty at the PSE. The PSE was defined as the stimulus length for which percent long = percent short = 50%. We defined a discrimination threshold, or just noticeable difference (jnd),  $\Delta L$ , as half the difference between the 25% and 75% correct points on the psychometric function. We also defined a Weber fraction,  $\Delta L/L$ , as the jnd divided by the PSE. Response times were measured as the time (in ms) elapsed between the onset of the test stimulus and the registration of the key press.

To minimize learning-related effects over the course of the experiment, subjects performed 1000 trials (100 trials per session) outside the scanner over the course of a week prior to starting the fMRI scanning sessions. Performance on the task reached asymptotic levels after approximately 200 to 300 trials. Subjects performed one practice run within the scanner prior to data collection. Each subject was scanned 10 times. The series of scans for each subject took place within a 3–6 week period with no more than one session per day. Psychophysical thresholds were compared between the fMRI and the psychophysics experiments to confirm that the tasks were equally difficult.

During the fMRI experiment, stimuli were presented using a calibrated LCD projector (Sanyo PLCXP30) at a resolution of 1280 × 1024 pixels and a frame rate of 75 Hz. Stimuli were generated and responses collected using the Psychophysics Toolbox running under Matlab 5.2 on a G4 Macintosh computer (OS 9.2). Auditory feedback was provided via MR-compatible headphones. Stimulus size was adjusted to match the stimuli in the psychophysics experiments. The cue stimuli were red and green circles, 5.0° in diameter and 0.2° thick. The colors were matched for luminance. The line stimuli were black, vertically oriented line segments, 4 pixels wide, 40–70 pixels long, ranging from 0.4° to 0.7° in height against a gray background. The line segments were blurred by filtering with a 2D Gaussian blur function of the following form:

$$(3) G(x, y) = e^{-\frac{(x-x_0)^2 + (y-y_0)^2}{\sigma^2}}$$

where  $\sigma$  is the space constant of the blur function. An individualized blur was applied to each subject's stimulus set to make the task of roughly equal difficulty (as measured by the Weber fraction) across subjects. The stimulus set was also adjusted such that it spanned a broad range of high, medium, and low values of uncertainty.

### fMRI Imaging

Imaging experiments were conducted using a 1.5T GE Scanner using a standard GE birdcage head coil. A bite bar was used to minimize head motion. Structural scans were performed using the 3D SPGR sequence (124 slices; 256 × 256; FOV = 200 mm). Functional scans were performed using EPI bold (TE = 50; TR = 1.6; 17 slices; 64 × 64; FOV = 200 mm; voxel size = 3 mm × 3 mm × 5.5 mm). Slices were positioned to cover the frontal and parietal lobes on all subjects. Some subjects had brains larger than the z axis FOV (94 mm), which resulted in no coverage in the most ventral portions of the occipital and temporal lobe. We only report activity for voxels common to all ten subjects.

All analysis was done using the FMRIB Software Library (FSL; <http://www.fmrib.ox.ac.uk/fsl/index.html>). Preprocessing consisted of motion correction (McFlirt), brain extraction (BET), high-pass filtering (>50 s), and spatial filtering (FWHM = 5 mm). Standard statistical parametric mapping techniques (FEAT) were performed in original T2\* space. Multiple linear regression was used to identify voxels that correlated with specific behavioral events. Activation thresholds were set at  $p = 0.05$ , resel corrected. Second level analyses were performed in standard MNI152 space by applying the registration transformation matrices to the parameter estimates. In order to maximize the statistical power of the event-related fMRI data analysis, the stimuli were presented with a temporal jitter. The two ISIs and ITI were uniformly distributed across values from 1 to 4 s. This results in a mean ISI and ITI equal to 2.5 s. Recent work (Wager and Nichols, 2003) suggests that ITIs of 2.5 s have high efficiency for parameter estimation.

### Supplemental Data

The Supplemental Data include Supplemental Results, six supplemental figures, and two supplemental tables and can be found with this article online at <http://www.neuron.org/cgi/content/full/49/5/757/DC1/>.

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