Competitive and Entrepreneurial Cities and Regions

Peter Trainor

Note – Peter Trainor, a PhD student in Politics at Flinders passed away in late 2010 after a long illness. At the time of his passing, Peter was working towards completing his thesis on issues in urban politics and governance in the northern region of Adelaide. He had made significant progress with his research, a small part of which is published here. This paper gives a flavour of the depth and intellectual commitment that Peter brought to his work. We are pleased to publish the paper in partial recognition of Peter’s valuable contribution to intellectual life at Flinders both as a student and teacher.

In recent times, politics and public policy in western democracies have been shaped by a number of trends and influences including the rise of neoliberalism and the emergence of the ‘competition state, the complex of changes reflected in the idea of globalization and the associated ‘decentring’ of the national political economies, and the increasing resort to new mechanisms of governance with the consequent blurring of boundaries not only between different parts and different levels of government, but also between the public and private sectors.

An increasing focus, in both academic and policy circles, on competitive and entrepreneurial sub-national spatial ‘entities’ — cities, regions, city-regions and localities — may be understood as a reflection of these developments, but also as a contributing factor and ongoing ‘driver’ of these changes.1

Many of these themes are touched on in the complex and contested debates surrounding the concepts of “new regionalism” and “new institutionalism”.2 While debate under the rubric of “new regionalism” extends to discussion of supra-national and cross-border regions,3 the focus in the present study is on sub-national regions, broadly defined.

The idea of “territorial competition”4 both within and across national boundaries is now widely accepted in academic literature, as well as in the language of policymakers and politicians. Debate on this question is reflected in such terms as “urban
competitiveness”\textsuperscript{5} and “competitive cities”, \textsuperscript{6} “urban entrepreneurialism”\textsuperscript{7} and “entrepreneurial cities”, \textsuperscript{8} or “territorial competitiveness”. \textsuperscript{9} Although there are writers who draw some distinction between the concepts of’ competitiveness’ and ‘entrepreneurialism’, \textsuperscript{10} in much of the literature, the terms are more or less interchangeable.\textsuperscript{11}

For the present discussion, the broad equivalence of these concepts is assumed, while bearing in mind an underlying distinction in meaning.\textsuperscript{12} While use of the concept of competitiveness in the sense applied here is “pervasive”, \textsuperscript{13} and the idea is on occasions appealed to in simplistic terms, there are a number of important background questions and complicating factors worthy of consideration.

In his seminal article of 1989, David Harvey identified a trend in urban governance “from managerialism to entrepreneurialism”, and suggested that this trend was evident “across national boundaries and even across political parties and ideologies”.

\textsuperscript{14} He linked this development to the transformations in global capitalism which gathered pace from the mid-1970s. Historically, Harvey traced urban competitiveness as far back as “the Hanseatic league and the Italian city states”, noting also the recent precursors of urban entrepreneurialism in old-style “civic boosterism” and “growth machine” politics.\textsuperscript{15} However, he found distinctive features in the new style of urban entrepreneurialism which had emerged with the weakening of “the Keynesian compromise” of the post-WWII era.\textsuperscript{16} He referred in particular to the increasing use of ‘governance’ mechanisms, conceived here in terms of “public-private partnerships”:

[T]he new entrepreneurialism has, as its centerpiece, the notion of a ‘public-private partnership’ in which a traditional local boosterism is integrated with the use of local governmental powers to try and attract external sources of funding, new direct investments, or new employment sources.\textsuperscript{17}

For Harvey, an important aspect of the shift to urban entrepreneurialism was a change in emphasis away from the more traditional focus of urban government on “[the] provision of services, facilities and benefits to urban populations”.\textsuperscript{18} He also highlighted the tension between the territorially bounded perspective of government, and the inherently less bounded horizons of the private sector:
The new urban entrepreneurialism typically rests … on a public-private partnership focusing on investment and economic development with the speculative construction of place rather than amelioration of conditions within a particular territory as its immediate (though by no means exclusive) political and economic goal. [emphasis added]\(^{19}\)

Hubbard and Hall are cautious about “the perpetuation of a dualistic model of managerialism and entrepreneurialism” which some readings of Harvey might imply.\(^{20}\) They draw attention to significant historical continuities in city-based attempts to foster local economic development, finding precedents in both the boosterism in the nineteenth century frontier towns of the US, and also in “processes of place invention and promotion” witnessed in Australian cities in the colonial era.\(^{21}\)

Historically, they suggest, city government has always involved “an amalgam of managerially (socially progressive) and entrepreneurial (growth-centred) policies”.\(^{22}\) Nevertheless, these writers accept that

… there have been major changes in the way that cities are governed, and the way that the political process operating in cities impinges on the lives of urban populations.\(^{23}\)

Importantly, and consistently with Harvey, they point to the “ubiquity of entrepreneurial [urban] policies throughout the advanced capitalist world”, and note that in consequence, “cities are being run in a more business-like manner”, with “a political prioritisation of pro-growth local economic development, and …an associated organisational and institutional shift from urban government to urban governance”.\(^{24}\)

While there are some dissenting voices,\(^{25}\) over the last two decades, the idea of cities and regions as ‘competitive’ or ‘entrepreneurial’ entities has been widely accepted by analysts\(^{26}\) and also, importantly, by policy makers.\(^{27}\)

Begg points out that there are hazards in the “glib” use of such ideas, and refers to competitiveness as “a very slippery concept …open to multiple interpretations”, and one in the name of which “many policy initiatives are undertaken”.\(^{28}\) While ‘competitiveness’ may be understood simply as a quality of a particular territory
"equated ...with the ‘performance’ of an economy”, the concept is more generally seen as relating to a city’s capacity “to undercut its rivals …essentially about securing (or defending) market share”.29

Begg’s perspective is consistent with that of Camagni, who argues that “the Ricardian principle of comparative advantage” — which at the national scale “assigns a role to every country in the international division of labour” — does not apply at the sub-national level of city or region.30 If this view is accepted, an important implication is that not only do cities and regions find themselves in competition, but they increasingly compete in an environment where failure to achieve a certain level of ‘competitiveness’, may ultimately result in “crisis, depopulation and [economic] desertification”.31

On the features of urban competitiveness, there appears to be general agreement. Gordon summarises the parameters in the following terms:

Cities compete in a variety of ways...the most significant involve rivalry within product markets, and that for inward investment, the attraction of desirable residents, and contests for funding or events from higher levels of government ... competition may be concentrated among a few (identifiable) rivals or may involve many, and the field within which it occurs may be local, regional, national, continental or global.32

Lever and Turok contrast competition among cities and regions with, on the one hand, the ways in which nations compete — “by adjusting interest rates or the exchange value of their currency, or by engaging in restrictive practices or collaboration”— and, on the other hand, the ways in which firms compete — “with a single hierarchical decision-making body and a single objective, profit maximisation”.33

While the competitive strategies of nations and of firms are by-and-large not available to cities and regions, Lever and Turok concur with Gordon in finding that places “do compete for mobile investment, population, tourism, public funds and hallmark events such as the Olympic Games”.34

Docherty et al express similar views in their summary of aspects of inter-city competitiveness:
Cities compete as operating locations for firms, as nodes for the exchange and processing of information and capital flows, and as places where people want to live, work and consume. ‘Competitive’ cities are those that are most successful in attracting and retaining the skilled people and innovative firms that characterize the knowledge-led economy. If a city is unable to compete to secure these resources, it risks being ‘by-passed, leaving declining sectors, communities and cities behind’.

Beyond the issue of whether sub-national territories—cities, regions and urban areas—can be said to be in competition with one another, a number of further perspectives warrant consideration: questions associated with the concept of territorial ‘agency’ and the linkages between government and business which this entails; the ‘nature’ of territorial competition (e.g. “zero-sum” vs. “non zero-sum” competition); and the range of strategies deployed by ‘territorial’ actors in the pursuit of ‘competitive’ and ‘entrepreneurial’ ends.

The idea that territorial entities can engage in competitive and entrepreneurial strategies suggests a capacity for agency which seems to run the risk of ‘reification’. Keating recognises that “[t]o speak of regions as actors” presents difficulties “unless we specify how such actors, or systems of actors are constructed”. He suggests that the mobilization of various local actors around “projects for [local/regional] economic development” is one way in which, increasingly, “cities or city-regions” are constructed as “actors”. In relation to this question of agency Jessop appeals to the views of Cox and Mair, who defend the concept of territorial agency in the following terms:

If people interpret localised social structures explicitly in territorial terms, come to view their interests and identities as ‘local’, and then act upon that view by mobilising locally defined organisations to further their interests in a manner that would not seem possible were they to act separately, then it seems eminently reasonable to talk about ‘locality as agent’.

129
A more direct understanding of territorial agency is captured succinctly in Cheshire’s definition of the idea of “territorial competition”:

By ‘territorial competition’ is meant a process through which groups, acting on behalf of a regional or sub-regional economy (typically that of a city-region), seek to promote it as a location for economic activity either implicitly or explicitly in competition with other areas.  

As noted earlier, competitive strategies of place typically involve firstly, some kind of public-private partnership, and secondly, the active pursuit and fostering of “investment and economic development” at the local level. Various approaches to the theorising of business-government relationships in the urban context have been articulated. Two important theoretical strands in the North American context have been “growth machine” theory and “urban regime theory”. While growth machine theory has been classified as an “elite” model of urban politics, regime theory has been associated with “neo-pluralism” or “elite pluralism”. The label “North American [urban] political economy” has been attached to both of these models. Each of these approaches ascribes an important role to agents (both public- and private-sector) in fostering local economic development. A third theoretical strand is found in diverse writings by exponents of the so-called Regulation Approach. With “roots in neo-Marxism”, this approach presents a more structurally oriented account of urban political economy.

A range of competitive and entrepreneurial strategies may be deployed by territorially based interests and agencies. Different ways of categorizing competitive strategies have been used. In general terms, competitive strategies involve attempts by agencies representing particular areas to enhance their locational advantage by manipulating some of the attributes which contribute to their area’s value as a location for various activities.

In the competition for business activity, Begg suggests that territorial strategies may involve attempts to influence either “price” or “non-price” factors for firms. Price-related factors amenable to adjustment can include — depending on the context — land and labour costs, and local taxes. “Non-price” factors are more diverse, and can include perceived locational attractiveness — for both firms and residents, as well as
tourists — transport and infrastructure efficiencies, and the provision of business services. More broadly, work on the benefits of business clustering and other approaches to “enhancing the business environment” — or local *milieux* — has directed attention to “a range of supply-side factors” which may be “amenable to policy action” geared towards enhancing territorial competitiveness. Examples include endeavours to “foster… innovation and learning” or to foster and secure social cohesion.\(^5\)

Docherty *et al* depict the various “asset bundles” which are important contributors to city competitiveness. Apart from the “existing economic base”, they list “hardware” (in which category they include not only infrastructure, but also “human capital”), “software” (including city image, and perceptions of tolerance, diversity etc.) and “orgware” (“organisational assets”, including “local institutions”,\(^5\) see Figure 1 below). With the exception of the historical aspects of a city’s existing economic base, most of these factors are amenable to influence through strategic intervention by local agents.

**Figure 1:** Urban Asset Bundles (Source Docherty, Gulliver *et al.* 2004, p.448)

In comments about the competitiveness of firms in relation to particular locations, Camagni notes first the importance of “macroeconomic” factors, but also those he refers to as relevant to “the microeconomic and microterritorial approach”. In this latter group, he points to:

the specific advantages strategically created by…single firms, territorial synergies and cooperation capability enhanced by an
imaginative and proactive public administration, externalities provided by local and national governments and the specificities historically built by a territorial culture...all artificial or created advantages, open to the proactive, voluntary action of local communities and their governments.52 [original emphasis]

The necessity for business-government partnership in this context, as observed by Harvey, is also hinted at by Cheshire, who notes that the implementation of strategies for city competitiveness amounts to the localised production of a public good, viz. “additional local economic development”.53 This exercise, he argues, is prone to the standard challenges of the creation of public goods because firms have little incentive to act individually with the aim of creating “positive externalities”.54 On the other hand, while government action is “the other main mechanism for providing quasi-public goods”, there is often a mismatch between “the most effective scale of territorially competitive agencies ... [and] that of established units of city government”.55

In summary, neither the private sector nor the government sector acting alone is in a position to facilitate locally based competitive strategies, since,

The private sector is likely to be ineffective because of problems of market failure ... [while] the zone of competence of city government is typically smaller (and often fragmented) compared to the functionally relevant territory.56

While coordinated action is necessary in this situation, there are real challenges to mobilising an effective local coalition, and the success of such endeavours “cannot be taken for granted”.57 On this score, Docherty notes the particular difficulties which may plague attempts to foster collaboration where there are “cultural differences, particularly between cities with long proud histories of competition”.58

However, challenges to coordination arise not only from “histories of competition” and the vagaries of “multilevel governance” — an important feature of the Australian context59 — but also as a result of certain contradictory aspects in the very idea of territorial competitiveness. An underlying (if often implicit) assumption behind most attempts to mobilise support for strategies of territorial competition is that the
interests of a ‘local’ community (however defined) may be unproblematically identified with the monolithic interests of ‘local business’ or ‘local economic development’.60

For various reasons, reality is likely to be more complex than this. First, even when considering the interests of the business sector, a variety of competitive strategies is available, and different strategies are unlikely to favour all interests equally. As Gordon observes, important questions include those of the ways in which “the priorities of competitive strategies are actually constructed”, and the degree to which “gains to key sectors benefit all”61. The uneven structure of ‘pay-offs’ in relation to competitive strategies means that mobilisation is likely to be achieved more readily around strategies which have the potential to offer substantial gains to “key actors”.62 Turok makes a similar point when he suggests that appeals to the concept of local competitiveness,

can conceal important variations between the competitive positions of different branches of the regional economy…variable economic performance over time… and the uneven consequences of competitive success for different social groups and areas.63

More broadly, as Keating points out, even policy framed in “strictly economic” terms may also have “other objectives”, as well as carrying the potential for negative impacts in social and environmental terms.64 Indeed Keating refers to “studies” which, he suggests, show that, “a focus on economic development tends to increase social inequality, since resources are diverted away from social programmes”.65 The question of a positive or negative relationship between urban competitiveness on the one hand, and social exclusion/inclusion or cohesion66 on the other, has been extensively debated, particularly in the European context.67 There appears to be some agreement that — depending on the approach adopted — strategies for competitiveness may set in train either “virtuous” or “vicious” cycles of change. Keating presents the options in his two models of regional development:

In the virtuous model, there is a successful program of economic development. Social integration is secured and marginalization avoided … In the vicious model … [g]rowth is narrowly defined and
socially divisive. Cultural identity is destroyed or fragmented and the environment neglected.  

A similar perspective is presented by Fainstein, who writes that, “one can visualize the possible relationships between competitiveness and cohesion in terms of virtuous and vicious circles”. ‘Successful’ strategies for territorial competitiveness may fail to bring significant social benefits to the wider local population. Strategies for economic competitiveness may also sit uneasily with necessary agendas for environmental sustainability.

Complexity and conflicting interests notwithstanding, it is not uncommon that some kind of a local coalition is mobilised in pursuit of territorial competitiveness. A wide range of strategies are available, and there are different approaches to categorising such strategies. Jessop draws on Schumpeter’s ideas in offering a distinction between “strong” and “weak” approaches to competition:

[W]hereas strong competition refers to potentially positive-sum attempts to improve the overall (structural) competitiveness of a locality through innovation, weak competition refers to potentially zero-sum attempts to secure the reallocation of existing resources at the expense of other localities … weak competition is socially disembedding, strong competition involves the territorialisation of economic activity.

Jessop implicitly relates the opposition of ‘weak’ vs ‘strong’ competition on the one hand, with a distinction between “static comparative” and “dynamic competitive advantage” on the other. He relates “static comparative advantage” to “so-called ‘natural’ factor endowments”, but also to strategies which are geared towards, attracting inward investment from mobile capital at the expense of other places through such measures as tax breaks, subsidies and regulatory undercutting and/or simple, civic boosterist image-building.

“[D]ynamic competitive advantages”, on the other hand, may be “socially transformed”, and are amenable to nurturing through the introduction of,
economic, political and social innovations to enhance productivity and other conditions affecting the structural and/or systemic competitiveness of both local and mobile capital.\textsuperscript{75}

Jessop’s classification of approaches to competitiveness into two broad categories may be summarised thus:

1. A ‘weak’ model of competition, focused on securing “comparative advantage” and expressed in strategies such as “boosterist image-making”\textsuperscript{76} and the offering of direct financial incentives to business;

2. A ‘strong’ model of competition, directed at fostering “competitive advantage” and pursued through strategies focused on building “a complex of localized and specific economic and extra-economic assets which are socially regularised and socially constructed”.\textsuperscript{77}

Jessop’s ‘weak’ and ‘strong’ models of competition accord with the ‘vicious’ and ‘virtuous’ cycles of competition identified by Keating and by Fainstein as discussed above. While the “virtuous model” of territorial competition holds out the possibility of combining economic development with social and environmental benefits, and even of delivering wider systemic benefits beyond the location in question, the “vicious model” arises out of — and reinforces — perceptions of competitiveness as a “zero-sum game” of “winners and losers”, characterised by destructive ‘beggar-thy-neighbour’ strategies and a “race to the bottom dynamic”.\textsuperscript{78} There is, of course, no reason why both classes of strategy might not be pursued simultaneously in the same context.

The foregoing discussion offers a loose frame within which to locate the various strategies for territorial competition, the most commonly observed of which strategies are indicated in general terms by Cheshire:

\[T\]erritorial competition combines the concerns of traditional property-oriented growth machines … the newer city marketers oriented both to image manipulation and the repackaging of the ‘place product’ … French (or Japanese) planners of regional technopoles … or capacity building and local supply-side policies … \textsuperscript{79}
A core part of action to foster local competition are strategies for the ‘branding’ and ‘marketing’ of places. These warrant a brief comment, firstly because of the wide use of such measures, and secondly because so many strategies for territorial competitiveness include a significant promotional element. The marketing of places has a long history, as Ward points out. However, the present era is distinguished by an increase in the conscious application of marketing principles to the promotion and selling of places. In an environment where ‘places’ are conceived as competitive entities, it is scarcely surprising that modern marketing tools should be deployed in the pursuit of competitive advantage.

In their summary discussion of ‘city marketing’ Short and Kim observe that in the present period,

> Cities are marketing (selling, promoting, advertising) themselves to create and change their image with the intended goal of attracting business, tourists and residents. [emphasis added]

The aim, these writers argue, is to “replace vague or negative images” in the minds of “current or potential residents, investors and visitors”. For Philo and Kearns, city marketing efforts are directed to both ‘external’ and ‘internal’ audiences — on the one hand “to attract capital” and on the other to “legitimate redevelopment”. Short and Lim deliver a longer list of targets of city marketing campaigns — “business firms, industrial plants, corporate and divisional headquarters, investment capital, sports teams, tourists, conventioneers, residents …”. They observe that “improvement of a city image” may stem from two sources — “an energetic marketing campaign” or “economic growth (reality)” — noting that this raises the real possibility that a ‘place promotion’ campaign may generate a “gap” between image and reality.

The relationship between “image” and “reality” is complex, not only because “we increasingly move in a world of signs, symbols and images”, but also because when places are treated as products, the ‘image’ itself may have a significant influence on the ‘reality’, either for good or for ill. A further layer of complexity arises because of the way that the very ‘image’ of entrepreneurialism is often “a central element in many cities’ self-imaging and/or place-marketing activities”.

136
Elements of all of these policy approaches may be identified in specific urban settings, and the ultimate intention of my analysis here has been to move on to pursue its applicability in the northern Adelaide context, and in the wider metropole of which northern Adelaide is a part. For many years, questions of image have been significant for Adelaide’s northern region, and it has been my supposition that the concepts and frameworks identified here would help to frame and explain the endeavours to shape the image of the region and particular parts of the region.


12 In simple terms, entrepreneurial strategies can be understood as a subset of competitive strategies. Jessop argues, following Schumpeter, that the key quality of entrepreneurship is innovation, and observes that not all competitive strategies can be considered entrepreneurial.


16 Harvey, 'From Managerialism to Entrepreneurialism: The Transformation in Urban Governance in Late Capitalism'.

17 Harvey, 'From Managerialism to Entrepreneurialism: The Transformation in Urban Governance in Late Capitalism', p 7.
18 Harvey, 'From Managerialism to Entrepreneurialism: The Transformation in Urban Governance in Late Capitalism', p 3.
19 Harvey, 'From Managerialism to Entrepreneurialism: The Transformation in Urban Governance in Late Capitalism', p 8, see also Clarke and Gaile, The Work of Cities, p 36. For Harvey, a key point here is that the traditional focus of government activity is on spatially bounded territory, while the focus of business activity — and hence also of governance arrangements which bring in the interests of business — is less neatly circumscribed.
21 Hubbard, "The Entrepreneurial City and the 'New Urban Politics," p 16.
22 Hubbard, "The Entrepreneurial City and the 'New Urban Politics," pp 2, 4
24 See Lever, 'Competitive Cities: Introduction to the Review'. and other articles in the same issue; also Hall, ed. The Entrepreneurial City: Geographies of Politics, Regime, and Representation
30 Camagni, 'On the Concept of Territorial Competitiveness: Sound or Misleading?', p 2396. and Begg, 'Cities and Competitiveness'.
31 Camagni, 'On the Concept of Territorial Competitiveness: Sound or Misleading?', p 2396.
50 Begg, Cities and Competitiveness', pp 799, 804, 06.
51 Docherty, 'Exploring the Potential Benefits of City Collaboration'.
52 Camagni, 'On the Concept of Territorial Competitiveness: Sound or Misleading?'.
53 Cheshire, 'Cities in Competition: Articulating the Gains from Integration', p 843.
54 Cheshire, 'Cities in Competition: Articulating the Gains from Integration', p 843.
55 Cheshire, 'Cities in Competition: Articulating the Gains from Integration', p 844.
56 Cheshire, 'Cities in Competition: Articulating the Gains from Integration', p 844. Cheshire writes here in the UK context, and envisions the city-region as the “most obvious… functional economic area” in relation to which strategies of territorial competitiveness may be framed. He alludes in this context to the fragmentation of local government within a particular city-region. The situation in regard to the present case study of northern Adelaide is somewhat different, in that South Australia may be understood as a kind of “city-state”, with the capacity to act on behalf of the Adelaide city-region as a whole (Llewellyn-Smith 2002; see also Friedmann 2002, p.24). Nevertheless, the reality of governmental fragmentation vis-à-vis the region of northern Adelaide is analogous to that portrayed by Cheshire. The regional approach embarked upon by the SA Government in its plans for northern Adelaide necessitated collaboration between the two large local councils in the area.
57 Gordon, 'Internationalisation and Urban Competition', p 1002.
58 Docherty, 'Exploring the Potential Benefits of City Collaboration', p 449.; Here, again, although the reference by Docherty et al is to challenges of inter-city collaboration, a ‘history of competition’ may be found between the local government entity the City of Salisbury and its neighbour Elizabeth — later amalgamated with Munno Para to form the City of Playford.
61 Gordon, 'Internationalisation and Urban Competition', p 1002.
63 Turok, 'Cities, Regions and Competitiveness', p 1070.
66 Social cohesion is generally understood as an antonym of social exclusion (Fainstein 2001, p.7). In briefly defining these related terms, Parkinson and Boddy note that “social exclusion” is often simply used as a descriptive term “an equivalent to poverty, inequality or social deprivation” (Parkinson and Boddy 2004, p.4). More broadly these terms seek to expand concepts of poverty beyond the strictly economic realm to cover the social effects of poverty conceived as reduced opportunity for participation and engagement in mainstream society.


[H]ow to strike the right balance between policies for increasing the competitiveness of cities and policies for social cohesion and liveability is a major dilemma for the metropolitan areas of OECD countries” p.136.

71 Jessop, "The Narrative of Enterprise and the Enterprise of Narrative: Place Marketing and the Entrepreneurial City," p 79.


73 On the meaning of “natural factor endowments” Jessop writes that, “Ricardian discourse …tends to treat factors as ‘natural’ which are in fact heavily dependent on broader social conditions: an abundance of cheap wage-labour is only the most obvious example” (Jessop 1998, p.99n.).

74 Jessop, "The Narrative of Enterprise and the Enterprise of Narrative: Place Marketing and the Entrepreneurial City," p 82.

75 Jessop, "The Narrative of Enterprise and the Enterprise of Narrative: Place Marketing and the Entrepreneurial City," p 82.

76 Smyth explains that the idea of “boosterism” carries firstly a sense of “the desired outcome …improved perception of …[a city]”. Beyond this, there is a general perception that historically “a great deal of civic boosterism was founded upon rhetoric alone” or upon “claims …far exceeding what could be delivered” (Smyth 1994, pp.13-14).


79 Cheshire, 'Cities in Competition: Articulating the Gains from Integration', p 843.; Cheshire adds at this point, "What always distinguishes it [i.e. territorial competition] is its local origin and affiliation"


85 Short, "Urban Crises/Urban Representations: Selling the City in Difficult Times," p 56.
87 Short, "Urban Crises/Urban Representations: Selling the City in Difficult Times," p 59.
89 Short, "Urban Crises/Urban Representations: Selling the City in Difficult Times," p 558.
91 Short, "Urban Crises/Urban Representations: Selling the City in Difficult Times," p 59.
92 Jessop, "The Narrative of Enterprise and the Enterprise of Narrative: Place Marketing and the Entrepreneurial City," p 78.