Politics and the Russian Army: Civil-Military relations, 1680-2000, by Brian D. Taylor

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Wiley

Book Reviews


How good are our governments? What can we do to improve them? These questions are timeless and timely, as governments now have to cope with problems that are more complex and rapidly changing than perhaps ever. These three books seek answers to these questions. Light focuses on the U.S. government, and emphasizes its successes; Kettl and Dror are more concerned with governments’ failings, and how to remedy them. Each book is written by an eminent scholar, and all are well-worth reading and pondering.

As usual, Light leaves me wondering, “Why did I not think of that?” “That” is developing a compendium of what the U.S. government has actually done well and what it has done poorly over the past half century. His research team first identified 50 major policy areas in which the federal government has been active, and then polled academic historians and political scientists (450 responded) to learn their views on the most important, difficult, and successful endeavors. The poll is biased, of course, as the respondents are overwhelmingly white, male, liberal, Democrats with Ph.D.s (and tenure), but the respondents do represent those most likely to have a broad knowledge and perspective of government performance. Light does point out when subgroups of respondents have differing views (for example, men were much more likely than women to view “containing communism” as an important problem), but notes that these differences do not in general negate the consistency of the rankings. After describing the policy areas for which the respondents found government activity most important, most difficult, and most successful, Light creates an index (as in ice-skating, the score for each area was a weighted average of the three factors, with the highest weight placed on performance) to rank the achievements.

It is an amazing list. In the past half century, the federal government has helped rebuild Europe after World War II, expand the right to vote, promote equal access to public accommodations, reduce disease, reduce workplace discrimination, ensure safe food and drinking water, and many tasks that have immeasurably improved social welfare. (Brief but useful capsule summaries of the greatest achievements comprise the bulk of the book.) Light draws several lessons from this list. Achievement—successfully taking on important and difficult tasks—does not occur easily or quickly, but relies on endurance, consensus, and persistence. Success is more likely when policies are coherent, when results are measurable, when action serves moral purposes, and when there is at least a reasonable
amount of consensus on what should be done. Light’s list is a vital reminder that governments are not bound to fail, but can accomplish great things.

Kettl, perhaps the nation’s leading scholar of public management (PM), argues that neither the theory nor practice of PM is up to the problems the government currently faces. Until now, PM has focused on government, and has placed priority on authority and hierarchy. Kettl urges us to focus instead on governance, the ways that governments actually do their work. The tasks of governance have been complicated by increasing devolution, not just to local authorities but, increasingly, to nonprofit and for-profit agencies; by increasing globalization, whereby the most influential actors are supranational bodies (the World Trade Organization, International Monetary Fund, United Nations) and corporations without borders; and by hyperpluralism, in which private actors demand action. Whether facing devolution, globalization, or hyperpluralism, governmental actors must more often negotiate with those outside (and inside) government, manage contracts with external parties, and evaluate their performance, tasks outside the traditional purview of PM.

In the concluding chapter, Kettl outlines the five main issues (challenges, capacity, legitimacy, sovereignty, and public interest) that PM must face, and offers ten principles for transforming PM: (1) hierarchy and authority cannot and will not be replaced, but they must be fitted better to the transformation of governance; (2) complex networks have been layered on top of hierarchical organizations, and they must be managed differently; (3) public managers need to rely more on interpersonal and interorganizational processes as complements to—and sometimes as substitutes for—authority; (4) information is the most basic and necessary component for the transformation of governance; (5) performance management can provide a valuable tool for spanning fuzzy boundaries; (6) transparency is the foundation for trust and confidence in government operations; (7) government needs to invest in human capital so that the skills of its workers match the jobs they must perform; (8) the transformation of governance requires new strategies and tactics for popular participation in public administration; (9) civic responsibility has become the job of government’s nongovernmental partners; and (10) Americans need to develop new constitutional strategies for the management of conflict.

Kettl’s book will best suit those who favor curling up on a Friday night with Public Administration Review. Much of it comprises an intellectual history of PM, which will be of interest mainly to devoted scholars of administration. Otherwise, this book is the anti-dissertation: all the best material is at the beginning and end, rather than the substantive chapters in the middle.

I am loath to criticize The Capacity to Govern. Professor Emeritus Dror is smarter than I, more widely read, and more experienced (having worked for the Israeli government and the United Nations, and having organized policy workshops in over 40 countries). Moreover, I do not want to criticize the text, as I find Dror’s aspirations for governmental reform highly attractive. Dror’s main argument is this: to improve governments, we need a better class of citizens and leaders—better educated, more humane, more visionary. In short, he calls for a transformation in government through a transformation in humanity. Indeed, if we all had the education, humanity, and vision that Dror possesses perhaps the world would be better equipped to address the world’s greatest problems.

But for all of Dror’s clear wisdom, he seems to ignore a couple elementary facts of politics. First, politics is rife with conflict. He seems to assume that if we all had the virtues he espouses that we could come to agreement on what the central political problems are and how to resolve them. I wonder, would greater enlightenment lead to a consensus over whether market allocations are just or not,
whether religion should play a larger or smaller role in politics, whether cultural differences should be enhanced or suppressed, whether current needs should take precedence over those of future generations? Dror surely has views on these matters, but I suspect that equally wise souls will passionately disagree. What Dror thus seems to be calling for is a particular kind of enlightenment; the one he possesses.

Second, politics is permeated by interests and incentives. People often—not always, but often—act strategically to obtain more of what they value. Dror seems to hope that politicians and the public will put interests and incentives aside and simply do what is best (as Dror sees it). Dror clearly must understand these aspects of human nature, but he waves them aside. He claims that the public must become more engaged and informed about politics, and that politicians must consider broader concerns in setting policy. They might ask, “Why me? Why should I not care more about the concerns of my family, or about the next election?” The answer Dror offers is raison d’humanité. While as an idealist I might agree with him, as a political scientist I cannot find this answer compelling.

MARK CARL ROM, Georgetown University


From the cinematic clatter of hooves on soundstage palace stairwells of July 1762, as depicted in Josef von Sternberg’s 1934 movie, The Scarlet Empress, to the televised clank of real armored treads on Moscow’s loop highway in August 1991, the specter of the martial figure thrusting himself into politics astride a horse or a tank turret has been a constant feature in thinking about the character of the Russian and Soviet state. Yet, in the important analysis of Professor Brian D. Taylor—a political scientist of promise at the University of Oklahoma—this age-old perceived wisdom poorly describes the reality of the soldier and the state in Russia from the end of the 17th century until the beginning of this century. This study, which spans from Peter the Great through Alexander I to Stalin, Krushchev, and finally to Yeltsin, seeks to correct the assumptions of the previous literature on the subject, which now appears a remnant of a half-forgotten era.

In fact, the author asserts, the absence of Praetorian soldiers and their putsches marks the dominant characteristic of Russian and Soviet civil–military relations from the 17th century until the day before yesterday. To support this thesis, Taylor offers political scientists and scholars interested in civil–military relations theory within comparative politics, an analysis of the role of the Russian army in domestic politics and the causes for its generally apolitical and obedient posture even in extreme internal crisis. The evidence to substantiate this assertion unfolds in five chapters of 19 case studies. Of particular interest, the examples from the Soviet and post-Soviet period rely on materials extracted from recently opened Russian archives.

Military behavior in Russian domestic politics, according to Taylor, reflects a “two-step process,” comprised, in the first instance of the opportunities for the soldier to intervene in the life of the state (i.e., the vitality of the Russian state and the nature of its internal crisis), and second, by norms in the officer corps as concern the role of the soldier in politics. In this connection, the force of organizational culture has generally restrained the desire of field marshals, generals, and colonels to crash their chargers or their armored fighting vehicles through the
portals of the Kremlin and to take command. More often than not, unlike the cases detailed in the political science literature on coups and putsches in the wider world, soldiers and officers have remained in the Kasernen (barracks) and Kasinos (officers’ mess).

The author takes a very circumscribed view of his topic, focusing only on direct interventions of the military in the state—coupstrather than taking up civil-military relations in the more general sense, as in dynastic society, the officer and critics of the same, say, circa 1815 or the party and army as concerns the officer corps and rank and file in 1938 or 1982. Nor does he treat the manner in which political leaders and senior officers made key decisions of policy and strategy in the waging of war.

Still, even in this limited expression, Taylor’s argument strikes this reviewer as persuasive. Of course, the idea that organizational culture at arms—which is to say, the collective experience of the officer corps, its self-image and traditions of thought and deed, holds the key to the role of the soldier and the state in extremis—represents something less than a revelation to this reviewer as an historian of continental European civil–military relations and as a scholar, less heavily invested in certain schools of political science theory. These are troubled times, however, in which democratic forces in Russia appear to have endured a setback in the wake of Vladimir Putin’s presidential regime in the mode of Charles de Gaulle or Julius Caesar, and after September 11, 2001, the world has witnessed the spectacle of Mars and Bellona’s return to center stage. As such, the fate of the army in the Russian state in crisis is surely important to a critical and informed reader, whether a student of theory or not.

A certain fluency in the theoretical discourse, to say nothing of the historical context of Taylor’s case studies, will assist the reader of this volume. The author appears most interested in his political science elders and peers, a reasonable concern for a recent scholar. Thus, the novice to the subject and, perhaps, the daily practitioners in search of an easily readable and wide-ranging account of the civil–military relations of the Czarist, Soviet and most recent pasts must seek introductory and narrative accounts elsewhere. Similarly, those interested in the application of civil–military relations theory to the practice of democratic civil–military relations in the here and now—that is, a kind of how-to book of how the Russians discarded the ideas and mechanisms of Soviet civil–military relations and have adapted the norms of government and soldierly ethos to the world of the present and future—may dispense with some of Professor Taylor’s theory building in favor of the narrative sections that well describe the behavior of soldiers and civilians in case studies of crisis in the state.

Taylor does unlimber his theory to predict the future of Russian civil–military relations in the final pages of his book, wherein he suggests that, despite the mixed fortunes of post-Soviet pluralism, the citizens of Russia and the newly admitted NATO lands, need little worry about baby colonels in huge shoulder boards catapulting Putin over the Kremlin wall in a putsch. This work thus diverges from the more applied, nuts-and-bolts literature on Central and Eastern European civil–military relations as has appeared in the last ten or so years of epochal change in politics and armies in Europe and beyond. Taylor offers some guidance as concerns the future of security sector reform in Russia in such themes as the appointment and dismissal of senior officers; institutional barriers to officers in party politics; the reform of military education and socialization; and a redefinition of roles and missions.

None of this advice is at all remarkable or especially original; without doubt, the author’s greater contribution rests in his revision of civil–military relations
theory, in general as concerns the nature of coups. As for the generous portions of theory in this volume, one must keep in mind that even those interested solely in applied analysis via the all-too-promiscuous citation of “lessons learned” must always rely on theory. Finally, Taylor’s periodization is also highly useful to the advanced studies of students drawn from such nations as Russia, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, and elsewhere in the lands of the ex-Soviet realm. These students especially wish to integrate the Soviet experience into a longer historical context which can also help them make sense of the civil–military relations here and now. In this and more Professor Taylor’s work serves them well.

NOTES


DONALD ABENHEIM, Naval Postgraduate School


The current dispute about the creation of a separate EU defense planning and operational capability, in the wake of transatlantic disagreement over the Iraqi war, poses the most serious threat in years to NATO and U.S.–Europe relations. Although it was written before the Iraq war and the April 2003 meeting of leaders from France, Germany, Belgium, and Luxembourg that proposed the establishment of a separate EU military headquarters, this book provides essential background and analysis of the trends leading to the present debate about EU defense autonomy.

The eleven chapters of this edited volume are contributed by a collection of European and North American experts, and presented in four parts. Following an introduction by the editors, the three chapters in Part One examine the development of European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) since the 1990s. While Alexander Moens argues that the formation of a concrete European military capacity will take many years, Terry Terriff claims that NATO’s Combined and
Joint Task Forces (CJTF) arrangement will not provide sufficient autonomy for the EU to satisfy its long-term security goals and needs. Frédéric Bozo discusses the considerable impact of the Kosovo war on the development of ESDP. He argues that a strategic rebalancing in transatlantic relations is necessary, and this requires a more capable and assertive Europe.

The two chapters in Part Two discuss the military “capabilities gap” that became so apparent in the Kosovo war. David Yost writes that the persistence of this gap could lead to an unhealthy U.S.–EU division of labor in security affairs that could fuel transatlantic tensions in the future. Kori Schake argues for a “constructive duplication” of military capabilities as the best way to achieve greater equality in the alliance and assure the continued survivability of NATO.

The discussion in Part Three shifts to NATO enlargement and its implications for ESDP and NATO–EU relations. Sunniva Tøtte examines the problems that ESDP poses for non-EU NATO members, Turkey and Norway, and the problems these countries (especially Turkey) create for ESDP. In their separate chapters, both Mark Webber and Julian Lindley-French discuss the dilemmas of NATO enlargement, including problems stemming from the imperfect overlap of EU and NATO membership and threats to NATO’s effectiveness. Any decrease in NATO’s effectiveness as a result of enlargement, Webber argues, may push the EU to become more independent in defense matters.

The book’s final part consists of two chapters that make quite different arguments about the desirability of a stronger and more autonomous ESDP. In his chapter, Anand Menon claims that efforts to strengthen ESDP and give it greater independence from the U.S. and NATO are both “misguided and dangerous”; these efforts will not work, European governments will not pay for them, and they will lead to U.S. disengagement from Europe. Far better, according to Menon, would be for the EU to develop its “soft power,” where it has a comparative advantage, and strive for an effective security division of labor with the U.S. and within NATO. This argument is firmly rejected by Jolyon Howorth, who asserts that an autonomous ESDP is inevitable, the result of both endogenous (to the EU) and exogenous historical forces (global strategic developments and U.S. policies). While he acknowledges that ESDP faces many institutional, political, and financial challenges, Howorth confidently predicts that these will be overcome, because they must.

The Menon chapter is a bit of an “outlier,” and may have been included as a counterbalance to the dominant consensus in this book, which is more accurately represented by Howorth. Despite some disagreements among the contributors about how quickly or easily this can be achieved, the predominant view is that greater European autonomy in defense affairs is both inevitable and desirable. It is even more interesting that this conclusion was reached before the crisis in transatlantic relations created by the Iraqi war and the current debate about a separate EU military headquarters (conducted within the intergovernmental conference that is discussing a new constitutional treaty for the EU). But this indicates what is important and useful about this book. The current ESDP debate did not suddenly emerge in the past year out of disagreements over Iraq, but instead has deeper roots in longer-term trends and developments. It is these trends and developments that are examined and analyzed in this book.

If there is one glaring omission in this book, it is the inadequate treatment of the impact of the EU’s impending enlargement on ESDP. The current push of France, Germany, and several other EU member states for a stronger ESDP (through the mechanism of “enhanced” or “structured cooperation” that is being discussed in the intergovernmental conference; this would allow a smaller group of countries to push ahead with greater defense cooperation within the EU) has
also been stimulated by fears that enlargement will make closer cooperation and further political integration impossible. The threat posed by enlargement to ESDP and the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) was highlighted by the divergence of Poland and other incoming member states from the Franco-German position on Iraq, but its existence was recognized long before this. It is surprising and disappointing that this issue was not given more attention in the book.

Overall, this book makes a valuable contribution to our understanding of the debate about ESDP and European defense autonomy. The chapters fit together nicely into a coherent whole, and the scholarly quality of the various contributions is generally high. Some chapters are more technical (and jargon- and acronym-filled), and hence less readable, than others. But overall, it is a well written and accessible volume that should be of interest to general readers as well as experts, and useful for teaching in both upper-level undergraduate courses and graduate seminars.

MICHAEL BAUN, Valdosta State University


In Migration and the Externalities of European Integration, editors Sandra Lavenex and Emek M. Uçarer, and their contributors offer an innovative look at the European Union (EU). The EU’s slow, yet continued, move toward a common migration and asylum regime has generated a great deal of scholarship on its impact on the member states. We know little about the impact of this development on nonmember states.

The authors seek to redress this shortcoming, and draw on two bodies of literature. The first is that typically associated with the impact of EU policies on member states, “policy diffusion, lesson drawing, and policy transfers” (3). The second, borrowed from economics, is the notion of externalities, which makes it possible to “denote the positive or negative, intended or unintended, external effects on third countries, international organizations and adjacent policy fields.” The editors list three groups of countries examined: (1) the inner circle (Norway and Switzerland); (2) the Central and Eastern European accession countries (CEECs); and (3) the Mediterranean countries. Additional chapters focus on the EU’s impact on the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, and the extent to which the EU’s trade agreements include immigration or asylum components. Two chapters examine the consequences of the migration regime on the member states’ welfare and citizenship policies.

In chapter 1, Uçarer provides a comprehensive overview of the evolution of the EU’s immigration and asylum policies, from Schengen to the subsequent intergovernmental developments, concluding with the communitarization of immigration and asylum. Brochman and Lavenex deal with Switzerland and Norway, and their findings are mixed for the book’s main argument. They find that while Norway’s immigration policies followed that of many of the EU’s member states, it responded to external crises (i.e., Yugoslavia) rather than to EU policies per se. Turning to Switzerland, the authors argue that it was the first to apply the “notion of safe countries of origin to asylum seekers” (64). Although the point is not noted, it indicates that the causal arrows may not point in the same direction as the editors would have us believe. Rather than EU policies being the basis of its neighbors’ immigration policies, it may be, as is the case here, the...
opposite. They conclude by highlighting not the importance of the EU, but rather the “similar problem structures” faced by the EU, Switzerland, and Norway, which explains their similar policies.

Jileva finds that the requirement made of the CEECs that they adopt the EU immigration and asylum acquis has translated into a marked deterioration of relations with their eastern neighbors. This in turn conflicts with another EU requirement made of its future members, that of peace, stability, and good neighborly relations. In chapter 5 Grabbe looks at Hungary and Poland, but reaches essentially the same conclusions, and it is unfortunate that the editors did not merge the material into a single chapter rather than allow for this repetition.

Turning to Mediterranean countries in chapter 6, Pastore concludes that a lack of interest on the part of the EU makes it impossible to draw “any serious inference on the externalities of EU integration” (119). In chapter 7, Kirici argues that Turkey has been under increasing pressure to adopt the acquis since it became an official candidate for EU membership in 1999, particularly in the field of asylum. The outlook seems bleak, as he argues that Turkey is “neither bureaucratically/organizationally nor socioeconomically . . . ready to carry out these tasks” (131).

Chapters 8 and 9 explore the degree to which the EU’s immigration and asylum regime has been incorporated in its foreign and trade policies. That they come near the end of the volume is peculiar, given that they both expand on the theoretical underpinnings of the case for EU externalities.

In spite, or perhaps because, of its ambitious goals, Migration and the Externalities of European Integration suffers from a number of shortcomings. The theoretical framework outlined by the editors at the onset is absent from the case studies that come between the introduction and conclusion. While some contributors succeed in identifying externalities, there is no truly unifying thread that brings the chapters together. Furthermore, it is not always clear if the externalities should be attributed to the EU, its member states, or simply the similarity of external migration pressures faced by European countries. In their conclusion, Uçarer and Lavenex argue that “greater geographic proximity to the EU” accounts for the “degree of interdependence with the EU migration regime” (212). But the differences in interdependence are clearest between candidate and noncandidate countries, while this obviously follows geographical proximity, it need not be the case.

Responsibility for the other problems should be laid at the feet of the editors. Many of the chapters go over previously covered ground—there are too many “reminders” of EU developments of which we are reminded more than once. The introduction announces “four groups of countries or regions” but presents three (as does the book’s summary on the back cover). It is only in the final chapter that we learn of the fourth group: countries that have concluded less encompassing external agreement with the Union. This last group is a rather eclectic one (essentially, the so-called ACP countries [Africa, Caribbean, and the Pacific Group]) and they receive only the most cursory analysis. Finally, the chapters on the European welfare states (Geddes) and “the impact of immigration on conceptions of citizenship” (Brochman) contribute little to the stated objective of the book. Neither deals with the externalities as defined by the editors, and that they receive one scant paragraph on the final page in the editors’ summary only serves to make their presence even more conspicuous. Taken individually however, the contributors bring new and interesting insights on the impact of the EU’s immigration and asylum policies on nonmember states, and the EU’s foreign policy.

SEBASTIEN GAGNON-MESSIER, University of Maryland
American public administration has been insulated from, or has insulated itself from, developments occurring in other parts of the world. Comparative public administration, a flourishing discipline several decades ago is seeing a resurgence only now. Developments outside our borders have transformed our discipline dramatically. Even though many of us who have taught in the field have used academic approaches that have blended many of the contributing disciplines to public administration—much of our instruction still lacks an international dimension. Raadschelders, a Dutch scholar, has offered the discipline a much-needed textbook that approaches public administration in a multifaceted sense: one that is embedded in its respective constitutional and national context, responsive to the changes in the management practices of the field, the changes in society, and a theory-rich tradition that can draw from a multitude of governance experiences in Europe and the United States.

On the surface, the book covers the traditional canon of public administration texts. But there is a twist. Raadschelders’ European roots challenge the traditional instrumentalist tradition of many contemporary American public administration texts. The book’s holistic and multidisciplinary approach to government and public administration is intended to be more than a “bookcase framework” (373). Raadschelders contends that academics who are pursuing administrative matters either for the sole purpose of theory, or for managers who follow every latest fad are likely to fail both their students, their citizens, and their professions. Public policy makers, bureaucrats included, must ask fundamental questions about who governs, whose interests are represented, and what mechanisms are used to balance the various interests. The book thus serves to bridge “the gap between the more theoretical philosophy of government (political theory, etc.) and the more applied Public Administration literature (specialized, focused on techniques and instruments)” (31). Raadschelders approaches his task utilizing four different, but related challenges to governance. The first considers a society’s need to balance “individual and collective desires.” The second examines the implications of juridical (the formal constitutional base) and sociological traditions of public administration (with its emphasis on the dynamic relationships between formal and informal rules, and the roles of various actors in the policy process). The third element of his framework highlights the effects of political cultures and traditions on the functions and structures of government in a society. Finally, Raadschelders considers government and governance in their temporal continuum and the attendant need for a continuous rebalancing of the value frameworks that assign differential roles to public and private actions/actors. Raadschelders does not consider the four elements of his framework as dichotomies but as continua that also mutually reinforce each other.

The book lays out these arguments in four parts. Part I examines the shifting justifications for the need of government in societies. Part II discusses the institutional superstructure, such as democratic, legal, and federalist traditions whose mix evolves different governance arrangements. Topics in Part III are most familiar to many U.S. readers and cover public management traditions, organizational theories, or decision-making approaches. Part IV now moves the reader to the individual actor level: the roles of political and appointed officeholders, citizens, and other stakeholders. In the conclusion, Raadschelders reiterates the need for a holistic and multidisciplinary approach to governance that transcends the preference for “instrumentalist and technocratic” traditions of the past, especially in its
American context. He proposes a meta-framework (374) that combines all four challenges to governing embedded in their ideational, institutional, organizational, and individual traditions.

The book is well suited as a text for beginning graduate students in political science and public administration, especially those with little prior course work in the field. However, it is not an easy read. As Raadschelders says himself, “it does not provide ready-made answers to complex questions” (31) but rather challenges the teacher and student alike to engage some fundamental questions about the purposes and values of our work, both as academics and students, as well as practitioners. It further functions as a reference frame to link the divergent courses and specializations in a Master of Public Administration program. It is also an excellent primary text for courses that are structured around cases (to accompany, for example, Stillman’s popular case book). Instructors desirous of exposing their students to a more varied theoretical diet also will find this text suitable. It allows them to discuss with their students the various governance traditions in western settings, their impacts on approaches to governing, and the occasional misunderstandings that arise as Americans move outside their familiar reference frameworks.

Raadschelders challenges his readers to be cognizant of their own philosophical and governance traditions without which, mindless instrumentalism remains the only choice as we chase every latest management fad in hopes for a quick solution to problems that defy easy fixes.

MARGARET F. REID, University of Arkansas


Lisa Anderson, dean of Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs, begins this book by observing that in the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attack on the World Trade Center, Americans had two desires—to understand and to act. Since that event, she posits, we have learned how intimate and fragile are the connections between social science (understanding) and public policy (acting). Such an assertion anticipates and seems supported by, for example, recent controversies regarding the knowledge base underpinning “nation-building” policies in Iraq.

Dean Anderson’s thesis is that the public policy–social science linkage is characterized by “repeated oscillations,” featuring a good deal of tension and ambiguity. On the one hand, social scientists are attracted to the exercise of power—taking active roles in the making and implementation of public policies. Even though being an active participant in the policy process means entering a world where academic rigor and theoretical elegance is often a low priority, it is seductive to have the opportunity to apply research, make an impact, and be able to modify knowledge in “real world” contexts.

On the other hand, social scientists are fascinated with pursuing truth for its own sake. The attractiveness of this path is the possibility that their academic disciplines can become neutral bastions of scientific objectivity, modeled after the “hard” sciences, where enormous prestige resides with the “basic” research enterprise. Here, the impulse is to disregard all application, including that which might be policy relevant, in favor of the “value-free” pursuit of knowledge.
History shows that the pendulum has swung back and forth between the two perspectives. At first (in the late 19th century), government seemed likely to dominate the career paths of those who pursued academic degrees in the new social science disciplines. For example, when Columbia University created the first graduate school of political science in 1880, the program of studies was designed to prepare graduates for careers in the civil service. But it turned out that many of the jobs for these new social scientists would be found not in government but in the rapidly expanding higher education field (e.g., in the land grant universities). New academic disciplines and professional associations were not far behind. Led by economics, these disciplines quickly sought to become more scientific—to seek universal truths—funded by another newcomer to the American scene, the large private foundation (e.g., Carnegie, Rockefeller).

The Great Depression and World War II sent the pendulum speeding the other direction. Federal government funding for academic research expanded dramatically, and large numbers of university faculty and graduates took jobs in the host of new public sector programs. This pattern persisted into the postwar period (largely because of the Cold War), but was brought to a screeching halt by events beginning in the early 1960s.

The Vietnam War, Civil Rights Movement, Watergate, and other events did substantial damage to the image of public service—especially on America’s campuses. In response, academic social scientists turned inward, rescued once more by the resurgent private foundations. The Ford Foundation was especially important, helping to establish several new schools of public policy (e.g., the John F. Kennedy School at Harvard, the Haas School at University of California–Berkeley). These new schools were supposed to strike a balance between truth and power, but it has proven to be an uneasy truce that has pleased few parties at interest. For example, the new schools have been characterized as having curricula (e.g., applied policy analysis) that are less rigorous than the social sciences.

Nonetheless, by the 1990s, these disputes seemed to be taking a back seat to the complete emergence of the U.S. as the world’s only superpower. Models of almost everything American—including social science and public policy—were being snapped up around the world, defects and all. From Russia to Vietnam, and from South Africa to Mexico, U.S. experience helped shape social science and public policy almost across the board. What could possibly alter this “moment of triumph”?

This is the part of the book that is most impressive. Anderson asserts that in the world today there are two forces that have begun to destabilize, once again, the delicate relationship between truth and power. Privatization is the first and globalization is the second.

Privatization refers to the market beginning to compete with the state as the locus and source of public policy. For example, the proliferation of private military firms seemed to some observers to signal the beginning of the end of perhaps government’s final monopoly. Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) sprouted up everywhere. Think tanks and policy advocacy organizations, doing research that was very different from that provided by universities, began to occupy center stage in debates that previously had been the sole or primary turf of government agencies. Often these NGOs engaged in highly partisan advocacy, abandoning any pretense of neutrality. Policy was being made in more places, by a wider range of actors.

Not only did these new organizations enhance the diversity of employment opportunities for the graduates of American universities (including the schools of public policy), they also populated a marketplace increasingly familiar with social
science theories, methodologies, and findings (e.g., political polling, economic statistics). Social science was being diffused around the world in ways that raised questions about what was unique about the capabilities and knowledge of academic social scientists.

Perhaps more significant for the long term, privatization seemed to be changing the nature of the scientific enterprise itself. Perhaps the best-known formulation of the social norms of science lists: (1) universalism, which requires that the information presented to the scientific community be assessed independently of the personal characteristics of the source of information; (2) communality, which defines property rights to knowledge by requiring that all scientific knowledge be held in common, and not by those responsible for its discovery; (3) disinterestedness, which requires researchers to pursue scientific knowledge without considering their career or reputation; and (4) organized skepticism, which emphasizes the need to never take results on faith or trust—requiring instead constantly critical views (being open-minded, impartial, and self-critical) of its practitioners (Merton, 268–278). Each of these scientific norms is being changed by privatization.

Secrecy and the proliferation of property rights are the enemies of communality, yet this is precisely what privatization has generated. The proliferation of political advocacy organizations and fora has blurred the boundary between scientific knowledge and mere political argument, to the detriment of standards of organized skepticism or disinterestedness. Indeed, there seems to be a decline in the expectation that science for policy will be neutral. Similarly, the use of universal (preestablished, impersonal) criteria to assess science seems to be eroding. Faced with multiple, competing sources of science and policy, consensus on such criteria is increasingly difficult to reach.

Coevolving with privatization is globalization. Social science has been exported around the world, diffused by international networks of colleagues increasingly engaged in cross-regional and cross-national research. It has become commonplace for social scientists to be employed in international nongovernmental organizations. At the same time, however, the private, international market for social research is now largely unregulated. Among the negative consequences of these trends is a widespread concern about the declining credibility of the social science enterprise. Even efforts to understand globalization itself seemed to suffer. Anderson quotes Joseph Stiglitz as arguing that all too often International Monetary Fund policy was being made by “a person who stayed in a five star hotel for a few weeks looking at some data.”

Taken together, these trends seem to suggest that it is now more difficult to argue that truth is separable from power. Nonetheless, Anderson believes there is still hope. She argues that more than ever before, universities—and particularly the policy schools—must “construct and protect arenas for debate dissent, and dispute.” A starting point, she suggests is becoming familiar with the “the peculiar history of social science and public policy itself.”

This book is a good starting place for such discussions. It will be of most interest to academic social scientists with a policy bent, and their graduate students. Policy makers likely won’t read it, but they should.

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REFERENCES

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