The Crimea and the Donbass in flames: the influence of Russian propaganda and the Ukraine crisis

Hough, James T.

Monterey, California: Naval Postgraduate School

by

James T. Hough

September 2016

Thesis Advisor: Carolyn Halladay
Co-Advisor: Donald Abenheim

Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.
This thesis focuses on examining the enemy during the 2013–2014 Ukraine Crisis and providing context to the headlines regarding the politics of the conflict. It examines both the external enemy and the internal enemy, as characterized by the Russian press. The external enemy chapter focuses on NATO and five key propagandized myths that were popularized around the time of the Ukraine Crisis. The internal enemy chapter focuses on gender, examining the roles masculinity, femininity, and sexual orientation has in politics. Examining the propaganda helps to dissect the tactics used by the Russian government and media. Depending on how successful those tactics are, it could have a direct effect on whether they are recycled and used again in another conflict with another country, say in Moldova or Romania or Poland in the future. This thesis conducted a comparative analysis of the propaganda in the Ukraine Crisis surrounding events that have occurred in the areas of gender, WWI/WWII, Russian culture, and the enemy against historical Soviet and post-Soviet propaganda.

James T. Hough
Lieutenant, United States Navy

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES
(EUROPE AND EURASIA)

from the

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
September 2016

Approved by: Carolyn Halladay, Ph.D.
Thesis Advisor

Donald Abenheim, Ph.D.
Co-Advisor

Mohammed Hafez, Ph.D.
Chair, Department of National Security Affairs
ABSTRACT

This thesis focuses on examining the enemy during the 2013–2014 Ukraine Crisis and providing context to the headlines regarding the politics of the conflict. It examines both the external enemy and the internal enemy, as characterized by the Russian press. The external enemy chapter focuses on NATO and five key propagandized myths that were popularized around the time of the Ukraine Crisis. The internal enemy chapter focuses on gender, examining the roles masculinity, femininity, and sexual orientation has in politics. Examining the propaganda helps to dissect the tactics used by the Russian government and media. Depending on how successful those tactics are, it could have a direct effect on whether they are recycled and used again in another conflict with another country, say in Moldova or Romania or Poland in the future. This thesis conducted a comparative analysis of the propaganda in the Ukraine Crisis surrounding events that have occurred in the areas of gender, WWI/WWII, Russian culture, and the enemy against historical Soviet and post-Soviet propaganda.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................1
   A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION ...........................................................................2 
   B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION ..........................................2 
   C. LITERATURE REVIEW ..........................................................................................3 
      1. Propaganda ........................................................................................................3 
      2. Gender ...............................................................................................................5 
      3. WWI and WWII: The Age of Total War .............................................................7 
      4. Russian Culture ................................................................................................10 
      5. “The Enemy” ....................................................................................................12 
   D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES ......................................14 
   E. RESEARCH DESIGN .............................................................................................15 
   F. THESIS OVERVIEW AND DRAFT CHAPTER OUTLINE ..................................15 

II. RUSSIAN PROPAGANDA’S FOCUS ON “THE ENEMY”: NATO ..................17 
   A. MYTH 1: NATO’S PROMISE NOT TO EXPAND .........................................17 
   B. MYTH 2: RUSSIA’S DEMAND FOR A GUARANTEE ...................................19 
   C. MYTH 3: NATO’S ADVANCE OF INFRASTRUCTURE ..................................21 
   D. MYTH 4: NATO’S REINFORCEMENT OF ITS ALLIES ..................................24 
   E. MYTH 5: NATO’S COLD WAR MENTALITY ...............................................26 
   F. CONCLUSION .......................................................................................................28 

III. THE ENEMY WITHIN: GENDER POLITICS AND RUSSIA’S POWER GRAB .........................................................29 
    A. TRADITIONAL VALUES AND GENDER POLITICS ....................................29 
    B. FEMININITY, FEMINISM, AND THE FEMINIST ........................................30 
    C. MASCUINITY AND THE “MUZHIK” ............................................................37 
    D. THE OTHERS—LGBT ......................................................................................43 
    E. CONCLUSION .....................................................................................................47 

IV. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................49 

LIST OF REFERENCES .....................................................................................................51 

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST .........................................................................................59
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I dedicate this thesis first to my professors and mentors, Dr. Halladay and Dr. Abenheim. Thank you for your mentorship and guidance, and for helping to instill in me a love for European history and culture. Second, to my mother and sister, who have always supported me in everything I do, as well as to my friends, who have encouraged me along the way. Finally, with special thanks in no particular order to Shaun Geary, Allison Dolby, and Annie Patterson for always believing in me and encouraging me to finish this project.
I. INTRODUCTION

The Ukraine Crisis took an ominous turn in February 2014 with the arrival of the “little green men” who came to occupy certain parts of eastern Ukraine. These invaders were not from Mars. Rather, as journalist Linda Kinstler writes,

the “local defense forces” currently occupying Crimea are wearing unmarked uniforms that look a hell of a lot like the ones that Russian designer Valentin Yudashkin made for the Russian army. They’re carrying Kalashnikovs and Russian Dragunov sniper rifles, RGD-5 grenades, and NSV machine guns. They’re riding around in Russian “Tiger” and “Lynx” armored cars. And yet, according to the Kremlin, they do not exist.¹

Moscow resolutely denies any attachment to the militia, characterizing them—with echoes of former times in the 20th century—as spontaneous and independent patriots who have taken up arms against the “fascists” in Kyiv. Similarly, the self-proclaimed leaders of the armed separatists insist that they have no relationship to the Russian military, while avoiding direct comment on just how they came into possession of state-of-the-art Russian weapons and equipment.² They do proclaim their affinity to Russia, however: “Actually, there’s no such nationality as Ukrainian. That’s an Austria-Hungarian deception. We’re Russian. We’re all Russian. And this land isn’t Ukraine: it’s Novorossiya—and we will defend it.”³ Thus, the conflict in Ukraine has become as much a war of the words in the realms of politics and psychology as it is a struggle for the national future in classic geopolitical terms. Classic propaganda of the age of total war, some updated to the age of social media and some seemingly lifted from Cold War-era Communist Party newspapers, forms its own front in the Ukraine Crisis and deserves its own analysis as a feature of policy and strategy.


³ Ibid.
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION

This thesis analyzes Russian propaganda from the past to the present in light of Russia’s role in the 2013–14 Ukraine Crisis. This work seeks to uncover the roots of Russian propaganda and the propaganda of the Russian-backed separatists as well as how such mass persuasion uses social media to transform opinion. Does the Ukraine Crisis represent a shift in propaganda from its traditional Russian and/or Soviet roots, or is it recycled, reinvented, and reused propaganda, that is, old wine in new bottles?

B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION

Learned interest in the strategic character and effects of propaganda has long existed in the U.S. military, but in the context of a divided Ukraine at war in the years 2013–14, propaganda has been given new life and greater importance amid the events surrounding the Ukraine Crisis and the relationship with Europe, Russia, and the United States. Since November 2013, the world has witnessed protests, internal struggle, regime change, the annexation of Crimea, the separation of autonomous republics, back-and-forth battles throughout the eastern part of the country, and the downing of a passenger airliner. Its future may hold an invasion or all-out war.

This thesis examined the continuities and discontinuities of themes, images, discourse, and methods in the propaganda that is being generated by the Russian government and its allies in general in the 2013–14 Ukraine Crisis. The research examined how it interrelates with old Soviet propaganda, ideologies, and beliefs. The war in Ukraine itself represents a serious issue in the international community. It will cause far-reaching security concerns as well as affect the relations between Russia and the West for many years to come.

Perhaps another way to understand the significance of this even is to look at what a Russian editorial writer, Nikolai Epple, said in an interview with Der Spiegel about the conflict in April 2014

During Soviet times, everyone knew that official statements were propaganda, Epple said. People would just laugh and joke about them with friends behind closed doors. “But now many believe the reports coming
out of Ukraine—and that is dangerous,” he warns. “It gives you the feeling that something terrible is happening in modern-day Russia.”

Similarly, Philip Taylor explains in his book, *Munitions of the Mind*, that “in the struggle for power, propaganda is an instrument to be used by those who want to secure or retain power just as much as it is by those wanting to displace them. For the smoke to rise, there must first be a spark, which lights the flame. Propaganda is that spark.”

Understanding the propaganda in the Ukraine Crisis is important because it not only helps to explain the rhetoric and language of the crisis, but also it helps to better examine the evolving politics, goals, and aims of Russia toward its former satellite states through the lens of stylized propaganda and its historical roots.

C. LITERATURE REVIEW

Propaganda has many areas of significance and focus, and in the current context of the Ukraine Crisis there are four areas of focus in propaganda that were examined using both current and historical context: the role of gender; the image and collective memory of the First and Second World Wars (WWI and WWII); the role of “Russian culture”; and the varying faces of the “the enemy.”

1. Propaganda

Propaganda can perhaps be best described in terms similar to Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart’s famous description of pornography: “I know it when I see it.” In other words, propaganda defies easy definition. Thus, both Philip Taylor and Edward Bernays, two experts in the study of propaganda in the early 20th century, lead off in their books with the word propaganda itself and how it brings to mind the sort of

---


preconceived notion as to what it is, and how it has a generally negative reputation.\(^7\) They also agree that propaganda is not a 20th-century invention, but instead dates back many hundreds and even thousands of years even though it was not always called propaganda. The word *propaganda* itself comes from the Catholic Church and the College of Propaganda at Rome dating back to 1627 and the time of Counter Reformation.\(^8\) Moreover, both authors agree that propaganda in war as it is known today really came of age in the time of mass persuasion, mass politics, and World War I, which is the age of total war in the 20th century.

Both Bernays and Taylor discuss how the word propaganda, in and of itself, is not inherently bad but focus rather on the intent and goals of the message delivered, and how the persuasion and intent of the message drive people to achieve the ends to the means of the propaganda.\(^9\) In addition, Kenez, in his book *The Birth of the Propaganda State*, presents propaganda as “nothing more than the attempt to transmit social and political values in the hope of affecting people’s thinking, emotions, and thereby behavior.”\(^10\) Both Taylor and Kenez emphasize how the Bolsheviks were able to capitalize on the uses of modern mass communications methods to deliver their messages: press, posters, radio, and movies. With technology being so central to the craft of propaganda even in his day, Bernays recognizes the need and the ability to use these current forms of communication for Propagandists to be able to reach the masses. All of the authors focus on the mass persuasion elements of propaganda and Bernays reminds us “there is no means of human communication which may not also be a means of deliberate propaganda.”\(^11\)


2. Gender

Gender has played an important role in several instances of the propaganda battle in the Ukraine crisis. The first instance comes from the imprisonment of Yulia Tymoshenko, a former prime minister of Ukraine and a prominent political figure that was imprisoned two years prior to the crisis. The second instance draws from the capture of a female Ukrainian Air force pilot Nadiya Savchenko, and her significance as a woman and symbol of Ukrainian resistance. The third instance comes from a woman, captured by separatists, who was made to hold to hold a sign reading “she kills our children” on a street corner in Donetsk while she was spit on, kicked, beaten, abused, and called names. The fourth instance arises in comments made by the leader of Crimea against lesbian, gay, bi-sexual, and transgender (LGBT) individuals and activists in the Crimean region. The final instance is a series of pictures sketched by Ukrainian schoolchildren and how one of the reoccurring symbols was of the image of Ukraine itself as a little girl. These depictions trace their roots to when the Soviet Union broke apart and the search for an authentic Ukraine began, and in that, the images allude to what Marian Rubchak calls “matriarchal heritage” of Ukraine. They can also be potentially seen as further depictions of Berehynia the pagan goddess who has come to represent the nation of Ukraine itself.

The traditional view of women has always been stylized and propagandized. The book Women in Russia and Ukraine sums up many of the key arguments through a

---


17 Ibid., 319.
collection of short essays. Some of these propagandized images of the perfect socialist women include laborers, Stakhanovites, and housewives. The central question is the “women question” a term the Soviets used that defined a whole list of women’s issues: “legal, social, political, philosophical and cultural status of women.” One of the key issues is how much was a women’s experience shared in Russia and the Soviet Union given the differences in social status, economic status, and location.

Another key debate is to what degree, if any, was Communism a real liberating factor for women or was it something used to get women to go along with the movement. Both Sue Bridger and Lynne Attwood discuss such issues in their essays, which demonstrate how women’s roles were always shifted back to the duty of motherhood and the family and during Communist time that in and of itself was to the state as well. Identity also plays a key in the defining of gender roles—Lynne Attwood discusses how near the end of the Soviet Union, with 51 percent of women in the workforce, gender identity problems arose amid the tension between the domestic ideal of women and the economic and political necessity of women working outside the home. This tension impelled the push to reestablish a more traditional role for women after the fall of the Soviet Union.

The book *Moscow Women* is another good source of women’s experiences in the Soviet times because it is a series of interviews of thirteen women who lived in Russia under Communism. The interviews are conducted with a wide range of questions and themes, but central to all themes of this book is how there is a strong image of how things where stylized to be versus how they actually were, and how women in the end were left desiring a better life. The women also range in the full spectrum: politically, socially, domestically, and in location. The interviews provided a fascinating look into individual lives as they are asked a basic set of questions and allowed to tell their stories and share what unique insights that individual interviews make possible.

---


The Crimean leader’s comment on gays has also opened up a wider question in the role of gender and the state considering the place of LGBT individuals. In an essay on gays and lesbians in Russia, James Riordan tells of how Russia has had a fairly tolerant history until 1933, when it became illegal and got grouped in with ideas of the counter-revolution and thus counter to state interests. Article 121 made it possible for the Soviets to punish homosexuals; ultimately, it became another form of repression and handling dissidence. One of the main themes is identity and the changing nature of homosexuality in Soviet times—from how it was acceptable at first, then became a “bourgeois” effect, then transformed into a dissident idea. With the fall of the Soviet Union, the LGBT community became just another group seeking a place in the new order of Russia.\(^\text{20}\) Riordan also describes the struggle for legitimacy of sexual minorities and in establishing themselves and their place in the new and independent Ukraine by decriminalizing homosexuality, educating the public on it, and creating their own cultural identity.\(^\text{21}\)

Finally, to fill in some of the gaps in just looking at the issue of gender from a woman’s perspective, the book *Gender, State and Society in Soviet and Post-Soviet Russia* is useful. This book identifies one of the gaps in gender studies in Russia, which is the other gender—men. It examines the themes of motherhood, fatherhood, and jobs in both the traditional and modern sense as well as looking at new roles for men, the role of the press in gender, and youth and gender.\(^\text{22}\)

3. WWI and WWII: The Age of Total War

In propaganda, particular history is important in creating the basis for certain sources of propaganda and the Ukraine Crisis is no different. WWI, Russian Civil War, and WWII are important instances.


\(^{21}\) Ibid., 169.

One popular example found in many of the media sources is about a man called Igor Strelkov, whose real name is Igor Girkin. He is important because he has become one of the leading military figures of the pro-Russian separatists. He relates to propaganda because he is a war re-enactor who idealizes, romanticizes, and identifies with the Russian Civil War of the 1920s.

The Russian Civil War was a vicious and epic struggle between the Reds—Bolsheviks and their sympathizers—and all those who attempted to stop them from cementing their control over Russia. These included separatists from the non-Russian territories around the fringes of the old Russian Empire, peasant anarchists who wanted little but to be left alone, and (most prominently) the [reactionary, if not royalist] Whites.23

According to BBC as well as many other media sources, Strelkov and other separatists are using the songs, language, and figures of this time period as motivation for their separatist cause as well as furthering the idea that the Russian Civil War is still going on.24 He likes to play the role of a White Guard officer and looks the part to match.

In the literature there is no doubt whether it is because of actual propaganda at the time of the Russian Revolution/Civil War or whether it is the style and romanticized history put out about the time or some combination of the two, but some of the many of the authors consider this time period to be among the best in Soviet propaganda. Philip Taylor even mentions how some of the stylized posters are considered to be “among the most impressive contributions to pictorial art ever made by the Soviet Union.”25 Symbolism is a heavy theme of the propaganda because of its similarity to the widespread use of religious iconography as well as facilitating simple messages for the vastly illiterate population of that time. The other major theme in the WWI/Civil War time is the struggle itself for the hearts and minds using every means necessary to promote the party message. In reading about propaganda and the Russian Civil War time period it is clear that views portray the fight for the hearts and minds and while no doubt

---


25 Taylor, Munitions of the Mind, 200.
this what some of the pro-Russian separatists are longing for when it comes to revolution more is needed for the whole story. A few additional history sources will be needed to trace the roots of the battles and characters that Igor Strelkov and his followers draw inspiration from.

Then there is the matter of Moscow’s favorite F-word—”fascist.” The German news magazine Der Spiegel called the campaign to convince people that “Kiev is controlled by fascists … the greatest propaganda success of Russia.”

The article notes how a Russian parliament member called a fire that occurred and killed thirty separatists a “new Auschwitz.” Similarly bombastic, the Russian newspaper Pravda refers to the regime of President Viktor Yanukovich as a Fascist Junta seized power by hijacking the Parliament, using multiple votes from absent members of parliament, which was illegal, and voted President Viktor Yanukovich out of office without the existence of any single one of the four possible conditions for such a removal. The Junta is, in a word, a Putsch and the “Maidan Government” of Ukraine (“Maidan” being the word for “Square” where the Putsch took shape in Kiev—in Independence Square), has no authority whatsoever.

Russian media’s fascination with calling the Ukrainian government and its followers “fascists” seems to be right in line with Soviet propaganda tradition. In the book The Soviet History of World War II by Matthew Gallagher looks at several instances of the reinterpretation of WWII history by the Soviet government, historians, and writers. In an article republished in New Republic, Timothy Snyder discusses the same theme, namely that Russia is seeking to alter history and create the idea of a fascist problem in Ukraine. He looks at how in the past Ukrainian nationalists were caught in-between Russia and Germany in their struggle for an independent Ukraine. The roots of this conflict seem to be what is being rehearsed between pro-Russian rebels, Moscow, and

---


27 Ibid.


the Ukrainian government. Snyder also explains where the claim of Ukrainian fascism comes from. The claim has its roots in the famine of the 1930s and how Stalin accused anyone in the Ukraine who mentioned the famine as Nazi and in turn must be working for Germany.30

4. Russian Culture

Propaganda and Russian culture are framed as part of the reason that the Ukraine Crisis happened because shortly after the pro-Russian rebels began their campaign in Crimea, Putin and Russia began to proclaim the need to protect Russian speakers in the region.31 On concept of language itself, many of the authors including Anatol Lieven, Timothy Snyder, and Anna Fournier agree that Ukraine is a bilingual country, and while that might seem obvious, the propaganda would have you believe it is not. Fournier, in her article “Mapping Identities: Russian Resistance to Linguistic Ukrainisation in Central and Eastern Ukraine,” emphasizes how language is often used as a part of identity and in Ukraine despite some linguistic divides that it is hard to separate out the two languages into ethnicities and cultural identities because many Ukrainians speak both languages in all parts of the country.

The history of language conflict in Ukraine is not new, but a cyclical problem that resurfaces every so often when political power shifts or one group tries to assert their dominant view.32 In analyzing the data in Joanna Fomina’s report Language, Identity, Politics—The Myth of Two Ukraines affirms that it is not a bi-polar cultural split in Ukraine and concludes that “the widely-used category of ‘Russian speakers’ is largely irrelevant as an explanation of sociopolitical divisions within Ukrainian society.”33


One of the other narratives about Ukraine is that it is a bridge between East and West or that it has within itself some form of transnationalism that would enable Ukraine to become this bridge. I Ray Taras, Olga Filippova, and Nelly Pobeda in the article “Ukraine’s Europeans” describe four areas that make up the roots of Ukrainian transnational identity: Soviet internationalism, and the Orthodox idea of sobornist, the concept of seeing itself as European and modern, and the degree that a transnational identity already exists.\(^{34}\) They find that all of these factors explain and reinforce Ukraine’s transnational potential.

One of the root debates then becomes the question of Ukraine’s place in Central Europe and it begins with Ukrainian history. Mark von Hagen explores the roots of that history in his article “Does Ukraine Have a History” as well as the difficulty of identifying and establishing a history of Ukraine due to the fact that it has many discontinuities, disinterests, has been dominated by other Empires, and its propagandized cultural place between Germany and Russia.\(^{35}\) Anatol Lieven also emphasizes this point in his book *Ukraine and Russia* when he quotes a research fellow:

> Unlike the Baltic Republics, where the continuity of identity and even statehood was not disrupted during the fifty years of Soviet rule, or Armenia, where a high level of national homogeneity and integration provided good prospects for the revival and development of tradition, Ukraine and Russia did not maintain a continuity and in essence had nothing to revive.\(^{36}\)

In establishing Ukrainian history Lieven explores several of the historical debates between Russia and Ukraine to include: the debate on Kievan Rus (a gathering of lands), the Russian-Ukrainian Union of 1654 (how much was Ukraine really under Russian

---


influence and control), was Ukraine a Colony of Russia, Ukraine’s role in the Russian Civil War, the famine of 1933, WWII, and Soviet Identity and legacy.37

5. “The Enemy”

Perhaps the most integral part of propaganda is “the enemy,” the object for what the propaganda is aimed at. In the Ukraine Crisis, there is no shortage of enemies, The Guardian lists a few in an article where they explain the meaning of fascist as Moscow uses it: “a vague word that’s become a catchall for anti-Semites, terrorists, insurgents, anarchists and thugs.”38 In addition, traditional enemies of Russian propaganda always apply: anti-Americanism and anti-western propaganda are also prevalent in the Russian narrative. A BBC article describes this anti-American sentiment as an explanation for Ukraine and that some would like to see Russia break all ties with the West and invade Ukraine.39 The Guardian article mentioned anti-Semitism, but it is in an article in New Republic that really focuses on some of the anti-Semitic imagines and occurrences. The article describes how Jews are asked to register and pay a tax in Donetsk, and in Crimea, a synagogue had a swastika painted on the outside.40

With propaganda from Russia comes anti-Americanism, which takes on two forms: first, the traditional form stemming from the Communist history of Russia, and second, is the new form of anti-Americanism beginning from the fall of the Communism to today. The old or traditional anti-Americanism in the height of the Soviet era was focused on “memories of the 1930s and 1940s: social instability, purges and famine, the

37 Ibid., 11–48.
Second World War, German occupation, and Soviet victory in the war … [and] believed the United States was an enemy that wanted to deprive them of their hard-won gains.”

The new anti-Americanism comes for the difficulties and disillusionment experienced during the 1990s with Russia’s transition from Communism. In their book Shiraev and Zubok discuss the changing view of America in the post-Soviet era and how prior to the fall of the Soviet Union the Russian people did have a desire for “blue-jeans, cigarettes, and jazz and rock music,” but once all of that was attained or not after the fall of Communism Russians became increasingly disillusioned with the United States. These sentiments, in addition to a strong leader in Vladimir Putin, the struggle for a new identity, and along with the reestablishment of Russian power and prestige seem to be the driving force in the “New Russia.”

The roots of anti-Americanism can be traced back to European intellectuals and even the discovery of America itself. In his book Uncouth Nation, Andrei Markovits discusses some the history of anti-Americanism from the 18th and 19th century criticism of America’s backwardness, to a need to bring European-ness to America, and the European elite’s critique of Americans as childlike and superficial. Additionally, he goes into some detail of the different styles of anti-Americanism coming from various European countries, as example he gives a critique of America from a German writer and satirist Bertolt Brecht: “The mistakes of the Russians are the mistakes of friends; the mistakes of the Americans are the mistakes of enemies.”

---


42 Shiraev and Zubok, *Anti-Americanism in Russia*, 19, 63–85.


D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES

In the first section, gender, the most promising explanations for the first three cases involving Yulia Tymoshenko, Nadiya Savchenko, and Irina Dovgan is that that mistreatment of these women seems to be in harmony with traditional gender problems of Russian and Communist history, and that they themselves present a challenge to the traditional roles of women which is bad for Russia and pro-Russian separatists. The propaganda against them is no doubt in response to their leading roles in the Ukraine Crisis. As for the anti-gay propaganda, it appears that this, too, is in line with traditional propaganda, but not for the same reason as in the cases of the females mentioned earlier. It may be for the same reasons that the Soviets banned homosexuality, which is because it was considered part of the counter-revolution and that may offer the same explanation for Ukraine.

The world wars stylized propaganda and its rebranded history may offer explanation as to why some of the separatists are acting the why they are especially in the Donetsk region where they are influenced by Igor “Strelkov” Girkin and others who believe as he does. Also, the campaign of demonizing by Nazifying Ukrainian leadership and supporters appears in continuity with the way Russia has dealt with nationalists or national patriotism in the past.

The explanation of Russian culture through the lens of propaganda in the Ukraine Crisis appears to be a root problem with Russian and Ukrainian relations going back decades, and that problem is based on language as the identifying cultural marker. It appears that when one side gets in power and attempts to divide the country on this marker it creates heavy friction because at its foundation, Ukraine and most Ukrainians are bilingual, and regardless of what language they speak they identify culturally with both countries. In addition, it appears that at its cultural base Crimea is a hard area to separate on either side despite what the propaganda is saying about how Russian it is.

The most promising explanation regarding “the enemy” is that while traditional anti-Americanism seems to be in line with Soviet era propaganda the newer anti-Americanism that is described by Shiraev and Zubok seems to be what it taking place in
Russia and represent a departure from what has been the historical case. In addition, propaganda aimed at Jews and other minorities might be on the rise and more overt than ever, but the intent is what will need to be examined against historic instances of propaganda.

E. RESEARCH DESIGN

This thesis has conducted as a comparative analysis of the propaganda in the Ukraine Crisis surrounding events that have occurred in the areas of gender, WWI/WWII, Russian culture, and the enemy against historical Soviet and post-Soviet propaganda. This approach has helped to answer the research question by taking examples in the current Ukraine Crisis and looking at them through the lens of almost a hundred years of Russian propaganda both Soviet and post-Soviet for their roots, and what light it might shed on these current events. Sources looked at were from both current news stories and journal articles about what is going on between Russia and Ukraine. Additionally, historical books, journal articles and other news sources will be used to draw historical context from Russia, Ukraine and the Soviet Union. The mark of success will be in determining the continuities with the past on the Ukraine Crisis or if the incidents establish a new norm or gives new significance to an old one.

F. THESIS OVERVIEW AND DRAFT CHAPTER OUTLINE

This thesis is organized into four chapters including the introduction and conclusion. The introduction includes a brief section on propaganda itself in order to familiarize the reader with the subject. In the second chapter, the external enemy, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was examined as the quintessential/ideological enemy of Russia. It examines the five key myths propagated by Russia as a result of the Ukraine crisis.

The third chapter is about gender, and examines the roles of men, women, and LGBT individuals looking at Soviet history contrasting that with the propagandized roles today. This chapter also seeks to connect the role of masculinity and femininity to the politics that the Putin regime is applying to the world and Ukraine. The final chapter concludes with an outlook for the propaganda that was examined in this thesis.
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
II. RUSSIAN PROPAGANDA’S FOCUS ON “THE ENEMY”: NATO

In the context of the Ukraine Crisis there is little doubt in the propaganda that Russia is pumping out that the NATO is one of the key players. According to The Economist, “The EU and NATO are Mr. Putin’s ultimate targets. To him, Western institutions and values are more threatening than armies.” As a result, in December 2014, NATO published “Russia’s top five myths about NATO.” The five myths are: (1) “NATO leaders promised at the time of German reunification that the Alliance would not expand to the East”; (2) “Russia has the right to demand a 100-percent guarantee that Ukraine will not join NATO”; (3) “NATO had advanced its infrastructure towards Russia’s borders”; (4) “NATO’s response to the Russia-Ukraine crisis and its reinforcement of Allies in Central and Eastern Europe breaches the Alliance’s international commitments”; and (5) “NATO has a Cold War mentality.” These myths are propagated by Russia and its news media and, given the context of the Ukraine crisis, they have become hot topics of concern. This chapter builds on the NATO fact sheet about the myths and provides some context and analysis to each of the myths.

A. MYTH 1: NATO’S PROMISE NOT TO EXPAND

The propaganda surrounding the topic of the expansion of NATO is said to be one of the key reasons for Russia’s intervention in Ukraine. Vladimir Putin, in a speech to the 43rd Munich Conference, stated:

And we have the right to ask: against whom is this expansion intended? And what happened to the assurances our western partners made after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact? Where are those declarations today? No one even remembers them. But I will allow myself to remind this audience what was said. I would like to quote the speech of NATO General

---


48 Ibid.
Secretary Mr. Woerner in Brussels on 17 May 1990. He said at the time that: “the fact that we are ready not to place a NATO army outside of German territory gives the Soviet Union a firm security guarantee.” Where are these guarantees?49

The view prevails well beyond the Kremlin; however, John Mearsheimer claims: “The United States and its European allies share most of the responsibility for the crisis. The taproot of the trouble is NATO enlargement, the central element of a larger strategy to move Ukraine out of Russia’s orbit and integrate it into the West.”50 Furthermore, take the title Steven Hurst article as example, “Analysis: NATO expansion at the heart of Ukraine Crisis.”51 He, like Mearsheimer, also emphasizes with the latest rounds of NATO expansion this “now, Moscow’s only buffers to a complete NATO encirclement on its western border are Finland, Belarus and Ukraine.”52

The propagandized myth of NATO’s promise not to enlarge has come up with the various rounds of NATO’s expansion and appears to be the key foundation for the argument that NATO or the West cannot be trusted. This includes the three rounds of post-Cold War additions. The first round of expansion in 1999 added the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland. The second round of expansion in 2004 added the Baltics, Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. The third round of expansion in 2009 saw the most recent additions to NATO, Albania and Croatia.53 However, one of the more recent iterations of this false myth came about in the context of NATO’s possible expansion into Georgia: an article published by Michael MccGwire in 1997 got republished in 2008 in the midst of the conflict there. MccGwire claimed “that in 1990 Mikhail Gorbachev was


52 Ibid.

given top-level assurances that the West would not enlarge NATO, ensuring a non-aligned buffer zone between NATO’s eastern border and Russia.”

In an article for the *Washington Quarterly*, Mark Kramer explored how this propagandized myth of a pledge to Russia that NATO would not expand is just that a myth because no promise or guarantee was ever made. He explores how newly released and declassified documents at the time of the article demonstrate that the narrative that NATO or the West made a promise to General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev or any other Soviet official at the time was not true. Kramer goes right for the heart of the argument that a guarantee was made during the talks surrounding the process of German reunification. Kramer also makes it clear that throughout the process of discussing German reunification in 1990 that any mention of further NATO expansion was limited to only the context of East Germany. He emphasizes the concept of understanding, the context of the time, throughout the article, nothing that no one at the time knew that the Soviet Union was going to collapse or that the Warsaw Pact was going to fail.

This has not stopped the rehashing of this debate in the light of the Ukraine Crisis. As noted in the previous quote, it is said to be one of the central issues in the conflict. In an interview on April 17, 2014 on the Russian News channel Russiaya-1 President Vladimir Putin said:

> At one time, we were promised (I mentioned this at the Munich security conference) that after Germany’s unification, NATO wouldn’t spread eastward. The then NATO Secretary-General told us that the alliance wouldn’t expand beyond its eastern borders. However, it started expanding by incorporating former Warsaw Treaty member-countries and later on, the Baltic States, former Soviet republics.

**B. MYTH 2: RUSSIA’S DEMAND FOR A GUARANTEE**

On November 18, 2014, Dmitri Peskov, a spokesman for Vladimir Putin, told *BBC News*: “the Kremlin wants ‘a 100-percent guarantee’ that Ukraine will be prevented

---


from joining NATO.”56 One of the earlier forms of this myth comes directly from President Putin, who demanded in a news conference in May 2014: “[W]here are the guarantees that the government coup, this another colour revolution that happened in Ukraine, won’t be followed by NATO’s arrival to Ukraine?”57 However, outside the question of a guarantee by President Putin and the initial comments made by his spokesmen later on in December 2014 about Russia wanting the guarantee, there are not many examples of this myth in the media past the New Year and the Minsk II agreement.

NATO’s response to this demand has been to focus on two key agreements made between NATO and Russia: the Helsinki Final Act and the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation. In refuting the grounds for Russia to either ask for or demand a guarantee of this type NATO used the pledge made to the principles of the Founding Act between the two entities: “respect for [the] sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of all states and their inherent right to choose the means to ensure their own security.”58 Furthermore, the wording continues to call for respect for “the inviolability of borders and peoples’ right of self-determination as enshrined in the Helsinki Final Act and other [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)] documents.”59

As a further part of its refutation NATO emphasizes the language of the Helsinki Final Act through the wording of the latter half of Article I where all members of the OSCE agree that “every country has the right ‘to belong or not to belong to international organizations, to be or not to be a party to bilateral or multilateral treaties including the right to be or not to be a party to treaties of alliance.”60 Additionally, with regard to the

---


58 NATO, Fact Sheet.


60 NATO, Fact Sheet.
idea that somehow Russia has the right to make this demand that Ukraine not join NATO, the first part of Article I applies:

The participating States will respect each other’s sovereign equality and individuality as well as all the rights inherent in and encompassed by its sovereignty, including in particular the right of every State to juridical equality, to territorial integrity and to freedom and political independence. They will also respect each other’s right freely to choose and develop its political, social, economic and cultural systems as well as its right to determine its laws and regulations.61

Demands are nothing new for Russia. Since the beginning of this crisis it has made such declarations about Ukraine. In talks on March 30, 2014 Russia reiterated a list of demands that it had for the outcome of the Ukraine crisis: “Russia restated demands it made two weeks ago as it moved to annex Ukraine’s Black Sea peninsula of Crimea. They included military neutrality for Ukraine, a federal structure for the country, and promotion of Russian to an official state language alongside Ukrainian.”62

In analyzing this myth the demand for a guarantee that Ukraine will remain neutral is rooted in the idea that Ukraine represents a redline for Western encroachment on Russia’s traditional area of influence; and Russia has demonstrated that it will use force to protect that influence.

C. MYTH 3: NATO’S ADVANCE OF INFRASTRUCTURE

Infrastructure, in the eyes of Russia, is the increase of military installations and the presence of troops in countries that NATO has expanded into in recent decades. Of particular concern to the Russian leadership is NATO missile defense. For example, then President Medvedev in 2010 said, “The choice for us for the coming decade is as follows: we will either come to terms on missile defense and form a full-fledged joint mechanism of cooperation, or, if we fail to forge a constructive agreement, we will plunge into a new


arms race and have to think of deploying new strike means.” President Putin even made reference to infrastructure and missile defense in his March 18, 2014, Crimea Speech:

They have lied to us many times, made decisions behind our backs... It happened with the deployment of a missile defence system. In spite of all our apprehensions, the project is working and moving forward.64

A further example of this comes from a follow on interview with President Putin for Russian TV about a month after the annexation of Crimea:

…It is also true that when the infrastructure of a military bloc approaches our borders, we have grounds for certain apprehensions and questions. We must take certain steps, and this is also true; nobody can deny us this right. And this compels us to counteract. I’ll use this opportunity to say a few words about our talks on missile defence. This issue is no less, and probably even more important, than NATO’s eastward expansion. Incidentally, our decision on Crimea was partially prompted by this.65

As an answer to the myth and President Putin’s words NATO again relies on the language of the Founding Act as the foundation of its justification for furthering the need to modernize and integrate forces to accomplish NATO’s missions; in accomplishing these missions sufficient infrastructure needs to be maintained.66

In the all-encompassing term of infrastructure it is obvious that Russia has many more issues of contention than missile defense, but this is perhaps the issue that is at the forefront at the moment especially with tensions so high between both NATO and Russia. Moreover, in an interview for Pravda, Deputy Chairman of the Duma Committee on Defense, Franz Klintsevich, said, “In view of the emerging missile defense system that is being built against Russia, rather than Iranian missiles, the enemy will be designated. And this enemy is NATO. We understand that security services are working, aggressive

---

63 Yost, NATO’s Balancing Act, 104.
64 Vladimir Putin, “Speech to State Duma deputies, Federation Council members, heads of Russian regions and civil society representatives” (speech, Kremlin, Moscow, March 18, 2014).
65 Putin, Direct Line.
66 NATO, Fact Sheet.
intentions may come from different sides, and countries-provocateurs are likely to be used.”

The roots of contention over missile defense first come from the U.S. withdrawal from the U.S.-Soviet Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in June 2002, so that the United States could explore the idea of building and developing this technology. Additionally, once the technology was found viable the Obama administration announced in September 2009 that it was going to revise the George W. Bush administration’s plans to build missile defense sites in Poland and the Czech Republic. The placement of these installations has served as a huge point of discord for NATO and Russia, which argues that the interceptor missiles are aimed at Russia’s missiles. The second part is this mindset that “the Russians have continued to reject U.S. and NATO assurances that the projected missile defense will be incapable of intercepting Russian strategic missiles.” Russia’s response to U.S. and NATO missile defense technology is that it upsets the balance of nuclear forces in Europe. Also, it is nearly impossible to convince Russians that these systems are not aimed at them as well as to pursue any attempt to elicit cooperation over the matter without some sort of demand for guarantees that are “legally binding.”

In the breakdown of this myth, Russia perhaps does have legitimate security concerns regarding missile defense but the fact that NATO continues to try to cooperate and is trying to establish a method of cohesion to ease future discontent over the issue does suggest that perhaps some arrangement can be made in the future. However, at least for the time being this myth of NATO’s advancing infrastructure is likely to continue to expand, given the overt hostilities of the Ukraine Crisis.

---

68 Yost, NATO’s Balancing Act, 99.
69 Ibid.
70 Ibid., 105.
71 Ibid.
D. MYTH 4: NATO’S REINFORCEMENT OF ITS ALLIES

Myth number four is that NATO’s reinforcement of its Allies in Central and Eastern Europe breaches its commitments internationally, in particular the Russia-NATO Act. As a result “Moscow [says] is following NATO’s policies in Eastern Europe to make sure the Alliance is not taking any steps that would breach the fundamental Russia-NATO Act, [according to] Director of the Department for Non-Proliferation and Arms Control Mikhail Ulyanov.” 72 Furthermore, one of the most recent examples of NATO’s response to the crisis was the announcement on February 5, 2014, that it will “expand its rapid response force from 13,000 to 30,000 troops,” additionally providing 5,000 troops as a “spearhead” ready for rapid deployment to a frontline in a short time period. 73 Additional “measures included setting up six regional command and control centers in eastern European nations, namely Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Bulgaria, to ensure the new forces could be mobilized quickly.” 74

From the outset of the Ukraine Crisis NATO countries have watched the events in Ukraine with nervous eyes because “as far as NATO insiders are concerned—there is simply no telling how the Ukraine crisis will evolve.” 75 In the words of NATO’s Deputy Secretary General, “Russia’s aggression against Ukraine… is not an isolated incident but a game-changer in European security. It reflects an evolving pattern of behaviour that has been emerging for several years.” 76

In an article from Russia Today the view of Russia is that it “sees the recent actions as additional proof that NATO is an anti-Russian military bloc that has taken advantage of the Ukrainian conflict, using it as a pretext for a military build-up in Eastern Europe.” Further on the article references a speech from President Putin in which he says:


74 Ibid.


76 Ibid.
“NATO is developing its rapid response forces and is boosting its infrastructure near our borders, we are registering attempts to violate nuclear parity and the creation of the European and Asia-Pacific segments of the missile defense systems is being sped up,”

All of this comes as both sides in recent weeks have held various types of military exercises to demonstrate readiness postures. As a result of these maneuvers, Russia’s envoy to NATO, Aleksandr Grushko, pointed out in an interview to Germany’s Das Erste TV that Russia has not substantively increased the number of its military drills, while the military activity of NATO has escalated, “shaping a new military reality.”

NATO’s justification again comes from the Founding Act, and goes in hand with the justification of myth number three because in the language of the Founding Act: “In this context, reinforcement may take place, when necessary, in the event of defence against a threat of aggression and missions in support of peace consistent with the United Nations Charter and the OSCE governing principles, as well as for exercises consistent with the adapted Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, the provisions of the Vienna Document 1994 and mutually agreed transparency measures. Russia will exercise similar restraint in its conventional force deployments in Europe.”

This myth is likely to remain a point of contention, given the increases in personnel, equipment, and exercises as a result of the crisis. This has the potential to lead to the classical dilemma of the security spiral—where both sides continue to respond to one another’s actions. Moreover, this myth and the propaganda associated with various responses to the Ukraine Crisis as well as the posturing of both NATO and Russia have the potential to become the most dangerous aspect of this conflict. Although the Crisis in Ukraine may be cooling off as a result of the Minsk II agreement, the actions of NATO and Russia are heading up events to the most recent day of this paper.


78 Ibid.

79 NATO, Fact Sheet.
E. MYTH 5: NATO’S COLD WAR MENTALITY

In a statement on March 4, 2014, the Russian representative to NATO, Alexander Grushko described the calling of an emergency meeting on the situation in Ukraine as a sign of NATO’s “cold war mentality.” This myth appears to be the all-encompassing myth because it provides both sides ammunition to both compare the current situation with the history of the Cold War but also to serve to thwart NATO’s modernization because ultimately from that point of view Russia is still the ideological enemy. This idea also provides a context for commentators to present a lot more opinion-based analysis on whether NATO is or is not acting with a Cold War mindset.

Given the extensive history between NATO and Russia during the Cold War there is no doubt that commentators want to make comparisons because, depending on who is asked, the answers vary widely as to why either NATO is acting in such a Cold War manner or why the Ukraine Crisis represents a return of some sort to the Cold War. For example, in the words of Steven Hurst of the Associated Press: “The Cold War didn’t end. It just took on a 24-year pause. The East-West showdown over Ukraine makes that clear.” His reasoning is that “U.S.-Russian relations have fallen back into the dangerous nuclear and political standoff of the Cold War years before the Soviet collapse.”

The other side of the argument is that NATO’s reaction to the Ukraine Crisis does not represent a return to the Cold War either in ideology or mindset, but is instead a breakdown in relations and perhaps even a semi-provoked reaction on the part of NATO. Additionally, there are some that even speculate that the Ukraine Crisis represents a New Cold War in which hybrid warfare and destabilization are the end games. In his article Matthew Kroenig says it all with the title: “Facing Reality: Getting NATO Ready for a New Cold War.”

---


81 Hurst, “Analysis: NATO Expansion.”

According to the fact sheet, NATO’s official response to the idea of a Cold War mindset is that: “The Cold War ended over 20 years ago. It was characterized by the opposition of two ideological blocs, the presence of massive standing armies in Europe, and the military, political and economic domination by the Soviet Union of almost all its European neighbours.” Furthermore, it goes on to discredit the argument by saying that Russia is not the same sort of ideological leader that it once was by highlighting the differences that it once represented with Communism. NATO also emphasizes how after the fall of Communism it sought to cooperate with Russia through the NATO-Russia Founding Act, in addition to various partnership efforts, which ultimately resulted in the NATO-Russia Council in 2002.83

The NATO fact sheet reiterates its defense against this myth by citing a declaration made at the 2014 Wales summit: “the Alliance does not seek confrontation and poses no threat to Russia. But we cannot and will not compromise on the principles on which our Alliance and security in Europe and North America rest.”84

Reiterating the fact that this myth is a catchall for propaganda numerous comparisons are made in the context of old Cold War rhetoric, troop positioning, nuclear war and posturing of both sides to justify their reactions based on historic concerns. In further analyzing this myth, whether or not the point is made that NATO or even Russia is acting in a Cold War manner or mindset, one fact does remain the same—the threat of nuclear use is a holdover of the Cold War and a Cold War mindset because it offers the ultimate deterrent. If the situation escalates in any manner that Russia might use nuclear weapons, what would NATO’s response be? This is the question that Kroenig raises in his article in addition to the other factors that prompt him to suggest that NATO needs to reevaluate and conduct a strategic review.85 Given the possible threat of nuclear force this myth may have an eerie hint of truth to its allusion to a Cold War mindset when it comes to nuclear weapons but it hardly represents NATO’s mindset as a whole.

83 NATO, *Fact Sheet*.
84 Ibid.
Additionally, like the other myths, this is one of convenience, and it is not likely to disappear, given its usefulness as a catchall for discussion and opinion.

F. CONCLUSION

The five myths and their variations are persistent in the Russian presentation of its strategic concerns. They also tend to occur in multiples—for example in Vladimir Putin’s March 18, 2014 speech, he says:

They have lied to us many times, made decisions behind our backs, placed us before an accomplished fact. This happened with NATO’s expansion to the East, as well as the deployment of military infrastructure at our borders. They kept telling us the same thing: “Well, this does not concern you.” That’s easy to say. It happened with the deployment of a missile defence system. In spite of all our apprehensions, the project is working and moving forward.

Furthermore, the topics of infrastructure, reinforcement, treaty commitments, and NATO’s Cold War mentality all appear to be fairly common themes that can all be seen under the guise of Russian frustration with missile defense or the increase of NATO troops and exercises when Russia officials speak.

The Ukraine Crisis has served as a catalyst to highlight these myths as legitimate arguments for actions taken or security concerns as well as keeping them relevant to the current developments of geopolitics. The art of promoting and propagandizing these five myths has become standard play. For example, myths one, three, and five all have great context and significance because of the Ukraine Crisis. However, they have been long-standing issues of contention between NATO and Russia, and will likely continue as such for the foreseeable future.
III. THE ENEMY WITHIN: GENDER POLITICS AND RUSSIA’S POWER GRAB

This chapter examines the *internal enemy* or the *enemy within* and the propaganda that is directed at the roles of gender and their identity. “An essential part of the social order, gender is actively used to depict the world as a whole and to organize social relations among different groups (nations, classes, etc.). Several factors make it possible to consider gender independently of relations between the sexes proper, and among these factors the role of gender discourse in delineating social boundaries and hierarchies deserves special mention.”86 Furthermore, “due to the role that gender discourse plays in producing social borders and hierarchies, it is widely used in politics, including in the legitimation of power,” making it a key area to explore in the understanding of the *internal enemy*.87

In Eastern European politics, the role of gender has become central to how states approach conflict. This chapter sets out to explore how the “us versus them” relationship develops in the realm of gender politics and traditional values agenda of Russia and its influence on Ukraine. This chapter will first examine the roles of femininity, feminism, and the feminist; then masculinity and the “Muzhik.” It culminates in an analysis of LGBT persons and how they all have shaped the image of the *enemy*, which affects or establishes “the good versus the bad,” and the “us versus them” relationships.

A. TRADITIONAL VALUES AND GENDER POLITICS

In the focus on the *enemy* within, masculinity, femininity, and LGBT overlap in terms of gender politics and traditional values. Furthermore, the three also have connotations for nationalism, xenophobia, and the legitimation of power, shaping and playing into the dynamic for Russian and Ukrainian politicians and mass movements to influence the populace at large through the assertion of a traditional/conservative


87 Ibid.
Ultimately, the combination of gender politics through nationalism has influenced Russia to want to reassert its dominance over what it sees as its sovereign rights as a state.

Thus, in the wake of the Ukraine crisis, the picture of how the use of such gender-charged language in the popular press is given greater context by the understanding of the history and themes of gender roles throughout the two counties and how the remasculinization of the state through gender politics and discourse have contributed to ongoing discontent with the West and its values. Indeed, in the recent past similar language has been used to demasculinize Ukraine, in the gas disputes of 2006 and 2009. An example from 2006 is where “a Russian television program described Ukraine as a Mammonish kept woman, a ‘flighty Ukrainian mistress.’”

Riabov and Riabova assert that the use of gender can be a weapon of power legitimation but also a tool of delegitimation. With that in mind the weaponizing of gender is best exemplified by the band Pussy Riot and the female protestors of Femen.

B. FEMININITY, FEMINISM, AND THE FEMINIST

Russia’s current political agenda is seeking to return women to a more traditional and domestic role. One newspaper warns: “Feminism could destroy Russia, Russian Orthodox patriarch claims.” In the case of women in Russia, the internal enemy is the feminist and feminism itself, despite its egalitarian Communist history and outward appearance of democracy and women’s rights many Russians appear to be going along with the regime. Before delving into the history of Russian/Ukrainian women’s roles


89 Riabov and Riabova, “Remasculinization of Russia?” 28.

90 Ibid., 29.

definitions are needed for feminism and Feminist, but for femininity as well because there is an important distinction to make in the three.92

“Feminism has become ‘a dirty word’ in Russia and any challenge to Putin’s macho image is crushed. Witness Pussy Riot, the anarcho-feminist punk group whose irreverent performance in Moscow’s main cathedral in 2012 landed performers behind bars—and sparked… [an] ‘anti-feminist hysteria’ in Russia.”93 In the eyes of many, Pussy Riot has come to symbolize feminism, femininity, and female activists in Russia due to the media coverage from their overt opposition to the regime.94

Pussy Riot gained prominence during the time when Vladimir Putin announced his return to the Presidency; in an act of protest they sang a song in a Russian Orthodox Church that “challenging the Putin handlers’ equation of his masculinity with national strength.”95 In doing so, Pussy Riot became “a feminist project, a set of practices

---

92 Feminism: “Both a social movement and a perspective on society. As a social movement, it has challenged the historical subordination of women and advocated political, social, and economic equality between the sexes. As a social and sociological perspective, it has examined the roles that sex and gender play in structuring society, as well as the reciprocal role that society plays in structuring sex and gender.” Further, “Feminism is grounded on the belief that women are oppressed or disadvantaged by comparison with men, and that their oppression is in some way illegitimate or unjustified. Under the umbrella of this general characterization there are, however, many interpretations of women and their oppression, so that it is a mistake to think of feminism as a single philosophical doctrine, or as implying an agreed political program.” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Online, s.v. “Feminism.”


Femininity: “The forms of behavior associated with the female sex, as opposed to the biological difference that defines the sexes. Femininity is primarily a cultural product that exhibits a great deal of variation among cultures and often within cultures, where its specific requirements and normative power can vary widely. Femininity has historically been attributed to or considered inseparable from biological facts—such as childbearing and smaller size and strength compared to men—even by many early feminists, who sought to provide a greater social scope for the feminine virtues.” Dictionary of the Social Sciences, 2002 Online Edition, s.v. “Femininity.”

Note: These are not the only definitions for these terms or are they agreed upon by experts, however, they were selected for their generality and easy to understand meanings to provide a background context to this section.

93 Elder, “Feminism Could Destroy Russia.”


challenging the dominant gendered and sexualized order.”96 Amid charges of sparking an “anti-feminist hysteria,” the band members and author J. E. Johnson both argue that it is not the band but rather the regime that is responsible for the tensions that brought about and the anti-feminism discourse that followed.97 Either way, the band has been given credit for having “single-handedly added the word feminism to Russian public consciousness.”98

In addition to Pussy Riot, Femen in Ukraine has become the face of feminist protest, thanks to the media coverage they receive as a result of the lack of coverage they have on their bodies—the group turns up topless to make its point against sexism, exploitation, homophobia, and other battlegrounds of the gender (and gendered) debate.99 “Femen protesters target Vladimir Putin before his meeting with Ukraine leader,” announces a story about two topless women who poured buckets of wine over themselves to symbolize the blood of the Ukrainian people.100 Their radical tactics represent a weaponizing of femininity as a means to achieve their feminist goals.

In both compliment and contrast to feminism, femininity often lies at the heart of any contrast between tradition and progress. Because femininity is primarily a product of culture, Russian or Slavic femininity comes from a history and tradition of Slavic concepts of beauty and what makes a woman, including traditional dress and the conventional (submissive and domestic) roles of a woman.

A good example of this concept can be seen in the 2014 Eurovision contest with Poland’s national representative Donatan and Cleo and their song My Słowianie—We Are Slavic (English title Slavic Girls). In this song, the singer Cleo croons about Slavic beauty and blood. In the music video, women churn butter, milk cows, and clean the

96 Johnson, “Pussy Riot,” 583.
97 Ibid., 583–56.
98 Ibid., 584.
The lyrics are similarly inclined to traditional and nationalist views of femininity:

“We’re Slavic girls, we know how to use our charming beauty
Now shake what your mama gave ya!
Clap your hands to this music
This is our nature, this is our call
This is our hot Slavic blood…

The special thing we have in our genes
Makes us proud of our natural shapes
On our lines you have everything you need
So pour the vodka straight, no need to mix”

In examination of the lyrics, the song on the surface seems to suggest that women should return to churning butter or milking cows, but rather it is a call to take pride in the Slavic heritage and tradition. Within the context of the song it demonstrates the pride in Slavic culture and tradition through the lyrics used and dress of the women in the video and in the numerous stage performances. With that in mind it is upheld as the ideal, idyllic way to present feminism and femininity.

In this context, the ideal Soviet women traces her roots back to the early Soviet Era, when the leading image of a woman was that of a Bolshevik Revolutionary and the Stakhanovite. These images typify the propagandized role into which the Soviet state cast its women. In the revolutionary period, women became part of the focus of the Bolsheviks, this was seen through social reforms: women in the workplace, protection of

---


labor, and public hygiene—uniformly women participating in the system as well as the workforce and as contributing to socialist production.

In the time of high Stalinism, the stylized image of women in the workplace continued but in the form of the Stakhanovite, who was the idealized Soviet worker, a model of production and productivity—and reproductivity. In contrast to the Stakhanovite, the Soviet “Mother Heroine” was a title—and a medal—awarded to women who had 10 or more children. The Mother Heroine’s contribution to the bright Soviet future was, thus, reproduction, rather than production. The program was part of a wider push by Stalin to return women to domesticity through motherhood—part of the larger project of demobilizing the revolutionary masses and establishing a stable, if authoritarian, Soviet dictatorship. A partial return to conservative social conventions—including a tacit truce with the Orthodox church and a restoration of traditional gender roles—formed a key part of this project.

The general characteristics of the propagandized woman during this early Soviet period were that of a builder of socialism and feminism through the participation in the overall Communist system. “They subscribed to the image of the new Soviet icon of ‘femininity’—a combination of the tractor-driving heroine of socialist labour and the fertile mother breeding healthy children for the socialist utopia soon to come.” In other

---


109 Rubchak, “Christian Virgin or Pagan Goddess,” 323.
words, while some room remained for women to refashion their images and their roles in Soviet society in keeping with the revolutionary momentum of the earlier period, significant social and cultural incentives existed for women to return to their subordinate and domestic roles.

From the 1970s to the early 1990s, the image of the ideal Russian and Ukrainian women began to change. The shift started in the 1970s, when Soviet writers began “arguing that women’s high level of involvement in the workforce had led to distortion both of female and male personality.”110 One such article was titled “The Bitter Fruits of Emancipation.”111 As a result of women in the workplace, “women had been forced to develop personality traits more appropriate to the workplace than the home, while their independence and self-confidence had increased, their propensity to nurture and concede had contracted.”112 The development of the more appropriate workplace skills over domestic skills was decried as producing “a range of alarming social and demographic problems.”113 These concerns included how children were raised and cared for and the emasculation of the husband as the breadwinner, driving him to decouple from the family.114 Demographic problems of “divorce rate[s] up and the birth rate[s] down” marked the period.115

In the 1980s, 
Perestroika and 
Glasnost promised sweeping changes in the relationship of the Soviet government to the Soviet citizen, but it also marked a “return to domesticity and dependence.”116 Gone was the “image of women and men as partners in the building of socialism [it was] being replaced by that of the traditional family in which men work outside the home and women devote themselves to child care and

110 Attwood, “Post-Soviet Women,” 255.
111 Ibid.
112 Ibid.
113 Ibid.
114 Ibid.
115 Ibid.
domesticity.”\footnote{Ibid.} The socioeconomic reforms of the Gorbachev era leading to a propaganda campaign that focused on placing the family first and work second. Further efforts were in the area of education and the workforce; shifting the focus back to the family through teaching it in school and offering women the chance to work part-time from home.\footnote{Attwood, “Post-Soviet Women,” 256.} The collective desired image for women at this time emphasized a balance between work and domestic/maternal responsibility.

As Russia transitioned to democracy—or at least to a post-Soviet, post-socialist system, women were cast—or cast themselves—amid a more domestic lifestyle. While the market economy seemed to accommodate, if not demand, dynamic and active participation from Russia’s women, a return to a more traditional system beckoned some, and a rejection of Soviet-style empowerment attracted others. Then the reality of the introduction of the market economy to Russia caused further problems in for women, who disproportionately faced growing numbers unemployment. Fulfilling the fond predictions of the 1970s authors, many women had little other choice than to depend on a man.\footnote{Ibid., 256–59.}

Dr. Attwood uses Naina Yel’tsin as the quintessential example how women were supposed to think and act, drawing on a newspaper interview:

“\ldots I am not the first lady, I am simply the wife of the Russian President… Everything is just as it was before for us. I’ve remained a housewife… I choose his ties, I take care of his shirts and suits…” She admitted that unlike Raisa Gorbacheva, she undertook no public or social work, but this, she said, was because she had no power to effect any real change: “All I can do is to ask the President for help. But there is an unbreakable rule in our family: I must never ask my husband about anything that relates to his work.”\footnote{Ibid., 258.}

By the time President Putin turned the considerable power of the Russian state and government to the task of controlling feminism and femininity—for example, through notions of motherhood that Stalin could appreciate, with monetary incentives for
additional children and an attempt to put additional regulations on abortion—the average Russian woman might have had neither the desire nor the capacity to resist. Moreover, in the minds of Russian and Ukrainian women, these stereotypes of submission and stylized beauty distinguish them from Western women. They are suspicious of arguments against these roles because

the stereotypes presented in the media make Russian women feel that to be a feminist inevitably means that they will “lose their femininity” and cease to be attractive to men…[in addition to] the fact that Russian women simply do not know what feminism is, since western feminist ideas have been consistently misrepresented in the Soviet and post-Soviet press.122

C. MASCULINITY AND THE “MUZHIK”

Russia has always been known as mother Russia but through the power of gender politics it in more recent years has taken on a more masculine and dominant role through the remasculinization of the state and the feminization or homosexualization other states. Perhaps the best example is Vladimir Putin, who has claimed and retained power in part on the basis of a particular version of masculinity. Specifically, the Putin-esque masculine bravado has led to the remasculinization of the Russian state—and demonstrates the relationship between gender and politics.

“He shoots, he scores: Vladimir Putin celebrity cult achieves new goals” reads a recent headline in The Guardian.123 The article explains how Vladimir Putin led his team to victory in a hockey game, scoring eight goals himself.124 “Extreme-ski fishing: Vladimir Putin strips to his waist again for macho hunting trip.”125 “Arm-wrestling a woman, wielding a hunting rifle, bare-chested horse riding . . . Putin’s PR team knows a


124 Ibid.

thing or two about photo opportunities.” Putin has extended his own hypermasculine image as a living metaphor of the kind of Russia he claims to promote. This is not; however, without historical precedence because when Stalin was in power his image was carefully controlled as pointed out by Michael Hausladen. He states how Stalin was always pictured to the far right when he was featured with other Communist leaders. He was placed to the right to symbolize his masculinity and power; he was seen as the final iteration of Communism thus Marx, Engels, and Lenin were all to his left and placed on the feminine side of the picture.

Putin is playing to the image of the “Muzhik”—real guy—which Putin and Russian nationalists are using this word to describe the quintessential masculine man. Riabov and Riabova argue that Putin’s masculine image is tied in with the masculine image of the Muzhik; both of these images combine to form the new national masculine image of the 2000s. The Muzhik has “such qualities as economic independence and self-reliance in contemporary capitalist economics, as well as considerable self-dependence in his relationship with the state. Unlike the imagined man of the present-day West, the Muzhik is sturdy, tough, and strong; he doesn’t talk too much but makes his deeds speak for him.” As an example of just what is the Muzhik—Leonardo DiCaprio—who was called a Muzhik by Putin himself “when the actor came to a St. Petersburg summit on saving tigers and [he also] emphasized DiCaprio’s Russian roots.”

The Muzhik is much more than an image; he has become something of a status symbol, spanning working class and business elite and even infiltrating the lexicon and

---


129 Ibid., 26.

130 Ibid., 27.

131 Ibid., 26.
ultimately becoming a standard by which to judge all men. The contemporary version of a Muzhik is torn away from his peasant setting, incorporated into the context of urban life, and crosses the boundaries of socioeconomic strata, creating a common space of male solidarity.” Thus, the Muzhik unites Russian men—as neither the market economy nor, frankly, Soviet practice could—against competing claims on their social and political consciousness. Russian men are united in domination over Russian women and poised for a similar assertion of power over a weaker world, if need be.

The Muzhik, as an archetype, owes much to the traditional patriarchal family as it was known in the Tsarist time—in clear counter-distinction to Marxism, which, as an ideological philosophy, espoused women’s liberation and equality. The problem, according to skeptics of socialist gender practice, was that as a result of equalitarian policies, the family unit under the Soviet regime was established as an alliance of the state and mothers; fathers were secondary to this arrangement. In fact, the Bolsheviks enacted laws that changed the role for men. These early laws consisted of “the legalization of a civil marriage, which was to be registered only though ZAGS (Soviet registry offices); monogamy; that marriages should be entered into freely by mutual consent; equality for men and women in all aspects of family life; free divorce on request of both parties; state protection of motherhood; and equal rights for children, regardless of whether they were born within or outside registered marriages.” Additionally, all marriages performed by the church lost legal status when the church was separated from the state.

Ultimately, “these laws reflected not so much the desire of the state to destroy the bourgeois family unit, but its desire to replace patriarchal authority with the authority of

133 Pospelova, “Models of Manliness.”
135 Ibid., 73.
136 Ibid.
137 Ibid.
the state, on whom the family would now principally depend.”138 As a consequence, “women relied increasingly on the state as the omnipresent, reliable father and husband, while men were effectively marginalized, their domestic power curtailed, along with their ultimate responsibility to and for their families.”139 Marriage was no long the realm of husband and wife, but husband, wife, and state—as evidence of this Kukhterin cites letters written to newspapers and party leaders that detail private matters. For example, one such letter to Joseph Stalin discussed the need to develop women in order to help men’s alcoholism. This process would serve both women and the state by keeping men from getting drunk and beating their wives while making sure men were ready and able to sever the state. In this notional partnership between women and the state, men were objects of concern and “reform,” rather than agents of their own destinies as men and socialists.140 Additionally, the role of the state was not just any figure of the government but rather the larger than life figure of Stalin. He was the stately father figure and used many opportunities to demonstrate this by being pictured with ethnic minorities, particularly children.141

In the event, the state was then able to step more into the role of rising/influencing children, through: “nurseries, kindergartens, schools, [and] pioneer camps.”142 Indoctrination took place through these various organizations where “above all obedience and lip service to the ideals of the State,” were required.143 These institutions that facilitated indoctrination of the youth masses reinforcing the States’ role and further perpetuating from early age obedience and the abdication of personal autonomy and authority.144 In the Communist world “the State was the big, all-knowing, always-in-the-

138 Ibid., 74.
140 Ibid., 77–78.
141 Hausladen, “Narrative Propagation in Russia,” 42.
144 Ibid., 99–122.
right, authoritarian, decision-making ‘father.’” 145 With the removal of domestic responsibilities men “attempted to enliven the boredom of daily life with alcoholic beverages.” 146 Amid stereotypes—and real experiences—of male alcoholism and domestic violence, the new “social definition of a ‘good’ Soviet family became one in which the husband was sober and agreed with his wife.” 147 For most men, now “liberated” from the family, the Soviet period thus came to be centered on work. Work became the primary role of men; fatherhood and the family became lower in priority and secondary in nature. 148

In the years following the collapse of the Soviet Union, with the state no longer seeking to fulfill the role of father, men began a gradual return to a more dominant role in the family. 149 However, this new male role was left open for interpretation. “For women, a head of the family is someone who takes over some of the responsibility for the home, while men seem to perceive the role as that of a breadwinner whose word is treated as law.” 150 The post-Communist period was difficult for the redefined men, who now had to find work and participate in the family sphere. 151

The post-Communist period shift to a more market-based economy cost many former Soviets the safety net of Communism. Thus, when men lost their jobs or were under-employed it was perceived as a loss of status and identity, especially after the emphasis that the Soviets placed on the work. As Marina Kiblitskaya argues, because of the status that men held, in regard to work, before the fall of Communism, men had further to fall under the new system because of how work was perceived and that

145 Ibid., 86.
146 Ibid., 87.
148 Ibid., 80.
149 Ibid., 85.
150 Ibid., 88.
151 Ibid.
masculine identity was defined through the role of breadwinner.152 The “male worker identities that were based on the concept of ‘real’ men’s work, and the sense of indispensability and freedom that went with having certain labour skills in the Communist era, have been challenged by reform.”153 Because a man’s identity was bound to his work and ability to work when he failed to live up to such standards it not only caused a crisis in the man but in his home life as well due to the humiliation it caused.154 Ultimately, Kiblitskaya writes, such a man became a king without his crown.155

The transition to a market economy for Russia came with the rise of the entrepreneurs and in their view a new hierarchical relationship.156 In contrast to the Soviet period, when the hierarchy was rigid, in the transition period, the hierarchy became redefined through men’s new interaction with women. To be sure, in some cases cause men to become “financially dependent on their wives.”157 Nonetheless, the view of traditional gender roles did not go away. As Elena Meshcherkina writes, to many men, this dependence on their wives was “a temporary trial before moving to greater things.”158 This view allowed many in their mind to maintain “the ‘natural differences’ between men and women,” thus ultimately allowing businessmen to “see themselves as the undisputed leaders of their families.”159

Putin’s remasculinized Russia in the early 2000s, then, was an interesting juxtaposition of the power of the state in Soviet times and the power of the individual man from post-Soviet times. Meanwhile, image of Russia right after Communism was

153 Ibid., 103.
154 Kiblitskaya, “‘Once We Were Kings,’” 96–97.
155 Ibid., 100–1.
157 Ibid., 112.
158 Ibid., 116.
159 Ibid.
that of a weak and dependent state.\textsuperscript{160} Riabov and Riabova discuss how the power of “sovereignty is seen as an opportunity for Russia to decide its own fate, to render it less dependent on international financial organizations, to make it a subject rather than an object in world politics.”\textsuperscript{161} Under Putin’s presidency, Russia has begun to regain its sovereignty and independence. This increase its strength on the world stage is helping to rebuild the Russian national imagine through the inherent masculinity applied to it through President Putin, his supporters, and the collective masculine image of the \textit{Muzhik}.\textsuperscript{162}

D. THE OTHERS—LGBT

While femininity and masculinity have a more subtle focus as the enemy, LGBT persons have become the subjects of much more overt and hostile focus as the \textit{enemy}. “According to a Levada Center survey (July 2012), 43 percent of Russians believe that gays and lesbians have low morals, and 32 percent believe they are mentally ill. Only 17 percent of respondents believe that homosexuals have the same right to their sexual orientation as straight people.”\textsuperscript{163} The whole idea of LGBT is so anathema to Russians that they have developed a neologism “Gayropa” to describe how, in their view, the essence of European lifestyle has become homosexuality.\textsuperscript{164}

There is no better example of this than Conchita Wurst winning the Eurovision singing contest in 2014 and as a result Russia wanting to create its own straight version of Eurovision. One Russian political leader even went as far as to say: “This is the end of Europe…. … It’s rotted away. There are no more men and women. There is just ‘it.”’\textsuperscript{165} Some of the other more concerning and attention grabbing headlines about gays and lesbians in the Ukraine Crisis read: “Russia LGBT Activists Worried after Crimea

\textsuperscript{160} Riabov and Riabova, “Remasculinization of Russia?” 26–27.
\textsuperscript{161} Ibid., 27.
\textsuperscript{162} Riabov and Riabova, “Remasculinization of Russia?” 27.
\textsuperscript{163} Ibid., 29.
\textsuperscript{164} Ibid.
‘Leader’ Lashes Out,” “Russia ‘Ignoring’ Anti-Gay Attacks, Says Human Rights Watch.”
“Gay Porn about Ukraine Rebel Leader Strelkov Sold on Amazon.”166

In examining the history of gays and lesbians in Russian culture, James Riordan traces the roots of Russia’s tolerance back to ancient times.167 He offers how in ancient Russian culture was more tolerant than in other Western nations or in fact more recent times, for example, “the religious definition for ‘sodomy’ in ancient Rus’ was even vaguer than in the West, designating both homosexual relations and anal intercourse irrespective of the sex of the partners, as well as deviations from ‘normal’ sexual roles and positions.”168 In contrast to sodomy and homosexuality, “lesbianism was normally categorized as a form of masturbation.”169 Thus, lesbianism was looked at as a “lesser sin” when compared to even heterosexual lechery.170 In the context of sex and sexual intercourse the focus has always been on penetration thus sodomy and homosexuality being more the focal point when it comes to crime.171

In the early days gays and lesbians in the Soviet Union, enjoyed a fairly tolerant attitude—Riordan discusses how gays and lesbians even “played a major role in Soviet culture.”172 However, in 1933 this brief period of tolerance began to change as the Soviet government began to take steps to once more limit homosexuality, as part of the Stalin’s incremental demobilization and “rediscovery” of more conventional views and

168 Ibid., 156.
169 Ibid.
170 Ibid.
171 Penetration: “the act of a man putting his penis into his partner’s vagina or anus.” Oxford Dictionaries Online, 2016 Online Edition, s.v. “Penetration.”
Sodomy: “sexual act in which a man puts his penis in somebody’s, especially another man’s, anus.” Oxford Dictionaries Online, 2016 Online Edition, s.v. “Sodomy.”
institutions in society.\textsuperscript{173} It was in 1934 that sodomy once again became a crime under the law, but from the period of 1917 until then it was left off the books contributing to the period of tolerance.\textsuperscript{174} In 1936 homosexuality was further linked with decadence and the counter-revolution thus making it just another form of subversion.\textsuperscript{175} Article 121 was put into place “buggery” then became “punishable by deprivation of freedom for a term of up to five years.”\textsuperscript{176} One of the worst realities of Article 121 was it use as a weapon against all forms of dissidents.

It was not until the late 1980s that real discussions and dialog on the topic of sexual orientation began to appear. Riordan attributes to a combination of \textit{glasnost} and the growing concern over AIDS as to why the topic was finally able to gain some traction in the national discourse. It began to take shape in the youth publications giving a voice to the masses for gays and lesbians.\textsuperscript{177} It was not until after the fall of the Soviet in 1993 that the Duma repealed Article 121 and homosexuality was decriminalized.\textsuperscript{178}

In post-Communist Russia, the status of gays and lesbians has been punctuated with homophobia and harassment. However, two major victories were achieved in the 1990s. First, as previously mentioned, homosexuality was decriminalized in 1993. Second, in 1999 came the depathologization of homosexuality, meaning that for the first time in Russia homosexuality was not treated as a mental disease. The change was brought about when Russia adopted the World Health Organization’s classification of diseases, removing homosexuality from the Russian list.\textsuperscript{179} As it happens, Ukraine was

\begin{footnotes}
\item[173] Ibid.
\item[175] Riordan, “Sexual Minorities,” 160.
\item[176] Riordan, “Sexual Minorities,” 160.
\item[177] Ibid., 161–62.
\item[179] Ibid.
\end{footnotes}
“the first of the former Soviet Republics to repeal criminal sanctions for consensual homosexual intercourse between adults.”

While these events marked steps in the right direction for the status of gays and lesbians in both Russia and Ukraine, it does not help with the growing attitude of homophobia. In results from both surveys and studies from the Levada Center and the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology suggest that there is an overall increase in homophobia in both countries. While the numbers provide interesting data on the questions posed and spark an argument in the level of bias in the questions themselves, analyzing some of the contributing factors that lead to homophobia are of more importance.

Overall, there are many factors that are attributed to the rising trend of homophobia in both Russia and Ukraine, but two of which stand out, as identified by both I. Kon and Martsenyuk: first, is the growing activism and acknowledgement of gays and lesbians in society; second, the portrayal of the negative image of gays and lesbians. The second reason is the more disturbing and dangerous of the two because it perpetuates the mentality of the other or outsider, ultimately the enemy of traditional society. Using homosexuals as an object of directed attention comes from the assertion of a “traditional values” agenda of Putin, Russia, the government, the church, and the media. As a result, homophobia has not only become more present in the public sphere but also in the realm of the government sphere, through the passing of the anti-homopropaganda laws in Russia.

The new laws that were passed are commonly referred to as the “antigay” laws. The first came into effect as a local law in Ryazan Oblast in May 2006: “Article 3.10, entitled ‘Public acts aimed at the propaganda of homosexualism (sodomy and lesbianism)

---

amongst minors.”184 Violation of this local law carries with it an “administrative fine of 1500–2000 roubles.”185 Furthermore, on June 11, 2013, “a federal bill outlawing the ‘propaganda of non-traditional sexual relations to minors’ was passed.”186

The problem that these laws have created is in the ambiguity of what is exactly homosexual propaganda. Ultimately, these laws help to perpetuate the social inferiority of nontraditional sexual relationships from the state’s perspective.187 In Ukraine, the same push for increased separation and perpetuation of homophobia through the media and the push for laws have come from a group known as “Love Against Homosexuality.”188 The organization pushed for “criminal prosecution for propagandizing and popularizing homosexual behavior that threatens the national security of Ukraine.”189 Furthermore, a Kyiv city organization called Svoboda (Freedom) held a demonstration against homosexuality “in support of traditional family values and against the propaganda of perversion.”190 As the title of a contemporary articles put it, “Homophobia as a Litmus Test of Russian Democracy” it is certainly of concern for freedoms in general if one uses the growing homophobia in both societies a barometer for the measure of the health of Russia and Ukraine as democracies.

E. CONCLUSION

As is evident the role of gender and identity propaganda in understanding the complex nature of the Ukraine Crisis takes shape not only through the gendered headlines of the news clippings, but through the historical narrative that provides context and offers some explanation to the extent that the society collectively remembers and experiences. In the case of Russia, the transition from Communism to post-Communism proved to be a redefining moment for femininity and masculinity as well as feminism and patriarchy,

185 Ibid., 366.
186 Ibid.
189 Ibid.
190 Ibid., 59.
additionally, the LGBT communities’ victories and setbacks prove to be a growing factor of concern and gage to observe the shaping of attitudes.

In the future how will the weaponization of gender take shape—will Putin’s detractors continue to attack his masculinity and manhood or use homosexual slurs? A popular one that attacks his manhood is the nickname “condom,” which is a great insult to a Russian especially in Putin’s case vis-à-vis his image of national masculinity.191 Through the politics of gender and the remasculinization of Russia there is no way of knowing where this form of rhetoric and identity will take the Russian state—will it lay further claim over Ukraine, will it cause further strife with its other neighbors over territory that it sees as Russia and thus part of this reclamation of lost dignity and masculinity? If history has demonstrated anything the use of the “us versus them” tactics will continue to be used to identify those whom the state deems subversive and wants to control.

191 Riabov and Riabova, “Remasculinization of Russia?” 29.
IV. CONCLUSION

This thesis focused on examining the enemy in the 2013–14 Ukraine Crisis, and to provide context to select messages circulating in the headlines regarding the politics of the conflict. “In any conflict, a primary task of the propagandist is to identify the enemy publicly thus creating a target for anger and blame and, potentially, crystallizing the nation in its focus and support for a just war.”192 In this examination both continuities and discontinuities of the Russian propaganda were explored in order to establish the historical bases from where the myths and viewpoints that exist in the media headlines have come from. This study of propaganda was broken down into the juxtaposition of the external enemy and the internal enemy based on Russia’s current rhetoric: externally with NATO being a traditional ideological enemy, and internally with the use of gender politics on its people.

In the context of the external enemy, with Russia continuing its provocative moves like low-level fly overs of warships in the Black Sea, and NATO continuing its activities and strengthening its commitments to its allies and partners it is not likely that tensions between the two sides will go away anytime soon. Moreover, Russian propaganda and myths about NATO are not going to go away either, in fact they are likely to increase. For example, the opening of the new Ballistic Missile Defense facility in Romania is likely to cause greater friction and increased rhetoric about NATO expansion and the destabilizing nature of the organization. Vladimir Putin is already making threats to retaliate for the missiles being placed there.193 And thus, the sabre rattling and propaganda will continue.

In the context of the internal enemy, it is clear that Putin’s regime is using gender and the politics of gender to its advantage. From the masculinization of the government and the state, to the show trial of the young female Ukrainian pilot Nadiya Savchenko, a


female pilot who represented an ideological enemy to Putin’s masculine message, the Russian government’s rhetoric clearly has a certain expectation on what is masculine and feminine, and how each should act. Additionally, with Putin’s bravado being tied to the Russian government through the masculinization of the government, who knows what the potential political outcomes will be: will he run for another term as president, will he run as he did before with someone like Medvedev as president; will Russia start to concern itself more and more with Russians abroad and take up the case for more influence for the Russian peoples in former Soviet territories; how will Russia respond to its LGBT community with the expansion and greater worldwide acceptance and recognition of this group? Only time will tell. Furthermore, gender is but one example of the focus of the internal enemy, truthfully the Russian government can single out any group it wants—Religion—perhaps being the next most important topic to gender and requiring further exploration.

Finally, no one knows whether another conflict like the Ukraine Crisis of 2013–2014 will arise again, but examining the propaganda helps to dissect the tactics used by the Russian government and media. Depending on how successful those tactics are, it could have a direct effect on whether they are recycled and used again in another conflict with another country, say in Moldova or Romania or Poland. Moldova because it already has a frozen conflict with Russia going on within itself in the Transnistria region, and Romania and Poland for the ballistic missile defense sites in each of those countries.
LIST OF REFERENCES


Mearsheimer, John J. “Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault.” Foreign Affairs 93, no. 5 (September-October 2014): 1–12.


INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

1. Defense Technical Information Center
   Ft. Belvoir, Virginia

2. Dudley Knox Library
   Naval Postgraduate School
   Monterey, California