# A Key to Fuzzy-Logic Inference 

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#### Abstract

Classically, whether to effect inference, one uses a small set of axioms and modus ponens, or a set of rules of inference including modus ponens, one is going beyond what can be derived with the explicit operations of logic alone. Carrying this concept over to fuzzy logic we construct a fuzzy modus ponens and other rules of inference that include modus tollens and reductio ad absurdum. These in turn are based on (and greatly facilitated by) a choice for the operation of implication that preserves the (logic) symmetry implicit in its definition. Extensions including conditional quantification, cut rules (single, multiple, and implicitory), and fuzzy mathematical induction are sketched. As an example, a fuzzy-logic treatment of the Yale shooting problem is discussed. The results suggest that the implicit processes of inference, as distinct from the explicit processes of decision (control) theory and systems theory, can be effected in fuzzy logic if, as in classical logic, one ventures outside the scope of (fuzzy) logic operations.


KEYWORDS: fuzzy modus ponens / tollens / reductio ad absurdum, fuzzy rules of inference / cut rules, fuzzy conditional quantification, fuzzy mathematical induction, Yale shooting problem

## 1. INTRODUCTION

The objective of fuzzy-logic inference is to obtain some properties of the fuzzy sets ${ }^{1} B_{1}, B_{2}, \ldots$ from similar properties of the fuzzy sets

[^0]$\mathrm{A}_{1}, \mathrm{~A}_{2}, \ldots$ when these sets can be related according to an inference scheme
\[

$$
\begin{equation*}
A_{1}, A_{2}, \ldots \rightarrow B_{1}, B_{2}, \ldots \tag{1}
\end{equation*}
$$

\]

governed by a collection of rules of inference. In classical logic this can be accomplished in a variety of equivalent procedures based on combinations of both logic operations and modus ponens. Extensions of these procedures to fuzzy logic have been less successful: many lack contraposition ( $A \Rightarrow B$ ) $=\left(B^{\prime} \Rightarrow A^{\prime}\right.$ ); none reproduce reductio ad absurdum (rada) ( $A$ $\left.\Rightarrow B, A \Rightarrow B^{\prime}\right) \rightarrow A^{\prime}$. There are, of course, applications where such properties may be inappropriate, even undesirable; however, even the lack of a law of excluded middle should not prevent the formulation of a method of fuzzy-logic inference that captures these fundamentally essential features of classical logic. (As this is in sharp contrast to methods of fuzzy inference developed for the control of fuzzy systems, the reader must keep in mind that even though some of our terminology is similar, our concepts, motivation, and goals are very different.)
In approaching inference it is natural to try do derive conclusions from premises using logic operations. For example, to construct a modus ponens (ie, assuming the major premise $A \Rightarrow B$ and the minor premise A are valid to conclude B is valid)

$$
\begin{equation*}
(A, A \Rightarrow B) \rightarrow B \tag{2}
\end{equation*}
$$

one could try

$$
\begin{equation*}
A \wedge(A \Rightarrow B) \tag{3}
\end{equation*}
$$

or even

$$
\begin{equation*}
(A \wedge(A \Rightarrow B)) \Rightarrow B \tag{4}
\end{equation*}
$$

However, in classical logic $(A \wedge(A \Rightarrow B))=(A \wedge B) \neq B$, while $((A \wedge$ $(A \Rightarrow B)) \Rightarrow B)=1$. Thus, while both expressions are understandable, (the first saying that to obtain B , we must have a valid A , the second indicating that this expression is a tautology, valid even if $A=B^{\prime}$ ), neither can really be said to represent the heart of modus ponens. On the other hand, the classical statement, "If A is true and if A implies B is true, then B is true," is simple, direct, and, if B can be extracted (detached) from $A \Rightarrow B$, effective. But, most importantly, it involves an operation outside of the logic operations (and ( $\wedge$ ), or ( $\vee$ ), negation ('), etc.), but of course, not outside of logic. Let us now capture this important aspect in fuzzy logic.

## 2. MODUS PONENS

To achieve modus ponens for fuzzy logic, we must be able to derive the fuzzy set ${ }^{2} B$ from the fuzzy sets $A$ and $A \Rightarrow B$. (In other words, we are not given $B$ initially.) The logic operation $A \Rightarrow B$ we represent as $A^{\prime} \vee B$, because this form preserves the meaning of implication: when true, if $A$ is true then $B$ is true. (See Appendix A for a discussion of this point.) For $A \vee B$ we choose $\max (A, B)$, for $A \wedge B$ we choose $\min (A, B)$, for $A^{\prime}$ we choose $1-A$, a common choice since the beginning of fuzzy logic $[1-3]$, and one that satisfies all the standard properties of logic connectives except the laws of excluded middle and noncontradiction. In what follows $A \vee B$ means the logic OR if reference is to logic, set union if reference is to set theory and $\max (A, B)$ if reference is to fuzzy logic. Similarly $A \wedge B$ : AND, intersection, $\min (A, B) ; A^{\prime}$ : negation, complement, $1-A$.

Returning finally to modus ponens, given $(A \Rightarrow B)=\max \left(A^{\prime}, B\right)$, clearly if $(A \Rightarrow B)>A^{\prime}$ then $B=(A \Rightarrow B)$. Thus if we know $(A \Rightarrow B)$ and $A$, we calculate $A^{\prime}=1-A$ and compare $(A \Rightarrow B)$ with $A^{\prime}$. If the former is strictly larger, than we infer that $B=(A \Rightarrow B)$. We write this as follows:

$$
\begin{equation*}
(A, A \Rightarrow B) \rightarrow B=(A \Rightarrow B)>_{w} A^{\prime} \tag{5}
\end{equation*}
$$

where the " $>_{w}$ " symbol (as in $\mathrm{X}>_{w} \mathrm{Y}$ ) reminds us that the preceeding equality is valid whenever $X>Y$. Note that for $(A \Rightarrow B)=A^{\prime}, B\left(\leq A^{\prime}\right)$ is (otherwise) undeterminate. (The case $(A \Rightarrow B)<A^{\prime}$ is impossible.) Put another way, for $B>A^{\prime}$, which includes all the most useful region ( $1 / 2<$ $(\mathrm{A}, \mathrm{B}) \leq 1$ ), and in fact half of all possible values for ( $\mathrm{A}, \mathrm{B}$ ), $0 \leq A^{\prime}<B \leq 1$, $B$ can be readily extracted from $A \Rightarrow B$. In other words this has a strong intuitive ring: the larger $A$, the smaller $A \Rightarrow B$ need be to trigger inference, or the smaller $A$, the larger $A \Rightarrow B$ must be to permit inference: $\mathrm{B}=(\mathrm{A} \Rightarrow \mathrm{B})>_{w} \mathrm{~A}^{\prime}$ captures this inverse relationship.

The advantages of the above procedure include retaining contraposition $\left((A \Rightarrow B)=\left(B^{\prime} \Rightarrow A^{\prime}\right)\right.$, due to retention of $(A \Rightarrow B)=\left(A^{\prime} \vee B\right)$, the dependence of the result on the nature of $A$ as well as $A \Rightarrow B$ (see modus tollens below), and the retention of reductio ad absurdum. Concerning the latter, consider the case where we are given $A \Rightarrow B$ and $A \Rightarrow B^{\prime}$. We find

[^1]at once that
\[

$$
\begin{equation*}
A^{\prime}=\min \left(A \Rightarrow B, A \Rightarrow B^{\prime}\right)>_{w} \min \left((A \Rightarrow B)^{\prime},\left(A \Rightarrow B^{\prime}\right)^{\prime}\right) \tag{6}
\end{equation*}
$$

\]

a statement of rada. One can derive this result by recognizing that (6) has the form

$$
\begin{equation*}
A^{\prime}=(A \Rightarrow B) \wedge\left(A \Rightarrow B^{\prime}\right) \tag{7a}
\end{equation*}
$$

that expands into

$$
\begin{equation*}
A^{\prime}=\left(A \Rightarrow\left(B \wedge B^{\prime}\right)\right)=\left(A^{\prime} \vee\left(B \wedge B^{\prime}\right)\right) \tag{7b}
\end{equation*}
$$

so that for $A^{\prime}>\min \left(B, B^{\prime}\right)$ one obtains rada. (The whenever inequality in (6) ensures that $A^{\prime}>\min \left(B, B^{\prime}\right)$. Thus the crisper (ie, closer to 1 ) $B$ or $B^{\prime}$ becomes, the wider the range of $A^{\prime}\left(\min \left(B, B^{\prime}\right)<A^{\prime} \leq 1\right)$ that can be inferred using proof by contradiction (rada) (6). (Note that (7a) also follows from taking the conjunction of the given quantities. Recalling (3) we remember that this is not always a useful procedure.)

There are, of course, occasions where $\mathrm{A} \Rightarrow \mathrm{B}$ and $\mathrm{B}^{\prime}$ are known. By analogy to modus ponens above, we can construct modus tollens

$$
\begin{equation*}
\left(B^{\prime}, A \Rightarrow B\right) \rightarrow A^{\prime}=(A \Rightarrow B)>_{w} B \tag{8}
\end{equation*}
$$

While $(\mathrm{A} \Rightarrow \mathrm{B})>1 / 2$ and $\mathrm{B}^{\prime}>1 / 2$ yield $\mathrm{A}^{\prime}=(\mathrm{A} \Rightarrow \mathrm{B})$, in fact (8) can be used to recover $\mathrm{A}^{\prime}$ from the region $0 \leq \mathrm{B}<\mathrm{A}^{\prime} \leq 1$ complementary to that covered by modus ponens.

## 3. RULES OF INFERENCE

In logic inference can be formulated either in the form of axioms plus modus ponens or in the form of a set of rules of inference including modus ponens. For fuzzy logic, the latter are much more useful, as we shall see when we apply the rules to derive the standard axioms in fuzzy form. Thomason [4], as well as other authors [5-7], label each rule of inference in symbolic logic by a logic operation and either the word "introduction" or "elimination," or with quantifiers "instantiation" or "generalization." Extending these fuzzy logic, McCawley [8] changed "elimination" to "exploitation." Our rules differ significantly from his, however, because he chose to interpret $\mathrm{A} \Rightarrow \mathrm{B}$ as $\mathrm{A} \alpha \mathrm{B}$. Here we shall simply use the symbol for the operator and the first letter of the appropriate noun.
$\Rightarrow \mathrm{E}$ : (implication elimination) This is simply our modus ponens ((5) above).
$\Rightarrow$ I: (implication introduction) Here we taken what we know about A and $B$ to construct $(A \Rightarrow B)=\left(A^{\prime} \vee B\right)$. (This, of course, is not the only source of fuzzy functions of the form $A \Rightarrow B$ ).
$\sim \mathrm{E}$ : (negation elimination) $\mathrm{A}^{\prime \prime}=1-\mathrm{A}^{\prime}=1-(1-\mathrm{A})=\mathrm{A}$.
$\sim$ I: (negation introduction) This is rada (6), ie, reductio ad absurdum or proof by contradiction, or modulus tollens (8), whichever is appropriate.
$\wedge \mathrm{E}$ : (conjunction elimination) In logic given that $\wedge_{k} \mathrm{~A}_{k}$ is true (1), one infers that $A_{k}$ is true (1) for each $k$. In fuzzy logic one is given $\min _{k}\left(\mathrm{~A}_{k}\right)=\mathrm{A}_{\min }$ and infers $\mathrm{A}_{k} \geq \mathrm{A}_{\min }$ for each k . However, by analogy with $\vee \mathrm{E}$ (see below), based on modus ponens, we can infer

$$
\begin{equation*}
\left(\vee_{k}\left(A_{k} \Rightarrow M\right), \wedge_{l} A_{l}\right) \rightarrow M=\vee_{k}\left(A_{k} \Rightarrow M\right)>_{w}\left(\wedge_{l} A_{l}\right)^{\prime} \tag{9}
\end{equation*}
$$

while based on modus tollens we can infer

$$
\begin{equation*}
\left(\vee_{k}\left(M \Rightarrow B_{k}\right), \wedge_{l} B_{l}^{\prime}\right) \rightarrow M^{\prime}=\vee_{k}\left(M \Rightarrow B_{k}\right)>_{w}\left(\wedge_{l} B_{l}^{\prime}\right)^{\prime} \tag{10}
\end{equation*}
$$

(Here $\wedge_{k}\left(\vee_{k}\right)$ means minimum (max) over the index $k$ : $A_{1}, A_{2}, A_{2} \ldots$ )
$\wedge \mathrm{I}$ : (conjunction introduction) Here we take $\left(\mathrm{A}_{1}, \mathrm{~A}_{2} \ldots\right)$ and form $\mathrm{A}_{\text {min }}=\min \left(\mathrm{A}_{1}, \mathrm{~A}_{2}, \ldots\right)=\wedge_{k} \mathrm{~A}_{k}$.
$\vee \mathrm{E}$ : (disjunction elimination) In logic this is one of the more interesting rules of inference. Using modus ponens / tollens it is readily extended to fuzzy logic:

$$
\begin{align*}
& \left(\wedge_{k}\left(A_{k} \Rightarrow M\right), \vee_{l} A_{l}\right) \rightarrow M=\wedge_{k}\left(A_{k} \Rightarrow M\right)>_{w}\left(\vee_{l} A_{l}\right)^{\prime}  \tag{11}\\
& \left(\wedge_{k}\left(M \Rightarrow B_{k}\right), \vee_{l} B_{l}^{\prime}\right) \rightarrow M^{\prime}=\wedge_{k}\left(M \Rightarrow B_{k}\right)>_{w}\left(\vee_{l} B_{l}^{\prime}\right)^{\prime} \tag{12}
\end{align*}
$$

$\checkmark \mathrm{I}$ : (disjunction introduction) Here we take $\left(\mathrm{A}_{1}, \mathrm{~A}_{2}, \ldots\right)$ and form $\mathrm{A}_{\text {max }}=\max \left(\mathrm{A}_{1}, \mathrm{~A}_{2}, \ldots\right)=\vee_{k} A_{k}$.
$\equiv \mathrm{E}$ : (equivalence elimination)

$$
\begin{align*}
\left(\vee_{k}\left(A_{k} \equiv B\right), \vee_{l} A_{l}, \wedge_{l} A_{l}\right) & \rightarrow \\
\left(\vee_{l} A_{l}\right)>_{w} B & =\vee_{k}\left(A_{k} \equiv B\right)>_{w}\left(\wedge_{l} A_{l}\right)^{\prime}  \tag{13a}\\
\left(\wedge_{k}\left(A_{k} \equiv B\right), \vee_{l} A_{l}, \wedge_{l} A_{l}\right) & \rightarrow \\
\left(\wedge_{l} A_{l}\right)>_{w} B & =\wedge_{k}\left(A_{k} \equiv B\right)>_{w}\left(\vee_{l} A_{l}\right)^{\prime}  \tag{13b}\\
\left(\vee_{k}\left(A_{k} \equiv B\right), \wedge_{l} A_{l}, \vee_{l} A_{l}\right) & \rightarrow \\
\left(\wedge_{l} A_{l}\right)^{\prime}>_{w} B^{\prime} & =\vee_{k}\left(A_{k} \equiv B\right)>_{w}\left(\vee_{l} A_{l}\right)  \tag{14a}\\
\left(\wedge_{k}\left(A_{k} \equiv B\right), \wedge_{l} A_{l}, \vee_{l} A_{l}\right) & \rightarrow \\
\left(\vee_{l} A_{l}\right)^{\prime}>_{w} B^{\prime} & =\wedge_{k}\left(A_{k} \equiv B\right)>_{w}\left(\wedge_{l} A_{l}\right) \tag{14b}
\end{align*}
$$

$\equiv \mathrm{I}$ : (equivalence introduction) With the choice of $(\min , \max )$ for $(\wedge, \vee)$ as above, we find that

$$
\begin{equation*}
(A \equiv B)=(A \wedge B) \vee\left(A^{\prime} \wedge B^{\prime}\right)=\left(A \vee B^{\prime}\right) \wedge\left(A^{\prime} \vee B\right) \tag{15}
\end{equation*}
$$

$\oplus \mathrm{E}$ : (exclusive-OR elimination) We include this for the sake of completeness. They are $\equiv \mathrm{E}$ with ( $\mathrm{B} \leftrightarrow \mathrm{B}^{\prime}$ ).

$$
\begin{align*}
\left(\vee_{k}\left(A_{k} \oplus B\right), \wedge_{l} A_{l}, \vee_{l} A\right) & \rightarrow \\
\left(\wedge_{l} A_{l}\right)^{\prime}>_{w} B & =\vee_{k}\left(A_{k} \oplus B\right)>_{w}\left(\vee_{l} A_{l}\right)  \tag{16a}\\
\left(\wedge_{k}\left(A_{k} \oplus B\right), \wedge_{l} A_{l}, \vee_{l} A\right) & \rightarrow \\
\left(\vee_{l} A_{l}\right)^{\prime}>_{w} B & =\wedge_{k}\left(A_{k} \oplus B\right)>_{w}\left(\wedge_{l} A_{l}\right)  \tag{16b}\\
\left(\vee_{k}\left(A_{k} \oplus B\right), \vee_{l} A_{l}, \wedge_{l} A_{l}\right) & \rightarrow \\
\left(\vee_{l} A_{l}\right)>_{w} B^{\prime} & =\vee_{k}\left(A_{k} \oplus B\right)>_{w}\left(\wedge_{l} A_{l}\right)^{\prime}  \tag{17a}\\
\left(\wedge_{k}\left(A_{k} \oplus B\right), \vee_{l} A_{l}, \wedge_{l} A_{l}\right) & \rightarrow \\
\left(\wedge_{l} A_{l}\right)>_{w} B^{\prime} & =\wedge_{k}\left(A_{k} \oplus B\right)>_{w}\left(\vee_{l} A_{l}\right)^{\prime} \tag{17b}
\end{align*}
$$

$\oplus \mathrm{I}$ : (exclusive OR introduction) As with $\equiv \mathrm{I}$, we find that

$$
\begin{equation*}
(A \oplus B)=\left(A \wedge B^{\prime}\right) \vee\left(A^{\prime} \wedge B\right)=(A \vee B) \wedge\left(A^{\prime} \vee B^{\prime}\right) \tag{18}
\end{equation*}
$$

## 4. EXTENSIONS

These rules can be extended in a number of ways. If we interpret $\left(\forall_{x} A_{x}\right)$ as $\left(\wedge_{x} A_{x}\right)$ and $\left(\exists_{y} B_{y}\right)$ as $\left(\vee_{y} B_{y}\right)$ then $\forall \mathrm{E}, \forall \mathrm{I}, \exists \mathrm{E}, \exists \mathrm{I}$ follow at once by analogy with $\wedge E, \wedge I, \vee E, \vee I$ above. (As explained, ${ }^{2}$ the $x$ and $y$ here refer to elements of the universe; $\mathrm{A}_{x}=\mathrm{A}(\mathrm{x})$.)

Thus

$$
\begin{align*}
& \forall E:\left(\exists_{x}\left(A_{x} \Rightarrow M\right), \forall_{y} A_{y}\right) \rightarrow M=\exists_{x}\left(A_{x} \Rightarrow M\right)>_{w}\left(\forall_{y} A_{y}\right)^{\prime}  \tag{19}\\
& \quad\left(\exists_{x}\left(M \Rightarrow B_{x}\right), \forall_{y} B_{y}^{\prime}\right) \rightarrow M^{\prime}=\exists_{x}\left(M \Rightarrow B_{x}\right)>_{w}\left(\forall_{y} B_{y}^{\prime}\right)^{\prime}  \tag{20}\\
& \exists E:\left(\forall_{x}\left(A_{x} \Rightarrow M\right), \exists_{y} A_{y}\right) \rightarrow M=\forall_{x}\left(A_{x} \Rightarrow M\right)>_{w}\left(\exists_{y} A_{y}\right)^{\prime}  \tag{21}\\
& \quad\left(\forall_{x}\left(M \Rightarrow B_{x}\right), \exists_{y} B_{y}^{\prime}\right) \rightarrow M^{\prime}=\forall_{x}\left(M \Rightarrow B_{x}\right)>_{w}\left(\exists_{y} B_{y}^{\prime}\right)^{\prime} \tag{22}
\end{align*}
$$

Of greater interest are the representations of the conditional quantifiers. If we interpret $\forall_{x} f_{x}, g_{x}$ ie, for all elements $\mathbf{x}$ such that $f_{x}$ is satisfied in a fuzzy sense, then $g_{x}$ is also satisfied, as $\wedge_{x}\left(f_{x} \Rightarrow g_{x}\right)=\wedge_{x}\left(f_{x}^{\prime} \vee g_{x}\right)$,
and $\exists_{x} f_{x}, g_{x}$ as $\vee_{x}\left(f_{x} \wedge g_{x}\right)$, and noting that

$$
\begin{equation*}
\left(\forall_{x} f_{x}, g_{x}\right)^{\prime}=\exists_{x} f_{x}, g_{x}^{\prime} \tag{23}
\end{equation*}
$$

we obtain at once the following conditional quantifier inferences:

$$
\begin{align*}
\begin{aligned}
& \forall_{c} E:\left(\exists_{x} f_{x},\left(g_{x} \Rightarrow B\right), \forall_{y} f_{y}, g_{y}\right) \rightarrow \\
& \exists_{x} f_{x}>_{w} B=\exists_{x} f_{x},\left(g_{x} \Rightarrow B\right)>_{w}\left(\forall_{y} f_{y}, g_{y}\right)^{\prime} \\
&\left(\exists_{x} f_{x},\left(A \Rightarrow g_{x}\right), \forall_{y} f_{y}, g_{y}^{\prime}\right) \rightarrow \\
& \exists_{x} f_{x}>_{w} A^{\prime}=\exists_{x} f_{x},\left(A \Rightarrow g_{x}\right)>_{w}\left(\forall_{y} f_{y}, g_{y}^{\prime}\right)^{\prime} \\
& \exists_{c} E:\left(\forall_{x} f_{x},\left(g_{x} \Rightarrow B\right), \exists_{y} f_{y}, g_{y}\right) \rightarrow B=\forall_{x} f_{x},\left(g_{x} \Rightarrow B\right)>_{w}\left(\exists_{y} f_{y}, g_{y}\right)^{\prime} \\
&\left(\forall_{x} f_{x},\left(A \Rightarrow g_{x}\right), \exists_{y} f_{y}, g_{y}^{\prime}\right) \rightarrow A^{\prime}=\forall_{x} f_{x},\left(A \Rightarrow g_{x}\right)>_{w}\left(\exists_{y} f_{y}, g_{y}^{\prime}\right)^{\prime}
\end{aligned}
\end{align*}
$$

As in (19)-(22), (24) and (26) generalize modus ponens, (25) and (27) modus tollens.

In symbolic logic one often expresses hypotheses in the following form [6]

$$
\begin{equation*}
H=\left(\left(A_{1} \wedge A_{2} \wedge \ldots \wedge A_{n}\right) \Rightarrow B\right) \tag{28a}
\end{equation*}
$$

the negation of which is

$$
\begin{equation*}
H^{\prime}=A_{1} \wedge A_{2} \wedge \ldots \wedge A_{n} \wedge B^{\prime} \tag{28b}
\end{equation*}
$$

If $H^{\prime}$ is true (the set $\left(A_{1}, A_{2}, \ldots, A_{n}, B^{\prime}\right)$ consistent), then $H$ is false (not valid); if $H^{\prime}$ is false (the set inconsistent), then $H$ is true (valid). With our intepretation of the operation of fuzzy implication, we can manipulate (28ab) much as is done in logic to obtain analogous results.

Examples of this include the following. If

$$
\begin{equation*}
H_{12}=\left(\left(A_{1} \wedge A_{2}\right) \Rightarrow\left(B_{1} \vee B_{2}\right)\right), \tag{29a}
\end{equation*}
$$

then by a straightforward manipulation

$$
\begin{equation*}
H_{12}=\left(\left(A_{1} \wedge B_{2}^{\prime}\right) \Rightarrow\left(B_{1} \vee A_{2}^{\prime}\right)\right) \tag{29b}
\end{equation*}
$$

In this manner, one obtains a number of implications having the same (known) fuzzy truth value. Of particular interest is to write (28a) as

$$
\begin{equation*}
H=\left(\left(A_{2} \wedge \ldots \wedge A_{n} \wedge B^{\prime}\right) \Rightarrow A_{1}^{\prime}\right) \tag{30}
\end{equation*}
$$

In logic, if one also has $A_{2} \wedge \ldots \wedge A_{n} \Rightarrow A_{1}$, then using modus tollens it follows from (30) that

$$
\begin{equation*}
H=\left(A_{2} \wedge \ldots \wedge A_{n} \Rightarrow B\right) \tag{31}
\end{equation*}
$$

Hence, within a set propositions implied by other propositions can be omitted in hypotheses such as (28a). In fuzzy logic, owing to the continuous nature of the operations, it is necessary that $\left(\left(A_{2} \wedge \ldots \wedge A_{n}\right) \Rightarrow B\right)>$ $\left(\left(A_{2} \wedge \ldots \wedge A_{n}\right) \Rightarrow A_{1}^{\prime}\right)$ Expression (31) then remains valid since from (30)

$$
\begin{align*}
H & =\left(\overline{A_{2}} \Rightarrow\left(B \vee A_{1}^{\prime}\right)\right)=\left(\overline{A_{2}} \Rightarrow B\right) \vee\left(\overline{A_{2}} \Rightarrow A_{1}^{\prime}\right) \\
& =\left(\overline{A_{2}} \Rightarrow B\right)>_{w}\left(\overline{A_{2}} \Rightarrow A_{1}^{\prime}\right), \tag{32}
\end{align*}
$$

where $\overline{A_{2}}=A_{2} \wedge \ldots \wedge A_{n}$.
In proving theorems, more easily proved lemmas are often used in order to shorten the proof. This technique can be formalized using the cut rule [9]

$$
\begin{equation*}
\left(A_{1} \Rightarrow\left(B_{1} \vee R_{12}\right),\left(A_{2} \wedge R_{12}\right) \Rightarrow B_{2}\right) \rightarrow\left(\left(A_{1} \wedge A_{2}\right) \Rightarrow\left(B_{1} \vee B_{2}\right)\right) \tag{33}
\end{equation*}
$$

where $R_{12}$ is the cut formula (lemma of $A_{1}$ ) of this inference, the conclusion (result) of which does not involve $R_{12}$ explicitly. Longer chains of reasoning are readily envisioned

$$
\begin{align*}
\left(A_{1}\right. & \left.\Rightarrow\left(B_{1} \wedge R_{12}\right), R_{12} \wedge A_{2} \Rightarrow B_{2}, A_{2} \Rightarrow B_{2} \vee R_{23}, R_{23} \wedge A_{3} \Rightarrow B_{3}\right) \\
& \rightarrow\left(A_{1} \wedge A_{2} \wedge A_{3} \Rightarrow B_{1} \vee B_{2} \vee B_{3}\right) \tag{34}
\end{align*}
$$

Note that even in fuzzy logic the two intermediate terms can be combined as

$$
\begin{equation*}
\left(R_{12} \wedge A_{2} \Rightarrow B_{2}\right) \vee\left(A_{2} \Rightarrow B_{2} \vee R_{23}\right)=\left(R_{12} \wedge A_{2} \Rightarrow B_{2} \vee R_{23}\right) \tag{35}
\end{equation*}
$$

which has the same structure as (33).
In order to determine the nature of the inference (33) in fuzzy logic, we consider the simpler (actually equivalent) inference

$$
\begin{equation*}
\left(u \vee v, u^{\prime} \vee w\right) \rightarrow\left(v_{\vee} w\right) \tag{36}
\end{equation*}
$$

Clearly $(v \vee w) \leq \max \left(u \vee v, u^{\prime} \vee w\right)=\max \left(u, v, u^{\prime}, w\right)$. If $(u \vee v)>u$ $>\left(u^{\prime} \vee w\right)^{\prime}$ then we would have equality. However, merely from ( $\mathbf{u} \vee v$ ) and ( $\mathrm{u}^{\prime} \vee w$ ), we cannot guarantee both these strict inequalities. Now, so long as $(\mathbf{u} \vee v)>\left(\mathbf{u}^{\prime} \vee w\right)^{\prime}$, it follows that

$$
\begin{equation*}
\min \left(u \vee v, u^{\prime} \vee w\right) \leq(v \vee w) \leq \max \left(u \vee v, u^{\prime} \vee w\right) \tag{37}
\end{equation*}
$$

This is appropriate, as the conjunction of the antecedent implications in (36) would be expected to play a key role here. If, in addition to (36), we also have

$$
\begin{equation*}
\left(t \vee v, t^{\prime} \vee w\right) \rightarrow(v \vee w) \tag{38}
\end{equation*}
$$

with $(t \vee v)>\left(t^{\prime} \vee w\right)^{\prime}$, then the limits in (37) can be tightened to

$$
\begin{align*}
& \max \left(\min \left(u \vee v, u^{\prime} \vee w\right), \min \left(t \vee v, t^{\prime} \vee w\right)\right) \\
& \quad \leq(v \vee w) \leq \max \left((u \wedge t) \vee v,(u \vee t)^{\prime} \vee w\right) \tag{39}
\end{align*}
$$

These results, (37) and (39), differ from our previous results in that here we have not explicitly identified the consequent of the inference in terms of the antecedent, we have only bounded it. Because this is indeed a fuzzy logic, this limitation should not seem too unnatural.

However, if $(u \vee v)>(t \vee v)$ and $\left(u^{\prime} \vee w\right)<\left(t^{\prime} \vee w\right)$, then ${ }^{3} v=(t \vee$ $v$ ) and $w=\left(u^{\prime} \vee w\right)$, and inequalities in $(v \vee w)$ can be avoided altogether. Alternatively, $v=(u \vee v)<_{w}(t \vee v)$ and $w=\left(t^{\prime} \vee w\right)<_{w}\left(u^{\prime} \vee\right.$ $w$ ). (The other two choices of inequalities are not possible.) If both pairs are equal, then, of course, nothing is gained. If say $(u \vee v)=(t \vee v)$ while $\left(u^{\prime} \vee w\right) \lessgtr\left(t^{\prime} \vee w\right)$, then $v=(u \vee v)$ while $w$ cannot be uniquely ascertained; similarly $w=\left(u^{\prime} \vee w\right)<_{w}\left(t^{\prime} \vee w\right),(u \vee v) \lessgtr(t \vee v)$.). In this manner, the existence of a second (and different) inner structure (a second cut) significantly sharpens our results for cut rules. For the present we shall consider only a single cut.

We can now return to the cut rule (33). If we identify $A_{1}^{\prime} \vee B_{1}$ with $v$, $A_{2}^{\prime} \vee B_{2}$ with $w$, and $\mathrm{R}_{12}$ with $u$, then $v \vee w=\left(A_{1} \wedge A_{2}\right) \Rightarrow\left(B_{1} \vee B_{2}\right)$, and with these entries (37) yields

$$
\begin{align*}
& \min \left(A_{1} \Rightarrow\left(B_{1} \vee R_{12}\right),\left(A_{2} \wedge R_{2}\right) \Rightarrow B_{2}\right) \leq\left(A_{1} \wedge A_{2}\right) \Rightarrow\left(B_{1} \vee B_{2}\right) \leq \\
& \quad \leq \max \left(A_{1} \Rightarrow\left(B_{1} \vee R_{12}\right),\left(A_{2} \wedge R_{12}\right) \Rightarrow B_{2}\right) \tag{40}
\end{align*}
$$

so long as $\left(A_{1} \Rightarrow\left(B_{1} \vee R_{12}\right)\right)>\left(A_{2} \wedge R_{12} \Rightarrow B_{2}\right)^{\prime}$. Similarly (34) works out to be

$$
\begin{align*}
& \min \left(A_{1} \Rightarrow\left(B_{1} \wedge R_{12}\right), R_{12} \wedge A_{2} \Rightarrow B_{2} \vee R_{23}, R_{23} \wedge A_{3} \Rightarrow B_{3}\right) \\
& \quad \leq\left(A_{1} \wedge A_{2} \wedge A_{3} \Rightarrow B_{1} \vee B_{2} \vee B_{3}\right) \leq \\
& \quad \max \left(A_{1} \Rightarrow B_{1} \wedge R_{12}, R_{12} \wedge A_{2} \Rightarrow B_{2} \vee R_{23}, R_{23} \wedge A_{3} \Rightarrow B_{3}\right) \tag{41}
\end{align*}
$$

[^2]provided $\left(A_{1} \Rightarrow\left(B_{1} \vee R_{12}\right)\right)>\left(\left(R_{12} \wedge A_{2}\right) \Rightarrow\left(B_{2} \vee R_{23}\right)\right)^{\prime}$ and $\left(\left(R_{12} \wedge\right.\right.$ $\left.\left.A_{2}\right) \Rightarrow\left(B_{2} \vee R_{23}\right)\right)>\left(\left(R_{23} \wedge A_{3}\right) \Rightarrow B_{3}\right)^{\prime}$. (The inequalities in (40) and (41) are sharp, however many A and B are considered). Longer chains can be similarly analyzed and the bounds tightened with alternative lemmas.

A common variant of the cut rule (33) is the following minor extension:

$$
\begin{align*}
\left(A_{1}\right. & \left.\Rightarrow B_{1} \vee R_{1}, R_{2} \wedge A_{2} \Rightarrow B_{2}\right) \\
& \rightarrow\left(A_{1} \wedge\left(R_{1} \Rightarrow R_{2}\right) \wedge A_{2}\right) \Rightarrow\left(B_{1} \vee B_{2}\right) \tag{42}
\end{align*}
$$

where, of course, $R_{1} \Rightarrow R_{2}$ is understood to be a third antecedent. This can be decomposed and analyzed in much the same manner as (34), with the result that

$$
\begin{align*}
& \min \left(A_{1} \Rightarrow B_{1} \vee R_{1}, R_{1} \Rightarrow R_{2}, R_{2} \wedge A_{2} \Rightarrow B_{2}\right) \\
& \quad \leq\left(A_{1} \wedge\left(R_{1} \Rightarrow R_{2}\right) \wedge A_{2}\right) \Rightarrow\left(B_{1} \vee B_{2}\right) \\
& \quad \leq \max \left(A_{1} \Rightarrow B_{1} \vee R_{1}, R_{1} \Rightarrow R_{2}, R_{2} \wedge A_{2} \Rightarrow B_{2}\right) \tag{43}
\end{align*}
$$

so long as $\left(A_{1} \Rightarrow B_{1} \vee R_{1}\right)>\left(R_{1} \Rightarrow R_{2}\right)^{\prime}$ and $\left(R_{1} \Rightarrow R_{2}\right)>\left(R_{2} \wedge A_{2} \Rightarrow\right.$ $\left.B_{2}\right)^{\prime}$. Various simplifications of (33) or (42) lead to exact results. For example

$$
\begin{equation*}
\left(A_{1} \wedge A_{2} \Rightarrow R \vee B, S \wedge A_{1} \wedge A_{2} \Rightarrow B\right) \rightarrow\left(A_{1} \wedge(R \Rightarrow S) \wedge A_{2} \Rightarrow B\right) \tag{44}
\end{equation*}
$$

according to

$$
\begin{align*}
& \left(A_{1} \wedge(R \Rightarrow S) \wedge A_{2} \Rightarrow B\right) \\
& \quad=\min \left(A_{1} \wedge A_{2} \Rightarrow R \vee B, S \wedge A_{1} \wedge A_{2} \Rightarrow B\right) \tag{45}
\end{align*}
$$

while $A_{2} \Rightarrow\left(B_{2} \vee\left(A_{1} \Rightarrow B_{1}\right)\right)=\left(A_{1} \wedge A_{2}\right) \Rightarrow\left(B_{1} \vee B_{2}\right)$, again owing to our choice of $\mathrm{A} \Rightarrow \mathrm{B}=\mathrm{A}^{\prime} \vee \mathrm{B}$.
As an extension of $\vee E$, one can encounter this modus ponens like inference

$$
\begin{equation*}
\left(\left\{A_{j} \Rightarrow B_{j}\right\}, \vee_{i} A_{i}\right) \rightarrow \vee_{i} B_{i} \tag{46}
\end{equation*}
$$

By analogous reasoning we find

$$
\begin{equation*}
\left(\vee_{i} A_{i}\right)^{\prime}<_{w} \min _{k}\left(A_{k} \Rightarrow B_{k}\right) \leq \vee_{i} B_{i} \leq \max _{k}\left(A_{k} \Rightarrow B_{k}\right) \tag{47}
\end{equation*}
$$

While $\max _{k}\left(A_{k} \Rightarrow B_{k}\right)=\max _{k}\left(A_{k}^{\prime}\right) \vee \max _{l}\left(B_{l}\right)$, so that if one knew $\wedge_{k} A_{k}$, one could write

$$
\begin{equation*}
\wedge_{l} B_{l}=\vee_{k}\left(A_{k} \Rightarrow B_{k}\right)>_{w}\left(\wedge_{k} A_{k}\right)^{\prime}, \tag{48}
\end{equation*}
$$

this would not be too useful, as some $A_{k}$ can be 0 . Rather, it is the inequality

$$
\wedge_{k}\left(A_{k} \Rightarrow B_{k}\right) \leq \vee_{l} B_{l}
$$

which lies at the heart of (47). The equivalent expression using modus tollens is

$$
\begin{equation*}
\left(\left\{A_{i} \Rightarrow B_{i}\right\}, \vee_{j} B_{j}^{\prime}\right) \rightarrow \vee_{j} A_{j}^{\prime} \tag{49}
\end{equation*}
$$

and

$$
\begin{equation*}
\left(\vee_{k} B_{k}^{\prime}\right)<_{w} \min _{k}\left(A_{k} \Rightarrow B_{k}\right) \leq \vee_{j} A_{j}^{\prime} \leq \max _{l}\left(A_{l} \Rightarrow B_{l}\right) . \tag{50}
\end{equation*}
$$

Once again one could have

$$
\vee_{j} A_{j}^{\prime}=\max _{l}\left(A_{l} \Rightarrow B_{l}\right)>_{w} \vee_{l} B_{l},
$$

but as above this form has minimal utility.
Another common inference in logic (transitivity) has the form

$$
\begin{equation*}
\left(A \Rightarrow X, X_{1} \Rightarrow X_{2}, \ldots, X_{n} \Rightarrow B\right) \rightarrow A \Rightarrow B \tag{51}
\end{equation*}
$$

We can use our fuzzy modus ponens (5) to pass from A to B so long as the following inequalities are satisfied:

$$
\begin{align*}
A^{\prime} & <\left(A \Rightarrow X_{1}\right),\left(A \Rightarrow X_{1}\right)^{\prime}<\left(X_{1} \Rightarrow X_{2}\right), \ldots,\left(X_{n-1} \Rightarrow X_{n}\right)^{\prime} \\
& <\left(X_{n} \Rightarrow B\right) \tag{52}
\end{align*}
$$

From these we infer $X_{s}=\left(X_{s-1} \Rightarrow X_{s}\right)$ and $B=\left(X_{n} \Rightarrow B\right)$. Similarly using modus tollens (8) and

$$
\begin{aligned}
& B^{\prime}>\left(X_{n} \Rightarrow B\right)^{\prime},\left(X_{n} \Rightarrow B\right)>\left(X_{n-1} \Rightarrow X_{n}\right)^{\prime}, \ldots,\left(X_{1} \Rightarrow X_{2}\right) \\
& \quad>(A \Rightarrow X)^{\prime}
\end{aligned}
$$

we infer $X_{r}^{\prime}=\left(X_{r} \Rightarrow X_{r+1}\right)$ and $A^{\prime}=\left(A^{\prime} \Rightarrow X_{1}\right)$. (Note that the intermediate inequalities are the same as those above.) Should B and C be joined by $Y_{1} \ldots Y_{m}$ similarly satisfying

$$
\begin{aligned}
B^{\prime} & <\left(B \Rightarrow Y_{1}\right),\left(B \Rightarrow Y_{1}\right)^{\prime}<\left(Y_{1} \Rightarrow Y_{2}\right), \ldots,\left(Y_{m-1} \Rightarrow Y_{m}\right)^{\prime} \\
& <\left(Y_{m} \Rightarrow C\right),
\end{aligned}
$$

then this meshes with series (52) and $C=\left(Y_{m} \Rightarrow C\right)$.
These results illustrate a number of interesting features. So long as the intermediate inequalities are satisfied, the derived implication

$$
\begin{equation*}
\left(A \Rightarrow_{d} B\right)=\left(A \Rightarrow X_{1}, X_{n} \Rightarrow B\right), \tag{53}
\end{equation*}
$$

now represented by two quantities, does not depend upon the actual values of $\left(X_{1} \Rightarrow X_{2}\right), \ldots,\left(X_{n-1} \Rightarrow X_{n}\right)$. In other words, the successive influences do not dilute the inference. While (53) can not be reduced to the simpler form $(A \Rightarrow B)=\left(A^{\prime} \vee B\right)$, it does enable us to preserve the most important feature of the classical result. In (51) if $A$ is true, then $X_{1}$ is true, if $X_{1}$ is true, then $X_{2}$ is true, $\ldots$, if $X_{n}$ is true then B is true: hence if A is true, B is true, and (51) indeed simplifies to $A \Rightarrow B$. Similarly, if $\left(A \Rightarrow X_{1}\right)>A^{\prime}$, then $B=\left(X_{n} \Rightarrow B\right)$ summarizes (52). (It is this encapsulation that is not possible with the simpler form $A^{\prime} \vee B$.) If we are working with quantified quantities, then $\left(\forall_{x}\left(X_{s} \Rightarrow X_{s+1}\right)_{x}\right)>$ $\left(\forall_{y}\left(X_{s-1} \Rightarrow X_{s}\right)_{y}\right)^{\prime}$ guarantees $\left(X_{s} \Rightarrow X_{s+1}\right)_{x}>\left(X_{s-1} \Rightarrow X_{s}\right)_{x}^{\prime}$ for each x, and (53) becomes

$$
\left(A \Rightarrow_{d} B\right)=\left(\forall_{x}\left(A \Rightarrow X_{1}\right)_{x}, \forall_{y}\left(X_{n} \Rightarrow B\right)_{y}\right)
$$

Thus for each $\mathrm{x} \in \mathrm{X}, A_{x}>\left(\wedge_{y}\left(A \Rightarrow X_{1}\right)_{y}\right)^{\prime}, B_{x} \geq \wedge_{y}\left(X_{n} \Rightarrow B\right)_{y}$, using the minimization interpretation of universal quantification introduced above. Finally $\wedge_{x}\left(\mathrm{~A} \Rightarrow \mathrm{X}_{1}\right)_{x}>\left(\wedge_{x} A_{x}\right)^{\prime}$ yields $\wedge_{x} B_{x}=\wedge_{x}\left(X_{n} \Rightarrow B\right)_{x}$.

Perhaps the most counterintuitive result here is that some of the ( $X_{s} \Rightarrow X_{s+1}$ ) can in principle be less than $1 / 2$ without affecting the overall inference. (Clearly if each exceeds $1 / 2$, all inequalities are immediately satisfied.) Thus all that is required of ( $X_{s} \Rightarrow X_{s+1}$ ) is that it exceeds ( $\left.X_{s-1} \Rightarrow X_{s}\right)^{\prime}$ and $\left(X_{s+1} \Rightarrow X_{s+2}\right)^{\prime}$ which can be quite small. In general, no two adjacent implications can be less than $1 / 2$. However, given strong implications on either side, this model permits a weak implication in between representing an "intuitive leap" (a tunneling-in-inference-space) phenomenon. (Mathematically this results from making full use of the $B>1-A$ region of the $0 \leq A \leq 1,0 \leq B \leq 1$ domain over which $A \Rightarrow B$ is defined.) Should a weak implication enter, the system could search for a stronger connective, as would a person in a similar situation. However, one would still have the result, found initially more quickly and simply but so it would seem with less rigor. Of course, if appropriate, a lower limit (eg, $1 / 2$ ) can be imposed $a d$ hoc on the individual implications. In any event one is not restricted to a monotonicity increasing sequence of $A, X_{1}, X_{2}$ $, \ldots, X_{n}, B$, though such could be imposed if warranted.
Closely related to the above is fuzzy mathematical induction: ( $\mathrm{F}_{1}, F_{n-1}$ ) $\rightarrow F_{n}$, or more precisely, $\left(\mathrm{F}_{1}, F_{n} \Rightarrow F_{n+1}\right) \rightarrow F_{n+1}$. So long as $\mathrm{F}_{n}$ and $\left(\mathrm{F}_{n} \Rightarrow F_{n+1}\right)$ remain above $1 / 2$, then $\mathrm{F}_{n+1}>1 / 2$, and all is well. However, should ( $\mathrm{F}_{n} \Rightarrow F_{n+1}$ ) drop below 1/2, induction would cease. To avoid this deadlock, one should switch to $\mathrm{G}_{n+1}=F_{n+1}^{\prime}$ so that $\left(\mathrm{F}_{n} \Rightarrow G_{n+1}\right)>1 / 2$. Should ( $\mathrm{G}_{m} \Rightarrow G_{m+1}$ ) <1/2 for some $m>n+1$, one simply switches back to $F_{m+1}=G_{m+1}^{\prime}$ so that $\left(\mathrm{G}_{m} \Rightarrow F_{m+1}\right)>1 / 2$. One can continue in this manner to all countable $\mathrm{m}, \mathrm{n}$. (Clearly from the foregoing, implications
less than $1 / 2$ can still be used for inference. The point here is that in the spirit of induction, one demands that certain conditions be true for all $n$, and in this formulation the greater-than $-1 / 2$ is one of these.)

## Example

Pearl [10] has presented a probabilistic treatment of a simplified version of the Yale shooting problem [11]. Using our cut-rule results of the previous section, a fuzzy-logic treatment can also be effected. In this problem a gun is loaded at $t_{0}$, (represented by $\mathrm{LD}_{0}$ ), shot at someone at $t_{1}>t_{0}\left(S H_{1}\right)$, who dies by $t_{2}>t_{1}\left(\mathrm{AL}_{2}^{\prime}\right)$, despite the normal tendency to be (otherwise) alive at $t_{2}\left(A L_{2}\right)$ given being alive at $t_{1}\left(A L_{1}\right)$. The state $\mathrm{LD}_{1}$ also enters. Thus

$$
\begin{gather*}
A L_{1} \wedge S H_{1} \wedge L D_{1} \Rightarrow A L_{2}^{\prime}  \tag{54a}\\
L D_{0} \Rightarrow L D_{1}  \tag{54b}\\
A L_{1} \wedge\left(S H_{1} \wedge L D_{1}\right)^{\prime} \Rightarrow A L_{2} \tag{54c}
\end{gather*}
$$

summarize the given possibilities, and combining (54ab) according to (40), $\mathrm{LD}_{1}$ being the cut expression, we find at once that

$$
\begin{align*}
& \min \left(A L_{1} \wedge S H_{1} \wedge L D_{1} \Rightarrow A L_{2}^{\prime}, L D_{0} \Rightarrow L D_{1}\right) \\
& \quad \leq\left(A L_{1} \wedge S H_{1} \wedge L D_{0} \Rightarrow A L_{2}^{\prime}\right) \\
& \quad \leq \max \left(A L_{1} \wedge S H_{1} \wedge L D_{1} \Rightarrow A L_{2}^{\prime}, L D_{0} \Rightarrow L D_{1}\right) \tag{55}
\end{align*}
$$

so long as $\left(A L_{1} \wedge S H_{1} \wedge L D_{1} \Rightarrow A L_{2}^{\prime}\right)>\left(L D_{0} \Rightarrow L D_{1}\right)^{\prime}$.
Under some conditions these bounds can be tighter than the corresponding probabilistic result. [10] (Expression (54c) does not really enter because as a fuzzy function its values can be determined from those of (54a)).

## 5. CONCLUSIONS

Fuzzy modus ponens remains an active area of research [12-17]. The purpose here was simply to see how far one could go by preserving as much as possible of the spirit of classical inference, keeping in mind the roles played by the operator (connective) of implication. If, by means of axioms and/or rules of inference, we have derived $B$ from $A$, we write $A \Rightarrow B$ ( $A$ implies $B$ ). Alternatively knowing $A \Rightarrow B$, and $A$, we infer $B$, written $(A, A \Rightarrow B) \rightarrow B$. But keeping in mind that even in classical logic we cannot express inference purely in terms of logic operations, we carry
that principle over to fuzzy logic. We also preserve the character (symmetry) of the implication operation. The result has been a number of rules of inference, some, like the crutial rada (proof by contradiction), were not obtainable by other interpretations.

One should carefully distinguish inference and decision theory. In the latter one usually carries out explicit operations to determine an output that elicits a decision. In the former, by contrast, one relies on implicit operations. For example modus ponens goes into $\mathrm{A} \Rightarrow \mathrm{B}$ to note that if $1 \Rightarrow 0$ is 0 and $1 \Rightarrow 1$ is 1 , then $A=1$ and $A \Rightarrow B=1$ means that $B=1$; values of $\mathrm{A} \Rightarrow \mathrm{B}$ for $\mathrm{A}=0$ are not needed for this inference. This going inside of, this implicit-function dependence (given $x$ and $f(x, y)$, find $y$ ), is what inference is all about.

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## APPENDIX A: CHOICE OF IMPLICATION

A word about the operation of implication is necessary. We shall use $(A \Rightarrow B)=\left(A^{\prime} \vee B\right)$, as if it were just another logic connective. Some authors have modified $A \Rightarrow B$ in order to emphasize one or more aspects of inference, eg, $(\mathrm{A} \Rightarrow \mathrm{B})=(\mathrm{A} \alpha \mathrm{B})$. However, we must bear in mind that even though the result of an inference in classical logic can be expressed in the form, "When A is true, B is true," which can be represented by the operation of implication, $\mathrm{A} \Rightarrow \mathrm{B}$, the two, inference and implication, are two very different concepts. In addition, and as a technical point crucial for what follows, $\mathrm{A} \alpha \mathrm{B}=1, \mathrm{~A} \leq \mathrm{B},=\mathrm{B}, \mathrm{A}>\mathrm{B}$ has an inappropriate, logic symmetry in representing $\mathrm{A} \Rightarrow \mathrm{B}$. To be sure it reduces to the classical $A^{\prime} \vee B$ for $(A, B)=\{0,1\} .{ }^{2}$ But it is discontinuous along $A=B$ in the very region ( $(A, B)>1 / 2$ ) where $A \Rightarrow B$ is most useful. Indeed, one cannot infer B from A and $\mathrm{A} \Rightarrow \mathrm{B}$ for $\mathrm{A}<\mathrm{B}$ since $\mathrm{A} \alpha \mathrm{B}=1$ for all ( $\mathrm{A}, \mathrm{B}$ ) in this region. In addition, choosing $\mathrm{A} \alpha \mathrm{B}$ at once precludes both contraposition and reductio ad absurdum. Contraposition is excluded since $\mathrm{B} \alpha \mathrm{A}$ (Godel implication) cannot be determined from $\mathrm{A} \alpha \mathrm{B}$ for $\mathrm{B}>\mathrm{A}$. ( $\mathrm{B} \alpha \mathrm{A}=\mathrm{A}$ for $\mathrm{B}>\mathrm{A}$, but A cannot be had from $\mathrm{A} \alpha \mathrm{B}$.) Rada is excluded since $\mathrm{A} \alpha \mathrm{B}$ and $\mathrm{A} \alpha \mathrm{B}^{\prime}$ cannot be solved for $\mathrm{A}^{\prime}$ for the same reason, neither ever equals A or $\mathrm{A}^{\prime}$. To be sure one can infer B from $\mathrm{A} \alpha \mathrm{B}$ for $\mathrm{A}>\mathrm{B}$,
( $\mathrm{A}, \mathrm{A} \alpha \mathrm{B}) \rightarrow \mathrm{B}=\mathrm{A} \alpha \mathrm{B}<_{w} \mathrm{~A}$, according to the spirit of this paper; however, if $\mathrm{A}<\mathrm{B}$, inference is impossible as $\mathrm{A} \alpha \mathrm{B}=1$, even for A and B close to 1 . Also, lacking contraposition, there is no modus tollens.

The choice $(A \Rightarrow B)=\left(1_{\wedge}(1-A+B)\right)$, which, in contrast with $A \alpha B$, does correspond to $\mathrm{A}^{\prime} \vee \mathrm{B}$ in the choice of fuzzy logic operations bounded sum and bounded product for union and intersection, respectively, and which does preserve contraposition, also precludes reductio ad absurdum. Again, the logic symmetry is inappropriate since $(1 \wedge(1-A+B))=1$ for $\mathrm{A} \leq \mathrm{B}$ and $(1-\mathrm{A}+\mathrm{B})$ for $\mathrm{A} \geq \mathrm{B}$. Though continuous across $\mathrm{A}=\mathrm{B}$, it embodies two distinct functional dependences in the region $((\mathrm{A}, \mathrm{B})>$ $1 / 2$ ) where only one type of dependence would be expected. Again B cannot be inferred from $A$ and $A \Rightarrow B$ for $A<B$. In this, the Lukasiewicz form, for $\mathrm{A}>\mathrm{B}$ one can effect an inference in the form ( $\mathrm{A}, 1-\mathrm{A}+\mathrm{B}$ ) $\rightarrow \mathrm{B}=(1-\mathrm{A}+\mathrm{B})-\mathrm{A}^{\prime}<_{w} \mathrm{~A}$, and similarly for modus tollens $\mathrm{A}^{\prime}=(1$ $-\mathrm{A}+\mathrm{B})-\mathrm{B}<_{w} \mathrm{~B}^{\prime}$. However, neither inference is possible for $\mathrm{B}>\mathrm{A}$, although both B and A can be close to 1 . In chaining the consequent can only decrease, approaching 0 for long chains. This is most undesirable. Concerning rada, a degenerate form is in fact possible, but only for $\mathrm{A}>\mathrm{B}>\mathrm{A}^{\prime}$, in precisely the quadrant of $(\mathrm{A}, \mathrm{B})$ where rada is least expected: specifically one finds $\mathrm{A}^{\prime}=\left((1-\mathrm{A}+\mathrm{B})+\left(1-\mathrm{A}+\mathrm{B}^{\prime}\right)-\right.$ 1) $/ 2$. (N.B. $\mathrm{A}^{\prime}<1 / 2$.) In logic $\left(\mathrm{A} \Rightarrow \mathrm{B}, \mathrm{A} \Rightarrow B^{\prime}\right) \rightarrow A^{\prime}=1$.

It is surprising, therefore, that by choosing $(A \Rightarrow B)=\left(A^{\prime} \vee B\right)=$ $\max \left(\mathrm{A}^{\prime}, \mathrm{B}\right)$, not only does one satisfy all the basic operational properties of logic, except excluded middle, but one also obtains a number of properties of inference not generally obtained with other choices. To be sure Lucasiewicz preserves excluded middle but even so loses a meaningful rada as well as idempotency, absorption, distributivity, equivalence, and symmetrical difference. $(\mathrm{A} \Rightarrow \mathrm{B})=\max \left(\mathrm{A}^{\prime}, \mathrm{B}\right)$ maintains rada, as well as all these other properties of logic, even without the excluded middle.

## APPENDIX B: DEGENERATE FORMS

This inference $(\mathrm{A}, \mathrm{A} \Rightarrow \mathrm{B}) \rightarrow \mathrm{B}=(\mathrm{A} \Rightarrow \mathrm{B})>_{w} A^{\prime}$ will yield the fuzzy set B only for those elements $\mathrm{x} \in \mathrm{X}$ for which $\mathrm{B}(\mathrm{x})$ exceeds $A^{\prime}(\mathrm{x})$. (In much the same way, in $\operatorname{logic} \mathrm{A}=1$ and $(\mathrm{A} \Rightarrow \mathrm{B})=1$ are necessary to infer $\mathrm{B}=1$; the other combinations do not permit inferences.) Consider the degenerate form $(\mathrm{A}, \mathrm{A} \Rightarrow \mathrm{A}) \rightarrow \mathrm{A}=(\mathrm{A} \Rightarrow \mathrm{A})>_{w} A^{\prime}$. One might conclude that unless $A>1 / 2$, so that $A>A^{\prime}$, one could not infer $A$. However, since one is given the antecedent A to begin with, no inference is necessary. Hence, $A \Rightarrow A$ is not expected to play a significant role in inference, and can be ignored. It does, of course, equal max $\left(A, A^{\prime}\right)$. But in general, as in logic, structures of the form $(A \wedge B) \Rightarrow(A \vee C)$ are to be
avoided because they tend to stifle inferences. (In logic this structure always equals one.)

One might conclude on intuitive grounds that $(A \Rightarrow A)=1$-if I know A, I know A. But this is equivalent to postulating excluded middle, and, if all the other properties of logic are demanded, one is back to logic necessarily. Even worse is that the same intuition yields $\left(\mathrm{A} \Rightarrow A^{\prime}\right)=0$ : if I know A , I know I do not have $\mathrm{A}^{\prime}$. But $\left(\mathrm{A} \Rightarrow A^{\prime}\right) \neq 0$ even in logic.

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    ${ }^{1}$ Notation here is a bit problematic. Because membership functions are used so extensively and their combinations are so closely tied to the corresponding logic operations, Goguen's [2] definition of a fuzzy set as a function $A: X \rightarrow[0,1]$ was utilized, $X$ being the universe. Those preferring the "ordered-pair" notation, or the "fraction" ( $\left.\mu_{A}(x) / x\right)$ notation, which as fuzzy sets are also called A [3] can read the results presented here as fuzzy sets in which for each $x \in X$ the value of the grade of membership of the resulting set is determined by the indicated operations being taken between the grades of membership of the sets indicated as variables.

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[^1]:    ${ }^{2}$ All fuzzy sets are, of course, functions of elements that need not be the same when taken in combination. For example, we can have $\mathrm{A}(\mathrm{x}) \Rightarrow \mathrm{B}(\mathrm{x})$ or $\mathrm{A}(\mathrm{x}) \Rightarrow \mathrm{B}(\mathrm{y})$ depending on the problem of interest. In the former case the fuzzy set $A \Rightarrow B$ is a function which takes $\mathrm{X} \rightarrow[0,1]$, in the latter it is a function which takes $\mathrm{X}, \mathrm{Y} \rightarrow[0,1]$. None of the results presented depend on this difference. For sake of brevity we occasionally write $A_{x}$ for $\mathrm{A}(\mathrm{x})$, etc. to indicate the variable while simplifying the notation. Subscripts normally associated with indices, eg, $A_{1}, A_{2}, A_{k}, A_{l}$ refer to different fuzzy sets.

[^2]:    ${ }^{3}$ The proof is straightforward, but several alternative cases must be considered and systematically rejected.

