Imagining Agricultural Development in South–South Cooperation: The Contestation and Transformation of ProSAVANA

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Summary. — This paper discusses South–South cooperation by examining ProSAVANA, a flagship agricultural development program seeking to apply Brazilian experience to Mozambique. ProSAVANA is a joint Japan–Brazil–Mozambique initiative in the savannah zone of Mozambique’s Nacala Corridor region that was initially inspired by the Japan–Brazil PRODECER program in Brazil’s Cerrado region. ProSAVANA subsequently became the focus of fears about land-grabbing in the Nacala Corridor, attracting strong civil society contestation. We show how distinct imaginaries of agricultural development in Mozambique and Brazil were used to mobilize for and against ProSAVANA, thus revealing the contentious nature of the similarity claims underpinning South–South cooperation. In particular, we focus on the role of landscape imaginaries associated with the savannah and the Cerrado. We examine the use in the promotion and contestation of ProSAVANA of visual representations that draw on these imaginaries, including GIS maps of Mozambique’s savannah region made by Brazilian agribusiness consultants and an advocacy video of Brazil’s Cerrado region filmed by Mozambican land rights activists. Noting that the latest ProSAVANA planning documents differ significantly from those expressing its initial vision, we argue that the contestation of ProSAVANA has had a series of productive effects even before the program has moved to full implementation. These productive effects are visible not only in the program itself but also in the wider context of state-society relations shaping debates on South–South cooperation in Mozambique, Brazil, and beyond.

1. INTRODUCTION

South–South development cooperation is premised not only on a commitment to solidarity and an interest in “mutual benefit” but also on a claim of similarity. When deployed by Northern or multilateral development agencies interested in supporting South–South exchange via Trilateral Development Cooperation (TDC), the similarity claim is “frequently constructed in depoliticized and essentialist terms, presenting a ‘natural’ congruity between very different southern states” (McEwan & Mawdsley, 2012, p. 1887). When deployed by “rising powers” such as Brazil, China, or India, it tends to be more overtly political, often invoking a common geopolitical position or shared historical (colonial) experience (Six, 2009). Rising powers also deploy similarity claims that emphasize the technical rather than the political, as is the case with India’s effort to promote its technologies as suitable for Africa because they are “affordable, adaptable and appropriate” (Nayar, 2012, p. 561). Such claims have underpinned the rapid expansion in recent years of rising powers’ efforts to export their agricultural technologies and rural development strategies to Africa—in efforts in which Brazil has been particularly prominent (Scoones et al., 2016). In legitimating its development cooperation strategies, Brazil has made effective use of both “political” and “technical” similarity claims. As Abdenur (2015, p. 13) puts it, the country has differentiated its development cooperation from Northern aid by emphasizing “solidarity with African partners, especially by highlighting Brazil’s past status as a former colony and its shared historical and cultural bonds with Africa” as well as “compatibility, by claiming that its own development experiences are more similar to those of African countries”.

These similarity claims have gained particular potency in the agricultural development cooperation field. Domestic and international actors alike have come to assume that Brazil’s remarkable growth in agricultural output and record of innovation in tropical agriculture make it a natural source of know-how for Africa (Cabral et al., 2016). However, similar claims have been made for other rising powers, including China (Xu et al., 2016) and India (Chaturvedi & Kumar, 2015). What sets Brazil apart is the way in which claims that the country’s agricultural development models are particularly suitable for export to Africa have been supported not only by narratives focusing on innovation and production growth, but also by powerful representations of the Brazilian landscape that has both shaped and been shaped by these models. These representations focus on the Cerrado savannah zone of Central Brazil, and are deployed in ways that both emphasize the Cerrado’s biophysical similarities with African savannah.

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regions and evoke narratives of its transformation by pioneerv ing farmers from a sparsely-populated bush zone into one of the world’s most important regions of export-oriented agricultural production (Cabra, Shankland, Favareto, & Costa Vaz, 2013).

There is now a burgeoning literature that interrogates the optimistic assumptions about transferability that have marked the resurgence of interest in South–South cooperation, with Wolford and Nehring (2015, p. 214), for example, arguing that “the term “South–South” highlights the dangers of the Cartesian logic that ascribes similar characteristics to groups of countries that fall within the same latitudinal coordinates and fails to do justice to considerable political, economic and social differences”. Several scholars have also highlighted the increasing contestation within the South of the use of such claims to legitimate “sub-imperialism” (Bond & Garcia, 2015). In this article, however, we focus on a hitherto neglected aspect: the particular productive power that landscape-based similarity claims can give both to the promotion and to the contestation of South–South agricultural development cooperation.

We explore this productive power in relation to Brazil’s largest agricultural development cooperation project in Africa, the Program for Agricultural Development of the Tropical Savannah in Mozambique—ProSAVANA. This is a TDC project that involves Mozambique, Brazil, and Japan and is coordinated by the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security of Mozambique (MASA, formerly known as MINAG), the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) and the Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC). It was initially designed with a view to replicating in Africa the experience of the Brazil–Japan Cooperation Program for the Development of the Brazilian Cerrado (PRODECER), described by JICA as having produced a model of sustainable and inclusive development (Hosono & Hongo, 2012). In addition to technical cooperation in agricultural research and extension using experience and know-how from Brazil, ProSAVANA’s design included a “Master Plan” component intended to guide significant private-sector investment in commercial agriculture and agro-processing in its target region, the Nacala Corridor in Northern Mozambique.

ProSAVANA has been widely contested by a coalition of Mozambican and international NGOs, highlighting fears that an influx of Brazilian soy-farmers has not materialized (Wise, 2014). In fact, ProSAVANA has yet to establish a visible presence in Northern Mozambique, beyond an agricultural research component (mainly focused on soybeans) whose results have reached very few farmers, while the boom in ProSAVANA-supported commercial agriculture envisaged by a leaked version of the “Master Plan” has been limited to half-a-dozen small-scale “quick impact projects” financed by a specific JICA fund with only tenuous Brazilian involvement (Mosca & Bruna, 2015). After significant delays in implementation, ProSAVANA, having been first hailed as a transformative initiative and then vilified as “the biggest land-grab in Africa” (Justiça Ambiental, 2013; Mello, 2013; Nogueira & Ollinaho, 2013; Wise, 2014), is now beginning to be seen, even among its erstwhile backers, as a failed project or a broken Brazilian promise. Nevertheless, ProSAVANA has remained both an intense focus of civil society contestation and a powerful brand for attracting private-sector interest to the Nacala Corridor region.

In this article, we explore the particular ways in which both ProSAVANA’s promotion and its contestation have mobilized material and symbolic resources, and the particular effects that this process has had not only on the program itself but also on pro-peasant networks in Mozambique, Brazil, and beyond. With a history that dates back to the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (Borras, Edelman, & Kay, 2008), and having grown in activity and visibility following structural adjustment and the neoliberal turn of the 1980s (Moyo, 2005), national and transnational pro-peasant networks are now reconceptualizing themselves to engage with South–South cooperation in a context marked by the expansion of global capital and by authoritarian national regimes in much of Africa. We argue that ProSAVANA has accelerated this reconceptualization by providing a particularly potent rallying-point, and that this potency derives from the fact that alongside particular—and divergent—imaginations of farming systems and desired scales of production, the mobilization of particular landscape-related imaginations has played an important role in shaping not only the promotion of the program but also its contestation. This is key to understanding why, despite the program’s apparently limited impact on the ground, ProSAVANA has become the focus of such a powerful contestation process, and why this process has had such significant effects. It has been powerfully productive of changes not only in the program itself (whose official narrative has now undergone a major reconceptualization), but also in the political and social relations shaping agricultural and development cooperation policy in Mozambique and Brazil. This, in turn, has wider implications for the future of South–South cooperation.

2. CONCEPTUAL AND METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH

This study builds on a tradition of research on imaginations that stem from the work of Taylor (2002, p. 106), who uses the term “social imaginary” to account for “the way ordinary people ‘imagine’ their social surroundings [which] is often not expressed in theoretical terms: it is carried in imagistic, story, and legends”. As Gaonkar (2002, p. 4) puts it, imaginations “exist by virtue of representation or implicit understandings even when they acquire immense institutional force; and they are the means by which individuals understand their identities and their place in the world”. They also frame the ways in which individuals and groups imagine each other’s roles in development encounters, in a process that Hilhorst, Weijers, and van Wessel (2012) have termed “mutual imaging”.

We extend this conceptualization to consider the mobilizing power of other imaginations, particularly those connected with landscape. As Greider and Garkovich (1994, p. 1) put it, landscapes carry “multiple symbolic meanings that emanate from the values by which people define themselves”. Following Thompson (2012, p. 1), we term these representations “landscape imaginations”, as they lie at the intersection of historically-constructed perceptions of particular landscapes and “modern social imaginations”. Echoing the work of historians such as Schama (1995) who explore how different societies’ cultural, institutional, and political trajectories are shaped by the power of ideas about landscape, Thompson (2012, p. 1) argues that “imaginations we have inherited from the past […] continue to shape our landscapes and constrain our environmental choices today”. In development studies, a substantial body of research has examined how persistent colonial imaginations have shaped an ongoing process of
“misreading” of landscapes, particularly in Africa (Fairhead & Leach, 1996; Wolmer, 2007).

We are also interested in how “imaginaries” travel, and are connected to transnational networks of social movements and to networks of transnational capital (Appadurai, 1996; Ferguson & Gupta, 2002), in particular in the contestation of agrarian change and the state-promoted rush for land (Wolford, Borras, Hall, Scoones, & White, 2013). These understandings of social imaginaries and their relationship to landscapes and social movements provide a useful entry point for understanding how, in everyday life, South–South cooperation is co-constructed by actors who hold very different views of both landscapes and development processes.

Our research focused on the contestation of ProSAVANA during 2012–15, when the “Master Plan” was being developed. We combined document review and collection of audio-visual materials with a process of multi-sited ethnography (Marcus, 1995). We constructed an archive and timeline of the program’s development and the contestation process, using government documents, audio-visual materials, civil society statements, and newspaper reports, supplemented by multiple key informant interviews in Mozambique and Brazil. Following our initial fieldwork in Brasília, São Paulo, and Maputo (see Cabral et al., 2013; Chichava et al., 2013), we undertook field visits to six sites in the Nacala Corridor1 in August and September 2013, during which we interviewed dozens of members of regional and local peasant organizations, residents of villages where Brazilian investments had been reported and provincial and district government representatives, as well as observing a major regional mobilization meeting organized in Lichinga (Niassa Province) by Mozambique’s National Union of Peasants (UNAC) and a visit by UNAC mobilizers to Majune District (Niassa). During late 2013–14, we attended several public events in Maputo convened by UNAC (including the “Triangular People’s Conference” organized with Brazilian and Japanese civil society organizations in July 2014), as well as other international events in Brazil (particularly those organized around the BRICS Academic Forum in March 2014) where civil society actors debated their response to ProSAVANA. Finally, we carried out two brief periods of follow-up fieldwork, in Maputo and Nampula in June and August 2015 to observe civil society responses to the consultation process on the “Zero Draft” Master Plan. Throughout this process we have remained in direct contact with key figures in Mozambican and Brazilian civil society, as well as accompanying online debates on ProSAVANA. This approach has enabled us to examine not only the representations of agricultural development, the savannah, and the Cerrado deployed in key texts and audio-visual materials, but also the settings in which these were discussed and negotiated.

3. AN AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT CALLED PROSAVANA

In April 2015 the Government of Mozambique released a “Zero Draft” of the ProSAVANA Master Plan in Portuguese and launched a consultation process on its content. This came 5 years after ProSAVANA was announced and 3 years after the start of a civil society campaign that had sought first to obtain more information about the program, then to secure a pause for broader consultation on it, then to halt it altogether. It also came fully 2 years after a partial draft of the Master Plan was leaked, containing proposals for large-scale commercial agriculture development that apparently confirmed the fears of the program’s detractors (Justiça Ambiental, 2013; Nogueira & Ollinaho, 2013; Okada, 2015). However, the finally released “Zero Draft” was very different, undergoing “many metamorphoses” (Mosca & Bruna, 2015, p. 2): it was largely silent on the prospects for private investment in large-scale commercial agriculture, focusing instead on government support for small farmers as a means to “improve the livelihood of inhabitants of the Nacala Corridor through inclusive and sustainable agricultural and regional development.”

The program’s initial documentation (ABC & Embrapa, 2011; Oriental Consultants, 2010) strongly emphasized the role of private investment, reflecting the fact that by the time ProSAVANA emerged, Mozambique had long since abandoned the post-independence vision that agricultural development would come from peasants’ labor on state or collective farms (Araújo, 1988; Castel-Branco, 1994). Private—and especially foreign—investment had come to play a growing role in official imaginaries of rural development, particularly after the failure of the heavily donor-funded National Program of Agrarian Development (PROAGRI), which was criticized for focusing excessively on institutional development of state agencies and paying insufficient attention to smallholder agriculture, particularly commercialization, credit, and rural infrastructure (Cabral, Shrivastava, & Muendane, 2007; Cunguara & Garrett, 2011). By the time the leaked version of the ProSAVANA Master Plan appeared in 2013, a new Strategic Plan for Agrarian Sector Development (Plano Estratégico de Desenvolvimento do Sector Agrário, PEDSA) was in place that identified six high-priority “Development Corridors”, of which the Nacala Corridor was one. Although PEDSA took a broadly pro-smallholder approach to strengthening agriculture within these corridors, its operationalisation relied on the agribusiness-friendly National Agriculture and Food Security Investment Plan (PNISA). This was criticized by the peasant union UNAC, which called for PNISA to be complemented by a “National Plan for Supporting Family Farming”.

PNISA reflected the way in which capital-intensive agribusiness has come to be imagined by the Mozambican policy elite as a powerful alternative (commercial) development approach. This perspective grew in importance after President Armando Emílio Guebuza came to power in 2005 promising a “green revolution”, although this term itself faded out of official rhetoric without yielding visible results. The food, fuel, and financial crises of the late 2000s increased the pressure on the Mozambican government to do something about hunger at the same time as they intensified the interest of international capital in acquiring land in Mozambique. As South African, European, Malaysian, Indian, Brazilian, and Chinese investors have sought to capitalize on the agricultural potential of Mozambican “Development Corridors”, there have been a growing number of cases where peasants have complained of being displaced from their land, as foreign investors secure the support of central government and local elites in obtaining concessions to use what are often quite large areas by local standards.

ProSAVANA has increasingly been seen as symbolizing these trends, becoming in the process a focus for the tensions that have accompanied them. After the initial public statements by government officials from Mozambique, Brazil, and Japan presented ProSAVANA as a program with the potential to transform Mozambique into an exporter and eventually an African agricultural powerhouse, various campaigns were launched to sell the idea of the program as an enabling framework for international investment, particularly
from Brazil. It was these campaigns—with their associated media stories about millions of hectares being made available to Brazilian farmers in Mozambique—that alerted civil society groups in both countries to what they were soon characterizing as a major land-grabbing threat. Fears that ProSAVANA might serve as a catalyst for land-grabbing were aggravated by the fact that the agencies responsible for the program were initially quite secretive about what exactly it was supposed to do in the Nacala Corridor. Uncertainty and mistrust were generated as contradictory information about key issues—including the role of smallholder farmers—was relayed. As Funada-Classen (2013a, p. 4) put it for the Japanese authorities, official communication about the program was marked by “lack of information and a constant shift in arguments, rationale, and focus.” The first civil society report to analyze ProSAVANA noted that a key problem was “the nonexistence of a systematic communication system or strategy for the program” (Jamal, Nicole, Lihahe, & Baleira 2012, p. 52). In fact, until the release of the “Zero Draft” of the Master Plan in April 2015, the only document on the program that had been officially disseminated was a “concept note” released 6 months after an unofficial version of the ProSAVANA Master Plan was leaked in 2013. This concept note specifically stated that its role was not to summarize the Master Plan itself but only its general approach.

While no official information was being released to the people who actually lived in the Nacala Corridor, accounts filtered through of promises being made to potential investors by Mozambican officials and Brazilian consultants, and media stories appeared that reported plans for Japanese capital investment and visits to the Nacala Corridor by Brazilian entrepreneurs, who had apparently been invited to occupy large “uncultivated” portions of land. To many civil society groups this was evidence that ProSAVANA was in fact a land-grabbing scheme aimed at transforming diverse family farming territories into mechanized estates producing single crops for export. These concerns were aggravated by references to the Brazilian Cerrado as a model experience to be replicated in Mozambique. Within what is a complex and highly transnationalized process of contestation—in which the actors range from Japanese academics and corporations to European NGOs and private equity firms to US-based think-tanks and commodity traders—the power of landscape imaginaries has given a particular intensity to the Brazil–Mozambique axis. In the next section, we review how the landscapes of Central Brazil and the Nacala Corridor have been represented by Brazilian and Mozambican elites, and by transnational actors engaging with those elites to shape agricultural development policies. We examine how these representations have informed the maps developed by Brazilian consultants to promote investment in the Nacala Corridor. We then shift our focus to the reciprocal landscape imaginaries and conceptions of agricultural development that have been mobilized by the actors involved in contesting ProSAVANA, focusing on the video images of Central Brazil recorded by Mozambican activists and used to warn the peasants of the Nacala Corridor about the nature of the changes that the program is claimed to be bringing to their region.

4. IMAGINED LANDSCAPES OF AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT: THE CERRADO AND THE SAVANNAH

Two landscapes are at the heart of the imaginaries mobilized around ProSAVANA: the Central Brazilian Cerrado and the Northern Mozambican savannah. A key element of the discourse around ProSAVANA has been the identification of these two landscapes as sharing a common “savannah” identity—one which outside Africa is of course bound up with a powerful landscape imaginary, shaped by a myriad wildlife documentaries, book covers, and safari brochures. Yet the wooded miombo savannahs of Northern Mozambique and the diverse, wooded grasslands, and gallery forests of the Cerrado (dos Santos, Barbieri, de Carvalho, & Machado, 2010; Campbell, 1996) have very different ecologies to the “classic” savannah of open, grassland plains. Throughout the research, we found Brazilian interviewees who had visited the Nacala Corridor remarking on how they had been struck by the fact that its landscape resembled not this “classic” imagined savannah but the Brazilian Cerrado. However, ProSAVANA represented a convergence of landscape imaginaries that went beyond this superficial similarity of appearance to evoke a broader set of historical, cultural, political, and economic resonances.

The historical processes shaping the “commodification of land, labor, and money” within the Central Brazilian Cerrado and the northern Mozambican savannah are very different (Wolford & Nehring, 2015). Nevertheless, the relationships between the regions where these landscapes are located and each country’s centers of economic and political power have certain revealing similarities. Elites based in remote capital cities have long associated both regions with social and political otherness and ungovernability, seeing them as a source of challenges to their legitimacy. These same elites have been encouraged in their efforts to consolidate political control in the two regions by the opportunity to exploit the natural resources they contain. The intensity of these efforts has been shaped by the irregular cycles of commodity boom and economic stagnation that have marked both regions since the 18th century, when both Brazil and Mozambique were under Portuguese colonial control.

In the first half of the twentieth century, Central Brazil entered the urban Brazilian imagination as the destination for epic expeditions in which heroes such as Marshal Candido Rondon and the Villas-Boas brothers set out to demarcate frontiers, lay telegraph lines, and make peace with the region’s notoriously fierce indigenous tribes ahead of the advancing agricultural frontier (Hemming, 1987). The transfer of Brazil’s capital in 1960 to the purpose-built city of Brasilia, located in the heart of the Cerrado belt, was an unambiguous statement of intent in the struggle to control the “Eldorado of Central Brazil” (Ribeiro, 2002). It was followed by the unleashing of what Mazzetto Silva (2009, p. 62) has called a “predatory and conservative modernization process”. This centered on the expansion of capital-intensive, large-scale export-oriented agriculture, made possible by the successful adaptation of soybean cultivation technology—a process within which the Japanese-supported PRODECEER program is depicted as playing a key role.

As the region’s agricultural output grew exponentially, aided by a surge in demand for soybeans and other agricultural commodities from the rising economies of Asia, Brazilian and international economic elites alike began to speak of a “miracle of the Cerrado” (The Economist, 2010). In Brazil, pride in this technical and commercial achievement was intertwined with a longstanding national narrative of commercial farmers as rugged pioneers taming the country’s “Wild West” (Cabral et al., 2013). This imaginary has encouraged contemporary Brazilian elites to look overseas for other “wild” landscapes that could be profitably tamed using their Cerrado experience. Entrepreneurial actors operating within the
influential political-economic networks of Brazilian agribusiness—led by GV Agro, the well-connected consultancy group that had won the contract to coordinate Brazil’s inputs to the ProSAVANA Master Plan—directed their attention to the savannahs of Northern Mozambique, deploying a discourse of landscape similarity that soon took a powerful hold among elites in both countries (Chichava et al., 2013).

As is the case for Central Brazil, the three Mozambican provinces that are the focus of ProSAVANA—Niassa, Nampula, and Zambezia—have historically been places onto which agricultural landscape imaginaries have been projected by colonial and post-colonial elites. Sparsely-populated Niassa, which during the colonial period had been run as a commodity producing area by the Niassa Company (a royal company set up primarily to fend off British and German plans to occupy parts of the then Portuguese colony), became a key site of the liberation movement Frelimo’s post-independence Operação Produção (“Operation Production”). This included the forcible resettlement of thousands of citizens who had been categorized as unemployed, prostitutes, or criminals in the major cities of Maputo and Beira, who were put to work in collective farms in remote areas (Quembo, 2012; Thomaz, 2008).

The more populous provinces of Nampula and Zambezia have long seen their agricultural growth hampered not only by factors such as isolation from the urban markets of the South and the absence of a tradition of using animal traction, but also by political conflict. They were fiercely contested by Frelimo and the rebel Renamo movement during Mozambique’s long civil war (Chichava, 2007), and their strategic location astride Development Corridors with rapidly-improving rail, road, and river transport links to the key hotspots of Mozambique’s mining and energy boom has made them into a political battleground to this day. After the 2014 elections, Renamo threatened to use force to establish “autonomous governments” in the two provinces. It was not by coincidence that the current Frelimo president, Filipe Nyusi, launched his 2014 election campaign in Nampula by declaring his intention to turn the province into an “agricultural powerhouse”.

In the last few years, key Mozambican policymakers have become enthusiastic converts to the “idea that Brazilian agribusiness could help to make this ‘powerhouse’ a reality,” following an extensive campaign to market various Brazilian models of agricultural development that was spearheaded by Brazil’s former President Luís Inácio Lula da Silva (Cabral et al., 2016). This process has been abetted by multinational and bilateral development agencies. During the period in which ProSAVANA was in gestation, marked by much international excitement about the potential of an “African Green Revolution”, the World Bank was actively promoting a landscape imaginary of Africa’s “Guinea Savannah”—a loosely-defined “zone” that is held to cover a third of sub-Saharan Africa and two-thirds of Mozambique, including the Nacala Corridor—as a “Sleeping Giant” crying out for investment in commercial agriculture to awaken its potential (World Bank, 2009). Most important for ProSAVANA has been the role of JICA, which according to some observers was the original proponent of the idea of “spreading the results of the PRODECER to the African savannah” (Nogueira & Ollinhaú, 2013, p. 10). In her analysis of the initial Japanese discourse on ProSAVANA, Funada-Classen (2013a, p. 9) has highlighted how in JICA documents “tropical savannah” functioned as “a repeated term used as the evidence of the similarities between the Cerrado and Mozambique”.

Nevertheless, this imaginary of similarity was swiftly disrupted once Japanese technicians came into direct contact with the Nacala Corridor’s landscape (Funada-Classen, 2013a).

Far from being characterized by small and scattered settlements as the Brazilian Cerrado had been, the area along the main rail line that originally defined the Corridor was densely populated by smallholders. JICA was soon publicly acknowledging that, while “individual technologies of Cerrado type savannah development can be transferred”, it was not clear that this represented an adequate response to the key question of “how to implement regional development” (Oriental Consultants, 2010, p. 3).

This marks a crucial difference in relation to Brazilian discourses, in which the issue of landscape similarity remained central, consolidating itself as a key element in a vision for the Nacala Corridor in which there was an increasingly evident commercial stake: one that centered on the possibility of reproducing the Cerrado model in its entirety, including a substantial element of large landholdings producing commodities for export. In the end, rather than this Brazilian landscape imaginary being revised to fit the reality of the Nacala Corridor, it was the Corridor itself that was redefined, as successive maps produced by the Master Plan team expanded its area to incorporate additional regions of Niassa Province. The incorporated regions were further and further away from the rail line (the ostensible rationale for the Corridor), but had been identified as having low population densities and agroecological conditions that were suitable for soybean cultivation using the large-farm Cerrado model. As a result, the region covered by ProSAVANA grew from an initial 12 districts in 2010 to 19 districts in 2015. Thus, even while its official narrative has shifted strongly toward smallholder agriculture, ProSAVANA has maintained a consistent focus on expanding the boundaries of the Nacala Corridor into areas of Niassa Province that have been framed by both historical Mozambican and contemporary Brazilian elite imaginaries as empty and available for large-scale externally-driven agricultural development, giving credence to the suspicion that the program continues to carry “undeclared agendas” (Mosca & Bruna, 2015, p. 33).

(a) Representing landscape similarities as opportunity through GIS imagery

This use of maps to expand the scope of ProSAVANA can be situated within a long tradition of representations of landscape as something that can be assessed and controlled from outside rather than experienced from within, often giving rise to the processes of appropriation and contestation that Bryan and Wood (2015) have called “weaponizing maps”. Within these processes digital technologies, such as Geographical Information Systems (GIS), can act to transform landscape imaginaries by “privileging abstract forces and flows over the material conditions of the site” (Desimini, 2013, p. 1; see also Rambaldi, Chambers, McCall, & Fox, 2006).

Map-making played an important symbolic as well as practical role in the colonial “scramble for Africa” (Castelo, 2012), so it is unsurprising that there has recently been a surge in map-making in relation to certain African landscapes as new forms of capital expand on the continent. This surge is especially linked to the increasing interest in “African Agricultural Growth Corridors” promoted by initiatives such as the New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition and the Program for Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA), as governments, donors, and investors seek to reorganize the territorial governance and physical infrastructure of these regions along export-oriented lines (Paul & Steinbrecher, 2013). The Nacala Corridor, which connects the Brazilian-operated coalfields of Tete Province to the Brazilian-built port of Nacala, is emblem-
atic of this trend, including in the paradox that its natural resources are being mapped with extreme precision while the territorial boundaries within which the mapping is taking place are fluid and shift constantly in response to demands from powerful actors.

The same tensions were at the heart of Brazil’s “map wars”, a process of political contestation in the late 1980s and early 1990s over the social, economic and environmental dynamics unleashed by the “Greater Carajás” megaproject in the forest-savannah transition zone of the Eastern Amazon (de Almeida, 1993). Carajás, which centered on a rail corridor linking the world’s largest iron ore mine with the port of São Luís, has a number of resonant similarities with the development plans for the Nacala Corridor—starting with the role played by the Brazilian mining and logistics giant Vale, operator of both the mine and railway in Carajás, as it is in Nacala. In our interviews with Brazilian agribusiness consultants, they described how in Carajás, Vale has stimulated investments in export-oriented agriculture along the corridor, which in turn unleashed by the “Greater Carajás” megaproject in the forest-savannah transition zone of the Eastern Amazon (de Almeida, 1993). Carajás, which centered on a rail corridor linking the world’s largest iron ore mine with the port of São Luís, has a number of resonant similarities with the development plans for the Nacala Corridor—starting with the role played by the Brazilian mining and logistics giant Vale, operator of both the mine and railway in Carajás, as it is in Nacala. In our interviews with Brazilian agribusiness consultants, they described how in Carajás, Vale has stimulated investments in export-oriented agriculture along the corridor, which in turn have generated additional freight traffic for its rail operation, and went on to describe how the same logic is expected to apply in the Nacala Corridor.

One of the most powerful tools for projecting Brazilian landscape imaginaries into other contexts has been the map-based digital presentation package prepared by GV Agro, the lead Brazilian consultants for the “Master Plan” component of ProSAVANA. This deploys layers of data on soil types, vegetation, rainfall, transport infrastructure, and land tenure to provide visual evidence of the technical suitability and economic viability of the sites chosen for the “agribusiness clusters” that it proposes to set up. The package draws on a well-established Brazilian environmental governance technology known as Ecological-Economic Zoning (Zoneamento Ecológico Econômico, ZEE), which first came to the fore in highly contested megaproject-based regional development initiatives in the Brazilian Amazon, including the Greater Carajás project (Ab/Saber, 1989).

GV Agro, which is the agribusiness consulting arm of leading Brazilian business school Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV), is connected with Vale through a web of powerful agricultural interests in which its Director, former Minister of Agriculture Roberto Rodrigues, plays a prominent role. It has worked with the Brazilian mining giant in the Carajás region, as well as in several African countries, including Mozambique. During an interview in São Paulo in October 2012, one GV Agro consultant eagerly pulled out his laptop to show how ZEE methodology had helped the firm to design an oil-palm project in the Carajás region that was being taken as the model for the clusters ProSAVANA intended to introduce in the Nacala Corridor. He emphasized that the project’s successful incorporation of local small-scale producers via a contract farming scheme could be replicated in Mozambique. In his view, the fact that these “small farmers” had an average landholding of around 100 ha, more than 60 times larger than the average for family farmers in the Nacala Corridor, did not undermine the model’s replicability.

During the same interview, the GV Agro consultant shared a PowerPoint slide with an image that has become one of the most widely-circulated representations of agroecological similarity between the Brazilian Cerrado and the Mozambican savannah: a map showing how the two regions lie within the same parallels of latitude, accompanied by bullet-points highlighting that the regions share “similar biomass” and “similar challenges” (cf. Woldorf & Nehring, 2015) (see Fig. 1). Variations on this image have continued to circulate in Brazil and beyond, as GV Agro’s sister firm GV Projetos has run “roadshows” designed to attract international investment to the private-sector “Nacala Fund” that it has now set up using the data collected and the contacts established through GV Agro’s involvement in the ProSAVANA Master Plan process. As contestation has grown within Mozambique and Brazil, this image (and its attendant display of ZEE technology, which is designed to reassure audiences of GV Agro’s profound knowledge of the landscape of northern Mozambique) has been used to promote first ProSAVANA and now the Nacala Fund in centers of global capital located far from the Nacala Corridor.

During the initial phase of the “Master Plan” development process GV Agro’s team was criticized by some of our interviewees for making only brief “flying visits” to the Nacala Corridor. However, the consultant we interviewed in São Paulo in October 2012 stated that the GV Agro team had already collected most of the data they needed to produce their ZEE models and identify potential cluster sites for the Nacala Corridor well before the “Master Plan” field trips officially began, as part of previous work for “another client” of which other sources later confirmed was Vale. (Rossi, 2015). GV Agro, Vale, and the networks of Brazilian and global capital with which they are connected have been mapping the Nacala Corridor since long before the Japanese, Mozambican, and Brazilian governments came together to launch ProSAVANA.

5. THE TRANSNATIONAL CONTESTATION OF PROSAVANA

While proponents of ProSAVANA have used maps to represent agroecological similarities between Brazil and Mozambique and the commercial potential of the Nacala Corridor, civil society organizations critical of the program have used audiovisual materials as key artifacts in the contestation of ProSAVANA. Of particular importance has been “Face Oculta do ProSAVANA” (“The Hidden Face of ProSAVANA”) (Ram Multimedia, 2013). This is a video documentary based on images and interviews collected by members of UNAC (Mozambique’s National Union of Peasants) and ORAM (a Mozambican rural support NGO) who received support from the Brazilian NGO FASE (the Federation of Social and Educational Support Organizations) and a number of international NGOs and foundations to visit the agribusiness-dominated Brazilian state of Mato Grosso in 2012, with the aim of hearing from Brazilian grassroots actors what their experiences had been with PRODECER. FASE also organized trips by Brazilian activists to the Nacala Corridor, generating eyewitness accounts of the landscape threatened by the program, complete with nostalgic references to the once-diverse Cerrado landscape destroyed by soybean cultivation, together with comparisons between the misunderstandings of territory of Nampula’s “native communities” and the communal notions of Brazil’s indigenous peoples (Ferreira, 2013; Mello, 2013).

(b) Representing landscape similarities as threat through a video documentary

These imaginaries were mirrored by the Mozambican activists who visited Mato Grosso to produce the video documentary, which uses stock footage of indigenous hunters moving through a forest and naked indigenous children splashing happily in a river to evoke the lost landscape of traditional communities living in harmony with Nature. The video repeatedly contrasts these images with others representing...
what Mozambican civil society organizations have termed the “Brazilian Model” of agrarian development, principally through long takes showing vast expanses of sugarcane or soybean monoculture in Mato Grosso, still photographs of gleaming farm machinery and interviews in which Mato Grosso residents describe pesticides being sprayed indiscriminately from planes, poisoning the land and the people of what was once the Cerrado. This material, in turn, is intercut with images of the rich and diverse miombo woodlands of the Nacala Corridor and of Mozambican women harvesting cassava by hand, without a tractor in sight.

This linking of territory and tradition suggests that both Brazilian and Mozambican activists have ignored Sauer’s (2012, pp. 93–4) warning that it is dangerous when “the fight for territory becomes restricted to “traditional communities”, as a fight for backwardness”, and his suggestion that such struggles should “reject the notion of a traditional community as a socio-cultural group in opposition to notions of progress and development”. As Sauer points out, struggles for the right to territory become vulnerable to accusations that they are conservative reactions when they adopt this traditionalist framing, rather than focusing on the multiplicity of actually existing modernities and the right of a given territory’s inhabitants to determine their own terms of engagement with “modernity at large” (cf. Appadurai, 1996). However, the deployment of a landscape imaginary associating the Cerrado and the savannah with time-honored traditions of life and livelihood is clearly a powerful resource for contesting landgrabs, since it conveys a notion of primordial belonging at the same time as evoking sustainability and the protection of biodiversity, which are important for building the kind of alliances with environmental groups that have helped Brazilian indigenous peoples to retain control of many of their territories (cf. Schwartzman & Zimmerman, 2005).

(b) Contesting ProSAVANA in Brazil

Following the exchange visits that gave rise to UNAC and ORAM’s documentary, FASE and its allies were able to extend the mobilization process in Brazil through networks that connected civil society organizations and academics interested in Brazil’s growing international role with parts of the country’s ruling Workers’ Party and with key sites for formal government-civil society dialog, such as the National Food and Nutrition Security Council (CONSEA). These networks play a key role in mobilizing one of the three discourse coalitions, labeled by Cabral (2015) as “priests”, “technicians”, and “traders”, that dominate domestic struggles over Brazilian South–South Cooperation with their competing emphases on solidarity, technology, and commercial interest.

FASE’s solidarity-oriented network, which includes other leading Brazilian NGOs such as IBASE and INESC, intersects with but is distinct from another part of the “priests” discourse coalition: the agrarian networks that link Brazilian organizations such as the Movement of Landless Rural Workers (MST) and its sister organization the Movement of Small Farmers (MPA) with UNAC through the transnational agrarian movement (TAM) Via Campesina, described by Borras et al. (2008, p. 172) as “perhaps the most politically coherent of all contemporary TAMs”. The MST and MPA have a long-
standing collaboration with UNAC, including an ongoing agroecology knowledge exchange project. Like the larger Workers’ Party-aligned rural union Contag, they also have strong links with Brazil’s Ministry of Agrarian Development, which increasingly competes with the Ministry of Agriculture for leadership in Brazilian agricultural development cooperation (Cabral, 2015).

The MPA and Contag both have seats on CONSEA, which is currently chaired by a FASE representative. It was a combination of these NGO and movement networks that in December 2013 secured an invitation for a UNAC spokesperson to present the organization’s views on Brazil–Mozambique agricultural development cooperation at a CONSEA meeting. This contributed to a resolution that included strongly-worded criticism of ProSAVANA (CONSEA, 2013, p. 6). Given CONSEA’s formal status and political prestige, this made it impossible for the Brazilian government to ignore the controversy. It signaled the end of official statements about ProSAVANA that echoed the triumphalist rhetoric of agribusiness boosters such as GV Agro, whose formal role in the program began to be wound down as the search began for a more smallholder-friendly framing for the program.

(c) Contesting ProSAVANA in Mozambique

In Mozambique, the documentary film Face Oculta had meanwhile become a key artifact in the contestation of ProSAVANA, being repeatedly screened as part of UNAC-organized platforms at the local and national levels. The video was shown and discussed at UNAC’s three regional meetings in 2013; during our fieldwork we witnessed how hundreds-strong audiences watched with rapt attention while the video relayed the stories of Brazilian small farmers and indigenous activists who had lost land or been squeezed out of markets, supplemented with expert testimony from activist researchers. After the screening of the video, which ends with Brazilian farmers advising their Mozambican counterparts not to accept a program similar to PRODECEP—at least not without conducting proper research to learn about what it entails—a member of UNAC’s technical team (the group of young activist-advisors who lead its communication and advocacy work) would ask the assembled farmers “é isto que nós queremos?” (“is this what we want?”), to which the audience would respond in unison “Nãoooo!” (“No!”). These set-piece events were followed by meetings with representatives of farmers’ associations where the video was discussed and awareness-raising strategies were drawn up to be implemented at district level.

In the 2 years during which the release of the Master Plan was repeatedly delayed, the landscape imaginary articulated in the video came to dominate local and national perceptions of what the program would deliver. Face Oculta was used to expose contradictions in public statements made by officials, as UNAC and other civil society organizations pursued a systematic strategy of inviting government and ProSAVANA representatives to national meetings at which the video was being presented. In a context marked by longstanding, historically-rooted mistrust of government in many parts of rural Mozambique (including much of the Nacala Corridor), the perception that officials were not telling the truth about the program was quickly able to take root, reinforcing the video’s message that the “hidden face” of ProSAVANA was its real face.

Several of these meetings brought together Mozambican civil society organizations and peasant leaders with Brazilian and Japanese civil society organizations and pro-peasant international social movement organizations. They helped to consolidate an international alliance that not only included the MPA, UNAC’s fellow Via Campesina member organization, but also a significant contingent of environmental NGOs led by Justiça Ambiental (JA, Environmental Justice), the Mozambique branch of Friends of the Earth International. Despite their different class and ideological origins, the agrarian and green movement organizations found common ground in opposing the environmental and social impact of high-input monoculture (associated with biodiversity loss by JA and with the power of transnational seed companies by the MPA) and promoting agroecology as an alternative.

This civil society alliance produced and disseminated a series of open letters to the Mozambican, Brazilian, and Japanese governments demanding information and public consultation on ProSAVANA. When by mid-2014 the governments still had not released the Master Plan, UNAC and a number of Mozambican civil society organizations decided to launch a “No to ProSAVANA Campaign” to stop the program altogether (Beghin, 2014, p. 53). The response finally came in April 2015 when the newly-elected Mozambican government released the “Zero Draft” Master Plan and organized a new round of consultations throughout the districts of the Nacala Corridor.

(d) From contestation to transformation?

The productive effect of the contestation process can be seen in the differences between this new “Zero Draft” and the version of the Master Plan that was leaked in 2013. In contrast with the initial framing of the program that emphasized its strong export-oriented commodities component, the version of ProSAVANA presented for public discussion in April 2015 had a new emphasis on smallholder agriculture, subsistence and local markets, leading one observer to conclude that it was “clearly written by Brazilians from the pro-peasant faction of ProSAVANA” (Hanlon, 2015, p. 2). In fact, since the “pro-peasant” faction of Brazilian agricultural cooperation policy (represented by the Ministry of Agrarian Development) had refused to get involved with the Master Plan, the revised version was mostly written by Brazilian consultants under contract to JICA, which had become very concerned to present itself as “pro-peasant” in the face of rising criticism of its role in ProSAVANA by Japanese civil society. JICA ensured that these Brazilian consultants were not the same GV Agro team who had produced the controversial version of the Master Plan leaked in 2013 (Mosca & Bruna, 2015, p. 12).

However, the contestation did not have a similarly productive effect on the broader dynamics of Brazilian and Japanese investment in the Nacala Corridor. The Nacala Fund, initially a much-vaunted strategy for leveraging private-sector investment to support ProSAVANA’s commercial agriculture component, is nowhere to be found in the “Zero Draft” Master Plan. But although GV Agro has been sidelined from the official ProSAVANA program, its sister firm GV Projetos has begun to promote a rebranded and repositioned Nacala Fund—this time negotiated directly with the Government of Mozambique, by-passing the Brazilian and Japanese official development cooperation agencies (Amorim, 2014, p. 12).

Meanwhile, Japanese corporations are continuing to invest alongside Brazil’s Vale in the infrastructure that will make the Nacala Corridor an attractive export platform (Mitsui, 2014). The Japanese and Mozambican governments have now launched an ambitious new Project for Economic Development Strategies in the Nacala Corridor (PEDEC) that aims to promote “integrated development strategies” across five
provinces, including the three covered by ProSAVANA (Oriental Consultants, International Development Center of Japan, & Eight-Japan Engineering Consultants Inc., 2014, pp. 1–1).

None of this is any longer officially classified as part of ProSAVANA. According to Mosca and Bruna (2015, p. 30), the new configuration of the program suggests that ProSAVANA may represent “only the family farming component” of the overall strategy for the Nacala Corridor. This has made it possible to deny that land conflicts—such as the one involving a large soybean farm in Zambezia that is part-owned by the Brazilian agribusiness firm Grupo Pinessol (UNAC & GRAIN, 2015, p. 9)—are linked to the program. The role of transnational capital in the Corridor has thus been rendered less visible—and less subject to demands for public accountability—by being edited out of the official version of what ProSAVANA represents.

The transformation in the program document has thus not been translated into changes in the logic of broader government and corporate plans for the Nacala Corridor. Nor has it meant more effective inclusion of civil society organizations, despite the assurances of commitment to “broad, participatory and inclusive discussion on the path to be followed for developing agriculture in the Nacala Corridor in particular and in Mozambique in general”. The optimism that greeted President Nyusi’s rhetoric when the Zero Draft consultation process was launched soon gave way to skepticism after the process was denounced as deeply flawed, authoritarian, and “lacking in democratic spirit” (Mosca & Bruna, 2015, p. 25). It remains to be seen whether the release of the “Zero Draft” represents a genuine departure from the entrenched government practice of provisionality in policy making, in which plans and ideas are preferably communicated orally and policies are continuously revised as implementation takes place (Gonçalves, 2013).

There has, however, been a transformation in two areas: the configuration of coalitions linking local and national Mozambican peasant organizations with other civil society groups in Mozambique, Brazil, and beyond; and the space for civil society engagement in South–South development cooperation policies. The contestation of ProSAVANA has provided an opportunity for the revitalization of UNAC, which has regained public visibility. ProSAVANA has also allowed UNAC to build alliances with environmental groups by promoting agroecology as a sustainable alternative to the input-intensive monocultures of the Cerrado, following the example of the MST (Borsatto & do Carmo, 2013, p. 656). More importantly, at the local level, ProSAVANA has provided UNAC with an opportunity to expand its membership base in rural areas, especially in the Nacala Corridor. Thanks to the effectiveness of resistance to land-grabbing as a unifying appeal, national-level activists were able to build new links with the local peasant associations that they had long struggled to mobilize, leading one activist to reflect that “perhaps ProSAVANA will be a ‘necessary evil’—necessary in order to provoke negatively affected communities to rise up” (Monjane, 2015, p. 1).

UNAC has not been the only civil society organization to benefit from the contestation process: in Brazil, FASE, and other solidarity-based NGOs have been able to leverage significant new material and symbolic resources, strengthening their positions at a time when conventional Northern donor funding for the civil society groups now engaging with South–South cooperation is under threat from multiple directions (Poskitt, Shankland, & Taela, 2016). The contestation around ProSAVANA has thus transformed the space for civil society engagement with South–South cooperation. Internationally, it not only activated existing transnational networks such as those linking UNAC and the MST and Justiça Ambiental and Friends of the Earth, but also established new ones such as those linking Mozambican and Japanese CSOs. In Brazil, the program provided the focus for mobilization that civil society organizations needed, after a period as largely impotent by-standers while Brazilian government and corporate actors moved rapidly into Africa during Lula’s presidency. Thanks to the willingness of high-visibility state-society engagement spaces like CONSEA to discuss ProSAVANA, and thereby to take on the consequences of Brazil’s South–South cooperation activities for poor and marginalized people overseas as a legitimate topic for debate, the government was forced out of its reluctance to engage with these issues, effectively “putting an end to the insulation of cooperation from wider state-society dynamics” (Cabral & Leite, 2015, p. 440).

Thanks to organizations like FASE that have the ability to bridge domestic and international policy domains and to use party-based and other networks to draw influential government figures into the discussion, this debate may evolve into a more inclusive policy discussion on Brazil’s development cooperation activities.

6. CONCLUSION: IMPLICATIONS OF THE CONTESTATION AND TRANSFORMATION OF PROSAVANA

Since work on the Master Plan began in 2012, the triumphantly optimistic tone of the original promotion of ProSAVANA has evaporated, and both Brazilian and Japanese development agencies have grown wary of even discussing the program as the political cost of promoting it rises. In part, this is due to the waning of investor enthusiasm as a result of falling commodity prices. Management problems have also played a role: the “Extension and Models” component through which ProSAVANA was supposed to engage with smallholders has yet to take off, and the research and technological component has been criticized. However, the strength and visibility of transnational civil society contestation has been a major factor in driving the transformation of the program (Mosca & Bruna, 2015).

Both landscape-inspired assumptions about similarity and transferability and landscape-focused contestations have played a role in shaping ProSAVANA. Key to this was the mobilization of landscape imaginaries through the use of graphic and audio-visual artifacts. ProSAVANA’s initial incarnation—powerfully captured in the GIS imagery used by GV Agro’s consultants—managed to unite fears of land-grabbing, biodiversity loss, transnational corporate encroachment, Japanese government resource-seeking, Brazilian government “sub-imperialism”, and Mozambican government authoritarianism. Those contesting ProSAVANA deployed alternative landscape imaginaries, using easily-distributed audio-visual materials such as the Pacé Oculta documentary to communicate across sites and scales in a way that no report or speech could have done. Technology can thus expand the mobilizing potential of images and imaginaries, placing representational tools such as digital videos and websites within reach of farmer groups in Mozambique who can turn the gaze back on the more powerful Brazilian “Other” and problematize the claims of similarity on which the discourse of South–South cooperation is founded.

The contestation process contains lessons both for transnational agrarian movements and for advocates of South–South
development cooperation. The former have gained a clear example of the power of landscape imaginaries to mobilize across scales when deployed in accessible formats. However, this also carries risks. The first is that eco-traditionalist landscape imaginaries such as those articulated in the Face Oculta documentary can help to build alliances between green groups and agrarian movements, while simultaneously opening up opportunities for governments and corporations to outflank them by promising material “development” benefits to their grassroots constituencies, as the “Zero Draft” Master Plan does. The second is that effective contestation may drive governments to remove explicit references to the role of transnational capital from their programs, thereby making this role less rather than more subject to public scrutiny and demands for accountability. This can leave mobilization focused on opposing a government program such as ProSAVANA even after it has ceased to represent a serious threat, while the plans of the corporations themselves remain unchanged and unchallenged.

In both Mozambique and Brazil, a less simplistic set of narratives about the potential for transforming African agriculture should now inform debates on South–South cooperation following the ProSAVANA experiences. This will require a more nuanced approach to arguments about agroclimatic similarity, and a challenge to the framing of South–South cooperation as a vehicle for harmonious transfer of “best fit” development experiences. Instead a greater focus on adaptive learning will be required. South–South cooperation initiatives are no different from most other development programs; they undergo constant revision as different actors incorporate new ideas and draw lessons from unexpected results, while also struggling for position within inevitably contested processes. An approach that responds to dissent and opposition rather than seeking to deny or disguise it, and embeds learning in its approach, is likely to offer a much more robust and valuable pathway toward fulfilling the potential of South–South cooperation as a source of support for African agriculture.

NOTES

1. These were Nampula in Nampula Province, Lichinga, Cuamba, Majone, and Mandimba in Niassa Province and Lioma in Zambezia Province.


6. See the special issue of Boletim sobre o processo politico em Moçambique (2011, p. 48).


9. See for example Justiça Ambiental (2013) and UNAC (2013). Figures given by Mozambican government representatives for the total area to be covered by ProSAVANA have varied from 14 million hectares to less than 4 million hectares.


11. See, for example, Rossi’s account of an interview with a Brazilian farm manager in the Nacala Corridor (2015, p. 43).


13. See the YouTube post of the documentary film here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jUKmYK5E0k (accessed 12/06/15).


15. Field observations, Lichinga and Majune, August 2013.

16. Indeed, PEDEC is a bilateral Japan-Mozambique project that makes no reference to the role of Brazilian development cooperation in the Nacala Corridor.


