HANNEKE J. NIJLAND

DISENTANGLING
THE DOMESTIC CONTRACT

The Art Of Framing

PADDY STACK &

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PORK

Disentangling the Domestic Contract

Understanding the everyday-life construction of acceptability -or non-acceptability- of keeping and killing animals for food

Hanneke J. Nijland

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CHAPTER 1

What is the domestic contract
and why does it need disentangling?

The Art Of Framing

PADDY STAC

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PORK

"Old MacDonald had a farm..."

If only talking about farming animals and related food products would be simple, like it was when we were children learning the names of animals, farm utensils and food products from picture books. However, the intricate realities of modern-day farming practices differ momentously from this primary reference - the picture books. The topic brings about polarized responses, both rationally and emotionally, reflecting very diverse outlooks on our world. In this dissertation, I set out to explore various aspects of how people in everyday-life construct (non-)acceptability of keeping and killing animals for food, or in other words: disentangle the domestic contract.

1 - Introduction: What is the domestic contract and why does it need disentangling?

1.1 Introduction

According to data brought forward at the Second World Water Forum, only a small percentage of the biomass of all vertebrates on land still is made up of (non-human[a]) animals in the wild, approximately one third consists of human beings and nearly two thirds consists of farm animals.[1] Even if only approximations, these numbers show that in the relation between humans, animals and the environment, food production constitutes by far the most important element: people eat animals for food, claim the habitat of wild animals, often to use it to grow foodstuff for farm animals. Food, and especially food of animal origin, is an issue that transcends mere individual preferences and touches upon complex social and ecological matters. In the societal debate the acceptability of animal production systems and meat consumption are increasingly being questioned.[2]

Take for example the mainstream definition of sustainability: 'people-planet-profit'. This commonly used 'triple bottom line' dictates that farming practices need to be economically viable, ecologically sound, and socially accepted.[3] Though many objections can be made to this broad definition (for one: there is no 'animal'-leg), it does typify the trade-off situation that is inherent to animal production. Modern practices like industrializing, up-scaling and intensifying for example may contribute to economic viability, but are -especially in the West- heavily criticized due to a supposed negative impact on the environment and animal welfare. The ever remaining question is how the balance between these different interests should be struck. One thing however is clear: the post-materialistic side of human-animal interactions, sometimes labelled sentimental, increasingly influences product evaluation and food choice.[4] In other words: social acceptance (sustainability's 'people'-leg) has become a very real aspect of the validation of animal production.[5]

Researching the ways that social acceptance of meat production and consumption are put into words -or in communication science jargon: are *framed*- in everyday-life is intriguing for several reasons. The topic brings about diverging and dynamic responses, that are made up of factual knowledge as well as more subjective interests and values[6], therewith

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[a] Though I am aware that humans are an animal species as well, for reasons of clarity in this dissertation I will use the term 'animals' as shorthand for 'non-human animals', and in the same line of thought, 'humans' or 'people' where I mean 'human animals'.

touching upon the very core of human decision making. Debate on the issue seems to be increasing with the scale of breeding and slaughter, while animal farming no longer is part of the average consumer's daily life and production and slaughter in general are hidden to the public eye.[7] The theme is known to cause cognitive dissonance, leading to a general sphere of taboo and to the use of coping strategies such as the de-linking of meat from animals or the pointing at other groups as being responsible - but also to lifestyle changes such as turning vegetarian or vegan.[8] And related to sustainability, the construction of (non-) acceptability of farming, slaughter and consumption of animals involves a complexity of factors, including but likely also transcending the earlier mentioned economic viability ('profit') and ecological soundness ('planet').

In short, there may have been a time in which food, also that of animal origin, was just food - to anyone; but at present, the matter of keeping and killing animals for food leaves us with a smorgasbord of ways to frame its acceptability, non-acceptability, and the many shades of grey in between.

The domestic contract(s): constructing (non-)acceptability

To develop a better understanding of and bringing order into this wide variety of ways of framing the issue, a research project was initiated, that resulted in this dissertation.[b] The title-giver of the research is a philosophical concept called 'the domestic contract'. The concept, that can be traced back as far as Lucretius[9], is grounded in the idea that human communities have (at least since the Neolithic age) included various animals, leading to relations of sociability between human beings and animals.[10] Humans and domesticated animals in agrarian systems can in this line of thought be said to constitute a 'mixed community', in which human-animal relations, however hierarchical and non-egalitarian, follow a tacit agreement of domestication.[11] This implicit agreement, defining what is acceptable or unacceptable for people when rearing animals for food, is referred to as the domestic contract.

The idea of a contract describing rules regarding the use of animals has been subject to philosophical critique, on grounds of the inequality of its constituents, the inability of animals to understand and consent to such a contract, and the questionable gain for the animals involved.[12] Indeed, the domestic contract relies on the assumption of communication between people and animals, of shared experience and exchanges between the two parties.[13] Though animals arguably do have a voice[14] and may have once chosen to cohabitate with humans, when taking a closer look it becomes clear that in modern everyday-life the idea of such a contract is much more a social *construct*: in

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[b] As well as several conference presentations and (professional and scientific) articles – see appendix VI: list of publications related to this dissertation.

theory made between man and animal, in practice much more between people. This construction furthermore is not limited to the 'ivory tower' of philosophers: choosing to eat or not to eat meat -for whatever reasons- is an everyday practice, and though not everyone may think deeply, rationally, or even consciously about the topic, talking about it in terms of acceptability correspondingly is a natural practice.

For the purpose of this research, I therefore define the domestic contract as: *"The human everyday construction of (non-)acceptability of keeping and killing animals"*. Following this interpretation, there really is no question whether this domestic contract exists. As Te Velde et al. show in their research in the Netherlands, regarding animals domesticated for food, producers and consumers in general agree that humans have certain obligations towards farm animals, and are able to pronounce the reasons and conditions making farming acceptable or not (whether or not plagued by feelings of ambivalence).[15] However, because the mixed community of humans and animals is not uniform and coherent but layered and fragmented, there is disagreement about the *nature* of these obligations, leading to multiple ways of framing the (non-)acceptability of keeping and killing animals for food.[16]

The complex influence of context

Social acceptability of animal farming is a relatively new research area. Still, quite some research has been initiated in the last few decades, in particular on animal welfare perception. The existing body of knowledge indicates that ideas about the human-animal relation are context dependent in a multi-faceted and complex way.

First of all, there is evidence of varying perceptions of animal husbandry between countries.[17] In Western European countries for example, societal concerns regarding the use of farm animals are a hot topic. Environmental impact of animal farming is increasingly recognised, the European Union has a separate General Directorate for animal welfare and several scientific studies have been performed on issues related to the perception of animal welfare.[18] In the Netherlands, a country with a rich background in (mostly intensive) animal farming, a political party established to represent the voice of animals even occupies two seats in parliament, making it one of the leading countries in Europe in terms of problematizing animal husbandry. Eurocentric ethical concerns and research results however cannot easily be extended to EU membership candidates like Turkey, since geography, production systems, economic/technological development, but also socio-cultural and moral standards vary.[19] Animal husbandry in Turkey consists of traditional small-scale systems, next to an increasing number of large-scale confinement systems.[20] Though Turkey currently strives for a more innovative and competitive rural

economy that complies with the EU's Acquis[c], Turkish legislation controlling the handling of farm animals hardly exists, and scientists addressing reform and sustainability of animal agriculture in Turkey have not yet focused on any aspect of socio-cultural acceptance.[21] However, part of a research that I performed in Turkey in 2004 on animal welfare perception showed broadly ranging views: from being mesmerized with modern farming and slaughter systems and putting big importance on meat eating, to feeling disgust about animal production and consumption.[22]

Research in Western countries indicates that contexts within societies, such as urbanization level, cultural value systems, the kind of production system under scrutiny, group membership like gender or age, and personality traits such as empathy influence the perception of animal farming and consumption.[23] The relationship to and species of animal involved also effects the construction of acceptability: dogs for example are commonly only kept as pets in Europe and are a taboo to eat, while chickens and rabbits are a commonly accepted species for consumption (though the latter is also kept as a pet).[24] Moreover, specific situations that individual people find themselves in, as well as their moods and identities or 'roles' they assume, can affect decisions made and arguments with which the domestic contract is shaped.[25] This is visible as differences in individual behaviours at varying locations and moments in time, and as discrepancies between pronounced intention and behaviour such as in the so called 'citizen-consumer gap': the phenomenon that citizens that express concern and willingness to pay for e.g. animal welfare or environmental impact, in their role of consumers opt for cheap (often unsustainable) meat at the supermarket.[26]

Gaps in current knowledge

Four main gaps can be distinguished in the understanding regarding the construction of the domestic contract within the European sphere. Firstly, though it is clear that there is a connection between external context and aspects of the human-animal-environment relation, research has mainly been performed in Western contexts. At the onset of this research there was no research on the subject in Turkey (besides the pilot I executed myself in 2004), a country that as an important trade partner and candidate to the European Union does belong to the European sphere, but contextually differs from Western European countries such as the Netherlands in many aspects (geography, culture, religion, farming styles, perception of the importance of animal welfare, etc.).[27] Secondly, most studies regarding the perception of animal production and consumption have concentrated on single issues such as profitability or animal welfare; while, when made explicit, social acceptability of animal farming may encompass many more aspects,

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[c] Acquis communautaire: the EU's body of legislation, as expressed in the Treaties, the secondary legislation, and the policies of the Union.

ranging from for example nutritional value, consumer safety and environmental impact, to meat taste, religious views, aesthetics, and cultural and personal habits.[28] Thirdly, though identity-related phenomena such as the citizen-consumer issue, pointing out the importance of context *within* individuals, have been signalled in research[29] and quite some theory on decision making exists, the existing theory does not suffice to explain and understand the nuances of the complex cognitive and interactional processes involved in the contextual construction of (non-)acceptability of animal farming and related issues. And fourthly, though research suggests the existence of an inherent feeling of unease about the treatment of animals and it is obvious that there are many conflicting ideas about the topic[30], there is a lack of insight into the patterns of and reasons for dissonance in the construction of the domestic contract - and the ways people deal with it. It would thus be interesting to dive deeper into the issue, keeping these gaps in mind.

Problem statement and research questions

The domestic contract is not univalent; there are multiple ways to construct various aspects of animal farming in terms of (non-)acceptability, likely related to contextual factors of geographical, cultural and personal nature. Ambivalence regarding the acceptability of animal production systems and meat consumption is increasingly noticed, and the apparent pluralism in determining which arguments should be or are decisive, may give space to the legitimation of different behaviours.[31] In the expanding European sphere, when designing effective policies for sustainable agriculture, it is necessary to distinguish and contextualise similarities and differences in framing regarding the (non-)acceptability of farming, slaughter and consumption of animals[32]. To this end it is instrumental to get a clear picture of the complexity of topics related to and processes underlying the construction of the various domestic contracts.

To develop a better understanding of this complex issue and encourage societal dialogue based on scientific comprehension, the research project 'Disentangling the domestic contract' was developed, leading to this dissertation. Based on a case-driven in-depth interpretive analysis carried out amongst consumers from various backgrounds, the project is centred around the research question:

How can we understand the everyday-life construction of acceptability -or non-acceptability- of keeping and killing animals for food?

From the problem statement and overarching research question the following two main questions (and accompanying areas of exploration) distilled, that guided the research:

1) **What frames are used to construct (non-)acceptability of keeping and killing animals for food in everyday-life and how do these relate to context?**
   (Research focus #1: Framing: content and patterns)

2) **How do people come to complex decisions like the construction of (non-)acceptability of keeping and killing animals for food?**
   (Research focus #2: The decision making process)

1.2 Scope, depth, objectives and relevance of the research

The research's main research question, "How can we understand the everyday-life construction of acceptability -or non-acceptability- of keeping and killing animals for food?", limits and focuses the research in the sense that it regards *only human interpretations of the relation between humans, animals and the environment, that follow from the breeding, slaughtering and consumption of farm animals*. As has become clear in the introduction, this is neither an unimportant issue, in terms of land use and contribution to sustainable living, nor a simple issue, in terms of the variety of narratives, topics and contextual factors involved. To reach sufficiently different contexts and people, yet meet restraints in time and resources, the research took place amongst consumers with different backgrounds and pronounced protein consumption behaviour, in case study areas in two extremes in the European sphere: the Netherlands and Turkey.[d]

The formulation of the two main sub-questions is connected to the pursuit of two interconnected yet different areas of exploration: *1) Framing: content and patterns* and *2) The decision making process*. These research foci, both invaluable to the gaining of in-depth understanding of the construction of the multitude of domestic contracts, formed the scope of the research. The rationale behind them, their development, the depth to which they are examined, and their relation to one another are discussed in the paragraphs below. The section ends with the objectives and relevance of the research project, and a short discussion of possible research that falls beyond the scope of the current study.

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[d] See chapter 3.3 for an extended discussion of the selection of case study areas and respondents.

Research focus #1: Framing: content and patterns

Main question:
What frames are used to construct (non-)acceptability of keeping and killing animals for food in everyday-life and how do these relate to context?

The world consists of a variety of cultures, in which different values and norms are applied by people with different interests, and to different animals.[33] Previous research into various aspects of the human-animal relation shows, that sensitivity to context is of great importance.[34] The first important area of exploration thus regards distinguishing and contextualising similarities and differences in the framing of the domestic contract, in different settings[35]. To this end, I collected constructions of (non)-acceptability from documents, informal talk and fifty in-depth semi-structured interviews, with people from different age groups, gender, and education backgrounds, and with differing pronounced protein consumption behaviour (meat eater; vegetarian; vegan; compromise), in urban and rural areas in the Netherlands and Turkey. I inventoried and categorised (coded) the content of the frames, to get an overview of the topics involved. I looked whether there were qualitative patterns in framing ('common frames') to be found -both between as well as within people. And I looked how these patterns can be explained, related to the (geographical, social-institutional, cultural, and situational) context in which they arise. In this way, I aimed to identify contextually valid knowledge, as well as general patterns at the level of theory.[36]

The formulation of sub-questions -some already existing at the onset of the project, others developed while building the conceptual framework, during data gathering or analysis- functioned as a colander, guiding the depth, direction and design of the research. The questions that distilled that fall under this research focus are:

a) How can existing concepts contribute to researching content and patterns in framing?
b) What frames do people across the case study areas use to construct (non-) acceptability of keeping and killing animals for food in everyday-life?
c) What topics constitute the content of the frames used to construct (non-) acceptability of keeping and killing animals for food?
d) What patterns stand out in the framing of (non-)acceptability of keeping and killing animals for food?
e) How do the acquired insights contribute to a better understanding of the everyday-life construction of domestic contracts?

Research focus #2: The decision making process

> Main question:
> *How do people come to complex decisions like the construction of (non-) acceptability of keeping and killing animals for food?*

Wanting to understand how people construct (non-)acceptability of keeping and killing animals for food, lead to the need to understand how people come to such complex decisions. Understanding the internal and interactive processes underlying complex decisions, I felt could shed important light on both personal and contextual differences in formulation of the domestic contract. For, however context dependent the construction of the domestic contract is, I believe it is not arbitrary. This second research focus, initially intended to consist only of a literature review to help understand internal factors to patterns in framing, turned into an extensive theory building endeavour, grounded in the research data generated for research focus #1. Literature research on decision making processes, interpretations of empirical observations, as well as introspection, resulted in a detailed model of complex decision making in interaction, dubbed the 'inner decision committee model'.

The sub-questions I formulated that fall under research focus #2: the decision making process are:

a) How can existing concepts contribute to researching the complex process of decision making that underlies the construction of (non-)acceptability of keeping and killing animals for food?
b) How can the process of deciding on everyday-life constructions of (non-)acceptability of keeping and killing animals for food be conceptualised?
c) How do the acquired insights contribute to a better understanding of the everyday-life construction of domestic contracts?

Interrelatedness of the research foci

Though pulled apart for analytical and methodological purposes, the two research foci that form the main threads in the dissertation and ensure its focus and scope, are in reality nested in one another. The research starts and ends with the interpretive analysis of frames, breaking the case data down into the topics that constitute the content of the frames in certain situations, and looking where patterns emerge between and within people. The conceptualization of the decision making process, though more clearly based on sensitizing concepts, actually also is an in-depth interpretation of a pattern of strived-for goals that are mentioned in certain situations and pronounced ways of deciding.

Objectives and relevance

The research project 'Disentangling the domestic contract' aims to distinguish and contextualize patterns in how people construct (non-) acceptability of the keeping and killing of animals for food in two European extremes: the Netherlands and Turkey. Intrigued by the differences and similarities in ways of reasoning accompanying this intricate human-animal issue, my objective is twofold:

- *To understand the content of and the process underlying everyday-life frames regarding keeping and killing animals for food in the selected case study areas; and*
- *To create space for thought and talk by developing policy-relevant tools for (self-) analysis and dialogue facilitation.*

To achieve these objectives, I will provide:

1. An account of typical and remarkable frames encountered in the Netherlands and Turkey;
2. A list of topics that are used to construct (non-)acceptability of keeping and killing animals for food in everyday life, which can help understand others, as well as provide insight into our own blind spots;
3. A discussion of the relationship between the encountered patterns and the contexts in which these occurred;
4. A pattern of circles of increasing spatial, temporal and relational inclusivity, that helps explain which parties' interests are being taken into consideration when deciding on (non-)acceptability;
5. An account of two distinct ways of looking at causing death in animals;
6. A pattern of eleven distinct clusters of reasoning and behaviour, that help explain why certain sets of values, knowledge & convictions, consideration of interests and behavioural norms are related;
7. A detailed theory of the decision making process underlying the construction of domestic contracts, that I conceptualize as an inner negotiation process between drives, primed in interaction with (real or imaginary) others and external situational input, that may take place in heuristic, deliberate or intuitive (comprehensive) ways; and
8. Suggestions as to how the findings can contribute to (self-)analysis and dialogue facilitation.

My original contribution to scientific knowledge, besides the generation of contextually valid insights into the construction of (non-)acceptability of keeping and killing animals for food, lies in the development of a theory of complex decision making, based on the example of the contextual construction of domestic contracts. Moreover, I have contributed to refining the existing model of the frame-of-reference and to an increased understanding of dissonance and ways of dealing with the uncomfortable tension associated with it.

Finally, the societal relevance of disentanglement of the various aspects of domestic contracts, lies in the creation of space for thought and talk. The insights and tools developed in the research are particularly relevant for policy-makers, marketers, educators, and NGOs, to analyse the views of different actors in the societal debate, provide grounded recommendations for facilitating cross- and intra-cultural debate, design education methods and initiate awareness raising campaigns.

Beyond the scope of the current research

In order to achieve the research objectives, a balance between scope and depth needed to be struck. The research this dissertation reports on focuses on the analysis of (inter-)subjective human interpretations of the relation between humans, animals and the environment, that follow from the breeding, slaughtering and consumption of farm animals, by analysing oral and written ways of constructing the domestic contract in everyday-life by consumers in the Netherlands and Turkey.

Falling outside of the scope of the current research are thus first of all other aspects of the human-animal relation, such as pet keeping, zoo keeping, animal testing, interaction with wildlife, etc., as well as value systems beyond the human-animal relation[37], unless they are relevant to the domestic contract. The effects that certain ways of farming, slaughter and meat consumption have on human health, the animals involved, or the environment, is a topic various life scientists are studying[38], and may be part of the arguments brought forth; however, the empirical validation of the objective truthfulness or even the rational logic of the statements with which the domestic contract is constructed has not been part of the current research. In a similar line of thought, the human interpretation of the animal perspective forms an important part of the research, but engaging in interpreting the world from the eyes of animals as a researcher[39] has not been part of my current endeavour.

Within the oral ways of human communication researched, tone of voice, silence, facial expressions and body language have been part of the interpretation in as far as to discern seriousness, irony or sarcasm. However, they have not been researched separately (as could have be done, e.g. with the help of Noldus observer[40] software). The research

consists of a detailed framing analysis, up to the level of topics (see chapter 5 and appendix III), but the research has not been carried out as a classical discourse analysis in the sense that the meaning of all silences, punctuation marks and detailed choice of words are analysed, as this would have compromised the breadth of the researched contexts, and I felt it would distract from discerning policy-relevant patterns. Though initially planned, quantitative confirmations of contextual influences have not been carried out within the timeframe of this study, because the interpretation of patterns in framing and the in-depth conceptualisation of the decision making process presented itself as more urgent and, I believe, more relevant. And, though they would provide an even better grasp of exact contextual influence and priming and would be great for further research, neither have experiments that can be thought out to research mindsets and the behaviour people actually perform in certain contexts.

Generalizability of encountered patterns in framing beyond the researched case study contexts is probable to a certain extent, though details are likely to differ (especially in areas with very different food cultures like South-East Asia). And, though the decision making process has been thought out in great detail throughout this project, an inquiry into whether this kind of decision making can be generalized outside of the matter of constructing the domestic contract has also not been part of this study. Lastly, though several tools for (self-) analysis, dialogue facilitation and awareness raising have been developed during the course of this project, their extensive testing and further development remains material for future projects.

1.3 Dissertation structure

The chapters in this dissertation provide an analysis of the different ways people construct their everyday-life domestic contracts as well as the complex decision making processes underlying this construct. Both raw narratives and mapping and modelling of patterns are used to create space for thought and talk about the intricate issue of farming animals for food. Figure 1.1 (on the next page) provides an overview of the order and content of its chapters.

In the previous sections of this chapter, **chapter 1**, I have introduced the concept of the domestic contract, the questions I set out to answer with my research, and what I intend to contribute by answering these questions. **Chapter 2**, the theoretical framework, reports of a journey into existing scientific theory and sets out the research project's 'sensitizing concepts', as well as a combination of these into adaptations and generation of theory. In **chapter 3**, the research design (case-driven interpretive analysis of framing dynamics) is set forth, encompassing the corpus of data, methods used for data collection and analysis,

and a reflection on methodological matters. **Chapter 4** provides an emic account of typical and remarkable narratives, reflecting the raw data that I used for the etic analysis in the ensuing chapters. In **chapter 5** the collected data is broken down into framing elements (down to the level of topics), patterns in relation with demographic contextual are analysed and discussed, and eleven clusters of reasoning and behaviour are distinguished. In **chapter 6** the decision making process underlying the construction of the domestic contract is conceptualised, leading to the 'inner decision committee model'. Concludingly, in **chapter 7** I synthesise the research findings, propose ways to apply the lessons learnt from the research project in practice, and reflect on the research project.

Figure 1.1: The representation of the research foci in the dissertation's remaining chapters

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CHAPTER 2

Conceptual framework: making theoretical sense of the construction of domestic contracts

"It is well known that people don't always 'speak their minds',
and it is suspected that people don't always 'know their minds'."

--Excerpt from Harvard's Project Implicit®[1]

Framing is not neutral - people do not merely describe reality but do things with their communicative behaviour in order to achieve certain goals. However, as the excerpt from Harvard's Project Implicit® above exemplifies, what is being expressed in the open often only is a part of the full and complex inner dialogue, and this inner dialogue and the cognitions used in it may not even always be within a person's consciousness. Though the exact practices themselves remain implicit and subject to interpretation, researching and conceptualising them can help unveil some of these inner processes. In this chapter I report of my journey into scientific thought and literature, making theoretical sense of the construction of domestic contracts through a series of sensitizing concepts. Moreover, a start is made with theory generation.

2 - Conceptual framework: making theoretical sense of the construction of domestic contracts

2.1 Introduction

The research into the domestic contract that this manuscript reports of, consists of empirical in-depth interpretive analysis and theory advancement. This chosen path of research is action-oriented, grounded in the acquisition and interpretation of primarily qualitative research data, and makes use of existing theory in the form of *sensitizing concepts*.[1] The late American sociologist Blumer explicates sensitizing concepts by contrasting them with definitive concepts, stating that *"whereas definitive concepts provide prescriptions of what to see, sensitizing concepts merely suggest directions along which to look, giving the user a general sense of reference and guidance in approaching empirical instances."*[2] Sensitizing concepts thus are interpretative devices whose specific interpretation depends on where the data leads us and whose main purpose is to allow the research findings to be described in a shared language.[3]

Chapter 3 describes and discusses the chosen research design and the methods I applied. In the current chapter, I introduce and discuss the sensitizing concepts that helped shape the research design, the interpretation of the research data, and the generation of new theory concerning the construction of domestic contracts. The sections in this chapter follow the logic of the research foci: bringing forth sensitizing concepts to help understand respectively content and patterns in framing, and the process of the decision making leading up to these frames.

Theory building

Though I did not necessarily set out to improve or refine any sensitizing concepts, several theories and models were influenced by the research in turn. Besides simply reporting the sensitizing concepts that formed the starting point of the research, parts of the current chapter are a result of combining and generating theory, grounded[4] in the case data. So, this theory building process was by no means a linear one, but explicitly an iterative process of going from existing concepts to the data and back to the concepts, leading to the development of thickened and novel conceptualisations.[5] For practical reasons, in this dissertation I do present them in a more linear fashion: I already present several combinations of existing theories and ideas into refined or new interpretations in this theoretical chapter (i.e. the thickened frame-of-reference, and the basic idea of the inner decision committee model). However, where theoretical concepts are more grounded in

and better explained with help of the research data, they are set out in detail in later chapters.

2.2 Framing: content and patterns

Addresses the question:

- ***How can existing concepts contribute to researching content and patterns in framing?***

Sensitizing concepts

The sensitizing point of departure of the study into the domestic contract is that human beings are 'story-telling animals'.[6] A story, or narrative, is an ancient method and perhaps our most fundamental form for making sense of experiences.[7] Stories tie experiences, views and interpretations together, and are said to *"have sequence, logic, flow and direction, representing a coherent version of the emerging reality"*.[8] However, as Luhmann eloquently puts it, this process of creating meaning can also be regarded *"a powerful form of coping with complexity under the unavoidable condition of enforced selectivity"*.[9] People rely on the use of communication to regulate their perceptions and behaviours[10] and (consciously or not) in interaction choose specific descriptions of reality out of innumerable possible descriptions, in order to accomplish various goals.[11] Narratives thus are subject to strategic[a] selection from moment to moment, are dynamic and context-dependent, and may as a result be incoherent over time. A key sensitizing concept in this research, related to stories and narratives but more acknowledging of this dynamic, strategic and selective nature of communication, therefore is the *framing* metaphor.

Framing in interaction: including and transcending the idea of cognitive building blocks

In literature, quite divergent definitions of framing can be found, whether explicit or inferred by usage. Besides viewing framing as semiotic behaviour ('message framing' or 'meaning construction'), the term has been used to mean the cognitive schemas of interpretation, mental filters or 'mindsets' through which we perceive reality and that guide our action, the process of fitting new information into one's mindsets ('sense-making'), or combinations of these.[12] I have chosen to use framing to refer to the communicative behaviour that is the result of these inner filters and processes *as well as* the interaction with others. This view includes but also transcends the idea that the

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[a] Historically, the term 'strategy' meant a consciously deliberated long-term plan; however, over time 'strategy' has grown to become jargon for any directional process, whether or not they involve rational choice. (Hendrickson, J. R. (1980). The Ecological Strategies of Sea Turtles. *American Zoologist*, 20(3), 597–608.)

narratives brought forward in conversations (including those about keeping and killing animals for food) are representations of some more or less stable cognitive building block-like structure: though what is said relies on what is cognitively available, frames are dynamic and flexible *presentations* aimed at pursuing specific goals in a specific context, making use of cognitions, that iteratively *get added to and continuously change* while we communicate with (real or imaginary) other subjects and physical context.[13] Framing in this research thus is defined as the dynamic way people selectively and strategically use (or hide) available cognitions to narratively present a situation or action in interaction - or as Aarts and Van Woerkum captured it in more detail: *"frames are constructed and legitimated in interaction by combining and integrating cognitive building blocks referring to previous experiences, expectations and objectives concerning the issue at stake (content), the actors involved (relations) and the process that takes place (process)"*.[14]

Cognitions, drives and goals

To understand what gets framed in interaction, it is useful to know something about the inner representations of framing elements, *cognitions*, and about what *drives* urge us to select and bring forward a certain frame making use of these cognitions.

Coming from the Latin *cognoscere* (= to know), cognitions refer to pieces of information, that are kept somehow in our minds and help us to 'know' things - and eventually frame them.[15] These cognitions consist of the distinct though interrelated categories of *thoughts* and *feelings*. I define thoughts as the linguistic conceptualisations of our experiences, beliefs and opinions. Feelings -that are non-linguistic in nature- I outline as encompassing physical sensations (images, smells, sounds, tastes and tactile input, leading to a sense of the outside world as well as one's inner world), states (moods and other temporary but relatively sustained felt modes of being, such as cheerful, depressed, or hungry) and emotions (positive or negative associations with experiences or thoughts, such as fear, anger, disgust, sadness and joy).[16] I furthermore see thoughts and feelings as co-arising (i.e. they do not necessarily follow one another in a set order), and while thoughts are a prerequisite for verbal framing (communicating cognitions through language), non-conceptualised feelings can still show up in communicative action, e.g. as facial expressions, gestures, or tone of voice.

In addition to thoughts and feelings, our inner experience includes *drives*: impulses activating us to behave in a certain way.[17] Drives both influence and are influenced by feelings and thoughts, but are different in nature: whereas the earlier mentioned definition of cognitions outlines thoughts and feelings as pieces of information that help us to know things (including sensing and conceptualising what our drives are in a certain moment!), I conceptualise drives as the motivating *forces* that are caused by the tension between what is and what is needed.[18] These forces possess a certain charge or strength -

depending on the size of the gap and the urgency of the need- and a direction -aimed at the goal of relaxing or even releasing the tension. Drives are not goals, but are described *in terms of* their goals (as in: the drive to connect, the drive to survive, the drive to stay healthy, and the drive to satisfy one's taste buds).[19] The goals people have accordingly can be defined as whatever inner drives -consciously or implicitly- motivate us to strive for.

Priming and context

Various research shows that, at a given moment, only a *selection* of the total collection of cognitions related to an issue at stake is active, shaping one's perception of the issue in that moment.[20] And, in a similar manner, only a selection of inner drives -and accompanying goals- is focal in a given moment, shaping one's reaction to the issue (in which multiple simultaneously primed drives are the rule rather than the exception).[21] This process of activation of cognitions and drives is called *triggering* or *priming*.[22] A related distinction made in literature is that between cold and hot cognitions: where *cold cognitions* are thoughts that are rational, intellectual and considered without associated affect or motivational tension, *hot cognitions* are cognitions that are charged in terms of affect and motive, that are active and alive for a person in a certain moment.[23] Following this idea, people are more driven to act on hot cognitions.[24]

In my interpretation (see figure 2.1), the choice to use a certain frame then depends on an on-going dynamic exchange between 1) our active inner cognitions and drives that determine how we selectively perceive and deal with what is going on, 2) the external situational context that further primes and adds to existing cognitions and tensions resulting in drives, and 3) our actions -intended and unintended, habitual and incidental- with which we in turn influence the external context as well as inner drives and cognitions. *Framing*, the observable (para-)linguistic behaviour accompanying our decisions in conversations, consequently is a manifestation of the interplay between active cognitions and drives, the external context, and performed actions.[25]

Figure 2.1: Representation of the interplay between active drives and cognitions (internal), the interaction context, and actions (external)

Contextual information can be viewed as information from physical surroundings (ranging from geographical and other demographic factors to situational settings) that trigger and therewith 'cause' a certain behaviour - such as bringing forth a certain frame. However, in my interpretation, context includes not only the *objective* physical, behavioural and social-institutional structures that are present, but also the *subjective* cultural and individual reality of human norms, customs and ideologies (also called the 'noosphere').[26] This subjective contextual information includes our interpretations of what actually present others in our surroundings say and do, but also cultural ethical or aesthetical values that we may adhere to or object to, and what we remember or anticipate others to say or do, as well as what we imagine others to think and feel.

Following from this, the theoretical separation between what I refer to as (objective and subjective) *external situational context* from what could be deemed the *internal situational context* of interpretation through activated cognitions and drives, is rather fluid (hence the dotted box in figure 1). The reason I do make the distinction between external and internal context, is for analytical purposes: though we possess an extent of individual personal agency and are not merely 'blank slates' that are the product of our surroundings[27], we certainly do get 'nudged'[28] in the interaction with our (physical and cultural) environment. We think, feel and act differently in different situations, triggered by the external context of our surroundings as well as the internal context of active drives and cognitions. Additionally, as the link between actions back to the beginning of the figure indicates: context -external and internal- is not only a possible *cause* of a certain action, but also the *result* of it. In short: we are constantly shaped by and shaping reality.

Selective framing and the blind spot

Though the conceptualisation of cognitions, drives and (external and internal) context helps understand framing, this does not mean that a certain constructed frame -for example about the (non-)acceptability of keeping and killing animals for food- is an exact representation of the actual active inner drives and cognitions in that situation. People may, first of all, in interaction strategically choose to emphasize or cover up certain elements in their narrative presentation.[29] But moreover, to prevent our mind from getting overloaded or to not get confronted with unpleasant memories, a substantial share of cognitions and drives is known to stay implicit: remaining outside of our consciousness, even when they are primed.[30]

In psychoanalytical terms, the location of cognitions and drives that that have either never been conscious or have been blocked into the subconscious after a traumatic experience, is often referred to as 'the shadow'.[31] This part of the psyche is thought to only be able to be brought to light with the help of external mirroring, for example in therapeutic sessions (though it is not at all certain whether the entirety of hidden thoughts, feeling and urges

can unambiguously be brought to the surface).[32] Wanting to refrain from passing judgement on the positivity or negativity of cognitions that are difficult to become conscious of, I choose the more neutral term *blind spot*.[33] Though actively influencing decision making, drives and cognitions in the blind spot cannot introspectively be known by the actor, meaning that though his/her frames and other actions may *reflect* these hidden drives, feelings and thoughts, they cannot thus not be explicitly referred to in an explanatory frame.

Finding and contextualizing content and patterns: mindset, symbolic convergence and the frame-of-reference

Finding and contextualizing content and patterns in the everyday-life construction of domestic contracts thus starts with collecting and breaking down frames that are used by different persons in different settings. Based on this, we can get an idea of the cognitions and inner drives that are or can be involved, and of the contextual factors influencing the framing process, which in turn will help distinguish patterns in the complex larger narratives brought forward in certain interaction contexts. (A later step is to interpret the decision making process of how drives, cognitions and contextual factors interact leading up to the different constructions of the domestic contract. The theory behind this will be the focus of section 2.3: sensitizing concepts regarding the decision making process)

There are several, partially overlapping, concepts relevant to distinguishing patterns in framing and the underlying cognitions and drives regarding a certain issue. First of all, a concept helpful to understand the *dynamics* of framing is the *mindset*[34], with which I refer to the combination of primed cognitions and activated drives -whether within consciousness or in the blind spot- at a given moment in time. The mindset, the internal context or 'state of mind' that 'sets' our interpretations and intentions for action (strength, direction), is induced by priming and thus flexible. Mindsets explain why people are capable of multiple views and behaviours, and adapt them or shift between them, sometimes in a matter of seconds.[35]

To get more insight into the *contextuality* of and *interrelation* between frames, the *symbolic convergence theory* is of use.[36] Symbolic convergence refers to similarities that occur in communicative behaviour, for example in certain groups of people or contexts. People use language to construct stories to give meaning to the world around them, and by sharing of interpretations in groups of people, a structure is created and language and stories may converge into a shared story. Thus a set of socially shared narratives for a group, or 'common frames', can differentiate.[37] This is not to say that these stories are rigid or that they are all exactly the same - common frames can be distinguished based on family resemblances: connections based on similarities in for example the use of topics in the categories of the frame-of-reference, certain (his)stories, or lines of reasoning.[38]

An important existing tool to distinguish the content of and patterns in framing is the model of the *frame-of-reference*.[39] The term refers to the cognitive filter through which we interpret situations, or in other words: the cognitions within consciousness that we use and 'refer to' when we frame something. The main idea of this concept is that people's perceptions of a certain issue are the result of a (largely unconscious and rather fluid) process of tuning of the cognitions that are part of their frame-of-reference, which is reflected in the communicative behaviour displayed.[40] Admittedly, the name 'frame' is confusing with regard to the way I conceptualised framing earlier on. However, the model of the frame-of-reference is of great importance to the researching of patterns in framing, because it offers clear and workable categories of cognitions (traditionally: values, norms, interests, knowledge and convictions[41]; see the ensuing 'Theory building' paragraph for a discussion and adaptation of these to suit the current research). The frame-of-reference offers a means to organize content of framing behaviour in a meaningful way. Applying the frame-of-reference in natural conversation analysis reveals that part of the mindset that is within consciousness and strategically selected to be brought forward. In more active and in-depth ways of researching, the categories of the frame-of-reference can be used as a checklist when probing for all cognitions that are within consciousness (also initially not primed ones). Additionally, when data from conversations with multiple persons are combined, an overview of framing elements related to a specific issue (here: the domestic contract) can be composed[42], which can provide insight into cognitions that could possibly be in individual persons' blind spots.

Ambivalence, dissonance and coping strategies

An important concept to explore, with regards to content and patterns in framing as well as the decision making process (which is further explored in the next section), is ambivalence. In complex cases like constructing acceptability of keeping and killing of animals for food, chances are high that contradictory cognitions and drives get simultaneously primed. This can happen for example when a craving for meat conflicts with a personal feeling of empathy towards animals. It can also happen when confronted with frames and other behaviour of persons that are considered significant (for example when someone who enjoys eating meat and cheese gets a strictly vegan girlfriend - or the other way around for that matter). The state of having simultaneously activated contradictory cognitions and drives, and being unsure about which to favour with regards to one's behaviour, is called *ambivalence*.[43]

According to the Cognitive Dissonance theory, ambivalence causes a *psychological tension*. When this tension is big or discordant -one could say: when the inner conflict is experienced as *dissonance*[b]-, feelings of uncertainty, discomfort, and even anxiety come up that are so uncomfortable that it drives people to somehow try and reduce it, in order to feel better.[44] The larger and discordant the discrepancy between contradictory cognitions, drives and actions, and the more urgent the need to avoid psychological discomfort is, the stronger the drive to reduce dissonance becomes. The drive to reduce the uncomfortable feeling related to dissonance may lead to a *change in behaviour* - both in framing as well as other actions; relevant to understanding the content of and patterns in framing of the domestic contract, is that the drive to reduce dissonance may lead to the use of (more or less conscious and intentional) communication strategies, known as *coping strategies*.[45]

In literature commonly four coping strategies used to *reduce* dissonance are distinguished:[46]

- Adding consonants to behaviour: selectively applying cognitions to represent one's decision as a positive one;
- Eliminating dissonance: bringing forward cognitions that decrease or eliminate the negativity of the decision;
- Amplifying consonants: making the drives and cognitions that support the made decision seem important; and/or
- Trivializing dissonance: making the drives and cognitions that oppose the decision seem unimportant.

To *oppress* dissonant cognitions or drives and/or *avoid* their priming altogether, another type of coping strategies are distinguished. These are commonly called *distancing devices*[47], which encompass:

- Detachment: creating an emotional distance between the self and subjects that trigger dissonance;
- Misrepresentation: depicting or imagining the situation being different than it is;
- Shifting responsibilities: revoking agency and blaming others for the situation;
- Concealment: hiding (negative sides of) a situation to avoid confrontation all in all.

Another term used for these coping strategies is *strategic ignorance*.[48]

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[b] Literature about ambivalence and dissonance is not clear about how these two concepts differ from and relate to one another; they are very similar concepts and sometimes used interchangeably. For the sake of analysis I chose to make a distinction between them, that relates to music theory: where one could say one is ambivalent about hearing a C together with either and E or a G, when one hears a D with a C it is no longer just ambivalent, but also dissonant. And dissonant tones are experienced as uncomfortable (at least: to many ears).

A less commonly acknowledged, creative way to deal with dissonance is to *admit*, *accept* and even *embrace* antagonistic or conflicting forces, seeking to balance and optimize ambiguous situations *instead of seeking to dissolve them*.[49]

In list form, these *non-oppressive*[c] coping styles could look like this:

- Admitting dissonance: acknowledging that there is discomfort, instead of trying to cover it up; and
- Embracing dissonance: feeling good by virtue of the non-oppressive acceptance of any cognitions or drives.

In short, coping strategies are communicative instruments used to feel better by fine-tuning (deemed uncomfortable) discrepancies between cognitions, drives and actions.[50] Their occurrence indicates that people try to deal with the psychological tension caused by dissonant positive and negative aspects of the situation at hand, a deviating presumed other norm that is considered significant, or an overwhelm caused by the presence of a lot of information.[51] I will elaborate more on this mechanism as well as on encountered coping strategies in chapters 5 and 6. As a sensitizing concept however, it is useful to state that there are individual differences between people, with regards to for example the level of discomfort regarding the tension between opposing cognitions and drives a person can handle, and also the amount of opposing cognitions a person can consciously entertain (in case of overload, coping -especially via distancing devices- is a useful strategy). Furthermore, not everyone uses coping strategies consistently: people are constantly experimenting with them, seeing 'what works best', both in interaction with others as well as within themselves.[52]

Theory building: organizing cognitive content of framing based on the model of the frame-of-reference

The model of the frame-of-reference is a proven tool to probe for the cognitions that constitute the content of framing regarding a certain issue (in as far as they are within consciousness), as well as to distinguish patterns in framing based on these cognitions. A common way to organise the elements of the frame-of-reference regarding a certain issue, is to distinguish between:

- Values: opinions about what is intrinsically important;
- Norms: translation of values into rules of conduct;
- Interests: including material (economic) as well as immaterial (social, moral) interests;
- Knowledge: constructed out of experiences, facts, stories, and impressions; and
- Convictions: opinions about 'the way things are', assumptions that are taken for granted. [53]

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[c] The only drive being oppressed here is the initial urge to reduce the uncomfortable feeling related to dissonance.

According to the model of the frame-of-reference, the interplay between these cognitive elements determine people's perceptions and framing of a certain issue. However, when interconnecting the sensitizing concepts on framing and cognitions above and attempting to code pilot interviews for the current research, I found I needed to fine-tune this list of categories.

First of all, the original grouping of the categories of cognitions belonging to the frame-of-reference in my view is limited, because it seems to reduce cognitions to thoughts only. Though often omitted from cognitive models, feelings are known to play a determining role in framing.[54] Because feelings are intertwined with linguistic thought (feelings can emerge after entertaining a particular thought, and similarly we sometimes conceptualise or rationalise earlier felt emotions, states or physical sensations), they could be argued to already be in the model, being two sides of the same coin. However, people in conversations -and especially regarding a topic like animal farming- specifically *refer* to feelings, in addition to referring to their thoughts regarding values, norms, interests, knowledge and convictions. I thus opted to add *feelings* as a separate category to the model.

In a similar line of thought, because people consistently refer to behaviours in conversations while this was not yet accounted for in the model, I added the category *behaviours*. The common vision in literature is that cognitions and framed willingness to act predict behaviour - at least partially.[55] A less common vision is that it can also be behaviour that determines our thoughts and feelings, resulting in frames being verbal rationalizations of our (often unconscious) drives and behaviours.[56] In my view they co-arise, in a similar fashion that individual and social values and norms do.[57]

I chose to collapse the originally separate categories *knowledge* and *convictions* into one category, due to the undefinable grey area between fact and opinion.[58] Because in framing they both concern expressions of *thoughts about 'the way things are'* (or what Ford calls *second order reality*[59]), knowledge and convictions share a much higher degree of resemblance and overlap than the other categories. Especially in topics regarding farming, slaughter and consumption of animals, it is fairly difficult to differentiate between conviction and 'true' knowledge (even much scientific knowledge is conflicting, as outcomes depend on context and perspectives).[60] Within the scope of the current research, it therefore made more sense to combine them into one category.

Besides these category adaptations, to contribute to more clarity and less chance of overlap, I refined the names and definitions of the existing categories. In this study, when searching for patterns in framing, I accordingly distinguish between:

- **Behaviours**: what 'is' done: pronounced personal past and present actions, including habits and exceptions;
- **Values**: rational concerns: conceptualisations about what and whom is considered important and to what extent;
- **Norms**: what is brought forward that should be done: ideal rules of conduct imposed on the self - and possibly others;
- **Feelings**: affective concerns: physical sensations, states, and emotions (while framing often accompanied by gestures and facial expressions);
- **Interests:** recognised stakes and goals that inner drives motivate us to strive for, both material (physical, economic) as well as immaterial (social, moral, aesthetical); and
- **Knowledge & convictions**: opinions about the way things are, about (self-) efficacy and the effects certain situations will have, associations and assumptions about what is true; including the perceived behaviours, values, norms, feelings, interests, and knowledge & convictions of others.

The elements of the frame-of-reference are a means to organize framing elements in a meaningful way. While all categorisation is artificial and ambiguous, and the discerned elements obviously relate to and mutually influence one another, I argue that these adaptations and extensions to the model of the frame-of-reference provide a more complete and nuanced insight into the cognitions used to frame an issue such as the domestic contract, than the original categories would.

Chapter 5.1 provides an application of these categories, to organise the cognitive ingredients of the domestic contract.

2.3 The decision making process

Addresses the question:
- ***How can existing concepts contribute to researching the complex process of decision making that underlies the construction of (non-)acceptability of keeping and killing animals for food?***

Sensitizing concepts

According to the sensitizing concepts so far, framing is how people strategically select and apply certain narrative elements in order to reach a goal in interaction, as the result of a - largely unconscious- process of tuning of activated inner drives, activated cognitions and the interaction context. This chosen delineation of framing reflects an integration of so called *cognitive* approaches (emphasizing that frames are representations of cognitions stored in memory) and *interactional* approaches (focusing on the dynamic enactment of

frames in on-going interaction).[61] Frame construction in this view is, however context dependent and dynamic, *not arbitrary*: leading up to the personal and contextual differences in framing is a complex, often subconscious, but sensible process of meaning making and deciding.

The dynamics of decision making of course largely take place inside the 'black box' of the mind: as researchers we can only empirically observe input and output –the process itself remains implicit and up to interpretation. Furthermore, the mind cannot be seen separately from its environment, that it is both shaped by and shaping. And, due to the blind spot (see section 2.2), the mindset(s) involved in decision making processes cannot fully be brought into consciousness. Nevertheless, conceptualising (and later interpreting) the process of how inner drives, cognitions and context interact, will contribute to a better understanding of how the domestic contract is constructed.

Consciousness, awareness and rationality

In literature on decision making, much attention is paid to the difference between *conscious* and *non-conscious* processing, or as popular scientist Kahneman calls them: *slow* and *fast* thinking.[62] Tempting as it may be to always assume conscious, meticulous, deliberate reasoning (which is slow), the decision making leading up to our actions is largely automatic (fast) - which can be both useful as well as disadvantageous.[63] Non-conscious decision making may be indicative of repressed thoughts, feelings and drives, which has a negative ring to it[64], and fast thinking may result in our choices not being rationally optimal.[65] The term non-conscious furthermore does not only refer to drives and cognitions in the blind spot: even thoughts and feelings that can be brought into consciousness (i.e. that are part of the frame-of-reference), often are processed outside of the focus of consciousness. However, non-conscious processing is also a part of how we function.[66] Automatic processing prevents overload in a life of overwhelming information, interactions and decisions, and thus also is something to be appreciated.[67] Following Simon's *bounded rationality*, (partially) non-conscious decision making even is unavoidable, because the mind's ability to process information rationally and deal with possible degrees of indeterminacy involved within the time available to make decisions, is limited.[68] Nonetheless, there still can be *awareness* of the existence of non-conscious processes, i.e. one can know that they occur (e.g. after reading this, or by observing an unpredicted urge or behaviour in oneself). I thus conceptualise consciousness and awareness as being different in nature: conscious processing cannot happen without awareness, but -though it is not always there- there can be awareness of non-conscious processing.

An additional distinction arises here between *rational* decisions (i.e. based purely on fact and reasoned thought that is logically coherent) as opposed to *irrational* decisions (i.e.

also based on logically incoherent thoughts, feelings and drives). This is connected to the idea of conscious and non-conscious processing in as far as that rational decisions (for example when following a drafted pro and con list strictly not involving feelings) can only be made consciously. However, the distinction between rational and irrational differs from that between conscious and non-conscious, because in most cases conscious decision making is not solely rational: it almost always also involves conscious processing of irrational thoughts, and feelings. And, in addition, conscious decision making may be unwittingly influenced by drives and cognitions in the blind spot, that -though being very useful in many aspects- may not comply with the rules of rational logic.

Recapping, there are two kinds of non-conscious processing: that by active drives and cognitions that can be brought into consciousness, but that are *'out of focus'* to save time and energy; and that by primed cognitions and drives in the blind spot, that cannot be brought into consciousness (at least not without external mirroring). And, though they are not in conscious reach, people can be *aware* that non-conscious processing exists.

Modes of decision making, drive-control and the place of intuition

To conceptualise different routes -or *modes*- of decision making, several theoretical models have been developed. Widely held are the *dual mode* models (e.g. by Kahneman[69], Petty and Cacioppo[70], Eagly and Chaiken[71], Strack and Deutsch[72], and Usher et al.[73]), stressing the dichotomy of what is called slow, central, analytical, reflective or conscious vs. fast, peripheral, automatic, impulsive or heuristic routes of decision making - whether or not with a sliding scale or a mention of these processes being able to occur simultaneously. However, doing more justice to the complexity of decision making in my opinion are *multiple mode* models, depicting decision making as a modular practice possessing different qualities related to different goals and levels of consciousness or complexity (e.g. Plato's Tripartite Soul[74], Freud's Id, Ego and Super-Ego[75], MacLean's Triune brain[76], Wilber's Integral Psychology[77], and Barrett's Modes of Decision Making[78]).

I appreciate the elegance of the commonly used dual mode frameworks, enhancing insight through distinguishing two subsystems of processing: within and outside of our (momentary or absolute) consciousness. However, I feel that in these frameworks, heuristic and intuitive processes are often painted with the same brush of unconscious automaticity whereas in my opinion they are distinct. *Heuristic processes* in my view are either impulsive (instinctive) or conditioned (learned, habitual) automatic reactions to a situation, that lack awareness or reasoned thought, and are based on drives and cognitions that are either in the blind spot or otherwise non-conscious.[79] These therewith indeed differ from *deliberate ways of processing* that involve systematic analysis with focused awareness on conscious drives and cognitions and require *drive-control* (oppressing certain inner drives to actively change one's actions to fit the deliberate

thought process) - and resultantly are highly energy consuming.[80] However, I argue that heuristic processing is also quite distinct from *intuitive processing*, that, though for a large part happening non-consciously, in contrast happens with awareness of cognitions and drives participating both within and outside of consciousness, and makes use of both. Intuitive processing, requiring the proverbial 'counting to ten', 'sleeping on it', or 'meditating on it', acknowledges heuristic tendencies as well as conscious processes, and approaches decision making through the wisdom of experience and intuition, that expresses itself an 'inner knowing'.[81] The phenomenon that such intuitive processing leads to more optimal decisions, especially in complex cases, has been described by Dijksterhuis as the *unconscious thought effect*.[82] And Usher et al., though applying a dual mode framework (affective/intuition vs. analytic/deliberation) in theory, in their experiments and discussion actually also make a similar threefold -instead of twofold- distinction, which they call immediate, rational and intuitive decision making.[83]

Putting these sensitizing lines of thought in other words:

- Where heuristic processing is either *pre-conscious* (never was conscious: instinctive, impulsive) or *post-conscious* (once conscious but not anymore: habitual, routinely), lacks awareness, but is fast (immediate), and therefore energy-efficient;
- Deliberate processing is *conscious*, in awareness of all active thoughts and feelings that are not in the blind spot, higher of quality but slow and energy consuming;
- Intuitive processing in my view is best conceptualised as *comprehensive*: inclusive of all drives and cognitions, also those that reside in the blind spot or that would be oppressed by drive-control otherwise, in complex cases known to lead to decisions of even higher quality, and though requiring a period of pause to invite all cognitions and drives -within as well as outside of consciousness- to fully participate (which can be quite short: a matter of seconds or minutes, as well as longer: e.g. 'sleeping on it' for a night or 'letting it simmer' for some days or even weeks) is relatively fast in terms of the time actually spent on pondering the decision.[84]

The conceptualisations above furthermore mean that, though valuing the existence of all of these processes, I presuppose a potential for development of the capacity to invite complexity and deal with our thoughts, feelings, and actions in a more present and attentive manner.[85]

The mind as a complex dynamical system

The processing of the mind during decision making, like many natural processes, is complex and changeable. It can therefore, as has been done in literature on the brain and personality, be compared to a *complex adaptive system* or *non-linear dynamical system* - both terms from the field of systems theory. Complex adaptive systems can be defined as complex systems whose connected components have the ability to adapt and 'learn' from

previous experiences.[86] A dynamical system is defined as a set of elements that undergoes constant change over time by virtue of interactions among the elements.[87] In linear versions, a change in one element is directly proportional to a change in another element, and the complexity of such a system's behaviours is a direct reflection of the number of interacting elements and the complexity of their added mutual influences. The relations between variables in non-linear systems however, are non-proportionally contingent, depending on sometimes the slightest variations in a complex, continuously changing interaction context. The behaviours of such systems thus are not exactly predictable; however, this doesn't mean that what happens is arbitrary: in complex non-linear dynamical system situations order emerges in the form of patterns of self-organisation.[88]

Decision processes as inner negotiation dialogues

Besides describing how a given pattern persists under various environmental conditions (its stability) and how it adjusts to changing internal or external conditions (its adaptability), an important part of a system's conceptualisation furthermore is to describe the connections among its elements and the changes in the system's behaviour that these connections promote.[89] Ways to distinguish emerging patterns in framing (the result of complex dynamical patterns in the mind) have already been discussed in the paragraph on symbolic convergence, the frame-of-reference and the mindset of sensitizing concepts #1. A conceptualisation that has inspired my research of the decision making process underlying domestic contracts is the idea of decision processes as *negotiation dialogues*.

The idea of negotiation dialogues is described among others in Jungian analyst Joseph Wheelwright's archetypal committee metaphor (in Bolen 1984:266) and theatre director Augusto Boal's Rainbow of Desire method.[90] Both refer to inner forces, possessing unique characteristics and goals, that are present in us and interact -within us as well as with the social and physical context-, driving the complex dynamics of our psyche and the decision making process. A similar representation of inner dialogical decision making, is brought forward by Dutch psychologist Hermans in the Dialogical Self Theory.[91] Building on Bakhtin's dialogism[92], Hermans poses that there is a *"dynamic multiplicity of voiced positions in the landscape of the mind, intertwined as this mind is with the minds of other people"*.[93] The idea of decision processes as internal negotiation dialogues, shaped by and shaping the external reality, furthermore holds similarities to Blumer's idea of symbolic interactionism, stating that there is not just 'input' (external context) and 'output' (action/language), but also an internal step of interpretation (the activation and negotiation of inner drives and cognitions), modifying the meaning that people ascribe to a situation or issue.[94]

As proposed in sensitizing concepts #1, the *mindset* is the flexible internal state of situationally primed drives and cognitions, shaping one's reaction to the issue (in which

multiple simultaneously primed drives are the rule rather than the exception). So, it is the priming of a certain mindset (further influenced by the possible oppression of drives and cognitions through drive-control[95]) that determines which drives and cognitions are part of an inner negotiation and which are not. Further building on these ideas of mindsets, inner negotiation dialogues and modes of decision making, one could conceptualise *drives* as the inner forces that generate decision making processes, that combine *cognitions* in the resulting inner negotiation to achieve the specific *goals* with which they are defined.[96] The goals and cognitions that are focal then determine the outcome of the dialogue in terms of framing content, as well as the way this negotiation is held (through heuristic, deliberate, or intuitive processing).

Identity

A concept that is furthermore relevant in this respect is *identity*. Coming from Latin 'identitas', meaning 'sameness', identity roughly has two conceptual delineations: it can both refer to the internal sense(s) one has of oneself (as a differentiated individual or as a member of a particular social category or group), as well as the outward bound image(s) that one tries to portray of oneself in interaction with others.[97] The view of identity as self-concepts that one identifies with and that serve as guides for action, bears resemblance to Jung's idea of *archetypes* (models of people or roles -including accompanying ideas and behaviours- within us) or the *i-positions* that Hermans refers to in the Dialogical Self Theory.[98] Whether these inner roles are somehow universally present in all of us (as Jung believed), whether they arise as the result of self-organization, or are actively constructed, I conceptualise them as dynamic *compounds* of drives and related cognitions, that when triggered become part of the mindset. The conceptualisation of identity as the image we construct and represent *to others* -known as an *identity frame* in framing literature-, bears more resemblance to Jung's concept of the *persona*, the 'mask' we represent to other people.[99] While such identity frames are relatively easily observable *output*, inner self-concepts belong to the *mindset*, and are less easily accessible.

However, both conceptualisations of identity are important to explain decision making, and add to the conceptualising of the decision process as negotiation dialogues between activated drives and cognitions. For where cognitions are 'what people think and feel' and drives determine 'what they pursue'; identities are specific combinations of drives and cognitions that touch upon *'who they are'* (internally) and/or *'who they pretend to be'* (outward bound). When triggered, the drives and cognitions associated with such existing or ambitioned identities not only instantly become part of the mindset, but, depending on how strongly one identifies with a certain identity, the related goals and cognitions are considered of more importance than other triggered ones (in earlier used terms: identities are *hot* - i.e. charged with affect and motive).[100] Protecting an identity is a goal in itself - and one that (depending on the strength of the identity) seems to be assigned extra a

priori weight to. For example, a situation of contradictory drives or cognitions such as a moral conviction to care for animals and a craving for meat (as discussed in the paragraph on ambivalence and dissonance in section 2.2) leads to more pressing internal dissonance and a stronger drive to reduce it when one or more active identities are threatened, e.g. when one *identifies* as being a vegetarian or animal lover (examples of other identities relevant to the domestic contract are 'tough guy', 'carnivore', 'good host', 'Burgundian lover of food', as well as 'consumer' and 'citizen').[101]

Further exploring the notion of identity and identification -whether internal or as an element of outward framing- it becomes clear that, though implying boundaries and a certain coherence, identities are *fluid*. Identification can vary between being coherent to the point of rigidity, or -at the other end of the spectrum- being incoherent to the point of being chameleon-like, changing from moment to moment and from situation to situation.[102] Though one can identify with a single drive, more commonly identities are made up of a compound of drives, cognitions and behaviours that have been internalised and are being portrayed as belonging to the self (and existing next to other possibly triggered drives and ideas). Moreover, though a person can have one single distinct identity, more often there are several overlapping and changing identities that an individual simultaneously or intermittently can draw upon as self-concept or that is represented to others (cf. 'hats' that are worn or the even more dynamic and unstable 'paintings that are made over former layers of painting').[103] Finally, the conceptualisation of identity as (sub-)mindsets that one identifies with, implies that identity is a narrower conception than the mindset itself, that can also encompass drives and cognitions that are not part of any self-concept or image one tries to show of oneself - in other words: not all primed drives are part of an identity.

Theory building: the inner decision committee model

Summarizing, the (not always conscious, but nevertheless active) decision to bring forth a certain frame, depends on external contextual cues (including already made decisions to act), on the existing repertoire of cognitions, on the cognitions that are primed or added in the interaction, on the priming of and negotiation amongst inner drives - that they may or may not identify with-, and on the level of consciousness during processing. The triggering of drives, their directions (goals) and relative strength, and the cognitions that are available to use, determine how we perceive a situation and how we decide to react to it.

To increase insight into this dynamic process of individual decision making and frame construction in interaction with the social and physical context, I combined the discussed sensitizing concepts regarding framing and decision making to form a model (see figure 2.2).

Figure 2.2: Schematic representation of the inner decision committee model

External situational information
(physical/objective & cultural/subjective)

Internal collection of cognitions
(thoughts & feelings)

Mindset

Inner decision committee
(members are inner drives, urging us to achieve a certain goal and using cognitions to accomplish that goal)

Intuitive processing
(all committee members -also in the blind spot- are invited to participate; well-chaired; relatively fast)

Deliberate processing
(the committee members within conscious awareness actively participate; slow)

Heuristic processing
(based on instinct or routine; committee member(s) most powerful in a certain context; unconscious; immediate)

Decision
(action incl. framing)

The model supposes a metaphorical inner decision committee, consisting of interacting inner drives (the *committee members*) that each strategically combine cognitions in order to accomplish a certain member-specific goal in interaction. Based on a collection of existing cognitions, (objective and subjective) contextual input and past decisions, the activated part of the committee negotiates and decides, leading to an action and an accompanying frame. Ideally this decision is made on the most comprehensive side of the processing mode continuum, letting all committee members - conscious and non-conscious- have their say to come to a decision in a fair and high quality way (*intuitive* decision making) - or at least all committee members within conscious awareness (*deliberate* decision making). The process can also be -and often is- more on the *heuristic* side of the continuum, saving energy either by routinely following a once more or less consciously made decision or the pre-conscious 'winning' of the most powerful (coalition of) committee member(s) in the context at hand.

Besides being based on sensitizing concepts, the inner decision committee model developed grounded in the research data. Therefore, I will set forth its details in chapter 6 (section 6.2), which will include:

- The characteristics of the committee members (including the two special positions of inner chairperson and joker);
- Their triggering, interaction and relative strength in decision making processes (depending greatly on habits and identification with one or more of them); and
- The resulting different modes of decision making.

Supported with examples from the research, chapter 6 aims to conceptualise the decision making process underlying the construction of the domestic contract and therewith contribute to a better understanding of why individual people make different decisions in changing contexts.

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CHAPTER 3

Design of the research

"Let it be your constant method to look into the design of people's actions, and see what they would be at, as often as it is practicable; and to make this custom the more significant, practice it first upon yourself."

--Marcus Aurelius

To arrive at sound interpretations in any study, a solid and transparent research design is of great importance. This chapter provides the details of the approach of the research into the domestic contract, including an account of the choices I made with regard to methodology, the analytical process, and the applied methods of data collection, processing, and requesting of feedback. In the final section, I compare the research's case-driven interpretive approach against a range of criteria that are used to assess scientific quality.

3 - Design of the research

3.1 Positioning the research and its approach

In any research, the problem statement and research questions, the research objectives, and the methodology and methods are inextricably linked: *what* is researched and *why* links to the conceptualization of *what can be known* and *how it can be researched*, depends on the *toolbox of data and methods* available to the researcher, which in turn relates back to the *sort of questions asked* and the *strived-for objectives*. Developing these has been an iterative cyclical process, converging into the final research design. In this chapter, I will elaborate on the adhered-to design: a case-driven approach, applying an interpretive analysis of framing dynamics, aimed at identifying contextually valid knowledge as well as general patterns on the level of theory. As I will explain in this chapter, the research developed in an open and systematic manner, following a stepwise dual-looped analytical process in which sensitizing concepts were continuously connected with and adapted to the collected research data, resulting in a converging of insights, made visible in this report.

Case-driven approach

The research that this dissertation reports on is designed to collect and understand the various ways in which people construct (non-)acceptability of keeping and killing animals for food - in short: the construction of the domestic contract.[1] Leading to the problem statement of the research is the observation that there are multiple ways to frame various aspects of animal farming and consumption in terms of (non-)acceptability, likely related to contextual features of geographical, cultural and personal nature. This apparent pluralism in determining which arguments should be or are decisive when deciding on the acceptability of animal production systems and meat consumption, may give space to the legitimation of different behaviours[2], as well as to increasing dissonance about what counts as acceptable and what not.[3] In the expanding European sphere, when designing effective policies for sustainable agriculture, it is necessary to distinguish and contextualise patterns in the construction of the domestic contract.[4] To understand the complexity of topics and processes involved and create 'space for thought and talk' about the issue of farming animals for food, the research project 'Disentangling the domestic contract' was developed, set in the Netherlands and Turkey.

Recapping, the research' overarching question and the two main questions that formed the focus of the project are:

How can we understand the everyday-life construction of acceptability -or non-acceptability- of keeping and killing animals for food?

1) **What frames are used to construct (non-)acceptability of keeping and killing animals for food in everyday-life and how do these relate to context?**

2) **How do people come to complex decisions like the construction of (non-) acceptability of keeping and killing animals for food?**

The formulation of these questions is connected to the pursuit of two interconnected areas of exploration, that combined help understand the contextual construction of domestic contracts: *1) framing: content, context and patterns* and *2) the decision making process*. These research foci are linked to and driven by the research's objectives of improving the understanding of the content of and the processes underlying everyday-life frames regarding keeping and killing animals for food, and developing policy-relevant tools that can be used for (self-)analysis and dialogue facilitation. A conceptual framework of sensitizing concepts was developed to make theoretical sense of the contextual construction of the domestic contract and provide tentative directions for the analysis.

The research strategy therewith first and foremost adheres to a case study approach: the case of the everyday-life construction of (non-)acceptability of keeping and killing animals for food, with case study areas in the Netherlands and Turkey. Rather than being driven by set-in-stone theories to use, quantifiable research questions or hypotheses to test, the study into the domestic contract thus is *case-driven*: driven by the desire to explore and better understand the puzzle that the problem statement offers. A case study, with its in-depth and context-sensitive approach, is especially suited to search for patterns in the relation with specific contexts and to gain insight into how and why certain instances happen as they do.[5] As explained in the theoretical framework, existing theoretical concepts in the research are used in a sensitizing manner: as interpretive devices that provide a shared language and suggest directions along which to look, while at the same time allowing the case itself and the collected data to lead on the quest to understand the problem that is posed.[6]

Answering the research questions in a case study benefits most from exploring the case at hand from multiple angles, by combining different theories, methodological perspectives, methods and sources of information.[7] This *triangulation* -a term coming from navigation, where different bearings taken together give a more accurate position of an object-, adds depth to a case study and ensures a broad approach, allowing the complexity and variation in perceptions to be captured.[8] In chapter 2, I set forth the choices I made with

regard to theory: selecting and combining sensitizing concepts from diverging fields of study into a theoretical framework that I think will best help answer the research questions at hand. This chapter, the research design, deals with the choices I made with regard to methodological perspectives, modes of analysis, information sources, and methods for data selection and collection.

The chosen approach thus first and foremost is guided by curiosity about the case, as reflected in the problem statement and the formulation of open-ended research questions. Loss of details is avoided by exploring the issue at stake broadly (including the 'backstage' and 'side streets') and keeping the case 'open' as long as possible, allowing patterns to emerge from the case data as well as from categorization on the basis of sensitizing theory.[9] A main result of a case-driven approach is that the questions and the conceptual framework are not pre-set but rather develop iteratively during the course of the research process -within the boundaries set by the case-, depending on what arises, what surprises, and what is expected to yield useful insights.

The interpretive paradigm

The research design is influenced by several methodological assumptions. A key starting point of the study is that the construction of the domestic contract is complex, contingent and context-dependent, but not arbitrary.[10] This means that I approach the case from the assumption that all aspects of the domestic contract and its larger context mutually influence and shape one another, and that causes and effects are inextricably intertwined.[11] The study thus is not aimed at finding linear cause-effect relationships, because these cannot explain what is happening in complex situations.[12] Instead, the case study is aimed at interpreting the frames that others construct and distinguishing patterns therein. These patterns are then related to the (cf. chapter 2: external and internal) context in which they occur. This provides practical contextually valid knowledge, as well as general theoretical insights into why these patterns occur in the ways they do.

The methodological umbrella of the research therewith is the *interpretive paradigm*. An interpretive approach aims to understand how particular human beings in particular times and locales make sense of their worlds[13] - in this case: the (non-)acceptability of keeping and killing animals for food in everyday-life by consumers in contemporary Netherlands and Turkey. In addition to empirical-positivists[a] studying *(inter-)objective, exteriorly tangible facts, in experimental settings*, interpretivist researchers study *(inter-)subjective*

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[a] The word 'empirical' here is meant in its pure sense, referring to what can be observed with the five senses (as opposed to what can be known only through communication and interpretation), and the word 'positivistic' in Comte's sense of the search for generally applicable, context-free laws.

experiences and patterns therein, by interpreting communicative behaviour, in the context in which they are (co-)constructed.

Though I acknowledge that physical realities exist and that they influence reactions to a given situation, in this research the ontological and epistemological presuppositions of interpretivism apply.[14] According to the interpretive paradigm, frames of (physical as well as social) realities are (inter-)subjectively constructed inside and between the heads of people, set in larger systems of meaning.[15] As Rudolph and Rudolph put it: *"An 'understanding' (verstehende) interpretation of human events reaches to relationships and regularities but not to necessity; that is, it is governed by meaning, not by laws."*[16] Following from this, there is not one absolute objective 'truth', but instead *multiple and dynamic subjective realities, adapted, negotiated and translated in interaction*. This holds for people in everyday-life, communicating and making meaning based on interpretations in interaction, and in an added manner for researchers interpreting this interaction and translating it into scientific reporting (what in literature is called the 'double hermeneutic'[17] or even 'third hermeneutic' - including the interpretive turn of the scientific audience[18]). In practice as well as in research, (inter-)subjective realities can only be known through *interpretation of communicative behaviour*, which means that they can only be determined and represented *by approximation*. The quality of interpretative research depends amongst others on the interaction between the research subject and the researcher, the researcher's previous knowledge, the systematics of the research design, the quality of the selected sensitizing concepts, on having a critical research attitude, and whether interpretations are subjected to structural feedback (see also the section 'Securing scientific quality' later on in this chapter).

Methodological sub-perspectives

The quadratic model in figure 3.1, developed by Wilber[19], depicts the interiorly oriented interpretive sciences (left-hand side) as differing from as well as adding to the exteriorly oriented empirical-positivistic sciences (right-hand side). Both paradigms employ different methodologies to study phenomena on individual (upper quadrants) and collective (lower quadrants) levels, and in addition, all four are possible from an observer's outside perspective as well as an empathic inside perspective (arrows), resulting in a total of eight methodological zones.[20]

Figure 3.1: Methodological perspectives according to Wilber

Within the choice for an interpretive paradigm (left-hand side of the figure), the resulting four interpretive methodological zones are phenomenology (individual, inside perspective), structuralism (individual, outside perspective), hermeneutics (collective, inside perspective) and cultural anthropology or ethnomethodology (collective, outside perspective). In the case of studying the construction of the domestic contract -an interpretive analysis of individual framing dynamics, aimed at both identifying contextually valid knowledge as well as general patterns on the level of theory- I applied a combination of all four interpretive methodological perspectives and accompanying methods.

The main focus of my research is on understanding how individual people contextually construct their personal everyday-life domestic contracts and why. This positions the research predominantly in the zone of phenomenology: interpreting individual persons' frames of whether or not it is acceptable to keep and kill animals for food in certain situations, and -if present- the ambivalence they experience, and trying to empathically understand their personal underlying motivations and their personal decision making processes. The phenomenological methodological zone comes with several in-depth methods, that all involve taking an inside perspective of individual subjective experiences (thoughts, emotions, motivations, their sense of identity) and trying to represent these as accurately as possible. However, as in my view framing is never separate from context and always happens in interaction with (real or imaginary) others, my research is also importantly informed by hermeneutics, involving methods focused at interpreting inter-

subjective meaning, understanding and values. Next to this, the research is importantly aimed at finding patterns - both within and between the individuals studied. To distinguish reoccurring structures in (inter-)subjective experiences, the methodology was influenced by structuralist and cultural anthropological approaches. This more general pattern-finding involved taking an outside methodological perspective to individual and inter-individual subjectivity, using analytical methods to look at the constructed frames from a distance in order to see what structural similarities and differences emerge, and capturing these through the development of models and theory.

Unit of observation and unit of analysis

As already became clear in chapter 2, I base myself on the general notion that all communication is strategic: language is not neutral, people do not merely describe reality but -implicitly or explicitly- *do* things with their communicative behaviour in order to achieve certain goals.[21] Framing, a theoretical concept that beautifully reflects the strategic nature of communication and has been used in many different ways, in this research is defined as the dynamic way people selectively and strategically use (or hide) available cognitions to narratively present a situation or action in interaction. Framing thus is a form of action, which comes about inside and between the heads of people.[22] The not always conscious, but nevertheless strategic[b] decision to bring forth a certain frame in this research is conceptualized in a model that uses a metaphoric inner decision committee to describe the process of goal-oriented decision making in interaction (see figure 3.2).

Figure 3.2: The inner decision committee model

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
[b] As John R. Hendrickson (1980) has beautifully pointed out, the term 'strategy' has become jargon for directional processes, whether or not they involve rational choice.

Following the model, deciding on a certain frame or other action depends on the negotiation among inner drives (committee members) and the cognitions they employ to reach their goals. Which committee members and cognitions play an active role in framing, depends on whether they are primed in the interaction. Priming can occur internally, as a reaction on other activated goals and cognitions, can be triggered by already made decisions to act, as well as by the external (physical and cultural) environment that can even add new cognitions to be used in the decision process leading up to the action/frame. And, as the figure shows, the committee decides following a mode of processing (negotiating) ranging from heuristic to deliberate to intuitive.

Useful as this conceptualisation may be, the only aspects of this process that a researcher can empirically *observe* in other people, are the frames (and other actions) that are uttered in interaction by different people in different contexts: the *unit of observation* in this research accordingly is *the frames with which the domestic contract is constructed in interaction with (real or imaginary) others*.[c] Though the strategic communication used by different people in different contexts is under scrutiny, the variation in contexts and research subjects is intended to serve comparison in terms of facilitating increased understanding of the contextual construction of each unique frame.[23] The main *unit of analysis* in the case study is the *everyday construction of (non-)acceptability of keeping and killing animals for food* - with foci traveling from uncovering content of and patters in framing and conceptualizing the complex decision making process leading up to these frames.

3.2 Stepwise iterative analysis of framing dynamics

The methodological approach of this research, as elaborated upon in the previous section, is a *case-driven interpretive analysis of framing dynamics*, consisting of both taking an empathic inside perspective leading to representation of individual research subjects' contextual constructions of the (non-)acceptability of keeping and killing animals for food, as well as of taking an observer's outside perspective leading to the distinguishing of recurring patterns (both within and between individuals) at the level of theory. In this section, I will elaborate on the methods of analysis that accompanied this approach. As depicted in figure 3.3 (on the next page) and further explained in the ensuing paragraphs, analysis involved a combination of *two iterative stepwise cyclical processes*, leading to a converging of insights guided by the collected research data, in association with the sensitizing concepts and the researcher - as is characteristic for interpretive research.[24]

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[c] And in many cases, with me as a researcher.

Figure 3.3: Systematic iterative interpretive analysis of framing dynamics: two mutually informing loops

Loop I. Empathically understanding individual constructions of the domestic contract

The first analytical loop (the left segment of the figure eight) is aimed at empathically understanding the way people in different contexts construct (non-)acceptability of keeping and killing animals for food. This cycle consists of four methodical elements that were repeated again and again, each time building on results from the previous stage, until there was enough understanding of the way people construct their specific domestic contracts to be able to describe (and report) them in a manner that resonated with the various constructors' experiences.

A) I *asked questions* during in-depth semi-structured conversations with a variety of individual respondents (from different contexts in the Netherlands and Turkey - as explained in the next section: 'Sources, selection and collection of case data'). The questions asked aimed to uncover the content of their frames, understanding the relation of these frames to certain contexts, and understanding how they arrive at their decisions. The structure of these conversations was specifically designed to encourage respondents to grow curious and self-analytical instead of defensive (as explained in more detail in the next section of this chapter). I followed an interview method called *laddering*, which entailed asking why-questions, allowing people to elaborate on their previous answers (content and process) until no deeper clarifying answer could be given.[25] Furthermore, I used the (adapted) model of the frame of

reference[26] (see chapter 2) to formulate questions that covered the complete range of cognitions that may play a role in the construction of the domestic contract, without putting the exact topics or arguments in people's mouths. Finally, I tried to increase my comprehension of the influence of identity and context by making use of hypothetical situations ('some people are picky about their food, others are not, where would you put yourself on this line?' or 'how would your behaviour change if you survived a plane crash and were stranded on an island with limited food?').

B) It was explicitly part of my method to *empathically listen* to my conversation partners. According to Scharmer, this type of listening goes beyond attending to what you already know (downloading), as well as beyond recognizing new facts (factual listening); empathic listening means to see a situation through the eyes of another.[27] This also requires having an attitude of interest and curiosity as a researcher and allowing conversation partners to elaborate fully on a topic without interruption. This phase in the loop ideally then continued to the third step of interpretation, but - as the double-ended arrows indicate - to arrive there sometimes it was necessary to first go back to asking clarifying questions and listen again.

C) *Interpreting the content and process of framing* entailed making sense of what my conversation partners explained, from my empathic point of view as a researcher. This step beyond listening, meant trying to capture the respondents' specific individual realities regarding keeping and killing animals for food and the (non-)acceptability of it in terms of content, as well as trying to understand how they come to their construction - the individual decision making process. This is the step where the interpretive style of analysis -going back and forth between the data itself, sensitizing concepts and my previous ideas as a researcher[28]- is most obvious: cf. the conceptualizing of the decision making process in figure 3.2, any sense-making process happens on basis of existing ideas and guiding concepts that I have as a researcher, that are added upon by interacting with external contextual input, including frames that my conversation partners construct in our interaction. It is important to realise that interpreting always leads to a representation of reality that is *approximate* because of inevitable changes of meaning - that are more or less subtle depending on the person interpreting. Thus, further following figure 3.2, it was important in my role as a researcher to keep an open mind and practice trans-conscious processing, actively allowing a continuous dialogue between data, theory, and myself as a researcher. This way, rather than relying on heuristics, or trying to rationally fit everything that is heard into previously conceived theories, the actual framing dynamics (the interactional data) were put first, leading to interpretations that more accurately approach the respondents' experiences.

D) To further ensure that my internal interpretations indeed are credible approximations of others' domestic contracts, *checking interpretation with experience* formed a crucial step in the loop. To this end, I summarized my interpretation of my conversation partners' arguments and asked for feedback to see if the interpretation resonated with their personal experience regarding the topic. Depending on this feedback regarding my interpretations, the loop kept on iterating in a spiral-like manner, arriving at increasingly precise, in-depth and contextualized interpretations until the final stage of reporting took place (this manuscript).

Loop II. Finding recurring patterns in the construction of the domestic contract

The second analytical loop of the research (the right segment of the figure eight), illustrates the process of distinguishing recurring patterns in the construction of the domestic contract, and reporting them. Just like the first loop, loop II also consists of four methodical elements that iteratively build on results from the previous stage (including the results from loop I). However, in this cycle of analysis, rather than empathically interpreting (inter-)subjective frames formed in interaction to reach understanding, the data was approached from an outside interpretive view, aimed at finding structural similarities, differences and other patterns in how people construct (non-) acceptability of keeping and killing animals for food.

A) In order to find recurring patterns in the construction of the domestic contract I *collected descriptive metadata*. Descriptive metadata is information about more than just the framing content of different people: it also encompasses information about the construction process of the different frames, the characteristics of the people constructing them, and the context they occur in, making it possible to distinguish patterns and possible relations between these aspects.[29] The planned in-depth semi-structured conversations (recorded and transcribed) were specifically designed to provide this type of data. In addition, I collected documents (newspaper articles, campaign and commercial texts, fora conversations, social media posts, and artwork) and made notes of (held or overheard) unplanned conversations related to the subject. By comparison of similar phenomena within this metadata collection, I could generate interpretations that go beyond the specificity of individual domestic contracts.[30]

B) The next step involved *observing and organizing the thus collected data*, in order to start grasping what it had to tell me. This step resembles Scharmer's listening[31] as described in loop I, in the sense that the data is approached with an attitude of curiosity and openness to what it has to say, beyond attending to what is already known or expected. Practically, this step entailed my repeatedly going through the metadata and coding frames and processes, guided by categories from the sensitizing

concepts (such as the model of the frame of reference - see chapter 2), but first and foremost based on categories that emerged from the data itself. I used Computer Aided Qualitative Data Analysis Software: initially Atlas.ti, but in the course of the project, I transferred to a Microsoft Excel database file for increased overview, with respondents in the rows, context and categories in the columns, and content and processes (i.e. quotes and summaries of frames) in the fields. In addition to the (colour-code aided) overview that the Excel database offered, I used XMind mind-mapping software to be able to organize codes and findings in a way I could easily move around (in a similar way that you can move around post-its stuck on a white board).

C)   Following this continuous organizing and re-organizing of the metadata is the step of *distinguishing patterns and developing theory*. Visually aided by the abovementioned Computer Aided Qualitative Data Analysis Software, I found that several patterns started to emerge: similarities and differences standing out in the content and the dynamic interactive process of framing, both within and between individuals, often related to characteristics of the people constructing them, their ideas and behaviour, and the external context they are constructed in.[d] In this step, I interpreted the metadata by developing contextually valid models, and, in many cases, arriving at more general theoretical insights into why these patterns occur the way they do. This pattern finding and theory development involved a practice that is called 'abductive reasoning' - a term first introduced by the pragmatist philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce to refer to the process of forming explanatory hypotheses, a type of reasoning he saw as distinct from both deduction and induction.[32] Yanow describes abductive reasoning as an implicit interpretive process taking place within the black box of the mind, entailing reading and rereading and reading again, categorizing, organizing and 'musing' until, in the light of prior knowledge of the theoretical literature, the empirical data, or both, something makes sense in a new way.[33] In practice, this step already started by gathering and analysing the metadata, informed by my previous knowledge and guided by sensitizing concepts (such as cognitions, drives, external and internal context, the mindset, frame-of-reference and symbolic convergence from chapter 2). It continued to finding patterns emerging from the interaction between the metadata, theory and myself as researcher[34], and describing these in terms of models and theoretical insights - both adapted and new (i.e. the thickened frame-of-reference in chapter 2, the clusters of reasoning in chapter 5 and the

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[d] See the paragraph about internal and external context in chapter 2. In natural sciences, context is considered everything external to what we consider the variables we research. In interpretive science, these variables are not pre-set and thus any part of the progressive context can be used to explain why a certain pattern might stand out.

detailed inner decision committee model in chapter 6). Again, these theory building processes were not linear, but explicitly an iterative process of going from concepts to the data and back to the concepts. The found patterns and theories in this step are based on interpretations of subjective experience, so they unavoidably are approximate representations of an always more nuanced reality. However, as George Box famously states[35]: *"all models are wrong, but some are useful"* – and it is arguably more likely to arrive at more accurate approximations and more useful models, when the approach of the case is open and trans-conscious, allowing patterns to arise from continuous interaction between metadata, ideas of the researcher, and theory (see also 'Securing scientific quality' later on in this chapter).

D)   To improve the accuracy of my interpretations in this loop, I *checked newly found patterns and theory for congruence with the raw data and collected feedback*. First of all, I contrasted any distinguished patterns and developed theories against the metadata, to see to which extent they would hold in similar researched instances. In addition, I checked whether the patterns I distinguished resonated with others by asking for feedback from peers (through presentations at conferences and seminars, in focused discussions, and via scientific and professional articles that I published), as well as by returning to 20 of the original 50 respondents, asking whether they could see themselves in the models and insights that were the result of this loop of interpretation. Again, depending on this feedback on my interpretations, the loop kept on iterating in a spiral-like manner, arriving at increasingly insightful interpretations until finally reporting in this manuscript.

From analytic process to scientific reporting

The visualisation of the analytical process (figure 3.3) and the description of the steps above, illustrates the systematics of the research into the domestic contract. Initiated by step I.A, the analytical process in general followed an iterative converging cycle *I.A-B-C-D* until understanding and reporting on various contextually constructed domestic contracts, and a similar iterative converging cycle *II.A-B-C-D* until final reporting on reoccurring patterns. As indicated by the two-way arrows within the loops, the analysis involved a moving back and forth between steps when necessary. Moreover, the analysis importantly iterated between the left and the right loop along the research process: each individual conversation adding to the conceptualisations of patterns, and, reversely, each conceptualisation of a pattern informing the interpretation of individual frames. The loops thus are only separate in theory, in practice they inform one another. Though arguably an ongoing process[36], the analytical process culminates in *reporting*: the step in which the results of the interpretive research becomes visible to a scientific audience.

Styles and plots

There are two main styles of reporting within interpretive sciences: *emic* and *etic*.[37] An emic account is a description, written from the perspective of the person or culture being researched, in terms meaningful to that person and context. An etic account on the other hand is a description of the research subjects' behaviours or ways of reasoning written from the perspective of the analysing observer, generally in terms that can be applied trans-culturally, explaining cultural and contextual differences. Although emic and etic reporting differs, corresponding with the empathic inside perspective and the observer's outside perspective illustrated in the two analytical loops, their complementarity is widely recognised.[38] In fact, neither is achievable in pure form, for producing a completely emic account without any interpretation by the researcher is not possible, nor is providing a satisfying etic explanation that does justice to the unique characteristics of research subjects and contexts involved.[39] In this dissertation, both styles can be recognised. Emic representations of domestic contracts are provided in chapter 4 and occasionally in examples throughout the remaining chapters. However, the style of writing in this dissertation is predominantly etic, aiming at offering structural insights into how these different individual domestic contracts come about.

Both loops of analysis involved a continuous going back and forth between theory and research data, with sensitizing concepts informing how to look at the data, and the case data in turn informing and developing theory. Related to this, in the report of this research an interweaving of two plots - a *conceptual plot* and a *case plot*- can be recognised.[40] The case plot[e] tells the story of the case that is researched, in terms of (emic and/or etic) descriptions of people's cognitions and actions situated in time and space, as well as the (etic) description of patterns therein.[41] However, academic reporting is not complete without a conceptual plot, making (etic) theoretical sense of the (patterns in) frames and contexts using existing concepts and/or translating the empirical data into context-elucidating and context-transcending theories and models.[42]

The abovementioned styles and plots were woven together to form the dissertation before you, with two objectives in mind: 1) to present the *findings* of the research in a clear manner, and 2) to provide *space for talk*, furthering the ongoing scientific and societal dialogue in relation to both the content (domestic contracts) as well as the processes (framing and decision making) that were studied.

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[e] This plot, Flyvbjerg's 'plot 1' is commonly also called 'empirical plot', but because I use empirical to refer to 'being observed using the five senses', I will refer to this plot as 'case plot' instead.

The resulting report includes:

- An emic account of typical and remarkable frames within the case (chapter 4): to get a feel for the various ways the (non-)acceptability of keeping and killing animals for food is constructed.
- An overview of the cognitive ingredients of the domestic contract and their relation to context (chapter 5): a first case pattern, based on the model of the frame of reference, including a discussion of links between cognitive elements and contextual features; to help understand others as well as provide insight into topics that are or may be of conscious or unconscious importance to ourselves.
- The description of encountered 'clusters of reasoning' (chapter 5): a case pattern describing that certain behaviours, values and other topics occur in clusters, as well as a conceptualisation that helps explain how they are connected.
- The inner decision committee model (chapter 6): a detailed theory, illustrated with examples from the case, to help understand the decision making process underlying the construction of the domestic contract and explain why different framing choices are made in different contextual settings.
- A synthesis of the research results (chapter 7): recapping the answers to the research questions posed in chapter 1, connecting the results, and discussing how the findings can contribute to (self-)analysis and dialogue facilitation.

My role as researcher in the analytical process

In interpretive research, researchers explicitly don't separate themselves from the world they describe, but acknowledge that they are part of the interpretation process. They do so endangering their credibility according to positivist standards, because in this way they explicitly admit to entering personal bias into the research. However, a researcher's acquaintance with the field or topic they are studying can actually add to the credibility of the research: knowledge about the context of frames, adds to the depth of their understanding.[43] My background as a researcher therefore is an important part of in the analytical process (and inherent to any interpretation).

I have been researching the topic of human-animal-nature relations professionally since 2001, in both the Netherlands and Turkey. As a native Dutchwoman who spent over 6 years in Turkey in the period between 1992 and 2014, I am immersed in both cultures. I furthermore have good command of English, Dutch as well as Turkish. This made me well-equipped to address both the case as well as these two case study areas as an interpretive researcher. My familiarity with the cultures and the languages helped in getting willing participation of respondents from all layers of both populations, and being the only one performing the in-depth conversations (e.g. without help of a translator) ensured a uniformity in approach. As language of analysis I chose English, translating raw data from

Dutch and Turkish to English before further analysis, to minimize (or at least standardize) language effects. Combined with the in-depth approach of inquiry that continued until theoretical saturation, the acquaintance I have with the domain and contexts in this study thus actually increases my ability to arrive at valuable interpretations. Finally, keeping an curious, open and critical reflective attitude during every step, actively searching for things that challenged my worldview and interpretations, and continuously asking for feedback, contributed to interpretations that -though inevitably being approximate due to the limitations of language- are of high scientific quality[44] (see the section 'Securing scientific quality' at the end of this chapter for a more detailed discussion hereof and how the research meets the standards for judging the soundness of interpretive analysis).

3.3 Sources, selection and collection of case data

In a case-driven approach, determining what to treat as part of the case and how to go about researching it is defined in the interplay between theory, the research data, and the researchers' ideas.[45] I have laid out my reasons to explore the case of the everyday-life construction of (non-)acceptability of keeping and killing animals for food in chapter 1. I have explained my choices with regard to the methodological approach and mode of analysis in the previous sections of this chapter. In the discussion of the two analytical loops in the previous section, the sources of data used in each step have already briefly been mentioned. In this section, I will elaborate more in-depth on the case data that form the base of my analysis, on the methods of selecting and collecting that data, as well as provide information about its storage.

Data sources

To understand others' individual constructions of the domestic contract (Loop I of figure 3.3), I performed *planned in-depth conversations*. These conversations were held with a total of 50 selected respondents from varying contexts in the Netherlands (in Dutch) and Turkey (in Turkish). Each of these conversations, all of which were performed on location by myself in 2010, followed the same semi-structure and lasted about 1-2 hours each. All 50 conversations were recorded and transcribed word-for-word in their original languages. Transcripts were used for the analysis in addition to the original raw audio recordings.

To distinguish reoccurring patterns in the construction of the domestic contract within and between individuals (Loop II of figure 3.3), I assembled a database of *descriptive metadata*. This database consisted first and foremost of the *accumulated transcripts* of the 50 in-depth conversations, and was confirmed and added upon by *encountered documents* as well as *notes of unplanned informal conversations*. Encountered documents

refer to several hundreds of newspaper articles, social media posts, fora conversations, and artwork related to the subject of breeding, slaughtering and consumption of farm animals, that I have collected in the Netherlands and Turkey (in Dutch, Turkish and English) between 2004 and 2014. The unplanned informal conversations refer to dozens of conversations on the topic that were overheard, partaken in or initiated, in the Netherlands and Turkey between 2009 and 2014 (in Dutch, Turkish and English), that I kept notes on.

A special additional type of data were *notes of feedback*. To check for the accuracy of the interpretations I made within the planned in-depth conversations, the respondents' frames were summarized by me continuously during the conversation and again at the end of each of the 50 conversations (Step D. of Loop I.). The feedback on these interpretations thus are part of the audio files and transcripts of the conversations. To check whether the patterns I distinguished and theory I developed resonated with others (Step D. of loop II.), I had special feedback sessions. These sessions on patterns and theory were held with fellow scientists (at conferences and seminars, in focused discussions with peers, as well as via scientific and professional articles that I published, over the course of the research), and with 20 of the original 50 respondents (that I returned to for this reason in 2014). Notes of this feedback were added to the metadata.

Selection of case study areas and respondents

Adding to both the understanding of individual narratives as well as to distinguishing patterns between them, is the realization that each respondent has a personal set of cognitions and goals (internal context) and is set in an external context of physical and socio-cultural surroundings, which they influence and are influenced by. The divergence in perceptions and behaviours related to farmed animals in scientific literature has been explained through differences in geography, industrialization and development levels, urban or rural contexts, population group membership (gender; age group; education level), or roles that people assume (e.g. consumer/citizen).[46] A quick inventory of factors that are of known or posiible influence on the construction of (aspects of) the domestic contract (see figure 3.4) shows that their number and expected interaction make their exact individual influence unpredictable. This, combined with the open approach that is characteristic of case-driven research, made it difficult to determine the exact most appropriate theoretical base to use to guide data selection prior to the data collection process.

Figure 3.4: Inventory of factors that are of known or possible influence on (aspects of) the domestic contract - categories used for the target-group oriented theoretical sampling of respondents in bold

Target-group oriented theoretical sampling

To address this problem, I applied a triangulation technique that is typical within case-driven research, called *target-group oriented theoretical sampling*.[47] By selecting data from sources that provide good coverage over the main research areas, yet are picked to differ as much as possible from one another (on a range of measures), I created the best chance of identifying patterns of difference or similarity and thus facilitate the development of theory. I thus did not aim to representatively capture all possible variations or average reactions of groups of people within the European context, but used an accumulation of unique cases[48] to gain a deeper understanding of each of those unique cases as well as of the more general aspects of the construction of acceptability -or non-acceptability- of keeping and killing animals for food.

To allow for an acceptable extent of theoretical sampling, based on previous research on contextual influence, the decision was made to select case study areas and respondents that differed on the following measures: *geographical location (country; urban and rural areas), gender, age group, education level, income level,* and *pronounced protein consumption*:

- To reach sufficiently different contexts and people, yet meet restraints in time and resources, the research first of all took place among consumers in the Netherlands and Turkey. The choice for these two countries was made because, due to variations in both geography and culture, as well as production systems and perception of the importance of animal welfare, they arguably form two extremes within the European context.[49] The Netherlands and Turkey thus were the basic case study areas in which all research data (the 50 planned in-depth conversations as well as additional encountered documents and unplanned conversations) was collected. The category 'consumers' was chosen because this group theoretically does not exclude anyone and to provide a focus on the (non-)acceptability of consuming animals that were farmed and slaughtered for this purpose.
- For the conversations (both planned and unplanned), within each of the two countries, an urban and a rural region was appointed, forming four case study areas: the city centres of the Dutch and Turkish capitals Amsterdam and Istanbul; and the rural area located in the Dutch provinces of Drenthe/Overijssel and in the Turkish provinces of Aydin/Balikesir. These locations provided ample area for research, while still being comparable in terms of the availability of both animal and non-animal protein sources (in contrast to for example Turkish provinces in Middle and Eastern Anatolia, where there not always is a choice).
- Respondents to the planned conversations were further selected on the basis of gender (male; female), age group (15-30; 30-50; 50-70), education level (high; middle; lower; student), and income level (sufficient to buy meat or not). And, because the (non-)acceptability of keeping and killing animals for food is most related to the related behaviour, I tried to specifically find people with differing pronounced protein consumption behaviour (meat eater; vegetarian; vegan; compromise).

The characteristics of the selected respondents for the planned conversations are listed in appendix I.

Selection techniques

The selection technique for finding respondents for the planned in-depth conversations was initially *fortuitous* and moved on to *chain referral* (popularly known as the 'snowball' method).[50] This meant, that in the onset I approached random people in the designated case study areas and asked for their cooperation, and when this didn't render sufficient people fitting a specific group of criteria, I moved on to asking local people to refer me to someone fitting those criteria who would be interested to engage in a conversation with me. Selection of respondents for the planned conversations continued until *theoretical saturation* - that is: until no new information/frames were found in the last 4 to 5 conversations.[51] The initially planned number of conversations was 30 (15 in each country), but, because new data was still emerging, I continued to select people.

Ultimately a total of 50 in-depth interviews were performed, all within the first half of 2010.

Again, this selection technique does not claim to capture all variations within the European context, nor the average reactions of groups of people; it does not allow drawing statistical conclusions about certain groups of people or contexts. However, combined with the in-depth and open manner of inquiry, continuing until theoretical saturation ensures that, within the selected case study areas, I did capture the range of topics and the predominant ways of combining these. Knowledge about the context in which the framing takes place is used to add to the depth of their understanding.

Adding the encountered documents and unplanned conversations helped me check whether I had indeed captured the diversity in domestic contract constructions in the case study areas. The selection technique for the unplanned conversations and the encountered documents was *fortuitous* as well as *information-oriented*.[52] I limited my document database to newspaper articles, social media posts, fora conversations, and artwork related to the subject of breeding, slaughtering and consumption of farm animals, that were posted or published in the Netherlands and Turkey (in Dutch, Turkish and English). Within these criteria, for selection I depended on serendipity, referral by other people, as well as intentional subscriptions to relevant pages from all backgrounds (pro and against keeping and killing animals for food, for various reasons) – all between 2004 and 2014.[f] Eventually, these documents added up to such a large number, that from the start of this research into the domestic contract, I added only documents that contributed new information, were remarkable or typical, to my analysis. The same goes for the unplanned informal conversations: only notes of talks that contributed new information, were remarkable or typical, were added to my analysis.

Design and technique of the planned in-depth conversations

The planned in-depth conversations were specifically designed to uncover the content of the frames that respondents use to construct their domestic contract, to understand the relation of these frames to certain contexts, and understand how they arrive at their decisions. Each of these conversations, all of which were performed on location by myself in 2010 in the native language of the respondent, lasted about 1-2 hours each, and followed the same semi-structure and technique, which I will elaborate on in this paragraph.

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[f] I have been working on the topic of human-animal-nature relations in the Netherlands since 2001, where I started out collecting arguments regarding the keeping and killing of pigs for food. Since I started doing research on animal welfare in Turkey in 2004, I have been collecting documents on the larger topic of all farmed animals in both countries.

Since the subject under scrutiny is known to be rather delicate (anger-, discomfort- or defensiveness-evoking) for some people, at the onset of the conversation the research was introduced as being about *"human-animal relations and food culture"* (rather than the acceptability of keeping and killing animals for food). Trust was gained via ensuring anonymity, pronouncing that the respondent is considered the expert, applying active listening skills that, and encouraging self-analysis.

The conversations started with a visualisation technique, asking respondents to intuitively place magnetic patches containing descriptions of humans and different animals in relation to inanimate objects on the circles of Wenz[53], determining relational distances (see table 3.1 for the list of items and figure 3.5 for an example result). This rapid appraisal method[54] functioned as an ice-breaker, as well as providing valuable insights that formed a trigger for further conversation. The items were selected to include several non-human animals that are conventionally seen as consumption animals, pets and pests, some human beings, as well as some edible and inedible objects.

Table 3.1: Items used in the visualization exercises (in no particular order)

me (placed in the centre of the circles)	staple (placed outside the circles)
my pet (if existent)	someone on the other side of the world
fish	a farmer
cow	dolphin
pig	swan
dog	carrot
frog	flour worm
sheep	tomato
lamb	grasshopper
rabbit	broiler chicken
mosquito	wild chicken
snake	my best friend
laying hen	elephant
horse	cat

Figure 3.5: Circles of relational distance / emotional value: "How close do they feel to you?"

I moved on to ask whether they could move the items from the circles they ate on a daily basis and in exceptional cases, on two lines ranging from 'gladly' to 'rather not' (figure 3.5). Letting my conversation partner analyse him- or herself, with regard to the reasons they have for the distinctions they make, proved effective in getting to the issue, without imposing topics or ambivalent feelings (that sometimes arose, and sometimes not).

Figure 3.6: Lines of items eaten in daily life vs. in exceptional cases

Subsequently, free association listing on the topic 'eating meat' and, later on, on the topic 'production of meat', lead to many themes and arguments related to the domestic contract.

Figure 3.7 (a-b): Free-listing on the topics 'eating meat' and 'production of meat' (a: *"Red; Juicy; Tender; Luxury; Melting on your tongue; Hunt; Action; Company"* b: *"Busy; Meadow; Commerce; Consumption - a lot!"*)

Finally, I tried to increase my comprehension of the influence of identity and context by making use of hypothetical situations ('some people are picky about their food, others are not, where would you put yourself on this line?' or 'how would your behaviour change if you survived a plane crash and were stranded on an island with limited food?'). I then checked for their take on a list of topics, asked whether there have been any critical incidents changing their behaviour, and asked them to describe their ideal situation related to meat production. I ended the conversation with several context measurements.

Throughout the conversations, to get a deeper understanding of motivations and criteria for decision making, I applied the *laddering* method: I let people elaborate on their previous answers by continuously asking why-questions (as well as being silent) until no deeper clarifying reasons were produced.[55] Furthermore, I used the (adapted) model of the frame of reference[56] (see chapter 2), to formulate questions that covered the complete range of cognitions that may play a role in the construction of the domestic contract, without putting the exact topics or arguments in people's mouths.

Examples of these questions are:

- What do you do? How do you do it? Have you always done this? Are there any exceptions? (behaviours)
- What do you consider important? What is the best way to come to a decision? What kind of person do you want to be? Why? (values)
- How would you translate that into practice? What do you think should be done? What would your ideal picture look like? (norms)
- How does it feel physically? What state or mood are you in? What emotions come up? (feelings - paying attention to facial expressions)
- What do you want? What do you really need? What are your goals? What do you want to avoid? (interests)
- What do you know? What effect do things have? What is stopping you? Who can you trust? (knowledge and convictions)

The exact topic list (translated into English) can be found in appendix II.

Storage and processing of data

The planned semi-structured in-depth conversations were recorded and transcribed, and photos were taken of the positioning of items on the circles and lines as well as the written down free associations. Both recordings and transcriptions were stored digitally. Gathered documents online were stored digitally and in print documents in a paper folder. Of the unplanned conversations, in as far as information came up that differed from the information gathered in the in-depth interviews (which was hardly ever the case), field notes were made and stored in print. Access to the raw material (interview transcripts, field notes and collected documents) is available on request.

As described earlier, the planned in-depth conversations were initially processed and coded using Atlas.ti, and then put in an Excel database, combined with Xmind mind maps, for increased overview. The data from the collected documents and unplanned conversations were always added to the analysis when they contained new or remarkable information. In addition, they were used when they represented typical ways of constructing the domestic contract. Though the raw data naturally is stored in the original language, the common language for processing, analysis and reporting was English.

Chapter 4 provides an overview of the range of frames (both typical and remarkable) that the raw data encompasses.

3.4 Securing scientific quality

The realisation that the frames that are under scrutiny in this research are (inter-) subjective, relative and only knowable through interpretation by approximation, and the realisation that any resulting models and theories were developed on basis of subjective interpretations of patterns in this (inter-) subjective experience and thus unavoidably also are approximate representations of reality, raises questions regarding to how scientific quality is secured. Interpretations depend on perspectives, meaning that they can never have objective truth value. However, they can be more or less truth*ful*[57]: for example the conclusion that Hamlet is a story about a butcher is not a truthful interpretation of Shakespeare's book.[58] Because the ontological and epistemological presuppositions of interpretive science differ from those of traditional positivist-empirical sciences, the standards for judging the soundness of interpretive research differ as well.[59] Instead of traditional criteria such as objectivity, truth, reliability and falsification, standards that are widely recognised and applied for judging interpretive research are sociologist Goudsblom's[60] *precision*, *systematics*, *scope* and *relevance*, and Lincoln and Guba's[61] related *dependability*, *confirmability*, *credibility* and *transferability*. To argue for the trustworthiness and scientific merit of the research I performed, in this section I will discuss these (related and partly overlapping) criteria and explain how and to what extent they are met.

Precision and systematics (dependability, confirmability, credibility)

According to Goudsblom[62], two criteria with which one can secure the quality of interpretative research are precision and systematics. *Precision* of data collection, analysis and reporting is an indispensable element in any scientific endeavour: the conclusions of research need to be accounted for on the basis of accurate and specific records. As elaborated upon in this chapter, precision was attained by the careful selection and collection of case data, by practicing empathic listening[63], by holding and recording in-depth conversations in the native language of the respondent to avoid loss of detail, transcribing the conversations word-for-word, by applying traceable steps and careful triangulation during the analysis, keeping an open and critical attitude as a researcher, and my effort to report in a detailed manner.

In addition to precision, a research requires a *systematic* approach to earn the status of being of scientific quality: the theoretical concepts and terminology that are used, need to form an organized and coherent whole, and steps in analytical reasoning need to be clear and verifiable.[64] Systematics in this research can be recognised in the development of the conceptual framework (see chapter 2), consisting of a composition of sensitizing concepts that are logically fit to help explain the various selected aspects of the contextual construction of domestic contracts. It can also be recognised in the coherence between

the choice of concepts, the problem statement, research questions, objectives, and the chosen methodology and methods. The transparent and detailed description of the modes of interpretive analysis furthermore contributed to a high level of systematics in the research: the methods of data collection, the analytical process and the systematic requirement of feedback were explained step by step, at the hand of a lemniscate of mutually informing iterative loops. Systematics was applied in the design of the planned in-depth conversation, in which the same semi-structure of natural conversation with fixed topics and order of introduction was applied, as well as in the processing and storing of all data. And last but not least, systematics can be found in my efforts to report the research design and findings in an orderly and logically coherent way.

Besides obviously building on one another, precision and systematics are closely related to Lincoln and Guba's[65] criteria of dependability, confirmability and credibility. The research was openly approached through a continuous interaction between theory, and the case-based data, with an explicit role for myself as an interpreter of these. The transparency, precision, and systematics of the steps taken in this research resulted in what Lincoln and Guba call *dependability*: meaning that I contend that, following these steps, the research can be repeated without difficulty -by myself or other researchers- to yield comparable results.[66] The systematic, open, curious and critical attitude with which I approached the case, arrived at my results and required feedback from both critical peers as well as research subjects, contribute to the research's *confirmability*: meaning that I assert its findings are more the product of the focus of inquiry than of my initial expectations.[67] However, it is important to realise that both the researcher (see the paragraph 'my role as a researcher in the analytical process' in the second section of this chapter) and the researched cannot be seen separately from the context and Zeitgeist that the research process took place in.[68]

Precision, systematics, dependability and confirmability all impact the *credibility* of a research. In traditional research, credibility relates to the truth value of research. In interpretative research, it relates to the degree of confidence that the people with whom the research was carried out, as well as those who read it, have in the findings of a particular study.[69] This relates back to virtually all points mentioned above: to a precise and systematic way of looking at events, collecting data and analysing information[70], to being an experienced scientist with prolonged engagement in the field, practicing persistent observation and triangulation to enable a deeper and multi-perspectival understanding of the case and arriving at truthful interpretations, asking for criticism on the research by both research subjects and peer reviewers[71], as well as reporting results in a systematic way.[72]

Scope (transferability) and relevance

The remaining criteria that Goudsblom distinguished to determine the quality of interpretive scientific research are scope and relevance.[73] I have already elaborated on the extent of depth and scope that the current research encompasses, as well as on its scientific and societal relevance, in chapter 1. In this paragraph, I will explain the implications of scope (and Lincoln and Guba's related transferability[74]) and relevance in terms of adding to or undermining the scientific merit of the case study, and discuss the extent to which they can be defended.

Firstly, the *scope* of a research project refers the latitude with which its findings can be applied: when careful observation and convincing arguments result in models and theories that are only valid in a small number of fixed cases, the scope of that research is very limited.[75] Scope therewith is related to what Lincoln and Guba call *transferability*: the extent to which the research findings can be applied or generalised to other contexts. Conventional wisdom of case-study research is dominated by the assumption that case-studies *"cannot provide reliable information about the broader class".*[76] However, I follow Flyvbjerg who argues: *"Social science has not succeeded in producing general, context-independent theory and, thus, has in the final instance nothing else to offer than concrete context-dependent knowledge. And the case-study is especially well suited to produce this knowledge."*[77] The relevance of case-studies is importantly based on 'the force of example' for gaining knowledge and insight.[78] The in-depth and critically reflexive approach of case-driven research makes it particularly suited for identifying alternative framings of reality as well as 'black swans'.[79] Rather than striving after formal generalization and proof through enumerative generalisation, case study research is ideal for analytic generalisation, in which previously developed theory is used as a template against which to compare the empirical results of the case study.[80] Lastly, as Flyvbjerg argues, scope inevitably is *linked* to *depth*, with which it should be balanced.[81]

The case study into the domestic contract aims to gain in-depth understanding of the everyday human construction of the (non-)acceptability of keeping and killing animals for food. To do so, I have researched both content and patterns in frames and conceptualized the decision making process leading up to these frames. To reach sufficiently different contexts and people, yet meet restraints in time and resources, I interpretively researched oral and written frames of consumers in urban and rural areas in the Netherlands and Turkey, selected on basis of target-group oriented theoretical sampling. The results of the case study encompass contextual examples of individual domestic contracts as well as general patterns and theoretical insights into why these patterns occur the way they do. The research comprises enough qualitative detail (depth) and ranges over enough contexts and people (scope) to be able to extend the research findings to at least similar people in similar contexts. And, with regard to the distinguished tools to understand

different frames and the developed theory on decision making, I would argue that generalizability of the results beyond the European sphere is probable, though details in content (such as exact topics referred to and goals that are deemed important) are likely to differ.

Research within the social sciences, besides being positioned in a particular methodological field or even a 'school' of academic thought, often takes place within the context of a particular societal issue - as does the current research. Whether such research is considered relevant by the reader will depend on a number of factors, such as the (scientific or societal) group the reader belongs to, the reader's appreciation of the research design and the results, in combination with his/her evaluation of the influence this research might have, and the time and place this manuscript is read.[82] This makes the last criterion to judge this research' scientific quality, *relevance,* difficult to defend unequivocally.

In chapter 1, I have stated the *societal relevance* of my research, lying first and foremost in the creation of a space for thought and talk, that hopefully is insightful and safe enough to allow people from all kinds of backgrounds to step out of rigid viewpoints and conflict and examine common ground. My original *contribution to scientific knowledge*, besides the generation of contextually valid insights into the construction of (non-)acceptability of keeping and killing animals for food and insightful patterns therein, lies in the development of a conceptual framework that includes a novel model of complex decision making in interaction and the refining of the existing model of the frame of reference.

Inherent to interpretative analysis are *multiple hermeneutics*: research subjects communicating based on mutual interpretations, the researcher interpreting this interaction and translating it into writing, that in turn again is to be interpreted.[83] The relevance of an academic report therewith importantly lies in it being meaningful and convincing to its audience.[84] Accordingly, the final judgement against Goudsblom, Lincoln and Guba's criteria lies with you: the reader of this dissertation.

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CHAPTER 4

Setting the scene: typical and remarkable frames used to construct domestic contracts

Research focus addressed in this chapter:

Framing: content

Focal question:

- *What frames do people across the case study areas use to construct (non-)acceptability of keeping and killing animals for food in everyday-life?*

"If you don't know the trees you may be lost in the forest, but if you don't know the stories you may be lost in life."

--Siberian proverb

This chapter provides an account of typical and remarkable frames used to construct (non-)acceptability of keeping and killing animals for food. Though I have carefully selected the quotes and images to offer the reader a feel for the range of perspectives that are a part of everyday-life domestic contracts in the Netherlands and Turkey, I have consciously chosen to refrain from labelling them at this point in the report. The selected frames are therefore presented in an indiscriminate (alphabetical) order, providing a not yet disentangled 'forest' of emic stories, that sets the scene for the etic differentiation of patterns in later chapters.

4 - Setting the scene: typical and remarkable frames used to construct domestic contracts

4.1 Introduction

As described in detail in the previous chapter, the data that this research into the domestic contract is based on consists of the *transcripts of 50 planned in-depth conversations* with respondents from varying contexts in the Netherlands and Turkey, confirmed and added upon by *notes of unplanned informal conversations* that were overheard, partaken in or initiated, and *encountered documents* (newspaper articles, social media posts, fora conversations, and artwork related to the subject of breeding, slaughtering and consumption of farm animals), collected in the case study areas between 2004 and 2014. Though the aim of the research is to find and understand *-disentangle-* patterns in the way various people in these contexts construct their domestic contracts by means of interpretive analysis of framing dynamics, I found that the raw data, the frames I encountered, were deserving of a separate chapter.

This chapter is written in the form of emic short stories and depictions, that together provide a taste of the sheer variety of topics and ways of reasoning contributing to the construction of the (non-)acceptability of keeping and killing animals for food. The images and quotes have been carefully selected to reflect the framing I encountered my raw data (translated from Dutch and Turkish into English where applicable), and therefore contain both typical as well as remarkable frames.

Many of the examples given clearly consist of combinations of topics and indicate the various internal dilemmas that are being played out in everyday life: e.g. between caring for oneself, other humans, animals and the environment; between staying alive and causing death; between standing out and fitting in; and between acting on facts and acting on feelings. However, I have intentionally arranged the selected frames in a non-differentiating alphabetical order, saving the interpretation of recurring patterns in framing for the ensuing etic chapters.[1]

4.2 A taste of typical and remarkable frames

All natural

"My guess is that many supporters of 'all natural' dairy would be more than happy to yank on the animal's teat to steal the milk, but would be less thrilled to do the suckling oneself. Why? Aha! That would be weird*. Why would that be weird? Because what's* natural*, if we're going to play the 'all natural' game, is for the calf to suckle at the teat of the cow. The human hand is the moral equivalent of a mechanical milker when the calf is included in the 'all natural' equation. When a modern human with a brain chooses the milk of another animal species over a plant-based substitute, that modern human with a brain is engaging in a tragically artificial act. He's substituting custom for moral logic. There is, in essence, nothing at all 'real' or 'natural' about high-jacking the genetics of another animal, artificially inseminating the females, stealing their milk, sending male offspring to live in veal crates, and calling any of this normal, real, natural behaviour."*[2]

Animal rights

(The sign reads "Animal rights")[3]

BBQ dish bingo

"Coming Saturday we're raffling off a BBQ dish for 4 persons!
What a nice present for father's day!"[4]

Brainless chickens

"Cramped cages. Extreme temperatures. Filthy surroundings. No doubt about it: Our industrial food system treats animal welfare as an afterthought. As a commentary on today's 'modern' farming, a London architecture student has created a thought-provoking design for a chicken farm that strips the birds of their mobility—and their brains. Royal College of Art student André Ford created the installation, dubbed The Centre for Unconscious Farming. It's a pretty grim affair, made of a massive steel frame that would contain up to 1,000 birds. In it the chickens are completely immobilized—their feet are removed (to save space), and the birds receive food, water and oxygen through an intricate network of tubes. In order to eliminate the suffering that chickens would face under such conditions, Ford proposes that the birds' cerebral cortex be removed, leaving the brain stem (and key homeostatic functions) intact. The chickens would continue to grow, but would basically spend their lives in a coma. Ford asserts his concept isn't just a bid for attention: 'In the past six years we have witnessed an unprecedented increase in the demand for meat. Higher welfare systems are available, but this project looks at addressing the inherent problems with the dominant system that produces the majority of our meat—the system that will be increasingly relied upon… We do not, and cannot, provide adequate welfare for those agricultural products and therefore welfare should be removed entirely. [...] There are numerous differences between the current dominant production systems and the one I am proposing, but the fundamental difference is the removal of suffering. Whether what I am proposing is an appropriate means to achieve the removal of suffering is open to interpretation.'"[5]

Carnism

"Carnism is the invisible belief system, or ideology, that conditions people to eat certain animals. Carnism is essentially the opposite of veganism; 'carn' means 'flesh' or 'of the flesh' and 'ism' denotes a belief system. Most people view eating animals as a given, rather than a choice; in meat-eating cultures around the world people typically don't think about why they find the flesh of some animals disgusting and the flesh of other animals appetizing, or why they eat any animals at all. But when eating animals is not a necessity for survival, as is the case in much of the world today, it is a choice - and choices always stem from beliefs."[6]

Cheese

"A lot of people I've talked with about becoming vegan, tell me: 'Meat okay, but how could I ever give up cheese?! It just tastes too good, I am addicted to cheese.' But there are really good alternatives available - or you can make them yourself."[7]

Considering veganism

[8]

Cosy

"Eating together is enjoying together. With a cosy barbecue on a sensual summer night or a charming gourmet feast with all your friends and family at the table."[9]

Dietary ponderings

Distance

Drawing the line

"They said that fast food executives were turning fat profits by making us fat, so I stopped eating fast food. They said that killing animals was wrong, so I became a vegetarian. They said that fertilizer run-off from industrial farming is killing the Gulf of Mexico, the pesticides are killing honeybees, so I started only eating organic. They said that shipped food is too carbon intensive and not as fresh, so I started eating only local, in-season food. They said that it was wrong to punish a cow by milking it twice a day, or to steal a chicken's eggs, so I became a vegan. They said that cooking food destroys nutrients, so I starting eating only raw food. They said that following a macrobiotic regimen would prevent cancer, so I followed it. They said that I should follow a zero-waste diet, so I stopped buying anything packaged. And when I showed up at the farmers market in December with my reusable bag looking for local, certified-organic, vegan, unprocessed, uncooked, whole foods, without packaging, that would fit into my macrobiotic diet, I realized that the best thing for the planet, the animals, and my health would be to just stop eating altogether..."[12]

Environmentalist impasse

Eternal consequences

14

Ethics and facts

"The question of animal rights is discussed in relation to man's evolutionary history as a predator and exploiter of other species. It is suggested that, providing man's attempts to eliminate suffering from the animals with which he is dealing, there is no reason why he should not exploit them. However, decisions on the degree to which, and the manner in which, we exploit animals are ethical decisions that should be made by society in general, but only when it has a knowledge of the facts."[15]

Exceptions

"I never eat meat, not at home, not in a restaurant. Only when I have to - like when I was recovering from my eye operation and it wouldn't heal, the doctor told me to eat a steak and it healed. But other than that, never. Well, my only vice is lahmacun[a], ha-ha."[16]

Feeling pain

17

("People really aren't animals, are they? I mean, they really don't feel pain, right?")

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[a] *Turkish pizza with ground meat.*

Flesh becoming our own

"When we eat factory-farmed meat we live, literally, on tortured flesh. Increasingly, that tortured flesh is becoming our own."[18]

Food crisis

"Even when the planet produces enough food for everyone, not everyone has enough food. Some policy makers argue that the intensification of livestock farming is the answer to the food crisis; that we need to cram animals together in the pursuit of 'efficiency'. But this will only deepen the hunger crisis and create havoc for people, the planet and animals. Animals that are kept confined rather than allowed to graze and forage on the land need to be fed large quantities of grain. This means that there is less for people to eat and what's left is often more expensive. We're literally taking high-quality, nutrient-rich foods that people could eat and feeding them to our farm animals. "[19]

Freeganism

"Vegans are people who avoid products from animal sources or products tested on animals in an effort to avoid harming animals. Freegans take this a step further by recognizing that in a complex, industrial, mass-production economy driven by profit, abuses of humans, animals, and the earth abound at all levels of production (from acquisition to raw materials to production to transportation) and in just about every product we buy."[20]

Great chicken recipes

"Great chicken recipes are perfect for pleasing picky eaters and the cooks who like a good, easy meal. Plain chicken has been dressed up in a variety of different recipes with delicious spices and sauces; then served as chicken casseroles, fried chicken, chicken soup, chicken tenders, and more. You'll find recipes that have been passed from one family's recipe box to another, the home cooked favourites that folks come to the table and linger a bit longer for. The chicken recipes below are tested and approved by generations of families and friends. Enjoy them with those who gather at your table."[21]

Halal to the letter

"Actually, halal means not only that the animal is cut in the right way, but also that it needs to be treated well during its life. People don't usually know that, but it's in the Quran."[22]

Herring

"According to tradition, on Flag day the first barrel of New Dutch Herring was auctioned. Wholesale company Makro bought it for 56.500 euro. Prior to the auction the herring was judged by a panel, consisting of fish specialist Jaap Koning and top chefs Julius Jaspers and Alain Caron, who are known from the tv-program MasterChef Holland. According to Julius Jaspers the new herring is 'insane'. It is light, juicy and fat. Also, it's a little bloody, but that is normal for a herring that has only been caught three days ago, according to the master chef."[23]

How to eat mindfully

"A larger issue even is how we eat. By slowing down and enjoying and savouring the food in front of us no matter what it's nutritional value, we will assimilate more nutrients from a candy bar by savouring it than from a healthy salad if we are shovelling it down mindlessly trying to multitask or get to the next thing on our to-do list. Eating mindfully and with gratitude provides far greater nutritional benefits than mindless eating."[24]

Humanimal selves

"What we do to animals, is what we do to the animal nature in our own humanimal selves."[25]

Human dignity

Pope Francis @Pontifex

It is contrary to human dignity to cause animals to suffer or die needlessly. #LaudatoSi [26]

Innate craving for meat

"I believe humans are hard-wired to love meat. Look, it's arguable better to be vegetarians. But we're not. So there must be an innate craving for meat."[27]

Innocent plants

EVERYDAY, THOUSANDS OF INNOCENT PLANTS ARE KILLED

BY VEGETARIANS HELP END THE VIOLENCE. [28]

Instant vegetarian

"St. Nicholas gave her a book about a little pig with a carrot in its mouth. 'Mom, pigs don't eat carrot, do they?' 'Yes dear, pigs eat almost anything. Even chicken, I think.' 'No, little girls eat chicken' 'Yes, and little girls also eat pig' 'No way!' 'Bacon are little pieces of pig.' *shock* #instantvegetarian*"[29]

Just not going to happen

"I host a big meat festival every year, and this year's event has sparked talk of an on-site vegetarian protest. Which is fine. I respect that. But I think the vegetarians miss the point. People aren't going to start eating carrots three times a day. It's just not going to happen."[30]

Karma

"I don't look at them as animals. I see them as tortured souls. Hindu's say, they are not innocent. They are paying their Karmic debt, inflicted on them by their own prior actions. The butcher becomes the butchered, and the cycle does not end until that soul steps out of the Karmic circle, by not being cruel."[31]

Killed

("Is that an animal friendly piece of meat? No. They've killed the animal.")

Law

"The aim of the Turkish Animal protection act is 'to provide a good standard of life for animals and to provide a decent and appropriate treatment to animals and to protect them as good as possible against treatments of pain, discomfort and torture and to prevent any sort of unjust treatment to them'. The law includes items on pets, stray animals, wild animals and farm animals ('slaughter animals'). For farm animals it includes items such as 'a veterinarian should supervise medication and measures to animals', 'slaughter should be performed hygienically and in a manner that is as less painful and frightening for the animal as possible, and should be performed by a licensed person', 'animals cannot be taken care of by an uneducated person or anybody under the age of 16', and several items that apply to all animals like 'it is forbidden to torture animals, hit them, leave them hungry and thirsty, expose them to excessive cold or heat or neglect them' and 'it is forbidden to have sex with animals'. There are fines specified for the breaking of each rule, and the law also provides information about administrative issues (which authority is responsible for what). An interesting addition is the item on educational productions, which ensures a certain amount of broadcasting time for education on animal protection on Turkish radio and television. However, there are no specific welfare rules such as housing minimum standards or transport standards present in the Animal protection act, for any farm animal species."[33]

Liars and sex-offenders

"Meat makes you aggressive. That's why I quit. Look you can read it even: meat eaters tend to be a liars and a sexual offenders."[34]

Life of a chicken

"The life of a chicken doesn't mean anything. Not to me, not to anybody. We have many things to worry about. The way a chicken lives is nothing. I wouldn't care."[35]

Local meat is better

"Someone who wants to consciously deal with his or her meat consumption from ecological conviction, eats less meat, but also of better quality and locally sourced. Meat with more flavor, that has been produced in a sustainable, small-scale farming system. Purchased at the local farmer who lets his cows graze and largely self-cultivates their feed. This is a winning combination for the animals, the environment, the farmers and the consumers. Worldwide."[36]

Logic of the larder

"Could it be that it is actually less ethical to be a vegan or vegetarian? I mean, they say we don't have the right to kill animals, but that also means that these animals would not be bred and farmed. I mean, they might not be born if we don't farm them. So what I'm asking is: do we have the right to not let them live? Maybe it's better to have animals in the food chain. For all different kinds of reasons, but also for the animals."[37]

Loving life

"I spent 45 years in the cattle business always professing that I loved my animals. But it was years before I was willing to admit I was more interested in profit than the animals' health. The fact of it is, we simply raised them to a point where they became economically beneficial to sell. I finally woke up. Looking into those big brown eyes, I realized those animals loved life in their way just as much as I loved life in mine; there was no way in the world I could ever put them to death again."[38]

Meat is murder

"Heifer whines could be human cries
Closer comes the screaming knife

This beautiful creature must die
This beautiful creature must die

A death for no reason
And death for no reason is murder

And the flesh you so fancifully fry
Is not succulent, tasty or kind

It's death for no reason
And death for no reason is murder"[39]

Mishkat al-Masabih

"A good dead for an animal is as good as a good dead towards a human, while an act of cruelty towards an animal is as bad as an act of cruelty towards a human."[40]

Moral imperative

"According to the greatest nutritionist organizations, such as the Academy of Nutrition and Dietetics, humans have no need for animal products to live a healthy life. For us, the consumption of animal products thus is a non-vital need. So when you think about this, veganism is the only logical outcome. Veganism is a moral duty. It feels like an enormous moral liberation to be vegan and exempt from evil in my life. "[41]

No animals were harmed in the filming of this movie...

[42]

Protein

"Did you know one ounce of pumpkin seeds contains 9.35 grams of protein? That's over two grams more than the same quantity of ground beef!"[43]

Pregnant

"Ten years long Laura Dixon (34) attempted to get pregnant in vain. The cause: endometriosis and a polycystic ovarian syndrome. After 2 failed IVF-attempts she heard the changes of miscarriage or premature labour were big. She had two laparoscopies to fix the gynaecological problems, but to no use. The chance she would ever get pregnant was very slim. Instead of resigning herself, Mrs. Dixon radically changed her eating habits. She had been a vegetarian all her life, but hypothesized that her chances of a full-term pregnancy would increase by eating more protein. So she switched to a diet of chicken, bacon and fast food. Soon she got a taste for it, too: she really craved meat and at around six meals a day. Sometimes she would wake her husband up to go to McDonalds at night. She gained over 30 kilos and yes: the third (and last) IVF attempt was successful. She got pregnant with triplets. Max, Mason and Mia are now 14 months old and doing well. Laura is back to being a vegetarian."[44]

Psyche

"Until a couple of years ago I believed that the primary reasons to eat less meat were environment- and health-related, and there's no question that those are valid reasons. But animal welfare has since become a large part of my thinking as well. And I say this as someone not known to his friends as an animal-lover. If we want a not-too-damaged planet to live on, and we want to live here in a way that's also not too damaged, we're better off eating less meat. But if we also want a not-too-damaged psyche, we have to look at how we treat animals and begin to change it."[45]

Punishment and subsidy

("When you abuse one animal, you get punished. When you abuse thousands of animals, you get subsidized.; Stop millions of subsidy for booster chickens and mega stables! Take action and sign the petition on www.geengeldvoordierenleed.nl. Choose food without abuse. Choose plant based food."[46]*)*

Question
"The question is 'can they suffer?'"[47]

Reverse reasoning

[48]

Seeing and feeling
"I can't eat animals that I have seen alive. Only those I have not met in person. Even though I know how things are in the meat industry and I don't agree with it, it's easy to eat them because I haven't met them. Seeing and feeling is very important."[49]

Since we must kill to eat
"Since we must kill to eat, then let it be an act of worship."[50]

Steak
"Oh, I love animals! Just the other day I bought a steak for my dog...!"[51]

Stress-free death
"On farm euthanizing or slaughtering of poultry or pigs with the use of nitrogen foam may be the way to go in the future. An abundance of nitrogen, captured in foam bubbles, ensures a stress-free death in a short period of time."[52]

Sue 'm
"I want to sue Peta for 'pain and suffering' for making me aware of the pain and suffering caused by my lifestyle choices."[53]

Superior technology and thinking skills

"Our mission: To continue to consume meat in vast quantities, preferably in front of hippies. To incite jealousy in those that have given up on that delicious slice of life, meat. Our products: The flesh of all lower animals that can be killed with our superior technology and thinking skills."[54]

Taste

"Some people say: 'meat is delicious!'. Well, ethics is about self-control: your preferences, wishes and desires are morally constrained, by the freedom of others. You are not allowed to harm others. When it comes to humans (anthropocentrism) many people see the reasonableness of this principle: rape is punishable by law for a reason, because there is a victim. The judge will hopefully not be receptive to the argument of the perpetrator that 'it's just so delicious. It is morally irrelevant whether rape is delicious. The point is that there is a victim. And there is one when it comes to animal products, too. It is important to extend the moral circle to all beings that can experience pain and pleasure."[55]

The Native American approach

"The Native American approach to living was to hunt to survive, there were no grocery stores to go to. When they hunted and killed an animal, it was prayed for, honoured and thanks given for its sacrifice. All was used from the animal as well. Hunting for sport is just for egotistical, cowardly , lustful reasons and regularly hides behind the excuse of hunting to donate to the locals. Animals are sentient beings , they feel as we do. I have become a vegetarian in the last 6 months. Only fish and chicken now, which I have no problem with but say thanks for. Someone mentioned stepping on ants etc., well that's not done intentionally. Hunting for sport is an intention and it's an evil one at that. I love and respect animals, it's about learning to understand what they are as a being."[56]

Through the eyes of a cow

[57]

Trend

"Where vegetarians 25 years ago not seldom had to defend the fact that they didn't eat meat ('how many mushrooms need you eat to replace it?'), nowadays it's mostly the meat-eaters that feel compelled to justify their eating behaviour ('those chickens don't know they're being eaten, so it doesn't matter'). If this trend continues, perhaps in a hundred years people will say: 'You know, not so long ago, people would just eat animals.'"[58]

Trust

"Nowadays we can't be sure what's in our own food. They can fake everything. I read it in the newspaper. So I don't buy organic, I don't trust what they say. Anyway, I'm too old for that stuff."[59]

Uninhabited island

"Often, vegetarians are asked the question: what if you were washed ashore on an uninhabited island and the only food there is is meat, would you eat it or would you starve to death? Andrew Kirschner's answer to this question is sublime: What if you would not be alone, but would live together on a planet with 7 billion people and you had unlimited access to fruit, vegetables, nuts, beans and other healthy food, and you would know that animals suffer and die a horrible death so you can eat them while you do not need their meat to survive, would you still eat them? The difference between these questions is that the first one wile likely never happen while mine is the choice you are confronted with right now. Which question is worth answering in your opinion?"[60]

Wakker Dier/Anti Wakker Dier

"Animal rights foundation Wakker Dier claims to fight for animal welfare, but why do they try to make things so difficult for the farmers here? If they really would be about animal welfare, they would have to be on the farmers' side. Consumption is stable, and the rules in the Netherlands are already many times stricter than in a lot of other countries. Ultimately, it seems that foundation Wakker Dier is fighting to improve animal welfare by fighting against *Dutch farmers. A lot of people have had enough of that by now. Instead of explaining how to choose a good piece of meat and emphasizing that a lot of farmers in the Netherlands are very good to animals, it seems that they are trying to portray Dutch farmers as culprits. By bringing a few rotten apples in the news, Wakker Dier argue for even stricter rules for all. This creates additional costs, which is why many people opt for cheaper meat from countries such as Brazil, where farming conditions are many times worse. And that's why it seems to me that people who are* anti *Wakker dier, are* pro *well cared-for animals and farmers."*[61]

Wash your hands

"Related to no-kill policies, bacteria would form another problem. Almost every time you wash your hands you commit mass murder"[62]

Worm

"Without taking off its cover, I could never peel an apple,
Nor heal any wound of mine.
But when it confronted me, I never got angry at no apple worm,
For it was me, who put a knife in its home..."[63]

X-rated

"Dairy and eggs are the result of systemized rape - or should we not call involuntary insemination rape when it is done to nonhuman animals?" [64]

You can't say we are herbivores

"You can't say we are herbivores. Meat isn't the problem, low quality food is the problem. Grain doesn't work with the biology of many people, making vegetarianism virtually impossible. Meanwhile, eating a diet rich in high quality animal products would support excellent health. Saying people don't need animal products is misleading and ignores the obvious fact that we don't all share identical biology. We are omnivores."[65]

Zugzwang

"The most annoying thing about being vegan is being called a hypocrite if you feed your pet meat, and crazy if you don't."[66]

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CHAPTER 5

Patterns in the domestic contract:
ingredients of framing, the complex influence of context, and clusters of reasoning and behaviour

The Art Of Framing

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Research focus addressed in this chapter:

Framing: content and patterns

Focal questions:

- *What topics constitute the content of the frames used to construct (non-) acceptability of keeping and killing animals for food?*
- *What patterns stand out in the framing of (non-)acceptability of keeping and killing animals for food?*
- *How can the acquired insights contribute to a better understanding of the everyday-life construction of domestic contracts?*

"That all truth and meaning are context-dependent does not mean that they are necessarily arbitrary, relative and built on the shifting sands of cultural whim."

--Ken Wilber

The stories in the previous chapter exhibit such a complexity and diversity in practices and perspectives, that it becomes clear that there are numerous nuances beyond 'simply eating meat' and 'vegetarianism'. People take on different perspectives and refer to a vast range of topics, that combined and interrelatedly amount to the construction of various degrees of (non-) acceptability of keeping and killing animals for food. This chapter is the result of my inquiry into the content of and recurring patterns in this framing of domestic contracts. I describe the analytical steps of coding and organizing the variety of encountered topics, and distinguishing similarities and differences in their relation with demographic contexts in the Netherlands and Turkey. The chapter concludes with a pattern of typically coinciding framing elements, that emerged when looking at domestic contracts as complex individual wholes: eleven clusters of reasoning and behaviour.

5 - Patterns in the domestic contract: ingredients of framing, the complex influence of context, and clusters of reasoning and behaviour

5.1 The ingredients of the domestic contract

The research project 'Disentangling the domestic contract' is designed to understand how people construct (non-)acceptability of keeping and killing animals for food in everyday-life, through interpretive analysis of framing dynamics. After having provided a selection of emic accounts showing the range and complexity of the constructs in the previous chapter, in this chapter I report my inquiry into the content of and recurrent patterns in the framing of the domestic contract.

Coding and organising framing content

As elaborated upon in chapter 2, *framing* involves strategically selecting cognitions in order to achieve goals that active inner drives -consciously or implicitly- motivate us to strive for. Following this conceptualisation, *individual frames* are a reflection of both the various *drives* that are active in an individual in a certain situation (which will be the focus of chapter 6) as well as of the *cognitions* that are available to the individual in that moment. As set forth in detail in chapter 3, I used target-group oriented theoretical sampling in various demographic contexts in the Netherlands and Turkey to collect data for the research, resulting in a core database of 50 semi-structured in-depth conversations, added upon by (triangulated[1] with) encountered documents and unplanned informal conversations.

Of course, the complete frames that were brought forward in these conversations and documents amount to more than the sum of their parts: they are formed by combining cognitions that mutually influence one another, are interrelated, and dynamic in direction and meaning (as I will elaborate on in section 5.2). Still, the first analytical step on the way to understanding these complex frames encompasses breaking them down into the content elements they are made up of. I thus coded the frames brought forward in the individual conversations and documents down to the level of topics, and organised the assigned codes into categories and sub-categories.

The collected domestic contract ingredients could have been organized in different ways and codes and categories sometimes overlap; there are many ways to 'slice a pie'. Nevertheless, distinguishing (sub-)categories and codes provided a useful way to systematically organise and analyse the pieces of information used in interaction to form frames. As is clear from the main categories, I have used the model of the frame-of-reference as a basis for organising this cognitive content of framing, that I adapted based on the research data (see the theory building paragraph in chapter 2.2 for a detailed discussion hereof).

The diversity of topics

Per person and per situation, frames are composed of a bounded number of topics: those that are both primed and deemed fit to suit the situation-specific goal. The individual use of these framing elements, as well as the ways they are combined into complex domestic contracts, shows several patterns, that I will discuss later on in this chapter. The coded content *across* the transcripts of individual conversations and documents in my database, accumulated however provides a first case pattern through categorization: a systematic overview of the *diversity of possible topics* that play a role in constructing everyday-life domestic contracts in the Netherlands and Turkey. The resulting -elaborate but finite- list of topics is provided in Appendix III.

Interpreting the listed categories and codes leads to several inferences. First of all, the accrued codes clearly show that the domestic contract touches upon many more issues than just animals and their welfare. Of course animal oriented topics take up a reasonable portion of the list: ". However, by far the largest number of topics that are brought forward concern people and their needs and desires - such as taste and health and getting by financially -, as well as references to the socio-institutional system they have to manage to live in. Examples of these are: *"After I eat meat, I feel stronger."* [2] and *"The intensive farming system developed after the Second World War to prevent hunger from ever happening again. So, it had a good purpose, and now it's hard to change the way it is."* [3] Though the number of topics in a category may not completely coincide with the relative use or importance of said category, the list shows that only a fairly minor share of the topics concern environmental impact.

As already brought forward in chapter 2.2, when researching ambiguous topics such as the construction of the domestic contract the distinction between the framing of empirically observed *facts* and *opinions* (that can be constructed out of facts and/or fiction) is not at all that easy to make - which was confirmed during the gathering and analysis of data. For example, the sentence *"My neighbour is a vegetarian"* does not unmistakably show whether this is empirically observed knowledge, hearsay, or an assumption. While there arguably is a difference between *"Science has proven that sows suffer in birth cages"*

(reported speech, pointing towards factual information) and *"I believe that sows suffer in birth cages"* (direct speech, using 'I believe', pointing at this being a conviction), the *topics* referred to are the same (in this example: the impact of housing, measures and treatment on animals). Because of this overlap and the uncertainty in distinguishing factual knowledge from convictions in the analysis of framing, all mentions of thoughts about the way things are were organised into one main category: *knowledge & convictions*. The other key categories that were distinguished were *values*, *norms*, *interests, feelings* and *behaviours*.

The length and complexity of the category *feelings* shows that physical sensations, states and emotions form an integral and complex part of the construction domestic contract. An example including all three is: *"Though it smells great and I find it really tasty, I don't eat meat because I feel sorry for the animals. When I think about the way they suffer during farming and slaughter, I get really sad and angry. So even though I love meat, I love the animals more."* [4] Not only do people refer to their feelings about the food they consume or the way animals are reared and slaughtered; they also express how certain values, norms, interests, knowledge & convictions they hold, behavioural decisions they make as well as feelings they have, make them feel. Examples of this are: *"I feel very strongly about being conscientious, compassionate and consistent in my consumption behaviour. It is why I like who I am."* [5] or the more dissonant: *"I want to change how I feel about killing animals. I think it is natural, but I can't bear the sight of it. It makes me feel weak. And that doesn't feel good."* [6]

The diversity of codes in the category *behaviours* demonstrates that the commonly made division between 'eating meat' and 'vegetarianism' is too simplistic when describing consumption behaviour. In the research, most self-named meat eaters still refrained from eating certain species or parts of the animal - 'all-meat' consumers are not all that common, and there also were many other 'in-between' behaviours, for example eating less meat or only meat from organic origin. Moreover, a number of people go further than vegetarianism, by not only refraining from meat, but also from other products, such as dairy and eggs. Figure 5.1 (on the next page) illustrates this variety of consumption behaviours with a table, originally composed by Geertrui Cazeaux[7], added upon by my research findings.

Table 5.1: Consumption behaviours and the way people performing it are commonly referred to

	Red meat	Poultry	Fish	Eggs	Dairy	Honey	Grains	Roots	Vegetables	Fruits	Nuts and seeds	Beans	Red meat
Omnivore *Eats animals, animal products, as well as plants*	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Carnivore *Eats mostly meat*	X	X	X										X
Vegetarian *Refrains from eating meat or fish, does eat eggs and dairy*				X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
Vegan *Refrains from eating and using any animal products*						X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
Lacto vegetarian *Refrains from eating meat, fish and eggs, does eat dairy*					X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
Ovo vegetarian *Refrains from eating meat and dairy, does eat eggs*				X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
Pescotarian *Refrains from meat and poultry, does eat fish*			X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
Pollotarian *Refrains from red meat and fish, does eat poultry*		X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
Fruitarian *Refrains from eating 'living' plants (roots), does eat their products (fruits, nuts, beans)*									X	X	X	X	
Flexitarian *Consciously eats less meat*	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X

A first tool for (self-)analysis

Summarizing, the content of the domestic contract involves mentions of behaviours, values, norms, feelings, interests, and knowledge & convictions. The diverse sub-categories that emerged when organising the topics within these categories, show that framing elements used to construct the domestic contract can be about oneself, other humans and culture, about the production chain, system and institutions, as well as about animals and environmental issues.

Besides being a result of my inquiry into content and patterns, Appendix III can be used as a tool for (self-)analysis, in which the accumulated codes and categories, aided by the accompanying eliciting questions, form a checklist to distinguish what thoughts and feelings are or may be of (conscious or unconscious) importance to ourselves and/or others when talking about farming, slaughter and consumption of animals.

5.2 Patterns in relation with demographic context

Literature indicates that demographical contextual features such as geography, gender, age group, education level and income level are linked to perception and behaviour regarding several aspects of animal farming, such as animal welfare.[8] The 50 semi-structured in-depth conversations that formed the key source of data in the research into the domestic contract, therefore followed a selection method that targeted respondents from these various demographic contexts within the main case study areas the Netherlands and Turkey (see chapter 3.3). The selected variation in contexts and research subjects is primarily intended to serve comparison by facilitating increased understanding of the contextual construction of each unique frame.[9] The applied selection method (target-group oriented theoretical sampling[10]) does not allow for making statistical inferences about these groups of people or context-dependency; however, it is well suited for distinguishing qualitative patterns in the construction of domestic contracts, and providing plausible explanations for them.

Where section 5.3 will deal with the patterns that arose when viewing the dataset as a whole, this section will report of a preceding important analytical step in my research: looking for manifest patterns in framing by looking at whether common frames (see the paragraph on symbolic convergence in chapter 2.2) occur in relation to demographic contextual features.[11]

Framing elements and demographic contexts in the Netherlands and Turkey

Looking at the use of framing elements (see appendix III) in relation to the researched geographical contexts (the Netherlands and Turkey; urban-rural areas) and population

groups (gender; age group; and education level), I encountered several trends. However, though common frames were found, the link between framing content and the separate demographic contexts was less prominent than anticipated - as will become clear in the discussion below.

The Netherlands and Turkey

Coherent with these topics being on the Dutch political agenda[a], in the Netherlands *animal welfare* and *environmental impact* were often problematized, while in Turkey these were only mentioned by a relatively small share of the respondents. In Turkey, the adverse effects of hormones and especially genetically modified foods (GMOs) were relatively frequently mentioned, linked to *human health* and *naturalness*, while my research indicates that in the Netherlands health is considered more in terms of the effects of red meat on heart disease. Interestingly, the topic of *halal meat* was more frequently mentioned by Muslim consumers (next to some non-Muslim critics of ritual slaughter) in or visiting the Netherlands than in Turkey; the reason offered was that in Turkey all available meat can be considered halal while in the Netherlands you have to specifically look for it. Vegetarianism and veganism was more widespread in the Netherlands than in Turkey (though over the last ten years numbers have increased in both countries).[12]

Age groups, education levels and income

The research results indicate that several respondents from higher age groups display *distrust* in labelling of food products and production practices as part of their domestic contract, such as by telling stories about salesmen fiddling with terms such as organic or free-range: " *I don't believe what is on the box. Then they say free range chickens, it says so on the box, but you know Hanneke, I don't believe everything. Because if a chicken is free range it is still inside a cage. Just a bit bigger one. You're being deceived all the time. Only this week I read a piece in the newspaper that the government does least research of all in the food chain. Because these companies, they have their own logos, but it hasn't been checked at all. They can just stick it on and that's not right.*"[13] Relative to older and lower educated respondents, more younger and higher educated respondents pronounced to opt for meat from alternative sources, flexitarianism or vegetarianism. Another demographic factor (that I did not use to select respondents, but did check for during the conversations) is having an income that allows for the purchase of desired food. Of the respondents, only a homeless person in Amsterdam and a poor farmer in rural Turkey had such limited funds that they could not opt for any alternatives. As the homeless man expressed *"I've lived on the street, if you're hungry you eat everything. If I*

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[a] Even the Dutch version of Vote Match (www.stemwijzer.nl) contains multiple questions related to animal welfare and environmental impact.

don't accept the chicken that is offered to me, I'll have an empty stomach and it will rot away. That would be absurd!" [14] However, also by many other respondents economic constraints were a frequently mentioned reason for not buying the ideally desired food. An interesting detail that stood out in this regard was that in the Netherlands alternatives for regular meat were framed as expensive, while in Turkey meat (even regular meat) was brought forward as costly in comparison to meatless meals.[15]

Urban and rural areas

The most prominent pattern in the use of framing elements in relation to demographic context was found when comparing respondents in cities and the countryside. In urban areas, (possibly due to the hiddenness of animal farming) both *ideal pictures* of happy farms (like in the song 'Old MacDonald had a farm'), as well as very *grim ideas* of animal production in terms of animal welfare and effects on the environment were frequently brought forward, and urban respondents were found to opt for adapted meat consumption relatively more often than their rural counterparts. In rural settings a *self-pronounced 'realistic' view of farming*, accepting the system of rearing and slaughtering animals for food as a natural necessity, appeared to be the norm. This seems to be tied to the trend that in rural areas (in both countries) the interests of animals and nature taken into account in decision making were linked by respondents to practical value (*"To me, cows mean money."*[16]) more than to their intrinsic value, while in cities this was often the other way around. This difference between urban and rural inhabitants was the only difference that was spontaneously referred to by several respondents, both in rural: *"You know, those city folk, they have all these ideas is their heads about what farming is like, but they don't know what it's like. They've never even been on a farm!"* [17] as well as in urban settings: *"Farmers have grown up with the ways of farming, they are dulled to how much the animals suffer."* [18] Still, this encountered general pattern knows 'black swans'[19], as was the case with a farmer's son in Turkey, who turned vegetarian after seeing what he referred to as his pet lamb being slaughtered at Eid.

Gender

When comparing framing elements (including pronounced consumption behaviour), gender difference was not as salient in my research as would be expected based on the common stereotype that females are more empathic[20]: the expression of feeling empathy for farm animals was found relatively equally across male and female respondents in the research. An example of empathy in a (Turkish) male respondent is given in figure 5.1, depicting not only the taking into *consideration* of animals, but the *emotional equation* of all living beings on the circles of relational distance.

Figure 5.1: Circles of a respondent (Turkey, male, 15-30, urban) assigning equal importance to humans and other animals (the only cards positioned in the outer circles were *tomato*, *carrot* and *egg*).

Complex framing and context-dependency

In conclusion, single demographic contextual features did not offer as much insight into differences that showed up in the content of the domestic contract as was expected based on literature. The research data does indicate several ties between mentioned framing elements and the researched case study areas and population groups – the most salient pattern being the difference in framing between respondents in urban vs rural geographic contexts. However, overall, *the variation between individual respondents' domestic contracts* (the patterns of which will be topic of section 5.3 and chapter 6) was far more striking than the differences between geographic context and population groups. An explanation for this lies in the complexity of frame construction, happening in relation with multiple interdependent contextual features:

Though categorized and coded as if separate, the ingredients of the domestic contract in reality do not stand on their own but are interrelated. To construct (non-)acceptability of keeping and killing animals for food in everyday-life, individual persons strategically select elements from the total of cognitions that is available to them in a specific situation, to suit goals they have in the interaction. The result is a complex combination of components, that as a whole consist of more than the sum of its parts. The framing elements not only mutually influence one another, but are also flexible in meaning. Negative or positive judgement may be added: *"That slaughter system for chickens, the running belt and machines taking their intestines out... Isn't that awesome?! How far has*

mankind gotten in terms of technology!" [21]; a time frame or context may be interwoven: *"Red meat is healthy, because I feel it gives me strength to do demanding work, but in the long run it may be unhealthy. My father died of heart disease, so it runs in my family, and red meat is known to have negative effects on arteries."* [22]; and credibility may be played with: *"Some meat has a label. But it doesn't matter what brand it has. Because I don't trust those companies."* [23] In short: cognitions are not yet stories - they become so in combination and in interaction.

Domestic contracts as wholes thus are dynamic narratives, constructed strategically by tapping from cognitions available, each cognition non-linearly adding to or subtracting from the acceptability of keeping and killing of animals for food. Similarly, the context in which meaning is made, consists of manifold and interconnected features. The specific influence of the initially researched contexts (geographical location, gender, age groups etc.) already appeared weak when linking them to different framing elements. When looking at complex frames, the relation with context becomes even harder to identify. This is not to say that domestic contracts are not context dependent; nor that knowledge about the context in which frames are embedded doesn't add depth to their understanding. The conclusion is rather that *so many* cultural and personal contextual aspects play a role, that singular contextual features simply don't explain the way they are constructed.

In short: because contexts involve a multitude of features that mutually influence one another, and domestic contracts are complex non-linear composites of interrelated and flexible framing elements, looking at the influence of single contextual features and single framing elements provides but a partial picture. The next step on the way to a better understanding of the construction of the domestic contract in my case study, thus consisted of approaching the collected complex frames as wholes, embedded in their multifaceted contexts, and look for patterns of symbolic convergence.[24]

5.3 Clusters of reasoning and behaviour

Each individual domestic contract is a unique and context-dependent synthesis of framing elements. However, as I will argue in this section (as well as in chapter 6 on the decision making process) the way domestic contracts are constructed is not arbitrary - there is a logic behind them. To discover this logic, I let go of the pre-determined demographic contextual features and approached my dataset as a whole, looking for other emerging patterns in framing. When thus distinguishing differences and similarities across individual everyday-life domestic contracts, I found that certain behaviours, values and other topics typically occur together: there are quite resilient clusters of reasoning and behaviour regarding keeping and killing animals for food.

Recurrent patterns across individual domestic contracts

The analysis of the conversations and documents showed that, across the research, individual *differences* in framing were most salient on the following points:

- Pronounced consumption behaviour (in daily life and exceptional situations);
- Relative emotional value assigned to farmed animals/relational distance farmed animals are placed at compared to the self and other parties;
- Pronounced feelings regarding rearing, slaughter and consumption of animals;
- The parties whose interests are taken into consideration when deciding on a certain behaviour;
- Values held and norms formulated regarding keeping and killing animals for food;
- Norms and ideal pictures painted regarding the issue;
- Knowledge & convictions referred to;
- Pronounced personal interests in specific situations; and
- Pronounced ways of coming to a decision.

The case study data furthermore indicated that the reasoning offered in relation to keeping and killing animals for food shows important *similarities*: certain pronounced consumption behaviours, parties whose interests are taken into consideration, core domestic contract related values and knowledge & convictions repeatedly showed up in sets during framing. In the remainder of this chapter, I will discuss these emerging patterns, resulting in the differentiation of eleven distinct clusters of reasoning and behaviour. (The patterns -and grounded theory generation- related to personal interests and ways of coming to a decision will be the topic of chapter 6.)

Pronounced consumption behaviour (in daily life and exceptional situations)

As already mentioned in section 5.1 and illustrated in figure 5.1, *pronounced consumption behaviour* ranges widely: from eating all parts of in principle all animals, via various in-between forms, to vegetarianism and veganism (in more or less strict ways). In the in-depth conversations (see chapter 3.3 for their design and Appendix II for the semi-structured topic list), I did not only ask to place the animals that were consumed *in daily life* on a line from 'least gladly' to 'gladly', but also, in a similar way, inquired into what respondents would consume *in extraordinary cases* - for example out of politeness (visiting a foreign culture), curiosity, or necessity (stranded on a deserted island with no food).

First of all, personal preferences in taste is an important reason given for variation in behaviour, and all 50 respondents were unique in their preferences and limits to what they would eat. As a pattern though, the research exercise showed that the *species of animal* was of great importance to the placement on the lines by individual respondents: *"Chicken, cow, and all is fine, but I would never eat a swan. They are just too noble and beautiful"* [25], but also that they varied a lot: *"Oh yes, I would have never guessed but swan is actually very tasty. The hunters around here shoot them and apparently they are just thrown away. But one of our neighbours, a bad ass guy, asked for them and then we had a barbeque!"* [26] In general, animals that people are unfamiliar with as food and/or that are perceived as pets, are less gladly eaten than animals that are culturally farmed for food. In addition, consumption of foods from certain animal origins appeared to be importantly linked to *the situation at hand* - what is considered normal, what is available, what is necessary, and when is a situation considered exceptional: *"In the war, we even ate rats. Rats! But, though I've heard of people that ate human flesh, I don't think I could ever do that."* [27] The conversations therewith also suggest that food preference, next to being linked to the situation at hand, is also linked to *the parties that are taken into consideration when deciding on a certain behaviour*, as I will discuss below.

Relative emotional value / relational distance, and consideration of interests

In the in-depth interviews I asked people to intuitively place a range of animals, people and items relative to the self on circles of emotional value / relational distance (see for examples figure 5.2 a-b on the next page). The interpretation of this rapid appraisal[28] assignment and the reasoning provided for the resulting positioning on the circles varied, which became clear in the ensuing discussion. For example, some respondents placed regularly farmed animals (such as cow, pig, chicken) in the inner circles because they ate them and thus felt close to them, others placed them further away because they ate them and thus felt they needed to create an emotional distance.

Figure 5.2 (a-b): Circle examples (Netherlands, male, 15-30, urban & Turkey, male, 15-30, rural)

The reasons given for these intuitive distances sometimes included rational arguments about why certain animals deserved moral standing (cf. Callicot or Singer's -rational ethical- theories of moral circles[29]): *"I put dolphins and pigs close to humans because they are very intelligent and our DNA is very similar - humans can even get a pig heart transplant."*[30] In many cases however the reasoning behind the intuitive placement on the circles was drenched in feelings, memories, and relational ties (cf. Wenz' circle theory of relations[31]): *"I had a pet rabbit called Flappie - you know, like in the song. So I can't eat rabbits. Rabbits are in my inner circle."*[32] *"I eat meat. No problem there. But when I have seen the animal, when I have looked it in the eye, then I can't eat that one."*[33]

Both ratio as well as feelings and relations thus seem to matter importantly. However, during the interpretation of the conversations it became clear that the construction of (non-)acceptability of keeping and killing of animals for food is most precisely linked with *the parties whose interests are pronounced to be taken into consideration*. This makes sense, because -though related to the attribution of moral standing, relational ties and the intuitive distance that I discussed above- *only those whose interests are considered become part of the actual domestic contract*.

Across the research, the interests of the following parties were mentioned as part of the domestic contract that was constructed:

- The self;
- Loved ones (human and non-human);
- Group members;
- Human beings in general (whether close by or on the other side of the world);
- All living beings (with a possible order of species preference, but including farmed animals);
- The environment, earth or biosphere; and/or
- Future generations.

Circles of increasing consideration of interests

The various considerations of interests thus found are an empirical result of the research. Figure 5.3 captures a pattern that I noticed in this, namely that the consideration of interest theoretically follows increasingly wider circles in terms of spatial and temporal distance.[b]

Figure 5.3: Circles of increasing consideration of interests

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
[b] This idea has been published in: Nijland, H. J., Van Trijp, H. C. M., Aarts, M. N. C., & Ingenbleek, P. T. M. (2013). What is careful livestock farming? Substantiating the layered meaning of the term "careful" and drawing implications for the stakeholder dialogue. *NJAS - Wageningen Journal of Life Sciences, 66,* 23–31.

Though similar to existing models of concentric circle (such as those of Callicot[34], Singer[35] and Wenz[36] mentioned earlier), these circles that arose from the research data are of a practical nature, their workings perhaps best understood using the metaphor of a set of babushka dolls. For, like the Russian dolls each of the groups whose interests are taken into consideration, in theory is broader than the previous, yet also includes it: group members for example include but transcend loved ones, and all living beings include but transcend livestock animals, human beings, as well as the self. This may raise the suggestion of a normative model, but it is not: in practice parties can be (and are) omitted and each doll is not inherently better than another - but only *the ones picked* play a part in an individual person's everyday-life domestic contract.

Individual respondents varied in which and how many parties they thought important enough to include in their construction of whether or not it is acceptable to keep and kill animals for food. There were only very few respondents who took the interests of all parties up until future generations into consideration. Also it is important to note that in the conversations sometimes certain circles may be given a different relative weight: *"Future generations of people I think are important, so we have to conserve biodiversity, but individual animal welfare is less important to me."* [37] And, in select cases, relatively centrally positioned parties were even omitted: *"I really don't like people. People hurt you and are selfish. So I don't care what happens to them. But animals, animals never betray you. That's why I became a vegan."* [38]

Another important difference that came up is that between *the domestic contract in theory* and *the domestic contract in practice*. This division has been described in detail by Argyris and Schön in their work on *espoused theory of action* and *theory-in-use*.[39] Empirically, the distinction became clear when comparing given reasons for performed behaviour in daily life with exceptional situations and especially ideal pictures. An example hereof is: *"I think we should take the welfare of animals into account, and also keep in mind the effect certain diseases have on ourselves. The environment is also important. But I don't really let environmental effects of meat production impact my decisions. I can't take care of everything.* [40] – in which the respondent included the environment in her ideal domestic contract, but excluded it in her practical one.

Domestic contract related values
The main domestic contract related values that were found in the research data were *survival*, *pleasure*, *health*, *profit*, *food safety*, *fair trade*, *world food supply*, *animal welfare/animal rights*, *environmental protection* and *sustainability*. These turned out to be very much aligned with the consideration of interests. This pattern is illustrated in figure 5.4.

Figure 5.4: Consideration of interests and domestic contract related values

The values depicted in increasingly outward circles are a mixture of values that are of importance to consumers personally such as pleasure and health, corporate values such as profitability and legally determined food safety, and values that are important to respectively all human beings, (farmed) animals, the environment and future generations.

Next to these values, there were two other key values that are brought forward when it comes to domestic contract related reasoning and behaviour. These two values represent two opposite standpoints that are taken towards the lives of others, and causing their death. On the one hand, there is a view which I dubbed *'live & let live'* - defending life and valuing death as something negative, especially when causing it in others: *"I just don't think that we have the right to rob an animal of its life."* [41] And on the other hand a *'live & let die'* standpoint surfaced - still valuing life, but also accepting causing death for food as an inherent and natural part of life: *"It's the circle of life: some things have to die in order for other things to live."* [42]

Figure 5.5: The additional values: 'live & let live' and 'live & let die'

In the collected data regarding the construction of (non-)acceptability of keeping and killing animals for food, these value standpoints are typically only brought forward in framing when the interests of (farmed) animals are being taken into consideration - thus beyond the red bold line separating *humans* from *all living beings* in figure 5.5. In addition, they were brought forward in cases where there was a perceived norm of (a) significant other(s) ascribing importance to the interests of the animals in question.[c]

Ideal pictures, norms, and knowledge & convictions

The norms and knowledge & convictions that are brought forward as part of the domestic contracts also are part of this clustered pattern. Norms -what is brought forward that *should be done*, including ideal pictures that are painted- typically take the shape of behaviours fitting the consideration of interests and values one has. For example, where the interests of farmed animals are considered, and animal welfare is being valued, solutions such as *"The biotechnology industry needs to be abolished and organic agriculture promoted instead. This calls for an end to industrial farming practices such as*

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[c] Relating back to the demographic contextual pattern between cities and countryside in section 5.2: if values above the bold line were incorporated, *'live & let live'* values were typically only found among people in urban areas, while in rural areas generally a *'live & let die'* standpoint was adopted.

castration and tougher penalties for those who abuse animals, as well as an end to ritual slaughter without anaesthesia" [43] are typically mentioned. Norms get more complex and contain more benefit trade-offs when more parties are considered: *"We should eat less meat. Animals need to be treated with respect. And, it's better for climate change to drive a Hummer than it is to eat a steak. But, you know, eating some meat is necessary, to not get B12 deficient for example. [...] You know, if it were just me, I could stop eating it. But I have children, and children should not be denied meat."*[44]

The multifaceted example above also contains knowledge & convictions in addition to norms. Across the research, knowledge & convictions were generally brought forward to support the chosen parties and values, or defend why other parties and corresponding values are not taken into consideration. For example, the reasoning defending the value 'fair trade' typically involves knowledge & convictions about the interests of human beings elsewhere on this planet, about what would constitute fair trade, and how this relates to the pronounced performed behaviour of buying fair trade products, but also knowledge & convictions pertaining to what this would imply for -for example- profit and related budgetary measures (a transcended circle), and how this trade-off can best be balanced. The topics in this category furthermore appear to be very flexibly used to construct (non-) acceptability. Knowledge & convictions appear to often be inserted and adapted to fit the direction of people's existing behaviours: *"I don't eat soy or soy-fed meat, as it give me gas. And, also, I've heard that farmers in South America, whose land is being used to grow the soy that is being fed to our livestock, are suffering from hunger, because there is no land left to grow their own food on. Not even to speak of the deforestation of rain forests. So, better not to eat it."*[45] Though sometimes behaviours are adjusted to existing or new knowledge, this is not always the case: *"I know that the efficiency of growing meat is way lower than growing grains for example. So it would be better for the world and its inhabitants to eat less meat. But it's just, you know, a habit that I won't give up easily."*[46]

Clusters of reasoning and behaviour

When looking at individual consumers' domestic contracts, though performed behaviour is situation dependent, the reasoning that is brought forward appears to be importantly linked with the -emotionally as well rationally informed- consideration of interests and related focal values. Across the conversations and documents in the research, a key pattern of eleven groups of typically coinciding framing elements ('common frames'[47]) emerged, that show the connection between the *norms* for *consumption behaviour* (and in ideal cases: *actual consumption behaviour*) that respondents brought forward, and their *ways of reasoning*. Figure 5.6 depicts this pattern, that I call the *clusters of reasoning and behaviour*.

Figure 5.6: The eleven clusters of reasoning and behaviour

Considering the interests of:

Future generations

The environment, earth, biosphere

All sentient beings

Human beings in general

Group members

Self & loved ones (longer term)

Self & loved ones (human & animal)

Self

'Live & let live' · 'Live & let die'

11 - sustainable living

10 - low eco-impact/ flexitarian/ (flex-)vegan

9 - free range/ organic/game

8 - eco-vegan

7 - vegetarian/ vegan

6 - global fair trade/divide

5 - supporting local business

4 - religious food law

3 - healthy/ quality food

2 - regular/cheap/ tasty food

1 - anything goes

The parties whose interests may be considered are portrayed with (half) circles; the line beyond which the interests of farm animals are being considered (or in other words, intrinsic value is assigned to them) is drawn in bold; and the dotted line above separates the 'live & let live' and 'live and let die' standpoints. The white blocks represent the eleven distinct encountered clusters of reasoning and behaviour, named after the consumption behaviours that normatively match the conditions of the reasoning regarding keeping and killing animals for food in each cluster. Everyday-life domestic contracts are made up of reasoning and behaviours belonging to one or more of these clusters and the trade-offs between them.

In brief, the clusters in the inner circles (up until the bold line) relatively straightforwardly follow the core values and reasoning as described in the previous section, paired up with the following dietary choices:

- When one thinks only of oneself and one's survival, *anything goes*;
- From a view that incorporates the interest of the self and loved ones, the choice for *regular/cheap/tasty food* is made;
- At the ensuing cluster of reasoning, *healthy/quality food*, more restrictions start popping up, from the more long-term perspective of health for the self and others;
- *Religious food law* is followed when spiritual health and belonging to a religious group get important;
- Taking the perspective of local farmers into account, reasoning leads to purchasing of regional or national products to *support local business*;
- And when considering the interests of people anywhere on the globe, *fair trade and fair divide of food sources* becomes important.

However, as soon as people start assigning importance to all living beings -including farm animals-, a fork in the clusters of reasoning arises, leading to two paths. From the 'live & let live' standpoint, in which people empathise with animals and not able to bear the idea of causing their slaughter:

- The choice to turn *vegetarian* and eventually *vegan* is made;
- And viewing the earth as a living entity that we should protect, *veganism* is also the norm (though for another reason).

The 'live and let die' value perspective on the other side, in principle not having a problem with slaughter or eating meat, though also minding the welfare of living beings, leads to reasoning combined with:

- Choosing meat that is *free-range/organic/captured in the wild*;
- And when environmental impact becomes in focus, eating meat with *low ecological footprint* becomes important, often also leading to (at least part-time) refraining from meat, popularly called *flexitarianism*, and animal products: *(flex-)veganism*.

Before I discuss the clusters in more detail, I want to stress that, though it is tempting to refer to them as 'groups of people', they are not. Rather, the categories I distinguished are *relatively closed and resilient 'webs' of reasoning, that people quite dynamically choose between, and often also use combined*. Keeping this in mind, the empirically found pattern not only describes the various ways of thinking and talking, it also shines light on the *logic* behind the different individual domestic contracts - and how they can vary in daily life and in exceptional situations.

1: Anything goes

The first cluster of reasoning and behaviour, *anything goes*, lies at the core of the circles of increasing consideration of interests, where the focus is on the self - regardless of others. The main value in this cluster is survival. In our current prosperous society, it is not surprising that this reasoning came forward mainly during the discussion of exceptional situations, such as being stranded on an island after a plane crash, or what was done in war situations (by oneself or others). The norm for consumption behaviour that is brought forward in this cluster is that, if necessary, anything can be eaten: insects, cats & dogs, snakes, meat, organs and blood, even human meat. However, quite some internal conflict came up in this discussion, too, regarding eating animals and parts that are found disgusting (e.g. insects, snakes, blood) and eating close ones (e.g. humans, dogs, cats): *"You know, I talked with someone who was in a concentration camp, and at once was so hungry she had to eat human flesh. She is still ashamed of it, still judges herself for it. I think I would do it, too, if I were really hungry. But I hope I'll never have to."*[48]

2: Regular/cheap/tasty food

The second (and: most common) cluster of reasoning and behaviour, *regular/cheap/tasty food*, lies at the place in the circles where oneself as well as loved ones are taken into consideration. The key value here is providing a pleasurable experience. In practice, this pleasure is derived from consuming a) what is habitually eaten and conveniently available at the supermarket, b) what is cheap, c) what people using this way of reasoning think tastes good, and d) what brings about a feeling of having sufficiency or abundance of food. Though this may vary from person to person, in general the kind of meat consumed is what is regularly offered at restaurants and retail: in Turkey mostly beef, sheep, chicken, turkey and fish - including organ meat (even brains and intestines) but no blood; in the Netherlands mostly pork, chicken, fish and beef - blood is allowed but organ consumption is limited to mostly liver (no intestines). The budgetary aspect of this cluster is not the 'profit'-value (related to corporations, export value and/or BNP) that has been mentioned at the domestic contract related values, but is closer to home: buying cheap meat helps manage the personal 'wallet content' which is also needed for other pleasures and necessities in life. The reasoning is not purely selfish here, for it incorporates one's loved ones, too - including pet animals: *"My dog loves tripe. I can't afford to give it to him daily,*

but I try to get it for him at least once a week."[49] Finally, this cluster also includes pleasing oneself and/or important others by eating different kinds of food out of politeness or curiosity.

3: Healthy/quality food

The third cluster of reasoning and behaviour, *healthy/quality food*, in terms of consideration of interests still is about the self and loved ones, but now from the longer-term perspective of health and quality of living - which are its focal values. The reasoning in this cluster, like the second one, is also quite commonly encountered, though especially prevalent among people who have dealt with illness (of themselves or of a family member): *"My father died of cancer, and he ate a lot of red meat. I've read that red meat causes cancer. So when I eat meat, I only eat chicken and fish."*[50] and among new parents who want the best and safest food for their children: *"Children have a biological need for protein to grow, so it's inhumane to deprive them of meat. And the healthiest meat is organic meat."*[51] Food *safety* is often mentioned with regard to basic health. However, not only gross health risks are important in this cluster, more subtle health impacts related to food *quality* are also problematized, such as the difference between grass-fed and soy-fed beef, between traditional farming (*"of authentic quality"*) and modern intensive farming (*"advanced and hygienic"*); or the impact that the way of slaughter has in terms of the production of stress hormones in the animal whose meat is eaten: *"When pigs are CO2 sedated, they suffer a lot of stress because this method virtually lets them suffocate. And we are eating that stress, you know. That's not good for us."*[52] Quality in this cluster is more important than price: *"You know Kobe cows, they are Japanese cows that are being massaged every day! So their beef is really of great quality. It's very expensive, but boy would I like to try it!"*[53] This is the first cluster in which the ways animals are kept and killed are problematized - though not because the interests of farmed animals are taken into account, but because of the impacts on personal health and that of their loved ones. Though knowledge & convictions vary on what meat is and is not favourable from the perspective of health, in general the norms for consumption behaviour in this cluster impose restrictions on what can be eaten for health reasons. The most common example of this is not eating read meat, eating only white meat and (preferably fat, caught-in-the-wild) fish; other -less common- examples are: eating only grass-fed and well-treated animals, that were not given any hormones or unnecessary antibiotics: *"When we eat factory-farmed meat we live, literally, on tortured flesh. Increasingly, that tortured flesh is becoming our own."*[54] Though eating meat and especially fish is generally brought forward as necessary for health: *"Fish contains healthy fats, Omega fats, that our bodies need to flourish."*[55], in a few cases eating less animal products is mentioned as healthy: *"Dutch health insurance companies have a special insurance package for vegetarians, which is cheaper than the normal ones. If they're putting money on it, it must mean that*

vegetarians live healthier."[56] Labelling and traceability (knowing the origin of food) is important for this cluster.

4: Religious food law

The fourth cluster of reasoning and behaviour, *religious food law*, follows a similar line of thought as the healthy/quality cluster, though in this case that of spiritual health - which arguably is relevant on a longer time scale (i.e. in the afterlife), or in relation to acceptance in a wider social group of religious peers. Norms in this regard were most commonly found amongst Muslim respondents, who require meat to be of trusted *halal* origin. Generally mentioned rules for halal are that pork is forbidden, and that animals need to be slaughtered following the ritual of prayer and cutting the jugular vein of a breathing animal without affecting the air pipe, thus allowing the animal to bleed out properly (as blood is *haram*). Less commonly known contributions to the halal rules were that the knife needs to be out of sight of the animal as well as other animals that are waiting for slaughter, and that the animals need to be treated with respect during life as well. Other mentions of religious food law were kosher meat for Jewish people, and vegetarianism for Buddhists and (high caste) Hindus. A self-pronounced 'non-religious but spiritual' respondent in Turkey furthermore said: *"I became a vegetarian, because I want to be serene and I feel eating meat causes me to be wild and aggressive. We become what we eat. And when you eat meat, you make violence a part of your being."*[57] Ways of keeping and killing animals for food (and accompanying traceability/labelling) thus also are an issue in this cluster of reasoning and behaviour, but here because of the influences these ways have on human beings' spiritual well-being. The degree of care for animals and the earth/environment in the norms in this cluster is importantly linked to the *role* that humans have in relation to nature[58]: e.g. whether God gave animals and nature to humans to use as they see fit, or whether humans are 'stewards' who need to take good care of the animals and nature that are available.[d]

5: Supporting local business

In the fifth cluster of reasoning and behaviour, *supporting local business*, the interests of local farmers and other stakeholders in the vicinity (such as local butchers or other retailers), are being taken into consideration. The main values are protection of these parties' way of life and securing them profit so they can earn a decent living. The accompanying norm for consumption behaviour is the purchasing of local products: *"You know, it's so hard for farmers to make a living, that's why I go to farmers' markets, to support them - cut out the middle man, you know? And of course the local butcher can also*

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[d] An additional role that comes forward is the view that humans are part of nature and thus no different from other animals - in which case reasoning and behaviour tends to move into the circles beyond the bold line (i.e. clusters 7, 9 and possibly 11).

count on my support." [59] In this cluster nothing is said about the way animals should be kept and killed per se, as long as it is done by local farmers. This nevertheless is an important part of the domestic contract: in this cluster the income of farmers and other involved local parties, their 'licence to produce', are given priority to - both on local and on national level: *"We farmers are forced by government rules and market forces to grow more intensive and more large scale. I don't like it, but that's the way it is. Otherwise people won't buy our meat anymore, but will get it from abroad."* [60] The reasoning in this cluster thus also includes objections against the overarching system as it has developed (referring to national government policies, EU's Common Agricultural Policy, and World Trade Organization rules).

Figure 5.7: An example of reasoning and behaviour in cluster 5, reading: *"Do local business, shop locally, eat locally, enjoy your neighbourhood. Change the world, start at yourself. Support local entrepreneurs."*

6: Global fair trade/divide

The sixth cluster of reasoning and behaviour, *global fair trade/divide* focuses on the interests of human beings in general. The key values here are fair trade and fair division of food sources, to ensure the material well-being of all human beings on the globe. Like in the previous cluster, though different norms ensue than from consideration of local or national human interests, the ways animals are kept and killed are not under direct scrutiny from the point of view of this cluster. Norms that are brought forward are providing fair prices for animal feed from abroad, a fair use of resources such as farm land, alleviating poverty, and watching the efficiency of meat production in relation to the supply of food and water in developing countries (for examples see paragraph 5.1 on *knowledge & convictions* earlier in this section).

7: Vegetarian/vegan

In the first circle beyond the bold line not only human beings, but all living beings (including farmed animals) are assigned intrinsic value to. The seventh cluster of reasoning and behaviour, *vegetarian/vegan*, is located on the left-hand side of the dotted line between 'live & let live' and 'live & let die'. In this cluster, because a 'live & let live' standpoint is adhered to, it is found unacceptable to cause suffering as well as death in any beings that are worthy of consideration. The main value is animal rights, which here translates into safeguarding both farm animal well-being as well as their right to stay alive if naturally possible. The initial norm for consumption behaviour that follows from this way of reasoning is *vegetarianism*: refraining from eating meat due to adopting a no-kill policy, but still consuming other animal products such as cheese and eggs. The logical ensuing norm in this cluster is *veganism*. This arguable more restrictive behaviour (that can also be observed in clusters 9, 10 and 11) belongs in this cluster because it adheres to the same reasoning as the just mentioned vegetarianism, simply combined with additional knowledge & convictions regarding the ways dairy cows and laying hens are treated: *"I used to be a vegetarian for years, but then it dawned on me that if I want to be consistent in standing behind my values, I also needed to stop eating eggs and dairy products - even organic ones. Because for the production of eggs, the killing of day-old cockerels is unavoidable and the same goes for bull-calves. And in both systems, even the hens and milk cows don't live to be their natural maximum age. So I went cruelty-free all the way."*[62] An extraordinary expression of empathy with living organisms in this line of reasoning (not encountered in the in-depth conversations, only in the collected documents) is *fruitarianism*: refraining from eating the living parts of plants.

Figure 5.8 (a-b): Examples of reasoning and behaviour in cluster 7, the first one reading: *"Is that an animal friendly piece of meat? No. They've killed the animal."*

8: Eco-vegan

The eighth cluster of reasoning and behaviour, *eco-vegan*, focuses on the impact that keeping and killing animals for food has on the earth, the biosphere – which in this cluster is regarded as a living entity with intrinsic value: *"Earth is not a platform for human life. It's a living being. We're not on it but part of it. Its health is our health."*[65] The focal value is the conservation of the living environment and species, which is aimed for by having a small 'ecological footprint' - having an as low as possible impact on climate change and biodiversity loss. The norm for consumption behaviour in this cluster is strict veganism: *"Animal production has so much impact on our earth, she can't sustain that for much longer. Many species go extinct because of us. So we need to stop burdening Gaia and eat only plant-based, unprocessed foods."*[66] Taking the 'let live' standpoint to an extreme, environmental reasoning in this cluster can lead to far-reaching restrictions on the self: *"Green Evelien[e] does it, she lives vegan and with almost zero waste. Well, of course the most ecological thing we can do would be to commit suicide."*[67] Finally, reduced consumption of animal products in this cluster may come with the realisation that, from a species conservation point of view, farmed animals have an interest in continuation of their species: *"When all people stop eating animal products, there should be special areas designated for the conservation species that for so long provided these products to us."*[68]

9: Free-range/organic/game

On the right hand side of the dotted line lies the ninth cluster of reasoning and behaviour: *free range/organic/game*. Like in the *vegetarian/vegan* cluster, the interests of all living beings, including farmed animals, are taken into consideration here. However, from a 'live and let die' standpoint, though life is valued, death is seen as a natural part of life: *"All animals die, it's only a matter of when and how. And compared with many other natural deaths, death by a human hand may not be so bad: slaughter, if done correctly, is way more comfortable for the animal than it would be in nature when it would die of illness or starvation."* [69] The absence of a principal objection against death or causing it in this cluster, makes the core value the welfare of animals during life and slaughter. This makes the keeping and the killing of animals acceptable only when specific conditions for the animals are met - as farmed animals are seen as possessing *both* instrumental value as well as intrinsic value. One associated norm for consumption behaviour is opting for meat from animals that have had quality of life: for example from free-range or organic farms, or animals living in the wild - handled and transported with care. Another important norm is that the meat-providing animals must be slaughtered in a humane way. However, opinions on what this precisely entails diverge: ritual slaughter is generally seen as bad for the animal because it is usually not stunned and suffers for minutes before losing consciousness, while others think ritual slaughter is actually better, if done correctly,

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[e] A Belgian woman who is living an extremely green lifestyle (see: http://www.greenevelien.com/).

because the animal doesn't see the knife and therefore suffers less stress; and also regarding stunning there is much discussion on the differences between methods such as electric, pinning, and CO_2 stunning that are applied in slaughterhouses: *"With CO_2 stunning pigs scream and panic, it hurts and they suffocate. There has been a test in which they had pigs go and fetch food in a small room, and once they had administered a CO_2 sedation for only a minute, it screamed like hell and would not go back and eat for 72 hours. 72 Hours! That's huge. So it must be very uncomfortable. It is no wonder that the slaughterhouse lowers the pigs into vaults with no peeking holes when using CO_2 stunning. The electric shock on the head method is so much better: it takes only a fraction of a second."*[70]

10: Low eco-impact/flexitarian/(flex-)vegan

In the tenth cluster of reasoning and behaviour, *low eco-impact/flexitarian/(flex-)vegan*, the impact of animal farming on the biosphere and biodiversity is the focal issue. The key value in this cluster is responsibility and care for the environment. However, from a 'live and let die' standpoint the strived-for low impact on climate change and biodiversity in this cluster does not require veganism as a moral baseline, as the consequences of people 'living' are also accepted fully. However, just like the just discussed *free range/organic/game* cluster did find the lives of animals important, the flourishing of the earth is considered of importance - the biosphere and species are seen as having both instrumental as well as intrinsic value. A first norm that is brought forward in terms of consumption in this cluster, is eating meat with *a low ecological footprint*, such as chicken instead of beef, wild boar instead of factory-farmed pig, or from locally reared and fed animals to reduce emissions due to transport (this reasoning therefore also includes statements such as: *"Pig flats may be ugly, but they are closed systems, so they are way better for the environment."*[71]) Another sensible behavioural norm in this cluster is *flexitarianism*: eating meat (and possibly other animal products) in lesser quantity or frequency - of which 'Meatless Monday' is an example. Ultimately, because of reasons like *"Numbers from the UN show that 18 percent of all emissions come from livestock farming - 18 percent! That is more than from all vehicles, including planes, on the whole planet combined!"*[72], *vegan* behavioural norms arises as the most responsible solution in this cluster. This veganism however has a different point of departure and in general is more *flexible* than those in the left-hand side clusters: *"Yes, I am a vegan out of choice, not for the animals, but for environmental reasons. The impact of eating meat on climate change is bigger than the impact of driving a Hummer. Sweet water usage is huge, and then there's the deforestation of Amazon rainforest. And there is almost no fish left in the ocean. I don't want to contribute to all that. But I'm not against eating meat in principle. So if I visit my dementing grandmother and she makes soup with meatballs in it, I won't refuse it."*[73]

11: Sustainable living

The last cluster of reasoning and behaviour I encountered, *sustainable living*, is a somewhat special one. The focal issue of this way of framing is the interests of future generations (or at minimum: long term interests of current generations), and arguments regarding the 'triple bottom line'[74] (people, planet and profit) are likely to come up. Its main value is sustainability, and in some cases holism is also mentioned. However, unlike the other clusters that stand or their own in terms of behavioural norms, sustainable living frames consist of *combining and balancing selected behavioural norms of previous clusters rather than introducing new ones* (the cluster is placed on the middle line of the figure, because the inclusion of clusters to form sustainable living discourse can take either a 'live & let live' or a 'live & let die' route). For example, when considering the long-term interests of (several generations of) humans -making up the 'profit' and 'people' legs of the triple bottom line-, reasoning and behaviour from clusters 5: supporting local businesses and/or 6: global fair trade/divide are incorporated, representing the interests of business owners and human beings around the world. With sustainability as value, the effects on environment and biodiversity -'planet'- typically are added to the reasoning and behavioural norms of cluster 10: low eco-impact/flexitarian/(flex-)vegan or 8: eco-vegan are included. The inclusion of the interests of animals in this case mostly regards species or populations; the well-being of individual animal (clusters 7: vegetarian/vegan or 9: free range/organic/game) are not often included in sustainability frames (unless as part of clusters 3: healthy/quality food or 4: religious food law). Only in a holistic (i.e. all encompassing) interpretation of sustainable living are clusters 7 or 9 also incorporated: for true holism arguably combines clusters in *all* circles: *"Everything is connected. We have to see that if we influence one variable, everything else is influenced, too. If we damage the earth, or the animals, we damage ourselves."*[75]

Understanding different domestic contracts with the clusters of reasoning and behaviour

The ten clusters of reasoning and behaviour discussed above represent ten distinct framing repertoires on the topic of keeping and killing animals for food that emerged from the research. In the ensuing paragraphs I will show how the clusters of reasoning and behaviour can help understand the variation between every-day life domestic contracts.

Combining clusters into domestic contracts

The clusters of reasoning and behaviour, as mentioned before, do not represent types of people per se, but are values, norms, interests, feelings, knowledge & convictions, and behaviours that are contingent (build on one another) and logically coherent and therefore typically occur together during framing. Though it is possible that one person only applies one cluster -cluster 2: *healthy/cheap/tasty food* is common in that regard,

and in select cases cluster 8: *vegetarian/vegan* occurred standing alone in the research ("*I'd give my life for animals. I don't care what happens to farmers or other people one bit. You can trust animals, but not humans.*"[76])-, individual people's domestic contracts generally are more complex, built up of a selection of clusters.

The most commonly encountered combination of clusters is between 2: *regular/cheap/ tasty food*, and 3: *healthy/quality food*. Cluster 1: *anything goes* only came to the fore in exceptional situations, and cluster 4: *religious food law* in the research was added predominantly among Muslim respondents living in or visiting the Netherlands. When reasoning above the bold line is found important, it typically is added to clusters 2 and 3, in which a choice is made between the left-hand 'live & let live' and right-hand 'live & let die'. Of these, clusters 9: *free range/organic/game*, 10: *low eco-impact/ flexitarian/(flex-) vegan* and 7: *vegetarian/vegan* were relatively easy to find, unlike cluster 8: *eco-vegan*, which was not commonly encountered. In a similar manner, clusters 5: *supporting local business* and 6: *global fair trade/divide* were typically not mentioned standing on their own, but as additions *to* other clusters of reasoning and behaviour. Taking the interests of *future generations* (or at minimum: long term interests of current generations) into account inherently leads to a combining of clusters, as discussed in the description of cluster 11: *sustainable living* - yet this is more often people-, profit- and planet-oriented than animal-oriented (thus omitting clusters 7: *vegetarian/vegan* and 9: *free range/organic/game*). While combining clusters in *all circles* arguably can be seen as an expression of *holism*, very few respondents brought forward such a comprehensive combination, and combining *all clusters* was not encountered at all in the research.

To illustrate, an example of an everyday-life domestic contract in which framing repertoires are combined is: "*So to summarize, first of all, animal welfare is very important to me, so I only eat organic meat. I want the animals to live a good life. Besides, organic food is better for my own health as well. And, to contribute my share to prevent climate change, I don't eat beef or dairy products, only chicken. Organic chicken. And sometimes MSC[f] certified fish. Not only is it tasty and healthy, I feel good about that.*"[77] The person in this example combines clusters 9: *free range/organic/game*, 3: *healthy/quality food*, 10: *low eco-impact/flexitarian/(flex-)vegan* and 2: *regular/cheap/tasty food* (in order of appearance). A second striking example of the combining of clusters into a domestic contract in which purchasing meat (or anything else for that matter) is deemed unacceptable is freeganism: "*Freeganism is a total boycott of an economic system where the profit motive has eclipsed ethical considerations and where massively complex systems of productions ensure that all the products we buy will have detrimental impacts most of which we may never even consider. The word freegan is compounded from "free" and*

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[f] Marine Stewardship Council.

"vegan". Vegans are people who avoid products from animal sources or products tested on animals in an effort to avoid harming animals. Freegans take this a step further by recognizing that in a complex, industrial, mass-production economy driven by profit, abuses of humans, animals, and the earth abound at all levels of production (from acquisition to raw materials to production to transportation) and in just about every product we buy."[78] This reasoning and behaviour clearly encompasses a combination of cluster 7: *vegetarian/vegan* with clusters 6: global fair trade/divide and 8: *eco-vegan*. Another, more down-to-earth example is: *"Farmers need to make a living, too, so I understand why they intensify and give hormones and antibiotics to their animals. But that's not good for our health. I don't care much about the animals, but I do believe that the quality of the meat is better when animals have roamed outside and are fed healthy feed, not that soy stuff. The rest, if they are happier or not, I don't care about."*[79], in which cluster 3, *healthy/quality food*, is leading the construction what is acceptable and what not, though the interests of farmers in the Netherlands are taken into account (cluster 5: *supporting local business*); the farm animal circle (cluster 9: *free-range/organic/game*) here forms what could be called a 'negative' part of this person's domestic contract - explicitly mentioned to *not* take into account (but still an important part of framing his domestic contract).

In conclusion, though composite domestic contracts differ in complexity and outcome in terms of (non-)acceptability, the clusters can be recognized fairly easily in framing, which increases our understanding of the values and other ideas the person doing the framing holds.

Complexity increases with selected clusters and trade-offs to be made

As explained with the babushka doll set metaphor in the paragraph on the circles of increasing consideration of interests, the parties whose interests are picked to be taken into consideration play a role in individual domestic contracts. In theory, clusters in wider circles take parties into account that not only transcend but also include the parties in smaller circles: all living beings for example includes farm animals, all humans, group members and the self. In practice however, as we can see in the empirical examples provided in the previous paragraph, often certain clusters are emphasised, while others are omitted. In the first example, one's own taste, physical health, as well as farmed animals and the environment are taken into account, while spiritual health, farmers' livelihood and global fair trade/divide are not mentioned as part of the domestic contract. And in the second example, the line is drawn at the interests of farmers. We can thus see that, with the number of parties that are taken into account, the reasoning in domestic contracts becomes more multifaceted: more values, norms and interest need to be considered, and more knowledge & convictions become relevant.

The complexity of domestic contracts however is not only dependent on the number of clusters that are incorporated. Another factor is the incongruence of the reasoning in the clusters: the more contradicting arguments are encountered, the more complex the construction of (non-)acceptability is. In the first example, more clusters play a role than in the second example; however, the arguments used in the first example amplify one another, while the two contributing clusters of the second example (consideration for farmer's livelihood and personal health/quality of life) are in opposition to one another and thus pose a dilemma that makes the reasoning more intricate.[g] The number of trade-offs that need to be made to arrive at a certain conclusion thus also impacts the complexity of a domestic contract that gets constructed.

Balancing clusters and the robustness of reasoning

When multiple clusters are combined, a balancing of reasoning and behaviour takes place to create a new story. What this story, this domestic contract looks like, depends on the interplay between participating ways of reasoning and behaviour.h This means that, depending on the view a person has of the world and the role humans have in it, dietary choices and restrictions are constructed as either a matter of people, of animals, of the environment, or as a combination of these. The selected clusters of reasoning and behaviour thereby either are brought forward as part of what is valid for an individual respondent, or are mentioned as reasoning that they are aware of yet challenge and pronounce not to adhere to themselves (i.e. the earlier mentioned 'negative' parts of the domestic contract).

Apart from possible ambiguous knowledge & convictions (e.g. about the level of impact something has), reasoning within each separate cluster is typically coherent: the taking into account of certain parties' interests, whether based on rational though or feelings, co-arises with values and behavioural norms, as the clusters of reasoning show. In cases where the actually performed behaviour *matches* the behavioural norm of the cluster, a quite resilient 'loop' of framing occurs. When multiple clusters are combined and need to be balanced, reasoning becomes more complex. However, the more clusters are incorporated in a balanced way, the more *robust* the reasoning becomes - in the sense that the domestic contract becomes more complete, more 'bases are covered', making it less prone to accusations of self-referentiality. An example of this is: *"I care about animals, including farm animals, though I don't mind eating them sometimes - as long as they are treated well. But in this day and age, there are so many healthy alternatives for meat that*

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[g] Most of the time, such trade-offs occur between clusters, though there may also be trade-offs within one cluster - e.g. in case of contradicting knowledge & convictions.

[h] The conceptualisation of this interplay will be deepened in chapter 6, with the addition of competing inner drives.

eating animal protein is generally not necessary - as long as we are not dying, we don't need to. So I am a vegan almost all of the time. Also, being mindful of the inefficiency of meat production, the effects this has on food supply for countries in which there is still hunger, and on the environment, I thought it better to eat a less of it. I do enjoy and sometimes miss its taste, I especially love fish, but I have discovered this vegan chick-pea based recipe that I swear tastes just like tuna! So that is solved. But I'm not rigid: on special occasions, when celebrating with friends for example, I treat myself to a meat dish."[80] in which clusters 1, 2, 3, 6, 8 and 9 are clearly and thoughtfully balanced, making the reasoning and behaviour rather difficult to refute. A domestic contract in which a diversity of clusters of reasoning and behaviours are incorporated in a well-balanced manner (the behavioural norm usually being that belonging to the cluster in the widest incorporated circle), thus tends to become more robust.

Incoherence related to lack of thought and uncertainty

In practice, due to *not everyone haven given the topic much conscious thought*, or *uncertainty* as to what actually constitutes the better behavioural choice in a certain cluster, related to for example *not knowing enough* about the implications of a behaviour or to information being *ambiguous*, every-day life domestic contracts can be quite incoherent and unstable. However, recognising that people combine clusters that appeal and apply to them to form their personal basic domestic contract, helps understand even these not (yet) coherently balanced domestic contracts.

An example of an everyday-life domestic contract of someone that is not yet fully sure what to do, is: *"Yes, I eat meat, it's normal isn't it? [...] I get the creeps when listening to those Wakker Dier*[j] *radio commercials about how animals are treated. For a brief while I actually stopped and bought those meat replacements they have at the Albert Heijn. But then I slowly but surely started eating meat again. It's a habit. And though I'm not 100% sure of that, I reckon it's healthy, too. But I'm still feeling icky about it sometimes. [...] Farmers have started a counter movement to Wakker Dier, Anti-Wakker Dier, which I think is funny. But hey, who cares, I'm sure they'll find another job to do if everyone turns vegetarian."*[81]

However irresolute this domestic contract is, it is clear that the effects of keeping and killing animals for food on both animals and humans are incorporated: a balancing is taking place between becoming a vegetarian for the sake of the animals (cluster 7) and what is regular and healthy (clusters 2 and 3). The interests of farmers (cluster 3) are also mentioned by this person, though these are not a clear part of constructing the (non-) acceptability of keeping and killing animals for food. Though people thus can be dynamic

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[j] A Dutch NGO raising awareness on factory farming.

and even incoherent in how they frame their ways of reasoning and behaving, the clusters still provide insight into the logic of their framing. Another thing this example shows, is that behaviour can follow reasoning as well as reasoning can follow behaviour; there is a link between the two but not necessarily a one-way causal one.

Reasoning-behaviour responsibility, ambivalence and dissonance

Whether behaviour follows reasoning or reasoning follows behaviour, the research suggests that reasoning and behaviour are linked in clusters. It furthermore seems that this link comes with a sense of *responsibility* to either perform the normative behaviour that is associated with the reasoning of clusters that are found important (or the awareness of a deviating societal norm that is considered significant) - or to defend the actually performed behaviour. This sense of responsibility related to linked reasoning and behavioural norms explains the 'icky feeling' that is felt when the performed behaviour in a certain situation is *dissonant* with occurring reasoning - whether one's own or perceived in significant others.[82]

Of course, as set forth in the paragraph on ambivalence, dissonance and coping strategies in chapter 2.2, a state of conflicting arguments and ways of reasoning (*ambivalence*) is inherent to any trade-off situation and is not necessarily experienced as problematic. However, when someone grows aware that the reasoning and behaviour that make up their domestic contract don't match, that they lack certain arguments, and/or if there is a lot of uncertainty about what is the right course of action and why, ambivalence may turn into the (deemed uncomfortable) state of *dissonance*. According to the cognitive dissonance theory, people strive to solve uncertainty and contradictions in their reasoning and choices that cause dissonance, with the use of coping strategies.[83] I will elaborate more on this mechanism and on encountered coping strategies that indicate experienced states dissonance in chapter 6 and appendix IV.

For now, I want to show that the clusters of reasoning and behaviour also can help shed light on this occurring dissonance. For dissonance typically occurs when the performed behaviour does not fit the normative behaviour belonging to the reasoning in clusters that are -rationally and/or emotionally- found important. In most cases, this is when reasoning and normative behaviour (whether the own or that perceived in significant others) are in clusters that are *in wider circles* than the performed behaviour: *"I know what's going on in the bio-industry. My daughter keeps telling me. I've seen the footage. I know I should rethink my behaviour. I want to actually. But at the moment I'm still eating supermarket meat."* [84]. Additionally, dissonance occurs when rational reasoning and performed behaviour is on the 'live & let die' side, while one is emotionally adhering to the 'live & let live' side: *"Oh, I find that, IF I eat meat, which I do... I should also be able to kill and skin an animal. But I can't - I couldn't... So...I find myself rather hypocritical."*[85]

Situation dependency: ideals, daily life and exceptions

The clusters of reasoning and behaviour thus are a way of mapping the different empirically encountered framing repertoires. They shed light on the logic behind different people's every-day life construction of the (non-)acceptability of keeping and killing animals for food - whether the resulting framing is coherent or faltering. In addition, the clusters can also be used to start understanding differences *within* one person's reasoning and consumption behaviour, in varying situations. During the research, though some people pronounced to be very strict in their behaviours, many individual people referred to performing different behaviours in various (real or hypothetical) situations. Besides changes over time that were mentioned (such as *"I used to be a true carnivore, loving especially red meat, but after my dad died of cancer 3 years ago, I turned to white meat only."*[86]), distinctions were made between ideal circumstances, normal daily life situations and extraordinary cases.

Ideal pictures, such as: *"I knew that, for the environment, the animals, and my personal mental and psychological health, something needed to be done. Moreover: I can afford it. So I turned vegan."* [87] involve a situation in which all conditions are favourable to perform the normative behaviour that belongs to the cluster of reasoning in the widest circle that is incorporated in an individual's domestic contract (in this case cluster 8: *eco-vegan*). In many everyday-life domestic contracts, trade-offs lead to choosing behaviour that belongs to other incorporated clusters: *"When organic meat would be available, I would eat organic meat, always. I adhere to those values. But that's not really possible here in Turkey. And, I do know I need meat to thrive. So I eat regular meat. What can you do?"* [88] In this example clusters 9, *free range/organic/game*, 3: *healthy/quality food* and 2, *regular/cheap/tasty food* are balanced and the latter is opted for, due to -in this case- reasons of *availability* as well as *necessity* for health. The necessity-argument by the way is also used in the opposite way: someone who adheres to cluster 9: *free/range/organic/game* and thus frames keeping and killing animals for food as normal and natural, may choose to refrain from meat when there are ample replacements available for the protein, iron & B12 that it provides. Actual choices in such daily life cases thus may not coincide with the ideal norm of the cluster in the widest circle that is incorporated.

Even when relatively balanced choices are made in daily life, when discussing *extraordinary situations* quite deviating behavioural choices are framed as being acceptable for an individual. An example of this is the case of eating meat from uncommon animal species or uncommon parts of the animal out of curiosity or politeness (or conversely: eating a vegan meal when visiting a vegan acquaintance). Another example of an extraordinary situation is a sudden necessity for reasons of survival or the recovering of health: : *"You know, I always eat vegetarian. But then this once, I had eye surgery and*

my eye wouldn't heal. Then the doctor was so puzzled, and when he found out I didn't eat meat, he ordered me to. So I did, I ate steak and meat balls for a week, and my eye healed. It was needed, apparently. But now I'm a happy vegetarian again." [89] Not being a regular part of one's consumption behaviour, these instances are framed as *exceptions*. In terms of the clusters of reasoning and behaviour, in these situations one actually keeps the reasoning belonging to the clusters one adheres to in daily life: they are just temporarily traded off for other clusters (typically cluster 2: *regular/cheap/tasty food* in case of curiosity and politeness, and 1: *anything goes* or 3: *healthy/quality food* in case of necessity).

Last but not least, the clusters of reasoning and behaviour shine light on another type of exception: that which is made for farmed animals that a relationship has been developed with to the extent that these once designated 'consumption animals' are pardoned from being eaten[j]: *"I have no problem with eating animals. But if I have looked it in the eye, or have cared for it and especially when I know its name, I cannot eat that animal anymore."* [90] However, this is not a sudden widening of the circles to include farmed animals in the domestic contract, nor a change from 'live & let live' to 'live & let die' - rather it is an exceptional relocating of said farmed animal in the 'loved ones' circle - making it the equivalent of a pet. (In a similar manner this also happens the other way around - where people keep animals as 'part of the family' until the time comes for the sacrifice and they are relocated into the category of consumption animal.)

Tool for (self-)analysis and dialogue facilitation

Summarizing, the clusters of reasoning and behaviour not only describe the various ways of framing that arose from the research data, they also shine light on the logic of the different individual domestic contracts, providing insight into how these can vary from individual to individual, as well as from situation to situation.

Besides being an empirical research result, the clusters (illustrated once more in figure 5.9, this time with accompanying domestic contract related values) provide an important *tool for (self-)analysis*. The reasoning and behaviour that is incorporated in a person's ideal and practical domestic contracts in a given situation can be distinguished fairly easily with help of the eleven clusters of reasoning and behaviour combined with the following questions:

- *What behaviour is performed that relates to keeping, killing and consuming animals?*
- *Which parties' interests are taken into consideration, ideally and in practice?*
- *What values and norms are pronounced important?*

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[j] This also happens the other way around - where people keep animals as 'part of the family' until the time comes for the sacrifice.

- *What stance is taken regarding causing death in other living beings: is it more valued as something negative or more seen as an inherent and natural part of life?*
- *Which clusters thus play a role and: how are they balanced?*

Figure 5.9: The clusters of reasoning and behaviour

Next to forming an analytical tool, the pattern can be used as a *tool for dialogue facilitation*. Feedback sessions held with several of the original respondents as well as new informal conversations about the pattern, indicate that insight into the domestic contract using the clusters of reasoning and behaviour leads to more understanding of both oneself as well as others and provides a non-judgemental space for thought and talk (even people who are not using the clusters outside of the bold line reported that with the tool they now understood why others would). Especially combined with the questions above, the clusters of reasoning and behaviour can be applied as a tool to start a conversation about the reasoning and behaviours consumers put into practice in their everyday lives and about what their ideas on the topic of keeping and killing animals for food are - in a simple and structured way.

The dynamics of reasoning and behaviour

The results of the research so far help to comprehend how consumers in the Netherlands and Turkey frame the (non-)acceptability of keeping and killing animals for food in everyday-life, and help to see the interrelatedness of the various framing repertoires. A start has also been made in understanding variations in individual consumers' reasoning and consumption behaviour in changing settings, e.g. over time or in exceptional situations. However, patterns that emerged from the research regarding interests (recognised stakes and goals strived for in specific situations) and ways of decision making,

indicate that much more can be said about the dynamics of individual reasoning and behaviour. Grounded in the research data and building on the theory provided in chapter 2.3, I will further conceptualise the decision making process underlying the construction of individual domestic contracts, in the next chapter. In chapter 7, the final chapter, I will elaborate more in-depth on the scientific and societal relevance of the synthesised research findings.

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[2] Informal conversation, Netherlands, female, 30-50, urban

[3] Planned conversation, Netherlands, male, 50+, urban

[4] Planned conversation, Turkey, female, 15-30, urban

[5] Planned conversation, Netherlands, female, 30-50, urban

[6] Informal conversation, Turkey, male, 30-50, urban

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[12] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vegetarianism_by_country#cite_note-70
http://www.diyetisyendunyasi.com/guncel-haberler/200-diyetisyen-yesim-ozcan-turkiyedeki-vejetaryen-sayisi

[13] Planned conversation, Netherlands, male, 50+, urban

[14] Planned conversation, Netherlands, male, 30-50, urban

[15] Meat prices are indeed indeed much higher in Turkey than in the Netherlands. See
http://www.esk.gov.tr/tr/12197/Satis-Fiyatlari; http://www.numbeo.com/food-prices/country_result.jsp?country=Netherlands; and http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/high-meat-prices-planned-imports-ruffle-feathers-in-turkey.aspx?pageID=238&nID=86850&NewsCatID=345

[16] Planned conversation, Turkey, 15-30, rural

[17] Planned conversation, Netherlands, male, 50+, rural

[18] Planned conversation, Turkey, male, 30-50, urban

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[21] Pilot conversation, Turkey, male, 15-30, urban

[22] Planned conversation, Turkey, female, 50+, urban

[23] Planned conversation, Netherlands, male, 50+, urban

[24] Bormann, E. G. (1985). Symbolic convergence theory: A communication formulation. *The Journal of Communication*, *35*(4), 128–138.

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[26] Planned conversation, Netherlands, male, 50+, urban

[27] Planned conversation, Netherlands, male, 50+, urban

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[30] Planned conversation, Turkey, female, 30-50, urban

[31] Wenz, P. S. (1988). *Environmental Justice*. Albany: State University of New York Press.

[32] Informal conversation, Netherlands, male, 30-50, urban

[33] Planned conversation, Netherlands, male, 30-50, urban

[34] Callicott, J. B. (1988). On Intrinsic Value of Nonhuman Species. In B. G. Norton (Ed.), *The Preservation of Species: The Value of Biological Diversity*. Princeton: Princeton UniversityPress.

[35] Singer, P. (1983). *The Expanding Circle: Ethics and Sociobiology*. Oxford/Melbourne: Oxford University Press.

[36] Wenz, P. S. (1988). *Environmental Justice*. Albany: State University of New York Press.

[37] Informal conversation, Turkey, female, 50+, rural

[38] Planned conversation, Turkey, female, 30-50, urban

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[40] Planned conversation, Netherlands, female, 50+, urban

[41] Informal conversation, Turkey, male, 15-30, urban

[42] Planned conversation, Netherlands, male, 15-30, urban

[43] Social media post, Netherlands

[44] Planned conversation, Turkey, female, 30-50, urban

[45] Informal conversation, Turkey, female, 50+, mixed urban & rural

[46] Planned conversation, Netherlands, male, 15-30, urban

[47] Bormann, E. G. (1985). Symbolic convergence theory: A communication formulation. *The Journal of Communication*, *35*(4), 128–138.

Swaffield, S. (1998). Frames of Reference: A Metaphor for Analyzing and Interpreting Attitudes of Environmental Policy Makers and Policy Influencers. *Environmental management*, *22*(4), 495–504.

[48] Planned conversation, Netherlands, male, 50+, urban

[49] Planned conversation, Netherlands, female, 30-50, rural

[50] Planned conversation, Turkey, female, 50+, urban

[51] Planned conversation, Turkey, female, 15-30, urban

[52] Informal conversation, Netherlands, female, 30-50, urban

[53] Informal conversation, Netherlands, male, 30-50, urban

[54] Informal conversation, Netherlands, quoting Jonathan Safran Foer on Eating Animals

[55] Planned conversation, Netherlands, female, 30-50, urban

[56] Informal conversation, Netherlands, female, 30-50, urban

[57] Informal conversation, Turkey, male, 15-30

[58] Cf. Zweers, W. (1995). *Participeren aan de natuur: ontwerp voor een ecologisering van het wereldbeeld*. Utrecht: Van Arkel.

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[59] Planned conversation, Netherlands, female, 30-50, urban

[60] Informal conversation, Netherlands, male, 50+, urban

[61] Social media post, Netherlands

[62] Planned conversation, Turkey, female, 30-50, urban

[63] Social media post, Netherlands, caricature by Hein de Kort

[64] Social media post, Turkey

[65] Social media post, Netherlands, quoting Thomas Moore

[66] Informal conversation, Netherlands, male, 30-50, urban

[67] Informal conversation, Netherlands, male, 30-50, urban

[68] Planned conversation, Turkey, male, 50+, urban

[69] Informal conversation, Netherlands, female, 30-50, urban

[70] Social media post comment (on a video about CO_2 stunning), Netherlands

[71] Informal conversation, Netherlands, female, 30-50

[72] Social media post excerpt (from a video by Robert Bridgeman), Netherlands, male, 30-50, urban

[73] Informal conversation, Netherlands, female, 30-50, urban

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[75] Informal conversation, Turkey, male, 50+

[76] Informal conversation, Turkey, female, 30-50, urban

[77] Informal conversation, Netherlands, female, 30-50, urban

[78] Excerpt from a website, suggested to me in an informal conversation in the Netherlands: http://freegan.info/

[79] Planned conversation, Netherlands, female, 15-30, urban

[80] Informal conversation, Netherlands, female, 30-50, urban

[81] Planned conversation, Netherlands, male, 30-50, urban

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[84] Informal conversation, Netherlands, female, 30-50, urban

[85] Informal conversation, Turkey, female, 30-50, urban

[86] Planned conversation, Turkey, female, 50+, urban

[87] Planned conversation, Netherlands, female, 50+, urban

[88] Planned conversation, Turkey, female, 30-50, urban

[89] Planned conversation, Turkey, female, 30-50, urban

[90] Planned conversation, Netherlands, male, 30-50, urban

CHAPTER 6

Conceptualising the decision making process underlying the construction of domestic contracts

Research focus addressed in this chapter:

The decision making process

Focal questions:

- **How can the process of deciding on everyday-life constructions of (non-) acceptability of keeping and killing animals for food be conceptualised?**
- **How can the acquired insights contribute to a better understanding of the everyday-life construction of domestic contracts?**

"You didn't come here to make a choice, you've already made it. You're here to try to understand why *you made it."*

--The Oracle (The Matrix Reloaded)

The patterns reported in chapter 5 help explain the logic of various ways of framing (non-)acceptability of keeping and killing animals for food that were encountered in the Netherlands and Turkey. However, they provide little insight into the process through which people *arrive* **at their choices to bring forth particular ways of reasoning and behaviour. In this chapter I therefore set forth a model that conceptualises the decision making process underlying the construction of domestic contracts. This conceptualisation offers an additional explanation of the logic behind the various frames and especially of why these frames may be dynamic in changing settings.**

6 - Conceptualising the decision making process underlying the construction of domestic contracts

6.1 Introduction: on researching decision making processes

The analysis in chapter 5 and the resulting pattern of the clusters of reasoning and behaviour indicated that, though the individual framing of domestic contracts is complex and context-dependent, the way they are constructed is not at random: there is a logic behind the ways pronounced behaviours and other framing elements are combined, related among others to the internal consideration of interests and values that are found important. In this chapter, again through interpretive analysis of framing dynamics, but this time more visibly aided by sensitizing concepts, I will focus on developing a conceptualisation of the internal process of decision making, in order to further explain personal and contextual differences in framing.

As I will argue, the process leading up to domestic contract related decisions is also not arbitrary: the sensitizing concepts on framing and decision making set forth in the theoretical framework in chapter 2 and the case-driven framing analysis performed as part of this research suggest that, though often complex and subconscious, decision making is a quite sensible process. In this process, how we perceive a situation and how we decide to react to it is governed by the priming of drives (impulses motivating us to act towards achieving a certain goal), their relative strengths, and the cognitions (pieces of information that help us to know things - i.e. thoughts and feelings) available to them.

The result of this conceptualisation of the dynamics of decision making is a model, that I call the inner decision committee model. In the remainder of this chapter I will present the model in detail, show how it aids the understanding of the dynamic everyday-life construction of domestic contracts and forms a tool for (self-)analysis and dialogue promotion. But first I will briefly explain how I went about analysing the decision making process.

Input, output and interpretive analysis of framing dynamics

Following the sensitizing concepts described in chapter 2, framing is conceptualised as an outcome of a complex, dynamic, goal-oriented decision making process.[1] The *'input'* to this decision making process, determining the activation of certain cognitions (i.e. thoughts and feelings) and drives (i.e. impulses to act) in a certain individual in a certain situation, consists of both the individual's *existing collection of cognitions* and *drives*, as well as the *external* (physical/objective and cultural/subjective) *environment* that can

trigger existing cognitions and drives and add new ones to the decision process. The observable *'output'* of the decision making process consists of *framing* (communicative behaviour) and *other actions* (e.g. consumption of or refraining from certain products, information seeking behaviour or joining a social movement). The decision making process itself, however shaped by (and shaping) the external reality, is an entirely *internal affair*, that is conceptualised as an interactive process taking place in the mind: a dialogue amongst inner drives and fuelled by existing or newly added cognitions -whether or not occurring during, following or anticipating on an external dialogue with an actual person.

Because decision making largely takes place inside the 'black box' of the mind, researching it requires *interpretative analysis*. As explained in detail in chapter 3.2, the conceptualisation of the decision making process underlying the construction of domestic contracts was approached via an interpretive theory development method known as abductive reasoning.[2] This involved a stepwise iterative analysis of framing dynamics, building on existing theory, but also importantly derived from the collected research data and my interpretation thereof as a researcher. The *data* that forms the empirical basis of this research -and of the model- consists of the collected domestic contract related frames that are constructed in interaction with (real or imaginary) others in various regular and exceptional hypothetical situations. As described in section 3.3, these were collected via planned semi-structured in-depth conversations and ensuing feedback sessions, added upon by encountered documents as well as notes of unplanned informal conversations. To gain an as in-depth understanding of the decision process as possible, the laddering method was applied in the planned semi-structured in-depth conversations, asking for concrete practices, then posing why-questions and allowing people to elaborate on their previous answers (content and process) until no deeper clarifying answer was given.[3] The interests (strived-for goals - both material and immaterial, individual and interactional) that were pronounced as part of the frame-of-reference indicated the drives that are at play leading up to certain frames. Lastly, to analyse routes of processing taken, I made use of self-reports on the various ways of coming to a decision, and connected these to the kind of frames that are brought forward.

In the following section of this chapter, I will present the model of decision making that resulted from this interpretive analysis of everyday-life domestic contracts, building on the combined sensitizing concepts of chapter 2 and the patterns that arose from the accumulated data.

6.2 The inner decision committee model

The model described in this section is aimed at creating a better understanding of the dynamics of the decision making process underlying individual consumers' various everyday-life constructions of the (non-)acceptability of keeping and killing animals for food. The detailed conceptualisation of this process and the parts that play a role in it, in particular helps understand why individual people make different decisions in varying situations.

Basics of the model

The basic model, as set forth in chapter 2.3 and shown in figure 6.1, supposes a metaphorical inner decision committee, of which the members are interacting inner drives (motivating forces, resulting from the tension between what is wanted and what is perceived to be there) that each strive for their own specific goal.

Under the influence of external contextual information (that may include the effects of past decisions) and the internal existing collection of cognitions, certain cognitions and committee members get primed while others may remain inactive, therewith influencing the internal dialogue that is being held and the decision that ensues. To reach a decision, committee members that are active at a certain moment in time participate in a negotiation, strategically combining available cognitions (thoughts and feelings) in order to accomplish their goal, which then results in a certain action and an accompanying frame.

Figure 6.1: The inner decision committee model

Besides being determined by the inner committee members and cognitions that get primed (the *mindset*), the outcome of the decision depends on the *dynamics within the committee*. Certain committee members are more inclined to be triggered, increasing the likelihood of their participation in the inner negotiation process, and some are assigned more importance to than others due to an emotional charge or identification with said committee member, which increases their relative strength. Also, as in any negotiation process, forces may be combined and parties may be oppressed.

Combined, these tendencies are reflected in the different modes of processing. In short, when a decision is made using *intuitive processing*, all committee members -even those in the blind spot- are invited to participate, resulting in a decision process that is fair and of high quality. When all relevant committee members within conscious awareness are actively heard, a *deliberate* decision is made, involving systematic analysis with focused awareness on drives and cognitions within consciousness. When the process is on the *heuristic* side of the continuum, the decision is largely unconscious and impulsive - which is either the result of the 'winning' of the most powerful (coalition of) committee member(s) in the context at hand, or a habitual repetition of a once more or less consciously made decision.

I will elaborate on all this in detail in the remainder of this section. In its basic form, the inner decision committee model thus postulates that decisions and accompanying frames are shaped from a relatively steady collection of drives and cognitions, yet also are dynamic as active inner goals change in interaction with external and internal situational input. (To illustrate with an example from the research: *"After a night of watching live music in Taksim[a] my friends suggested to have bread with Kokoreç[b] together. I liked the idea, so we walked towards the Kokoreç place."* which shows external situational input leading to a motivation and an action. *"On the way however, thinking of Kokoreç, I remembered a documentary I had seen a while ago explaining the origins and health risks of the dish. Then I changed my mind, and decided against having one myself."[A]* which indicates internal priming of knowledge in the collection of cognitions as well as an antagonistic drive, in this case resulting in a deviating action.)

Next to being based on sensitizing concepts in chapter 2, the conceptualisation of the process of decision making in the case of the construction of everyday-life domestic contracts thus was importantly grounded in my interpretive framing analysis of consumers in the Netherlands and Turkey. The categories and codes listed in appendix III, providing an overview of the accumulated framing elements that were collected during the

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[a] A district with a lot of night life in Istanbul.
[b] Cut up intestines with spices.

research, reflect the potentially available thoughts and feelings in the *collection of cognitions*. The element *interests* (ingredient 5 of said appendix: goals that inner drives (consciously or unconsciously) motivate us to strive for) reveals the goals of recognized committee members. And *pronounced ways of decision making* (see ingredients 1.4 and 2.3 off appendix III) provided the basis for the formulation of the various modes of processing. I will further develop the model, building on the research into the domestic contract, in the rest of this section.

Characteristics of the committee members: four main groups, an inner chairperson and a joker

To explain the construction of everyday-life domestic contracts by means of the inner decision committee model, the characteristics of the inner drives that I found to play a key role need to be described in more detail. Across the research, respondents differed in terms of the interests (goals) that they brought forward as important to them (including both goals that are relevant directly for themselves as well as goals that matter in the interaction with others). When bringing order in these, I found that the committee members and their respective goals can be divided in four overarching groups, with the addition of two special committee members: an inner chairperson and a joker.

The four main groups of (competing and collaborating) committee members

Organising and scrutinising the variety of interests that surfaced during domestic contract related framing across my research (especially salient in the description of differences between hypothetical normal daily situations and exceptional situations such as when acting out of politeness, curiosity or necessity), resulted in the discernment of four main committee member groups.[5] I named them based on their overarching goals:

1) 'I want to live according to my moral convictions'

2) 'I want to take care of my physique'

3) 'I want to manage my relationships', and/or

4) 'I want to manage living in the world'

Ad 1: The goal that the first group of committee members that I distinguished has in common, is wanting to live according to one's personal moral convictions. This group, that largely coincides with the category 'values' of the frame-of-reference, includes committee members with goals such as being compassionate, responsible, well-informed, consistent, realistic, and contributing to a better world.

Ad 2: The second set of committee members focuses on safeguarding physical and emotional needs and preferences (taking care of one's physique), which encompasses

members with goals like satisfying the senses, emotional well-being, comfort, the continuation of pleasant habits, staying or becoming healthy, and plain surviving.

Ad 3: The third group, aiming to manage relationships, consists of members that are involved with ensuring the connection with others, with 'fitting in' through being a part of cultural identity, safeguarding their credibility and social status, as well as caring for loved ones and other fellow beings (i.e. empathizing with and helping them attain their goals).

Ad 4: The last category of goals that people refer to, regards managing to live in the world. The committee member members is this group are driven to for example generate or safeguard income, adjusting to (or conversely: wanting to adapt) the existing system of economy, legislation and policy, and deal with (perceived or real) constraints such as the accessibility of information and availability of certain products.

In any given situation, primed committee members from one or more (and likely all) of these overarching groups play a role in the negotiation process leading to a decision. Of course all categorisation is artificial and ambiguous and the discerned elements relate to and mutually influence one another: a value-driven goal for example often also has a physical, a relational and a structural/systemic component. Within each group, one could furthermore distinguish sub-groups based on e.g. short-term and long-term goals or unambiguous needs versus mere 'would-likes': taste and health for example both relate to caring for one's physique but pertain different possible time frames as well as variations in urgencies. There thus are multiple ways to categorize the large variety of goals. However, for purposes of (self-) analysis the four main committee member groups form a meaningful way to organize most of the goals -reflecting existing inner drives- that were brought forward during the framing of domestic contacts.

An example illustrating the workings of the four goal divisions is: *"Oh, I love the taste of meat and am convinced I should eat meat every day to stay healthy* (goals: satisfying the senses and staying healthy – both in the taking care of physique group)*, but when I visit my good friend Tom, who is a vegetarian, I am okay with eating a meatless meal* (goal more powerful in that context: managing the relationship)*. When he visits me, he brings along a meat-replacement so he doesn't have to compromise his values* (his friend's most powerful goal: living by his guiding principles)*, while not forcing me to have to change my cooking pattern* (his friend's additional goal: managing the relationship)*. However, I know for a fact, that when Tom visited the Himalayas - so high up that people didn't have easy access to vegetables and served him meat instead - he chose to eat the meat."* [6] (most important goal in that context: managing to live in the world as it is).

In addition to the main groups, my research lead me to distinguish two special committee members that have a specific influence on the dynamics of the decision making process: the inner chairperson and the joker. I will explicate their workings in the ensuing paragraphs.

The inner chairperson: 'I want to decide in a fair and high quality way'
The first special committee member that helps explain differences in the decision making process leading up to the various constructions of the domestic contract, is the *inner chairperson*. This drive, belonging to the moral convictions-oriented group, could also be referred to as our *conscience* - though in contrast with popular religious use of the term, the inner chairperson in my model does not sui generis know or decide on which frame or action is right or wrong. Instead, it aims for the *process* of decision making among the committee members in a given situation to be *fair and of high quality*: meaning that the goals and cognitive input of all committee members that are relevant to the situation are taken into account and no parties are being oppressed in the negotiation process.[7]

The inner chairperson works by monitoring and facilitating (chairing) the negotiation by the other committee members. When there is no apparent incongruence between goals and/or cognitions, the inner chairperson generally remains dormant, allowing automatic decision making. Activation of the inner chairperson in a certain situation (typically either by priming an identity that includes the desire to be fair or by a situation invoking so much dissonance that it calls for a 'reality check'[8]) means that one becomes *aware* of one's decision making process (including the awareness that non-conscious drives and cognitions are part of this process). As I will explain in more detail in the paragraphs on the modes of decision making, this begins with a mere witnessing of the (still heuristic) workings of the committee and its members, followed by the chairperson's active interference in the process of negotiation. When growing stronger, the inner chairperson will get increasingly successful in chairing the committee in a fair and high quality (or as Bierly calls it: wise) manner, meaning that all committee members are allowed to voice their goals in the process (i.e. none are being oppressed), and all relevant cognitions are allowed to be voiced and also incorporated in a given situation.[9]

It must be noted that achievement of deciding in a fair and high quality manner in a given situation does not mean that the *outcome* of said decision is necessarily the best one imaginable. Though research indicates that intuitive decision making leads to outcomes that are of higher quality[10], outcome may very well be of good quality even when decision making is automatic[11] (when the inner chairperson is dormant or allows automatic decision making), and, moreover, even when the decision making process is conscious, outcome is never fully foreseeable due to the many degrees of uncertainty involved in complex situations.[12] However, activation of a strong inner chairperson arguably does set

the best possible *conditions* for a good outcome, because it aims at a fair and high quality way of making a decision in which as much relevant urges and information as possible are being considered.

Whether the inner chairperson is activated and how powerful it is (i.e. whether and how well it chairs the committee), thus influences the *process* of decision making. In the data of the research into the domestic contract the inner chairperson can be recognised in statements such as: *"I knew I was making the wrong decisions with what I ate, I was watching myself do it. But only after seeing the movie 'Earthlings' did I find it important enough to consciously stop eating meat. Only then I took the feelings of the animals really seriously and saw clearly that it was not fair."*[13] and *"I believe you have to take all the sides of the story into account, all values and desires, whether good or bad. So taste as well as ethics. For me that means eating animals, but only at special occasions."*[14]

The joker: 'I want to feel good about my decision'

As set out in chapter 2.2, in complex cases like constructing acceptability of keeping and killing of animals for food, chances are high that contradictory cognitions and drives get simultaneously primed. When such a state of ambivalence occurs and opposing committee members are not particularly strong, this usually is not considered problematic. However, when strong committee members and the cognitions they employ are conflicting, or when the complexity of choices is experienced as overwhelming, ambivalence may turn into *dissonance*. The psychological tension accompanying a state of dissonance is often experienced as uncomfortable and problematic, which activates the drive to *feel better*.

The second special committee member that I set apart to better explain the everyday-life construction of (non-)acceptability of keeping and killing animals for food, regards this drive, that I call the *joker*.[c] It gets primed by the discomfort of dissonance, which threatens its ultimate goal: *to feel good about current, past and future decisions*. As the name joker implies, this drive acts as a wild card: it does not have a preference for any of the other committee members, it just wants to feel as good as possible about an expected decision. To achieve this goal, the joker typically applies short-term focused coping strategies[15] to reduce psychological tensions, such as reinforcing powerful committee members, weakening dissonant committee members to help their suppression, and/or avoid them of being of primed altogether (I will give some examples from the research later on in this paragraph). In addition, the hedonistic focus of the joker makes it urge the committee to

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[c] The delineation 'joker' originated from a brainstorm with prof. dr. Noelle Aarts in 2011. Van der Weele (2013) introduced a similar metaphoric character in her inaugural speech, that she called the 'automatische beschermer' (*automatic protector*).

decide as quickly as possible, to reduce the time that dissonance is felt to the minimum. As a rule, the joker defends the status quo, putting in effort to resist change so one can remain feeling good about previous decisions and returning ones (habits), and tries to make decision time as short as possible (so the uncomfortable feeling does not have to be felt for any unnecessary amount of time). However, if (one or combined) opposing committee members get sufficiently powerful in a certain context to cause a new action or frame, the joker will impromptu use its strategies to support the new decision –at least in that particular context– and will even help account for the (possibly ambivalence invoking) change of choice. All this may take place in conscious awareness, but most of the time, the joker operates unconsciously, as part of heuristics (or: witnessing heuristics).

Of course, the negotiation process of committee and the activity of the joker takes place internally, in the mind. It therefore is hard to be fully certain about whether a certain argument that is brought forward is a joker tactic or not: for example *"Animals don't have a soul, they are given to us by the creator to use as we see fit"*[16] may be a joker-driven coping strategy, but also simply a conviction, a 'regular' piece of framing. On a certain level of thought all communication could be seen as a form of coping, in the sense of 'dealing with reality'.[17] For the sake of this research I however define coping strategies in the customary narrower sense: as communicative fine-tuning instruments that are used to feel good -or less bad- about contradicting aspects of a decision (i.e. conflicting committee members and/or cognitions).[18] Though whether a certain frame is a coping strategy arguably can only truly be assessed by the person doing the decision making, several characteristic coping styles are documented in literature, providing a way for researchers to recognise them in framing. Classic examples from literature are Festinger's strategies for dissonance reduction[19], and Serpell's distancing devices to oppress or avoid priming of dissonant committee members.[20] Conversely, distinct, non-oppressive coping strategies have been recognised as well, involving some way of admitting and accepting the psychological tension linked to dissonance, rather than evading it.[21] Frames indicating possible joker activity were frequently encountered during the analysis of domestic contracts (which in many cases were recognised as indeed having been coping strategies during feedback sessions).

An example illustrating the workings of the joker from the research is[d]: *"During dinner the other day, I asked my non-vegetarian but otherwise adorable father whether he ever connected his eating meat to the way animals were treated and adverse effects of animal husbandry on the environment. Dad first answered "Oh come on girl, I'm eating here! Don't start with that bullshit again. Let's talk about something nice, like the planning of*

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[d] I chose this reported example because of the great visibility of the coping strategies in the father; however, in respondents' direct framing such strategies were also amply encountered.

our trip this summer." (reducing dissonance by trivializing dissonance & oppressing dissonant committee members by concealment) *At dessert however, he returned to the subject and told me: "You know, I do worry about the environment, and you know I care about animals. I really admire your choice. But every time I consider totally giving up meat I am afraid it will affect my health and I won't be able to be as good in rowing as I am now. So there you have it." I thought that was grand,"*[22] (admitting dissonance after he was challenged, overall indicating that joker strategies at first were used to protect caring for his physique, and later to support managing the relationship with his daughter). I have provided an extended list of coping strategies from literature together with examples of such coping encountered during the research in appendix IV.

Figure 6.2: Impression of the metaphorical inner decision committee

Processes influencing the workings of the committee

In the previous paragraphs I have introduced the inner decision committee. I will describe the dynamic negotiation between the committee members -and specifically the workings of the inner chairperson and joker- in detail in the paragraphs on the modes of decision making at the end of this section. But I first will elaborate on several processes that

influence the workings of the committee. An important concept in this regard is what I call the *mindset*: the inner committee members primed in a certain situation, their relative strength, and the cognitions available to them. Another important influence on the negotiation process to take into account is the share of it that is taking place outside of conscious awareness.

Situational priming of mindsets and the influence of habit

An example from the research demonstrating the activation of different mindsets in different situations is: *"I just started working at an animal welfare society, it is very easy to be vegetarian there. All infrastructure is there, no seductions and lots of social pressure to do the right thing. But outside of that office, in a restaurant or at a barbeque with non-vegetarian friends, it's more difficult. Oh, I grew up eating a lot of meat. So then you can imagine there's an inner war going on. I notice that sometimes I just go with it, because I'm used to it. But the moment I remember my colleagues and their words and values, and having to explain myself to them, it's gets harder to eat animals."* [23]

According to the combined sensitizing concepts and confirmed by data from the in-depth conversations and feedback sessions, the activation of committee members and cognitions to become part of the mindset occurs through both *external situational information* (physical, behavioural and social-institutional structures and surroundings, information about products and measures, cultural norms, customs, ideologies, and input from actually present others), as well as *internal situational cues* (as a reaction to other activated drives and cognitions, including recollections and/or imaginations of external contextual information and previously made decisions).

A significant part of the internal priming process is determined by impulsive (instinctive) or conditioned (learned) reactions to a situation, and habit formation plays an important role in this. Though incidental situational activation of uncommonly activated drives and cognitions can and does surely happen, it is common that particular committee members and cognitions are habitually triggered to be part of the mindset and thus are *more likely to partake* in the negotiation dialogue than non-habitual ones. [24]

Conscious awareness: visibility and influence at the negotiation table

It is furthermore important to realise that some committee members and cognitions become part of the mindset subliminally, and -though actively participating- remain non-conscious during decision making. A share of these (see figure 6.3) are located in in the blind spot, meaning they are not accessible through introspection (even though one can be aware of these processes). [e] However, another part of the participating drives and

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[e] At least not without external mirroring, e.g. in therapeutic sessions.

cognitions that are outside conscious awareness can be brought into it with analytical effort. In empirical research, only the drives and cognitions that are or can be brought into conscious awareness can be observed in conversations and probed for, using for example the earlier mentioned laddering method[25] (see also chapter 3.2 and 3.3).

Figure 6.3: The mindset: part empirically accessible, part blind spot

The mindset:

Active cognitions and drives that are in or can be brought to conscious awareness (empirically accessible)

(sometimes conscious, often heuristic=non-conscious; but with a possibility of conscious awareness)

Active cognitions and drives outside of the reach of conscious awareness (blind spot)

(always non-conscious; very hard to bring into conscious awareness)

To illustrate this conceptualisation with an example from the research: *"I am convinced that eating meat is not a sustainable food choice so I am a vegetarian. I have given my diet quite a lot of thought and consideration. I can explain exactly what the effects of meat consumption are in terms of food efficiency, world food supply and increased levels of atmospheric CO_2, and how a plant-based diet is the only option if humans want to sustain quality of life for all humans on the planet, and generations to come. I am also well aware of the fact that I love the taste of meat in general, love the festive barbeques my parents organized when I grew up, and of the dissonance this causes within me. I can resist barbeques and most kinds of meat. However, there is one thing bothering me: whenever and only when I smells bacon, I feel a strong pull making it virtually impossible for me to resist eating it - but I have no idea exactly why."* [26] (This respondent has taken the time to bring as many -even dissonant- activated thoughts and feelings (including recognised drives) as she can recall into consciousness, and is also aware of her regular and bacon-related behaviour. However, though she is aware of the *influence* of the smell of bacon, exactly what cognitions the smell of bacon activate, and why, lies outside of the reach of her conscious awareness.) Resultantly: though influencing the decision, drives and cognitions in the blind spot cannot be consciously accessed - even when someone tries to give full disclosure; but even though they are not in conscious reach, people *can* be *aware* that non-conscious processing takes place.

Translated into the language of an inner decision committee, one could say that committee members that participate in conscious awareness are the ones that can be

seen at the negotiation table (i.e. the official members of a decision committee), while those that are not present at the negotiation table but are nevertheless active can be thought of as the *civil lobby that goes on in the corridors*, which is unofficial and hence not visible at the table but does exert influence. Some members of this lobby and the ideas they propagate can fight their way to or be invited to take place at the negotiation table (i.e. brought into conscious awareness), while others are less visible and remain in the corridors (in the blind spot). But, even though they are not present at the table, in many cases the committee members at the table can be aware of their presence and feel their urging influence.

Complex dynamic properties of negotiation

The conceptualisation of the mindset implies that, whether conscious or non-conscious (whether present at the table or in the corridors), only the drives (committee members) and cognitions that are triggered to be *active* participate in the decision making process. Now, when all activated committee members are in agreement on the direction of the action that is to be taken, a decision is easily made and framing is unambiguous. Conversely, when parts of the mindset are conflicting, the decision (action/framing) is the result of an *inner negotiation process*.

Figure 6.4: Conflicting committee members: an encountered illustration

My desire to be well-informed is currently
at odds with my desire to remain sane. [27]

Much like real-life negotiations in systems of people, I conceptualise the inner decision committee to work as a complex non-linear dynamical system, in which resulting behaviours change contingent on the interaction between its active elements. Key to such dynamic systems are that the system (the inner decision committee) itself changes constantly, by virtue of learning and adaptation of its members.[28] Because their interactions are contingent in a complex non-linear way, the decisions of the committee furthermore amount to more than the simple sum of their goals. Nevertheless, as the decisions that emerge still are reflections of the mutual influences of the active drives and

the cognitions they have available to use, it is useful to conceptualise their characteristics and to explore the dynamics of their interactions.[29]

The relative strength of committee members and the role of feelings and identity

Outcomes of the negotiation process are importantly influenced by the relative strength of the primed committee members. Following the sensitizing concepts in chapter 2.2 and 2.3, the *relative strength* of the primed committee members that take part in this negotiation depends on the tension between what is and what is strived for. This motivational 'charge' not only relates to the size of the gap between the committee member's goal and its satisfaction (e.g. the degree of a desire for belonging to a social group, or the degree of physical craving for a steak), but also to the importance that is consciously or unconsciously assigned to these drive and the cognitions they use.[30] An important factor influencing individual committee member's motivation to act is the extent to which *feelings* are involved.[31] Across the research the reasons given for the domination of certain goals and behaviour over others were importantly feeling-driven: *"You know, Iskender kebab[f] is simply a favourite. My values are important to me, and I feel strongly about them. So I eat vegetarian always. But, Iskender kebab, well...it is my vice. It tastes so good, it makes me feel happy like a child. So I treat myself to it on special occasions."*[32] Another key factor that seems to influence the relative strength of a committee member, is the extent to which it and the thoughts and feelings it employs are part of (or threaten) an active *identity* (or *identities*).[33]

As discussed in chapter 2.3, individuals are assumed to have multiple and dynamic I-positions or perspectives through which they identify a sense of self.[34] Though the members of the inner decision committee can be seen as tiny separate I-positions, identities are generally made up of more complex *compounds* of drives and related cognitions (an example: the identity of 'being vegan' can consist of a combination of the drive to belong to a vegan group of friends, the drive to contribute to less environmental impact on our world, the drive to be health oriented and the drive to be morally inclined to protect animals - and all thoughts and feelings that contribute to these goals). Identification is important because people tend to feel strongly about their identities: where drives determine 'what people pursue' and cognitions are 'what people think and feel'; the drives and cognitions that are identified with touch upon 'who they are' (internal self-concept) and 'who they pretend to be' (identity frame or persona). An example of the influence of the (in)activation of an identity is found in the 'citizen-consumer' phenomenon, where a person asked about the treatment and slaughter of animals in intensive farms finds this largely non-acceptable (in his identity of 'concerned citizen'), but

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[f] Sliced beef on flat bread with melted butter, tomato sauce and yogurt.

in the supermarket, when this identity is not primed, as a consumer buys the cheapest available meat.

In short, the relative strength of inner committee members increases when the gap between what is and what is desired is large (depending on the situation), when feelings are involved, and when the drive is part of an active identity that is found important.[g]

Combining forces and oppression of committee members in the negotiation process

Just like in real-life negotiation processes, committee members can *combine forces* into coalitions to gain support for an action that would contribute to their individual goals (such as when a drive to stay lazy at home adds to a craving for fatty food, leading to ordering fast food). But, even more important for conceptualising the decision making process: drives and accompanying cognitions may -consciously or non-consciously- get *oppressed* by other drives, even though they are triggered to be part of the mindset in a certain situation. In the language of the metaphorical inner decision committee, this oppression can be imagined like the banishing of negotiation partners from the table to the corridors, or the stifling of their voices. However, oppressing drives requires drive-control, and because exerting drive-control is energy consuming and subject to depletion it is limited.[35] Hence, oppressed committee members still are part of what arises in a certain moment, and their oppression does not mean their presence is to be disregarded. Especially over time, because the gap between what is and what is needed for an oppressed committee member gets bigger, it may actually gain in strength, and seize influence in an unguarded moment.[36]

Often, the drives and cognitions that get oppressed are of the kind one does not like having, because they elicit an unwelcome feeling (such as for some people a felt desire for raw meat and blood is unwanted[37]) or because they threaten a core identity (e.g. feeling pressured to conform to one's surroundings while one identifies with being autonomous and an independent thinker; or feeling any emotion for those who identify as positivist scientists that decide purely based on rational facts[38]). However, such 'difficult' voices are arguably valuable to acknowledge and integrate (invite them to the negotiation table), as this turns them into contributors to a conscious decision process, while in oppressed form they might possibly unconsciously be more powerful than realised.[39]

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[g] In addition, it is imaginable that individual people's committee members differ in strength due to personality traits or developmental levels (both arguably influencing what they identify with). However, the empirical data of my research did not provide any evidence to support such a conceptualisation (as it was not designed to).

In the last part of this section, on the modes of decision making, I will set forth how the priming of mindsets, the relative strength of activated committee members (specifically the inner chairperson) and the associated degrees of consciousness lead to different ways of coming to decisions.

Modes of decision making

When constructing the (non-)acceptability of keeping and killing animals for food, the various ways of decision making that people referred to and reflected on shows that individual respondents differ in this regard - from one another as well as from situation to situation, even within one person. This became especially clear when people reflected on what they would or would not find acceptable in regular and exceptional situations. The conversational data suggests that different drives were activated, which lead to different modes of processing and resulting decisions.

In the paragraphs below I will conceptualise these differences in processing based on specific dynamics amongst members of the inner decision committee. Linked to the priming and strength of the inner chairperson and its style of interaction with the other committee members and the joker, the routes of decision making can be placed on a continuum, running from non-conscious (heuristic) to conscious (deliberate) to comprehensive (intuitive) processing (see figure 6.5).

Fig. 6.5: Processing mode continuum

This continuum regards the level of inclusivity of committee members in the decision making process, and relatedly, its level of complexity. However the term continuum is not intended to mean that the routes of decision making always follow one another in this order nor that they are mutually exclusive; though situations may call for processing involving an increasing inclusivity of voices, intuitive decision making for example is often followed by deliberate processing to explain an intuitive decision made, which then can be made heuristic. I will elaborate on this in the last paragraph. First I will lay down the modes of processing one by one.

Heuristic processing: instinct and routine

In many cases, decisions are made on the heuristic end of the continuum. Heuristic processing can, as shown in figure 6.5, be done *pre* conscious processing and *post* conscious processing: either an instinctive impulsive reaction takes place (instant dominance of the most powerful committee member), or a previously more consciously made decision is repeated automatically, because the same or a similar contextual situation occurs, thus saving the time and energy of making a conscious or intuitive decision again (letting it become a routine decision). Characteristic of these heuristic routes of processing in terms of the inner decision committee model, is that the inner chairperson has not been activated, that not all committee members that are or could have been primed in a certain context get to participate in coming to the decision, and that the joker -if primed at all- works non-consciously and in favour of the most powerful habitually primed committee member(s), oppressing conflicting committee members.

Fully heuristic processing is ruled by instinct and habit, virtually immediate and occurs outside of our conscious awareness. The advantage of this kind of processing is that it prevents us from getting overwhelmed by all incoming signals and decisions to be made in our busy lives, therewith allowing us to focus more consciously only on what really asks our attention.[40] A heuristically made decision can very well be of high quality, but, as it is not chaired, the risk of unfair dominance of powerful habitually primed committee members' is inherent.

An example from the research illustrating heuristic processing is: *"I don't give it any thought really. I just eat a hamburger when I feel like eating it. Which is almost every time I'm at a football game."*[41]

Witnessing heuristics

Typical for heuristic processing thus is the dormancy of the inner chairperson. With activation of the inner chairperson, processing becomes more conscious. However, it does not immediately lift the decision completely out of the realm of heuristics. First, there is a phase of merely *witnessing*[42] that part of the heuristic process that can be brought into a

person's horizon of awareness: performed behaviours, and the urges and cognitions leading up to these behaviours that are not in the blind spot. In this mode one can analyse one's actions and try to explain ('rationalize') them, but that doesn't mean the decision was *made* analytically. As long as the primed inner chairperson does not gain enough strength to chair the committee in a conscious way and prevent unfair oppression of committee members, the decision process itself remains heuristic and the joker -though now noticed by the inner chairperson- still works towards feeling good via oppressive reinforcement of the most powerful member(s) of the committee. Again, this does not make the resulting decision inherently right or wrong, but the risk of 'unfair' dominance continues to exist.

An illustration of witnessing heuristics from the research is: *"I find myself at the market square, walking towards the fish stand and getting fried fish. I've told myself not to, but I just go ahead and do it anyway. So part of me just eats, part of me sees it happening and doesn't agree."*[43]

Oppressing heuristics
On the way to conscious decision making, more active influence on the decision becomes possible: the inner chairperson realizes the possibility of drive-control - oppressing the goals of other committee members to actively change one's actions and framing.[44] In this phase, the inner chairperson sees heuristics and the joker as negative forces, that need to be controlled according to the part of reasoning that is in conscious awareness. This oppression of heuristic drives tends to express itself in favour of committee member goals in the inner chairperson's own moral convictions-oriented group, which may lead to *sterile rational reasoning* (putting emphasis on thought, therewith denying the importance of feelings) or to *normative judgement* (putting an over-emphasis on strict ethical rules, therewith denying the contextual importance that for example managing relations or physical limitations can have). There is no question that drive-control is useful and even crucial in arriving at civilized behaviour.[45] However, because it is highly energy consuming and subject to depletion, drive-control is limited.[46] Furthermore, as committee members are oppressed, this mode of decision making is still not free of oppression and therefore - according to the model- not fully conscious.

Two examples from the research illustrating the oppression of heuristics via drive control, the first showing sterile rational reasoning, the second normative judgement, are: *"As animal scientists, we cannot let feelings and opinions determine our course of action."*[47] and *"It's monstrous to eat animals. You should not allow your taste determine what you do. Don't allow it. People who let their habits rule their lives are simply weak. I used to like meat, but I've conquered my taste. And so can they!"*[48]

Deliberate processing

What distinguishes conscious decision making from more heuristic routes, according to the model, is that more committee members are *invited* to participate: the inner chairperson is powerful enough to ensure that less oppression takes place, as it uses its authority not for drive-control but only to temporarily refrain from action until the committee has had the time to negotiate and decide on the judged best possible course of action in a given situation. There also is an important change in joker activity in conscious decision making: fully congruent with its opportunistic nature of reinforcing the most powerful committee member, for the first time the joker is fully at the service of the inner chairperson, aiming to feel good by virtue of making a decision in a fair and high quality way. I call the first conscious manner of decision making, where careful deliberation is facilitated by the inner chairperson, *deliberate processing*.

Deliberate processing involves all recognised committee members systematically negotiating their goals, while incorporating all cognitions (i.e. thoughts as well as feelings) that are within awareness in a certain situation. This analytical multi-factor decision making, though high in quality, also is highly time and energy consuming. Deliberate processing hence only is possible when the mind can grasp all relevant information and deal with any possible degrees of indeterminacy involved, within the time available to make decisions.[49] Due to the blind spot, such full deliberation of all factors involved is virtually impossible: part of the decision process inevitably remains outside of our awareness and therewith outside of the deliberate decision. As a result, though commonly viewed as the utmost conscious mode of decision making, during deliberate processing, drives and cognitions in the blind spot are still excluded from the negotiation process. Nevertheless, trying to (re)collect as many relevant thoughts and feelings as possible and allowing the various inner drives to be heard, gives maximum insight into the factors involved in a decision.

An example of deliberate decision making is: *"I've collected many facts regarding the ways meat cows and dairy cows are kept, including ethological research results about their welfare, and came to the conclusion that in terms of cow welfare it's better to eat a steak than to drink milk - even when that milk is organic. On top of this, it doesn't feel right to me to kill an animal to eat its meat. So, this lead me to conclude that I also can't justify consuming dairy products anymore."*[50]

Intuitive processing

When deliberate decision making is too complex or time-consuming, one may fall back on more heuristic processing[51], simplifying the decision by allowing oppressing or disregarding of several committee members (with the help of the joker) and relying on habit. But, if the chairperson is powerful enough to be true to its goal (of deciding in a fair,

high quality manner), the data suggests it moves to *intuitive processing*. This mode of decision making is characterised by the chairperson chairing the committee in a comprehensive manner that allows *all* inner committee members to express themselves and attentively (or: 'mindfully'[52]) supervising the systematic and non-oppressive processing of all goals and arguments - including the ones that are not 'liked', hard to reach or difficult to grasp by the analytical mind. Intuitive decision making, though not immediate because it requires a period of pause in which cognitions and drives within as well as outside of consciousness are invited to participate (which can be quite short: a matter of seconds or minutes, as well as longer: e.g. 'sleeping on it' for a night or 'letting it simmer' for some days or even weeks), is *relatively fast* in terms of the time actually spent on pondering the decision.[53] Also, it requires a relatively moderate amount energy when compared to oppressing heuristics or deliberate processing. It however does require the *activation*[h] of a strong inner chairperson.[54]

Intuitive decision making is in some schools of thought called subconscious, making use of the 'smart subconscious' where the rational mind would tilt, based on 'consolidated experience'[55], 'presencing skills'[56], or even a 'collective subconscious'[57] containing knowledge and experience beyond that of the individual.[i] Though arguably better after a person has more experience and access to more knowledge (or better: 'wisdom'[58]), intuitive decision making entails responding to each emerging circumstance in a *creative* way, rather than routinely applying old solutions to new situations.[59] So, even though intuitive decision making may seem mysterious and comes from outside our immediate awareness, because there is a mindful 'letting all complex notions partake' (in awareness of the existence and influence of the non-conscious next to what is conscious) and no oppression of committee members takes place (outside of the temporary refraining from action to allow the time needed for this kind of processing), this mode of decision making is the most comprehensive processing mode in the model.

Fitting the goal of the inner chairperson, the intuitive decision making process is arguably the most fair, because all inner voices are heard and none are oppressed; the total of available capacities of the human being are used (not just the rational or consciously available). Though fairness of the process does not guarantee a desired outcome (as saying -or: eating- something can have unplanned results[60]), research suggests that, especially in complex cases, intuitive decisions are of increased quality as opposed to

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[h] Activation of intuitive processing, according to literature, can be done by applying one of several techniques available to prime an intuitive mindset, such as UTT based distraction while preventing thinking, CEST theory based indirect mind-set manipulation, or direct induction: see Usher et al. 2011 for an overview.

[i] Because it is not relevant to the workings of my model or the understanding of domestic contracts to be conclusive about this, I remain agnostic on this matter.

those resulting from deliberate as well as immediate (impulsive or automatic) modes of decision making.[61]

The way comprehensive processing takes place however does not necessarily mean that all clusters of reasoning and behaviour are incorporated (as this depends on rational and emotional concern for certain parties and standpoints towards life & death, which may differ in different people). An example from the research that illustrates intuitive processing in someone that includes many clusters of reasoning is: *"I've tried to suppress my desires, but they're not going anywhere. The desire to eat meat, the desire to be ethical, the desire to be sustainable, the desire to stand out and the desire to fit in. So I might as well just provide space for them to be as they are. I find that if I allow my thoughts and feelings, they hold less power over me. They just want to be heard, and then I can decide on what's best for me, in this moment. For me, that means mostly eating vegan, and, in exceptional situations, sometimes eating meat. I've found that, for me, this is the right thing to do."*[62]

Differences between and complementarity of the modes of decision making

In short, the different modes of decision making discussed above indicate how much the unofficial lobby in the corridor influences the decision process and how well the committee is chaired. As touched upon earlier and shown in figure 6.5, these processing modes can be placed on a line ranging from fully heuristic via conscious to comprehensive, based on *the priming and increasing strength of the inner chairperson* and the accompanying *increasing non-oppressive inclusion of other committee members*. This progressive line arguably also coincides with the *complexity* of the negotiation process, as the amount of possibly incongruent drives and cognitions that are part of this process increases. In terms of real-life political negotiations one could say that the decision making process becomes increasingly *democratic* on the way from heuristic to comprehensive modes of decision making.[63]

When judged with different criteria, the various modes follow another sequence. For example the amount of energy deciding costs varies from *low* in heuristic processing and witnessing heuristics, via *high* in oppressing heuristics due to the extensive drive-control applied in that mode, and *high* in deliberate processing but due to the length and intensity of a multi-factor analysis in conscious awareness, to *moderate* in intuitive processing due to a small amount of drive-control in combination with trusting the committee to be able to do its work both within and outside of conscious awareness. The time it takes to come to a decision follows a similar path: from *fast* in heuristics to *slow* in deliberate processing, to *relatively fast* again in the intuitive mode of processing.

Moreover, these analytical distinctions between the different modes do not mean that the routes of decision making always occur in isolation from one another. For example, intuitive decision making in practice is often followed by deliberate processing to explain an intuitive decision made (which is exactly what happens while *framing* an intuitively decided upon domestic contract) and can become a heuristic later (due to habit formation). Also, though deliberate processing explicitly does not integrate drives and cognitions that reside in the blind spot, that does not mean that heuristic processing may not be active underneath and come to expression in an unguarded moment. The same goes for oppressing heuristics: while one drive is intentionally oppressed, another may inadvertently seize power. The modes of processing thus are not mutually exclusive, but may follow one another in a complimentary manner.

6.3 Applying the inner decision committee model to understand the dynamic construction of domestic contracts

In this section I will discuss how the inner decision committee model developed in section 6.2 adds to the understanding of variations between everyday-life constructions of the (non-)acceptability of keeping and killing animals for food, and in particular to understanding why individual people's framing may be dynamic in changing situations. In addition, I will discuss how the model can be used as a tool for (self-)analysis and dialogue promotion.

Added value of the inner decision committee metaphor

The analysis of data in chapter 5 led to the distinguishing of a key pattern of typically coinciding framing elements, delineated in ten clusters of reasoning and behaviour (as repeated in figure 6.6). These clusters capture how emotional and/or moral standpoints resulting in the consideration of the interests of certain parties, tend to occur linked with particular consumption behaviour and ways of framing (non-)acceptability of keeping and killing animals for food. However, as already stated in chapter 5, people tend to be *dynamic* in their framing. In different circumstances, for example when confronted with certain issues or hypothetical scenarios, the reasoning they bring forward may draw on different clusters. And, though ways of reasoning are generally pronounced to come with a sense of responsibility to perform the normative behaviour that is associated with it, pronounced behaviour does not always fit the behavioural norm of the clusters that are in play. These changes in framing behaviour and deviations from reasoning and behaviour in other instances arguably are expected in exceptional conditions, but they also emerged in regular everyday life situations.

Figure 6.6: The clusters of reasoning and behaviour

This shows that, to fully understand people's everyday-life choices regarding farming, slaughter and consumption of animals, we need to know more than just the values they hold, the knowledge that is available to them, and the behaviours performed. The inner decision committee model was developed to better comprehend this dynamic aspect of the everyday-life construction of domestic contracts. Based on sensitizing concepts and recurrent patterns that were found across the research, it conceptualises the process of decision making, not only by recognising the available cognitions in a certain situation, but by viewing decision making in terms of the competing and negotiating drives that are active within people in that situation - visualised as the members of a metaphorical inner decision committee. The inner decision committee model thus deliberately integrates a *cognitive* approach to framing, underlining that decisions are representations of information that is present (i.e. the available cognitions in a certain situation) with an *interactional* approach, focusing on the dynamic enactment of frames in on-going interaction (i.e. a negotiation among committee members, strategically applying cognitions to reach their specific goals).[64]

Following the model, personal as well as contextual differences in framing can be explained by the priming and relative negotiation strength of metaphorical committee members and available cognitions, that, via different modes of processing, lead to different decisions. This conceptualisation implies that, rather than having a purely mechanical character, interior processes of decision making function in essentially the same communicative terms as interactions between people in society. Like in real-life negotiation processes, inner drives have the ability to adapt and learn from previous experiences[65], while there is a state of constant change over time by virtue of interactions between the drives and a complex and changing context. The outcome of such complex

and non-linear dynamical negotiations are never completely predictable. However, the resulting frames are also not arbitrary: as I will show, the emerging patterns in the framing of (non-)acceptability of keeping and killing animals for food can be understood quite well through scrutinising the drives that are at play and getting insight into the modes of processing, in addition to knowing about values, available information, and performed behaviour.

How the main committee member groups help understand framing

The four main categories of goals (reflecting existing inner drives) provide a first tool to discern drives that are of influence in the inner negotiation underlying the framing process. These were:

1) 'I want to live according to my moral convictions'

2) 'I want to take care of my physique'

3) 'I want to manage my relationships', and/or

4) 'I want to manage living in the world'

These four overarching goals can be seen as four much related but different aspects of deciding on domestic contracts. The balancing and trade-offs between these main groups of goals are amply reflected in many challenging situations that were portrayed throughout the research, such as the avid meat eater who falls in love with a vegan (his 2 & 3 & possibly 4, as well as her 1 & 3), the vegetarian who cannot seem to recover from an eye operation and gets instructed by her doctor to eat meat (1 & 2), the meat eater on holiday in India for whom it may be difficult to find meat (2 & 4), or the vegetarian who when visiting his grandmother for dinner finds meatballs in the soup (1 & 3). Conflicting goals are furthermore reflected in questions and statements that are put forth, such as: *"I don't know, should I live only according to my views regarding animal welfare, or do I make concessions to better fit in in a particular group of friends who like barbeques?"*[66] (1 vs 3) and *"It's quite challenging to take the best care of my body and still like my food, while taking my ecological footprint into account as well, with what is available in the supermarket?"*[67] (2 -long term & short term- & 1 & 4). Discerning between main drives within a person can thus help to understand the eventual decision that is made regarding consumption behaviour and the framing thereof, through increased insight into the inner negotiation process underlying it.

The link between the main committee member groups and the clusters of reasoning and behaviour

On the basis of their goals, several committee members quite obviously link with certain clusters of reasoning and behaviour. Activation of certain members in the goal group 'I want to take care of my physique' for example arguably leads to clusters 1: *anything goes*,

2: *regular/cheap/tasty food*, or 3: *healthy/quality food*, depending on the time frame of these goals and the orientation on survival, money, taste or health. The activation of drives in the overarching group 'I want to live according to my moral convictions' is linked with values and the moral consideration of the interests of particular parties leading to reasoning and behaviour in related clusters - for example the activation of the moral conviction that animals are subjects with intrinsic value with a dominant drive to live according to such convictions, arguably leads to framing according to cluster 7: *vegetarian/vegan* or 9: *free range/organic/game*, as well as likely the enactment of the behavioural norms fitting these clusters. The activation of empathy for particular parties together with a drive to 'manage my relationships' pertaining to these parties, would have parallel results, similarly ranging from clusters of reasoning and behaviour associated with caring for loved ones, all the way to the earth/biosphere and future generations. The committee members driven to 'manage living in the world' are often linked with adjusting reasoning and behaviour according to cluster 2: *regular/cheap/tasty food*, though conversely also with trying to adapt the world via adhering to clusters in wider circles such as 8: *eco-vegan* or 10: *low eco-impact/flexitarian/(flex-)vegan*. When recognising specific clusters of reasoning and behaviour in respondents, it can thus be elucidating to ask 'why'-questions to find out which drives lead them to express those clusters.

In addition, the conceptualisation of the decision making process in terms of active drives and the ways in which they interact, helps explain why in certain everyday-life situations clusters of reasoning and associated behaviour are being *evaded* - even though framing associated with these clusters would be expected on the basis of the consideration of the interests of parties and information that is available- while others are *prioritised*.

Understanding the evasion and prioritising of reasoning and behaviour in terms of priming and the relative strength of committee members
Underlying every action that we perform, the inner decision committee model conceptualises one or more drives (in the model metaphor: inner decision committee members) that motivate us to act towards a certain goal. When there is just one drive at play, or several ones that are satisfied by a similar action, the decision to be made is straightforward and framing is unambiguous. But as we have seen, in complex cases such as deciding on what is acceptable or not regarding the keeping, killing and consumption of animals, the decision likely involves the activation of multiple drives that call for different actions - for example: the drive to satisfy a craving for a certain type of meat, the aspiration to end suffering of animals in the meat industry, and the need to belong in a certain group of peers that have certain ideas on the topic. In theory, all primed drives and related cognitions (i.e. reasoning and behaviour in all associated clusters) are balanced in the process of coming to a certain decision. However, the research suggested that not only does some reasoning and behaviour get prioritised over others, in many situations

certain ideas are not being expressed at all (even when in-depth questioning or introspection shows that they would be of influence had the decision been consciously made).

The first explanation the inner decision committee model offers as to why some reasoning and behaviour does *not* become part of a domestic contract lies in the *lack of priming* of relevant drives in a situation, thus not voicing the related cognitions either. Like in real-life negotiation processes, only those that are actively present at the negotiation table can voice thoughts and feelings, and of those in the corridor only those that are motivated to lobby are of active influence on the process. So, because not all inner committee members and not all available cognitions generally are primed to participate in inner negotiations, decisions are commonly made by a *partial committee* with *partial information*. This for example occurs when a person thoughtlessly follows a habit to eat meat, unaware of the influence that this consumption behaviour has, such as effects on their health or on parties they would find important when the decision would have been made consciously. Or when one reacts heuristically, based simply on for example the earlier mentioned craving. Because the drives that would lobby for the protection of other parties or the longer term stay dormant in such a situation, the cognitions that these drives would apply are not included the decision and thus the related behaviour is not performed and the related reasoning is not expressed in framing.

The second explanation for the exclusion of certain frames that the inner decision committee model offers is more strategic, namely: the *oppression of committee members* (and therewith the cognitions they use). When decision making is not fully comprehensive, the negotiation process between inner drives is not democratic, but involves drive-control: strong committee members trying to banish weaker ones from the negotiation table or ignore what they have to say in a certain situation. The drive to satisfy a craving for meat may for example not only overrule but also oppress the aspiration to end suffering of animals in the meat industry and associated cognitions (a state which is called 'strategic ignorance'[68]). The reason for the evasion of certain reasoning and behaviours in framing thus can also lie the absence of committee members in the negotiation process that would apply such reasoning, not due to a lack of priming, but as a result of their being *oppressed* by other drives.

Further following the model, the *prioritizing* of certain clusters of reasoning and behaviour over others can be understood in terms of the *relative strength* of the remaining (i.e. primed and not oppressed) committee members, that enter into a negotiation process. Committee members can work together which further strengthens their position; the (coalition of) committee member(s) that is the strongest in a certain situation determines the behaviour that is performed and the frames that are uttered. A desire to satisfy a

craving for a certain type of meat for example arguably gets strengthened when one is hungry to boot, when feelings of joy related to childhood memories of eating that meat are triggered, or when one identifies with being a gourmand, and associated framing will reflect those characteristics (clusters 2: *regular/cheap/tasty food* and 3: *healthy/quality food* will most likely be prioritised, from a goal orientation in the 'I want to take care of my physique' group). In a similar line of thinking, when one identifies as a vegetarian and feels the need to belong in a group of vegans, animal- and environment-oriented reasoning and behaviour that link to their ideas will dominate (clusters 7&8 or 9&10, stemming from goals in both the 'I want to live by my moral convictions' and the 'I want to manage my relationships' groups); the craving ('I want to take care of my physique' and the related cluster 2: *regular/cheap/tasty food*) will most probably not be prioritised, though it might still be acknowledged.

Hence, the exclusion and prioritizing of reasoning may be investigated through asking questions related to what goals were strived for when coming to a decision, in addition to questions to uncover the clusters of reasoning and behaviour they would adhere to if a decision would be made consciously.

The joker: dealing with the discomfort of dissonance in various ways
The distinction between the four main committee members groups offers a first means to analyse and better understand the inner negotiation between drives that is taking place during decision making in the complex case of the domestic contract. However, in many cases specific framing emerges in certain situations that the priming and negotiation between the four main goal groups alone do not suffice to clarify. The expansion of the inner decision committee metaphor with the joker and the inner chairperson, two special committee members that work *on the level of the decision* (rather than the content), offers a more detailed explanation of such frames.

Take for example the situation in which a male respondent, a vegetarian out of animal rights considerations in daily life, told me: *"That one time though, I was applying for a job as a sales rep, and the assessment process included a lunch time speed-date session with my prospective bosses - caviar and fois gras. So, I guess I just felt so pressured to blend in, that I simply ate the food. Oh well, haha, it was an exception for a good cause, methinks: I got the job! And I don't eat meat at meetings anymore now, in fact I'm even educating them about animal rights."*[69] The inner decision committee model offers a logical explanation for the consumption behaviour and part of the framing, through the four main goal groups: the committee member advocating the consideration of animal well-being ('I want to live by my moral convictions', leading to behaviour in cluster 7: *vegetarian/vegan*) got challenged by the committee members wanting to safeguard his future job and income, and comply with the company culture he found himself in (i.e. in

the 'I want to take care of my physique' and 'I want to manage my relationships' groups) - and in this case, the latter dominated the decision. However, what the main groups do not account for, are the statements *regarding his decision*, such as the remark about feeling pressured, the formulation of the consumption behaviour as an exception, the laughter, and the part about educating his peers at present. Though these pieces of framing are a result and reflection of the inner negotiation between committee members from the main groups, they arguably also serve an important other goal: to feel better about a decision made in a state of dissonance (in this case caused by a conflict between the winning committee members and other simultaneously primed powerful committee members).

As discussed in section 6.2, the uncomfortable psychological tension accompanying dissonance (due to a conflict between opposing committee members and/or cognitions, or due to feeling overwhelmed by the complexity of a choice), leads to the priming of a drive that aims to relieve that tension. The committee member that helps grasp the workings of this motivation to deal with dissonance in the inner decision committee model is the *joker*, that can be investigated through asking what is done to achieve feeling good about current, past and future decisions. Though all communication can be seen as a form of coping with reality (that very seldom is consistent and not contradicting), the joker helps differentiate *coping strategies* as frames that -consciously or unconsciously- are aimed at dealing with the *discomfort* of discrepancies between active goals, thoughts and feelings.

When looking at framing, classical coping strategies (as set out in appendix IV) that involve the joker downplaying losing committee members and the cognitions they employ, and reinforcing winning ones, oppressing dissonant committee members, or even avoiding their priming altogether (also called strategic ignorance) can easily be distinguished. Statements like *"My eating differently won't change the way animals are treated. It's the government's fault that we can't trust that our meat is from a good source. It's not mine. So cut the crap, I just want to eat my potatoes, vegetables and meat, like I have always done."*[70] likely do not only reflect the goals of the regular committee members, but are expressed to *feel better* about a decision (in this case the decision to continue a cherished habit). Frames like this make a lot more sense when viewed with awareness of a metaphorical joker and its mechanisms to cope with dissonant concerns.

Now, traditional coping strategies indicate that people find dissonance difficult, and therefore try to avoid or reduce it, basically try anything to not feel the discomfort (and also: to not have to change their thinking or behaviour). In some cases however, a different, non-oppressive style of coping can be seen, that involves the joker not only admitting but actually allowing and embracing dissonance, instead of reducing or evading it: *" I am aware of the environmental impact of eating red meat, as well as the health*

implications. But I still love it. So I eat it sometimes."[71] For some people it is this conscious acceptance of the uncomfortableness of a state of dissonance, what makes them feel good - because there is honesty in no longer denying or concealing the dilemma that for most people is inherent to eating meat.

In some cases embracing of contradicting information and goals goes even further, such as in the following quote: *"I try to be as well-informed as I can about meat, weigh all the advantages and disadvantages against one another, and only then make my decision. Which can be different in different situations. But I make it a matter of principle to include all possible information and give space to all urges in me, before deciding."*[72] However, completely understanding this frame, as well as several others that I will get to in a minute, requires the incorporation of the other special committee member, the inner chairperson.

Explanatory value of the inner chairperson and the modes of decision making

Where the joker is the driving force behind the application of coping strategies in order to feel good about a decision, the metaphorical inner chairperson represents the drive motivating the different modes of decision making that are reflected in framing. The example at the end of the previous paragraph reflects the presence of an active and strong inner chairperson, striving for the process of decision making to be fair and of high quality by inviting all committee members to voice their goals and taking as much information as possible into account. The joker here -true to its nature- supports this powerful chairperson by embracing dissonance and feeling good by virtue of the fairness of the decision making process.

Whether the inner chairperson is active while coming to a certain decision and how well it chairs the committee can be discovered in various ways. Basically it all revolves around the question with what mode of processing the decision leading to a frame or other action is made: Is the action completely automatic (meaning the inner chairperson is dormant; and the joker isn't needed either)? Is a heuristic action noticed but not countered (meaning inner chairperson is active as a witness, but not strong enough to do anything; and the joker aids the winning committee members driving the decision)? Is the heuristic course of action being oppressed (drive control by the inner chairperson; the joker supporting the oppression while it lasts)? Are all voices in conscious awareness heard and weighed (deliberate processing by a strong inner chairperson; supported by the joker)? Or are all committee members -including those in the corridors, outside of our conscious awareness- invited to exert their influence, and does a decision emerge after a moment of ensuing stillness (intuitive processing)?

Many frames make much more sense when applying the inner chairperson and the modes of decision making as explanatory tools, in addition to the four main goal groups and the joker. Take for example the following case from the research: *L., mother of two and a vegetarian since birth, found herself torn between her conviction that the way the meat industry is designed causes unacceptable living conditions for animals, and a kinder garden teacher's recent remark that children who don't eat meat regularly will face health problems in the future. L. was born and raised a vegetarian, has always felt healthy and happy with her diet, but recently was diagnosed with B12 deficiency and started taking B12 supplements. Just after hearing the teacher's remark L. said she simply shrugged the remark away, telling herself that she lived to be 30 years old without any problems, so it wouldn't be any different for her children. But after a few days and reading a newspaper article about the health advantages of eating white meat, she admitted that she noticed that the desire to safeguard her children's health got so powerful, that she felt the impulse to start giving her children not only B12 supplements, but actual meat, regardless of her lifelong conviction. However, when she prepared a piece of chicken, L. explained, she felt a lot of guilt, torn apart between her family and the chickens she felt sorry for. The clashing of her feelings eventually caused her to want plan a consult with a paediatrician, to come to a better informed decision that did right to her feelings but also her need for a specialist's view. After hearing from the doctor that B12 supplements were indeed enough, she felt enough peace of mind to continue her family's vegetarian lifestyle without giving the issue much thought anymore.*[73]

Analysed with the full inner decision committee model, the frames this mother expressed (and the process she went through) can be easily understood: L.'s initial reaction to the teacher's startling remark (causing the dissonance that activated the joker, as well as the inner chairperson - though as of yet only making her aware of her behaviour and tendencies) was to shrug the remark away (oppressing the newly activated dissonant committee members aimed at safeguarding the health of her loved ones from the 'I want to take care of my physique' and 'I want to manage my relationships' group, aided by joker-driven arguments to keep feeling good about her behaviour) and continue her habitual vegetarianism (a post-conscious (i.e. learned) form of heuristics, based on the 'I want to live by my moral convictions' group, backed by the desire to continue a lifelong habit in the 'I want to take care of my physique' group). After a while, the desire to protect the health of her children grew so strong that it led her to break her habit and cook meat (which arguably still is an impulsive reaction, just with different committee members that 'won' the negotiation and the oppression of the normally primed and dominant ones). However, the oppression of those committee members voicing arguments advocating vegetarianism was not successful, and she started feeling so much dissonance (in the form of guilt) that the joker no longer was able to suppress it, which led to the inner chairperson and the desire to make a fair and high quality decision to grow stronger. The

information-seeking with the paediatrician followed by a conscious choice to continue refraining from meat but supplementing B12 points at deliberate processing, led by a powerful inner chairperson. And finally, the ensuing behaviour (that in this case was not different from the initial behaviour, but just as well could have been), got incorporated into a heuristic one once again, but from a position of acceptance of dissonant voices and the knowledge of having really heard and considered them.

As the example shows, the various ways in which decision making is framed can be explained with the relative strength of the inner chairperson influencing the negotiation among the committee members, and observed coping strategies can be understood by the joker adapting accordingly to deal with dissonance. The joker, the inner chairperson and the modes of decision making thus help analyse framing in an even more detailed way than just the four main committee member groups and the clusters of reasoning and behaviour can.

Why framing is dynamic in changing situations
Finally, the inner decision committee can be applied to understand the *dynamic* nature of framing. The idea that priming, oppression and the relative strength of the committee members and the resulting modes of processing are *prone to change* in changing situations, not only provides an additional explanation for observed differences in domestic contracts *between* individuals (adding to the reasons discussed in chapter 5.3), but also provides an explanation as to why *individual* people may be dynamic in how they frame the (non-) acceptability of farming, slaughter and consumption of animals in changing circumstances.

As the clusters of reasoning and behaviour discussed in chapter 5 propose, different people have different feelings, values, norms, knowledge & convictions, which are logically linked with different ways of reasoning and behaviour regarding the (non-)acceptability of keeping and killing animals for food. The consideration of the interests of certain parties outside of oneself on the basis of values or feelings of kinship or empathy, as well as their standpoint with regard to causing death in others, play a key role in the sort of reasoning and behaviour people find important. An important limiting factor for the content of frames furthermore lies in the knowledge & convictions people have, determining the information that is available to people to build arguments with.

In addition to these reasons, the inner decision committee model postulates that different drives and cognitions are habitually primed and powerful in different people. The inner decision committee model therewith offers an additional explanation for the differences in the construction of personal domestic contracts *between* different people, having different personalities and living in different socio-cultural contexts: for some people

standing by one's moral convictions may for example be the most important driving force in their lives so they will use more value oriented frames, while for others it may be the need to manage one's relationships, meaning they will likely talk more about belonging and communion.

But even more importantly, where in the discussion of the clusters of reasoning in chapter 5.3 the flexible situational and sometimes downright messy constructions of domestic contracts *by one and the same individual* were observed but not explained, the inner decision committee model elucidates *why* such individual framing is dynamic. Following the model, in different (hypothetical or real) situations, different drives and cognitions may be primed, influencing the composition of a person's inner decision committee. Feelings may or may not be triggered, possibly even as part of identities, influencing the relative (combined) strength of committee members and therewith the success of possible oppression. Depending on the priming and strength of the inner chairperson, the inner negotiation process is held more or less consciously, influencing the inner negotiation process. And the more cognitions and committee members play a role, the higher the chance of dissonance and related activation the joker, which leads to different coping strategies (which are oppressive or non-oppressive, depending on the mode of decision making). The case of L. in the discussion of the explanatory value of the inner chairperson is a good example of how the inner decision committee explains changing consumption behaviour and framing over time. But also varying domestic contracts in ideal and exceptional situations are easily understood with the idea that different mindsets are activated in these situations that alter the decision making process leading up to different frames. One can for example imagine that when asked about ideal pictures, the goal to stand by ones moral convictions is primed and strong, while when in the exceptional situation of for example eating the steak your midwife prepared for you after giving birth, the goal of taking care of one's physique is dominant (backed by at least the joker, but in some cases arguably also endorsed by the inner chairperson having supervised the fairness of the decision process). Lastly, incoherent framing such as *"Yeah, I decided to not eat red meat anymore, because of health reasons. But then I went out and had a hamburger."*[74] makes perfect sense in the light of heuristic routes of processing, in which decisions are made by a partial committee with partial information, entering in a negotiation process that is not guided by a strong chairperson.

Tool for (self-)analysis and dialogue facilitation

Summarizing, in this chapter I have argued that the various frames that people bring forth with regard to the (non-)acceptability of keeping and killing animals for food, depend not only on the cognitive content of arguments, but also on the underlying processes through which people *arrive* at their decisions to frame their domestic contracts in certain ways. The inner decision committee model (depicted once more in figure 67) is the result of a

theory development endeavour to conceptualise the decision making process underlying the construction of the domestic contract, grounded in patterns emerging from the interpretation of the research data in combination with existing sensitizing concepts.

Fig. 6.7: The inner decision committee model

Decision making of course is a process that largely remains implicit and up to interpretation. The exact composition of the committee, whether certain members are simply not primed or are being oppressed, and what the reason is for certain (coalitions) of committee members to dominate in the decision process or not, of course remains an internal affair, that is not easy to investigate. Still, as we have seen in this chapter, the conceptualisation of decision making as an inner negotiation between competing drives can help understand ourselves as well as others in ways that the tools provided in chapter 5 alone cannot.

Aided by the following questions, the inner decision committee model forms a *tool for (self-) analysis* with which the internal decision process underlying the various frames regarding the farming, slaughter and consumption of animals in a given situation can be explored and understood:

- *What driving forces are at play when deciding on a certain frame or other action?*
    - *Are there drives aimed at living according to one's moral convictions?*
    - *Are there drives aimed at taking care of one's physique?*
    - *Are there drives aimed at managing relationships?*
    - *Are there drives aimed at managing to live in the world?*
- *What drives are being supported, and what drives are being discounted or oppressed?*
- *What drives are in conscious awareness, and what urges can be felt from the sub-conscious?*

- *Is there emphasis on wanting to decide in a fair and high quality manner?*
- *Is the process of decision making heuristic, deliberate, or intuitive?*
- *What things are being said in order to feel good (or better) about one's decision?*

In addition to forming an analytical tool the inner decision committee model can also be applied as a *tool for dialogue facilitation*, to engage in meaningful conversations about domestic contract related matters. Specifically when combined with the questions above and the tools from chapter 5 (the content elements overview and the clusters of reasoning and behaviour), the model can be applied as a tool to start a conversation about consumers' everyday-life construction of the (non-)acceptability of keeping and killing animals for food. In several formal feedback sessions and informal conversations in which I introduced the inner decision committee model, the model led to more understanding of both oneself and others and provided a meta-perspective of looking at various ways framing, and especially a way of looking at inner struggles and ways of dealing with the dissonance that seems inherent to the topic. Understanding the decision making process underlying the frames that are uttered, in many cases led to a vivid conversation that went beyond ideas of right and wrong, which I imagine followed from a curiosity about the cause of differences and from finding common ground, through a recognition of shared mechanisms of the inner decision making process.

The next step

The eleven clusters of reasoning and behaviour that were distinguished in chapter 5 help comprehend the various ways in which consumers in the Netherlands and Turkey frame the (non-)acceptability of keeping and killing animals for food in everyday-life, and show how these framing repertoires are separate yet logically related. In this chapter, I have introduced the inner decision committee model, a conceptualisation of the process of decision making underlying the construction of the domestic contract that originated from an integration of sensitizing concepts and the research data. I have discussed how applying the inner decision committee model can help understand various everyday-life constructions of the (non-)acceptability of keeping and killing animals for food, as well as why individual people make different decisions in changing contexts.

In chapter 7, the conclusion and discussion, I will look back on the synthesised research findings, discuss the implications and possible applications of the research, reflect on the research and its scientific and societal relevance, and formulate recommendations for follow-up research.

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CHAPTER 7

Disentangling the domestic contract: conclusions and discussion

"We are all easily explained. But we remain inextricable."

-- Thomas Kushemski (La Vénus à la fourrure)

The chapters in this dissertation provide an analysis of the different ways people construct their everyday-life domestic contracts as well as the complex decision making processes underlying this construct. Both raw narratives and mapping and modelling of patterns are used to create space for thought and talk about the intricate issue of farming animals for food. In this concluding chapter, I will look back at the research project, to conclude that the insights and tools that followed from the case indeed contribute to a better understanding of ourselves and others in ways that didn't exist before - which, I will argue, can bring us closer together. At the same time however, framing and decision making are governed by meaning, not by laws; the inextricable complexity of the issue therefore deserves ongoing respect and ever new levels of interpretation.

7 - Disentangling the domestic contract: conclusions and discussion

7.1 Synthesis of insights resulting from the research

Set in the Netherlands and Turkey, the research project 'Disentangling the domestic contract' was centred around the overarching question: ***How can we understand the everyday-life construction of acceptability -or non-acceptability- of keeping and killing animals for food?*** This question was broken down into two interconnected yet different areas of exploration that formed the scope and focus of the project: 1) framing: content and patterns, and 2) the decision making process.

Recapping, where in chapter 1 the research was introduced and in chapter 3 the research design was set forth, chapter 2 provides the first result of the research: a report of a journey into scientific literature regarding the concepts of framing and decision making. The taste of typical and remarkable frames in chapter 4 helps to 'know the stories' that are used to construct everyday-life domestic contracts by consumers from various backgrounds in the Netherlands and Turkey. Chapter 5 offers insight in the range of topics that domestic contracts are constructed with (section 5.1 and appendix III), and into the complexity of patterns in relation with demographic contextual factors (as argued in section 5.2). The *clusters of reasoning and behaviour* (presented and discussed in detail in chapter 5.3 and depicted once more in figure 7.1) represent the various framing repertoires that surfaced from the research and shine light on the logic interrelation between parties that are deemed worthy of consideration of interests, domestic contract related values, knowledge & convictions, norms for behaviour - and in ideal cases: actual behaviour.

Based on both the sensitizing concepts in chapter 2.3 as well as interpretive analysis of the research data, chapter 6.2 presents a conceptualisation of the process of decision making leading to the various individual everyday-life domestic contracts. The resulting *inner decision committee model* (visualised once again in figure 7.2) supposes a metaphorical inner decision committee, of which the members are interacting inner drives that -when primed- apply cognitions to strive for their own specific goal. Four main groups of committee members emerged from the research data, that I named based on their overarching goals: *1) I want to live according to my moral convictions*; *2) I want to take care of my physique*; *3) I want to manage my relationships;* and *4) I want to manage living in the world*. In addition to these four groups, I distinguished two special committee members: the *inner chairperson*, who aims for the decision making among the committee

members in a given situation to be *done in a fair and high quality manner*; and the *joker*, who aims *to feel good about current, past and future decisions* by targeting the psychological tension associated with a state of dissonance in several possible ways. The various conscious and non-conscious ways in which complex dynamic negotiation processes between the committee members take place are conceptualised in the *modes of processing*: ranging from heuristic, via witnessing of heuristics and oppressing heuristics, to deliberate and even intuitive decision making. As discussed in chapter 6.3, the model provides insight into various aspects of the process underlying consumers' everyday-life construction of individual domestic contracts and in particular helps understand why individual people make different decisions in varying situations.

Taken together, the research findings of both research foci combined address the overarching research question, and meet the first research objective: **to understand the content of and the processes underlying everyday-life frames regarding keeping and killing animals for food in the selected case study areas**.

To contribute to the second objective, **creating space for thought and talk by developing policy-relevant tools for (self-)analysis and dialogue facilitation**, three tools were developed, based on the research results (see appendix V for an overview): combined with eliciting questions, the *ingredients of the domestic contract* listed in appendix III, the *clusters of reasoning and behaviour*, and the *inner decision committee model* can be implemented both for analysing the various ways of framing related to farming, slaughtering and consuming animals, as well as to facilitate dialogues about domestic contract related matters.

Figure 7.1: The clusters of reasoning and behaviour

Figure 7.2: The inner decision committee model

Main lessons learnt

Synthesising these findings, the main lessons learnt over the course of the project were:

1. Constructing (non-)acceptability of keeping and killing animals for food in everyday-life is not a simple one-issue rational display of facts, but involves rich and multifaceted framing ingredients. In addition to being about animals and their well-being, topics may include human health, nutritional value, meat taste and appearance, social relationships, religion, history, habits, consumption behaviours, global food supply, and environmental impact (see appendix III for the extensive list).

2. Feelings and identities matter. Consumer domestic contracts are based on thoughts (the linguistic conceptualisations of our experiences, beliefs and opinions) as well as feelings (physical sensations, states and emotions). And because people tend to feel most strongly about who they are (or who they pretend to be), identities form an important part of why domestic contracts are framed the way they are.

3. The influence of context is complex:
    a. The research suggests that views on domestic contract related issues in Turkey do not differ from those in Western European countries as much as would be expected.
    b. When comparing demographic characteristics of respondents, only the difference between urban and rural areas really stood out: the research data suggests that generally romantic (painting a very positive picture of animal farming) as well as contrasting pessimistic views (often in relation with adapted consumption patterns such as vegetarianism) are uttered more in urban areas, while in rural areas perceptions were relatively more rooted in 'the way things are' and an emphasis of the instrumental value of animals.

      c.   Overall, differences between individuals were more salient than the difference between population groups. This implies that domestic contracts are context-dependent in multiple and mutually influencing ways.

4. The framing of (non-)acceptability of keeping and killing animals for food is not arbitrary:

      a.   Though individual domestic contracts are unique, complex and dynamic composites of framing elements, eleven clusters of logically linked reasoning and behaviour were distinguished. Domestic contracts are built up of a combination of one or more of these clusters.

      b.   The domestic contracts that people bring forth furthermore depend on the underlying process through which people arrive at their decisions to frame the (non-)acceptability of keeping and killing animals for food in a certain way. Conceptualising this process in terms of a negotiation between members of a metaphorical inner decision committee, that when primed apply cognitions to achieve specific goals, makes insightful why individual people make different particular decisions in changing situations, and that they do so at different levels of awareness.

5. The construction of domestic contracts in everyday-life often is not comprehensive, consistent or fair:

      a.   Not all relevant information and intentions may be involved in the inner negotiation process leading to a decision to bring forth a certain frame. This can be due to actual ignorance, but also due to the oppression, evasion or habitual non-priming of drives or cognitions.

      b.   The need to feel good about past, present and future decisions leads to the use of coping strategies to deal with the uncomfortable tension that arises due to simultaneously activated conflicting drives and cognitions (dissonance). Most of these coping strategies are oppressive in one way of the other, leading to the justification of behaviour that would have been different if processing were comprehensive.

      c.   A truly fair decision making process requires a primed and strong inner chairperson, inviting all relevant committee members and cognitions to participate in a comprehensive democratic inner negotiation process, supported by the joker.

6. And even when done comprehensively and non-oppressively, dealing with the topic of farming, slaughter and consumption of animals inevitably requires making trade-offs:

      a.   Individual domestic contracts often differ in theory and practice, in exceptional situations, and even from one daily situation to the other, because different inner drives are primed and powerful in different

situations. Hence, the citizen that is driven to stand by his or her moral convictions in theory, in practice as a consumer may instead be more driven to manage relationships, to take care of physical or emotional needs or manage living in the world.

b. The complexity of the decision making process leading up to a certain frame increases with the number of clusters of reasoning and behaviour incorporated, the number of primed inner decision committee members, the level of incongruence between them and the cognitions they use, and the mode of processing that is followed.

7.2 Implications and applications

In the following paragraphs I will discuss several inferences that can be drawn from the insights stated in the previous section, aided by existing knowledge and theories. The implications are specifically written for people wanting to research aspects of the domestic contract, in themselves as well as in others, and for aspiring change-makers in fields connected to farming, slaughter and consumption of animals. Subsequently, I will provide several possible applications of the research results in the broader societal arena. Finally, I will discuss opportunities that the tools that were developed over the course of the research offer for conducting dialogues.

Implications for researchers and aspiring change-makers

The research findings indicate that understanding one's own and others' domestic contracts is very possible with help of the tools that were developed, but that the matter needs to be approached with appreciation of the complexity and dissonance involved.

As I will discuss in the following paragraphs, central implications that follow from the research into the domestic contract are:

- Awareness of the facts is not enough;
- Both the content of frames as well as the processes underlying framing matter;
- Part of the decision making process will always remain elusive;
- Frames are never context-free;
- There is value in noticing dissonance and coping;
- We are ruled by our mindset (ánd we can influence it); and
- Everyone holds partial truths.

Awareness of the facts is not enough

The first implication following from the research results is that, to understand everyday-life constructions of domestic contracts in their full complexity, focusing on factual knowledge is not enough. This is not to say that facts and rational concerns are not important: factual knowledge about climate change for example is what makes it an inescapable issue that value judgements or emotionally charged denial cannot counter. However, besides factual knowledge, the roles that unbacked convictions, values and interests play in *everyday-life framing* cannot be discounted.[1] Furthermore, as feelings are what charges decisions with affect, they need to be acknowledged as equally -if not more- important reasons for certain framing to occur.[2] For scientists, philosophers and societal stakeholders this implies that trying to understand consumers by approaching the topic at a factual thinking level only, will provide a partial picture. For aspiring change-makers this notion implies that fencing with facts without acknowledging and including people's values, convictions, interests and affective concerns will likely be counterproductive.

Both the content of frames as well as the processes underlying framing matter

The list of framing ingredients in appendix III can be used to probe for the cognitive content of thoughts and feelings that are or might be in play, for oneself or others. The clusters of reasoning and behaviour[a] can help to elucidate the logic interrelation between which parties' interests are taken into consideration (which 'babushka dolls' are picked, representing which spatial, temporal and relational level), what domestic contract related values are held (including the stance taken regarding causing death in other living beings), what knowledge & convictions thus may be of importance, and what norms for behaviour are focal. It is thereby important to realise that the clusters represent relatively closed and resilient 'webs' of reasoning that people quite dynamically choose between and often also use combined, and hence do not refer to 'groups of people' per se. Furthermore it is important to realise that though it is tempting to believe that reasoning always causes behaviour, behaviours may just as well cause reasoning.

To fully understand the everyday-life construction of domestic contracts in oneself or others, attention also needs to be paid to understanding the process of decision making that leads up to the different frames. Following the inner decision committee model, people who want to analyse this process in themselves or others will need to uncover which competing drives are at play as well as the modes of processing that are being practiced. This means:

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[a] Especially combined with the questions listed in chapter 5.3/the overview of tools in appendix V.

- Probing for interests and goals to see which drives are at play and which are strong (relevant in the case of the domestic contract are the four main groups: living according to one's moral convictions, taking care of one's physique, managing relationships, and managing to live in the world);
- Investigating the activity and relative strength of the inner chairperson (i.e. how much emphasis there is on wanting to decide in a fair and high quality manner relative to other active goals) and the related ways of coming to a decision (i.e. heuristic, deliberate or intuitive processing); and
- Examining whether there is an active joker at play, as well as the strategies it might be applying to feel better about past, present and future decisions (i.e. dissonance reduction, oppression or avoidance through distancing devices, or accepting/embracing dissonance).

For aspiring change-makers these tools imply that there are two basic roads to follow to achieve change:

1) Content: to try and change or activate existing cognitions or add new ideas to the collection of cognitions with the aim of changing which clusters of reasoning and behaviour become important in one's domestic contract;
2) Process: to try and change which drives are active and strong, with the aim of changing the mode of processing, or nudging/persuading people towards other reasoning and behaviour.[3]

Part of the decision making process will always remain elusive

At the same time, one must realise that even when knowing as much as they can about the committee members and their set-up, there will always be parts of the process that one will not be able to uncover, due to some participating drives and cognitions being out of the reach of conscious awareness (i.e. in the blind spot) or due to information being too abundant or complex to process.[4] Moreover, as the inner decision process follows the 'rules' of a complex dynamical system in which learning, adaptation and interaction takes place between active committee members and the cognitions they apply, outcomes emerge non-linearly, as part of processes of self-organisation.[5] This implies that, though much can be explained and understood and directed with knowledge of these inner processes, the decision process as well as the resulting frames and other actions are never fully predictable, and thus also not unequivocally targetable for change towards a certain outcome.

Nevertheless, it is still useful to explore the drives and cognitions that are part of the mindset in a certain moment and the dynamics between them - as well as the external context that both influences the mindset and is influenced by the frames and other actions that result from the decision making process.

Frames are never context-free

That the influence of demographical context is complex and the exact influence of individual factors is not easily isolatable, doesn't mean that there is no value in gathering knowledge about the situation in which framing takes place. The external situational context, including the structural world around us, the culture(s) we live in, the information that is available, and the ways peers construct and act upon their domestic contracts, provides a lot of information about why certain committee members and cognitions get primed in everyday-life while others do not.[6] Decision making after all is engrained the cultural, esthetical, behavioural, situational and structural surroundings in which it takes place.[7]

In that line of thought, though we call it individual decision making, decisions and resulting frames are, while person-dependent, never truly individual. As the research and the inner decision committee model that developed grounded in it suggests, frames are built in the internal context of the mindset, that specifically includes recollections and imaginations of external contextual information and previously performed behaviours. In other words, frames are partly constructed in response to things that have been said before or in anticipation of the response of (real or imaginary) others.[8] In addition, though people may very well experience and frame it as a personal choice, the construction of (non-) acceptability of keeping and killing animals for food is transpersonal because its effects reach way beyond the personal - arguably affecting people around the globe, the environment as well as numerous (farmed and wild) animals.[9]

Considering a frame together with everything relating to it thus adds depth to its understanding. The four main goals groups of the inner decision committee model thereby can provide insight in the balance between personal and relational motivations of framing by distinguishing between the more individually oriented living according to one's moral convictions or taking care of one's physique and the more collectively oriented managing relationships with others and living in the world - which can for example be researched through laddering in combination with providing hypothetical situations. Moreover, as has been done in this research, including a variety of contexts and research subjects facilitates an increased understanding of the construction of each unique frame.[10] For aspiring change-makers, distinguishing between personal and collective internal aspects of framing and external contextual factors gives information about what aspects could be useful to target to achieve certain behavioural outcomes (hopefully after they using the tools developed in this research to decide on *what* they think would be desirable behavioural outcomes).

There is value in noticing dissonance and coping

Truly understanding everyday-life domestic contracts is impossible without understanding that having simultaneously activated contradictory cognitions and drives (*ambivalence*) is inherent to complex issues such as constructing (non-)acceptability of keeping and killing animals for food. Whether it is made consciously or not, there always is a choice to be made: regarding the food to purchase or otherwise consume, regarding the shape and origin of that food, and regarding considering the implications of this choice on many other parties. Such a choice does not always have to be problematic. However, when someone notices that the reasoning and behaviour that make up their domestic contract is conflicting, that they lack certain arguments, that they feel they cannot deal with all the complex information involved, and/or if there is a lot of uncertainty about what is the right course of action and why, ambivalence may turn into the -deemed uncomfortable- state of *dissonance*.

The research and resulting tools provides insight into the occasions and possible reasons for ambivalence and dissonance to occur, as well as into the ways people deal with the uncomfortable feeling accompanying dissonance. First of all, ambivalence may be the result of a contradiction between different *clusters of reasoning and behaviour*, which especially leads to dissonance if the performed behaviour deviates from the behavioural norms in clusters that are found important. Furthermore, *cognitions* within an adhered-to cluster may not match or be ambiguous, which leads to uncertainty. Finally, dissonance may also stem from the simultaneous triggering of conflicting *drives*. Dissonance activates the *joker*, who, striving to feel good -or at least: better- about past, present and future decisions, tries to solve dissonance by applying one or several (usually oppressive) *coping strategies*.[11] Dissonance may furthermore trigger the need for a 'reality-check'[12] and activate the *inner chairperson*, which if strong will induce a conscious or even comprehensive style of decision making in which all drives and the cognitions they employ are heard and dissonance is allowed and even embraced as a sign of making the decision process more complete.

For researchers, this provides several opportunities for achieving increased understanding. First of all, awareness of the possibility of dissonance and alertness to the different (oppressive and non-oppressive; see appendix IV) ways of dealing with the uncomfortable tension related to it, may help pinpoint conflicts between drives and/or cognitions as well as possible ambiguities, where one may not have been aware of them before.[b] As

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[b] As discussed in more detail in chapter 6, whether a communication strategy is a coping strategy, i.e. a piece of framing used to feel good -or less bad- about contradicting aspects of a decision, or just a regular piece of framing arguably can only truly be assessed by the person feeling it. Ignorance for example may be real or strategic. Establishing dissonance via coping strategies thus calls for some caution. Asking feedback from the person(s) under scrutiny as to whether dissonance is actually felt or not, may be helpful.

discussed above, the clusters of reasoning and behaviour and the inner decision committee model can help uncover the specific *reasons* for felt dissonance, which in turn can help point out differences between active drives and clusters of reasoning that a person adheres to in *ideal cases* (espoused theory) and in *practice* (theory in use), as well as give an indication of the limits of the complexity a person can entertain.[13] Finally, the *style* of the noticed coping strategies -oppressive or non-oppressive- helps assess whether the *mode of processing* leading to a certain frame was more heuristic or conscious/comprehensive.

Awareness of coping thus sheds light on the reality of everyday-life behaviours, in which the best of intentions can and do take a backseat to other primed committee members - backed by the joker. The notions of dissonance and coping therewith also have important implications for aspiring change-makers. Pointing out the workings of the joker and its coping strategies (in a non-threatening way, for example by using humour[c]) can help individual people grow aware of their defence mechanisms as well as of the content and process of inner conflicts that are taking place, which can lead the way to behaviour change (especially when oppressive coping strategies no longer provide enough consolation and the inner chairperson is activated that sees the merit in hearing all dimensions to a decision). On a different level, noticing dissonance and coping can help change-makers uncover the paradoxes or contradictions that are present in society that both block the way to change as well as provide windows of opportunities for achieving it (usually by encouraging people to embrace paradox instead of running away from it, and show them they have more capacity to deal with complexity than they think).[14] Furthermore, the realisation that we all are alike in both experiencing dissonance and having the tendency to deal with the uncomfortable feeling related to it -though we may do that in different ways-, can help build a bridge between us and provide the common ground that will enable a less polarised dialogue (more on this later on in this section).

We are ruled by our mindset (ánd we can influence it)
An important conclusion that was drawn from the research results is that the everyday-life framing of domestic contracts is *dynamic*, due to the dynamic priming of *mindsets*: the inner committee members primed in a certain situation, their relative strength, and the

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[c] Some ponderings on humour and dissonance: Humour bonds us, and it arguably feeds on dissonance to become funny. Humour can thus provide a safe way to confront people with their coping and connect in the process. However, some caution is needed, because if humour is too much at the expense of others, there is a danger that it will polarise a debate even more. In addition, I suspect that humour can be used to check whether people feel dissonance about a certain topic: if they do not find a dissonance-related joke funny, it is worth researching if they actually are simply not feeling dissonance on that topic and explore what statements feel untrue for them.

cognitions available to them rule which of the multiple clusters of reasoning and behaviour are focal (and therewith what is brought forward in framing).[15] A large part of the activation of mindsets hinges on heuristic impulsive (instinctive) or conditioned (learned) reactions to a situation. This is why *habit* plays such an important role in the construction of domestic contracts: the heuristic activation of a habitual mindset, followed by a set course of action and uttering of accompanying frames.[16] Another important concept linked to the dynamicity of mindset activation is *identity*: compounds of drives and related cognitions that refer to an internal sense(s) one has of oneself or the outward bound image(s) that one tries to portray of oneself in interaction with others.[17] When triggered, the drives and cognitions associated with such existing or ambitioned identities not only instantly become part of the mindset, but, depending on how strongly one identifies with a certain identity, the related goals and cognitions are considered of more importance than other triggered ones (their part of the mindset gets more powerful because identities are charged with affect and motive).[18] An example of the influence of the (in)activation of an identity is found in the 'citizen-consumer' phenomenon, where a person asked about the treatment and slaughter of animals in intensive farms finds this largely non-acceptable (in his role of concerned and informed citizen), but in the supermarket, when the citizen-identity is not primed, as a consumer he is there to buy a cheap and nice piece of meat.[19]

For researchers, these notions imply that understanding mindset (incl. habitual priming and identity-related priming), though hard to research[d], holds the key to understanding the process of framing: for the framing on the outside relates to the mindset on the inside. Just like (identity) mindsets, frames may range from being coherent to the point of rigidness (ingrained habits, strong identity), to -at the other end of the spectrum- being fluid to the point of being chameleon-like (bending with every wind, almost to the point of having no identity whatsoever).[20] And moreover, as different identities may be primed to become part of the mindset from one moment to another, the resulting frames may be used in an overlapping fashion (like 'paintings that are made over former layers of painting').[21] Noticing these aspects of mindsets, on top of dissonance and coping, can help make better sense of everyday-life framing behaviour.

For aspiring change-makers, mindsets form both an obstacle as well as an opportunity to achieve change. A useful concept to understand this is *self-referentiality*, which refers to the tendency of people to be locked inside one's own perspective, accompanied by a rejection of the validity of deviating frames.[22] Self-referentiality (also called autopoiesis), suggests that the way we see and manage our environment is also a product of how we

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[d] Mindset can only be researched indirectly, through laddering, mirroring, and with the help of models such as the frame-of-reference.

see ourselves (our sense of identity and the stories we about ourselves and the world).[23] This forms a big impediment to change: even in an interactive setting, if people see their environment as extensions of their existing identity and stories, their mindsets will not shift and they will keep reproducing the same frames, without being aware of it - and very possibly aided by the joker.[24] Conversely, *self-reflection with awareness of self-referentiality* can drive transformation.[25] Habits for example are notoriously hard to break, but awareness of habits is the first step on the way to change. Moreover, making new habits through for example the use of rituals or bright-line rule approaches provides a possible opportunity for lasting adaptation.[26] Without awareness, identities are hard to change, though insight into what triggers certain mindsets or identities can help aspiring change-makers. They could choose either to use these insights to nudge people into activation of other identities that they expect will lead to change. Alternatively, they can put everything out in the open and invite people to transcend self-referentiality and encourage them to adopt specific identities that are linked to the behaviours that they advocate. Depending on the desired direction of change (using the clusters of reasoning and behaviour as a road map), examples of such possibly useful identities could be 'ethical/virtuous person', 'fellow animal', 'green-' or 'global citizen' on one end of the spectrum, or 'hedonist', 'carnivore' and 'tough guy' on the other.[27] Change-makers may also want to influence the mode of processing. In order to do that, the inner chairperson could be activated by triggering an identity that includes the desire to be fair (or even encouraging identification with *being* the inner chairperson). Alternatively, the joker could be aided by feeding dissonance reducing statements to a person to prevent the priming of the inner chairperson. Lastly, intuitive decision making can be encouraged by inviting people to self-reflect and take a little bit of silent time before making a decision; or it can be impaired by demanding a prompt decision that does not involve fair processing.

In short, our mindset determines what we think, what we do, and how we frame it. But, if we take a moment to become more aware of what is happening, we may find that we have the potential for the development of the capacity to invite complexity and deal with our thoughts, feelings, and actions in a more present and attentive manner.[28] Through such mindful self-reflection, we can move out of narrow self-referentiality, become more open to learning new information, and consciously shift to other mindsets.[29] In other words: though we are inevitably ruled by our mindset, we also hold the power to influence it.

Everyone holds partial truths
The last implication that I want to discuss is that of the apparent pluralism of domestic contracts. The clusters of reasoning and behaviour show that there are many (at least eleven) ways of talking about farming, slaughter and consumption of animals, that are all coherent and valid. The inner decision committee model conceptualises the dynamicity of

individual framing through the idea of negotiating inner parts of the self, and shows the plausibility of the influence of both personal, socio-cultural, physical and non-material stimuli on everyday-life framing.[30] These research findings, which are the result of conversations with many others, combined provide a map of the pluralism of everyday-life domestic contracts, both in ourselves and others - while at the same time providing a whole that shows the interrelation of all these partial views.[31]

For researchers, the clusters of reasoning and the inner decision committee model provide two inherently non-normative tools to recognise and analyse the pluralism of frames that domestic contracts are built with. For aspiring change-makers, the idea of multiple and dynamic truths form an opportunity to start conversations from a place of curiosity and respect for one another's views, stemming from the realisation that every frame is a part of the complex whole picture, as well as that everyone's everyday-life domestic contracts are dependent on the priming and relative strength of inner drives and cognitions. Knowing that we all hold partial truths provides opportunities for transcending self-referentiality and polarity - in our own minds as well as in dialogues with others.

I will explore the opportunities the research holds for the facilitation of dialogue at the end of this section. But first I will zoom in on some applications of the insights and tools that followed from the research on a more collective level: to understand contemporary issues in the societal arena.

Applications in the broader societal arena

The foremost value of the research into the domestic contract is that it provides opportunities for increased understanding of *individual everyday-life constructs*. In the previous paragraphs, I have discussed several implications of the research findings for researchers and aspiring change-makers, on the level of individual consumers. However, as I will discuss below, the research findings can also be used to shed light on matters that take place in the *wider societal arena*.

These include:

- Revealing normative statements in the societal debate;
- Substantiating the word 'sustainability'; and
- Improving understanding of awareness raising initiatives.

Revealing normative statements in the societal debate

Participating in the stakeholder debate on farming, slaughter and consumption of animals, many normative statements are made, to defend one's personal domestic contract and/or accuse others'. The values, accusations, defences and responsibility shifts in these societal

discussions can easily be recognized with the clusters of reasoning and behaviour and the inner decision committee model.

Examples of how the clusters of reasoning and behaviour can help reveal these (often implicit) normative statements are: *"Everyone only cares about themselves. But what about people in less fortunate circumstances, in developing countries? And what about animals? You cannot just forget about 'm."*[32] (calling for a widening of the circles, blaming those who don't) *"Pff, those city folk with their talk of feeling sorry for this chicken, that cow. They are here for us given by God to use as we see fit."*[33] (defending a not widening of the circles beyond the bold line with a referral to a religious argument) *"What is more important, empathy for individual farmed animals or preventing species extinction?"*[34] (debating the difference between clusters 9: *free range/organic/game* and 10: *Low eco-impact/flexitarian/(flex-)vegan* regarding the effect on animals) *"Aw...they can't handle seeing an animal getting killed. Grow up! It's the law of nature, and she's a bitch!"*[35] (defending a 'live & let die' standpoint and accusing a 'live & let live' standpoint as being soft) and figure 7.3 (accusing cluster 9: *free range/organic/game* of caring less for animals than cluster 7: *vegetarian/vegan*).

Figure 7.3: A normative statement from the societal discussion

Moreover, a phenomenon that is often seen as a result of dissonance but also in the societal debate, is the playing with the distribution of responsibilities for social and environmental consequences (in literature called *shifting responsibilities*[36]): *"I think the environment needs to be protected, but who am I to do that on my own? What I do has no influence. No, the government should make rules to make sure that farming doesn't have a detrimental impact on the environment, if the farmers don't do that themselves."*[37] In this example the circle of the environment/earth/biosphere is incorporated (though not clear whether through cluster 8 or 10) but the responsibility for performing the accompanying normative behaviour in person is shifted to actions that producers and the government could perform that address environmental impact instead.

Figure 7.4: The balancing of the circles

The inner decision committee model helps shed light on normative statements in society by pointing out the underlying motivations. Most normative statements stem from the committee member group aiming to live according to one's moral convictions, which, especially if decision making is non-conscious and oppressive, can come out in a normatively judgemental way: *"It's monstrous to eat animals. You should not allow your taste determine what you do. Don't allow it. People who let their habits rule their lives are simply weak. I used to like meat, but I've conquered my taste. And so can they!"*[38] Diverging from one's moral convictions out of relationship management (e.g. grandma with her chicken soup) or managing to live in the world (e.g. no meat replacements available in the local supermarket) are discounted easily; only caring for one's physique in cases of survival and recovery from illness are more mildly approached, though taste and cravings again are not seen as valid arguments. On the other hand, where humans are seen as more important than animals and/or a 'live & let live' perspective is adhered to, caring for one's physique and relationships with other humans are valid norms - that are in turn often defended by discounting feelings of empathy towards animals and moral convictions regarding parties in wider circles as *"sentimental"*[39].

The modes of decision making can furthermore be used to understand normative statements regarding (a lack of) conscious awareness of oneself and others in society. For example: *"They say it's normal to eat meat. But is it? It's nothing more than a cultural habit. That everyone just is conditioned to do it, doesn't make it right. Not if you really think and feel about it."*[40] can be recognised as discounting heuristic decision making for lacking conscious processing. *"Those animal advocates are just so touchy-feely, I can't stand it. Why do they have to show those movies about calves being separated from their mothers; can't they just have rational arguments about the facts of the matter?"*[41] points at valuing the rational weighing of factual pros and cons - which on the other hand can criticised by others for lacking empathy and not being sensitive enough to ethical and aesthetical arguments. Lastly, comprehensive decision making can be introduced as a

norm, therewith also discounting oppressive joker strategies: *"I advocate radical inclusiveness, not only of all opinions, but of all of our own feelings and ideas. I believe that the fact that we can't cope with the emotions of others is often a sign that we can't cope with our own. We need to create space for all of that."*[42]

Substantiating 'sustainability'

Another contemporary theme that can be addressed with the help of the clusters of reasoning and behaviour is the lack of clarity on what precisely is meant with the word *sustainability* - for example in 'sustainable livestock farming' or 'sustainable food production'. Sustainability is what Uwe Pörksen[43] calls a *plastic word*: a word that that due to high levels of abstraction, malleability, and overall positive -almost appeasing- connotation, carries an inherent risk of vague or blurred meaning though displacing of more precise content. Lack of substantiation of the word 'sustainable' can potentially disturb dialogue because it leads to conversation partners talking about quite diverging things without noticing. It thus requires further substantiation - with which the clusters can help. The research results show that when talking about sustainability, it is the key value linked to the consideration of long-term interests of considered parties and future generations: *"An ancient Indian proverb says: Treat the Earth well. It was not given to you by your parents, it was loaned to you by your children. We do not inherit the Earth from our ancestors, we borrow it from our children."*[44] Instead of leading to a new cluster of reasoning and behaviour, taking sustainability into account typically amounts in a combining of prior clusters with an emphasis on effects on the long term (ranging from a few years to several generations to come). And this is where the model comes in handy: it shows that an approach that calls itself sustainable *only in ideal cases incorporates and balances long term interests of all the parties in the circles of consideration of interests*. In many cases only long term interests/future generations of humans are included, or as the triple bottom line *people-planet-profit* indicates: only long term interests/future generations of local and global producers and the environment. The clusters therewith illuminate that the (short or) long term interests of *farmed animals* are not generally a part of the notion of sustainability, and a discussion on the difference between a 'live & let live' and a 'live & let die' approach is hardly ever held in this regard. In short: with help of the tool of the clusters of reasoning and behaviour, the meanings of the word sustainability in the societal debate can thus be better understood - as well as substantiated.

Understanding awareness raising initiatives

Lastly, though the clusters of reasoning and behaviour and the inner decision committee model are the empirical results of my research among consumers and not of awareness raising initiatives executed by educators, NGO-campaigners or passionate individuals, the

patterns can be used to increase understanding of such initiatives and what they are targeted at:

A trend often seen in awareness raising campaigns is the attempt to provide *knowledge* with the aim of convincing people to adopt the reasoning and eventually behaviours in the clusters they advocate (typically fair trade, animal well-being, environmental protection or sustainability). As follows from the ample video material that targets emotions, awareness raisers seem to already recognise that knowledge alone is not enough; that *feelings* need to be addressed too - which makes sense when looking at the reported influence of feelings besides rational thought on which parties' interests are taken into consideration by consumers in the current research. The pattern of the clusters of reasoning and behaviour helps to see that awareness raising initiatives typically aim at *widening* the circles of consideration of interests (i.e. embrace a larger span and/or time frame). This is usually done via providing stories and/or showing emotionally triggering imagery in order to stimulate altruism and longer-term thinking, or in other words: to expand consideration of interests to include the advocated-for parties. In the first example in figure 7.5, empathy is called upon to widen the circles. In the second example, the desired altruism is triggered by referring to the effects of not including these parties on the self. This strategy of 'altruism through selfishness' is even more deeply applied in for example the Schopenhauer quote often used by campaigners: *"Compassion for animals is intimately connected with goodness of character; and it may be confidently asserted that he who is cruel to animals cannot be a good man."*[45]

Figure 7.5 (a-b): Awareness raising examples: widening of the circles

A similar strategy encompasses linking advocated-for parties to parties in inner circles, e.g. by naming them or otherwise referring to them as loved ones or pets. Even though this seems less desirable in terms of the circle-widening spirit of awareness raising (as it seems to move only that specific personified example to the inner circles, leaving the wider circles unaddressed), this respondent's quote suggests that this may still be an effective awareness raising strategy: *"Charlotte in the movie Charlotte's web really opened my eyes as to how clever pigs are. I think they should all be treated way better than they are now."*[47] A confrontation with different behaviour towards pets and farmed animals aimed at causing a feeling of dissonance is not seldom part of this approach (see for an example Paul Kuczynski's painting in figure 7.6.

Figure 7.6: Awareness raising example: linking advocated-for parties to parties in inner circles

[48]

The pattern of the clusters of reasoning and behaviour furthermore helps shed light on a distinct movement within awareness raising: campaigning aimed at convincing people with a 'live & let die' standpoint to adopt a 'live & let live' standpoint (and sometimes vice versa, as the counter-organisation Anti Wakker Dier attempts). This trend is linked to the clash between proponents of animal rights and animal welfare[49] (cf. figure 7.3 and between farmers (that do consider the interests of animals and/or the environment) and what they call 'activists' or 'city folk'. As is illustrated with the clusters, from a 'live & let die' standpoint causing killing is not seen as problematic, so reasoning and behaviour that fits clusters 9: *free range/organic/game* and 10: *low eco-impact/flexitarian/(flex-)vegan* are considered adequately altruistic results of widening the circles; while from a 'live & let live' standpoint this does not suffice and clusters 7: *vegetarian/vegan* and 8: *eco-vegan* (i.e. not being okay with inflicting killing on others) are considered more altruistic than their right-hand side 9 and 10 counterparts - hence awareness raising energy is spent on it. However, because 'live & let live' and 'live & let die' are quite basic standpoints in life (quite similar to being 'right-wing' or 'left-wing' in politics), to a truly convinced 'live & let die' audience the pictures in figure 7.3 and 7.6 arguably form ineffective awareness raising strategies, and similarly, at the other end of the spectrum, farmers' organisations are not

likely to convince 'live & let live' proponents with arguments of normality and naturalness of killing animals for food. The only argument that both sides may be open to is the necessity argument - which can work both ways: either arguing that meat consumption sometimes is necessary for personal survival; or that meat consumption is not necessary because so many alternatives are available.

Moreover, the clusters help understand holistic awareness raisers -whether they adhere to a 'live & let live' or 'live & let die' standpoint, and whether they see humans, animals and nature as equal in a non-anthropocentric (e.g. mystical or post-humanist) way or not- do not just aim to include more circles, but include *all* circles: *"For the good of all; To support all life; Now and for the next seven generations."*[50] Regarding keeping and killing animals for food, this life-centric stance generally results in promoting veganism - at least in all instances in which eating meat is not necessary.

The inner decision committee model, besides pointing out that awareness raisers typically tend to appeal to the 'living according to one's moral convictions' goal group, elucidates another type of awareness raising: one that is not aimed at increasing knowledge, compassion for other parties or longer term thinking, but at influencing people by making use of insights into the *process of decision making*. Though there much can be achieved by nudging people during heuristic processing[51], or priming certain identities, the word awareness raising here implies the intention to increase the *awareness* of information processing, in order to decide more consciously or even intuitively, and transcend temporary urges and habitual behaviour. This type of awareness raising, unlike nudging, aims to make people aware of the influence of internal and external situational input on the priming of committee members as well as joker-induced coping strategies, with the aim of them being less ruled by these influences and make decisions regarding the keeping and killing of animals for food in a more fair and high quality manner. This type of awareness raising is implicit in any attempt to confront people with their coping strategies, such as in figure 7.7, but can also be explicitly done: *"How conscious are you when you decide what to eat? And how mindful are you when you are eating?"*[52] and *"As long as we remain unaware of how carnism impacts us, we will be unable to make our food choices freely – because without awareness, there* is *no free choice."*[53]

Concludingly, the research findings help pinpoint what it is that awareness raising initiatives target - or in other words: it leads to more awareness of the various types of awareness raising that are applied in the societal arena.

Figure 7.7: Awareness raising examples: confronting with coping strategies (in this case: concealment)

Opportunities for dialogue

Though the tools developed over the course of the research are non-normative in themselves, and as empirical research results primarily form tools for (self-)analytical purposes, the implications and applications discussed in this section indicate that they also form an opportunity to conduct (initiate and facilitate) conversations about domestic contract related matters. The list of ingredients of the domestic contract, the clusters of reasoning and behaviour as well as the inner decision committee model, while not normative models, can be used for having conversations *about* what norms do and should play a role.

For example, the idea of increasingly inclusive circles of consideration of interests, and of babushka dolls that are or are not selected to play a role in the domestic contract, invites questions regarding how *inclusive* the ideal domestic contract should be:

- *Is taking care of wider (spatial, temporal and relational) circles normatively speaking 'better'? Can some be skipped? Are some circles inherently more important than others?*

A translation of this into practice requires the question:

- *What concrete behaviour needs to be performed to accommodate the interests of the parties considered?*

The division of standpoints towards causing death raises the question:

- *Which -if any- is superior: 'live & let live' or 'live & let die'?*

And when circles and clusters are decided upon:

- *Who is held responsible for the social and environmental consequences that are deemed important, and how is that responsibility best distributed?*

The inner decision committee model can be used to problematize interest and motivations:

- *What goals drive the decisions that are made? And what goals should (and according to whom)?*
- *Are some goals more important than others? Why?*

Moreover, the model allows an open discussion on how *comprehensive* the decision making leading to domestic contracts should be:

- *What modes of processing are used?*
- *Are particular modes of processing inherently better than others? Why?*

It can be used to remain consciously aware of dissonance and coping, and discuss the pitfalls and merits thereof:

- *Are oppressive coping strategies used? Is that problematic? Why?*
- *How can we know which statements are real motivations and which are coping strategies?*
- *Does dissonance have benefits, too?*
- *Can contradicting drives and cognitions be accepted, or even invited? Why? And when?*

And open up conversations about possible external conflict:

- *Can contradicting others in society be accepted, or even invited?*

The research results and specifically the tools that were developed from it, thus form an invitation for both reflection as well as dialogue about the topic of farming, slaughter and consumption of animals, by ourselves or with others in society.

Developing methodology for dialogue.

Based on the tools and combined with existing knowledge, developing programs involving new ways of talking about domestic contract related issues is conceivable. A well-organized communication process may facilitate in bringing the stakeholder groups together and allow new ways of thinking and talking to emerge. The recommended communication form is an *open and constructive dialogue*, in which the stakeholders are engaged and invited to take a distance from right/wrong-schemes and in which paradox, trade-offs and the related dissonance are accepted.[55] Such a dialogue forces people to research differences in backgrounds and perceptions, and acknowledge coping

mechanisms by sincerely exploring feelings, which opens up possibilities of shifts in contexts and shared frames of reference.[56] Ideally, this then results in what Rawls calls *overlapping consensus*: parties with different views accepting solutions for different reasons.[57]

The research findings and the implications I formulated earlier on in this section suggest that to have a fruitful debate about domestic contract related issues, the starting point should not be a forced focus on factual knowledge or ethics only, but rather the recognition of the full complexity of interacting drives that are present in all participants, the acknowledgement of the importance of feelings, values and behaviour, a sensitivity to the contexts people interact with, and the awareness that ambivalence, dissonance and coping strategies are an inherent part of everyday-life domestic contracts. In such conversations, tools such as the list of ingredients, the clusters of reasoning and behaviour and the inner decision committee model can be used to be better informed about the issue at hand, help deal with the complexity of the matter, make positions insightful in a non-judgemental way, and find common ground between conversation partners through a recognition of shared mechanisms of decision making and framing.

However, designing programs and processes aimed at achieving a state of true dialogue should not be underestimated.[58] As Aarts explained in her inaugural speech 'The art of dialogue', *"the main characteristic of a dialogue -as compared to other conversations in the form of a discussion or a debate- is that nobody is trying to win"*.[59] Research shows that it is very difficult to put your own interests aside and partake in a constructive conversation in which all viewpoints are respected, and that often attempts at dialogue lead to creating more conflicts than solutions, instead of bridging distances.[60] Literature on dialogue, negotiation and conflict resolution provides several pointers for the facilitation of dialogue, such as valuing differences and diversity, allowing space for creativity, practicing empathic and generative listening, creating trust and safety, embracing paradox, and being sensitive to context.[61] However, of utmost importance for the development of such methodology for dialogue is that it should not simply present normative and wishful-thinking ideas about how conversations should evolve, but must be grounded in empirical research and practical experience on how everyday-life conversations evolve – both between as well as inside the heads of people.[62]

7.3 Reflection

The focus of the research project 'Disentangling the domestic contract' was on understanding how individual people contextually construct their personal everyday-life domestic contracts and why. As set forth in detail in chapter 3, the research was designed

as a case-driven in-depth interpretive analysis of framing dynamics, carried out amongst consumers from various backgrounds in two European extremes: the Netherlands and Turkey. Aimed at identifying both contextually valid knowledge as well as general patterns on the level of theory, the research followed a stepwise analytical approach in which sensitizing concepts were continuously connected with and adapted to the collected research data. This resulted in a converging of insights, of which this report is the visible result.

As can be seen in chapter 2 as well as in the analysis throughout the research, the conceptual basis of the research is very much interdisciplinary, inspired by strategic communication literature on -both cognitive and interactional- framing and cognitive dissonance, conflict management theory, psychological studies on decision making and goal-framing, dynamical systems theory, and quite obviously several dialogical approaches (ranging from Bolen's archetypal psychology, Boal's theatre of the oppressed and De Bono's organisational six-hat thinking, to Hermans' Bakhtin-based Dialogical Self Theory). Moreover, during the choice of contexts, the categorising and coding of topics, the search for patterns of symbolic convergence, and the conceptualisation of the decision making process, many sociological studies on aspects of the farming, slaughter and consumption of animals as well as literature on animal and environmental ethics have provided important theoretical input.

This dissertation in itself can thus be seen as the result of a dialogical approach: the voices of the respondents and written words in the documents that together formed my data, my own existing collection of cognitions, peers I've talked with, the sensitizing concepts, in fact all authors of all articles and books I've ever read have -consciously or non-consciously- been part of my endeavour to make sense of the everyday-life framing of (non-)acceptability of keeping and killing animals for food.

For an in-depth reflection on the design of the research I refer to chapter 3, which includes discussions of the chosen methodology (section 3.1), the analytical process (section 3.2), the corpus of data, and the methods used for its collection (section 3.3). In section 3.4 I have systematically discussed my practices to secure the scientific quality of the research, judged against the criteria of sociologist Goudsblom's[63] *precision*, *systematics*, *scope* and *relevance*, and Lincoln and Guba's[64] related *dependability*, *confirmability*, *credibility* and *transferability*, as well as pointed out the inevitable *multiple hermeneutics* of scientific writing.[65] In the remainder of this section I will discuss the research in terms of its scientific and societal value, reflect on the limitations of the project and formulate recommendations for future exploration. I will conclude the chapter with a personal contemplation on being descriptive and prescriptive.

Added value of the research

As discussed in section 7.1, the research that this dissertation reports on lead to both contextually valid insights into the construction of (non-)acceptability of keeping and killing animals for food in the Netherlands and Turkey (i.e. the frames in chapter 4, and the discussion of framing ingredients in relation to demographic context in chapter 5) as well as to the development of more general patterns on the level of theory (i.e. the clusters of reasoning and behaviour in chapter 5 and the inner decision committee model in chapter 6). With this, the project generated several contributions to scientific theory, in addition to rendering practical societal applications.

Contributions to scientific theory

Though I did not necessarily set out to improve or refine any sensitizing concepts, the iterative process of going from existing concepts to the data and back to the concepts lead to the thickening of several existing concepts:

- Through coding and categorising of the data I have contributed to refining the existing *model of the frame-of-reference*[66], by refining the names and definitions of the existing categories and adding the categories *behaviours* and *feelings* (as set forth in detail in chapter 2.2), making the model more sensitive to these categories.
- I have contributed to an increased understanding of *dissonance* and ways of dealing with the uncomfortable tension accompanying dissonance, by expanding the states of *dissonance* to include not only discrepancies between thoughts and perceived norms, but also include *feelings* and dissonance between *inner drives*.
- And in terms of *coping strategies* (that I defined as communicative strategies to feel better about past, present and future decisions) I have explicitly added *non-repressive coping styles* (admitting and embracing dissonance) to the generally recognised dissonance *reduction strategies* and *distancing devices* (see chapter 2.2 as well as appendix IV for an overview).

In addition, by combining existing theory with the interpretation of the conversational research data, I have developed the *inner decision committee model*: a dialogical conceptualisation of the individual decision making process underlying the construction of domestic contracts. Though it was inspired by many other theories on framing, information processing and decision making (as discussed in chapter 2), the *combination* of elements makes it a novel way of looking at decision making:

- The interpretation of the *modes of processing* in this model first of all diverges from and adds to the popular idea of two modes of decision making (*heuristic* and *deliberate*)[67] by adding *intuitive processing* as a separate mode on a continuum of increasing complexity, as well as distinguishing intermediary modes such as

witnessing and *oppressing heuristics*. Furthermore, the model does not simple state *that* intuition plays a role, but concretises *how*.

- The model adds to existing dialogical approaches such as Dialogical Self Theory[68] and goal-framing[69] approaches in that it discerns between a metaphorical *inner chairperson* and a *joker* in addition to more general goals. The inner chairperson adds to the idea of dynamic inner negotiation processes by inducing different modes of decision making with what could be called different political hues (heuristic: anarchistic; oppressing heuristics: fascism; deliberate processing: technocracy; and intuitive: deliberative or deep democracy[70]). The conceptualisation of the joker adds to coping literature, because it delineates more clearly when something is coping and when it is other framing, namely when framing is done in order to feel good about a past, present or future decision. Attention for the relational dynamics of framing through the ideas of an inner chairperson and joker-induced ways of dealing with dissonance in decision making, arguably enables a more realistic understanding of everyday-life domestic contracts than analyses in terms of straightforward attitudes.[71]
- Conceptualising the inner decision process this way contributes to the idea that our minds are not machines: like in real-life negotiation processes, decision making is not the product of a simple vector-like sum of committee members goals and the pros and cons they bring to the table, but as a whole works as a complex non-linear and adaptive system.[72]
- By conceptualising a *collection of cognitions* as well as an *inner negotiation process* between active committee members applying these cognitions to achieve certain *goals*, largely *in response to or anticipating on the reactions of others and the material surroundings -including one's own previous actions-*, the model has united cognitive and interactive approaches to framing.[73] And, providing an *everyday-life perspective*, the model stresses that context is not simply a collection of stimuli the influence a certain variable, but that people are in constant interaction with a dynamic context.[74]
- Finally, the value of the inner decision committee model lies in the fact that it is not simply a thought experiment, but a theory grounded in empirical data - that attempts to approach the complexity of reality as much as a model can.

The research into the domestic contract furthermore is positioned within and adds to existing literature on matters regarding the farming, slaughter and consumption of animals:

- The research is an extension of Te Velde et. al.'s research[75] as well as my own MSc theses[76], diving deeper into the arguments and motivations of consumers regarding the (non-)acceptability of keeping and killing animals for food. The research distinguishes itself by not focusing solely on animal welfare, and by the insights and tools regarding framing and decision making it generated that can be used for (self-) analysis as well as the facilitation of dialogue.

- As discussed in the paragraph on applications in section 7.2, the clusters of reasoning and behaviour help substantiate the word 'sustainability' beyond the triple bottom line that is central in scientific and popular discourse.[77]

- Though in many areas of human-animal studies post-humanism and non-anthropocentrism is the ideal[78], the research shows that most people in everyday-life still use a type of discourse that places themselves in the centre of their world and place temporally, spatially and relationally distant others in wider circles. The circles of consideration of interests and the idea of 'babushka dolls' that are or are not selected to play a role in the domestic contract and the ones given priority, however provide a way of talking about this that doesn't exclude non-anthropocentrism.

- An existing tool that is often applied in discussions about domestic contract related matters is the ethical matrix.[79] The ethical matrix also makes various parties that are (or are not) taken into consideration explicit (distinguishing between people in the food industry, citizens, farm animals and the living environment), and points at three values (wellbeing, autonomy and justice). The clusters of reasoning and behaviour and the inner decision committee model adds to this tool by systematically presenting the much more intricate aspects that influence decision making in everyday-life - beyond standing by one's moral convictions. Furthermore, it doesn't use ethical jargon.

- Finally, a research that was similar to mine was conducted using the very interesting nextexpertizier® method, which involves quantitatively clustering complex and freehand input that respondents enter into a three-dimensional values matrix, through which the attitudes and behavioural strategies of large groups of people are visualized and clustered to generate significant patterns.[80] The research into consumer attitudes towards animal production in the Netherlands lead to the discernment of three groups of consumers, that according to them can be seen as ways of coping with the quandary between human and animal: romantics (who abhor modern farming and feel torn between their own needs and those of animals), pragmatics (who accept of the conflict between humans and animals, and choose humans before animals), and ethicists (who make a choice in the conflict between humans and animals based on principles, and adapt behaviour accordingly).[81] The clusters of reasoning and behaviour add to this insight by providing a more detailed and multifaceted understanding of the underlying reasoning of these consumers and connected behavioural norms. The inner decision committee model adds to this research by pointing out that in everyday-life these attitudes as well as framing, including coping strategies, are likely to be dynamic.

In conclusion, the scientific value of the research lies in the tools it provides for analysing and discussing issues regarding farming, slaughter and consumption of animals, as well as in its contributions to the existing knowledge about framing and decision making.

Societal relevance

The societal relevance of disentanglement of the various aspects of domestic contracts (as follows from section 7.2), lies in the creation of space for thought and talk - hopefully insightful enough and providing enough safety to allow people to step out of rigid viewpoints, reflect on themselves, and explore differences and common ground with others from a place of curiosity. The practical value of the research lies in the patterns and tools that both individually and collectively can be consulted to understand consumers and used to decide on what course of action to take regarding the issue of farming, slaughter and consumption of animals (as discussed in in section 7.2: implications and applications). Besides of value to individuals, the tools are particularly relevant for policy makers, marketers, educators, and NGOs. Primary objectives of such groups can be straightforward: e.g. sustainability, maintaining the 'licence to produce' and prevention of negative impacts on humans, animals and the environment. However, establishing a strategy with which these objectives can be achieved is difficult: given different contexts and value systems, a one-solution-fits-all concept is not reasonable. The insights and tools resulting from the research can be used to investigate stakeholders, contexts, distinguish between animal species or monitor historic change, and provide grounded recommendations for facilitating cross- and intra-cultural debate, design education methods and better targeting awareness raising and intervention.

Limitations and recommendations

Besides added value, the research and its design also have limitations. In the following paragraphs, I will discuss these limitations, reflect on the extendibility of the research findings, and formulate suggestions for future research.

Limitations of depth and scope

The research this dissertation reports on focuses on the analysis of (inter-)subjective human interpretations of the relation between humans, animals and the environment, that follow from the breeding, slaughtering and consumption of farm animals, by analysing oral and written ways of constructing the domestic contract in everyday-life by consumers in the Netherlands and Turkey. As touched upon in chapter 1.2 in the paragraph 'Beyond the scope of the current research', several limitations of the research project lie in the restrictions of this chosen scope and depth[82]:

- The research was focused at everyday-life domestic contracts, and thus did not take any other issues regarding humans, animals and nature and their interrelations into account, unless they were relevant to the construction of (non-)acceptability of the keeping and killing of animals for food.
- The research was limited to specific urban and rural areas in the Netherlands and Turkey. Outside the case study areas other issues may be of influence.

- The research focused on individual consumers, their frames and their decision making process. The interactions between consumers as well as other stakeholders, though very relevant for follow-up research, have not been part of this research.
- The research was focused only on behavioural norms and pronounced behaviours, and did not check if actually performed behaviours matched these.
- The positivist-empirical validation of the objective truthfulness of pronounced arguments regarding certain ways of farming, slaughter and meat consumption and the effects they have on human health, the animals involved, or the environment - which is indispensable in the dialogue on domestic contract related matters-, has not been part of the current research, that purely regarded the interpretation hereof by consumers.
- Quantitative confirmations of the influence of demographic contextual factors or demographic distribution of the use of specific clusters of reasoning and behaviour in framing have not been carried out within the timeframe of this study.
- Though the research consists of a detailed framing analysis up to the level of topics, it has not been carried out as a classical discourse analysis in the sense that the meaning of all silences, punctuation marks and detailed choice of words are analysed. Nevertheless, such an analysis, and especially one of the power and political meaning of certain terms, would be of value. Similarly, tone of voice, silence, facial expressions and body language have not been researched separately.

Though these limitations were in part caused by the constrained time and resources available over the course of a PhD project, the scope and depth of the research were also importantly driven by conscious choice: to target the gaps in knowledge that I formulated chapter 1.1, and render what I thought would be relevant patterns and tools for creating space for thought and talk.

Extendibility

Though it was tailored at increasing understanding about the construction of everyday-life domestic contracts in the specific case study areas in the Netherlands and Turkey, the research into the domestic contract comprises enough qualitative detail (depth) and ranges over enough contexts and people (scope) to be able to extend the research findings to at least similar people in similar contexts. With regard to the distinguished tools to understand different frames and the developed theory on decision making, I would also argue that generalizability of the results beyond the European sphere is probable, though more research is needed to confirm that. Details in content, such as exact topics referred to and goals that are deemed important, are likely to differ - especially in areas with very different food cultures such as Africa, South-East Asia, or the Arctic. For the concepts and analytical tools to be used to understand other actors or topics, they would first need to be adapted and tested. An inquiry into whether the inner

decision committee model can be generalized outside of the matter of constructing the domestic contract has also not been part of this study, though I suspect that most likely, the four goal groups will be different in other cases, while the conceptualisation of the inner chairperson and the workings of the joker are probably more universal. The tools however can arguably be used to initiate dialogues in the European sphere as well as other parts of the world, with the provision that they are based on research in Dutch and Turkish contexts.

Limits to interpretation

The patterns and tools that followed from the case-driven study into the domestic contract help explain and understand the nuances of the complex cognitive and interactional processes involved in the contextual construction of (non-)acceptability of animal farming and related issues. The in-depth interpretive analysis of conversations and documents helped capture the range of domestic contracts within the selected case study areas and distinguish patterns in in relation with context. Simultaneously, the variation in contexts helped gain a deeper understanding of unique cases, and what these all have in common.[83] The insights and tools -particularly the clusters of reasoning and behaviour and the inner decision committee model- contribute to a better understanding of ourselves and others in ways that didn't exist before, and that can help us find common ground and bring us closer together in dialogues. However, interpreting patterns in framing and processes of decision making is not an exact science. The limitation of interpretively researching individual framing and decision making, lies in the fact that these, just like real-life negotiations and conflicts, are governed by inter-subjective meaning and not by laws. [84] The inextricable complexity of the issue therefore deserves ongoing respect, as well as ever new levels of interpretation.

Suggestions for future research

Based on the limitations of the research as well as general questions and ideas that arose while doing the research, I have several suggestions for future research:

- It would be interesting to use the insights and tools resulting from the research to specifically investigate *other stakeholders* (farmers, veterinarians, animal advocates and policy makers) as well as *other contexts* (within Europe, but especially in radically other cultures, for example in Asia, Africa, and the Arctic), as well as *monitor change over time* in certain contexts, to see what this would add to the list of ingredients, the clusters of reasoning and behaviour and the inner decision committee model.
- The more I researched and talked about the intricate issue of keeping and killing animals for food, the more I realised the power in language and perspective.[85] Language is a political tool, and more close-up view of the meaning and implications of specific language use in domestic contracts thus is recommended.

- Ambivalence, dissonance and coping strategies remain thought-provoking phenomena, that deserve more in-depth research. e.g. on how people seem to play with different coping strategies, and if they have preferences in that, or on the topic of humour and how this relates to dissonance, as well as how it can be applied to further dialogue.[86]
- As touched upon in the paragraphs on developing methodology for dialogue in the previous section, empirical research into dialogue and reframing in action needs to be performed, to come to grounded recommendations for engaging stakeholders and facilitating true cross- and intra-cultural dialogue. The tools resulting from the research can be further developed and tested in practices such as interactive stakeholder workshops, policy meetings and education programs.
- For the sake of focusing this research I have defined the arguably human social construct of the domestic contract as *"The human everyday construction of (non-) acceptability of keeping and killing animals"*. However, the original philosophical term implied a two-sided contract, in which animals have a voice, too. This makes it both necessary and interesting to research the animal side of the contract, through experiments as well as interpretive analysis of communication with and by animals.[87]
- Finally, though academic writing has the benefit of scholarly rigour and full documentation, the transmission of ideas seems to be hampered by a great deal of peer-oriented jargon.[88] I therefore argue it would be useful to re-write this scientific dissertation and develop tools in language that is accessible to a wider public.

On being descriptive and prescriptive

Though research arguably is an ever-continuing process[89] and this report thus represents a comma in my analytical process rather than a full stop, with these paragraphs I've reached the end of my dissertation. It has been a privilege to learn and work at Wageningen University's chair group of strategic communication. Also being part of the cluster Communication, Philosophy and Technology however, I encountered a difference in culture. For, even though one of the founding principles of my chair group is that all communication is strategic, which implies that everything I write is written with various - conscious and non-conscious- goals in mind, the 'school of thought' at strategic communication favours descriptive writing, warning against being normative in scientific reporting. Conversely, colleagues at the philosophy group did not understand this tendency and explicitly encouraged me to be prescriptive. Hence, I want to end this final chapter by embracing the dissonance I experience between being descriptive and prescriptive, and make my intentions in this matter explicit.

For, though about an issue of moral importance, the project 'Disentangling the domestic contract' was not initiated with the intention to be prescriptive: the foremost important personal driving force of my search for meaning was the simple desire to understand

people and their various viewpoints better, added upon by a curiosity about the dynamic and sometimes downright chaotic processes that I felt taking place inside myself - that I nevertheless intuited I should be able to make sense of. My intention has been to report in an as neutral a way as possible, and the provided frames and patterns, that were grounded in systematic analysis of empirical data over the course of this project, thus are descriptive - even though I realise that neither emic nor etic reporting is ever purely so.

Implicit in my research and writing however clearly is the prescriptive conviction that people should invest effort to understand their own and other people's reasoning. This implies prescribing tolerance for ways of reasoning and behaviour other than one's own as well as being understanding of differing living situations - and being willing to transcend these in order to achieve overlapping consensus by engaging in true dialogue. In addition, though I support pluralism and dialogue and am a defender of descriptive scientific writing from a stance of critical reflexivity, I also agree with McKibben who wrote that *"tolerance by itself can be a cover for moral laziness."*[90] Consequently, though I believe the issue of keeping and killing animals for food is too complex to come to a definite conclusion on its (non-)acceptability, I do think my philosophy colleagues have a point. Based on where I currently am in my own process and clusters of reasoning and behaviour, I feel that caring about the future of our planet, ourselves and other animals calls for a prescriptive statement.

So here it goes: I think that people should increase their compassion and include more and ideally all circles, and balance them as well as is possible in their specific situation. I think that they should educate themselves about the implications of keeping and killing animals for food, on human health, on the global human community, on farmed animals as well as animals in the wild, and on the environment. And finally, I think that people should train their ability to invite complexity, embrace dissonance and uncertainty, transcend self-referentiality, practice critical reflexivity, and process deliberately and intuitively, so they will make their everyday-life decisions about the keeping and killing of animals for food in an increasingly fair and high quality manner.

I hope my dissertation will contribute to that.

7.4 References

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APPENDICES

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Appendices

Appendix I: List of respondents and their characteristics

Overview of the demographic characteristics of the 50 respondents that were selected for the planned semi-structured in-depth conversations:

	Country	Main location	Link with animal production	Gender	Age group	Education level	Occupation type	Income level (enough to buy desired food?)	Pronounced protein consumption
1	NL	Urban	No	M	15-30	Stud.	High school student, not yet working	Sufficient	Regular meat eater (Halal)
2	NL	Urban	No	M	15-30	Middle	Sales, youth work	Sufficient	Regular meat eater (Halal)
3	NL	Urban	Half	M	30-50	High	NGO office work	Sufficient	Compromise (only from 'good sources')
4	NL	Urban	No	M	50+	Low	Retired labourer	Sufficient	Regular meat eater
5	NL	Urban	No	F	15-30	Low	Cleaning	Sufficient	Regular meat eater
6	NL	Urban	No	F	30-50	High	Journalism, writing	Sufficient	Compromise (less meat and only organic)
7	NL	Urban	No	F	30-50	High	Horticulture	Minimal	Compromise (less meat and only from 'good sources')
8	NL	Urban	No	F	30-50	High	Aquatic science	Sufficient	Compromise, mostly vegetarian
9	NL	Urban	No	F	50+	High	High school teaching	Sufficient	Compromise (just fish)
10	NL	Mixed	No	M	15-30	Middle	Intern, communications	Minimal	Regular meat eater/Compromise (less meat)
11	NL	Mixed	No	M	15-30	High	Volunteer coordinator	Sufficient	Vegetarian
12	NL	Mixed	Half	M	50+	Low	Jobless and homeless	None	Meat eater (no compromise)
13	NL	Mixed	No	M	50+	High	Lawyer	Sufficient	Vegetarian
14	NL	Mixed	No	F	15-30	High	Campaigner	Minimal	Vegetarian
15	NL	Mixed	No	F	30-50	High	Secretary	Sufficient	Compromise

16	NL	Mixed	Half	F	30-50	High	Computer engineer	Sufficient	Regular meat eater
17	NL	Mixed	No	F	30-50	High	Food scientist	Sufficient	Regular meat eater /Compromise
18	NL	Mixed	No	F	50+	High	Creative therapist	Sufficient	Vegetarian/Compromise
19	NL	Rural	No	M	30-50	Middle	Mechanic and fireman	Sufficient	Regular meat eater
20	NL	Rural	Yes	M	30-50	Middle	Organic farmer	Sufficient	Compromise (only organic)
21	NL	Rural	Yes	M	50+	Low	Dairy farmer	Sufficient	Regular meat eater
22	NL	Rural	Yes	F	50+	Low	Farm worker	Sufficient	Regular meat eater
23	NL	Rural	Yes	F	50+	Low	Farmer's wife	Sufficient	Regular meat eater
24	NL	Rural	No	F	50+	Middle	Forest conservationist	Sufficient	Vegetarian/Compromise (sometimes fish)
25	NL	Urban	Half	F	30-50	High	Researched	Sufficient	Flexible vegan
26	TR	Urban	No	M	15-30	High	Student, film director	Sufficient	Compromise
27	TR	Urban	No	M	15-30	High	Doctor's assistant	Sufficient	Regular meat eater
28	TR	Urban	No	M	30-50	High	Captain	Sufficient	Compromise (less meat, only chicken and fish)
29	TR	Urban	Yes	M	30-50	Low	Butcher	Sufficient	Regular meat eater/compromise
30	TR	Urban	No	M	30-50	High	NGO campaigner and radio host	Sufficient	Vegetarian
31	TR	Urban	No	M	50+	High	Retired leather shop owner	Sufficient	Vegetarian/Compromise (only wild animals)
32	TR	Urban	No	F	15-30	Stud.	High school student	Sufficient	Compromise (trying out vegetarianism)
33	TR	Urban	No	F	15-30	High	Social scientist	Sufficient	Vegetarian, thinking about going back to eating meat
34	TR	Urban	No	F	30-50	High	Tourism guide	Sufficient	Compromise (was vegetarian, eats meat only on the job)
35	TR	Urban	No	F	50+	Middle	Secretary	Sufficient	Compromise (no red meat, less meat)
36	TR	Urban	No	F	30-50	Middle	Restaurant co-owner	Sufficient	Regular meat eater
37	TR	Urban	No	F	30-50	High	Nurse	Sufficient	Regular meat eater
38	TR	Urban	No	F	30-50	High	Mathematics teacher	Sufficient	Regular meat eater
39	TR	Urban	No	F	30-50	High	Translator	Sufficient	Vegetarian
40	TR	Urban	No	F	30-50	Low	Mother, photographer, stray animal welfare worker	Minimal	Vegetarian/Compromise (feeds meat to her animals, sometimes eats a bit)

41	TR	Urban	No	F	50+	High	Banker, hotel owner	Sufficient	Regular meat eater
42	TR	Mixed	No	M	15-30	Low	Janitor	Minimal	Compromise
43	TR	Mixed	No	M	15-30	High	Food scientist, factory owner	Sufficient	Regular meat eater
44	TR	Mixed	No	M	50+	Middle	Accountant	Sufficient	Regular meat eater
45	TR	Mixed	No	M	50+	High	Imam	Sufficient	Regular meat eater
46	TR	Mixed	No	F	15-30	High	Ecologist	Sufficient	Vegetarian/Vegan
47	TR	Rural	Yes	M	15-30	Stud.	Farmer's son	Minimal	Regular meat eater
48	TR	Rural	Yes	M	30-50	Middle	Horse therapist and sheep farmer	Sufficient	Regular meat eater
49	TR	Rural	Yes	M	30-50	Low	Part-time farmer and restaurant manager	Sufficient	Regular meat eater
50	TR	Rural	Yes	F	50+	Low	Farmer	Very low	Regular meat eater

Appendix II: Topic list with example questions

The topic list (English translation; original in Dutch and Turkish) used for the planned semi-structured in-depth conversations:

<u>Introduction of the reason for engaging in a conversation</u>
I am a PhD student from the Netherlands, doing a research on **human-animal relations** and **food culture**. I would like to record our talk so it's easier for me to process our talk, is that okay? You will remain anonymous and I will not give this recording to anyone.
Moreover, I would like to stress that here are no right or wrong answers, I am curious and interested in **your** feelings and opinions.

<u>Human-animal relation</u>
To start, I would like to you place these buttons on this circles, given that you are in the middle and a staple is outside of the circles. **Intuitively, how close are they positioned to you?** *(relational distance/emotional value, intuitive placement on circles of Wenz)*?
Do you have a **pet** or pets? What kind?
Obviously this is based on feelings and intuition, but could you **comment/explain**? *(let them self-analyse: why is this the way it is?)*

<u>Keeping and killing</u>
Have you ever kept/raised an animal? Which? Or someone in your close surroundings? With what aim (hobby/production/food)?
Where do you live, where did you grow up? (urban/rural) Ever lived in a rural area, for how long?

Have you ever killed an animal? Which? When was that? With what aim? How did you find that, **how did it feel**? Could you still, which and which not?
And in special cases (you're dying of hunger etc.)?

<u>Food habits, food culture</u>
(put on lines) **Which animals do you eat in daily life** ('if I would put it in front of you now...') + order? **And which would you eat in special cases** + order? (For example out of politeness, curiosity, or necessity (you're dying of hunger))

Can you give an example of the special situations (per animal) and point out why you feel this in this way? (Why would you eat that, and when?)
Do you eat **other animals**?
Do you refrain from eating special **parts (e.g. organs)** of animals? Which? Why?
Do you find it important what the meat you eat looks like? **Shape, preparation**?

Why do you eat what you eat and not what you don't eat? *(note)*
How does this relate to the relational distance that you put on the circles? How does that feel?

Has you **daily eating pattern ever been different**? (history) If so, how has it changed and why?
What is that like in your **surroundings?** (Do most people eat like that, what is the general **food culture**, has it changed in the past 50 years? How, howcome?)

Origin, important items and organizing
What do you **associate** with **eating meat**? *(free association of thoughts and feelings)*

Do you pay attention in a **store** or a **restaurant** regarding the meat you buy? (Do you only purchase meat of a certain kind, brand or origin/production system, produced according to certain rituals?)
What do you find **important** when making these kind of decisions? *(note)* How do you **organize** that?
And **at someone's home**? (How is that different? How do you deal with such a situation?)
According to you, are there **products that are comparable to meat**? What? Is it easily available?
What does it mean for you to eat meat? What **value** does it have for you? Does it fulfil a **need**? Which?
There are people that find special **rituals** regarding meat important. You? Maybe connected to **religion**? (+ what is your religious conviction?)

Knowledge of keeping & killing, ideal
Can you write down what you associate with **the production of meat**? *(free association of thoughts and feelings)*
Do you have any idea how **animal farming** is organised, for example broiler farming? And **slaughter**?
Where did you get your knowledge from? (How come your knowledge is limited? Do you think you should know more? Do you want to know more?)
Did you ever work at an animal farm? Have family/friends with an animal farm? Ever visited one?

Are there also **good/bad examples** as well?
Would you like to see particular things **differently** in the production of meat, and if so, which and how? (what would you **ideal** look like? And do you consider that a **realistic ideal**?)

<u>Connecting, facing concealment, ambivalence</u>

Can you **relate** these associations and ideas to **what you eat and your associations with 'meat eating'**? How does that feel/what do you think (and evt. how do you deal with that)?

Are there things you'd rather not think about?

<u>Topics, consumer/citizen, tipping point(s)</u>

It is rather interesting, isn't it, that these things change over the course of time, and that the influence of culture is so big. You already mentioned some topics that play a role for you.

Which topics influence your choice (to eat or not eat meat *(both!)*) **mostly**? And how?

First free association, then via laddering-propositions - 'some people find …. important, others don't, where are you?' - question other topics:

• *own health*
• *environmental impact (rain forests, CO_2/fine particles exhaust, water, landscape)*
• *animal welfare (health/well-being, production system, keeping/killing)*
• *price*
• *livelihood farmer, license to produce*
• *world food supply*
• *taste, enjoyment, luxury, the feeling eating meat gives*
• *convenience, limiting factors (physical, feeling of agency)*
• *habit*
• *social context / pressure from your environment, culture, religion*
• *naturalness*
• *necessity, presence/absence of alternatives, trust in alternatives*
• *animal species (intelligence, kinship, relational/emotional value)*
• *awareness, trigger (just had something pointed out, e.g. seen video, or seen in reality)*

Can you think of situations that would change your current eating pattern? What are the **decisive items** for you**; the tipping point(s))**? (What are the considerations, what connects to what?) What is stopping you, possibly keeping you from change? *(note)*

Finally, I want to do a small thought-experiment. Suppose, the government is designing new policy and laws concerning meat production. Which of the topics **do you find should then play a role**? How (translate into norms: what needs to be changed, promoted, reduced?), and why? And what criteria are then most important? *(note)*

<u>Context measurements</u>
What is your year of birth?
Education level?
Occupation? Is your job related to farming or meat production (e.g. butcher)? (Optional: income level; do you consider yourself rich enough to buy the food you'd best like to eat)?
Are you a member of any NGOs related to animals, nature or sustainability?
What type of media do you use most? Television (channels) / radio (channels) / newspaper (which ones) / internet news (which ones) / facebook / magazines?
+ Note: nationality, place of residence, level of rurality, gender

<u>Feedback request</u>
Final question: Would you mind if I would call you or e-mail you if other questions come up, or to ask you for feedback? *(Note contact details)*.

Appendix III: Framing content: categories and codes

In this appendix I list the six main categories of framing content *behaviours, values, norms, feelings, interests, and knowledge and convictions*, and associated sub-categories and codes that I have distilled from the research data. Together, they provide an overview of the various ingredients with which the domestic contact is constructed. With each category, I have listed questions that can be used to probe for topics that play a role.

Focal question:
- ***What topics constitute the content of the frames used to construct (non-) acceptability of keeping and killing animals for food?***

Ingredient 1: Behaviours

When constructing (non-)acceptability of keeping and killing animals for food, one of the most important things people refer to are their *behaviours*. I define behaviours as pronounced personal past and present actions, including habits and exceptions. Behaviours thus are references to what *is (or was) done*.

Questions that can be used to elicit behaviours in conversations are:
- *What do you generally do? How do you do it?*
- *Did/do you always do it in the same way?*
- *When did/do you do it differently? How?*
- *What were exceptional behaviours?*

1.1 Personal consumption pattern

A first and central topic within the category of behaviours that people refer to in their everyday framing regarding the farming, slaughter and consumption of animals, is their personal consumption pattern: the extent to which meat is eaten. This, it turns out, cannot not simply be categorised as 'meat eating' vs 'vegetarianism'. In my research, most self-named meat eaters still refrained from eating certain species or parts of the animal – 'all-meat' consumers are not all that common. In Turkey for example, meat should be of Halal origin. Furthermore, there were many 'in-between' behaviours, for example eating less meat or only meat from organic origin. Finally, there were people refraining not only from meat, but also other animal products ('veganism'). In selected cases, additional rituals and habits were mentioned as part of the consumption pattern, such as praying before eating or not throwing meat away.

Sub-categories and codes:

- Eating meat
    - Anything goes
    - Regularly available meat
    - Only meat from certain species
    - Only certain parts of the animal
    - Only cooked meat
    - Only meat from certain origin/with certain label
- Refraining from animal products
    - Vegetarianism
    - Veganism
    - Fruitarianism
- Flexitarianism (eating meat in moderation)
    - Quantity per instance
    - Frequency
- Additional rituals and habits regarding consumption
    - Paying respect to the food
    - Not wasting food
    - Eating in specific spaces or in specific company
    - Mindfulness in eating

1.2 Personal practices regarding animal farming and slaughter

Several consumers, predominantly in rural areas, have personal experience with animal farming and slaughter due to their profession (e.g. farmer, agricultural contractor, butcher) or because they have killed an animal on occasion (e.g. for the Sacrifice feast, or for personal consumption). In their pronounced behaviours the distinction was made between regular and adapted farming and slaughter practices.

Sub-categories and codes:

- Regular farming and slaughter practices
    - Small holder type farming
    - Industrial type farming
    - Industrial type slaughter
- Adapted farming and slaughter practices
    - Free-range type farming
    - Organic farming
    - Biodynamic farming
    - Hobby farming
    - Ritual slaughter
    - Hand slaughter
    - Other rituals adopted regarding farming and/or slaughter
    - Feeding a non-herbivorous pet

1.3 Other behaviour related to keeping and killing animals for food

Next to practiced consumption behaviour or farming/slaughter style, several other activities are mentioned as relevant to the (non-)acceptability of keeping and killing animals for food, such as information oriented activities, financial activities and political activities.

Sub-categories and codes:

- Information oriented activities
    - Having observed information (/source)
    - Farm and slaughterhouse visit
    - Active knowledge pursuit
    - Transmission of information, awareness raising
- Financial activities
    - Spending money on consumption pattern
    - Saving money on consumption pattern
    - Investing in or earning money from animal production system
- Political activities
    - Voting
    - Social movement membership

1.4 Reflecting on behaviour

Besides mentioning current usually performed behaviours, some people also *reflect* on their behaviours - for example by mentioning behaviours that are exceptional in some way or revealing insights about the consistency of their behaviour or changes in history. Moreover, on an even deeper level, some people make a real effort to reflect on the habitualness or consciousness of the process of decision making.

Sub-categories and codes

- Exceptions to common personal behaviour
    - How I eat/ate differently out of hunger
    - How I eat/ate differently out of politeness / regard for others
    - How I eat/ate differently at special occasions (feasts, special gatherings)
    - How I eat/ate differently when I was feeling ill
    - How I eat/ate differently out of curiosity
    - How I eat/ate differently out of budgetary reasons
    - How I eat/ate differently out of a craving
    - How I eat/ate differently out of occupation with other things (business, laziness, ease)
    - The way I treat(ed) some animals differently during farming
    - The way I treat(ed) some animals differently when killing them
- Consistency/flexibility and change in behaviour
    - How consistent I am in my personal behaviours
    - The contexts in which personal behaviours differ

o   The way my common personal behaviours changed over time
- Consciousness and comprehensiveness of decision making
    o   How conscious I am when deciding on personal behaviours and exceptions
    o   How comprehensive I am (inclusive of all my thoughts and feelings)
    o   How much personal behaviours and exceptions are habitual
    o   Whether a possible change has become a new habit or still requires consciousness

Ingredient 2: Values

In constructing the domestic contract, individual people inevitably make use of the values they hold – values that may or may not coincide with mainstream values held in the society around them. Values are often implicit, but after asking repeated *"why is that important to you?"* type questions, people also mention them explicitly. I define values as rational concerns, conceptualisations about what and whom is considered important and to what extent (which includes valued ways of decision making).

Questions that can be used to elicit values in conversations are:
- *What is important to you? Who is important? How important? And what and who is not?*
- *What and who do you rationally take into account when making decisions?*
- *What is the best way to come to a decision?*
- *What kind of person do you want to be?*
- *Why is that important to you? How do you decide that?*

2.1 Attribution of value and consideration of interests

When talking about the (non-)acceptability of keeping and killing animals for food, the attribution of value and consideration inevitably comes up: *what or whom* to take into account and to what degree. Assigning value happens in two ways, namely the attribution of *practical value* (the practical importance or use something or someone has to ourselves or other humans – in philosophy referred to as *instrumental value*) and the attribution of *rational intrinsic value* (the value something or someone is thought to have in and of its own, regardless of its use).

Related to these values (much overlapping – but distinctly important for the domestic contract and therefor a separate code category) is the *consideration of interests* (i.e. valuing a being or entity to the extent that its interests must be given consideration in decision making). Even though certain beings were assigned intrinsic value to, in the daily construction of domestic contracts this does not necessarily mean that their interests were considered important enough to take into account in the actual decision making process. In my research, the interests that were said to be considered were at minimum the respondents themselves and human beings that are close by (relationally, temporally and/or spatially). In some cases this stretched via the interests of all human beings, to all

living beings and future generations. Only to a limited extent the interests of the earth/environment were really considered (more often through the practical value of environmental protection for the interests of us human beings). However, even if interests of for example animals were considered important enough to take into consideration, they were often pronounced to be of *less* importance compared to the interests of for example our loved ones.

Sub-categories and codes:
- Practical value
  - Meat
  - A clean environment
  - Animals (resource/capital)
  - The practice of farming and slaughter of animals
  - The trade in animal-based products
- Rational intrinsic value
  - Human beings
  - Animals
  - Plants
  - The earth/the environment
  - Future generations
- Consideration of interests
  - The self
  - Loved ones (human and non-human)
  - Group members
  - Human beings in general (whether close by or on the other side of the world)
  - All living beings (with a possible order of species preference, but including farmed animals)
  - The environment, earth or biosphere
  - Future generations

2.2 Personal values held

Regarding *what* is found important, there are several rational concerns that relate directly to farming, slaughtering and consumption of animals, such as basic survival, profit and saving money, food safety, food quality, protecting health, food culture, farmer livelihood, ensuring the supply of sufficient food to feed the word, and moreover in a fair and fairly distributed way. Regarding the animals themselves, their health, welfare, and rights, the ability to perform natural behaviour, the no-harm principle, sometimes extended to the no-kill principle, were values that were referred to. Finally, environmental protection and sustainability were mentioned as being important rational concerns.

Next to this, more general personal values are mentioned as relevant when constructing the domestic contract, that relate to the kind of person someone wants to be, such as

being objective, consistent or successful, being realistic, being compassionate, tolerant or polite, being intuitive, virtuous, responsible, informed or a change agent.

Sub-categories and codes:

- Rational concerns regarding keeping and killing animals for food
    - Preserving life, survival
    - Profit/saving money
    - Food safety
    - Food quality
    - Health
    - Food culture
    - Farmer livelihood
    - Farming culture
    - World food supply
    - Fair trade and distribution of food
    - Animal health
    - Animal welfare
    - Naturalness, ability to perform the natural behaviour
    - Quality of life according to the animal's function and capability
    - Animal rights
    - No-harm principle
    - No-kill principle
    - Waste reduction
    - Environmental protection
    - Sustainability, safeguarding future generations
    - Protection of depth of consciousness
- Other relevant personal values
    - Objectivity, rationality, impartiality
    - Consistency, reliability
    - Successfulness
    - Being in touch with natural instincts, raw
    - Realism
    - Autonomy, freedom
    - Being in touch with emotions
    - Compassion, empathy, care
    - Being protective
    - Belonging
    - Tolerance
    - Non-interference
    - Politeness
    - Being in touch with intuition, wisdom
    - Virtue, being a good person
    - Purity
    - Justice, equality, fairness

- o   Responsibility, accountability
- o   Being aware and informed, inquisitive
- o   Contributing to a better world
- o   Feminism
- o   Holistic approach

2.3 Valued ways of decision making

Knowing whose interests and what values are important, does not suffice to arrive at a deliberated conclusion on what one's course of action should be. When constructing the (non-)acceptability of keeping and killing animals for food, people therefore also refer to the ways of decision making they value. These are often deliberate ways of decision making, based on the ethical ideals of weighing positive and negative outcomes of a decision (consequentialism), living by duties and rights based on principles (deontology), referring to the role of humans or the kind of person one wants to be (virtue ethics), and pursuing inquiry into the validity of moral criteria (pragmatism).[a]

A different way of arriving at a decision that was pronounced to be of value is intuitive deciding. This way of decision making involves a description of a combination of rational reasoning with trusting of a 'gut feeling', 'inner knowing' or even a 'tapping into the field of knowing wider than ourselves' when making a new decision situation. This does not deny the importance of rational decision making (hence it is mentioned as a rationally valued way of decision making), but is more comprehensive: it includes thoughts as well as feelings, that are both within and outside of conscious awareness (thus not to be confused with purely heuristic decision making; see chapters 2.3 and 6.2 for more detailed descriptions of this way of decision making).

Besides referring to valued ways of decision making, some ways of deciding are explicitly mentioned as being inferior (not-valued), such as decision making lacking rational thought, solely based on feelings. Conversely, purely rational weighing of factual pros and cons has in cases also been criticised as lacking empathy and not being sensitive enough to ethical and aesthetical arguments. Non conscious decision making, based solely on heuristic habits or instincts, furthermore was seen as inferior.

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[a] See e.g. VanDeVeer, D., & Pierce, C. (1986). *People, Penguins, and Plastic Trees: Basic Issues in Environmental Ethics*. Belmont: Wadsworth.; Zweers, W. (1995). *Participeren aan de natuur: ontwerp voor een ecologisering van het wereldbeeld*. Utrecht: Van Arkel. and Van den Berg, F. (2013). *Veganism: a moral imperative*. Universiteit Utrecht (poster).

Sub-categories and codes:

- Deliberate decision making
    - Weighing positive and negative outcomes of a decision (consequentialism)
    - Living by duties (and sometimes rights) based on principles (deontology)
    - Referring to the role of humans, the kind of person one wants to be (virtue ethics)
    - Pursuing inquiry into the validity of moral criteria (pragmatism)
- Intuitive decision making
- Negatively valued ways of decision making
    - Only feeling-based deciding
    - Only rational deciding
    - Non-conscious, instinctive, impulsive and/or habitual deciding
    - Biased decision making

Ingredient 3: Norms

An important ingredient of the construction of the domestic contract are norms. As the name gives away, norms are normative, prescriptive in nature. As explained in chapter 2.2, in the original model of the frame-of-reference they were defined as ' translation of values into rules of conduct'. Norms indeed are importantly derived from values, in particular the consideration of interests and the valued ways of decision making. In practice however, these rules of conduct importantly get influenced by other frame-of-reference elements, such as knowledge & convictions, interests, and feelings. I thus define norms as simply what is brought forward that *should be done*: ideal rules of conduct imposed on the self - and possibly others.

In coding content, norms are very similar to the behaviours mentioned in the context of the domestic contract. However, in contrast to pronounced behaviours, that are statements about what really happens, norms are ideal behaviours, meaning they do not always get executed in real life. In the everyday-life construction the (non-)acceptability of keeping and killing animals for food, norms is the ingredient that defines theoretical (non-)acceptability, the other ingredients are used to underpin and develop these rules of conduct, or justify their non-execution. Primarily, these norms are rules that apply to oneself, and are mentioned as such, though they are also importantly brought forward to prescribe expected behaviours to others.

Mentions of norms that are alive in society and descriptions of what is considered the norm ('normal') in certain (sub-)cultures, fall under ingredient 6: knowledge & convictions.

Questions that can be used to elicit norms in conversations are:
- *How does what you find important translate into action?*
- *How would you like to act?*
- *What do you think should be done?*
- *Who is responsible for performing what should be done?*
- *What is acceptable and what not?*
- *What are the minimum requirements? What should be there?*
- *Can you describe your ideal picture?*

3.1 Norms regarding food

Depending on one's knowledge and convictions, one's physical state, one's values and one's ideas on whose interests should to be taken into consideration when deciding on the (non-)acceptability of keeping and killing animals for food, norms are formulated regarding food. These range from basic food requirements such as food safety and health, to norms about refraining from (certain parts of) animal meat due to religious convictions or consideration of the interests of animals and the environment. Also, in this regard mentions are made on how one should approach food that's on the plate.

Sub-categories and codes:
- Basic food requirements
  - Food safety, health
  - Food security
- Refraining from animal products
  - Vegetarianism
  - Veganism
  - Fruitarianism
- Flexitarianism (eating meat in moderation)
  - Quantity per instance
  - Frequency
- Eating meat
  - Anything goes
  - Regular meat
  - Only meat from certain species
  - Only certain parts of the animal
  - Only cooked meat
  - Only meat from certain origin/with certain label
- Additional norms regarding consumption
  - Paying respect to the food
  - Not wasting food
  - Eating in certain spaces or in specific company
  - Eating mindfully
  - Pet feeding norms

3.2 Norms regarding animal farming and slaughter

An important part of the (non-)acceptability of keeping and killing animals for food are of course norms regarding actual farming and slaughter practices. These regard both norms imposed on oneself as farmers or slaughters (forming the so called 'licence to produce'), as well as those imposed on others who farm and slaughter animals for a living, and range from basic legal standards to far reaching additional standards and the abolishment of farming and slaughter altogether.

Sub-categories and codes:

- Basic standards for farming and slaughter
    - o Small holder type farming
    - o Industrial type farming
    - o Industrial type slaughter
- Additional standards for farming and slaughter
    - o Free-range type farming
    - o Organic farming
    - o Biodynamic farming
    - o Hobby farming
    - o Ritual slaughter
    - o Hand slaughter
    - o Other rituals adopted regarding farming and/or slaughter
- Abolishment of farming
- Abolishment of slaughter

3.3 Other norms related to keeping and killing animals for food

Next to rules on consumption behaviour or farming and slaughter styles, other guidelines for action that were brought forward regarded management of finances, political action, information seeking, and valued ways of decision making.

Sub-categories and codes:

- Management of finances
    - o Spending money on consumption pattern
    - o Saving money on consumption pattern
    - o Investing in or earning money from animal production system
- Political action
    - o Voting
    - o Social movement membership
    - o Lobbying for legislation, targeted subsidies and taxes
    - o Awareness raising
- Objective information seeking
- Norms for making decisions
    - o Decide rationally

      o   Decide intuitively
      o   Avoid negatively valued ways of decision making

3.4 Parties that norms are assigned to

The parties that are held responsible to perform the rules of conduct, form a last and essential sub-category of norms. The parties included here describe whom the abovementioned behavioural norms are imposed on.

Sub-category and codes:
- Attribution of responsibility
    - Myself
    - Consumers
    - Producers
    - Government
    - Retail
    - The system/the market
    - Everyone

Ingredient 4: Feelings

An important ingredient in the construction (non-)acceptability of keeping and killing animals for food are feelings people state they have. Whereas values are *rational* concerns about what and whom is considered important and to what extent, feelings are *affective* concerns. As I define them, feelings comprise of three, much interrelated, categories: physical sensations (images, smells, sounds, tastes and tactile input, leading to a sense of the outside world as well as one's inner world), states (moods and other temporary but relatively sustained felt modes of being) and emotions (subjective positive, negative or neutral associations with experiences or thoughts). Pur sang, feelings are non-linguistic; however, they are an important element of verbal framing, for people continuously *refer* to feelings as part of their domestic contracts. The linguistic representation of feelings is often accompanied by gestures, facial expressions and an emotionally charged tone of voice.

Questions that can be used to elicit feelings in conversations are:
- *How does it make you feel?*
- *Who and what feels important, close to you?*
- *Where in your body do you feel that?*
- *What do you sense physically?*
- *What state or mood are you in?*
- *What emotions come up?*
- *What touches you? What do you dislike? What do you like?*

4.1 Felt relationship

Felt relationship delineates the others that are cared for, that they felt emotionally or relationally close to. This ranged from human beings that are close by, to all human beings, to all living beings, the earth, and future generations (cf. the rational consideration of interests).

Sub-categories and codes:
- Affective concerns/emotional/relational value
    - The self
    - Loved ones (human and non-human)
    - Group members
    - Human beings in general (whether close by or on the other side of the world)
    - All living beings (with a possible order of species preference, but including farmed animals)
    - The environment, earth or biosphere
    - Future generations

4.2 Feelings about consumption of meat, meat types and alternatives

An important category in which physical sensations, felt states and emotions are mentioned, is the consumption of meat and alternatives to meat. These feelings are declared to play a role at both real as well as imaginary consumption, so during actual eating and during thinking about eating, for example at the obtainment of food. Falling in this category are the personal physical food experience, with topics such as taste, smell and structure; states related to food consumption such as hungry, satisfied, sick or vital; and emotions regarding food consumption such as joy, gratitude, pride, and disgust.

Sub-categories and codes:
- Personal physical food experience
    - Taste
    - Smell
    - Structure
    - Appearance
    - Rumbling stomach
    - Satisfied stomach
    - Watering mouth
    - Aching/upset stomach
- States related to food consumption
    - Hungry
    - Satisfied
    - Weak, lacking in energy
    - Sick
    - Comfortable

- o   Vital, healthy, energetic, excited
- o   Strong, powerful
- o   Calm
- o   Agitated
- o   Cheerful, good mood
- o   Depressed
- o   Conscious, mindful
- o   Unconscious, habitual, thoughtless
- o   Instinctive, wild, rough
- Emotions regarding food consumption
  - o   Joy, happiness
  - o   Gratitude
  - o   Pride
  - o   Nostalgia
  - o   Disgust
  - o   Frustration, stress
  - o   Guilt
  - o   Anger
  - o   Indignation
  - o   Sadness
  - o   Neutrality/indifference

4.3 Feelings about animal farming and slaughter

Besides the consumption of meat and non-meat products, feelings are expressed specifically related to the practice of rearing and slaughter of consumption animals. Again, this both pertains to the feelings that come up during the actual animal production process, as well as feelings that come up during memories and imaginations of oneself and/or others partaking in it. It includes physical experiences such as smell and appearance; states such as strong, instinctive, cheerful, agitated, and depressed; and emotions such as joy, pride, love, sadness, anger and guilt.

Sub-categories and codes:
- Physical experience of farming and slaughter practices
  - o   Smell
  - o   Touch
  - o   Appearance, sight (whether real or on video)
  - o   Itching fingers
  - o   Upset stomach
- States related to farming and slaughter practices
  - o   Vital, strong, powerful
  - o   Calm
  - o   Excited
  - o   Agitated

- o Cheerful, good mood
- o Depressed
- o Conscious, mindful
- o Unconscious, habitual, thoughtless
- o Instinctive, wild, rough
- o Empathic, respectful
- o Selfish
- Emotions regarding farming and slaughter practices
  - o Joy
  - o Gratitude
  - o Pride
  - o Love
  - o Nostalgia
  - o Frustration, stress
  - o Indignation
  - o Anger
  - o Sadness
  - o Disgust
  - o Guilt
  - o Neutrality/indifference

4.4 Other relevant feelings

Besides feelings directly related to the acts of rearing, slaughtering and consuming animals, other feelings are in play when constructing the domestic contract. These regard first of all feelings *about* the values, norms, interests, knowledge & convictions they themselves hold, behavioural decisions they make, and feelings they have. Also relevant are feelings about the perceived values, norms, interests, feelings, behavioural decisions and knowledge & convictions of others, as well as feeling about the way society is organised. A final, but rather important category of feelings regards ambivalence and dissonance: for people report having various feelings about discrepancies between performed behaviour, drives, and cognitions (of oneself or perceived in others).

Sub-categories and codes:
- Feelings about oneself
  - o Own values
  - o Own norms
  - o Own interests
  - o Own knowledge & convictions
  - o Own behavioural decisions
  - o Own feelings
- Feelings about others
  - o Others' values
  - o Others' norms

- o Others' interests
- o Others' knowledge & convictions
- o Others' behavioural decisions
- Feelings about the way society is organised (more in general than specifically regarding consumption options and farming and slaughter styles)
- Feelings about ambivalence and dissonance (ambiguity, contradiction, conflict)
    - o Neutrality/indifference
    - o Doubt
    - o Uncomfortable tension
    - o Acceptance
    - o Feeling good by virtue of the acceptance of the tension

Ingredient 5: Interests

The recognition, formulation and defending of interests is an important part of the domestic contract. The coding category *interests* regards one's personal interests: recognised stakes and goals that inner drives (consciously or unconsciously) motivate us to strive for, both material (physical, economic) as well as immaterial (social, moral, aesthetical). The framing content coded under interests thus includes both the stakes people recognise they have in a certain matter, as well as talk about the inner urges or drives that are noticed, defined in terms of the goals they motivate us to strive for. Of course there are multiple ways to categorize these. One could for example distinguish groups based on e.g. short-term and long-term goals or unambiguous needs versus mere 'would-likes'. Here I have chosen a categorisation based on the distinction between an individual's moral convictions, their desire to take care of one's exterior physique, their need to belong in groups and otherwise manage their relationship with others, and their aiming to live in this world. Perceived interests of others are dealt with in Ingredient 6: Knowledge and convictions.

Questions that can be used to elicit interests in conversations are:
- *What do you want?*
- *What do you feel urged to do?*
- *What would be nice to have or do?*
- *What do you really need?*
- *What do you want to achieve?*
- *What are your goals and intentions?*
- *What are the stakes involved for you?*
- *How would this behaviour benefit or impair you?*
- *What do you want to avoid?*

5.1 Living according to one's moral convictions

The first category of interests that people referred to regard wanting to live according to one's personal moral convictions. The first sub-category deals with moral conviction of a general and specific nature that are applied to the issue of keeping and killing animals for food. The second sub-category is a special one, that regards *decisions* that are (to be) made in the past, present or future.

Sub-categories and codes:
- Wanting to live according to moral convictions *(see also ingredient 2: values)*
  - Being well-informed
  - Being tolerant
  - Being realistic
  - Being autonomous
  - Being in touch with natural instincts
  - Being consistent
  - Contributing to aesthetics
  - Being compassionate, empathic, caring
  - Protecting human well-being
  - Protecting animal well-being
  - Protecting the environment
  - Living sustainably, safeguarding future generations
- Wanting to come to one's decisions in a fair and high quality manner *(see also ingredient 2.3)*
  - Rational decision making
  - Intuitive decision making
  - Avoid negatively valued ways of decision making

5.2 Taking care of one's physique

The second set of committee members focuses on safeguarding physical and emotional needs and preferences, or in other words: taking care of one's physique. The second sub-category here again is of a special nature, regarding the fairness and quality of the *decision*, rather than consisting of domestic contract related topics.

Sub-categories and codes:
- Wanting to take care of one's physique *(see also ingredient 4: feelings)*
  - Survival
  - Health
  - Physical well-being
    - Food experience
    - Satisfaction of the senses
    - Comfort
  - Emotional well-being
  - Labour satisfaction

- o   Habit continuation
- Wanting to feel good about one's decisions (past, present or future)
  - o   Dealing with uncomfortable feelings regarding dissonance

5.3 Managing one's relationships

The third category of interests relates to various aspects of managing one's relationships with others (that are found of value: see ingredient 2.1).

Sub-categories and codes:
- Wanting to manage one's relationships (See also ingredient 4.1: felt relationship)
  - o   Connection with others
  - o   Belonging
  - o   Social status management
  - o   Face-saving
  - o   Food culture
  - o   Farming culture
  - o   Cultural identity (in a broader sense)
  - o   Caring for/helping others (i.e. empathizing with and helping them attain their goals)

5.4 Living in the world

The last category of interests that people refer to, regards dealing with (perceived or real) physical limitations, or in other words: managing to live in the world. This type of interests can be approached in two ways: by trying to adapt to the structural reality or by trying to change it.

Sub-categories and codes:
- Wanting to live in the world (see also ingredient 6: knowledge & convictions)
  - o   Adjusting to the current economic reality
    - ▪   Budgeting existing money
    - ▪   Generating new financial resources
  - o   Complying with existing policy and legislation
  - o   Adjusting to the accessibility of information
  - o   Adjusting to the availability of alternatives
  - o   Trying to change the economic/legal/institutional/socio-cultural systems

Ingredient 6: Knowledge & convictions

Last but not least, a lot of knowledge & convictions are brought forward with regards to domestic contract related issues: opinions about the way things are, about (self-)efficacy and the effects certain situations will have, associations and assumptions about what is true; including the perceived behaviours, values, norms, feelings, interests, and knowledge & convictions of others.

As already touched upon in chapter 2.2, the distinction between empirically observed facts and untested convictions is not at all that easy to make - which was confirmed during the gathering and analysing of data. For example, the sentence *"My neighbour is a vegetarian"* does not unmistakably show whether this is empirically observed knowledge, reported speech, or an assumption. While there arguably is a difference between for example *"Science has proven that sows suffer in birth cages"* (reported speech, pointing towards factual information) and *"I believe that sows suffer in birth cages"* (direct speech, using 'I believe', pointing at this being a conviction), the *topics* referred to are the same (in this example: the impact of housing, measures and treatment on animals). Because of this overlap and the uncertainty in distinguishing fact from assumption, all framing elements referring to the way things are or the effects certain actions or situations have were organised into one main category.

Within this last ingredient, I have divided the sub-categories according to the groups or systems the knowledge & convictions are about. Lastly, the lack of knowledge (perceived ignorance) and related knowledge-related uncertainty that people refer to was also designated to this category.

Questions that can be used to elicit knowledge & convictions in conversations are:
- *How are things really? What do you think? What do you know?*
- *What effect do things have? How much effect does what you do have?*
- *Can change really happen? What is hindering change?*
- *Who can you trust and who not?*
- *What do other people want, feel or do? What do they find important? What do they think or know? And what do they think should be done?*

6.1 Knowledge & convictions regarding oneself
The first sub-category of knowledge & conviction topics regards ideas about the effects certain situations will have on the self and (self-)efficacy.

Sub-categories and codes
- Ideas about the impact of eating meat, meat types & alternatives on oneself
    - Impact on personal financial space
    - Ease of purchase of meat, meat types and alternatives
    - Ease of preparation of meat, meat types and alternatives
    - Nutritional necessity (protein, B12, iron, fat, energy)
    - Other intake effects (stress, hormones, antibiotics resistance, GMOs, metals, disease)
    - Impact on (religious) virtue, karma, afterlife
    - Impact on identity, status

- Ideas about the impact of animal farming and slaughter practices (common, alternative) on oneself
    - Link between animal treatment and meat taste
    - Economic impact (livelihood or via national economy)
    - Environmental and landscape impact
    - Impact of farming and slaughter practices on the self
- Ideas about self-efficacy and personal influence on animal farming
    - The impact of personal action on the status quo of animal farming
    - Impact on the norms & behaviour of other humans
    - Impact on the systemic-institutional context
    - Impact on farming systems
    - Impact on farm animals
    - Impact on the environment (ecological footprint)
    - Limitations of impact of one's actions
    - The possibilities and limitations to change oneself
- Perceived lack of knowledge about issues affecting oneself

6.2 Knowledge & convictions concerning humans and culture

The second and by far largest sub-category of knowledge & conviction topics encompasses ideas about the way things are for humans in general or in certain cultures, including the perceived behaviours, values, norms, feelings, interests, and knowledge & convictions of other (groups of) humans.

Sub-categories and codes
- Ideas about mankind in relation to farming and carnivorism
    - Human nature, instinct
    - Human digestive system's suitability for carnivory/herbivory
    - History of farming
    - Cultural heritage
- Ideas about the characteristics certain humans possess earning them moral status
    - Relationship, kinship
    - Group membership
    - Power dependency
    - Fairness
    - Species membership
    - Intrinsic value
- Ideas about behaviours of others
    - Peers/loved ones
    - Groups of people/(sub-)cultures
        - General cultural consumption patterns
        - Religious practices
        - Social habits and rituals

- o Stakeholders in the animal production chain (farmers, butchers, transporters, retailers)
  - Farming practices
  - Practices during slaughter
  - Practices during transport
  - Practices in production and sale of protein products
- o The government/policy makers
- o Controllers (food authorities)
- o Social movements/NGOs
- Ideas about values present in human society
  - o Peers/loved ones
  - o Groups of people/(sub-)cultures
  - o Religious groups
  - o Stakeholders in the animal production chain
    - Farmers
    - Butchers
    - Transporters
    - Retailers
  - o Controllers (food authorities)
  - o The government/policy makers
  - o Social movements/NGOs
- Ideas about norms in human society
  - o Peers/loved ones
  - o Groups of people/(sub-)cultures
    - Cultural habits and taboos
    - Religious decrees
  - o Stakeholders in the animal production chain (farmers, butchers, transporters, retailers)
  - o Controllers (food authorities)
  - o The government/policy makers
  - o Social movements/NGOs
- Ideas about feelings of other humans
  - o Peers/loved ones
  - o Groups of people/(sub-)cultures
  - o Religious groups
  - o Stakeholders in the animal production chain
    - Farmers
    - Butchers
    - Transporters
    - Retailers
  - o Controllers (food authorities)
  - o The government/policy makers
  - o Social movements/NGOs
- Ideas about interests of other humans

- o Peers/loved ones
  - ▪ Feeling good
  - ▪ Being healthy
  - ▪ Living according to values
- o Humans in general
  - ▪ Human health necessity
  - ▪ Human food necessity
  - ▪ Future generations (sustainability)
  - ▪ Living according to values
- o Group members (i.e. based on culture, religion)
  - ▪ Protect shared group identity and group
- o Stakeholders in animal production chain
  - ▪ Earning livelihood
  - ▪ Making profit
  - ▪ Working circumstances
  - ▪ Image (licence to produce)
- o Social movements
  - ▪ Defending values, striving for ideal
- Ideas about knowledge & convictions (and lack thereof) of other humans
  - o Peers/loved ones
  - o Groups of people/(sub-)cultures
  - o Religious groups
  - o Stakeholders in the animal production chain
    - ▪ Farmers
    - ▪ Butchers
    - ▪ Transporters
    - ▪ Retailers
  - o Controllers (food authorities)
  - o The government/policy makers
  - o Social movements/NGOs
- Judgement of trustworthiness and reliability
  - o Peers/loved ones
  - o Groups of people/(sub-)cultures
  - o Religious groups
  - o Stakeholders in the animal production chain
    - ▪ Farmers
    - ▪ Butchers
    - ▪ Transporters
    - ▪ Retailers
  - o Controllers (food authorities)
  - o The government/policy makers
  - o Social movements/NGOs
- Ideas about the impact of eating meat, meat types and alternatives on other humans
  - o Nutritional value of meat, meat types and alternatives (protein, B12, iron, fat, energy)

- o Other intake effects (stress, hormones, antibiotics resistance, GMOs, metals, disease)
  - o Impact on (religious) virtue, karma, afterlife
- Ideas about the impact of animal farming (common, alternative) on other humans
  - o Employment, livelihood
  - o Economy, making profit
  - o Health, hygiene, disease
  - o Food supply
  - o World food distribution & fair trade
  - o Ecology, environmental issues (see further: the earth/the environment)
  - o Landscape change
  - o Civilization level in relation to treatment of animals (see further: knowledge & convictions concerning animals)
- Ideas about what other humans should do (normative statements)
  - o Peers/loved ones
  - o Groups of people/(sub-)cultures
  - o Religious groups
  - o Stakeholders in the animal production chain
    - ▪ Farmers
    - ▪ Butchers
    - ▪ Transporters
    - ▪ Retailers
  - o Controllers (food authorities)
  - o The government/policy makers
  - o Social movements/NGOs
- Ideas about efficacy and influence of other humans and culture on animal farming
  - o History, change in time
    - ▪ The move from hunter-gatherer and horticultural societies to agricultural and industrial societies
    - ▪ The possibilities and limitations of other humans and culture to change
  - o The impact of actions by humans on the status quo of animal farming
    - ▪ Impact on the norms & behaviour of other humans
    - ▪ Impact on the systemic-institutional context
    - ▪ Impact on farming systems
    - ▪ Impact on farm animals
    - ▪ Impact on the environment (ecological footprint)
    - ▪ Limitations of impact of others' actions
- Perceived lack of knowledge about other humans and culture

6.3 Knowledge & convictions concerning the production chain and relevant institutions

The next big sub-category of knowledge & conviction topics encompasses ideas about the way things are in the production chain and relevant institutions.

Sub-categories and codes

- Ideas about availability & proximity of meat, meat types and alternatives
    - Animal species generally eaten
    - Alternatives
    - Supermarket collection
    - Butchers
- Ideas about animal production systems (common, alternative, hunting & fishing)
    - Species commonly farmed
    - Housing
    - Measures and treatment
    - Feed origin and quality
    - Medicine use
    - Life span
    - Differences between farming methods
    - Stunning
    - Speed & numbers
    - Humane slaughter
    - Religious slaughter
    - Species commonly hunted & fished
    - Hunting & fishing methods
    - Fish farming
    - Game farming
- Ideas about government, policy & legislation
    - Policy (national, European, WTO)
    - Legislation, legal system & law-enforcement (control)
    - Subsidies and taxes
- Ideas about food production technologies, food prices, world food supply & distribution issues
    - Food prices (absolute/relative to income)
    - Margins of retail and other actors in the food production chain
    - Export, import issues
    - Transport issues
    - Distribution of food
    - Efficiency of food production
    - Welfare increase
    - Population growth
    - Technology increase in food production (incl. GMOs & in-vitro meat)
- Judgement of information availability & reliability
    - Availability of information (and lack thereof)

- o Trustworthiness of advertising
- o Trustworthiness of product labelling and control
- o Concealment by certain parties
- o Trustworthiness of messages of NGOs
- o Judgement of ambiguity of information
- Ideas about power relations, change and influence of the systemic-institutional context on animal farming
  - o Ideas about power relations within the systemic-institutional context
    - Citizens
    - Consumers
    - Producers
    - Veterinarians
    - Government, politicians
    - Retail
    - The system/the market
  - o History, change in time until now
    - The possibilities and limitations of the systemic-institutional context to change in the future
  - o The impact of possible change of the system on the status quo of animal farming
    - Impact on the norms & behaviour of other humans
    - Impact on farming systems
    - Impact on farm animals
    - Impact on the environment
    - Limitations of impact of a change in the system
- Perceived lack of knowledge about the production chain and relevant institutions

6.4 Knowledge & convictions concerning animals

The penultimate sub-category of knowledge & conviction topics encompasses ideas about the way things are with regards to animals, including their perceived feelings, and interests.

Sub-categories and codes

- Ideas about the characteristics certain animals possess earning them worthy of consideration of interests (moral status)
  - o Species differentiation
  - o Kinship
  - o Relational/emotional value
  - o Intelligence
  - o Ability to feel pain/suffer
  - o Ability to experience emotion
  - o Intrinsic/inherent value
  - o Indirect worth to humans (instrumental value)

- Ideas about interests of animals
    - Recognition of intrinsic/inherent value
    - Protection of integrity
    - Physical well-being (health, absence of discomfort and suffering)
    - Emotional well-being
    - Naturalness / being able to perform natural behaviour
    - Able to fulfil capabilities of species
    - Satisfaction of instincts
    - Species continuation
    - Staying alive
    - Humane slaughter
    - Respect from humans
    - Love, care
    - Service/sacrifice of life to humans/God
- Ideas about the feelings of animals
    - Comfort
    - Pleasure
    - Contentment
    - Fear
    - Suffering
    - Boredom
- Ideas about the impact of different production systems (common, alternative) on animals
    - Species commonly farmed
    - Housing
    - Measures and treatment
    - Feed origin and quality
    - Medicine use
    - Breeding and selection
    - Genetic modification
    - Life span
    - Animal behaviour in different production systems
    - Animal welfare impact
- Ideas about the impact of manners of slaughter on animals
    - Stunning
    - Speed & numbers
    - Humane slaughter
    - Religious slaughter
    - Animal behaviour in different slaughter systems
    - Animal welfare impact
- Ideas about the impact of hunting & fishing on animals
    - Species commonly hunted & fished
    - Hunting & fishing methods
    - Fish farming
    - Game farming

- o   Animal welfare impact compared with animal production systems and slaughter
- Ideas about animals and animal species in relation to farming and carnivorism
    - o   Reference to animals also killing and eating meat
    - o   Merits and downsides of animal farming for certain animal species
    - o   Role of animals for humans
    - o   Role of animals in/for the world
- Perceived lack of knowledge about animals

6.5 Knowledge & convictions concerning the earth/environment

The last sub-category of knowledge & conviction topics people refer to when constructing their everyday-life domestic contracts, deals with the way things are with regards to the earth/biosphere and environmental issues.

Sub-categories and codes
- Ideas about the characteristics the earth/environment possesses earning it moral status
    - o   Relational/emotional value
    - o   Intrinsic value
    - o   Indirect worth to humans (instrumental/sustenance value)
- Ideas about the fragility/resilience of nature and life in general
- Ideas about the environmental impact of different animal farming (common, alternative) on the earth/environment
    - o   Land use
    - o   Rain forest degradation
    - o   Climate change
    - o CO_2/methane/fine particles exhaust
    - o   Fertilizers
    - o   Water use
    - o   Ecology, biodiversity
    - o   Overfishing
    - o   Ocean floor scraping
    - o   Genetic modification
- Perceived lack of knowledge about the earth/environment

Appendix IV: Coping strategies and examples

The documented coping strategies listed below (each illustrated with one or two examples from the research) form a way for researchers to recognise the various ways the joker deals with the uncomfortable tension caused by dissonance:

A typical strategy to feel good about one's decision is to reduce occurring dissonance. Following Festinger (1964), four basic strategies exist:

- Adding consonants to behaviour - selectively applying cognitions to represent the committee's decision as a positive one:

  "It's normal and natural and healthy. Everyone eats meat. You should, too."

  "Yeah, I eat meat. But you know, if we wouldn't farm cows, they would probably be extinct by now. Eating meat supports farming and thus helps the cows."

- Eliminating dissonance - bringing forward cognitions that decrease or eliminate the negativity of the decision:

  "Nature is cruel. In the wild, animals often die in horrible ways, they starve to death or get ripped to pieces by a predator. At least our slaughter is quick and relatively painless."

  "Animals don't have a soul. They may not even have feelings. Especially fish."

- Amplifying consonants - making the goals and cognitions used by the winning committee member(s) seem important:

  "It's important to eat protein to stay healthy. Without your health you're nothing."

- Trivializing dissonance- making the goals and cognitions used by dissonant committee member(s) seem unimportant:

  "Ok, when I visit this vegan friend of mine, I don't eat meat. But that's only once in a while. The rest of the time I make sure to have meat on my plate."

  "Pff, not this again. Those people from the party for the animals always exaggerate so much and they represent what? They only have two seats in parliament. That's nothing."

Another type of joker strategy consists of oppressing or avoiding the priming of dissonant committee members, through what Serpell (1986) refers to as distancing devices (and Van der Weele (2013) refers to as strategic ignorance):

- Detachment - creating an emotional distance between the self and subjects that are possibly negatively affected by a given decision:

  "Who cares about chickens - they're just stupid animals."

- Misrepresentation - depicting or imagining the situation being different than it is:

  "It's not so bad. When I think of a farm, I think of animals roaming outside, all together, and the farmer being there all the time to care for them and feed them when there's not enough grass to be found."

- Shifting responsibilities - revoking agency and blaming others for the situation:

  "It's the system that forces farmers to farm this way. The government that doesn't take enough action. And the money-orientation of most consumers: they always buy the cheapest meat they can find. What can I do?"

- Concealment - hiding or repressing the (negative sides of a) situation to avoid confrontation all in all:

  "When such a clip with animal suffering or climate change horrors pops up on my news feed, I scroll down as quickly as I can, and I certainly don't click on it. I don't want to see any more of it. It makes me too sad."

  "Yeah, yeah. Now what about that cute blouse that we saw the other day, are you going to buy it?"

Conversely, there are distinct, non-oppressive[b] joker strategies that involve some way of accepting dissonance instead of evading it (cf. De Carlo 2005 & 2012; Fox 2013; Hamilton 2013). Examples of this that were distinguished in the research are:

- Admitting dissonance - acknowledging that there is discomfort, instead of trying to hide it:

  "Ok, so I'm kind of confused here. I know farming is bad for the environment, like, look at climate change and all. But I also like the taste of meat a lot. This is my conundrum."

- Embracing dissonance - feeling good by virtue of the non-oppression of any cognitions or committee members:

  "This is the most fair way to decide. Really, honestly letting in all information, and the difficult feelings that come up with it, and not trying to cover anything up - not even anger or fear or sadness. It was hard at first, but it is the best. I love it. It's honest. It's real."

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[b] The only drive being oppressed here is the initial urge to reduce the uncomfortable feeling related to dissonance.

Appendix V: Tools for (self-)analysis and dialogue facilitation: an overview

Aided by the accompanying eliciting questions, the accumulated codes and categories listed in **appendix III** form a checklist to distinguish what thoughts and feelings are or may be of (conscious or unconscious) importance to ourselves and/or others.

The reasoning and behaviour that is incorporated in a person's ideal and practical domestic contracts in a given situation can be distinguished fairly easily with help of the **clusters of reasoning and behaviour,** asking the following questions:

- *What behaviour is performed that relates to keeping, killing and consuming animals?*
- *Which parties' interests are taken into consideration, ideally and in practice?*
- *What values and norms are pronounced important?*
- *What stance is taken regarding causing death in other living beings: is it more valued as something negative or more seen as an inherent and natural part of life?*
- *Which clusters thus play a role and: how are they balanced?*

To explore and understand the internal decision process underlying the various frames regarding the farming, slaughter and consumption of animals in a given situation, the **inner decision committee model** can be applied, aided by the following questions:

- *What driving forces are at play when deciding on a certain frame or other action?*
  - *Are there drives aimed at living according to one's moral convictions?*
  - *Are there drives aimed at taking care of one's physique?*
  - *Are there drives aimed at managing relationships?*
  - *Are there drives aimed at managing to live in the world?*
- *What drives are being supported, and what drives are being discounted or oppressed?*
- *What drives are in conscious awareness, and what urges can be felt from the sub-conscious?*
- *Is there emphasis on wanting to decide in a fair and high quality manner?*
- *Is the process of decision making heuristic, deliberate, or intuitive?*
- *What things are being said in order to feel good (or better) about one's decision?*

With relatively little adaptation, the empirical findings from the research thus form *tools for (self-)analysis*. In addition, the lists, models and questions listed above arguably can also be used as *tools for facilitating dialogue*: to engage in meaningful conversations about domestic contract related matters. Especially combined with the list of **ingredients to the domestic contract** in appendix III and the questions formulated above, the **clusters of reasoning and behaviour** can be applied as a tool to start a conversation about the argumentation consumers put into practice in their everyday lives and their ideas on the

topic of keeping and killing animals for food - in a simple and structured way. The **inner decision committee model** in addition provides a way of looking at inner struggles and ways of dealing with the dissonance that seem inherent to the issue for consumers. Combined, they provide a meta-perspective of looking at and talking about the various ways of framing related to farming, slaughtering and consuming animals.

Appendix VI: List of publications related to this dissertation

- Nijland, H. J. (2016). How non-identity problem thinking messes with reasoning regarding killing animals. *EurSafe newsletter, 18(1)*.

- Nijland, H. J., Aarts, N. M. C., & Van Woerkum, C. M. J. (2015). Farmed Animals: Cultural and Personal Clusters of Reasoning and Behaviour. In *Minding Animals Conference III, New Delhi, India*.

- Nijland, H. J., Van Trijp, H. C. M., Aarts, M. N. C., & Ingenbleek, P. T. M. (2013). What is careful livestock farming? Substantiating the layered meaning of the term "careful" and drawing implications for the stakeholder dialogue. *NJAS - Wageningen Journal of Life Sciences*, *66*, 23–31.

- Nijland, H. J. (2012). Interpreting the human-nonhuman animal relation...examples from the "disentangling the domestic contract" research project,. In *Seminar "Interpreting the human- animal relation: Problematizing the integration of animals in interpretive research."*

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SUMMARY

Summary

The research that this dissertation reports on is designed to collect and understand the various ways in which people in everyday-life construct acceptability -or non-acceptability- of keeping and killing (non-human) animals for food - in short: to disentangle the construction of individual everyday-life domestic contracts. In this summary I provide an overview of the research and its chapters by relating the research findings to the research foci and (sub-)questions, showing how these meet the research objectives, and conclude with a summary of the main lessons learnt and the implications and applications of the research results.

Recapping the what, how & why of the research project

As stated in the introduction in chapter 1, perceptions and behaviours regarding the - often ambivalence-evoking- issue of husbandry, slaughter and consumption of farmed animals, diverge between individuals and cultures. To develop a better understanding of this complex issue and encourage societal dialogue based on scientific comprehension, I initiated the research project 'Disentangling the domestic contract'. Set in the Netherlands and Turkey, the research project aimed to distinguish and contextualize patterns in arguments that people use to construct (non-)acceptability of keeping and killing animals for food.

The project was centred around the overarching question: *"How can we understand the everyday-life construction of acceptability -or non-acceptability- of keeping and killing animals for food?"*, that was broken down into two interconnected yet different areas of exploration that formed the scope and focus of the project. The two main research questions (and associated two research foci) were:

1) **What frames are used to construct (non-)acceptability of keeping and killing animals for food in everyday-life and how do these relate to context?**
   (Research focus #1: Framing: content and patterns)
2) **How do people come to complex decisions like the construction of (non-) acceptability of keeping and killing animals for food?**
   (Research focus #2: The decision making process)

As explained in detail in chapter 3, the research was designed as a case-driven in-depth interpretive analysis of framing dynamics, via conversation- and document analysis, carried out amongst consumers from various backgrounds in two European extremes: the Netherlands and Turkey. Aimed at identifying both contextually valid knowledge as well as general patterns on the level of theory, the research followed a stepwise analytical

approach in which sensitizing concepts were continuously connected with the collected research data. This resulted in a converging of insights, of which this report is the visible result.

My research objective was twofold: **to understand the content of and the processes underlying everyday-life frames regarding keeping and killing animals for food in the selected case study areas; and to create space for thought and talk by developing policy-relevant tools for (self-)analysis and dialogue facilitation.**

Addressing research focus #1: Framing: content and patterns

The main question of research focus #1, ***"What frames are used to construct (non-) acceptability of keeping and killing animals for food in everyday-life and how do these relate to context?"***, consisted of 5 sub-questions, that have been addressed in chapters 2, 4 and 5:

The first sub-question, ***"How can existing concepts contribute to researching content and patterns in framing?"*** has been addressed in chapter 2.2, where sensitizing concepts have been introduced regarding framing. To find *patterns* in framing -in relation to context as well as emerging from the data as a whole- I looked for symbolic convergence (*common frames*). The model that I chose to use to distinguish the *content* of framing is the model of the frame-of-reference, that thickened during the course of the research into the categories *behaviours*, *values*, *norms*, *feelings*, *interests* and *knowledge & convictions*.

I have chosen to provide an answer to the second sub-question, ***"What frames do people across the case study areas use to construct (non-)acceptability of keeping and killing animals for food in everyday-life?"***, in an emic manner in chapter 4. The typical and remarkable frames portrayed there form a reflection of the raw data of my research into the domestic contract.

The third sub-question of research focus #1, ***"What topics constitute the content of the frames used to construct (non-)acceptability of keeping and killing animals for food?"***, was approached via an etic framing analysis: by coding the research data via the categories of the model of the frame-of-reference, via sub-categories, down to the level of topics. This led to an extensive list of framing elements that domestic contracts are constructed with within the selected case study areas (provided in appendix III), and a discussion thereof in chapter 5.1: *the ingredients of the domestic contract*.

The fourth sub-question, ***"What patterns stand out in the framing of (non-)acceptability of keeping and killing animals for food?"***, has been addressed in chapter 5 in two ways:

As set forth in chapter 5.2, of the patterns (common frames) in relation with demographic contextual factors that were encountered while interpreting the frames, only the difference between respondents in cities and the countryside stood out. Overall however, the variations between individual respondents' domestic contracts were far more striking than the differences between geographic context and population groups. An explanation for this was found in the realisation that domestic contracts are complex non-linear composites of interrelated and flexible framing elements, that do not form under the influence of single contextual features, but are context-dependent in multiple and mutually influencing ways.

When searching for patterns in framing across the research data as a whole, I found that, though each individual domestic contract is a unique and context-dependent synthesis of framing elements, the way individual consumers frame the (non-)acceptability of keeping and killing animals for food is not arbitrary but follows clear patterns. In individual everyday-life domestic contracts, certain considerations of interests, domestic contract related values and norms for behaviour were found to typically occur together. This observation resulted in the discernment of eleven distinct *clusters of reasoning and behaviour* (presented in detail in chapter 5.3 and depicted once more in figure A).

Figure A: The clusters of reasoning and behaviour

Combined, the findings of this research focus address the sub-question **"How do the acquired insights contribute to a better understanding of the everyday-life construction of domestic contracts?"**: The taste of frames in chapter 4 helps to 'know the stories' that are used to construct everyday-life domestic contracts in the case study areas. Chapter 5 offers insight in the range of topics that domestic contracts are constructed with (chapter 5.1 and appendix III), and into the complexity of patterns in relation with demographic

contextual factors (as argued in chapter 5.2). And (as discussed in chapter 5.3) the clusters of reasoning and behaviour both describe the various framing repertoires that surfaced from the research, as well as shine light on the logic interrelation between the circles of increasing consideration of interests, domestic contract related values, knowledge & convictions and norms for behaviour (and in ideal cases: actual behaviour).

Addressing research focus #2: The decision making process

Research focus #2, dealing with the question **"How do people come to complex decisions like the construction of (non-)acceptability of keeping and killing animals for food?"**, consisted of 3 sub-questions that have been addressed in chapters 2 and 6.

The first sub-question of research focus #2, **"How can existing concepts contribute to researching the complex process of decision making that underlies the construction of (non-)acceptability of keeping and killing animals for food?"**, has been dealt with in chapter 2.3, where I discussed several sensitizing concepts regarding information processing and decision making. To make theoretical sense of the complex dynamics of individual decision making and frame construction, I interpreted and combined the sensitizing concepts into a model: *the inner decision committee model*. The basics of this model were first introduced in the theory building paragraph of chapter 2.3 (and in flow-chart form provided once again here, in figure B).

Figure B: The inner decision committee model

I developed the inner decision committee model in detail, based on both the sensitizing concepts and patterns found in the data of the current research, in chapter 6.2, which addresses the second sub-question: **"How can the process of deciding on everyday-life constructions of (non-)acceptability of keeping and killing animals for food be conceptualised?"**. The resulting conceptualisation supposes a metaphorical inner decision committee, of which the members are interacting inner drives that -when primed- apply

cognitions (thoughts and feelings) to strive for their own specific goal. Four main groups of committee members emerged from the research data, that I named based on their overarching goals: 1) *I want to live according to my moral convictions*; 2) *I want to take care of my physique*; 3) *I want to manage my relationships*; and 4) *I want to manage living in the world*. In addition to the four main groups, I discerned two special committee members: the *inner chairperson*, who aims for the decision making among the committee members in a given situation to be *done in a fair and high quality manner*; and the *joker*, who aims *to feel good about current, past and future decisions* by targeting the uncomfortable psychological tension associated with a state of dissonance in several possible ways. The various conscious and non-conscious ways in which complex dynamic negotiation processes between the committee members take place are conceptualised in the *modes of decision making*, ranging from heuristic decision making, via witnessing of heuristics and oppressing heuristics, to deliberate and even intuitive decision making.

The question **"How do the acquired insights contribute to a better understanding of the everyday-life construction of domestic contracts?"** has been addressed in chapter 6.3 by showing how the inner decision committee model can be applied to understand the dynamic construction of domestic contracts. Conceptualising the four main groups of drives that interact within consumers increases insight into the inner negotiation process leading up to the construction of different domestic contracts. The evasion and prioritizing of certain frames are made insightful through the notions of priming and relative strength of committee members. The various ways in which the decision making process itself is framed can be explained with the relative strength of the inner chairperson and the associated modes of decision making. And observed coping strategies can be understood by conceptualising the joker and its ways of dealing with dissonance (listed in appendix IV). The inner decision committee model thus provides insight into the process underlying consumers' everyday-life construction of individual domestic contracts, which in particular helps understand why individual people make different decisions in varying situations.

Meeting the twofold research objective

Taken together, the research findings of both research foci combined address the overarching research question, and meet the first research objective: **to understand the content of and the processes underlying everyday-life frames regarding keeping and killing animals for food in the selected case study areas**.

To contribute to the second objective of the research, **creating space for thought and talk by developing policy-relevant tools for (self-)analysis and dialogue facilitation**, three tools were developed, based on the research results (see appendix V for an overview): combined with eliciting questions, the *ingredients of the domestic contract* listed in appendix III, the *clusters of reasoning and behaviour*, and the *inner decision committee*

model can be implemented both for analysing the various ways of framing regarding the farming, slaughter and consumption of animals, as well as to initiate and facilitate conversations about related matters.

Main lessons learnt

The main lessons learnt over the course of the project were synthesised in chapter 7.1. In short:

1. Constructing (non-)acceptability of keeping and killing animals for food in everyday-life is not a simple one-issue rational display of facts, but involves rich and multifaceted framing ingredients.
2. Feelings and identities matter.
3. The influence of context is complex.
4. The framing of (non-)acceptability of keeping and killing animals for food is not arbitrary:
   a. Though individual domestic contracts are unique, complex and dynamic composites of framing elements, eleven clusters of logically linked reasoning and behaviour were distinguished. Domestic contracts are built up of a combination of one or more of these clusters.
   b. The domestic contracts that people bring forth furthermore depend on the underlying process through which people arrive at their decisions to frame the (non-)acceptability of keeping and killing animals for food in a certain way. Conceptualising this process in terms of a negotiation between members of a metaphorical inner decision committee, that when primed apply cognitions to achieve specific goals, makes insightful why individual people make different particular decisions in changing situations, and that they do so at different levels of awareness.
5. The construction of domestic contracts in everyday-life often is not comprehensive, consistent or fair.
6. And even when done comprehensively and non-oppressively, dealing with the topic of farming, slaughter and consumption of animals inevitably requires making trade-offs.

Implications and applications

The research findings indicate that understanding one's own and others' individual domestic contracts is very possible with help of the patterns and tools that were developed, but that the matter needs to be approached with appreciation of the complexity and dissonance involved. As discussed in detail in chapter 7.2, several implications of the research findings for researchers and aspiring change-makers are: that awareness of the facts is not enough; that both the content of frames as well as the processes underlying framing matter; that part of the decision making process will always

remain elusive; that frames are never context-free; that there is value in noticing dissonance and coping; that we are ruled by our mindset (ánd we can influence it); and that everyone holds partial truths. The foremost value of the research into the domestic contract thus lies in the opportunities it provides for increased understanding of individual everyday-life constructs.

The research findings can furthermore be used to shed light on matters that take place in the wider societal arena, including the revealing of normative statements in the societal debate; substantiating the word 'sustainability'; and improving understanding of awareness raising initiatives. Finally, though the tools developed over the course of the research are non-normative in themselves, and as empirical research results primarily form tools for (self-)analytical purposes, the implications and applications indicate that they also form an opportunity to initiate and facilitate conversations about domestic contract related matters and develop methodology for dialogue. However, achieving a truly constructive dialogue that leads to overlapping consensus is a difficult and delicate process, that needs to be grounded in more empirical research as well as practical experience on how everyday-life conversations evolve - both between as well as inside the heads of people.

Courses and Teaching Activities

Hanneke J. Nijland
Wageningen School of Social Sciences (WASS)
Completed Training and Supervision Plan

Name of the learning activity	Department/Institute	Year(s)	ECTS[*]
I) General Part			
Information Literacy, including Introduction Endnote	WGS	2009	0.6
PhD Competence Assessment	WGS, Maas Assessment & Development	2009	0.3
Scientific writing	WGS	2009	2
Effective behaviour in your professional surroundings	WGS	2009	0.7
Voice and Presentation Skills Training	Voice Matters	2012	0.15
Improve your writing	WUR, Language Services	2013	1.2
Writing and blogging workshop for scientists	De Schrijfster	2013	0.15
Career Assessment	WGS, Meijer en Meijaard BV	2014	0.3
II) WASS-specific part			
Mansholt Introduction course	Mansholt Graduate School (WASS)	2009	1.5
'Disentangling the domestic contract - Interdisciplinary and multi-level approach to human-farm animal relations, with case studies in Dutch and Turkish contexts'	International XXIII ESRS Conference, Vaasa (Finland)	2009	1
'Disentangling the domestic contract - An account of how people deal with the keeping and killing of animals for food, with case studies in Dutch and Turkish contexts'	International ESEE 2011 Congress, Istanbul (Turkey)	2011	1
'Duurzaam leven: mensen, dieren, consumeren, waarden & zelfreferentialiteit'	Sustainability day, Humanistisch Verbond GriftVallei, Hemmen	2011	1

Name of the learning activity	Department/Institute	Year(s)	ECTS
Organizing WASS Multidisciplinary Seminar 'Interpreting the human-animal relation. Problematizing the integration of animals in interpretive research' with Susan Boonman-Berson	WASS	2012	1
'Interpreting the human-nonhuman animal relation...examples from the 'disentangling the domestic contract' research project'	WASS Multidisciplinary Seminar 'Interpreting the human-animal relation'	2012	1
'Farmed Animals: Cultural and Personal Clusters of Reasoning and Behaviour'	Minding Animals Conference III, New Delhi (India)	2015	1

III) Discipline-specific part

Management of Change: Inter-Human Processes and Communication	WUR COM 31306	2009	6
PhD student lunch seminar series on Consumer Behaviour	WUR MCB	2009	1
High-level course applied Turkish, specified on Agricultural settings	O. Yıldırım & K. Bozkurt, Istanbul (Turkey)	2009	2.5
Membership of discussion group on Interpretative Analysis	WASS	2009-2011	1.5
'Innovation for Sustainability, bringing theory into practice'	TransForum	2010	3
Membership of taskforce Careful Livestock Farming	WUR ASG	2010-2012	0.2
Non-scientific publication: 'Hoofdstuk 1.4: De facetten van zorgvuldigheid', in: 'Over zorgvuldige veehouderij, veel instrumenten, één concert, Essaybundel'	Wageningen UR	2010	0.5
Masterclass Interpretative Analysis with prof. dr. Dvora Yanow	WASS	2011	1.5
Capita Selecta Agricultural and Rural Innovation Processes: 'Food Crisis? Strategies to Transform our Food Systems'	WUR RSO 51303	2011	3
Membership of workgroup Halal and Animal Welfare	Stichting Dier & Recht	2011	0.2
Non-scientific publication: 'Duurzaamheid: waarden rond wetenschap en welzijn'	Newsletter Nederlandse Vereniging voor Bio-ethiek	2011	0.5

Name of the learning activity	Department/Institute	Year(s)	ECTS
Peer review of an application for a research fellowship	The Wellcome Trust	2011	0.2
Peer review of a scientific journal article	Society and Animals: Journal of Human-Animal Studies	2011	0.3
Summer seminar: Integral leadership for sustainability	Experience Integral Foundation, Groenekan	2014	1
Discussant at seminar: 'Qualifying halal meat: the apparatus of the slaughterhouse' by Dr Mara Miele Reader	WUR RSO	2015	0.1
Non-scientific publication: 'How non-identity problem thinking messes with reasoning regarding killing animals'	EurSafe newsletter	2016	0.5
Participating as social scientist in the discussion about the separation of cow and calf	WUR ASG	2016	0.2
IV) Teaching and supervising activities			
Teaching Assistant: Management of Change: Inter-Human Processes and Communication (COM 31306), student communication and reviewing of assignments	WUR COM	2009, 2012, 2013	1
Guest lecture: 'Proposal writing' for Communication Research (COM 35306)	WUR COM	2009	0.2
Co-organising and supervising study trip to Istanbul for the Master 'Management of Agro-Ecolological Knowledge and Social Change' (MAKS)	WUR MAKS	2009	1
Supervising: MSc internship & thesis students	WUR COM	2010-2013	1
Guest lectures: 'Integral Methodological Pluralism' for Management of Change: Inter-Human Processes and Communication (COM 31306) and Masterclass Organic Agriculture (CSA-33303)	WUR COM	2012, 2013, 2014, 2015	0.8
Total			**39.1**

[*] One credit according to ECTS is on average equivalent to 28 hours of study.

About the author

Hanneke (Johanna) Nijland was born in the Koestraat in Zwolle, on October 15th 1978, first child of Sytske & Henk Nijland, and first grandchild of both Hannie & Wierd Wijnterp and Ria & Wichert Nijland. Her mother is a vegetarian when she can, her father an avid meat eater, her brother Jasper works on cattle farms all over the world, and her partner is an environmental philosopher. Hanneke has a passion for Turkey and spent about 6.5 years of her life in this beautiful, unfortunately currently quite troubled, country. She has been studying and working in the field of human-animal and human-nature relations for over 15 years.

Her student life started at the University of Twente, where she studied Applied Physics for a year. Though she loved maths and physics, she quickly realised that the indoors and predominantly male-oriented culture there wasn't making her happy and started searching for a quicker way to study human-animal relations (which is what she wanted) than waiting for her fifth year to see if she could possibly apply physics to study dolphin communication. So, she moved to Wageningen, to study Forest & Nature Management. Within this study she composed her own free BSc/MSc program that she called 'Nature & Society', in which she studied the ethical and practical argumentation regarding keeping and killing pigs for food; researched animal welfare labelling and wrote articles for Natuur & Techniek's special NWO issue on animal welfare; organised a philosophical debate on farm animal welfare with Peter Singer for Varkens in Nood and Philosophy Magazine; monitored sea-turtle nesting beaches for WWF-Turkey; researched the legal and practical welfare situation of broilers in Turkey; and performed an ethological study on the effects of group size and density on the vocalisation of laying hens. She graduated cum laude.

After her studies, she worked as a researcher/consultant/coordinator at WWF-Turkey in Istanbul, the Animal Sciences Group in Lelystad, Küre Mountains National Park in Kastamonu (Turkey), and the Animal and Law Foundation in Amsterdam. In 2008 she returned to her alma mater, Wageningen University, as a researcher at the Strategic Communication chair group, to research the perception of circus animal welfare by hands-on experts. After this (published) research, she wrote a research proposal with which she acquired the funding to perform the interpretive research project 'Disentangling the domestic contract', that this dissertation is the result of.

Currently, she is working as a researcher and research consultant on projects related to human-animal and human-nature relations and sustainability, having started her own company.

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