political reasons, also the most
twentieth century. His influ­
field of jurisprudence. The
political implications, all the
historical and biographical con­
Thus, this book is a healthy
limit primarily as a theoretic­
to the usual reduction on
his concept of the concrete
work "through the lens of his
move it - this is an unconven­
concept of legal standards,

as Professor of Constitutional
Humboldt-Universitat, Berlin

of his long life: political the­
national lawyer, polemicist,
Nazi. However, first and
With The Legal Theory of Carl
present to an English-speaking
count of Schmitt's legal think­
troversial career. The authors
eo-Kantian origins to its fully
arity and sophistication they
the many debates he engaged

in P. McCormick, Professor of

cience, University of Chicago

Routledge
Taylor & Francis Group
a GlassHouse Book
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