

INTERNATIONAL RIVALRY IN SAMOA

1845 - 1884.

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INTERNATIONAL RIVALRY IN SAMOA. 1845-1884 *Masterman*

(Synopsis of thesis)

The thesis deals with the origin and growth of the interests of Great Britain, Germany, and the United States in Samoa. The first British contact, through the missionaries, (1836) aimed at Christianizing, civilizing, and Anglicizing the natives; and thus they prepared the way for political and commercial developments. Commerce was, however largely opportunist, until the utilization of coconut oil in European markets brought merchants to the Pacific for copra. The Hamburg merchants, Godeffroy & Son, chose Samoa as the centre for their extensive copra trade. (1854). Plantations tied German interests materially to Samoa, and the fear lest these should suffer, made Germans undesirous of seeing Samoa annexed by another Power.

The development of trans-Pacific communications that followed the gold discoveries in the United States, Australia and New Zealand, gave the islands a strategic importance. New Zealand statesmen envisaged advantages in annexation of Samoa and other Polynesian islands for defense, for commercial expansion, and for the suppression of the labour trade. American speculators and adventurers agitated for United States intervention, and the response they received indicated a halfhearted desire on the part of the government for the extension of American interests in the Pacific.

Native wars within the islands (1869-1881) threatened to ruin trade and planting. The mutual recognition of inter-

2.

-ests, embodied in the treaties of the three Powers with the native faction in power at the time in Samoa, (1878-9) led to the joint action of the British, German and American representatives in restoring order. (1881) Co-operation was interrupted in 1884 by the aggressive action of Germans, the reflection of a change of policy in Germany. The refusal of New Zealand and the United States to recognize the superiority of German rights led to the impasse of 1885. After this the Samoa question became a part of international diplomacy, the subject of negotiations, upon which the affairs within the islands had comparatively little influence. This last phase is outside the scope of this thesis which deals only with the roots of the problem, before it becomes international.

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NOTE.1. Samoa or Navigator Islands.

Bougainville's name, the Navigator Islands, for the Samoan Group, is used by the Missionaries until about 1845 and in official dispatches until about 1870.

2. Polynesia.

This term is applied to the island groups East of long. 180° with the Ellice and Gilbert Islands and Rotumah, whose inhabitants belong racially to the Polynesian stock, light brown and intelligent Malaysian type of which Samoans are typical.

3. Melanesia.

This term is applied to the island groups South of the equator to lat. 30° S. and between long. 180° and (circ.) 130° East. The inhabitants are a black frizzy haired negrito type far inferior to Polynesians in intelligence.

4. Micronesia.

This term is applied to the island groups North of the equator to lat. 20° N. between long. 170° E. and 130° (circ.) The inhabitants are a mixed race with certain Polynesian and certain Japanese characteristics.

INTRODUCTION.

1.

In the last fifteen years of the 19th Century, the small island group of Samoa played a part in world affairs, quite out of proportion to its size and intrinsic importance. It is in and after 1884 that published correspondence on Samoa becomes voluminous. (1) In that year the German Consul in Samoa forced an agreement on the de facto Samoan rulers - the native King and vice-King, - which virtually handed over the government to Germans, while the British and American Consuls protested vigorously and ineffectively. The act was not repudiated - in January 1885 the German flag was hoisted and remained flying for a year; in 1887, Germany declared war on the Samoan King's party, and from that time Samoan affairs were constantly before the public in Europe, the United States and Australasia. The important point is that these events were brought before public notice, and became subject matter for diplomatic correspondence - Anglo-German commissions were held in 1885 and 1886 to inquire into causes of the disturbances; conferences were held to

(1) U.S.A. Hse. Exec. Doc. 6.
Ser. " " " 13.

discuss the future of the islands, (1887, 1889, 1899) not because native disputes in themselves mattered, but because they were interfering with the ambitions of the great nations concerned. The tangled affairs irritated statesmen in Europe and America, who, while recognising the apparent insignificance of the question, yet refused to give up rights on the islands. On one occasion (1889) the outbreak of hostilities between German and American men of war in Apia harbour was only averted by a hurricane that wrecked three German, and three American warships. On another occasion (1899) hostilities actually broke out, and an American man of war bombarded German plantations. On at least two occasions, the Samoan question was the cause of strained relations between Germany and England (1). The sudden prominence given to Samoan affairs is not because there were no Samoan affairs of importance before 1884. It is because after 1884, when Germany embarked upon a colonial policy and there was the likelihood of German annexation, the problem, which had been primarily one of keeping Samoa peaceful with a minimum of trouble, now was one of maintaining a balance

(1) 1887 see Grosse Politik Vol. IV. p. 150.

1899 Schwertfeger B. "Die Diplomatischen Akten"
Pt. I. chap. 96. no. 4056 des Auswärtigen
Amtes. Pt. 3. "Die Politik der freien Hand."


between the rights of Great Britain, Germany and the United States. This delicate task was the work of diplomatists in Europe, and not the foreign representatives in Samoa.

If, by 1884, the matter had become of international importance, clearly the origins of the Samoa question must lie further back in its history. It is with this early part that this thesis deals. It is an attempt to trace the antecedents of the troubled years 1885-99, to show the reasons that attracted Europeans to Samoa, and the effects of that contact in modifying native political organization, warfare and ownership of land. As the century advanced there arose the problems of conflicting interests. There was the humanitarian desire to preserve and benefit the native race, manifested partly by missionaries, partly by the British Government, giving rise to the policy of non - or rather the minimum of intervention in native affairs. There was also the commercial ambition, to utilize Samoan natural resources to the utmost. This, in turn, led to political interference, the realization of the need to control the native political organization, in order to utilize fully the commercial resources of the country.

Apart from the growth of these conflicting interests within Samoa, its strategic position attracted the Australasian colonies and America. Consequently there grew up, outside Samoa, a demand from New Zealand for annexation, quite unrelated to New Zealand interests within Samoa, which were negligible. Similarly, the growth of American interests in the islands was due, only partially, to the activities of Americans in Samoa itself.

On the one hand, therefore, we find interests growing up within the islands which assume dimensions large enough to summon the attention of outside governments. On the other hand we find interests that grew up, in the first place, outside the islands, and that were extended to the islands in the course of growth. By 1878-9 the rights and obligations of the three Powers in Samoa were chrystalized into treaty form. Equality of rights ⁽¹⁾ may have been possible while each nation was concerned with the good behaviour and protection of its nationals, and the maintenance of peace amongst natives, but in the face of more extensive ambitions it was impossible. The latter story of affairs after 1884, whether of the island disturbances or of the diplomatic negotiations, is outside the field of this inquiry.

(1) Each treaty had a "most favoured nation" clause.



11. The Islands and their Discoverers.

Samoa is the native name for the group of islands situated between lat. 13° and 14° South and long. 169° - 173° West, midway, in fact in the Pacific, ⁽¹⁾ and centrally amongst the island archipelagos. Savaii, the largest ⁽²⁾ and most Western island is ringed with inaccessible coral reefs, and therefore little use for shipping. Upolu, ten miles to the east is the most fertile and the most important among natives and white men. It has three harbours, Apia, Saluafata and Falealili, providing efficient shelter, though the two former, in facing North are liable to be exposed to storms between January and April. Between Savaii and Upolu are two little islets, Manono and Apolima, both small, but important in native politics. Thirty-six miles east of Upolu, are the islands of Tutuila and the islet Aunuu. Tutuila is noted for its excellent harbour Pago-pago,

(1) Note of distances:-

1560	miles	from	Auckland,	N.Z.
2060	"	"	Sydney.	
5660	"	"	Panama.	
4160	"	"	San Francisco	
4570	"	"	Vancouver.	
4050	"	"	Yokohama.	

(2) Note of sizes:-

Savaii	660	sq.	m.
Upolu	340	"	"
Tutuila	54	"	"
Manua Group	25	"	"

reputed to be one of the safest and best in the Pacific. To the east again sixty miles, is the Manua group of three islands, T'au, Olosenga and Ofu, and yet seventy miles on is the unimportant coral atoll of Rose Island. All except the last are volcanic, and this partially accounts for their fertility. Volcanic mountains rise in Savaii to 6,096 ft., and to 3,607 in Upolu. The warm, damp climate, usually with a temperature average ranging between 61° F. and 94° F. ⁽¹⁾, and the volcanic soil make the islands among the most productive of the Pacific. Coconuts, breadfruit, taro, bananas and nutmeg are among the most luxuriant indigenous food plants. The early accounts of the great fertility and productivity of the islands were, however, somewhat exaggerated, and the damp climate suits only some of the plants that have been introduced for commercial purposes. Some that flourished at first were later ruined ⁽²⁾ by the introduction of disease or pestilent insects.

(1) Average temp. at sea level 78.4°. "Handbook of Western Samoa" Wellington, N.Z. 1925.

(2) esp. coffee disease which ruined coffee at first successful, and the rhinoceros beetle which ruined coconuts (1911). The most successful introduced plants are cacao, rubber, oranges, lemons, limes and the Cavandish banana.

The position of the group, in relation to other Pacific islands is interesting. It is on the dividing line between Melanesia and Polynesia. Inhabiting the islands to the west are the dark, frizzy-haired negrito Melanesians; to the north, the mixed Micronesians, who have a Polynesian element in their stock. In the eastern islands are the pure Polynesians, members of the same family as the Samoan natives. In Fiji, to the south, there is the blend of Polynesian and Melanesian. Samoa is supposed to be the original home of the Polynesians in the Pacific, before they made their way to Hawaii, Tahiti, New Zealand and other islands. The traditional Hawaiki of Maori and other legends has been identified with Savaii, the westernmost island. The Polynesian languages are sufficiently like each other to be understandable from island to island, and of them all Samoan is the most archaic⁽¹⁾. But though traditions are similar, customs vary. Of all the islanders, the Samoans are reputed to be the gentlest, least fanatic and most courteous. Their gods were mild and demanded no brutal sacrifices nor hideous images of themselves. A narrow code of morality, established by long usage, was on the whole strictly observed. Ancestor worship, the veneration of some "aetu" or totum, a fish, an

(1) It retains the sibilant 's' which in most other forms has been changed to 'H'.

owl or some animal, comprised the chief features of their religion. The law of "tapu" (taboo) was a great check upon freedom of action. Cannibalism was said never to have been practised, at any rate after the advent of white men⁽¹⁾, though Mr. Hunkin, an escaped sailor who became a missionary, and who probably had seen more of the native practices than the missionaries from England, states that he had heard of isolated cases in Tutuila⁽²⁾, when enemies taken in time of war were eaten. It certainly was not practised within the memory of Samoans as part of their religious rites, as at Hawaii, Tonga and other islands. One custom implies that it may once have been usual for Samoans to eat their enemies. In time of war the defeated captive had to humiliate himself in the dust before his conqueror carrying sticks, banana leaves, and stones - the requisites for a Samoan oven - implying he was in a position to be cooked, and only the magnanimity of his enemies would save him.⁽³⁾

(1) Murray. "The Bible in the Pacific". p. 38.
Pritchard, W. "Polynesian Reminiscences" - says it was occasionally practised in revenge, bravado but not "lust of appetite". p. 126.

(2) Samoan Reporter 1845.

(3) (Churchward. "My Consulate in Samoa."
(Pritchard. "Polynesian Reminiscences." p. 52.
This may also be interpreted as a willingness to become servant to the conqueror.

By temperament Samoans are mild, music-loving and gay, fond of all dancing and games, feasting and entertainment. Theirs was a nature that accorded with the natural beauty and fertility around them. Coconuts grew without any special cultivation, breadfruit and taro needed little work; pigs abounded in the forest, pigeons in the berry covered trees, fishes in the waters. Hunting and fishing parties were long picnics. A communistic mode of life made saving profitless. The necessaries, food, houses, clothes were provided, all for all within the family or clan. Extras, if any, were acquired - as for instance in the early days of the "papalangi"⁽¹⁾ - would soon be divided or shared by all. This communism, and the plenty that usually surrounded him, made the Samoan unambitious to amass more wealth than his neighbour. The Samoans were found to be entirely unsuitable as labourers, indeed, in any menial work. They were often indicted as lazy and unambitious. This is undoubtedly true, but in the general scramble for wealth that so characterized his civilized white brothers, the Samoan, who preferred his hours of leisure, and his freedom to hunt and fish and swim, or merely to lie idle enjoying his pleasant surroundings, is not altogether an

(1) literally "cloudburster" the Samoan name given to white men.

ignoble figure. Indeed, it is remarkable that his dignity and his charming customs have survived the stress of planter's whip and missionary austerity. As Samoans persistently refused to become good plantation labourers and even house servants, so they refused to relinquish many of their native ways. Unlike Polynesians in Tonga, Fiji and other semi-civilized islands, they are still tattooed, and the women, while wearing full dress and bonnet on Sunday, on every other day still prefer their mats and garlands.

In their natures the Samoans combined a childlike simplicity with a high average intelligence. They entered with zest into whatever sport offered. Old men joined with young in enacting scenes of the arrival of the white man in his "papalangi-ship"⁽¹⁾. The introduction of cricket (1884) proved ruinous⁽²⁾ and play had to be controlled by law because it became so popular. Whole villages neglected work and turned out to play sometimes a hundred a side, A single Match might last for weeks and a touring team, like locusts, ate up the countryside. War, too, has about it an air of sportiveness when one reads that women were allowed to pass without harm between the lines, exchanging gossip and state

(1) Wilkes. Narrative of the U.S. Exploring Expedition. Vol. 2. p. 144.

(2) Churchward. op. cit. p. 143.

secrets with friends and relatives of either party. ⁽¹⁾ It is true that villages were desolated and foodcrops pillaged, and enemies' heads were paraded before the triumphant chief. But shining with oil and paint, adorned with a great headdress of human hair and feathers, the Samoan felt the excitement was worth the risk of death or famine.

The social organization was tribal and land was held communally by the whole family. Each "clan" or group of families had a chief chosen always from the same line though he was not necessarily the eldest son. He and his family were treated with punctilious respect, and "hedged about with strict etiquette." ⁽²⁾ There was indeed, and still is, one vocabulary of words for the chief and his family, and another for the same things applied to a common man. All his important business was done through his advisor or talking man - talafale, an important man in the clan. A number of these clans made up a district. Each district had the power of conferring a name upon one high chief of the two most important families in Samoa, the Tupua and the Malietoa families. If it should happen that all five districts conferred their honour upon the same man,

(1) Pritchard. op. cit. p. 62.

(2) Handbook of Western Samoa. p. 42.

then he would, theoretically at least, be sole ruler of Samoa. Actually this did not occur. If it had, he would still not have been, in any sense, autocratic King. This weakness in the native political organization, of which there is more mention in a later chapter⁽¹⁾ was at the root of the native disorders.

... ..

Such then, in brief, was Samoa and its inhabitants before the coming of the white man. The first European to record a visit to the group was the Dutchman, Jacob Roggwein, who in 1722 obtained water and herbs at Manua. The purpose of his voyage was to discover the Golden Islands, or the "Terra Australis Incognita", and to open trade on behalf of the Dutch West India Company. His hope was to find civilized and industrious people who would trade in gold, silk, and spices and such desirable commodities, and so contribute to the wealth of Holland, the Dutch West India Company and the Roggwein family. The aim was entirely commercial. There was no scientific, religious, or humanitarian purpose. He had no use for half naked savages and the luxuriant vegetation, except in so far as the medicinal herbs cured his crew of scorbutic ravages. The islands of which he was the first discoverer, Easter Island

(1) Chap. 6 infra.

and Samoa, which he called the Baumann Islands ⁽¹⁾, were to him disappointments. The inaccuracy of longitude measurement made his discoveries of little scientific value as they could not be accurately placed on the map. Further, his log was lost until 1839 ⁽²⁾ and the two accounts published ⁽³⁾ were inaccurate and conflicting. It was not until Roggewein's log was rediscovered, that it could be asserted that the islands he visited actually belonged to the Samoa Group.

Consequently the credit of the discovery of Samoa for many years fell to Bougainville, the French navigator. He touched at Manua and sighted Tutuila. From the numerous seacraft that surrounded his vessel, and from the skilful manner that they were handled by the natives, he named the islands the Navigator Islands. This is the name solely used until about 1840 by missionaries, and official dispatches are directed to the Navigator Islands until about 1875 when the native name gradually usurped the foreign.

(1) After the Captain of his ship, the "Tienhoven".

(2) Mulert. "De Reis van Mr. Jacob Roggewein" 1911.

(3) (1728 in Dutch (translated and
(1738 by a German Behring (quoted by
Dalrymple. The World Displayed 1744. Vol. IX.
Schwabe J. Allzemeine histoire der Rusin
Leipzig 1775.

The visit of La Perouse in 1787 left a blot upon the name of the Navigator Islands. During his visit to the island of Tutuila, some eleven of his men, including the scientist M. de Langle, were killed in an affray with the natives. Later accounts obtained from natives seem to show that the French sailors were partly to blame, but, nevertheless, this incident gave the natives an undeserved reputation for ferocity.

The only other visits to the islands down to the time of missionary endeavour were those of the H.M.S. "Pandora" in search of the missing "Bounty", and the expedition of Kotzebue in 1824. Neither added any points of importance to the knowledge then existing of the islands.

It was the scientific exploration of Captain Cook and his contemporaries that opened up the Pacific. The accurate charting of islands, reefs, harbours and so on, prepared the way for less expert navigators, and the search for wealth that characterized the explorers of the mercantilist age, gave place to the desire to know the unknown parts of the world. The worthy endeavours of the great scientific discoverers of the Pacific were followed up by whalers and traders. These often scattered over the Pacific islands a thin splashing of renegade sailors and escaped convicts,

whose influence was almost invariably harmful. It became customary in Samoa and some other islands (e.g. New Zealand) for a chief to have a "papalangi", or white man to live in the tribe, to teach the use of firearms and metals ⁽¹⁾. These isolated whites, by their superior knowledge and disregard of the supposed dangers of the native "tapus" became sometimes chiefs or more commonly "priests" - promulgating laws to satisfy their wants, and conducting mock services, interspersed with ribald sailor songs instead of hymns. The part played by these adventurers was small. The advent of the missionary, and the increased familiarity of Polynesian with white men, ultimately caused the disappearance of this class of white from positions of influence among the natives.

Until the coming of missionaries the contact of native with white was invariably unfortunate for the native. An old Samoan Prayer reads: "Keep away from us Sailing Gods; lest they come and cause disease and death." Again, "Here is ava ⁽²⁾ for you Sailing Gods; do not come on shore at this

(1) Accounts of these in (Williams op. cit. chap. XXIV. (Pritchard G. "Polynesian Reminiscences". (Turner, G. "Nineteen Years in Polynesia". p. 103.

(2) Ava, or Kava, the chief native drink for festal occasions. It was customary to spill a little as an offering to the gods before drinking.

place; but be pleased to depart along the ocean to some other land."⁽¹⁾ These may, of course, refer to Tongan invaders, but they may well be references to the first Europeans. Even the best intentioned brought new diseases⁽²⁾, and few except missionaries failed to use their firearms against natives. The missionaries alone came as servants, not tyrants. Consequently it was they, with their message of peace and goodwill, that opened the breach in the defensive attitude customarily assumed by natives towards traders. "Wherever your missionaries go," said Williams, the Apostle to Samoa, "new channels are cut for British commerce to flow in."⁽³⁾ And indeed, where the commerce flowed, there followed official protection and commercial rivalry.

So it is with the missionaries, their ideals and the effects of their teaching, that the civilized contact with the islands begins.


(1) Turner, G. "Nineteen Years in Polynesia". p. 200.
These may, of course, refer to Tongan invaders.

(2) Very many natives died of influenza brought by the missionaries. Measles, whooping cough and chickenpox proved a serious menace.

(3) Missionary Magazine 1837. Nov. p. 291.

2 SKETCH MAP SHOWING MISSION STATIONS OF THE
 LONDON MISSIONARY SOCIETY IN THE PACIFIC. 1797-1846
 (New Guinea 1871)

KEY
 e.g. Rarotonga (1832) STATION WITH BRITISH MISSIONARY.
 Yangatolu (1797) UNSUCCESSFUL MISSION
 Loyalty (1841) AT FIRST ATTEMPTED BUT LATER SUCCESSFUL.
 ELLICE ISLANDS † NATIVE TEACHERS ONLY ON ISLAND.



CHAPTER I.

The Origins of British Influence - The Missionaries

1836-45.

Of the three Missionary Societies that influenced Samoa, the London Missionary Society is far the most important. Although two years before the arrival in 1830 of Williams, the L.M.S. Missionary, Tongan converts of the Wesleyan Society had made their way to Samoa, the Wesleyans never won as great an influence. In 1835 a Wesleyan Missionary was stationed in Samoa, but in the succeeding years the home committees wisely agreed to divide their spheres of work so as to avoid overlap. The Wesleyans withdrew to Fiji and Tonga. In 1857 their renewal of work among Samoans caused not a little bitter feeling among London Missionary Society workers who, very naturally deplored the manifest confusion to the native of rival sects as similar, and as far removed, as the two Societies. The London Missionary Society, however, never lost their large following, and Wesleyans and Roman Catholics won a proportion each of about 8 per cent. of the population.

The Roman Catholics, who landed in 1845, occasioned the alarm of the Protestant teachers. Their fears of French aggression, however, proved groundless. That the Samoans,

with their love of pageantry and ceremony, did not flock in greater numbers to this Church, is remarkable, and speaks for the strong hold that the London Society Missionaries had obtained upon the minds of the people. The work of the Catholics has been praised as most beneficial and quite unpolitical⁽¹⁾.

The hold of the London Missionary Society upon their converts was due to the untiring zeal of the first missionaries. The legend of John Williams and his works still lives among the people. What he established is handed down from pastor to pastor as unalterable religious custom. That three short visits should have left so lasting an impression is witness to his impelling personality. The rapid and excellent translation of the Bible into Samoan (1835-45), by all the missionaries guided by the Rev. Messrs. Pratt and Turner, further accelerated the work of conversion. The founding of a teachers' seminary at Malua, 1844, for the training of native pastors and teachers further consolidated their evangelizing work.

The importance of the early London Missionary Society missionaries in moulding the history of colonization in the

(1) Churchward. "My Consulate in Samoa". p. 202.
"A Handbook of Western Samoa 1925" p. 67.

Pacific in general and Samoa in particular, is sufficient to warrant a closer examination of the history, ideals and sacrifices of these devoted servants, and the effects of their service.

The establishment⁽¹⁾ of the London Missionary Society⁽²⁾ was immediately due to Dr. Haweis, chaplain to Lady Huntingdon, who was eminently favourable to mission work. The publication of the "Evangelical Magazine" in 1792, brought clergy and laymen of like sympathies into touch with each other. Meetings of Evangelical Ministers were convened in London on September 21st, 23rd and 24th 1795, largely through Dr. Haweis' instrumentality, and the formation of the London Missionary Society was the outcome. It was Protestant and undenominational but the latter formation of denominational Societies⁽³⁾ tended to leave within it the Congregationalists.

To Dr. Haweis also is due the initial suggestion of the South Seas as a field of endeavour⁽⁴⁾. The reading of the

(1) Almost the first British Miss. Socty. 1698 S.P.G. 1792. Baptist Miss. Socty.

(2) (Ellis. "History of L.M.S." Vol. I.
(Lovett. "History of the L.M.S." Vol. I. pp. 11-26.
also Martin, H.K.L. "Missionaries and Annexation
in the Pacific" p. 8.)

(3) 1799 Church Missionary Society (altogether 38 were est.
1814 Wesleyan " " (between 1792-1892.

(4) Lovett. op. cit. Vol. I.

voyages to the South Seas," he said "and especially to Otaheite, had lead my thoughts earnestly to desire, that while Lady Huntingdon was striving to send missionaries to America, she should make some effort to send some to Otaheite and the Southern islands." Further, he considered that "of all the dark places of the earth, the South Sea Islands presented the fewest difficulties, and the fairest prospects of success."⁽¹⁾ Upon his advocacy it was determined that the South Seas should be the first field of missionary enterprise. The narratives of the great navigators to the Pacific Ocean, Wallis, Cook, Carteret, Bougainville, and the mysterious disappearance of La Perouse, had familiarized the educated classes in England with the romantic charm of the islands of Tahiti, Hawaii and others, and of the intelligent savages that inhabited them. Indeed, the information about these islands, coming at a time of religious revival, seemed to indicate the hand of God in revealing this field for missionary work. As one preacher⁽²⁾ said, "Thus the providence of God, in an unusual manner, seems to conspire with the Spirit of God; everything favours, nothing impedes the design."

(1) Williams, J. op. cit. Chap. 1.

(2) Rev. T. Pentycross in a sermon at St. Mary's Wallingford.

Williams, who quoted this in his book, elaborated this theme.⁽¹⁾ "The discovery of so many beautiful islands just before that wonderful period, when amidst the throes of kingdoms, and the convulsions of the civilized world, a gracious influence was simultaneously shed in so surprising a way on the minds of thousands of British Christians, cannot fail to convince every thinking person that the undertaking was of God." The special reference to British Christians implies further that God was guiding a favoured people into the path he revealed.

The choice might seem to us curious in view of the immense distance to traverse, and the full scope for Christian work that offered much nearer home. Distance was in itself no setback. Filled with the first flush of courage and enthusiasm many offered regardless of, and perhaps, too, somewhat ignorant of, the extent of the isolation the work involved. The very distance was a challenge which no true follower of Christ might refuse, the ferocity of the natives an inducement. The reputed intelligence of the natives made it the more deplorable that they should have fallen to brutal and obscene practices. Yet the more hideous their depravity, the more urgent was the need to lose no moment in bringing to them the means of salvation. Not merely was

(1) Williams, J. op. cit. Chap. 1.

it to be a message to save the soul, but the missionary was also to teach useful arts and crafts and all the blessings of civilization, from arithmetic to plastering houses.

The missionary spirit represents a fusion of evangelical revival with *laissez-faire* theory. It was the individual that was important, but he must be given the opportunity to save himself. "The responsibility of believing, if there be any, rests with the individual told; the responsibility of telling him rests with the Christian Church."⁽¹⁾ Consequently, the Evangelical Revival "intensified the worth of the individual, and to snatch even one brand from the burning, became a dominant impulse."⁽²⁾

... ..

For some the sacrifice was too great. The romantic call of the islands, of work for humanity and God, lost its glamour in the face of the stern reality. The devotion that could override the bitter sacrifices of those first years was indeed great. The voyage might take three months to a year, with dangers of shipwreck, piracy or disease, and the certainty of acute discomfort in the cramped accommodation. That was, however, the least. Worse was the utter estrangement

(1) Encyclopaedia Britannica. "Missions."

(2) Ibid.

and isolation. Often letters would not be received for years at a time. The occasional chance of a visiting man-of-war or whaler was the only means of communication. Situated in a strange land, unwelcome and unsuccessful, labouring in a hot and enervating climate, and teaching in a strange language, it is little wonder that the heart failed one and another, and that disappointed and broken in health some turned back. This makes all the more admirable the obdurate courage and faith of those that remained. Of the first party of thirty ⁽¹⁾ that left in 1797 for Tahiti and Tongataboo, the majority failed in their mission. In Tongataboo three were killed and the other seven left before 1799. Of the Tahiti mission, eleven left the following year, 1798, in the Nautilus, one left the Society to live with a native woman and was subsequently murdered, another was expelled for ceasing to believe in the immortality of the soul. The four who remained in Tahiti made a little headway among the natives between 1802-8, but there were no converts to Christianity. In 1808 they were driven to Eimeo by the outbreak of civil war in Tahiti. Their devotion was, however, rewarded at last. In 1813 the deposed high chief, Pomare, became

(1) Only four of these were ordained clergymen. The remainder professed crafts that they hoped to teach the natives.

Christian, and in 1816 he regained power. By 1819, the Christian kingdom of Tahiti was well established, and laws were promulgated under missionary guidance. (1) Tahiti became the starting point for further ventures. News of the success of the mission at Tahiti reverberated through Christian Churches at home, and gave an impetus to further mission work in the Antipodes.

The British Missionaries, in the first place, did not seek to prepare the way for the extension of the Empire. Their work was begun at a time when colonies were at a discount after the War of American Independence. Rather they sought to guide natives into forming themselves into autonomous states with laws based on the Christian commandments and with life ordered according to the enlightenments of British civilization. In New Zealand the missionaries opposed annexation perhaps "for the very human reason that it would tend to detract from the position of influence, almost of power, which they themselves held with the natives." (2) They deplored the advent of traders and settlers in that they

(1) Accounts of the early history of the Tahitian mission in Lovett op. cit. Vol. 1. Chap. III.
Ellis, W. "History of the L.M.S." Lond. 1844. Vol. I

(2) Scholefield, G. "The Pacific." p. 205.

furnished the natives with unworthy examples of life and conduct. They sold firearms and spirits and diminished accordingly the missionary influence, which was so big a factor in the rightful ordering of a Christian kingdom. The power exercised by missionaries over chiefs was sometimes very great. One native King, of the Island of Apemama in the Kingsmill Group, would not allow a missionary in his kingdom, lest he should be bewitched by him and lose his power in a short time. ⁽¹⁾

Nevertheless, the missionary ideal of autonomous native kingdoms was rudely shaken by their experiences in Tahiti. The Roman Catholic missionaries preferred sowing in land ploughed by others, to ploughing. Supported by the guns of French warships, they intruded into the Tahitian Kingdom. The incidents culminating in expulsion of the missionary ex-Consul Pritchard, further showed the pathetic helplessness of autonomous native rulers. Embittered by this first rebuff they preached in Samoa warnings against Catholics. ⁽²⁾ The appeals of native chiefs for annexation ⁽³⁾ to Great Britain that followed are due, even if not directly so, to missionary influence.

(1) N. 2. Blue Book 1874. Sterndale report.

(2) Wilkes. "Narrative of the U.S. Exploring Expedition."

(3) Lovett. op. cit.

The London Missionary Society missionaries spread from their first station, Tahiti, to the surrounding islands. In 1808 attempts were made at converting Huahine and Eimeo - the latter successful. Further missions went to Raiatea (1818), Borabora and Eitutaki (1820), Rarotonga (1823) and Samoa (1830). Later on missions were extended to the New Hebrides (1840-59), Loyalty Islands, Niue and New Guinea (1871).

The extension of work after 1816 is largely due to the unbounded energy, persistence and courage of John Williams, a missionary whose name after a hundred years is remembered by natives and revered. As a somewhat mundane young man he had embarked upon the career of ironmonger, but a sudden conversion turned his heart toward God, and led him to offer his services as a missionary. From the first moment he never looked back. In 1816, at the age of twenty, he was ordained, and left with his newly-married wife for the South Seas. He plunged whole-heartedly into the mission field, and by his enthusiasm and devotion carried all before him. He was, above all, an adventurous pioneer. The unremitting toil of monotonous years of labour and self-sacrifice on the same island had no appeal to him. He gave himself whole-heartedly, but impatiently. After a few months at Raiatea, he cried out, "I cannot content

myself within the narrow limits of a single reef." Unable to prosecute his plans in fresh islands for lack of means of transport when he was at Rarotonga, he turned his carpentering skill to account, and constructed a ship with the help of another missionary and the natives. It was in this ship, the "Messenger of Peace,"⁽¹⁾ a vessel of some⁶⁰ tons, rigged with native rope and native mats for sails, that he ventured across 1800 miles of ocean to Tonga and the Navigator Islands.

He was amply rewarded, in Samoa, by a very favourable reception. The Samoans, reputed to be so ferocious, received him with every courtesy. This, one writer suggests,⁽²⁾ was due to the lucky chance that Williams had with him an exiled Samoan, who created a favourable impression by his knowledge of the correct language used to chiefs. "John Williams," he says, "apparently, was the first white man ever to approach Samoans with a qualified talking man - and as a consequence, the first ever to appear among them in a manner befitting the great according to their ideas of decorum."⁽³⁾ Williams attributes his success

(1) The Wesleyans were established at Tongataboo.

(2) Rowe. "Samoa Under the Sailing Gods." p. 42.

(3) Ibid.

to the advantageous moment of his arrival shortly after the death of a particularly powerful and wicked chief, and before anyone had arisen to take his place - a clear example of Divine providence - Williams is frank in his account of the impression made by his material possessions upon the natives. The Samoan, whom Williams had brought back, asked permission to speak to the people from the boat first. "Can the religion of these 'papalangis' be anything but wise and good," he said, "Let us look at them and then look at ourselves; their heads are covered while ours are exposed to the heat of the sun and the wet of the rain; their bodies are clothed all over with beautiful cloth, while we have nothing but a bandage of leaves around our waists: they have clothes upon their very feet, while ours are like dogs, and then look at their axes, their scissors, and their other property; how rich they are." "They all," adds Williams, "appeared to understand and appreciate this reasoning, and gazed on us with interest and surprise."⁽¹⁾

Williams asked to be allowed to leave Rarotongan teachers in safety. On his return a year later he was

(1) Williams, J. op. cit. Chap. XIX.

begged at every point at which he touched to leave teachers. So promising was Samoa, and so anxious did the natives seem for further instruction, that the London Missionary Society decided to send out a party of six missionaries to the Navigator Islands. Accordingly in 1835 two missionaries, Messrs. Wilson and Platt, prepared the way for the newcomers on the islands. The new arrivals were stationed two on Upolu, two on Savaii and two on Tutuila. The numbers were increased in 1839 to eleven, and in 1842 to fifteen. Ellis (1) estimated 40,000 Christians out of a population of 60,000 in 1844. This is almost certainly an exaggeration (2) but it is, none the less, indicative of the rapid spread of Christianity.

Samoa, thus, in a few years sprang to importance in missionary circles. In 1837, when John Williams returned from a visit to England, he envisaged the Navigator Islands as the ideal centre from which to attack the problem of Christianizing the Western Pacific and particularly Melanesia. It was, indeed, in an excellent position for this object. Samoa lies north of Tonga and Fiji and south of the Ellice and Gilbert groups. To the east were the partially converted

(1) Ellis. "History of the L.M.S." 1844. p. 299.

(2) Murray. "Missions in Western Polynesia". 1863.

He gives numbers of Church members as only 4,200 and candidates 3,245. Undoubtedly the work received a setback after the outbreak of war in 1847. All the same he declared that heathenism no longer existed in Samoa. p. 456.

groups of the Society, Leeward, Hervey, and Marquesas Islands and others; and to the west lay the as yet unattempted islands of Melanesia, among them the New Hebrides, the Solomans, New Britain and New Guinea. It was to Samoa, therefore, that Williams returned, and it was from thence he left on his fatal missionary journey in 1839 to the New Hebrides where he was killed and eaten (Erromanga 1839). Later, missionaries were sent out on tours, and between 1839 and 1862 there were no less than fifteen of these missionary voyages ⁽¹⁾ to the wilder islands. The task was hard and severely handicapped by the subversive influence of traders, who often undid the work of missionaries by their brutal treatment of natives.

Two other factors contributed to the selection of Samoa as a missionary centre. The conversion of Samoa had presented no obstacles in its early days. The natives, as Williams says, drank in the words of the missionary "with outstretched necks and gaping mouths." ⁽²⁾ They welcomed teachers and treated them well. In the second place, Samoa grew in importance as Tahiti came under Catholic

(1) Murray. "Missions in W. Polynesia." Appendix.

(2) Williams. op. cit. Chap. XIX.

influence and French protection. The ex-Consul Pritchard, cast without even bag and baggage upon the mercy of the British Foreign Office, was appointed as Consul to Samoa. As the seat of a consulate the islands were before ^{the} notice of the Foreign Office and men-of-war were commissioned to visit the islands from time to time.

Though during the first ten years the spread of Christianity was rapid, it was for that very reason somewhat superficial.. The Revival Meetings at Tutuila were accompanied by the wailing of sinners and interrupted by converts fainting with emotion. ⁽¹⁾ Such hysterical fervour could not, and did not, last. The real meaning of much of the teaching was often lost on the natives. An outbreak of war in 1847 occasioned the profound disappointment of many missionaries, though they confessed that it would winnow the chaff from the hay. ⁽²⁾ Pritchard, the son of the Missionary-Consul of Tahiti, throws light on the nature of their Christianity. The natives stopped war on the Saturday, that they might forage and cook food on that

(1) (Lundie. "Missionary-life in Samoa."
(Murray. "Forty Years' Mission Work in Polynesia."

(2) Murray. "Missions in W. Polynesia." p. 454.

day and leave the Sabbath to be a day of rest from secular work. ⁽¹⁾ But the same natives entered Apia harbour in eighteen great war canoes. "On the bow of each canoe was a warrior, whose blackened face and oiled body glistened in the morning sun, shouting vociferously and whirling his club over his head ... At his feet lay the head of a man he had slain ... The canoes moved slowly round the harbour, to display their bleeding trophies...." ⁽²⁾ All the same, many became true and self-sacrificing Christians, and it was the native Samoan teachers who converted the Ellice and Gilbert Islands and Savage Island. The Missionary College at Malua, founded in 1844, trained native teachers and pastors for work in Samoa and the other islands. In time of war the College pursued its peaceful life unmolested and unreduced in numbers, and to this day it is a flourishing and beneficial institution. Its success is partly due to the fact that, situated in Samoa as it is, the training of native teachers involves no removal to foreign climates and foreign condition - one of the great disadvantages of Bishop Selwyn's College in Auckland, New Zealand, which was established in connection

(1) (Pritchard, W. "Polynesian Reminiscences." p. 63
(2) (Ibid. p. 51.

with the Melanesian Mission.

There is of necessity much that one can nowadays criticise in the light of nearly a century of experience. The benefits of civilization, clothes, bonnets, plaster-houses, have been proved unhygienic, or else merely ludicrous and ugly. We may prefer the untutored charm of savage custom, in seeing it distilled, as it is now, by many years of enforced law and order. Yet no one would deny the brutality of many customs existing before the advent of the white man, and in their destruction the bloom of naive simplicity has been rubbed off. The blame for this does not attach to the missionaries. The harsh contact with white men had already begun. Rather do they deserve unstinted thanks for preserving the native races from annihilation. It was they who pleaded the cause of the native race, who acted as intermediaries, who saved natives from being duped by traders. The protection and welfare of the native races was an entirely new idea arising from the same movement that sent missionaries abroad. An acknowledgment of the work was made by the Select Committee of 1837 commissioned to report upon aboriginal tribes. The Committee numbered among them at least two distinguished statesmen, W.E. Gladstone and Sir George Grey. ⁽¹⁾ Their

(1) The Colonial Governor appt. to N.S.W., N.Z. and Cape Colony - later Prime Minister of N.Z.

report upon the effects of European contact with aboriginals was universally damning of all except missionaries. "It is not too much to say, that the intercourse of Europeans in general, without any exception in favour of the subjects of Great Britain, has been, unless when attended by missionary exertions, a source of many calamities to uncivilized nations. Too often their territory has been usurped, property seized - - and the spread of civilization impeded." ⁽¹⁾ Renegade sailors and escaped convicts also terrorized native communities and the Committee reports of these in Samoa. "Our hearts bleed for the poor Samoa people. They are a very mild, inoffensive race, very easy of access." ⁽²⁾ The Committee further pointed out that the root of the trouble was the control of the British subject in these distant seas. "British merchants, seamen, convicts, etc., are able to commit crimes with impunity in the South Sea Islands because we regard them as foreign states." ⁽³⁾ This problem of the control of British subjects was to be troublesome for many years to come. The impotence of the natives to protect themselves was a temptation

(1) Aborigines Report 1837. p. 3.

(2) Ibid. p. 27.

(3) Ibid. p. 128.

to the trader to exploit, to the powers to annex. The Report foreshadows this problem. "Great Britain will not, it is to be ~~hoped~~, ever exert her power to destroy the political rights of these comparatively feeble and defenceless people: yet it cannot be denied that their national independence cannot be consulted without some immediate injury to their social welfare."⁽¹⁾ In this endeavour to preserve the natives, and the autonomy of native states, the missionary was acknowledged to be the best supporter. "To protect, assist, and countenance these gratuitous and invaluable agents is amongst the most urgent duties of the Governors of our Colonies."⁽²⁾ That this was realized by some, at least, of them, is shown by the advice of Normanby to Hobson on his departure to New Zealand in 1839, "to afford them the utmost encouragement, protection and support, and to give them pecuniary aid."⁽³⁾

Yet besides the negative work of mitigating the evil affects of others, missionaries' work had the positive and acknowledged effect of stimulating trade. Many of the

(1) Ibid.

(2) Ibid. p. 121.

(3) Normanby to Hobson 14th Aug. '39. quoted by Young, W.A. "Christianity and Civilization in the South Pacific." p. 26.

missionaries were themselves artisans. Of the thirty that left in 1797 only four were ordained clergymen. They hoped to teach the use of European implements and they encouraged natives to prepare the products of their islands⁽¹⁾ for traders. The stimulation of trade was a recognized and lauded by-product of their work, though it was clearly only a by-product. When Williams in 1837 wished to raise money for the purchase of a missionary vessel to take the place of his romantic island-made craft, it was to the city he turned. He applied to the Honourable the Court of Common Council of the City of London, and, "so convincing was his statement of the advantages of missionary labour to British commerce, (on which ground only the Common Council could in their corporate capacity entertain such an application) that the grant was made with scarcely a dissentient voice."⁽²⁾

The mission stations alone insured a small but steady market, but the natives soon hastened to demand the strange new goods. "Demand for British Hardware!" so runs a paragraph in the Missionary Magazine, "The Gospel not only supplies the means of spiritual renovation, and opens the way to eternal happiness, but is likewise eminently favourable to the cause of social

(1) e.g. coconut oil. See infra. Chap. 3.

(2) Missionary Magazine 1838. March. p. 66.

improvement . . . numbers of natives display uncommon
eagerness to obtain articles of British manufacture." (1)
Besides teaching crafts the missionaries zealously determined
to clothe them in the respectable garments of the English
middle classes, and among the prime articles of import (until
about 1870) were cotton prints; (2) shirts and trousers, shoes
and stockings, and, particularly popular - umbrellas. Bonnets,
astonishing parodies of early nineteenth century feminine
headgear, were usually manufactured of island materials, (3)
and were, and are to this day, the Churchgoers' substitute
for the gay garlands of flowers that clothe the head on
weekdays. Indeed, the wearing of clothes and bonnets, (4)
the building of plaster houses (5) were regarded as visible
signs of grace - though in Samoa missionaries were less
successful than in other islands in implanting foreign ways.
An idea, however, of the joy and pride with which natives
adopted European clothing, may be had from an account by
Wilkes in 1839 of an influential Samoan lady going to Church.

(1) Missionary Magazine 1840. Feb.

(2) In 1851 the demand for cotton cloth was reckoned at
80 to 100,000 yds. per annum.

(3) An example, in Tortoiseshell, is to be seen in the
British Museum.

(4) Williams. This is clear all through his book.

(5) Wilkes. "Narrative of the U.S. Exploring Expedition."
Vol. 2. p. 85.

"She endeavoured to display on her person the greater part, if not all, that she had thus acquired. These consisted of a red calico gown, four or five petticoats of different colours, woollen socks, green slippers, cap and bonnet, a large plaid blanket shawl, and a pair of polar gloves, the whole surmounted by a flaming red silk umbrella, and this with a thermometer of 87°!"

The harmless trade in hardware and prints was in course of time supplemented by less scrupulous people by spirits and gunpowder - more will be said in a later chapter of the growth of import and export trade. Here it is enough to point out the part of the missionary in creating a market. His teaching was such to inspire and promote industry and application to crafts and husbandry, a lesson very distasteful to the indolent islanders. The ideal of labour, and of private property was strongly put to the communistic native. To eradicate his communism, partially the cause of his idleness, was a task that faced missionaries down to the present day. Undoubtedly this division of property is partly at the root of the laziness of these people. The attraction of an income vanishes when it ceases to be private, and as late as 1891 R.L. Stevenson tells of his servant girl, who was bereft of

her respectable serving garments every time she went to visit her communistic relatives. (1) In such a state of society the eventual plan was for those who wanted produce, to produce it themselves by buying land and importing labour. Even in the first plantations the missionaries set an example, (2) that of the Malua Institute.

Consequent upon missionary work was the anglicising of the islands. Though innocent of, and often opposed to, plans of annexation, their work and teaching predisposed the natives to favour English people and English ways. The natives learnt to speak English, wear English clothes and imitate English customs and habits. They were told much about Queen Victoria and her wise rule, and of British justice and judicial procedure. (3) The missionaries came primarily (4) as Christians, but they were also enthusiastic Britons. They reflected the optimism and self-assurance of the middle class England of the time. English civilization was to them altogether desirable. They could do no better than build another England in the South Seas. It is hardly to be

(1) Stevenson, R.L. "A Footnote to History."

(2) The students worked on the plantation for their food not for producing articles for export.

(3) In Tahiti a system of trial by jury was introduced.

(4) See Young. op. cit. "They came, not as Christian British but as British Christians."

wondered that the Samoans, throughout the Century looked to England and Englishmen for aid.

Williams ends his narrative of missionary enterprise with an appeal not only to the Christian but also to the philosopher ⁽¹⁾ and statesman. "Apart entirely from the value of Christianity," he says, "no enlightened statesman can regard labours which secure such results ... with indifference, new havens are found in the Antipodes for our fleets, new channels are opened for our commerce, and the friends of our country are everywhere multiplied." ⁽²⁾

It was, therefore, through the missionaries that Samoa became known to English people; and when the ex-Consul Pritchard was expelled from Tahiti, it was to Samoa that he was commissioned.

(1) Natural philosopher or scientist.

(2) Williams. op. cit. Chap XXXII.

CHAPTER II.

The Origins of British Official Interest in the Navigator Islands (1845-55) and the French Menace 1846-1862.

The decision of the Foreign Office to make the Navigator Islands the seat of a new consulate ⁽¹⁾ was very natural. The growing communication of the Australasian colonies with the Pacific Islands made it desirable that there should be a consul in the vicinity of the colonies - Tonga and Fiji, both nearer, were still too wild. Their inhabitants were still cannibals, whereas the Navigators were by 1844 apparently well under Christian influence. In 1842 Walpole, the Consul at Chile, wrote to Aberdeen suggesting "the Samoan isles as a spot well adapted as an establishment ⁽²⁾ for the refreshment and refitment of British vessels." A later correspondent emphasises their fertility, implying that they might become important on that account in the future. ⁽³⁾ "The Navigator Islands are not much more extensive, but far superior to the Society Islands. The land is fertile

(1) 1824. A consul appt. for Sandwich Islands, 1822
Consul. for Society Islands.

(2) F.O. Chile 16/47 Walpole to Aberdeen 22nd Aug. '42.

(3) F.O. 58/26 (Pac. Islands) Consul Miller to Aberdeen
(No. 45) 22nd Aug. '44. Encl. 1. Capt. Darnet
to Miller.

to the tops of the mountains, and will produce any quantity of sugar, coffee, spice, arrowroot, coconut oil, and all tropical products and plants. With European capital and labour they would become very important. The natives are peaceable and governed by various chiefs. They are favourable situated for trade with the Colonies of New South Wales and New Zealand, and lie almost in the direct line for the Sandwich Islands." And he continues by recommending the establishment of a respectable resident there.

From the beginning Pritchard found his task by no means easy. The country seemed wild and the Samoans barbarous in contrast with his friends, the Tahitians. His landing was inauspicious. The Captain of the Warship in which he arrived put him on shore, fired a salute of guns and sailed away without making any attempt to explain his office to the Samoans or to introduce him to the chiefs, and so facilitating his task. He was mortified by not being able to buy a house or land, and his horses were stolen by the Samoans. Only the kindness of Mr. J. Williams⁽¹⁾ in

(1) Son of the Missionary. Commodore Wilkes of the U.S. Exploring Expedition had appointed him U.S. Consul.

inviting him to his own house, saved him from being homeless.

The islands were during these years attracting a greater number of ships and Europeans. The mixed, shifting "beach" (or "beachcombers") of Pacific Islands was appearing. With such a community growing up, there arose the likelihood of disputes between Europeans, or between natives and Europeans. Though the consul was in an official position to look after the interests of British people, he was powerless to redress wrongs or demand reparation for outrages upon British people. Serious affairs had to wait until the captain of a visiting man-of-war could hold an inquiry and enforce compensation. It was difficult to find who was the criminal, and to persuade the natives to deliver him up for judgment or punishment. On occasion, a whole village was burnt before the offender was handed over.

The guiding principle in such cases was certainly admonitory rather than punitive. The visits of warships were rare, and the Captains were often given to conciliatory methods of dealing with natives. This was bitterly deplored by Pritchard. "When the American squadron were here," he writes to Palmerston (1847), "they burnt down a whole village." The French demanded pigs and mats as atonement for a robbing

whereas the British were by their leniency a laughing stock. (1)

The need for regular visits of warships to those islands where British people were stationed, was gradually borne home to the government. Pritchard's letters alone are constant in their appeals for visits at regular intervals. Within two months of his landing Pritchard wrote to the Earl of Aberdeen emphasising the importance of the occasional visits of a British man-of-war. (2) A note was made of this, and there the matter rested. Again in October and December his dispatches bear a similar strain. In 1851 Pritchard received a crushing reply. (3) "From this paper you will observe," wrote the Under-Secretary for Palmerston, "that the Navigator Islands have lately been more frequently visited by H.M. ships than any of the other groups in the Pacific, and I have to observe that the naval establishment of the British Empire is not sufficiently large to enable the Admiralty to place a ship of war at the disposal of each of H.M. Consuls in distant stations . . . The intervention of

(1) F.O. Pac. Isl. 58/67. Pritchard to Palmerston - 17th April '47. The F.O. reply commended the behaviour of the naval Capt. as an example to Pritchard.

(2) F.O. 58/38. Pritchard to Aberdeen. (no. 6) 8th Sept. '45.

(3) F.O. 58/71. Palmerston to Pritchard. 9th July '51.

a ship of war must be reserved as an extreme and last remedy." Nevertheless, Pritchard continued to urge the need with commendable insistence. Again in 1853 and '55 he presses his point. In the meantime with the development of trans-Pacific trade, the islands were becoming more important. In 1858 a British Consul for Fiji was appointed, and in 1859 one for Tonga. The rapid increase of communications and trade involved the need of a regular oversight of British interests. From 1858 a man-of-war was sent annually on a cruise round the islands.

The problem was not, however, so easily solved. In the early days the naval officer acted as judge, whose verdict was taken, and who could punish with impunity according to his judgment. With increased trade, disorders arose among mixed Europeans and natives. Not only did it become increasingly hard to control natives, half emancipated from their barbarous law and order, but British Justice could only be administered to British ⁽¹⁾ subjects. Consequently other Europeans behaved as they wished. From the comparatively simple situation which required only dealing with natives who had wronged British missionaries or traders, sprang a

(1) and, of course, to natives who had outraged British subjects.

chaotic condition of ~~the~~ lawlessness of which the protection of British subjects was only a small part. So by the time the visits of warships were assured, they were already insufficient. Of the ultimate arrangements which brought foreigners under a regular system of law and justice, there is more in a later chapter. ⁽¹⁾

Though Pritchard urged the visits of warships, it was only as an immediate measure of expediency. Ultimately he and other of H.B.M's servants in the Pacific hoped for the annexation of Samoa by Great Britain. Two points of view are given; the one setting forth the supposed advantages to Great Britain, the other considering primarily the islanders. ⁽²⁾ Grounds for the first point of view were the fertility of the islands, the ease with which they could be seized, the desirability of anticipating French action. Grounds for the second ⁽³⁾ were, that ultimately the islands would have to be annexed by some European Power. It was, therefore desirable that annexation should come before disorders should become too serious.

(1) Chap. 7. The Establishment of the Municipality of Apia. This controlled foreigners who had had no consular jurisdiction. i.e. all except British, German and American.

(2) That of Pritchard.

(3) That of Mr. Charles St. Julian, Consul at Hawaii.

Annexation was urged by Pritchard during his first year. Previous to his arrival in Samoa the chiefs of Tutuila had appealed to Great Britain for protection. This was partly a repercussion of the Tahiti affair, and probably due to missionary influence. For example, the missionary on Tutuila, Mr. Murray, wrote in 1844 that "the French are acting in a most outrageous manner at Tahiti, and it is said to be their full intention to seize these islands (Navigators) when they have sufficiently secured themselves there. They claim the Samoan group by right of discovery, and England, it is said, has refused to interfere. So, unless God graciously interpose, we have nothing between us and French oppression and tyranny. A fiery trial is doubtless coming upon us." (1) Or again, "Can we refrain from again repeating the cry to Britain! Wilt thou suffer the boar out of the wood to trample down this vineyard? Wilt thou suffer the precious of thy countrymen to be chased as partridges on the mountains? Shall we, as a nation, fall under the just judgment of an offended God, because our rulers shut their ears against the cry of the bleeding flock of Christ, and close their eyes against the

(1) Lundie. "Missionary Life on Samoa." p. 280.

desolating encroachments of the French Anti-Christ?" (1)

It is not surprising, with such violent protagonists of British interference amongst them, that the chiefs should appeal to Great Britain. This also illustrates the change in missionary opinion, from supporting autonomous kingdoms to advocating British protection. (2) Yet it was not that they wanted annexation in itself, they wanted Great Britain to prevent other powers from establishing themselves on the Navigators. "They desired," as one writer has aptly put it, "to establish native kingdoms under missionary influence, behind the shield of British protection." (3)

Her Majesty's Government in their reply to the chiefs (1845) showed no desire to extend their protection any further than was absolutely necessary. "Her Majesty's Government" wrote Aberdeen to Pritchard, "do not think it advisable or politic to accept this offer of cession by the chiefs of Tutuila." All the same no other power should exercise a greater degree of influence than that possessed by Great Britain. "It is unnecessary to add" he continued, "that Her Majesty's Government would not view with indifference

(1) Ibid.

(2) See Chap. 1. p. 25.

(3) Cambridge History of the British Empire.
"The Pacific." Vol.

the assumption by another power of a Protectorate which they, with a regard for the true interests of the natives, have already refused."⁽¹⁾

At the end of some five months in office Pritchard described outrages and the lawlessness of the islands. "It is in the opinion of many," he wrote, "that the only way in which an alteration for the better can be effected, is for some foreign power to take possession, and place over them a Governor with equitable laws. This might be accomplished with perfect ease, for the natives are so divided among themselves that they would not unite in opposing any power that might come to take possession."⁽²⁾

The matter was not considered. Great Britain had enough to concern herself with in her colonies to wish for more. Though at the very time Grey⁽³⁾ was dreaming of a new British Oceana with New Zealand at its heart, yet these were the ideals of a visionary not of the practical opportunist at the Foreign Office table. The dispatches to Pritchard, epitomize the British attitude. Britain did not wish to

(1) F.O. 58/27. Aberdeen to Pritchard (no. 2) 15th Jan. '45

(2) F.O. 58/38. Pritchard to Aberdeen (no. 9) 31st Dec. '45

(3) Sir George Grey, Governor of New Zealand 1845-53.
See chap. 4 infra. for his ideas.

interfere, nor would she suffer gladly any other Power to do so.

After seven years in the Group, Pritchard evolved an annexation scheme, elaborated to tickle the appetite of the Home Government for further acquisitions. ⁽¹⁾ It smacks somewhat of Edward Gibbon Wakefield. Settlers should be tempted out and sold land at the cheap rate of a dollar an acre. Natives should retain "as much land as they are likely to cultivate" which, with his knowledge of easygoing natives, must have been jotted in a mental reservation as a very small area. Natives should pay taxes at the rate of one gallon of coconut oil per head, for children under fifteen, two gallons per head for all over fifteen. A "respectable chief" was to be deputy-governor in each district and a few laws, plain and simple, should be enacted." A governor, a band of some hundred soldiers, a police force of mixed natives and foreigners, an extensive and lucrative production of tropical products would assure the government security and prosperity of the proposed colony.

Alas for Pritchard! Malmesbury merely poured cold water on his schemes for territorial aggrandizement. "I have

(1) F.O. 58/74. Pritchard to Malmesbury. 1st Jan. 1852.

heard of him" a minute reads, "as a busy, active, meddling man, and he will be doing something on his own account if you don't stop him."⁽¹⁾

A more considered memorandum by the Hawaiian Commissioner and Consul-General, Mr. Charles St. Julian,⁽²⁾ was forwarded to the Foreign Office by Governor Denison at Sydney (1855). St. Julian depicted the spasms that would convulse Samoa unless the Great Powers realized the very real problems that were arising, and attacked them before they should become acute. "The time is at hand" he wrote, "when it will be necessary to decide, promptly and finally upon the course of policy to be pursued. There are three alternatives for the Home Government." (a) 'To assume or rather accept an actual protective sovereignty over the archipelago;' or (b) 'to aid in the construction and maintenance of an independent national government;' or (c) 'by leaving Samoa without aid of any description, to permit that splendid archipelago to become a dependency of another power.'" He continued by explaining that it would be impossible to expect natives "without aid from without to maintain an independent existence."

(1). F.O. 58/74. Minute 27th July '52. Pritchard to Malmesbury

(2) F.O. 58/82. St. Julian to Denison. 10th May '55.

But that "by the influence of the great maritime powers . . . especially Great Britain, the native chieftains might be induced to combine for the construction of a government among themselves. But such a government, when constructed, would have to be supported by the same influence which called it into existence, or it would not long endure. And while it did endure it would exist only in name, and would be powerless for good" - a fair description of Malieton Laupepa's Government-on-sufferance of 1881-4.⁽¹⁾ In Note VIII. of his memorandum, St. Julian emphasised the growing strategic importance of the islands, the result of mid-century developments in trans-Pacific trade and communications.⁽²⁾

During the first three decades of the 19th Century the British had a virtual monopoly of the S. Pacific. Had they wished they could have claimed the whole island world. This was very naturally undesirable, but the absence of rivals left Great Britain supreme, and later the advent of other powers was regarded by British subjects in the Pacific (e.g. missionaries) as an intrusion. The British monopoly was

(1) See Chap. 7.

(2) See Chap. 4.

broken into, first by the French, and then by the appearance of Germans and Americans. Of the growth of German and American interests in Samoa, there is more in a later chapter. (1)

The French influence in Samoa was only that of the Roman Catholic priests and was not political. For a time, however, (1845-62) the British Consuls considered that there was a danger of French intrusion into island affairs, and for this reason the extent of French interests deserves consideration.

The French Roman Catholic Missionary Association of Picpus was founded at Paris in 1814, that of the Marists in 1817. (2) In 1826 an apostolic prefect of the Sandwich Islands was appointed. It was, however, in the 4th decade of the Century that the activities of French Missions became marked. In 1834 missionaries were placed on the Gambier Islands. In 1836 the first attempt to gain admission for Roman Catholic priests on Tahiti was made. In 1837, Wallis Island, 250 miles west of Samoa was missionized and here a Roman Catholic seminary was founded. Wallis Island was, in fact, destined

(1) Chap. 3 and 5.

(2) The priests of Picpus Society worked in Tahiti.
The Roman Catholic priests in Samoa were Marists.

to become a Roman Catholic centre as Samoa had become a Protestant one. In 1838 priests made their way to the Marquesas and New Zealand. It was not until 1845 that Marist priests landed in Samoa. By that time their potent influence upon other islands was so well known that their appearance caused the utmost alarm among the English residents, and those under their influence.

The proceedings of the Roman Catholic missionaries were not confined to the conversion of souls. Traders and priests went hand in hand. "It seems," so reads an article in the Samoan Reporter of 1846, "It seems a strange mongrel affair for his Holiness the Pope to be engaged in the buying of oil and in disposing of powder and shot." ⁽¹⁾ Pritchard wrote to the Foreign Office (1846) that the Society of the Virgin Mary was formed "for the purpose of supplying the whole of Polynesia with merchandise at a little more than cost prices in France, and to render facilities for opposing the Protestant Missions, by placing amongst them Roman Catholic priests, and by these cheap goods to win over to the Roman Catholic faith, all the isles of the Pacific." ⁽²⁾

(1) Samoan Reporter. 16th Nov. '46.

(2) F.O. 58/45. Pritchard to Palmerston. 16th Nov. '46.

He feared that the influence would be "very detrimental to British commerce in this part of the world."

The association of the extension of the Catholic faith and the extension of French interests was, from the outset, in people's minds. The action of French warships in enforcing the entry of priests into Tahiti and of imposing the protectorate of 1842, was due cause for alarm and suspicion, and it defined the Protestant missionary's attitude. Although missionaries retaliated bitterly to French activity, the French can only deserve criticism for pursuing their activities in those parts where missions had already been established. The general indignation over the treatment of Queen Pomare and the British missionary-consul was such that Aberdeen instructed Cowley to inquire into the intentions of the French in the Pacific. "Public feeling in England," he wrote, "having been deeply wounded by the French proceedings in Tahiti, might be again intensely excited by any further operations of the French in the immediate vicinity of the islands, where our missionaries are successfully using their utmost exertions to bring the inhabitants within the pale of Christianity and civilization." ⁽¹⁾ Guizot, however, assured Lord Cowley that

(1) F.O. France 27/690. Aberdeen to Cowley 1844.
(quoted by J. Brooks. Anglo French Rivalry
1815-61. p. 170.)

the French "have not the slightest intention of interfering in any manner with those islands (Navigators) or with the missionaries therein established."⁽¹⁾ The French government announced their intention of annexing the Gambier Islands, which had been under Roman Catholic influence for some time and where the Bishop resided, but they declared that they had no designs for the annexation of Wallis Island - an action which might cause alarm in Samoa.⁽²⁾ All the same, in September of the same year, 1846, two Roman Catholic priests were landed at Samoa and "mass was said, accompanied with the firing of cannon, kissing of images and many other Popish ceremonies."⁽³⁾ This was, of course, constructed as a first step in French machinations toward aggrandizement. In Samoa, however, Catholic activities were not political.

In the succeeding years Pritchard wrote with alarm of the visits of French warships. "If we have not an equal force out here" (to that of the French), "I am fully persuaded that all the principal groups of islands in the Pacific will,

(1) F.O. Pac. Isl. 58/38. Aberdeen to Pritchard.
(no. 3) 15th Jan. '45.

(2) Ibid. Wallis Island was officially annexed by France in 1887.

(3) Samoan Reporter. Sept. 1846.

ere long, be in the hands of the French, which may prove a most serious affair for our British Colonies, etc." ⁽¹⁾ It must be remembered, though, that Pritchard had every reason to be violently suspicious of the French, and his interpretation of their visits was inevitably coloured by his vivid memory of their treatment of the Tahitian Kingdom, even if his judgment was not impaired by a deep mortification and personal loss, resulting from his rough imprisonment and deportation.

Again in 1846 he indicated a French menace, feared, so he stated, by the natives. He added the sting that the chiefs believed that the British would not be able to give protection if the French interfered. ⁽²⁾ In November of the same year he described the arrival of two French ships, "laden with priests, merchants and merchandise." ⁽³⁾ In 1847 he wrote that "many of the natives are fearing this (French aggression) and are wishing they were under the protection of the English. If H.M. Government should be

(1) F.O. 58/38. Pritchard to Aberdeen (no. 8) 11th Oct.'45.

(2) F.O. 58/45. " " " (no. 1) 28th May.'46.

(3) F.O. 58/45. " " Palmerston. 16th Nov.'46.

disposed to do anything with these islands, they must act promptly or it will be too late." (1)

In July 1847 rumours of French intentions on New Caledonia caused some alarm, (2) but when the annexation actually took place in 1853, there was no hint of the extension of French interests to Samoa. (3) The last hint of French designs on Samoa is in a report by Williams of a rumour in May 1862 that the French intended to take Samoa. Nothing, however, shows that this was more than rumour. In the succeeding discussions on the Samoa question France took no part. (4)

In 1855 then, British interests in the islands were greater than those of any other power. (5) The missionaries, by their influence had induced a general regard among the natives

(1) F.O. 58/57 Pritchard to Palmerston. 17th April '47.

(2) F.O. 58/57 " " " 30th July '47.

(3) Commodore Erskine in "A Cruise Among the Islands" in 1853 writes of this in Tonga, and adds that "this apprehension of foreign occupations has been very general among the Polynesian islands since the establishment of the French at Tahiti." p. 133.

(4) The only exception was in 1880 - see Chap. 7.

(5) The Americans had a consul, but otherwise they had practically no interests.

for England, English customs and civilization. The presence of a British consul kept the Foreign Office in touch with the British and foreign commercial developments on the islands, with native affairs, and with any actions of foreign powers that might be construed as political or aggressive.

At the same time the British government were clearly averse to annexation, and were unwilling to extend their influence by the visits of warships or any other means. Yet they were also desirous of preserving natives and native rights. The reference to the "regard for the true interests of the natives"⁽¹⁾ may be construed as a piece of Victorian hypocrisy, veiling an unwillingness to incur responsibilities or to allow other powers to reap benefits. In practice, however, leniency towards natives was applauded at a time when every other nation used force. This attitude, only faintly outlined during these years 1845-55, is indicative of the British standpoint in the decades that followed.

Before 1855 there was indeed little incentive to annex the Samoan Islands. They were remote in the Pacific until trans-Pacific communications developed. As yet their productive resources were unexploited. It was the developments of the years 1855-79 that enhanced the value of Samoa and made the group important in Pacific affairs.

(1) p. 49.

CHAPTER III.

The Origins of German Interests.

(i) The Copra Trade.

It has been shown that until 1855 the commercial value of the islands lay in the supplying of articles of European manufacture to missionaries and to natives under missionary influence. Payment was made in supplying pigs and fruit and also a little pearl and tortoiseshell. As the natives came under missionary influence there was added to these coconut oil, the production of which was encouraged by missionaries who taught them to construct presses for the purpose.

Further commercial developments during the Century arose from two things: first, the increased demand for oil in European markets for the manufacture of candles and soap; and secondly, the readiness and efficiency of the Hamburg merchants, Godeffroy and Son, in availing themselves of this to build up a far-reaching organization for the satisfaction of this demand. Moreover, Samoa became the centre of their activity.

As the copra and oil trade was essentially dependent upon the demand for oil in Europe, it is well to examine the antecedents of that demand. Until the early 19th Century the chief house illuminants were either wax or tallow candles, the wax dear, the tallow unpleasant. With the rapid increase in the population, and the rise in England, and later all over Europe, of a prosperous middle class, there arose also a demand for candles. Improved methods of illumination caused an increasing tendency to exploit the hours of night, and vice versa the spread of this habit led to a demand for illuminants.

Until the experiments ⁽¹⁾ of Chevreul had led the way in splitting up the constituents of fat, both candles and soap were made from tallow. Chevreul's discoveries made possible the employment of other fats. Spermacetti, ^{it} was found ^{could} ~~to~~ be used for candles, and the Pacific sperm whaling industries profited. Continued researches threw on the market another Pacific product. In 1829 a certain J. Soames took out a patent (no. 5842) for separating coconut oil into solid and liquid constituents. In 1840 coconut oil was used

(1) (1811-1823) see Encycl. Brit. article Chevreul, Soap, Oil.

(1)
for soap, and in the course of the next decade Price and Field, prominent candle manufacturers to this day, introduced it into their candle manufacture. The demand for it rose rapidly - Ellis, a missionary in Tahiti, wrote in 1831 that oil had recently become an article of exportation, "although the value is so small as to afford but little encouragement to its extended manufacture."⁽²⁾ Within twenty years its price was to rise to £12. a ton in the Pacific and £20. a ton in England - a value which amply repaid not only export but special cultivation. The trade was indeed foster-brother to the whaling industry, not ousting it, but with it helping to meet the needs of the new age. The islands, previously merely picturesque ports of call, now afforded wealth in a more tangible form, and the traders began to reap the fruits of the missionaries civilizing efforts, to which they had made no contribution.

In Samoa, the first export of coconut oil was by Williams, the son of the missionary, who in 1842 shipped 6 tons of oil.⁽³⁾ In 1859, 592 tons worth £14,000⁽⁴⁾ were exported.

(1) Patent R.L. Sturtwant. No. 9230.

(2) Ellis. "Polynesian Researches." Vol. 1. p. 57.

(3) Murray. "Missions in Western Polynesia." p. 466.

(4) P.P 1860. Vol. 65. c. 2753. Report on the Navigator Isls.

and in the year 1875 the copra export was valued at £121,360.⁽¹⁾

The profits of this extensive trade lay partly in the ease with which copra and oil could be produced, and partly in the ready markets for oil in Europe. The production of oil was in due course supplemented, and then superseded by copra (about 1868-1874).⁽²⁾ The pressing of oil was a laborious task for the idle Samoan. The simplest method of preparing oil, by drying the nut in the sun, and allowing the oil to run off, was wasteful. The presses invented by the missionaries were primitive. The transport of oil required barrels, not always easily obtained or manufactured on the islands. Besides the Samoans jibbed at any work that they could avoid - Copra could be much more easily prepared. The nut was opened, the flesh cut in small pieces, allowed to dry in the sun, and so was ready for export. In this form it was easily packed into sacks, and from it was not only oil obtained but the residual cake was found, in Germany, to be suitable for feeding cattle. Another product of the coconut palm, the fibre, found a market in Europe for making mats.

(1) P.P. 1876. Vol. 76. c. 1589. Report on the Navigator Isls. 15,170 tons worth \$606,800, oil 20 tons worth \$2,000.

(2) In 1875 oil was still being exported in small quantities.

In spite of the luxuriant growth of the palm on the coasts of all the tropical Pacific islands, certain disadvantages in its production became manifest to the copra and oil traders by about 1865. The first was the laziness of the natives. Even as late as 1890 the communistic principle of division prevailed. Two influences tended to undermine the ancient custom. The example and teaching of the missionaries separated the converts from their families, and they emulated their teachers' neat plastered houses and civilized garb. Christians, moreover, became the proud possessors of Bibles, books, paper, ink and clothes, all forms of private property contrary to communal custom. The other influence was that of warfare, which continued to distract the country until the end of the 19th Century. The Samoans learnt that the white man had one thing that he prized - firearms. In the wars of the late '70's they were even willing to part with their land to obtain guns and gunpowder. Spirituous liquor though imported, was not retailed on a large scale to natives. (1)

Another handicap to the growing coconut oil and copra trade, besides the unwillingness of the natives to work, was the reluctance of the natives of certain islands to part

(1) (P.P. 1873. Vol. 65. c.828. p. 923. Rep. of Consul Williams.
(P.P. 1880. Vol. 74. c.2577. Rep. of Consul Graves.

with their copra. In the Ellice and Gilbert Islands, for example, coconuts formed the staple food and drink of the natives. They preferred to let the surplus rot than to risk a famine.

These disadvantages led to the principal traders, the German firm of Godeffroy & Co., to embark upon the policy of buying land for plantations. The important effects of this step are dealt with later in the chapter in connection with the growth and organization of the Godeffroy firm in Samoa.

So much space has been devoted to copra as it was undoubtedly the most important product of Samoa. It was the demand for oils that had led to the enterprise of the Hamburg merchants to the South Seas - The cultivation of cotton was for a time a source of profit second only to copra. In 1859 Williams, the British Consul, reported that cotton grew luxuriantly.⁽¹⁾ During the American Civil War, which had important effects upon planting in Fiji, cotton was grown in Samoa. In 1864, when the demand for cotton was great, the first shipment was exported. In 1875, 150,000 lbs. to the value of \$227,000⁽²⁾ was shipped from Apia. Two varieties

(1) P.P. 1860. Vol. 65. (c. 2753.pp. 14-15.)

(2) P.P. 1876. Vol. 76. c. 1589.

were grown, the sea island cotton which was utilised in the silk factories in Alsace-Lorraine, and the kidney which was used in Saxony. (1) Cotton seed was also exported. From 1865 on cotton was planted on the German coconut plantations for the first seven years, to shelter the young palms. When these were full grown the cotton bushes were cut down, grass planted and cattle grazed. Ultimately the labour problem proved to be a bar to its successful cultivation. By 1895 it was no longer grown in German plantations. (2) The fact that no attempt was made to revive its culture may indicate that the islands were not altogether suited to it.

There were in the 1880's and 1890's, considerable and hopeful experiments in coffee, cocoa, and indiarubber. (3) In 1888 the U.S. Consul-General Sewall, reported that the Germans had 450 acres of coffee planted from which they obtained a crop of 90,000 lbs. (4) The outbreak of coffee

(1) Congress Records. Hse. Mis. Doc. Cons. Monthly Rep. 1881. No. 3. Vol. 2. 18th Sept. '80. Total export 1880 2,500,000 lbs.

(2) P.P. 1895. Vol. 101. c. 1587.

(3) Ibid.

(4) Congress Documents (Hse. Misc.) 50-1. Cons. Rep. No. 97 Vol. 27. 15th Aug. '88.
Coffee. Attempts to introduce coffee were made in 1863, 1879 and 1882. It was found to thrive on the upland plateau at a height of about 800 ft. above sea level.

disease in 1895, however, ruined this culture in succeeding years. Cocoa has since become a source of profit to the islands, and a little rubber is exported at the present day. (1) These later experiments, however, lie outside the period under consideration. As early as 1880, it was becoming clear that the first estimates of the fertility of the Group were exaggerated. (2) The failure of successive crops at a time of native disorders in the 1890's and a severe depression in the Australasian Colonies set the islands on a new standard of value. In the negotiations of 1899 the issue for Germany was one involving sentiment and national honour rather than national gain. (3)

(1) Handbook of Western Samoa.

(2) F.O. 244/341. Memo by Maudslay. 9th Nov. '81.

(3) Gooch and Temperley. British Documents on the Origin of the War. Vol. 1. Lascelles to Salisbury, 24th March '99.

COCONUT OIL £14,800

- Mother of Pearl v. £600
- Tortoise Shell v. £1,500
- Arrowroot. v £400.
- Old Copper v. £150.


EXPORTS FROM APIA

1859

COPRA val. £121,360



oil val. £400



EXPORTS FROM APIA.

1875

(ii) The Godeffroy firm.

The firm that sprang forward to seize the opportunity of supplying European markets with coconut oil, was the Hamburg firm of Godeffroy and Son. The only other trading concern of importance in the islands was also German - that of Ruge, Hedemann & Co., established in 1875, which was run on a very much smaller scale. Germans, consequently, were constantly bargaining with natives for copra, and buying their land, and later (after 1876) interfering in native affairs to secure peace and justice.

The Godeffroy agents were not by any means the first Germans to venture to the South Seas. From the beginning of the century Prussian whalers had hunted in Pacific waters, though it was the Hamburg merchants who built up in the Pacific, interests of a real and weighty character. In 1837 Hamburg vessels called at Sydney. They were the forerunners of many more, who yearly increased in numbers, and who absorbed a large proportion of the Pacific Islands trade. The first Hamburg merchant ship called at Apia in the Navigator Islands in 1847. Seven years later this port was chosen to be the centre for the trade of the Godeffroy firm.

The founders of the Godeffroy family were originally French refugees who settled in Hamburg, ⁽¹⁾ possibly at the end of the 17th Century. Their first enterprises to the South Seas were about the year 1845. Within the succeeding five years they had establishments in Valparaiso and in Cochin China. It was from Valparaiso that the first agents came to Polynesia. Tahitian traders had come to Valparaiso for flour, and the success of other traders in Tahiti (e.g. Hort Bros. and Brander) inspired the German firm to set up a rival establishment in the vicinity. The first station in the islands was in the Taumatu Archipelago, but the Navigator Islands offered so many more advantages that within a few years they moved thither. Apia became the centre of the firm's trade and the station on the Taumatu Islands was ⁽²⁾ abandoned in 1867.

August Unshelm, the Godeffroy agent, first landed ⁽³⁾ in Samoa at Apia in 1854. The advantageous position of the

(1) Kirchoff, Alfred. Die Sudsee Inseln und der deutsche Sudsee handel. p. 261. Frommel und Pfaff. Sammerlung von Vortragen 1880. Vol. 3.

(2) Stonehewer Cooper. "Coral Lands" Lond. 1880. p. 48.

(3) Trood. "Island Reminiscences." Brunson Fletcher "The New Pacific."
(N.B.) Various dates are given, Scholefield 1857, Zimmermann 1864, for the establishment of the Godeffroys in Apia. Trood himself records landing in 1857 and finding Unshelm had been established some three years.

islands could not fail to impress him. By 1857 the firm was established as the centre from which further trading exploits could emanate. Small vessels were commissioned to collect oil, and later copra, from the surrounding island groups, while bigger ships carried the valuable cargo from Apia to Europe.

The suitability of Samoa for such a depot need hardly be emphasised. Its position between the semi-civilized Polynesian and the unexploited Melanesian islands was admirable. The coral atolls⁽¹⁾ of the Ellice and Gilbert Islands, the Marshalls and the Carolines were within easy sailing distance for small vessels. The group itself was normally within at most a fortnight's sailing of Sydney or Auckland. It was about midway on the direct route between Valparaiso and Cochin China. Should the Central American canal, then a much discussed project, ever become a reality, it would facilitate direct communication with Europe. The natives were unusually docile. The islands were very fertile, and believed to be outside the hurricane track, though exceptional visits could be most devastating. There were two tolerable harbours on Upolu beside that of Apia, those of Saluafata and Falealili, and that of Pago-Pago was quite exceptionally good.

(1) Where coconut palms abounded.

In 1864 August Unshelm was drowned at sea. (1) By that time he had woven the outline threads of his web of Pacific trade. The firm was fortunate in having a remarkable man on the spot to consolidate and enlarge his work. In 1861, at the age of only twenty-three, Theodore Weber was sent to Apia as his assistant, with a commission as consul for Hamburg and the North German confederation. Himself a man of unbounded energy and tact, of foresight, enterprise and efficiency, he devoted his talents unceasingly to the work of building up Germany's commercial power in the South Seas. It is impossible to say how far his plans at the outset were for political aggrandizement, how far the commercial needs of his firm involved interference in native politics, and ultimately scheming to insure the establishment of some stable government. (2) Sterndale recounts that prior to 1870 Weber was preparing a scheme for the settlement and colonization of Germans in Samoa. Many more acres of the best land were bought than could immediately be planted. The higher plateau was to be colonized by Germans, the seacoast by Chinese who were to become indentured labourers. The elder Godeffroy,

(1) P.P. 1866. Vol. 69.

(2) Appendix to Journal of House of Representatives, N.Z. 1874. Vol. 1. Papers Relating to South Sea Islands. A.3. Memo by Sterndale. Also, Lowe. c. Prince Bismarck, 1887. pp.211-12.

who was a personal friend of Bismarck's was to enlist his sympathies. The "Hertha" was already commissioned to come out when the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian war involved the recall of the "Hertha", the blockade of Hamburg; and in the succeeding years the Godeffroy firm had too many encompassing difficulties to indulge in any far-reaching schemes. Certainly by 1872 there were rumours in Sydney that the Germans were planning annexation.⁽¹⁾ In 1871 Weber suggested to the new Imperial government the assumption of guardianship, control or protection over the Samoan Islands.⁽²⁾ Webb states that it was with chagrin that Weber saw, in February 1872, Capt. Meade of the U.S.S. "Narrangansett" make his unauthorised treaty with Mauga, chief of Tutuila for the acquisition of Pago-Pago harbour as a U.S. naval station.⁽³⁾ Within a short time of this he returned to Germany. While he was home, and we may assume therefore his influence in the affair, Steinberger drew up his agreement with the Godeffroys.⁽⁴⁾ This implies that the firm was seeking primarily the establishment of peace

(1) C.O. 209/230. Ferguson to Kimberley. No. 10220.
1st Aug. 1873.

(2) E.M. Townsend. "Origins of Modern German Colonization"
p. 47.

(3) C.O. 209/226. No. 8805. Enclosure W.H. Webb to Voge.
14th April 1872. (Webb was owner of the trans-Pacific Steamship line of 1869, and he was considering making Pago-Pago a port of call).

(4) See page . infra. Chap. 5.

and that only later, as the colonial movement in Germany became stronger, and there was hope of government support, did Germans work for annexation.

To Weber is due the organization and efficiency of the firm's branch in Samoa. All accounts show him to be tactful, charming, but of dominating personality. R.L. Stevenson, although he never met him personally, says this of him:-(1) "He was an artful and commanding character; in the smallest thing or in the greatest, without fear or scruple; equally able to affect, equally able to adopt, the most engaging politeness or the most imperious airs of domination. It was he who did most damage to rival traders; it was he who most harried the Samoans; and yet I have never met anyone, white or native, who did not respect his memory. All felt that it was a gallant battle, and the man a great fighter: and now when he is dead, and the war seems to have gone against him, many can scarce remember, without a kind of regret, how much devotion and audacity have been spent in vain. His name still lives in the songs of Samoa." He died in 1889, the end in more ways than one of an epoch in Samoan history.

(1) "A Footnote to History." p. 89.




CHART SHOWING THE TONNAGE OF SHIPS ~ BRITISH
GERMAN AND AMERICAN ~ THAT CLEARED AT APIA

1858 ~ 1884.

[Figures from Parliamentary Accounts and Papers.]




CHART SHOWING THE NUMBER OF SHIPS ~ BRITISH, GERMAN AND AMERICAN ~ THAT CALLED AT APIA ~ 1858-84.

[Figures from Parliamentary Accounts and Papers]

CHIEF FEATURES.

1. Great preponderance of German shipping.
2. That the German ships, though many, were small.

The monument to the man, indicative of himself and his methods, is the organization he built up, an organization of immense importance in Samoan affairs. The distinguishing feature of the Godeffroy Company in the South Seas was the large scale of their activities. From Apia, trading vessels irradiated to the surrounding islets. The consular report of 1883 (Appendix) shows the preponderance of German trade and shipping over that of other countries. Shipping alone increased from eight vessels in 1859 to one hundred and sixty-one in 1883. (See Fig. 3).

The methods of running so far-reaching an enterprise are described by an employee of the firm in 1874.⁽¹⁾ Men of all nationalities were engaged to serve as agents at the various depots. Three questions were asked them; "Can you speak the language? Can you keep your mouth shut? Can you live among natives without quarrelling with them?" Among their instructions was the advice to steer clear of missionaries. "Give no assistance to missionaries by word or deed, beyond what is demanded by common humanity," for the missionary taught that cloth or coin were better than beads and tobacco. Traders were further advised; "Have a woman of your own, no

(1) Appendix to Journal of Hse. of Reps. N.Z. 1874.
S. Sea Papers. Pt. II. Memo by Sterndale.

matter what island you take her from, for a trader without a wife is in continual hot water." The firm supplied the trader with materials for his house, and the promise of a commission on his produce. It is hardly to be wondered at that tales should come back of the hard actions of the firm's agents. Stationed on outlying islands among hostile natives, a bullying manner backed by the guns of a visiting man-of-war, secured the position of the lonely white man. The men who engaged on such enterprises were such as wished no questions asked.

The Masters of the trading vessels were similarly remunerated. They were paid on the low scale of £5. a month and the ships were not insured, but each Master secured a commission of 3 per cent. on the profits of every successful voyage.⁽¹⁾

It has already been shown how the laziness of Samoans led to the new step of buying and planting land. In this the Germans were pioneers. Even as late as 1883 they were very nearly the only planters.⁽²⁾ The great importance

(1) Gordon Cumming. "A Lady's Cruise in a French Man-of-War." p. 135.

(2) Exceptions were the Roman Catholic plantations and Cornwall's estate - Cornwall was from New Zealand. See map

of this was that the possession of land tied down German interests to the islands and that plantations were a proof of this. They, further, involved a staff of European agents - not by any means always German - but nevertheless in German pay. When the question of annexation by one of the great powers came up, the extensive German interests, quite apart from trade, were a deciding factor against British and United States claims. Finally, and perhaps most important, was the fact that native civil wars made planting hopelessly precarious. The constant depredations led to attempts to control the chaos, to insistence on the neutrality of plantations, and so to attempts to control the government. At any rate until 1879 the evidence seems to show that the German firm wanted primarily peace in order to trade. In 1874 the Godeffroy firm made an agreement with the American adventurer Colonel Steinberger,⁽¹⁾ by which he agreed to establish peace and give the firm certain advantages over other traders in acquiring copra. Yet Steinberger hoped to see the United States establish a protectorate over Samoa. To this the Godeffroy agreement seemed no bar.

The methods by which the Germans obtained their land are for the most part wrapt in mystery. Occasional allusions

(1) See infra. Chap. 5.

in dispatches throw light on their dealings. It is probable that the way in which Germans acquired plantations made them unpopular with natives. We hear, for instance, of land claims being enforced by H.I.M.S. "Arcona" in 1874,⁽¹⁾ and of ammunition being supplied as payment in war time.⁽²⁾ Buying land from natives inevitably involved complications. Samoans, like the Maoris of New Zealand or the Bantus in South Africa, held land communally. The chiefs had no right to sell land that belonged to a whole family or tribe. In practice though, chiefs would sell land sometimes without even the knowledge of his family and the Germans had to resort to bullying methods to oust "the squatters" on the land they had purchased. In 1882 the British Consul speaks of "the native tenure of land so intricate and complicated" and "the inclination of the native to effect wrongful sales with a view to reclaiming the land subsequently." Sometimes the Germans mortgaged the land to natives obtaining from them a steady supply of copra.

However the Germans obtained their land there can be no doubt that by 1879 they had acquired by far the greatest

(1) F.O. 244/275. Correspondence between Derby and Russell re "Arcona" affair Oct. and Nov. 1874.

(2) See Supra p. 91.

trading interests in the group. The German-Samoan treaty of that year stipulated that land sales down to the time of ratification of the treaty in Berlin should be recognized. As the treaty allowed two years for ratification this gave Weber time to consolidate the firm's plantations if he wished to do so. By the Berlin Act of 1889 the powers stipulated that land sales prior to 1879 should be regarded as valid. Thus the validity of the greater part of the German land titles came to be established. The appropriation of land gave Germans a tangible proof of their interests, which was extremely important in succeeding negotiations for deciding the ultimate fate of the islands. Though Britishers in the South Seas, particularly in New Zealand claimed as great an import as the German export trade,⁽¹⁾ it was upon their plantations that the Germans considered that they had prior rights.

A medium of payment for lands and copra that was introduced by the German firm was Chilean and Bolivian silver. This specie, very much debased, was bought cheaply and circulated as though equivalent to United States currency.⁽²⁾

(1) This is not justified. It seems more probable that German traders imported goods from the Australasian Colonies.

(2) Gordon Cumming. "A Lady's Cruise in a French Man-of-War." p. 135.

The unfortunate Samoans were thus defrauded into receiving only three quarters of the price they bargained for. Incidentally, it also proved an obstacle to the development of American trade. "South American coins" wrote Consul Dawson in 1880, "pass here" (Apia) "at par, and when a cargo is brought from San Francisco here and exchanged for this depreciated coin the prices must be exorbitantly high, such as cannot always be realized to cover the discount of eighteen Cents on the Dollar in the former market."⁽¹⁾ The British Consul also complains of this in 1879. Goods imported were paid for in this debased currency. The Germans issued drafts at ninety days' notice and gained 5 per cent. on the transaction.⁽²⁾ Incidentally, the introduction and use of

(1) Congress Doc., Hse. Misc. Doc., Cons. Monthly Rep. 1881. Nos. 3-8. Vol. 2. Report of Consul Dawson 18th Sept. '80.

(2) P.P. 1880. Vol. 74. c. 2577.

It is only fair to say that the currency had always been somewhat mongrel. The Samoan token money was their mats, the missionaries used oil as a basis of exchange.

By 1856 the following specie were in circulation:

<u>Gold.</u>	Spanish doubloons	=	16	Dollars
	Eagle of the U.S.	=	10	"
	Chilean piastre	=	10	"
	English sovereign	=	5	"
	French 20 Franc piece	=	4	"
<u>Silver.</u>	Spanish dollar	=	1	"
	Mexican and Peruvian	=	1	"
	French 5 francs	=	1	"
	English half-crown	=	50	Cents.
	" shilling	=	25	"

See P.P. 1860 Vol. 65. (c. 2753).

this currency enhanced the problem of a peaceful settlement within the islands in the years 1889-99.

Occasional hints show the methods by which the Godeffroys extended trade. Miss Gordon Cumming⁽¹⁾ calls them the "grab all's of the Pacific" - a name which any enterprising firm might covet - if successfully achieved. Their methods of gaining ascendancy are, where traceable, illuminating. In Tonga, for instance, Layard describes the natives mortgaging their copra for ready money that they might outvie each other at the mission meeting contributions.⁽²⁾ It suited the missionaries to obtain ready money, it suited the natives to appear virtuous in their large contributions, and it suited the Godeffroy agents to obtain rights over copra picked or unpicked. Thus, the natives fell into debt, the Wesleyans raised £15,000 in a year, and the Godeffroys ousted other traders.

To secure stability to native government and favourable treatment the firm tried to get into touch with, or even assist in establishing the directors of native governments.⁽³⁾ In Samoa the Godeffroys made a contract with Steinberger by which he was not only to receive German support

(1) Gordon Cumming. op. cit. p. 135.

(2) F.O. 58/150. Layard to Derby, 8th March 1876.

(3) 44 Congress 2nd Sess. House Ex. Doc. 44 Foster to Hunter. 8th March '76.

in his attempt to secure a stable government, but he was to raise taxes in copra which he would sell to the firm. ⁽¹⁾

Mr. Shirley Baker, the sometime Wesleyan missionary and Tongan Prime Minister was believed to hold a similar agreement in that island. ⁽²⁾ Consul Liardet of Samoa hints that Weber had the previous Consul Williams "under his thumb" and that he attempted to control any leading member of the community by bribery. He speaks of the U.S. Consul Colmesnil as ⁽³⁾ "constantly in the pay of Mr. Weber."

Besides enlisting the aid of white men of importance, in furthering their ends, the firm endeavoured to set rules to fall in with their wishes by even less creditable methods. For example, Liardet describes Weber, in time of civil war, threatening one side (the Taimua and Faipule) that he would supply their enemies (the Puletua) with ammunition unless they complied with his demand for an agreement. ⁽⁴⁾ The frequency of such reports, the variety of sources from which they spring indicates that they are in essence true, even if

(1) F.O. 58/150. Layard to Derby. 8th March '76.

(2) F.O. 58/150. Layard to Derby. 8th March '76.

(3) F.O. 58/156. Liardet to Wilde. Confidential 18th Oct. '77.

(4) F.O. 58/ ibid.

the details are exaggerated. One fact come out clearly, that Germany was unpopular with the natives. Great Britain, New Zealand and the United States were all petitioned frequently to annex the islands between 1870-1884, but there is not one such application to Germany. In his report in 1880 Maudslay, (1) while stating the case for annexation to Germany, said frankly that there was not any desire for German rule. "Even the chiefs who feel most strongly the impossibility of a native government, would be very reluctant to cede their country to Germany." (2) This unpopularity was due to the aggressive action of individual Germans, and to a distrust inspired by sharp practise and bullying methods. Much of the work of the firm was carried on secretly, e.g. ships left harbour with sealed orders, and this fermented the distrust of foreigner as well as native. Indicative of this is the letter from the Consul of the Duke of York Islands, who, though himself so remotely situated, writes to the Foreign Office of the fears of German domination in the Pacific. (3)

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- (1) F.O. 244/341. F.O. to Lord Odo Russell. encl. Memo by Maudslay. 20th Oct. '80.
- (2) F.O. 244/341. F.O. to Russell 19th Nov. '80. enclosing Memo by Maudslay. 20th Oct. '80.
- (3) F.O. 244/308. F.O. to Russell. enclosing Memo by Palgrave to F.O. 30th July '77.

In one other activity have the Germans been indicted by Stevenson and later writers, ⁽¹⁾ i.e. their treatment of imported labourers. This much vexed question of the labour trade, the "Kanaka" ⁽²⁾ trade, or "blackbirding," as it was variously called, which affected English planters in Queensland and Fiji, was in Samoa only the concern of the German firm. In 1882 there was only one British plantation on which imported labourers worked. ⁽³⁾ The majority of labourers were in the employ of Germans. At first the kanakas were from the Gilbert and Ellice, or Line Islands - as all islands on the Equator were frequently called; later, they were brought from the Marshalls, New Britain, Solomons and the New Hebrides. The onus of importation rests partly on the British, as many contractors were British. At first their treatment seems to have been fairly good. Sterndale, who was employed for a time by the Godeffroy firm and had an intimate knowledge of their methods, ⁽⁴⁾ speaks highly of their treatment of labourers.

(1) Brunsdon Fletcher in "The New Pacific," "Stevenson's Germany," who indicts German methods heavily at a time immediately after the war when he wished to prevent German Colonies - particularly Samoa - from returning to Germany.

(2) Polynesian word for man.

(3) That of Cornwall, a New Zealander. The overseer was American and his treatment of labourers notorious.

(4) Appendix to Journal of Hse. of Reps. 1874. Papers relating to the South Sea Islands. Pt. 3 Memo by Sterndale.

(1874) "Messrs. Godeffroy and Son deservedly rank among the most enlightened merchants of Europe:" the word "enlightened" seems misapplied in view of some of his comments on the organization (quoted page 74) - "In no respect," continues Sterndale, "is this more apparent than in the wise regulations framed by them for the conduct of their plantations in Samoa." The islanders are described as arriving "filthy, lazy and ferocious." "They are comfortably lodged, decently clothed, well fed and trained to honesty and peaceful industry. After six months' plantation life, they do not resemble the same beings, and at the expiration of their agreements, they are so far improved as to be as unfit for communion with their brutal brethren in their native isles, as they were previously for contact with civilized humanity." The regulations provided that they should not be engaged without their own consent, backed by that of their chiefs and relatives. The overseers were their own countrymen. They were well housed, well fed, had only nine hours' work and were not allowed to be beaten by overseers. A properly qualified European surgeon supervised their health and supplied needed medicines. "It would be well," Sterndale concludes, "for planters throughout the tropics if the system pursued by Messrs. Godeffroy were more generally known and adopted."

Within the succeeding years, however, these pleasing conditions seem to have disappeared. As contractors used more brutal methods to obtain labourers, they became hostile and difficult to procure. This tempted planters to keep them longer than they had agreed, until more arrived to take their places. Churchward states in 1884⁽¹⁾ that housing and food was insufficient, and that at times they were ill-treated. They were kept beyond their contracts, paid in second-rate produce, and had no one to whom they could appeal. The mortality was high and in one batch only eleven out of eighty were returned. Escaped labourers, an evil described graphically some six years later by Stevenson,⁽²⁾ were becoming a menace to Samoan native districts. Thurston forwarded Churchward's dispatch with the note that he had no reason to doubt its substantial correctness.

The validity of Churchward's report is supported by the evidence from the report of the U.S. Consul Dawson. In 1882 he describes similar conditions,⁽³⁾ Sewall, however, in 1888, though at the time in open antagonism to the German

(1) C.O. 225/15. Churchward to Des Voëx, Confidential. 20th May '84, enclosed in Des Voëx to Derby 25th Aug. '84.

(2) Stevenson. "A Footnote to History." p.

(3) U.S. Monthly Cons. Reports. No. 25. Cons. Dawson, 10th Aug. '82.

Consul, yet writes favourably of the German treatment of labourers - that they were well housed, well fed and tended. (1)
"As a rule" he says, "the labour trade is humanely conducted by the German labour vessels coming home." This would seem to show that Stevenson's hints imply worse conditions than (2)
actually existed.

By 1877 the firm had reached the point at which its activities had become of political importance. In 1876 the German warships sent to the Pacific concluded a trade treaty with Tonga. In 1877 Weber forced the Samoan Parliament, (3)
The Taimua and Faipule, to accept a similar agreement, which later was to develop into the treaty of 1879. Until the '70's the main purpose and aim had been commercial - to bring in profits to Hamburg. Gradually there emerged two contingencies that could not be disregarded. The one was that further development would be impossible without political

(1) Ibid. Monthly Cons. Reports. No. 97. Cons. Gen. Sewall. 15th Aug. '88.

(2) Numbers of labourers on Samoa:-
1874 475
1880 1,600
1881 1,847
1888 1,320

(3) See. Chap. 7.

action. The other ⁽¹⁾ was the growth of an interest in Germany in colonization which not merely shaped the action of German agents in the Pacific, but which was in itself directed to the South Seas as to the most profitable field of German enterprise.

Within Samoa itself political interference arose directly from the need to control the disorders that were destroying the plantations and ruining the native crops. Immediately around Samoa events were pointing to the advantages of a policy of acquisition. Until 1870 there had been a strong feeling that while there was free trade, colonies were unnecessary responsibilities. By 1877 there were indications that this might not always be so. In 1875 the United States concluded a Reciprocity Treaty with Hawaii. German traders suffered by the annexation of Fiji to Great Britain (1874). So long as it had seemed likely that the islands would be autonomous, and free trading, or at any rate in no sense monopolistic, there was no need for colonization schemes. In the early '70's schemes very definitely monopolistic were put forward by New Zealand, partly indeed directed in envy against

(1) Townsend. op. cit. Chap. 4. quotes "Weissbuch 1885" p. 4.
a) by statute of limitations which cancelled all debts by Fijians.
b) by the dispossession and eviction of German settlers without indemnity. The Fiji claims were not settled by England until 1884.

the German merchants. Although they wilted under Foreign Office scrutiny, they none the less indicated to the Germans the possible antagonists that might arise in the fast growing Southern British Colonies. America, too, was becoming a Pacific Power, aware more and more of the potentialities in the islands of the Pacific.

During this time the body of opinion that favoured a colonial policy in Germany was small. The building up of German interests in the South Seas and in Africa was the work of a few individuals. When the government began to adopt a policy favouring colonization, there was already an empire in embryo. It took time, and a change in political and economic affairs, before the German Government could, or would, back up the activities of Germans in the South Seas, with political interference or an assertion of rights. Theorists like List in 1840⁽¹⁾ and Treitchky in 1870, expounded the need for colonies into which Germany could pour her emigrants and upon which to build her future greatness. Other economists derided overseas possessions as anachronisms.⁽²⁾

(1) List. "A National System of Political Economy."

(2) Townsend. op. cit. p. 17. quotes from Lammer
"Deutschland nach dem Krieg" 1870.

Prior, at any rate to 1877, Bismarck was opposed to the extension of territory overseas. ⁽¹⁾ "All colonial enterprise must be left to individuals . . . Germany has no navy and conflicts with other Powers are inevitable" (1868). Or again; "For Germany to possess colonies would be like a poverty-stricken Polish nobleman acquiring a silken sable coat, when he needed shirts." ⁽²⁾ Weber in 1871 was counselled "to avoid scrupulously anything which might lead to a misunderstanding with the United States." ⁽³⁾ In November 1874 Lord Odo Russell was commissioned to inquire into German aims with regard to Samoa - the outcome of some local indignation at the arbitrary treatment of some natives by a German man-of-war H.I.M.S. "Arcona." The reply was definite; "Herr von Bülow avails himself of the opportunity, to say that his government has no desire to acquire the Samoan Islands, nor indeed any colonies for Germany." "A similar assurance," continues Russell, "was again lately given me by the Prince Chancellor, who said that all the insinuations of the Foreign press

(1) Ibid.

(2) Poschinger. "Bismarck als Volkswirt" Vol. I. p. 63. Berlin 1889.

(3) Zimmermann. "Geschichte Deutsche Kolonialpolitik." Berlin 1914. p. 6.


respecting the desire of the German Government to acquire colonies were totally unfounded. (1)

Nevertheless, the years between 1870 and 1877 were critical ones in the growth of colonialism in Germany. Tingling with a new consciousness of triumph and unity after the Franco-Prussian war, she was suffering from abnormal economic conditions, over-production, an increase in industries needing raw materials, and a great flow of emigration resulting from the overstocked labour market. During these years the visits of warships to the Pacific became more frequent. After 1875 German interests were considered important enough to warrant the allocation of two warships there at a cost of 700,000 Marks a year, and of two cruisers at 271,000 marks. (2) The support of commercial interests by the warships was a real one. For example, in 1874, at the instance of Weber the "Arcona" burnt down a Samoan village. In 1875, a year after the annexation of Fiji, H.I.M.S. "Gazelle" went to the Pacific to report. In 1876 the "Hertha" was ordered off the Asian coast to Samoa and Tonga to negotiate trade treaties. With the negotiations for treaties, began the era of political interference.



(1) F.O. 244/275. Russell to Derby. No. 275. 6th Nov. 1874.

(2) Zimmermann. "Geschichte Deutsche Kolonialpolitik." p.17

MAP OF UPOLU. [From U.S. Papers 50 Congress; House Ex. Doc. no 227 p 226]



1. The map only comprises such German landed property, cultivated and uncultivated, as is the property of *Deutsche Handels und Plantagen Gesellschaft*. The land belonging to smaller German proprietors is not marked.
2. The German lands comprise a total area of 133,122 acres of which 7,485 resp. 7,985 acres are under cultivation. Of this total area 102,207 acres have been acquired before the conclusion of the German-Samoa treaty in 1879; the rest after this time, of the latter 1,065 acres were acquired in 1884, 503 in 1885.
3. The extent of other German landed property may be approximately stated as being 2,000 acres. Therefore the total extent of German lands is about 135,127 acres.
4. The extent of English and American property is based upon investigations made in 1883, and comprise only the land belonging to the greater proprietors; smaller items of land belonging to different English and American people, not being marked.



3. MAP OF UPOLU ILLUSTRATING EXTENT OF GERMAN PLANTATIONS.

(Cir.) 1884.

CHAPTER IV.

The Awakening of New Zealand's Interests
in Samoa.

1.

While the commercial activities of the German merchants were raising the intrinsic value of the islands, new discoveries were taking place that affected the Fiji, Tonga and Samoa Groups profoundly. The discovery of gold in America, New Zealand, and Australia produced an increase in trans-Pacific traffic, which naturally raised the importance of the three groups on the main route.

The opening up of the Pacific coast of North America began with the gold rush in California of 1849. Until then communication between east and west had been almost entirely by way of Cape Horn, or over the Central American Isthmus - a tedious and uncomfortable horseback journey. With the speeding up of communications **plans for an inter-oceanic canal were revived,** ⁽¹⁾ and a Company was formed to examine the Nicaragua route. It was called the "American and

(1) to tackle the Nicaragua route. This was revived in 1872 - the Panama route was attempted by Lesseps in 1881. Ultimately the Canal was not opened until 1914.

Pacific Canal Company." Secondarily to this main purpose it conveyed passengers from coast to coast by small steamers which ran up the San Juan River to Lake Nicaragua, and by coaches from thence to the Pacific coast.⁽¹⁾ This mode of transit proved a most successful venture⁽²⁾ and even the railway at Panama, opened in 1855, did not usurp its work. Only the completion of the trans-American railway (1869) diminished its importance. These two ventures, this steamship and coach Company and the Panama railway, affected private individuals and increased the volume of traffic over the isthmus. Cargo ships, gold carrying ships and warships kept to their old routes. Until the canal was completed the value of the islands as strategic points on the route to Panama was hypothetical.

By 1869 the trans-American railway was completed. This was the culminating point in a series of events that combined to make America a Pacific power.

The Australian gold discoveries were in 1851. In February Hargraves, a Californian gold miner, first found

(1) Henderson. "American Diplomatic Questions." p. 72.
"The Inter-Oceanic Canal Problem."

(2) Although the attempts to prosecute their original projects for a Canal failed.

gold at Summerhill Creek, twenty miles north of Bathurst. By September the great gold fields of Ballarat and Bendigo were opened up. Two years later a new turn was given to affairs by the discovery of gold in Otago, New Zealand.

The importance of these discoveries upon the Pacific Islands is evident. By the increase of wealth of these Pacific countries, by the acceleration of their development, they became capable of a more ambitious policy than previously. America began to look west towards Japan and China. In 1851 the E. Australian States and New Zealand were given constitutions. Thus at a time when growth was most rapid, a freedom was given which encouraged independence of action. Within the succeeding decades the United States, Australia and New Zealand began to release themselves from internal problems and to join in the tussle for a share in the island world of the Western Pacific.

The immediate effect of the gold discoveries was the inter-communication between the three countries. Until then, Australasian Colonies had communicated with Europe by Cape Horn or the Cape of Good Hope routes. There was no North-East flow of ships⁽¹⁾. Now miners, prospectors, traders

(1) As has been mentioned, individual people travelled via the West Indies, Panama and Callao, but it was a laborious and uncertain journey. (e.g. Pritchard describes his journey by this route in 1845. F.O. 58/38.

poured from one to another country.

So it was that by the middle of the century Samoa came to have an importance quite unrelated to its commercial value. a) It was in an advantageous position between the North American Pacific slope and Australia and New Zealand. b) It was on the main route between the Eastern Australian ports and Panama, important from the aspect of naval defence. Indeed, in his report ⁽¹⁾ on 1859 on this, Admiral Washington strongly recommended the acquisition of one or other island group. It would be a point from which to defend the main route along which, in the event of the completion of the Inter-Oceanic Canal, the gold ships from Australia would pass. The home government, however, did not consider the need urgent. Despite an offered cession of Fiji in 1859, ⁽²⁾ and of the Navigators in 1862, ⁽³⁾ the British Government determined to support the independence of the various island peoples. c) The third factor affecting Samoa was the growth of a feeling in Australia and New Zealand of the need to acquire the surrounding islands partly for defence and partly for commercial expansion. The Australasian Colonies, in fact, began

(1) C.O. 209/232. No. 4967. Quoted in Vogel's Memo. 11th March '74.

(2) Scholefield. "The Pacific." p. 77.

(3) F.O. 58/96. Williams to Earl Russell. 14th May '62.

to promulgate a Pacific Monroe Doctrine and they chafed at the British Government which refused to follow their plans and which restrained them from putting their policy into practice. They desired that the whole island world from New Guinea to Tonga ⁽¹⁾ at least should be reserved for them to develop. The fear of Germany, the United States, or France stepping in first, intensified their impetuosity and annoyance at the hesitation of Downing Street to act. The weakness of the position of these Colonies, indeed, was that they had not the resources to back up their demands. Thus, while idealists dreamt of a British, or perhaps Australasian Western Pacific, the politicians knew very well that they could only raise a little part of the necessary money to help ⁽²⁾ in the materialization of their dreams.

(1) See N.S.W. Papers. Legislative Assembly 1883-4, 3rd Sess. Vol. 9. "Proceedings of Inter-Colonial Convention of 1883." Australian Colonies wanted islands from New Guinea to the New Hebrides. New Zealand wanted especially Samoa and Tonga.

(2) In 1883 at the Sydney Convention (N.S.W. Papers 1883-4 3rd Session. Vol. 9) all the Colonies consented to "bear such share of the cost" of annexing New Guinea "as may be deemed fair and reasonable." This was, however, only a part of the total sum annexation would involve, and New Guinea was only part of their total scheme, which included Samoa and Tonga. The British Government was, however, cautious after the refusal of the Colonies to contribute toward the cost of Fiji Government (infra. p.123).

11.

While Australia was concerned chiefly with New Guinea and the islands in her vicinity, New Zealand's interest lay in Samoa, Tonga and the Polynesian Islands. As early as 1847 Sir George Grey, Governor of New Zealand envisaged a Pacific peopled by British and governed from New Zealand. At the time New Zealand was too young a colony, and, faced by its own acute problems, could not support the dreams of its enterprising governor. His idea of a Pacific Empire was first inspired by the appeals of King George Tabou of Tonga for annexation to Great Britain, and by the evident willingness of chiefs at Fiji to come under British protection. He was convinced that the desire was genuine and he recommended the annexation of the islands by Great Britain. (1) They would be a valuable defence for New Zealand and Australia in time of war. The wealth of the Islands would make them self-supporting. The natives could augment the military resources of the Empire. The acquisitions would, in short, bristle with advantages.

(1) His enthusiasm met with little response from the Home Government. Expense alone was a sufficient deterrent.

(1) C.O. 209/59. Grey to Earl Grey (No. 1286) 14th March 1848.

"We are to consider the question" runs one minute, ⁽¹⁾ "with a deficient Revenue and a distressed Population." A half-hearted suggestion from Palmerston of treaties for protection, was whittled down by Earl Grey to a vague proffer of advice to chiefs "without introducing an express condition into the treaties." It was suggested that, for example, the preamble might express Her Majesty's anxiety "to assist in promoting the progress of prosperity, civilization and religion in those islands," and that she accorded ⁽²⁾ "to their inhabitants her disinterested friendship." Grey's schemes languished for some twenty odd years, when they found a new advocate in Mr. Julius (after Sir Julius) Vogel.

What Grey was unable to do in the realm of politics Bishop Selwyn partially achieved in mission work. By a mistake in his Letters Patent ⁽³⁾ he was given episcopal jurisdiction over 68° more of latitude than was intended. This Selwyn would not recognize as an error. When he reached New Zealand in 1842 his work in the Colony employed all his energies. After the first five years he determined to take the first step

(1) That of Elliot.

(2) Ibid.

(3) Creighton, L. "G.A. Selwyn- His Life". p. 8.

toward launching his cherished plan. The savage inhabitants of the Melanesian Islands, especially in the Solomons, New Hebrides and New Guinea, were notorious. Already some fifty missionaries, native and European, had perished. ⁽¹⁾ Selwyn planned to convert these savage parts by taking boys from the Islands, training them at Auckland and sending them to their island homes to disseminate the message of Christianity among their own people. On the success of his plans there is no need to dwell here. Voyages were undertaken annually from 1847, and the S. John's College at Auckland was established. The vital point as concerns this essay, is that it was a scheme originating from New Zealand for the spiritual conquest of Melanesia. New Zealand was to be the centre from which this new interest in the islands was to spring, and to which the islands would turn in need. In 1853 a Suffragan Diocese of Melanesia was established, and the Rev. J.C. Patteson became the first Bishop. Fifteen years later his murder at Nukapu of the Santa Cruz Group led immediately to the demand for the annexation of the Navigator Islands, as a suitable centre for suppressing the labour trade.

Between those years 1847 when Bishop Selwyn made his first voyage round the Melanesian Islands, and 1871 when

(1) Selwyn, G.A. "Letters on the Melanesian Mission." p.14.

Bishop Patteson was murdered, the labour trade had grown up. In his account of his voyage in 1847 Selwyn describes a broil on Rotumah, the result of a conflict between traders and escaped labourers that they were deporting from the Loyalty Islands for work in New South Wales. ⁽¹⁾ Probably the early experiments in enlisting black men, kanakas, were well organized, and their contracts were explained to natives. ⁽²⁾ It was not long, however, before untold abuses crept in to the system. Natives were deceived as to the term of their contracts, impressed, kidnapped. They were ill-treated on boat and plantation. They were ill-fed, -clothed, -housed, -paid. When their contracts expired, if they were not found to remain longer, they were often shipped to the wrong islands, and with the consequence that they were killed by hostile natives. The almost immediate result was that the natives retaliated by attacking any white man's ship that called at islands where traders had been. It became extremely unsafe for unarmed vessels to venture among those islands. A public outcry was raised in 1871 on Bishop Patteson's death which was the direct sequence to the visit of a "blackbirding"

(1) Selwyn. "Letters on the Melanesian Mission" p. 37.

(2) Scholefield. "The Pacific." p. 52. Civil War. The labour trade in the islands was conducted largely in New Zealand and the plantations of Queensland and the labourers did to a smaller extent the Dartmoor plantations in America.

ship. The blackguardly traders, unable to persuade the apprehensive natives to approach their vessels, dressed in cassocks and surplices, and so, in the guise of peaceful missionaries, entrapped the natives into approaching their
(1)
ship.

The indignation aroused by the publication of such facts, and the heavy toll of murders on the islands, led to a demand for the control of the labour traffic. It was, therefore, suggested by the New Zealand Government that the possession of a central point in the area of disorder would facilitate the task. Fiji, already for some years in the running for annexation to Great Britain, was of course proposed. This suggestion was particularly favoured by Australia who had contributed more in settlers and capital
(2)
to its development. New Zealand from the outset recommended the annexation of the Navigator Islands, inhabited by natives closely allied to the Maories in race, language, appearance and customs.

(1) "The Daily Southern Cross" 1st Nov. '71. New Zealand. also C.O. 209/223 Bowen to Kimberley, Nov. '71.

(2) There were altogether some 2,000 white settlers in Fiji drawn chiefly from Australia between 1860-70. This immigration to Fiji was due to the cotton planting boom during the American Civil War. The labour trade in the islands was conducted largely to feed the plantations of Queensland and Fiji with labourers and to a smaller extent the German plantations in Samoa.

The first petition to the Queen by both Houses of the New Zealand Parliament to annex the Navigator Islands was made in November 1871, soon after the news of Bishop Patteson's death. It did not, however, originate in the Houses of Parliament.

The promoter at this time of a wide Pacific policy for New Zealand and Great Britain was the energetic and adventurous Julius Vogel. Born in 1835 in London, he was in Australia at the time of the gold rush of 1851, and from there he moved to Otago, New Zealand. Here he made a reputation as the editor of a paper and superintendent of the Province. He was returned to the House of Representatives 1863, and in 1869 he became a member of Sir William Fox's Ministry as Treasurer and Postmaster-General. ⁽¹⁾ As Postmaster-General he did much to secure the inauguration of a new trans-Pacific mail service. As Treasurer his spirited finance caused some stir. The colony was still suffering severely from the depression caused by the Maori wars. Vogel's policy was to accelerate the development of the colony by the institution of public works and public services. Thus, during

(1) In 1872 he became Premier until 1876.

(2) C.O. 205/230, No. 15482, Minute to Comm. by Vogel.

(3) C.O. 205/230, No. 245, Minute on Disposal of Pardon to Governor.

his term of influence, roads, railways, bridges and public buildings were constructed, all of which played a big part in opening up the country and increasing its prosperity. He provided for future generations and expected them to pay. It was he who inaugurated the policy of State borrowing which was carried to excess by his followers. His Pacific aims were in line with his domestic policy. The islands might in the future be a source of wealth, they might fall into foreign hands and become a danger. On such grounds he recommended that the home government should act without delay, or should authorize the New Zealand Government to do so.

His very impetuosity defeated his ends. "Vogelism" became a byword for wild schemes. Robert Herbert, the permanent Under-Secretary at the Colonial Office, commented on his scheme for annexing Polynesia as "a foolish as well as an impudent composition" and he refers to Vogel as "the most audacious adventurer that perhaps has ever held power in a British Colony."

Though Vogel was regarded with a certain suspicion and distrust, not untempered with amusement by the British

(1) See infra. p.112.

(2) C.O. 209/230. No. 13652. Minute to Memo. by Vogel.

(3) C.O. 209/230. No. 942. Minute on dispatch, Fergusson to Kimberley.

Colonial Office; in New Zealand he was, to use Herbert's phrase "everything now." He became Prime Minister in 1872 and the rapid return of prosperity to New Zealand secured him confidence and support. In 1875 his services were awarded by the Queen with a Knighthood, and the following year he resigned⁽¹⁾ and became Agent-General for the Colony in England.⁽²⁾ Subsequently he had to retire from this position. He stood for the English House of Commons as Conservative Member for Penryn in 1880, but was defeated at the polls in 1884. He returned to New Zealand and became again Prime Minister for a term of three years.

To him undoubtedly are due the Pacific schemes presented during the years 1871-6. The memoranda of the Ministers are his composition, and they fully express his views. At his departure from New Zealand in 1876, plans for political aggrandizement in the Pacific ceased and on his return in 1884 there cropped up again an agitation in New Zealand for the annexation of Samoa, and in Samoa for incorporation into the Colony of New Zealand.⁽³⁾ But though

(1) His policy of abolishing the provinces in New Zealand roused considerable opposition and undermined his popularity.

(2) On his own recommendation (enc. Britt. Article Vogel)

(3) Actually they began in 1883 before his return. They reached a height while he was Premier.

the scheme in the main was that of an individual Minister, it was important because he was Prime Minister and carried his Ministers with him. The fact that for five years the New Zealand Government cherished a dream of Pacific Empire, influenced the lines on which her interest in Samoa developed. New Zealand came to regard herself as having a particular interest or right in the group.

Vogel, then, launched his Pacific scheme upon a Parliament stirred to its depths over the death of Bishop Patteson. Another factor conditioning his proposal was the new Pacific mail line of 1869. The New Zealand Government had agreed to subsidize the line if mails were taken to America and to England across the Continent by the new railway. It was run by a certain W.H. Webb of San Francisco. In 1871 the final route for the line of steamers was still uncertain. The harbour of Pago-Pago was suggested as a very suitable port of call, and Webb sent an agent of his, a certain Captain Wakeman, to report on the harbour and the group generally. ⁽¹⁾ Wakeman's account was most satisfactory, but subsequently Webb failed to get an American subsidy, and his line of steamships was discontinued. Nevertheless, the potentialities of the islands were brought before public

(1) Wakeman. "Report on the Navigator Islands."

notice in New Zealand and America, and a New Zealand agent, a William Seed of the Customs Office, was also sent to the Group to draw up a report upon it. ⁽¹⁾

A third stimulus to Vogel's plea for urgency in annexation, was the frequency of rumours at this time of the designs of other great powers upon the islands. The rapid growth of the Godeffroy firm, the secrecy with which all their business was conducted, the hint of the awakening of American interest in Captain Meade's Treaty with the chief of Tutuila, and in the appointment of Colonel Steinberger as Commissioner to Samoa, were all actions which gave rise to alarm and suspicion. ⁽²⁾ At such a distance from Europe it was often difficult to distinguish between the policy of a home government and the action of agents on the spot, and to realise that the two might be very different.

Vogel's proposals followed two main lines. They were, in the first place, petitions for the direct annexation of the islands. In the second place, as an alternative, he

(1) Votes and proceedings of the Legislative Assembly of New South Wales, 1883-4. Vol. 9. pp. 106-113.

(2), C.O. 209/226. Bowen to Kimberley (56) Encl. No. 2. from Webb. 26th June 1872.

proposed an extensive scheme for the foundation of a trading Company with certain privileges, and with political as well as commercial aims.

The first scheme was put forward ostensibly by the Prime Minister, Sir William Fox, in November 1871.⁽¹⁾ The chief reasons given in support of this proposal were a) to acquire Pago-Pago which would afford a suitable coaling station for the Pacific Mail Line of steamers, b) to assist the chiefs to maintain order on the islands, and to do justice to European interests likely to grow up there, and c) to stop "the frightful system of slavery" in the islands. The anarchical condition of Fiji was cited as an example of the lawlessness that might well spring up if there was no controlling government. Moreover it was considered that a foreign country in possession of the group "with a small fleet at command might inflict great injury upon the Australasian Colonies."⁽²⁾ To which remark Herbert could not resist a laconic "stuff!" in the margin.

The Colonial Office did not seriously consider the proposal. Information regarding Samoa was extracted for the

(1) C.O. 209/223. No. 1174. Enclosed in Bowen to Kimberley. 24th Nov. '71.

(2) Ibid.

benefit of Lord Kimberley from a Geographical Magazine that "the islands possess the greatest advantages of soil and climate - clothing is unnecessary - the natives are thievish, treacherous and ferocious. The islands are much more advanced in internal policy than any in the Pacific."!- a remark either meaningless or untrue. The matter was considered and it was suggested that some arrangement similar to that of Cape Colony and Penguin Island might be arrived at. Lord Kimberley was unwilling. The islands were too distant from New Zealand for a government from there to be satisfactory. "I suppose," he said, "Penguin Island is probably only inhabited by penguins, which are not ferocious natives. New Zealand had better rest contented with the task of dealing with the Maoris which is quite enough for them at present. We have quite isolated stations enough to defend in case of war, and by adding to them shall only add to the points open to an enemy's attack. They are only too numerous already, and will tax our powers to the very utmost to maintain."⁽¹⁾

Six months later Governor Sir George Bowen despatched a second memorandum by Vogel.⁽²⁾ In February '72 Captain

(1) C.O. 209/223. No. 1174. Proposal to place the Navigator Islands under British Protection 24th Nov. '71.

(2) C.O. 209/226. No. 8805. Captain Meade's Treaty. Bowen to Kimberley 26th June '72.

Meade of the U.S. ship "Narrangansett" had concluded a treaty with the chief Mauga of Tutuila for the cession of Pago-Pago harbour to the United States, as a coaling station for the United States ships of war, and for the trans-Pacific Mail Line. In return Captain Meade had promised the vague protection of the U.S. Government. Webb, the owner of the Steamship line, wrote to Vogel of this and of the indignation it had caused in German circles, as, so he stated, the Germans had hoped to anticipate his action.⁽¹⁾ Vogel considered that there were grave possibilities of danger in this treaty. The various island groups might some day unite;⁽²⁾ it might be detrimental in case of war with the United States. He felt none the less that the treaty was not inspired by ill-feeling towards Great Britain and that the United States would probably not object to Great Britain obtaining similar privileges. Kimberley was unwilling to interfere. "I don't see" he wrote, in a minute to the memorandum, "how we are to interfere unless we are to lay down and enforce the doctrine that no European or American Power is to interfere in any part of the South Pacific but ourselves."⁽³⁾ (4th Sept. '72).

(1) See supra. Chap. 3. p.72

(2) The only tendency to union was in the '80's when King Kalakana of Hawaii cherished the dream of a United Polynesia. One step toward its accomplishment was the Samoan Hawaiian Treaty of 1887. Scholefield. op. cit. p. 46.

(3) C.O. 209/226. No. 8805/72. locus. cit.

Correspondence with Sir Edward Thornton in Washington showed that Meade had acted on his own initiative. ⁽¹⁾ Thornton believed little attention would be paid to a petition for an American protectorate which had been received. When the matter was brought up in Congress, though President Grant was favourably disposed, the treaty was not ratified.

In August 1873 Governor Sir James Fergusson was requested to forward another memorandum to the Colonial Office. The line of steamships had been discontinued and therefore the United States cession was temporarily valueless. It was urged that Great Britain should step in before the United States took further action. Vogel added that "there is good reason to believe that the German Government have contemplated annexing these islands and would have done so but for Captain Meade's action." ⁽²⁾ It would occasion a profound disappointment," wrote Fergusson, "to the people of this Colony, were the present opportunity to be lost, and in spite of the preference manifested in our favour by their inhabitants were a post of great commercial and possibly great political importance . . . to fall into the hands of a foreign power." ⁽³⁾

(1) C.O. 209/228. No. 9440/72.

(2) C.O. 209/230. No. 10220. "N.Z. Ministers urge that New Zealand should not fall into foreign hands." Fergusson to Kimberley, 1st Aug. '73.

(3) Ibid.

Kimberley remained firm. "I am entirely opposed to the annexation of these islands" his minute runs. "It might be judicious to obtain a treaty granting equal advantages to British subjects trading with the Navigator Islands, but the present moment seems unfavourable for such action as it might lead to a controversy with the United States. Considering the number of points in the world which we have annexed, we cannot object to other maritime powers seeking to obtain some stations of their own. If we multiply our stations too much we really weaken ourselves by multiplying the points open to attack beyond our power to defend." (1) The answer was guarded and non-committal, worded so as "not to offend the susceptibilities of our Colonists." H.M. Government were "not prepared to take any steps which would lay this country under any obligation to interfere." (2)

Vogel would not let the matter drop. In October Fergusson was again requested to forward a ministerial memorandum (3) advising this time not merely the annexation of the Navigator Islands, but the whole of Polynesia. "If Great Britain

(1) Ibid. Minute.

(2) C.O. 209/231. Telegram secret 101. Kimberley to Fergusson. 14th Oct. '73.

(3) C.O. 209/230. No. 13652. "Annexation of Polynesia." Fergusson to Kimberley. 22nd Oct. '73.

means to extend her dominion in Polynesia,"⁽¹⁾ ran the memorandum, "it will be better, for abundantly evident reasons, for her to do so comprehensively, than to allow herself to be forced into it, the choicest islands being, in the meanwhile, appropriated by Foreign Powers. Unless she agree with Foreign Powers - say with Germany, the United States and perhaps France and Holland - to jointly protect all Polynesia, and in that case it is to be presumed Australasia would have to be included," (C.O. "Why?") "she would find it easier to deal with the whole of the unappropriated islands herself, rather than submit to taking the leavings of other Powers, and run the risk of having to deal with complicated international questions." The arguments given in support of this policy are an elaboration of previous ones, - the suppression of the labour trade, the lawless acts of British subjects committed "for want of the extension of that authority, which they think should follow them wherever they may go."! The profits of the trade should go to the Colonies. They pressed, too, to be allowed to enter into treaties with chiefs "rather as an expedient than as an

(1) Though indeed there was no indication that she had any such wish.

equivalent for the far more effectual influence at the disposal of the imperial government." ⁽¹⁾ New Zealand claimed a special aptitude for dealing with native people - a claim that the Colonial Office hesitated to endorse. As for the financial burden involved, "New Zealand might be willing to shoulder the burden but with the heavy cost of their own development ... they would undertake it at great disadvantage and ... infinitely inferior prospects of benefit to the subject races." ⁽²⁾

The minutes made in the Colonial Office leave no doubt as to the feelings of the Home Government. Herbert commented on it a "a foolish as well as an impudent composition" and recommended that the scheme should need at least to be passed by both houses of the New Zealand Parliament before it should be sent back to London for reconsideration. Lord Kimberley remarked that "one would have supposed that the New Zealand Government would have thought it as well first to get possession of the whole of New Zealand before undertaking to govern other territories. They will have enough to do for years to come without embarking on these quixotic schemes.

(1) C.O. 209/230. No. 13652. Fergusson to Kimberley.
22nd Oct. '73.

(2) Ibid. *together a profitable venture.*

Amongst other things they might build or purchase two or three armed steamers to relieve the "burdened Englishman" (1) whom Mr. Vogel so much pities, from having to provide ships to patrol the New Zealand coast."

Simultaneously with the ministerial memorandum drawn up by Vogel arrived a confidential dispatch from Governor Fergusson (2) containing a proposal of a different nature. A certain Mr. Coleman Philips, an English barrister engaged in mercantile pursuits, and who had played a large part in establishing the Bank of Fiji, (3) proposed the formation under Government auspices of a trading Company in the South Pacific. The trade was to be primarily in the staple products of the various islands, "But" continued Fergusson, "he looks for a much more important object, viz. the acquisition of dominion by the Company in the fashion of the East India Company by such steps as the willingness of the local chiefs, governments and populations will agree to." He hoped, strange to say, for support in Germany as "several German

(1) A reference to the memo. in which Vogel compared the free New Zealanders with Englishmen.

(2) C.O. 209/230. No. 13653. Fergusson to Kimberley, confidential 22nd Dec. '73.

(3) Not altogether a creditable venture.

mercantile houses are already carrying on a trade similar to what he proposes, but that he knows that they are not succeeding owing to their competition and to the expense attending small operations." In face of the successful Godeffroy establishment, we can only assume that Philips was ill-informed himself or was deliberately misinforming the Governor to gain his support.⁽¹⁾ Before the Colonial Office could digest this proposal, a second and more elaborate one⁽²⁾ arrived. (Jan. 1874).

The details were as follows. A Company should be formed to colonize the islands of the South Pacific. The New Zealand Government should guarantee 5 per cent. interest for four years on the capital. Settlers should go out, factories be established and lands acquired, arrangements made with chiefs, the labour trade effectually suppressed. Missionaries should be supported ("Monstrous cant!" says Mr. Herbert) and inter-island steamship lines financed. In New Zealand, factories would be built to absorb the raw products of the islands and all goods going to the islands should go through

(1) By this time the reports of Sterndale and Seed were being compiled in a Blue Book so his mis-information was probably deliberate.

(2) C.O. 209/230. No. 942. Fergusson to Kimberley, 24th Nov. '73. enclosing memorandum by Vogel.

New Zealand. New Zealand should get 5 per cent. royalty from the Company on all products from the islands, and $7\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. on all goods shipped to the islands other than New Zealand manufactures. "The ultimate object," said Vogel, "which I have in view, is the establishment of the Polynesian Islands as a Dominion with New Zealand the centre of the government, and the Dominion, like Canada, to be a British Dependency."⁽¹⁾

Vogel's castles in the air were rudely shaken by a telegram to Fergusson, that H.M. Government was not prepared to enter upon the consideration of the questions involved in this proposal.⁽²⁾ In a dispatch it was hinted that the "self government which has been accorded to the Colonists does not extend to the power of legislating on subjects which may largely affect and compromise this country or foreign powers, as well as the islands which are the more immediate objects of the scheme."

At this juncture the defeat of Gladstone's Ministry brought Lord Carnarvon to the Colonial Office. His comments

(1) Ibid. Minute dated 20/2/74

(2) Ibid. C.O. 209/230. No. 942. Fergusson to Carnarvon. 11th March '74, enclosing memo. by Vogel.

(3) Ibid.

(1)
were no more favourable. He considered the proposal was "crude and indigested" and he objected to the New Zealand monopoly and the risk of complications with foreign countries. Further, it was obvious that "this country cannot fairly resist, were it indeed for her interest to do so, the establishment within a reasonable distance of her own Colonies of other settlements which may hereafter become centres of foreign commerce, and the present circumstances of the South Pacific form no exception to this." He therefore recommended delay and that the draft of the proposed Bill should be sent to England.

The detailed report arrived in May 1874 together with the heads of agreement. (2) There was little that was new in it. "It seems to me," wrote Vogel, "that New Zealand may earn for a reluctant Great Britain - without committing her to the responsibilities she fears - a grand island Dominion, and in the meanwhile save the Mother country much trouble and danger and risk. I speak, of course," he added sarcastically, "of the danger and risk of expenditure, which weigh so much with the rulers of Great Britain." (3) His importunity alarmed

(1) Ibid. Minute dated 26/2/74

(2) C.O. 209/232. No. 4976. Fergusson to Carnarvon. 11th March '74, enclosing memo. by Vogel.

(3) Ibid.

the Colonial Office lest he should take it upon himself to act without authority. "This highly speculative scheme" reads a minute, "should be promptly snuffed out." Yet the same mail brought another dispatch ⁽¹⁾ from Fergusson with the news that the Company was in process of formation and requesting permission to be freed from having to reserve Bills in the matter. "Mr. Vogel's unscrupulousness and Sir James Fergusson's placability" wrote Herbert, "threatens us with a more awkward difficulty than we have in Fiji." ⁽²⁾ And a telegram was hastily despatched to Fergusson reaffirming his instructions to reserve any Bill on the subject.

July brought to Carnarvon a dispatch marked "secret" ⁽³⁾ answering his objections. The tone, whether intentionally or not, was a little threatening. "I trust," said Fergusson, "that I may not presume in representing that it would be a policy of doubtful expediency, in view of the relations of the Mother country with a dependency so progressive and energetic as this, to check its efforts for the development of its external relations, because it may be more enterprising

(1) C.O. 209/232. No. 4996. Fergusson to Carnarvon. Confidential, 12th March '74.

(2) Ibid.

(3) C.O. 209/232. No. 7712. Fergusson to Carnarvon, secret, 8th May '74.

than others. . . . I submit that it would be a mistaken policy on the part of H.M. Government to throw obstacles in the way of Colonial commercial enterprise." Further came the illogical statement of the need to control the islands "when civilization be preceded by its questionable representatives, the overflowings of Colonial Society."!

Again before Carnarvon had formulated a reply, Fergusson wrote of alarm that was caused by Steinberger's arrival at Samoa, and that the New Zealand Ministers begged liberty "to make arrangements if only with a view of staving off for a few years the entrance of a foreign power into the group."⁽¹⁾

The wearied Colonial Office, sceptical both of dangers of foreign aggression and the extent of New Zealand interests, were not persuaded. Carnarvon did not consider his objections had been answered. Further, the cession of Fiji to Great Britain altered the whole situation. "It is obviously undesirable for the present to give a decision either in favour or against any particular scheme on so important a question."⁽²⁾

(1) C.O. 209/232. No. 10167. Fergusson to Carnarvon. 24th June '74. The arrangements were to be for shipping, customs, duties, use of ports and "perhaps the admission of chiefs' sons to native schools in New Zealand."

(2) C.O. 209/232. No. 10167. Carnarvon to Fergusson. 4th Sept. '74.

The matter was dropped for the time. Mr. Coleman Philips came to England and offered the Government his services and a little pamphlet on "British Colonization and Commerce." The latter was "read with interest by Lord Carnarvon" and returned.⁽¹⁾ Vogel presented another lengthy elaboration of his Pacific Island Commercial Company scheme in October⁽²⁾ but with no more success than on previous occasions.

Although this somewhat lengthy correspondence had not the results hoped for by New Zealand, it is in itself significant, not merely of the policy of England, but also of a change in New Zealand's attitude.

While the actions of Weber or Steinberger were causing fear of annexations in the Pacific in New Zealand, the British Government was reassured by messages from Washington⁽³⁾ and Berlin⁽⁴⁾ that neither the United States nor Germany had designs upon the islands. Nor indeed would Carnarvon have shown alarm if they had.⁽⁵⁾ "It must be doubtful," Herbert wrote, "whether

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- (1) C.O. 209/234 (Philips) No. 5953, 27th May '75. It recommended concentration of the Empire round the Indian Ocean and the abandonment of Canada.
- (2) C.O. 209/234. (Vogel) No. 12173. Vogel to Carnarvon. 18th Oct. '75.
- (3) C.O. 209/228. No. 9440. Thornton to F.O. 20th Sept. '72.
- (4) F.O. 244/283. Bulow to Odo Russell. 6th Nov. '74.
- (5) C.O. 209/233. No. 2025. Minute by Herbert to dispatch - Williams to F.O. 11th Oct. '73.

the United States will assume the Protectorate of the Navigator Islands, but if they are now for the ^{first} time disposed to assume responsibilities so far from home, they will by all accounts find the Navigators a better property than Fiji. . . . As it is not likely that we shall take possession in any form, of the Navigator Islands, we may be well satisfied to see the Americans there." The nearest approach to an expression of a desire for Samoa is in a minute by Herbert, in which he suggests that if the Bill for the purchase of Pago-Pago harbour (1) did not pass Congress, it might be advisable for Great Britain to acquire the harbour. (2) The Bill did not pass, neither did England acquire the harbour.

This examination of correspondence shows a continuity in the policy of the Home Government which is not broken by changes of office holders. Aberdeen and Palmerston in the '40's showed a disinclination to increase England's responsibilities. Lord Carnarvon followed Kimberley's policy in discouraging New Zealand in her desire to extend the British Empire in the South Seas. England was too concerned with problems of domestic policy, with Ireland, the Near and Far East, with Europe and with India., to concern herself with the

(1) See Chap. 5. p. 134

(2) C.O. 209/228. No. 9440/72.

doubtful advantages that might be gained from Vogel's plan. Carnarvon, it is true, consented to the annexation of Fiji, but that was the result of a long series of events and not a change of policy. Had there been no change of Ministry it would have been accomplished by Kimberley.

The unwillingness of the Home Government to consider New Zealand's propositions for annexing the islands was bitterly resented by Vogel. Yet it was a characteristic caution that can be defended on several grounds. In the 1870's New Zealand had only just emerged from drawn out and expensive Maori Wars which had cost England men and money. In South Africa the native problem threatened expense and unrest. Her past experiences with black and brown races were no good augury for the assumption of further responsibilities of that nature. The feeling in the British Government was indeed put concisely by Derby when he affirmed in a speech that "the Queen has black subjects enough."⁽¹⁾ Besides the question of military defence, an extended island Empire would need an extended navy. It was the English taxpayer who suffered every time.

The South Sea Islands in themselves had not enough intrinsic value for England. She had Dominions enough in

(1) Scholefield. "The Pacific." p. 113. quoted à propos of New Guinea, 1874.

which to produce coffee, coconuts, cacao, rubber, cotton and other tropical products. For Germany, sadly lacking Colonies, they might indeed be tempting. As for strategic value, it was considered that Fiji was sufficient for guarding the main ocean routes. In time of war further acquisitions would be a nuisance to defend and no advantage. The suggestion of the danger that might accrue to New Zealand from the possession by some foreign power of Samoa was treated with contempt.⁽¹⁾ Besides, the Home Government did not at this time believe that there was any likelihood of either Germany or the United States annexing islands in the Pacific. The most cogent argument in favour of acquiring Samoa was that it might be an excellent centre from which to suppress the labour trade. Fiji was, however, considered better placed for this.⁽²⁾ An attempt to control the traffic in Samoa would very probably have led to undesirable broils with the German planters.

By 1876 New Zealand was beginning to assume a new attitude toward the question of annexation. In 1871 the Colonial Government had petitioned Great Britain to annex Samoa. A year later they asked permission to be allowed to make trade

(1) C.O. 209/223. No. 1174. desp. No. 112. Bowen to Kimberley. 24th Nov. '71.

(2) As labourers were taken largely to plantations in Fiji.

treaties with island chiefs. The Colony further suggested a willingness to contribute towards costs. In 1875, however, the British Government suggested that as the annexation of Fiji was due in some measure to the long continued agitation of the Australasian Colonies for it, they might help to shoulder the burden. Lord Carnarvon suggested that each Colony concerned ⁽¹⁾ might contribute £2,000 a year towards the cost of Government. ⁽²⁾ They one and all refused. Sir Julius Vogel, replying for New Zealand, stated his case. New Zealand was anxious to take part in the government of Fiji, but he deplored the suggestion that the Colonies should be asked to contribute money and have no part in the policy. Great Britain should have asked for contributions before, not after, annexation. ⁽³⁾ "To ask for contributions from the Colonies," wrote Vogel, "was a novel proceeding, connected only with the presumed policy of casting the Colonies adrift, and that to acquiesce in it would argue an acceptance by the Colony of the new position it was desired to assign them." ⁽⁴⁾ He

(1) Queensland, New South Wales, Victoria, New Zealand.

(2) C.O. 209/230. No. 13652. Fergusson to Kimberley, 22nd Oct. '73.

(3) C.O. 209/235. No. 7568. Normanby to Carnarvon, 27th April '76.


(4) Ibid.

continued by arguing that if the Colonies were to pay for annexations that were made for their benefit they should be allowed to control the policy of what was to be annexed. He recommended that New Zealand should be required to make a statement of the pecuniary aid she would be prepared to render if further annexations, particularly the Navigator Islands, were considered.

There were no immediate results. In that year Vogel went to England as Agent-General, and in his absence the matter was dropped.

Although Vogel was the chief promoter at this time, of a policy of the annexation of Samoa, yet it became a genuine desire of many in New Zealand. The feeling in the Colony in 1886 was sufficiently strong to deter Great Britain from consenting to German annexation. Similarly in 1899 the Colonial Office reminded the Foreign Office that the Samoan question was one that affected the Australasian Colonies very deeply. ⁽¹⁾ When in 1899 the Group fell into foreign hands it became a "terra irredenta" to New Zealand, and in 1914 her first action in the Great War was to seize Western Samoa from Germany. This persistent interest was thus of no new growth, and its origin was in the remote dreams of Sir George Grey and the plans of Vogel in the '70's.

(1) Gooch and Temperley. British Documents on the Origin of the War. Vol. 1. p. 100. Samoa. C.O. to F.O. 24th Jan. 1899.



4. SKETCH MAP ILLUSTRATING THE CENTRAL POSITION OF SAMOA IN THE PACIFIC.

CHAPTER V.

American Interests in Samoa 1839-1876.

(i) The Growth of American Trade in the Pacific.

The previous chapters have shown how England was drawn into concern over the fate of Samoa, by her missionaries and traders, and by the assertions of New Zealand in the '70's. Germany's political interference followed the extensive interests of her enterprising merchants. The part played by America, which led eventually to her acquisition of Eastern Samoa, is far less easily traced. The numbers of American residents were always small. ⁽¹⁾ American shipping was less ⁽²⁾ than German or British.

Yet it was in her relations with Samoa that the United States departed from her traditional policy of non-interference in external affairs. In the early days of the independence of the United States it was a necessity as well as a matter of principle to maintain this freedom. World

(1) e.g. 1871 there were only 15 U.S. citizens reported. 1875 there were 75 English, 33 Germans and 22 U.S. in that year the U.S. numbers were larger than usual as Steinberger and at least one of his colleagues were on the island.

(2) See Fig. 1 and 2. Average No. of (American vessels 7
(British " 29
(German " 42

economic developments - the increase of trade and of rapidity in communications made this attitude hard to maintain. Nevertheless, the policy had become traditional, and it required some very cogent reason to force an aberration from it. That Samoa should have been an occasion for a departure from this traditional policy is curious. The islands never supported any large volume of American trade or other interests.

The United States trading interests in the Pacific follow three lines. The earliest is the trade with the Far East which began long before the United States had any Pacific coast line. As early as 1784 three American traders appeared off the China coast laden with ginseng. ⁽¹⁾ A continuous succession of trading ventures followed the first enterprise. In 1787 five ships were engaged in the China trade carrying furs to exchange for silks and tea. In the course of their voyages American traders came to call at the Sandwich Islands, and also occasionally at the Marquesas. The intercourse with the Sandwich Islands was furthered by the discovery there of sandalwood, for which a ready market in China could always be found. Until 1814, the North Pacific trade with China was entirely in American hands. Whaling, sealing, and pearl

(1) Callahan. "American Relations in the Pacific and the Far East." 1784-1900. p. 14.
also Greenhow. "History of California and Oregon."
Chap. X.

fishing, also drew Americans to the Pacific in the early half of the Century. Wrecked Americans were found early in the Century on the Wake, Washington, Tinian, and Fiji Islands. (1) In 1812 during the war with England, there was a brief occupation of Maddison Island (Nukuhiva) by American sailors under the U.S. Sea Captain, Porter.

Official support to the expanding trade may be said to have begun in 1832. In that year President Jackson sent an expedition to obtain trade treaties with Borneo, Siam, Cochinchina, and Japan. (2) The acquisition of California and Oregon gave American ships a shorter route by which to cross the Pacific. This persistence, increasing year by year, forced Japan to open her ports to American commerce. (3) (1852 and 1857). Similarly treaties were made with China and Korea which enabled American merchants to trade in those countries. It was this trend of American interests that drew America into Hawaiian affairs and into the eventual acquisition of Guam and the Philippines.

(1) Callahan. op. cit. p. 160.

(2) Ibid.

(3) Callahan. op. cit. Expeditions in 1832, 1846 (Biddle) 1849 (Glyn), to demand the release of U.S. prisoners. 1851 (Anlick), 1852 (Perry).

This intercourse with Asia followed roughly the lines of the old Spanish trade routes between South America and the Philippines. When California and Oregon were included in the United States, there began direct communication between San Francisco, and the Australasian ports. ⁽¹⁾ The line of sailing was through the island archipelagoes of the South Pacific. The ships usually called at Honolulu, but chose sometimes a Samoan sometimes a Tongan or a Fijian harbour as a second stopping place. It was the eminent suitability of the harbour of Pago-Pago at Tutuila as a port of call on this trans-Pacific route, that attracted American attention in the '70's.

The third route of approach to the Pacific was the much discussed Panama route. ⁽²⁾ Although not completed until 1914, the potential importance of the canal was a factor that was taken into account from the middle of the 19th Century. Had the Canal been cut in 1850-5 when the Nicaragua project was put forward, it would have opened the Western Pacific to the Eastern and Southern States of the United States. The Panama route would, for twenty years at least, have been the

(1) Principally Sydney and Melbourne in Australia, Auckland and Wellington in New Zealand.

(2) See Chap. 4. p. 91.

principal means of transit to the Western States, and it would doubtless also have become a route to New Zealand and Australia. Its failure gave greater importance to the trans-Continental railway of 1869, and the American influence on the Western Pacific was derived largely from the Western States, particularly California. ⁽¹⁾

American interests in the Navigator Islands began with the survey of the islands in 1839 by the U.S. Exploring Expedition under Commander Wilkes. ⁽²⁾ One of the principal objects of this expedition was to find harbours suitable for whaling boats in the Navigator, Tonga and Fiji Groups, and a careful and scientific survey of the islands was made. The excellent harbour of Pago-Pago was charted and its merits extolled. Wilkes's estimates of area and fertility were ⁽³⁾ quoted forty-five years later by Steinberger, and upon this account was based much of the importance which Americans later attached to the harbour.

(1) On account of the port, San Francisco.

(2) Wilkes. "Narrative of the Exploring Expedition." 1838-42. Vol. 2.

(3) 44 Congress I. Hse. Ex. Doc. No. 161. p. 35.
"Report on Samoa" by Albert Barns Steinberger. p.13.

Wilkes further took the opportunity of drawing up of a trade treaty with the de facto King, King Malietoa, newly converted, and in the regal garments of pantaloons, round jacket and pink and white striped cotton shirt, received him. The regulations agreed upon, followed the lines of the British Captain Bethune's treaty of 1838. They were framed to secure safety and good treatment to Consuls, traders and shipwrecked sailors. In return there were to be harbour and pilotage dues. No spirituous liquor was to be brought ashore, and the natives were not to shelter deserters from ships. (1) The agreement was for the benefit of all trading vessels, not merely American ones. That there was in those days at least a little American trade is implied by the fact that Wilkes appointed John Williams (afterwards H.B.M. Consul) to be United States Consul. (2)

The growth of trans-Pacific traffic in the 1850's and the completion of the trans-American railway (1869) rendered the Pacific Islands accessible to an unprecedented extent. From Australia and New Zealand on the one hand, and America on the other, adventurers trickled into the islands

(1) Wilkes. op. cit. Vol. 2. Appendix.

(2) There was a continuous succession of U.S. Consuls from this time, though they were allowed to trade as well.

hoping to make fortunes in land sales, or in growing profitable tropical products. An American Company, for example, was started to "grow cotton on the Navigator Islands,"⁽¹⁾ another for the purchase of land.⁽²⁾ Besides commercial exploitation, there was also intrigue for political power in the islands.⁽³⁾ Adventurers in Samoa, no less than in other islands, tried to fish fortunes from the troubled waters of native discontents.

The intervention of the United States Government in Samoa was the outcome of the action of individual Americans. The individuals who drew the attention of Congress to Samoa, were not traders who needed any general protection or control. They were men who sought the direct interference of the U.S. Government to further their own ends. For example, Webb wished for the ratification of Meade's treaty for the advantages that would accrue to his line, if Pago-Pago were developed by Americans. The Polynesian Land Company, likewise,

(1) C.O. 209/231. No. 1673. Reported formation of a Company for culture of cotton on the Navigator Islands, 21st Feb. '73.

(2) C.O. 209/231. No. 3131. Polynesian Land and Commercial Co. 2nd April '73.

(3) Steinberger (1875), Barclay (1880), Klein (1888) in Samoa all played major parts.

hoped to sell their land to the Government. (1) From 1871 onward, the United States was each year drawn more closely into the affairs of the islands.

Because the importance of the islands to the Americans was mainly strategic, the American centre of interest was at Pago-Pago. Apia harbour had become the centre of trade, because it was on the most important island. Upolu was fertile and carried large stretches of German plantations. The Mission Churches, the press, the Malua College, were all on that island. The majority of white people lived at Apia. The centre of native government had moved in 1867 from Malie to Mulinuu, the Western wing of Apia harbour. Commercially and politically, Apia was more important. Pago-Pago offered advantages merely as an excellent, safe harbour and port of call. From the first, American private intrigue and public policy was directed rather to securing Pago-Pago than to obtaining political dominion or commercial advantages. The United States did not wish to assume responsibilities outside her territory, but she was willing to accept privileges and advantages when the risk of conflict with other powers seemed small.

(1) C.O. 209/231. No. 3131. F.O. to C.O. 2nd April '73.

In the events that led to United States interference in island affairs, three adventurers play a part, Webb, Stewart and Steinberger. The first, W.H. Webb, was the owner and director of the Pacific Mail Line between San Francisco and New Zealand. The line was opened in 1869 and a contract was made with New Zealand to carry her mails. A certain Captain Wakeman was sent by Webb in 1871 to report upon the harbour. His report includes a good deal more. ⁽¹⁾ "I know of no other island," he says of Upolu, "with the same form of government, which all chiefs are willing and desirous of ceding to the Americans, and which would in that event be so valuable. From its commanding position in Mid-Pacific, with the control of the commerce of all the islands which are contiguous to this point, with Australia and New Zealand at their door to supply with sugar, coffee, etc., no group affords equal facility for a naval station as well as a coal depot for steamers, with a most brilliant future for a most lucrative and extensive commercial enterprise. Two places," he continues to Webb, "have been secured in the bay of Pago-Pago for your ships - the best that could be selected. As the trees, stone, earth are close at hand to fill up with and are free, nothing but the

(1) Wakeman. "Report on the Navigator Islands."
New York, 1871.

long piles for the tenders, and planks for the wharf would be required to be shipped from Puget Sound." The report was published in New York 1871, and so disseminated information of the value and desirability of the group.

The next step taken by Webb at the time of the publication of the report, was to persuade Captain Meade of the U.S.S. "Narrangansett" to conclude a treaty with Mauga⁽¹⁾ chief of Pago-Pago for the acquisition of the harbour.

Webb was concerned at this time in the Polynesian Land Company, and the acquisition of the harbour by the United States Government would have given him advantages of selling the land and rights he had acquired.

Meade negotiated his treaty with Mauga⁽²⁾ in February 1872. In return for the "friendship and protection of the great government of the United States of America," the United States were to have "the exclusive privilege of establishing in the said harbour of Pago-Pago on the island of Tutuila, a naval station for the use and convenience of the vessels of the U.S. Government."⁽³⁾

(1) Meade wrote to Webb informing him of the action taken. C.O. 209/226 No. 8805. encl. in Bowen to Kimberley 4th April '72.

(2) Mauga had petitioned England for annexation, in 1865. F.O. 58/105. Williams to Earl Russell. 14th July '65.

(3) 44 Congress 1. Hse. Ex. Doc. No. 161. p. 2. Fish to President Grant 1st May '76.

In itself the treaty was dubious. It was questionable whether Mauga as one of the several chiefs on Tutuila had the right to grant such privileges. Meade had, on his side, no authority to offer the protection of the United States. Indeed it was the implied promise of protection that proved fatal to the ratification of the treaty. President Grant, himself, received the treaty favourably, but it was thrown out by the Senate. ⁽¹⁾ But in the ensuing years, Mauga sincerely believed that the treaty held good, and that the United States would intervene on his behalf against foreign powers, if occasion should arise.

Although the treaty was not ratified, and the petition of the chiefs for direct annexation, which arrived in April, was refused, the matter was not allowed to drop. "About that time," wrote the Secretary of State, Fish, to Steinberger ⁽²⁾ a year later, "About that time the attention of the government was directed by highly respectable commercial persons, to the importance of the growing trade and commerce of the United States with the islands in the South Pacific Ocean, and to the opportunities of increasing our

(1) 44 Congress 1. Hse. Exec. Doc. No. 161. p. 6.
Message of President to the Senate 22nd May '76.

(2) Ibid. p. 2. Fish to President Grant. 1st May '76.

commercial relations in that quarter of the globe." It was pointed out that Samoa lay in the direct track of that trade. It was decided to prosecute further inquiries and a Colonel A.B. Steinberger was chosen as agent to report upon the islands.

It seems highly probable that the "highly respectable commercial persons" referred to above were acting in conjunction with the second venture that attracted American interests to the islands.

In conjunction with Webb was a certain James Stewart who also attempted to draw the United States into intervention in Samoan affairs. After some association with his brother in a shady venture in Tahiti ⁽¹⁾ he fell out with him, and turned his attention to a new enterprise. He proposed, and carried through, the formation of a Company known as "The Central Polynesian Land and Commercial Company." From his own account to the trustees, ⁽²⁾ it was incorporated under the laws of California for "a) the purchase and acquisition of lands in the Navigator Islands, and the cultivation, sale, lease or

(1) Stonehewer Cooper. "Coral Lands." Vol. 2. p. 30.

(2) Ibid. Stonehewer Cooper. op. cit. p. 30.

otherwise disposing of the same: b) the formation of a coaling station for the U.S., New Zealand and Australian Mail Steamship line: c) the establishment of a central Polynesian Depôt to be connected with the various groups of the South Pacific." He hoped to raise capital of \$100,000 in a thousand shares of \$100 each. Webb had the option of taking at cost price an interest amounting to 54/100ths of the lands purchased, and he also had the advantage of the harbour chosen by his agent for his steamship line. Consequently Stewart planned to buy land round Pago-Pago harbour at a low price. When the harbour became an important coaling station his Company would, of course, reap the benefit by selling their land at a profitable price.

Stewart arrived in Samoa to buy land just after Captain Meade's departure (Feb. 1872). He purchased "from the chiefs of Upolu, Savaii, Manono and Tutuila 414 square miles of land "which, with previous purchases, amounted to 300,000 acres. He made arrangements for establishing a commercial depot at Tutuila and during his stay the petition of the chiefs of Tutuila for annexation was sent to President Grant. (1) (17th April '72). The petition was duly received

(1) See p. 113.

and acknowledged but little attention was paid to it. (1)

The success of the Central Polynesian Land and Commercial Company depended upon the rapid development of the islands which would enable them to dispose of their land at profit. With the United States acquisition of Pago-Pago harbour they hoped to make Tutuila the centre for a big American trading concern. The failure of Congress to ratify Meade's treaty, the discontinuation of the steamship line, and the withdrawal of all Webb's interests in 1872, threatened destruction to Stewart's plans. He made another bid for official support in 1874. In that year a Bill was introduced into the House of Representatives for the purchase of Pago-Pago harbour. (2) The Bill expressly provided that the purchase should "not be construed to authorize any negotiations for the annexation or political control of the islands" which might seem contrary to United States policy. As Herbert noted in a minute, (3) the passing of the Bill depended upon "the amount of influence which the powers who desire to make a good sale of their property in Samoa, can bring to bear upon members."

(1) C.O. 209/228. No. 9440. F.O. to C.O. 20th May '73.
Encl. Thornton to F.O. 18th Nov. '72.

(2) C.O. 209/233. No. 6966. F.O. to C.O. 19th June '74.
Enclos. dispatch from Thornton.

(3) Ibid.

The Bill, however, was indefinitely postponed,⁽¹⁾ and the Polynesian Land and Commercial Company disappeared for a time. In 1877 Stewart reappeared in some discreditable intrigues in native affairs.

The account given by Steinberger in his report of⁽²⁾ the activities of Stewart's Company is not to its credit. "I found," he wrote, "in Pago-Pago and Apia the representatives of the 'Polynesian Land Company.' Of the originators of this scheme of speculation in these islands, I know but little, and that not creditable to their antecedents nor their more recent acts in connection with it. The San Francisco stockholders, and one James McKee of the Sandwich Islands are certainly innocent and highly respectable gentlemen, whose money has been squandered and their reputation stained by adventurers representing them on the islands. Trading posts were established by the Company at Pago-Pago and Apia, and large tracts of land purchased from the natives during the war, arms and ammunition given to the belligerents in trade for valuable property - a far-off cousin giving a deed for land belonging to the family with whom he was at war; contracts

(1) C.O. 209/234. No. 2454. F.O. to C.O. 15th July '75.
encl. dispatch from Thornton to F.O.

(2) 43 Congress 1. Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 45. p. 36.
Steinberger's Report on the Nav. Islands.

were made for immense tracts of land at nominal prices, a paltry sum in guns and powder and lead being paid as a bonus, the remainder to be paid in two years."

Nothing eventually came of this Company. Much of their lands they attempted to dispose of by auction - and a good many of their sales lapsed. ⁽¹⁾ The political significance of the venture ceased with the failure of the Bill to purchase the harbour.

The third adventurer to attempt to enmesh the United States Government in Samoan affairs was Colonel A.B. Steinberger. For a brief three years he flashed brightly across the pages of Samoan history, and then disappeared into the obscurity from which he emerged. Stonehewer Cooper, who knew the islands well, and who gives some account of Stewart, states that Steinberger had been a clerk in Stewart's office in San Francisco. ⁽²⁾ It seems probable that it was on Stewart's suggestion that Webb recommended Steinberger as "a competent person to visit the Navigator Islands and report upon their condition." ⁽³⁾ Whatever expectations Stewart and Webb had

(1) Ibid.

(2) Stonehewer Cooper. "Coral Lands." p. 38.

(3) 44 Congress 1. House Ex. Doc. No. 111. No. 2 Stewart to Webb. 28th June '72.

hoped from Steinberger, he on his part determined to play his own game, as the report on Stewart's Company (quoted above) shows. It seems highly probable that it was this that caused Steinberger's failure in 1875. His most persistent antagonist was the U.S. Consul Foster, and Foster was on occasion auctioning the land of the Polynesian Land Company. ⁽¹⁾ This and his advent from Tahiti in 1872 ⁽²⁾ about the same time as Stewart, who also came from Tahiti, seem to show that they may have been working in conjunction. This would account for Foster's hostility to Steinberger during his brief period of influence in Samoa.

It was thus probably through the influence of Stewart and Webb that Steinberger was appointed as Special Commissioner to report on the Navigator Islands. He received his final instructions in March 1873. ⁽³⁾ He was to give full information on the islands, products, inhabitants and harbours. "It is not unlikely," wrote Fish, "that perhaps in the most distant future the interests of the United States may require, not only a naval station in the Samoan Group, but a harbour where

(1) 44 Congress 2. Hse. Ex. Doc. No. 44. p. 2. No. 1.
Steinberger to Fish 30th Oct. '75.

(2) 44 Congress 1. Hse. Ex. Doc. No. 161. p. 75. No. 16
Steinberger to Fish. 19th Nov. '74.

(3) 44 Congress 1. Hse. Ex. Doc. No. 161. p. 5.
Fish to Steinberger 29th March '73.

steam and other vessels also may freely and securely frequent. Full and accurate information in regard to the islands will be necessary to enable the Government here to determine as to the measures which may be advisable toward attaining that object. There was indeed the definite consideration of the first step, that of winning favours with the natives, that later committed America to a virtual condominium with Germany and Great Britain - quite contrary to her usual policy.

Steinberger left San Francisco in June 1873⁽¹⁾ and returned in December. His mission had been accomplished with success. His observations were minute and probably accurate. His tact with natives and Europeans won him confidence. He had helped to promulgate laws and draft a constitution. Letters from various residents teem with friendship and hope for his speedy return as a representative of a United States protectorate. "Your honest kindly spirit" wrote Dr. Turner⁽²⁾ of the London Missionary Society, "has won their" (the natives) "esteem and love, and you leave with the hearty good wishes of the entire native population. You may feel assured that you have the hearty co-operation of all honest men, and all who have the welfare of the native race at heart." "Providence,"

(1) 24 June '73.

(2) 43 Congress 1. Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 45. p. 52.
Turner to Steinberger 7th Oct. '73.

wrote the Roman Catholic Bishop Elloy,"⁽¹⁾ seems to show that the Government of the United States is to take on the matter" of bringing to an end the unsettled state of the islands. The Wesleyan Minister, the Rev. George Brown,⁽²⁾ wrote that he rejoiced when he "heard of the petition sent by the chiefs asking for a protectorate from the Government of the United States." It was evident that there was a widespread desire on the part of natives and whites that there should be some political organization authorized by one or other foreign power in the islands. Secondly, the general impression was undoubtedly that Steinberger's mission was primarily political. Thirdly, Steinberger himself believed that his government was seriously contemplating a direct influence over Samoa. Though he was guarded and noncommittal in his speeches to the Samoan chiefs, they evidently believed as he did. They sent a present of a staff and fly flap, symbols of authority in Samoa, to President Grant, and they prayed him to allow Steinberger to return and to help them to rule.⁽³⁾

By December '73 Steinberger had returned to Washington apparently confident that the United States would accept this

(1) Ibid. p. 53. Elloy to Steinberger. 29th Sept. '73.

(2) Ibid. p. 53. Brown to Steinberger. Sept. '73.

(3) 44 Congress 1. Hse. Ex. Doc. No. 161. p. 56.
Chiefs to President. 3rd Oct. '73. (see appendix)

new responsibility. "They seek American protection" he wrote to Fish of the Samoans. "It seems to be a matter of moment that the government will send a minister or commissioner with plenipotentiary powers to recognise their government and treat them as an independent people."⁽¹⁾ He estimated the requirements of a protectorate and suggested an extension of interests to the "Gilbert, Ellice and Kingsmill Groups."⁽²⁾ Some months elapsed. Steinberger was determined to return to the islands where before he had been so well received and which offered scope for his ambitions. In the autumn of 1874 he left for Europe and entered into negotiations with the Godeffroy firm at Hamburg.

The political importance of his transactions with the German firm is difficult to gauge. He mentioned his action in a dispatch to Fish. "In the interests of the Samoans I have conferred with Messrs. Godeffroy of Hamburg," he wrote.

He considered he had secured promises that the action of the "Arcona"⁽³⁾ would not be repeated; land sales must cease. The Godeffroys further would use their influence "to secure the recognition of the Samoan Government by Germany."⁽⁴⁾ But the

(1) Ibid. p. 71. Steinberger to Fish. 8th April '74.

(2) Ibid. p. 72. Incidentally Gilbert and Kingsmill are different names for the same group of Islands.

(3) Chap. 3.

(4) 44 Congress 1. Hse. Ex. Doc. No. 161. p. 75.
Steinberger to Fish 19th Nov. '74.

agreement which came to light at the time of ~~his~~ deportation from Samoa shows that he was playing a double game. ⁽¹⁾ It assumed that he would return as U.S. Commissioner to establish a fixed government. He pledged himself to further the interests of the German firm, and to avoid connections with American or English. Steinberger later declared that on becoming Samoan Premier he was excused the execution of these pledges to the Germans. But surely if they were compromising for a Samoan Premier they would have been far more so for a United States Commissioner! There were also various conditions in the agreement for trading:- free trade but for a tax on spirits and pilot dues, harbour dues. The firm were to have a monopoly of paper mulberry. The taxes of the Samoan Government were to be raised in copra and sold to the firm - for which Steinberger was to receive a 10 per cent. commission. Further they lent sums of money up to 1,400 Dollars, so that Steinberger could purchase a steam yacht, the "Peerless", to use for governmental purposes.

Though the terms were to further the commercial interests of the Godeffroy firm, Germany gained no political

(1) 44 Congress 2. Hse. Ex. Doc. No. 44. pp. 128-134.
Foster to Hunter, 18th March '76, enclosing
Steinberger's correspondence with J.C. Godeffroy.

advantages. The establishment of civil order was in the interests of trade. Steinberger on the other hand genuinely considered that annexation by America was a probability in no long time. (1)

On his return to America, Steinberger reminded the Secretary of State of affairs of Samoa. "The Samoan Islands," he wrote to Fish, (2) "lie directly in the track of commerce between San Francisco and the English Colonies; their population is about a quarter less than that of the Sandwich Islands, and is increasing. The natives are mild and tractable and Christianized." Further, by the offer to the United States President of the sacred "staff and fly flap," they virtually "tender their country in parting with these symbols. Further legislation will determine the action of the United States in this, but I am confident of my ability and the devotion of the natives to make Samoa valuable, creditable and popular." Steinberger hinted that he should be allowed to return with "such diplomatic powers" as would give him precedence over the Americans and other Consuls. He suggested suitable presents to give the Samoan Government.

(1) 44 Congress 1. Hse. Ex. Doc. No. 161. p. 71.
Steinberger to Fish. 8th April '74.

(2) Ibid. p. 75. Steinberger to Fish. 19th Nov. '74.

Fish replied in December '74, authorizing him to proceed to the islands at his own expense with a letter of friendship from President Grant and presents for the Chiefs. (1) But though he commented on the advantages which the Group had to offer, he concluded, "It is more than doubtful, however, whether these considerations would be sufficient to satisfy our people that the annexation of those islands to the United States is essential to our safety and prosperity. In any event supposing that the general sentiment should be favourable to such a measure, I am not aware that it has received such an expression as would require an acknowledgment by the Government and warrant measures on our part accordingly. It is deemed inexpedient without such a call from the public to originate a measure adverse to the usual traditions of the Government, and which, therefore, probably would not receive

(1) Ibid. p.76. Fish to Steinberger. 11th Dec. '74.

The presents consisted of -

1 Gatling gun and 1,000 cartridges

2 12 lb. bronze guns and 200 rounds of ammunition

1 3 " Parrot gun and 100 " " "

1 Broyle boat howitzer with ammunition.

1 Forge, 100 Sailor suits, flannel clothing and caps.

3 U.S. Flags and bunting, some band instruments

12 revolvers.

Of these Thornton wrote "It is said, moreover, that the guns are very old and are more likely to do harm to those who use them than to anyone else!"

C.O. 209/234. No. 2166. encl. Thornton to Derby, 8th Feb. '75.

such a sanction as would be likely to secure its success. Under these circumstances, your functions will be limited to observing and reporting upon Samoan affairs, and to impressing those in authority there with the lively interest which we take in their happiness and welfare."⁽¹⁾

Steinberger executed this simple mission in Samoa with the necessary discretion. The sequel came quickly. A new constitution was drawn up by the natives, and he was asked to become Prime Minister in July '75. This he accepted⁽²⁾ and it seems probable that he considered that this would be a step welcome to the American Government.

As Prime Minister Steinberger served his newly acquired country with admirable zeal, seeking first the welfare and protection of the natives and teaching them how to organize their lives with a minimum of friction with foreign residents. An elaborate constitution was drawn up with two representative houses of Parliament - the Taimua of seven chiefs and the Faipule of elected representatives.⁽³⁾ The King was only to hold his office for four years and he was to be chosen

(1) Ibid. p. 76.

(2) 44 Congress 1. No. 161. p. 81. Steinberger to Fish
4th July '75.

(3) In 1873 the Taimua had 15 chiefs but this was reduced to 7. In the Faipule there were roughly 1 for every 2,000 persons.

alternately from the two Royal families of Malietoa and Tupua. The underlying ideas were undoubtedly American and the preamble to the laws was a veritable Declaration of Rights, entirely out of keeping with Samoan customs and thought. (1)

For administrative purposes the chiefs were given special powers in their own districts. The whole spirit of his administration seems genuinely inspired with a desire to teach these people principles of rule based on Christianity. The country was quiet and willing to be ruled. Later verdicts on his government witness to its efficiency. "He appears," says Mr. Griffin the United States Consul, (2) to succeed Foster, Steinberger's contemporary, "He appears to have realized . . . every just expectation of the government and people who had invested him with all but absolute power. . . . He was self denying, earnest and enthusiastic in his efforts to ameliorate the condition of the people and to raise their government and country to the dignity and independence of a well ordered and independent nation." He was afterwards "looked upon by the natives as the wisest and safest ruler and best friend that their country has ever had." In fact,

(1) 50-1. Hse. Ex. Doc. No. 238. p. 194. Report by Bates. Encl. Bl. "Samoa Times" 17th Aug. '78.

(2) 44 Congress 2. Hse. Ex. Doc. 44. Griffin to Fish, 2nd Feb. '77.

although his deportation involved immediate confusion and rebellion, his system of government lingered on and was the basis of subsequent governments. It was, however, his own guidance that had made it efficient for a short time, and when that was withdrawn the confusion was worse than before.

The good reception that Steinberger was accorded by Europeans in 1873 was due in large measure to the belief that the United States intended to undertake the government of the country. It is probable that between 1873-5 the opinions of British residents changed. Before that date the prime need was some power to establish order. England would have been preferred but England had already refused to consider any annexation schemes. In the meanwhile (1873-5) the New Zealand proposals were becoming known. A New Zealand Commissioner ⁽¹⁾ had reported upon the islands to the New Zealand Government, and in 1874 the New Zealand Government ⁽²⁾ published a Blue Book on the South Sea Islands. The annexation of Fiji by Great Britain in 1874 may further have given rise to hopes among British residents that British

(1) William Seed.

(2) Appendix to the Journal of the N.Z. House of Representatives. 1874 - Papers relating to the South Sea Islands.

authority might some day be extended to Samoa. Further, America's attitude seemed remarkably vague. It gradually came to be realized that Steinberger in his assumption of rule in Samoa, was not acting under the authority of the United States Government. Foster, the U.S. Consul ⁽¹⁾ wrote to Washington and asked for a statement of Steinberger's official position. The answer which arrived, January '76, was explicit. "Any official or semi-official connection he (Steinberger) may have had with this Government is terminated," ⁽²⁾ wrote - "On neither occasion did his visit have any diplomatic or political significance whatever. Colonel Steinberger was not authorized or empowered by the United States to form a government in Samoa, or to pledge the United States to sustain, in any way, directly or indirectly, any government that he might form or assist forming. . . . The U.S. Consul is the only representative of the United States in the Samoan Islands, and you will so inform the missionaries and others interested."

This left Steinberger at the mercy of his antagonists. It seems probable that apart from reasons given above, his

(1) See p. 119. He may have been connected with the Polynesian Land Company and opposed Steinberger because of his opposition to it.

(2) 44 Congress 1. Hse. Ex. Doc. No. 161. p. 125. Campbell to Foster. 12th Jan. '76.

influence with natives, and his advocacy of religious toleration incurred the jealousy and opposition of the missionaries. (1) His laws and regulations detracted from the influence of the Consuls, (2) and annoyed beachcombers and publicans. (3) Indeed, there were very few white residents who supported him. (4)

The Samoans, on the other hand, were delighted with his rule. (5) "We are pleased," wrote Malietoa to President Grant, "because by the laws we know what is bad . . . We are thankful that Col. Steinberger has arrived here . . . It is like the love of God to our country. Our wish is still to have this gentleman with us because these people are so obstinate," and again, "We are pleased with this wise and kind-hearted gentleman." Poppe, the German Consul, also testifies to his good rule. (6)

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- (1) The Rev. Whitmee and Dr. Turner in particular. Both had received him well at first.
 - (2) The two who opposed him were the U.S. Consul Foster and H.B.M. Consul S.F. Williams - the grandson of the missionary.
 - (3) 44 Congress 1. Hse. Ex. Doc. No. 161. p. 70. Turner to Steinberger, 29th Oct. '73. He writes of the anger of free publicans at the liquor laws directed against grog-selling on Sunday.
 - (4) Only the German Consul Poppe and his associates, Jonas ~~Lee~~, an American, who was deported with him and one or two in his service.
 - (5) 44 Congress 1. Hse. Ex. Doc. No. 161. p. 96. Malietoa to Pres. Grant. 19th Oct. '75.
 - (6) Ibid. p. 97.

Nevertheless, by December '75 there had grown up intense hostility to Steinberger's government. He was criticized and abused. Prisoners tried under his government were claimed by Foster and liberated. The arrival of H.M.S. "Barracouta" (12th Dec. '75) rang up the curtain on the last act of his little drama. Steinberger feared British annexation of Samoa. Foster and Williams hoped to get support in their determination to remove Steinberger from Samoa. On 17th December Foster seized Steinberger's yacht, the "Peerless," for transgressing the United States neutrality laws. (1) It had been used entirely for the benefit of the Samoan Government, and flew both Samoan and United States flag. Steinberger's protests were of no avail, and it was only after many months had elapsed that Foster's action received the cold disapproval of the Government at Washington.

Further, the Consuls persuaded Captain Stevens of the "Barracouta" to hold an inquiry into Steinberger's conduct. The accusations against him were at first petty. The real inquiry was into his position on the islands. "I

(1) 44 Congress 2. No. 44. Steinberger to Fish.
8th Jan. '76. Enclosures C. Correspondence re
Yacht "Peerless."

cannot understand", said Stevens, ⁽¹⁾ "how Steinberger can hold office under the Samoan Government, be a special commissioner of the United States, and at the same time be an American citizen; because I observe on p. 77 of Acts of 43 Congress ch. 294 that no ambassador can hold office under any foreign Government." ⁽²⁾ Steinberger gave instances. He was asked to show his papers. He produced the somewhat inadequate evidence of a passport and the letter from Secretary Fish. Malietoa made a valiant attempt to defend him. ⁽³⁾ "We now wish to impress truly on you," he said, "that he is neither an adventurer nor a schemer, but he is a gentleman whom we requested the President of the United States to send us . . . to assist us in establishing our government. . . . We do not wish him to have a commission for the United States to establish our government; he has taken the oath of allegiance to our government, and we will protect him." Alas! for the vain boast! The King himself was inveigled into betraying him. Into the midst of these

(1) 44 Congress 2. Hse. Ex. Doc. 44. p. 8.
Proceedings of meeting at Mulinuu, 24th Dec. '75.

(2) Ibid. 27th Dec. '75.

(3) Ibid. p. 20.

inquiries arrived Campbell's letter⁽¹⁾ explaining that Steinberger had now no official connection with the United States. Steinberger was in the hands of the Consuls. Natives could be wheedled and hoaxed. Malietoa was persuaded to write an appeal to Stevens to remove Steinberger. He was consequently seized and imprisoned on the "Barracouta." The natives could do nothing to save him, but they turned on Malietoa and drove him from the seat of government. Thus civil war again broke out - a war that lasted until 1880 -1. Captain Stevens, misguided but well-meaning, once more dipped a ponderous finger into the Samoan pie. A last effort to reinstate the feeble Malietoa over his contemptuous government, resulted in an affray in which three British sailors were killed and eight injured.⁽²⁾ (11th March '76). With that Stevens retired not merely from the scene of his endeavour, but also, eventually, from his position in the navy.

Steinberger pained, bitter, penniless, poured his grievances into the abysmal files of the government, but he never returned to Samoa. His memory was kept green by

(1) 44 Congress 1. No. 161. p. 124. Campbell to Foster. 12th Jan. '76.
also 44 Congress 2. No. 44. Campbell to Griffin, 23rd June '76. Campbell expresses the govt. disapproval of Foster's conduct.

(2) 44 Congress 2. Le Mamea to President, 1st May '76.

the natives for many years. Foster, too, was replaced, and the islands returned, from a temporary lapse into order, to their more wonted anarchy.

The rule of Steinberger in Samoa, though in itself but an incident of brief duration, is nevertheless not without significance. It reveals the attitude of the United States. Taken as a whole the policy is one of noninterference, but there is also a forecast of her later actions which were to draw her into taking an active part in Samoan affairs. When the United States consented to become party in the condominium of 1899, or even in the co-operation in restoring order between 1881-5, this was a departure from her accustomed policy.

The part played by the United States Government in 1872-5 shows a desire to inquire into the resources of the islands - an inquiry which it was hinted ⁽¹⁾ might lead to further steps. This is in continuation of Seward's line of thought, when he saw the Pacific as an important factor in future history. "Its shores, its islands and the vast regions beyond," he said, "will become the chief theatre of

(1) 44 Congress 1. No. 161. p. 5. Fish to Steinberger, 29th March '73.

events in the world's great hereafter." ⁽¹⁾ Yet Steinberger's commission was informal, special and confidential. ⁽²⁾ Though he wished to go under the mantle of authority, the Government ⁽³⁾ was emphatic in denying that he had any official position. Sir Edward Thornton, the British Minister in Washington, it is true, reported that Steinberger had "confidential instructions from the president with a view to his instilling into the minds of the Samoans a desire for a Protectorate by, or perhaps even annexation to the United States." ⁽⁴⁾ Steinberger succeeded in instilling a desire for annexation to America into the Samoan mind, but the appeals to America for annexation that were made in 1872, and again in 1876, and 1877, were all refused. Though Fish and Grant may have favoured the prospect of spreading the wings of United States protection over Samoa, Congress would not sanction departure from her policy of aloofness from foreign entanglements. "Our policy of non-intervention," Seward had written when he was Secretary of State, ⁽⁵⁾ "straight, absolute, and peculiar as it may seem

(1) Callahan, J.M. "American Relations in the Pacific and the East." Ch. IX. p. 160.

(2) 44 Congress 1. Hse. Ex. Doc. No. 161. 29th March '73.

(3) Ibid. Fish to Foster, 12th Jan. '76.

(4) C.O. 209/234. No. 2116. Thornton to Derby, 8th Feb. '75.

(5) Henderson. "American Diplomatic Questions."
111 "The United States and Samoa." p. 207.

to other nations, has thus become a traditional one which could not be abandoned without the most urgent occasion, amounting to a manifest necessity."

Of the general opinion in America there are but few indications. The unpopularity of Grant, and the cloud under which the Government existed partly accounts for the derision with which Steinberger's commission was treated by opposition newspapers. Indeed, it was suggested that the President should be called to account the next session, for having taken it upon himself to send a vessel of war with Colonel Steinberger to the islands. "That President Grant should lend the credit of the United States to such an undertaking is simply astounding," ran the "New York Herald."⁽¹⁾ "Every tradition of the Republic is wantonly outraged for the sake of a little silly byplay in the presence of a mob of naked savages. The American President in secret and without the consent either of Congress or the country sends off an adventurer in a vessel belonging to the American navy to make one breechclout, King of the breechclouts. An American officer assists in these degrading performances. . . . The American people cannot look with favour upon the silly farce he has led the country

(1) N.Y. Herald. 21st July '75. Also C.O. 209/234.
No. 9282. Thornton to Derby. 26th July '75.

into playing before the eyes of all the world."

The abrupt termination of Steinberger's rule is not the end but the beginning of American interests. Besides revealing the opinion to some extent of Grant, and Fish and of Congress, the affair defined the lines of future American policy. The Californian adventurers who hoped to make fortunes by the sale of land round Pago-Pago harbour, Steinberger and his associates drew notice to the little group, and its extremely favourable position. The implication of Foster in the deportation of Steinberger led to his removal, and the United States Consul who replaced him spoke warmly of the deported Premier. There grew up a feeling among American residents in Samoa and probably to a small extent too in California, that America had an especial interest in Samoa. Although quite unauthorized to do so, on two occasions when there was fear of German or British aggression, United States Consuls hoisted the Stars and Stripes ⁽¹⁾ as an indication that America was considered to have the right to annex. There was a very strong pro-American feeling among the natives. The party that

(1) (23rd May '77. U.S. Consul Colmesnil) See Chap. 6.
(22nd Feb.'78. " Griffin)

represented Steinberger's government, the Taimua and Faipule remained loyal to him. It was they who sent an embassy in 1877 to plead for annexation by the United States. The outcome of this deputation was the treaty of 1878 which, by promising the Samoans the vague "good offices" of the United States drew America into the tangle which thickened into a condominium, and which was not unravelled until 1899 when the Eastern islands were apportioned to America.

Indirectly the deportation of Steinberger hastened the interference of Germany and England in native affairs. The civil war that followed Malietoa's dethronement intensified insecurity of life and property. The German treaty of 1877 was largely a protest against this. The eventual joint interference of Germany and Great Britain in 1879 was the direct outcome of this.

CHAPTER VI.

The Years of Unrest that led to the
German, American and British Treaties with Samoa,
1876-79.

The civil war that followed the deportation of Steinberger and the deposition of Malietoa, brought the native question, as it affected the white community in Samoa, to a head. From the first Great Britain had maintained the ideal which she had absorbed from the missionaries, the ideal of native autonomy. The history of Samoa is indeed the history of the failure of that ideal either to profit natives or white men, or indeed eventually to be compatible with civilized law and order. In face of foreign enterprise and native impotence and vacillation, Great Britain was forced to admit that the islands must be submitted to some form of foreign government, whether to the condominium of several powers or to the annexation by one.

The establishment of a unified and peaceable government had been in Tahiti, in Hawaii, in Tonga, and even in Fiji, very greatly simplified by the native form, or acceptance of the form, of monarchical government under missionary influence. The King became Christian, the people followed

his example. He made laws that applied to all. The matter resolved itself into one problem, that of winning the ear of the King. In Samoa, however, the kingship or highest title carried no powers of legislation or, more important, the enforcement of laws; neither was he supreme over all districts in his rule. If the Samoan "King" (lit: high chief) became Christian, this was sufficient reason for a large party to remain heathen, or to join an opposition sect. The districts that elected high chiefs, were by tradition opposed to one another. "There are rival provinces," wrote R.L. Stevenson, "far more concerned in the prosecution of their rivalry than in the choice of a right man for King. If one of these shall have bestowed its name on competitor A, it will be the signal and sufficient reason for the other to bestow its name on competitor B. or C."⁽¹⁾

Thus, with a powerless King having only a shadow of authority over the bare majority of the districts in his kingdom, surrounded by powerful and autocratic chiefs, it was inevitable that wars between rival chiefs should rend the islands frequently. There were wars when Williams visited

(1) R.L. Stevenson. "A Footnote to History." p. 73.

the islands in 1830. (1) For a time peace followed the introduction of Christianity, but another outbreak in 1845 (2) lasted ten years. In 1869 two claimants of the Malietoa family, the uncle Malietoa Talavou, and the nephew, Malietoa Laupepa, disputed the power and again caused intermittent wars for twelve years. Talavou was established in 1873, but Steinberger replaced him by Laupepa in 1875. In 1876 Laupepa was deposed by Steinberger's parliament, the Taimua and Faipule who attempted to rule without any King. Malietoa's party, the Puletua, however, increased in strength by slow degrees, partly through supplies of ammunition from European traders, partly through the decline in power, incident upon their inefficiency, of the Taimua and Faipule. The eventual support by the Consuls and British and German battleships of the Puletua, or Royal party, involved the anointing of Malietoa Talavou as King on 5th May, 1879. (3) Still the foreign powers were not able to induce the rebel party to acquiesce in this arrangement until 1880. (4) Even then the death of

(1) Williams. "A Narrative of Missionary Enterprise." Chap.

(2) "Samoa Reporter." 1845. seq.

(3) F.O. 58/165. Swanston to Salisbury. 2nd June '79.

(4) 4th June '80. Graves to Granville. 5th June '80.

Malietao Talavou in 1881 involved temporary disorders. An agreement made on board the U.S. ship "Lackawanna" (12th July '81) gave peace for some four years. (1)

Nowhere was it more clearly shown than in Samoa, that a king, or a constitution, set up by Europeans could not be maintained except by those who had given the authority in the first place. Autonomous government, as applied to Pacific States was a myth covering an unsatisfactory condition of partial and half-hearted interference. In 1885 Mr. Charles St. Julian had emphasized this. (2) "By the influence of the great maritime powers, or any one of them," he had written, "especially Great Britain, the native chieftains might be induced to combine for the construction of a government among themselves. But such a government, when constructed, would have to be supported by the same influence which called it into existence, or it would not long endure. And while it did endure, it would exist only in name, and would be powerless for good."

The King, who received the support of foreign Consuls was in no enviable position. He was expected to

(1) F.O. 58/177. Graves to Granville. 18th Nov. '81.

(2) See Chap. 2. F.O. 58/82. Memo by S. Julian to Gov. Denison. 10th May '55.

control local chiefs, to promulgate laws, to punish offenders, to raise taxes, to build roads, all, it may be said, for the eventual benefit of the foreigner. Gradually to instil foreign principles of liberty, of justice or of law might be the work of a Steinberger in Samoa, or a Pritchard in Tahiti. That was not the method of the Consuls. They agreed on the appointment of a king, and they badgered him to set up his Government according to their ideas. Little wonder was it that the much harrassed Malietoa offered his uneasy crown to England, or New Zealand or America.

Besides the conflict arising from the vague, indefinite, Samoan theory of kingship and the closely-defined, authoritative European one, Samoan usage clashed with foreign upon other points. Two particular points of variance chafed foreigners and Samoans alike. As has been pointed out, ⁽¹⁾ one of the features of Samoan custom was their communism. This made of unusual difficulty the sale of land. In the decades 1860 to 1896 very large tracts of land were sold. In fact in 1889 the land claims were

(1) Introduction.

(1)
estimated as follows:-

British	about	950,000	acres
German	"	100,000	"
American	"	650,000	"

The total area claimed was 1,700,000 acres - some 1,000,000 acres more than the total estimated area of land on all the islands!

Land was sold twice, was inadequately paid for, was sold dishonestly to honest buyers, was settled and not bought. Natives were cheated and defrauded - as were probably some of the white men. Speculators⁽²⁾ bought large tracts of land at low prices to sell again at a profit. Natives having once parted with their lands often lived to regret the sale, and among the most popular schemes in this troubled period prior to 1879 were those to sell back land to the natives. Consul Liardet attributes Steinberger's early success to his promises to get the land for the natives.⁽³⁾ Land disputes inevitably caused friction either between two white claimants or between white and native. In both events the result was much bad blood, sometimes

(1) B.F.S.P. Vol. 85. p. 954. Hatzfield to Salisbury 10th Feb. '92.

(2) e.g. Polynesian Land Co., McArthur & Co. of Auckland, who between 1883 and '87 had bought two-thirds of the land on Savaii.

(3) F.O. 58/156. Liardet to Wylde - confidential - 18th Oct. '77.

retaliation and often participation in intrigue. By 1889 the land question was among the most pressing to be settled by the Berlin Congress. ⁽¹⁾ The Commission, appointed by them did not finish their work until 1894.

The extent of land owned by the Germans was begrudged by the Samoans and accounts, in part, for German unpopularity. Disputed lands caused friction between rival traders. ⁽²⁾ As disputes became more intense, they became also international, the German Consul supporting the German claimant, the American Consul the Californian, or the British ⁽³⁾ the British trader. Thus the land question served to foment international hostility.

We find then, the Samoans, often dispossessed of their lands by unfair means, with little to control them beyond ancient custom and a tribal chief, breaking free of the former under the influence of Christianity, and of the

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- (1) B.F.S.P. Vol. 81. pp. 1217-1273. Protocols of Berlin Conferences, 29th April - 14th June '89.
- (2) When others began buying land. Americans bought from 1871 onward - N.Z. firms only began to buy land on a large scale after 1883.
- (3) e.g. in 1887 a dispute between Weber (German) and McArthur (N.Z. over the land on Mulinuu Pt. Correspondence between G.B., Germany and the U.S. 1885-8. B.F.S.P. Vol. 79. (No. 178. Wilton to Salisbury, 26th Sept. '87). pp. 963-1053.

latter under the persuasion of white men. The area from which they could obtain their food was thus greatly diminished. They themselves occupied between 1876-81 in warfare neglected to cultivate their own village plantations. Warfare involved, not merely destruction of villages and plantations, but also that the hungry natives, unable to conceive of stored up private property, regarded the fruit-laden lands of the Europeans (primarily German) as fair game for spoliation.

Indignant German planters demanded the seizure and punishment of offenders. The first offered a big problem, the second a bigger. There was no one to take the responsibility of seizing or punishing effectively. There were, indeed, native courts, but they were of little use. Maudslay, who after Liardet's death, became Consul in Samoa for a few months, describes the ineffectiveness of native courts. (1) A judge pleading with a convicted prisoner begged him to pay the fine "for my sake," but the prisoner replied that he would die first! On another occasion the Christian judge when the prisoner pleaded guilty, fell upon his neck and said, "Then I, too, will forgive you."

(1) Maudslay, A.P. "Life in the Pacific 50 Years Ago."
p. 212.

In 1881 this burden of ensuring the punishment of offenders was placed upon Malietoa Laupepa, and he shouldered it unwillingly and shirked it unceasingly. This inability to secure just chastisement for those who despoiled plantations, very naturally irritated the Germans. Though Americans and British were also obtaining possession of lands, the Germans were the only possessors of large areas under cultivation. (1) Consequently the problem of securing punishment for plantation thieves was a German problem. In 1874 a dispute on this question of intrusion upon German land led to the shelling of the native village, Fuaipolu, by the H.I.M.S. "Arcona." (2) In 1877 (3) and 1879 (4) efforts were made to secure the neutrality of German lands, but in face of the civil war this was unsuccessful. When the establishment of peace (1881) still failed to give security to property outside Apia, it became clear that the native government under Malietoa Laupepa was incompetent. It was very doubtful

(1) See Map 6.

(2) See Chap. 3.

(3) German Samoan agreement of 3rd July '77. F.O. 58/160. Swanston to Salisbury No. 36/78, 22nd July '78. See also rep. infra.

(4) German Samoan Treaty of 24th Jan. '79. B.F.S.P. Vol. 70. pp. 241-246.

in face of Samoan custom whether any punishment, according to civilized ideas could be secured. The Germans demanded the imprisonment of offenders, but this was entirely contrary to Samoan usage. Punishment, according to Samoan custom, should be quickly administered and quickly forgotten. For dire offences it might be death or, more terrible, banishment, for light offences some corporal infliction, the eating of an unpleasant root - Most popular with chiefs was the administration of a fine, paid in food or mats, and they enjoyed with gusto the feast thus afforded. (1) But to keep a man locked up, or at work on a road was to make him an object of pity. (2) Relatives would come and picnic with convicts, and the King, despite his fear of powerful foreigners, had not the heart to close the prison gates firmly or, at any rate, regularly. (3)

It is, therefore, hardly remarkable that those who suffered most should seek most persistently to gain the control of the weak government. It was not, however, until

(1) Turner, G. "19 Years in Polynesia." Turner also records how in the early days of missionaries chiefs would insist on fining Samoans who came late to missionary schools.

(2) Stevenson. "A Footnote to History." p. 93.

(3) Churchward. "My Consulate in Samoa." p. 185.
Churchward recounts how after some very serious burglary when the criminal could not be traced it was discovered to have been done by a convict, who, having skeleton keys of the prison roamed at large during the night but preferred the comforts of gaol to escaping.

Bismarck showed signs of favouring a colonial policy, and until the acquisition of colonies gained national and popular support or, at any rate, interest, that the German Consul, Stübel, and the head of the German firm, Weber, dared to attempt to gain a monopoly of the Samoan administration.- Quite apart from establishing German sovereignty in the islands, this practical problem of gaining security to German plantations, was essential to German commerce. It was, therefore, in the first place, the Samoans who so irritated the planters that, on the first indication of support from Berlin, they resolved to obtain control of the native government.

In the years of confusion that followed the deportation of Steinberger each of the three powers concerned in Samoa secured a treaty with whatever government was in power. The importance of the treaties was that they were witnesses to the rights of each power; or, rather, each power by a treaty established its claim to certain rights in the islands. The Consuls of all three powers were highly suspicious of each other and each feared lest Samoa should fall to one or other of the powers. It was only in 1879, when the Home Governments united in making fresh appointments, when the

German Consul was no longer an employee of the Godeffroy firm, that friendly relations were established. In 1879 the Consuls were clearly informed that their respective Home Governments had no aggressive designs whatever upon the islands. (1)

Prior to 1879, however, the suspicion and intrigue was such that every action was construed as a step towards annexation. In 1876 Commodore Hoskins on H.M.S. "Pearl" was sent to investigate into the skirmish that had taken place in March '76 between English sailors and Samoans. He demanded an indemnity for this outrage of \$2,000 which was eventually paid in 1878 to Maudslay, the Acting British Consul. (2) (3)

The part played by the British Consuls and residents increased rather than lessened the unrest during these years. Commodore Hoskins, in his report upon the "Barracouta" affray of 13th March '76, had stated that he had not considered the

(1) How far this was true is indicated in the next chapter.

(2) See Chap. 5. Stevens' misguided attempt to reinstate Malietoa. 13th March '76.

(3) Maudslay, A.P. "The Pacific 50 Years Ago" p.191. Maudslay was in Colonial Govt. in Fiji 1875-80 as Secty., Deputy Commissioner and Consul Gen. for Tonga. He describes the Samoans complaining bitterly and begging from door to door in Apia to get more money from anti-British residents, even though they had already collected the full sum. By mistake they handed over \$100 too much, and when this was returned they had a right royal feast on the strength of it.

Acting-Consul, S.F. Williams, a suitable person to hold such an office, and he hinted that both he and Foster were, in the Steinberger affair, "much influenced and embittered by private motives and reasons." Williams was consequently replaced by Consul Liardet who was appointed from England. Liardet's short term of office ⁽¹⁾ was filled with difficulties, both with Samoan and foreign affairs. He appealed constantly to Sir Arthur Gordon to come and use his influence to promote peace. Gordon was, however, too occupied with affairs in Fiji, and until he received his appointment as High Commissioner he did not feel justified in leaving his post. On 2nd October '77 Liardet left Samoa for Fiji to explain his difficulties to Gordon, but for this desertion of his post he was severely reprimanded ⁽²⁾ and recalled, but the day before this news reached him he died (Feb. '78) on the very day that Sir Arthur Gordon arrived to deal with the situation.

Liardet was evidently quite unequal to the very difficult situation that the islands presented. He had

(1) 29th Jan. '77 - 22nd Feb. '78 when he died.

(2) F.O. 58/160. Derby to Liardet, 23rd Feb. '78.
Telegram.

constant opposition from Europeans.⁽¹⁾ One trader Woods of Fiji notoriety brought a law suit against him for "refusing to protect British interests."⁽²⁾ Liardet complained that the opposition he met was so strong, that he was not able to cash a cheque⁽³⁾ in Apia. Much of his misfortune he attributes to the new firm under the control of a certain Captain J. Stewart,⁽⁴⁾ in fact a resuscitated Polynesian Land Company. He complains that they fomented the civil war so as to ensure a market for their arms and ammunition, and intrigued with the natives that they should appeal to England for annexation. The confusion was such that on one occasion, in September '77, the United States Consul, Griffin, determined to seize Stewart's store where these schemes were hatched, but in order to do so he appealed to Taimua and Faipule for a hundred Samoan warriors to help him. Fortunately the other Consuls⁽⁵⁾ and Europeans were able to intervene to prevent this. On

(1) A fact which he attributes to his refusal to "work with Weber" as did the American Consul.

F.O. 58/156. Liardet to Wylde. 18th Oct. '77.

(2) F.O. 58/156. Liardet to Derby. 17th July '77.

(3) F.O. 58/156. Liardet to Wylde. 18th Oct. '77.

(4) F.O. 58/156. Liardet to Wylde. Confid. 18th Oct. '77. Constant references to the intrigues of Stewart, Woods and others in Liardet's dispatches.

(5) As a result of this, however, there was an attack on the U.S. Consulate and Griffin only escaped with difficulty.

another occasion, December '77, a United States citizen, who had committed a murder was lynched. (1)

The lawlessness amongst Europeans was quite sufficient to create numberless difficulties for a Consul who, fresh from England, was unfamiliar with conditions in the South Seas. In native affairs war continued, and frequent skirmishes occurred in and near Apia. An example of difficulties that arose from this may be given. In July 1877 certain chiefs of the Puletua sought sanctuary from attack in the grounds of the British Consulate. The opposing party dared not attack them there but surrounded the Consulate to prevent their escape - Consequently the Consul was forced to allow the chiefs to encamp in his grounds, a concession they appreciated and enjoyed for some seven months. (2)

In this period the natives were inveigled into intrigues again and began a series of petitions to England. (3) Liardet was convinced that the natives could not under

(1) He was solemnly tried and condemned and executed by an assembly of white residents - partly indeed as a demonstration of the need for some authority to control the lawlessness. Many troublesome people had come from Fiji to Samoa after Gt. Britain annexed Fiji.

(2) (Maudslay "The Pacific 50 Years Ago." p. 187. (F.O. 58/160. Liardet to Derby. 17th July '77.

(3) Liardet states that these were fostered by Stewart. F.O. 58/156. Liardet to Derby, 30th March '77. Also again deputation in April sent to Fiji, and in Sept. F.O. 58/156. Liardet to Gordon, 12th Sept. '77.

existing circumstances set up an ordered government so he encouraged the natives to petition England for protection. A petition was sent to Queen Victoria and a telegram was sent to New Zealand to be despatched from thence. "Civil war imminent," it read, "Great risk to life and prosperity of British subjects, both factions petition H.M. The Queen to grant a Protectorate which would avert war. Will take responsibility of granting this temporarily." (1) At the same time he sent a whole deputation of twenty-one chiefs from both parties to present the petition to Sir Arthur Gordon the Governor of Fiji. (2) Each chief was given a "shiny black leather box" and was feasted at public expense, so it was hardly surprising that deputations became popular in succeeding years.

The deputation, however, returned somewhat crest-fallen at Gordon's refusal to grant what they wished and the Consuls who succeeded Liardet (3) received strict injunctions not to countenance petitions for annexation.

(1) F.O. 58/156. Liardet to Derby. 9th April '77.

(2) who in Nov. 1877 received his commission as High Commissioner of the Western Pacific. As Governor of Fiji only he had no authority to deal with Samoan affairs.

(3) 12th March '78. Consul Maudslay (temporarily appt. from Fiji where he was Colonial Secretary to Gordon).
April '78 Acting-Consul Swanston.
Aug. '78. Consul Graves who remained until 1882.
March '82. Acting-Consul Churchward. See Chap. 8.

The deputation left Samoa on 14th April '77. On the 16th the German man-of-war "Augusta" arrived. Alarm lest the petition to England should be successful and lest the Germans should take aggressive action drove the United States Consul Colmesnil to hoist the American flag 24th May '77. Further, when they failed to get British support the Samoans determined to appeal to the United States and in 1877 a Samoan, Mamea, went to Washington to petition the United States Government to annex Samoa. The outcome of this was the American-Samoan Treaty of January '78 by which America gained rights over Pago-Pago harbour, and promised the Samoans her "good offices" in the event of a dispute with another power. ⁽¹⁾ Until the news of this treaty reached Samoa there was a very sanguine hope among Americans and Samoans that United States might annex. This feeling led in February '78 to a second demonstration by the United States Consul, Griffin, when, fearing British aggression, ⁽²⁾ he again hoisted the Stars and Stripes over the Samoan flag. (22nd Feb. '78). It was, therefore, with disappointment that the Samoans learnt that the American treaty did not fulfil their expectations.

(1) B.F.S.P. Vol. 69. p. American-Samoan treaty signed 17th Jan. '78 in Washington.

(2) This was the occasion when Maudslay arrived and demanded the indemnity for the "Barracouta" outrage.

Meanwhile during these years of American and English intrigue the Germans had also been active. In 1876 the German warship "Hertha," was ordered from China to Samoa to negotiate a trade treaty with the Government. When Captain von Werner, however, arrived, the confused state of the islands made this impossible. Consequently he proceeded to Tonga where he was successful in obtaining a treaty ⁽¹⁾ (2nd Nov. '76). In April '77, however, the man-of-war "Augusta" arrived at Apia (10th April '77). Captain Hassenpflug made a speech defining the German attitude toward Samoans. ⁽²⁾ He had come to protect German life and property. "It is my commission," he said, "to remain in these waters, and there will be always in future a German ship-of-war here. You perceive from this the great favour the German Government shows for the welfare of these islands. . . . The German Government has got no intention to annex these islands. . . . all such rumours are spread by people animose to Germany" ⁽³⁾ Nevertheless, Weber was determined that the war should not handicap the firm's trade. A treaty, or rather an ultimatum, was

(1) F.O. 58/150. Williams to Lister. 4th Dec. '76.

(2) It was at this that Consul Colmesnil first hoisted the U.S. flag.

(3) F.O. 58/156. Liardet to Derby. 23rd April '77.

prepared for the Taimua and Faipule. (1) Liardet declared that Weber gained the friendship of the Puletua (royal) party by supplying them with ammunition. He then threatened the Taimua and Faipule (Parliament Party) that he would continue to supply the Puletua with ammunition until they, the Taimua and Faipule, consented to his agreement. (2) They reluctantly complied on 3rd July '77.

This informal agreement was primarily commercial. (3) By the first two clauses the Samoans promised to clear warriors off Mulinuu and to guarantee its neutrality. The third clause secured the inviolability of the German plantations and the promise of the Samoans to pay for damage. The fourth clause in the Samoan-English translation reads thus:-

"We are bound not to ignore the German Government. We are bound not to give superiority to any of the great Governments over Germany."

For the time Weber was satisfied with his agreement. Civil war, however, continued and a fruitless appeal to

(1) F.O. 58/156. Liardet to Wylde. 20th Dec. '77.
Enclosure Weber to T. and F. 15th June. '77.

(2) F.O. 58/156. Liardet to Wylde, confidential, 18th Oct. '77. It is possible that this may not be true as Liardet was ill and rather unbalanced at this time. (Maudslay. p. 187). He died on 22nd Feb. 1878 in Apia. At the same time it is quite in accordance with general accounts of the firm's methods.

(3) F.O. 58/160. Swanston to Derby. 22nd July '78. Encl. 1.

England directed Samoans to hope for American protection. The return of Mamea's deputation in June '78 was to the Samoans disappointing.⁽¹⁾

Weber none the less regarded the ratification of the American Treaty as a direct breach of the "most favoured nation" clause (No. 4) of his agreement of '77. On the same day that the American Treaty was ratified by the Taimua and Faipule, Captain von Werner of H.I.M.S. "Ariadne" occupied Saluafata harbour; the next day Falealili was seized.⁽²⁾ A proclamation was read in the market place of Saluafata:- "We have no idea," it read, "why the chiefs of the Taimua and Faipule are objecting (to our agreement), hence has sprung up our doubt as to the evil schemes and desires on the part of the chiefs of the Taimua and Faipule to transfer the whole of Samoa to some great government. The German Government has already told you that neither England nor the United States have any interest in occupying these islands. In order to secure the rights of Germany is the reason why we take possession of the harbour of Saluafata and of all

(1) See page 155. supra.

(2) F.O. 58/160. Swanston to Gordon. 17th July '78.
Encl. 1. Weber to Swanston 16th July '78.

its shores. . . . We have no desire to seize these islands, but it is due to us that we should obtain some security for German rights."

To this occupation of the two harbours of Saluafata and Falealili the Samoans had to submit, and the British Consul was instructed to use his best endeavours to persuade the Samoans to give Germany the treaty "on a just and reasonable basis."⁽¹⁾ In January the Germans secured their Treaty⁽²⁾ from the Taimua and Faipule.

Meanwhile the royal party, the Puletua, gained in strength and in May Malietoa Talavou was "annointed King."⁽³⁾ The Taimua and Faipule were expelled from Mulinuu, the seat of Government. Nevertheless, Malietoa made a declaration that he would regard the validity of the German and American Treaties even though they were made by the faction in opposition to his Government.

Meanwhile the Acting Consul Swanston received instructions that "in view of the welfare of British subjects

(1) F.O. 58/165. Salisbury to Swanston. 2nd Jan. '79.

(2) The terms of all three treaties are discussed in Chap. 7. See also Appendix A.

(3) 5th May '79.

and property H.M. Government "considered themselves" justified in proposing that a treaty should also be entered into with them. ⁽¹⁾ Consul Graves, who arrived in Samoa 6th August '79, entered into negotiations with Malietoa for a treaty between Great Britain and Samoa which was procured ⁽²⁾ on 28th August '79.

By this time it was evident to all white people that without a co-operative effort of the foreigners there could be no peace in Samoa. By mutual agreement between ⁽³⁾ the Governments at London, Berlin and Washington the Consuls were instructed to act in unison to force the hostile Samoan party to submit. United action was facilitated by the opportune appointment of a new German Imperial Consul-General, a Captain Zembsch "one still remembered" wrote ⁽⁴⁾ Stevenson in 1892, "as the gentleman who acted justly." He was quite unconnected with the German firm and consequently was free to act as he considered right. Stevenson implied

(1) F.O. 58/165. Salisbury to Swanston. 2nd Jan. '79.

(2) B.F.S.P. Vol.76. pp. 133-135. Treaty between Great Britain and the malo of Samoa.

(3) F.O. 244/341. F.O. to Russell (Cons. 13) encl. dispatch Thornton to Salisbury, 26th Jan. '80.

(4) Stevenson. "A Footnote to History." p. 89.

that his recall was due to Weber's dislike of Zembsch's interference to prevent some of the shadier transactions of the firm's. (1) All reports from British officials express satisfaction at their happy relations with the German Consul. (2)

The Consuls combined to issue a proclamation (5th Sept. '79) begging the parties to cease hostilities until a decision of the Home Governments upon the fate of Samoa should be reached. (3) This was, however, ineffective and more stringent measures were taken. The British and German warships entered into the conflict against the rebel chiefs, and, on at least two occasions, native villages were shelled by men-of-war. (4) Such drastic action was, however, strongly discouraged by the British Government. (5) The continued disorder produced from the Consuls a plan for a tripartite government of the islands, with representatives of each of the three powers acting on an executive council. (6)

(1) Ibid.

(2) Both Consul Graves and Sir A. Gordon. See F.O.244/341. Salisbury to Russell. Encl. Gordon to F.O. 3rd Dec. '79.

(3) F.O. 58/165. Graves to Salisbury. 17th Oct. '79.

(4) 21st Nov. '79. by Capt. Deinhardt of H.I.M.S. "Bismarck" 5th Jan. '80. Capt. Purvis of H.I.M.S. "Danaii" shelled Lufilufi.

(5) F.O. 58/169. Granville to Graves. 7th Sept. '80.

(6) Graves to Salisbury. 24th March '80.

This was later disapproved by the Governments in Europe. (1)

Accordingly the fighting continued. Consul Graves describes the intermixture of primitive and civilized warfare. "The Malietoa party," he wrote, "have been bombarding the villages of their opponents from a forty ton schooner, purchased two months ago from a British subject, with a 12 lb. gun - one of those with ammunition presented to Samoans by Colonel Steinberger on behalf of the U.S. Government in 1875. No quarter is given by either side, and the barbarous custom of parading the heads of the slain on spears is still continued." (2)

The rebels submitted in June 1880, and there was peace until Malietoa Talavou died in 1881. His death threw the country again into confusion. While the majority supported Malietoa Laupepa, two districts gave their support to two other high chiefs, Tamasese and Mataafa. Hostile to the more generally accepted ruler they united in a decision to support each other's nominee in an alternate monarchy, each chief to rule for a year at a time. The Consuls were

(1) There is further discussion of this in Chap. 7.

(2) F.O. 58/165. Graves to Salisbury. 17th Oct. '79.

able to prevent a further convulsion of civil war. On board the U.S.S. "Lackawanna" an agreement was reached which lasted for some three years. ⁽¹⁾ Malietoa Laupepa was to be King. Tamasese was to be vice-King. Mataafa, who, according to Stevenson, was the only regal and decisive personality of the three was left out of account.

Actually the solution was only another problem. "To the constitution of Samoa, which was already all wheels and no horses, the Consul had added a fifth wheel. In addition to the old conundrum, "Who is the King," they had supplied a new one, "What is the Vice-King?" ⁽²⁾ If Malietoa was a helpless shuttle thrown between Consul and Consul, the existence of a more impotent second-in-command served only to thicken intrigues.

The most successful outcome of these troubled years was the establishment of Municipal Government in Apia. (2nd Sept. '79). All Europeans except some eight or nine missionaries and their families, certain German planters,


(1) F.O. 58/177. Graves to F.O. 5th June '80.

(2) Stevenson, L. op. cit. p.

5 MAP OF MUNICIPAL AND NEUTRAL
TERRITORY OF APIA. 1879.

Bounds of Municipality

Bounds of Neutral Territory



and a few store-keepers at Pago-Pago⁽¹⁾ were in Apia. In 1874 the total number of European residents in Apia was estimated at about 158.⁽²⁾ This number is surprisingly small when compared with the population of Fiji in 1874 which reckoned at 2,000.

Map 5. shows the situation of the town of Apia, between the arm of land at Mulinuu, the seat of native government, and the other arm Matautu, where at this time there was a native fort. With swamps between Mulinuu and the coast to the Westward armed parties inevitably passed through Apia en route to Mulinuu unless they chose, as they frequently did, to go by sea. Both town and harbour were frequent scenes of skirmishes and the disturbance of shots and street fighting became annoying and destructive. On these occasions the Consulates were barricaded with empty cases and barrels, and nationals were invited to take refuge there.

(1) Also a small number of whites who lived amongst the natives on Savaii, known as "Savaii Squires." Churchward op. cit.

(2) P.P. 1875. Vol. 76. c. 1284.

English	75	Portuguese	2.
U.S.	22	Swedes	5
German	33	Spanish	1
French	19	Danes	1
			<u>Total: 158.</u>

There are no estimates of residents given later than this. In 1871 an estimate of 445 is given in Seed's report but this probably includes half castes. Appendix to Journal of Hse. of Reprs. Papers rel. to S. Sea Islands. Pt. A.3. p. 21.

From 1869 onward efforts were made to induce the Samoans to recognize the town and harbour as neutral territory. (1) Foreign property was to be distinguished by either a national or white flag. But in an affray that followed soon after, an English flag was torn up and rioting was as bad as ever. The chiefs apologised, handed over the miscreant and made further pledges which were not strictly kept. A similar agreement was made in 1872 which, though sometimes transgressed, helped to establish a precedent of regard for foreign property. Between 1876-9, however, in the stress of the wars, neutrality of foreign property was constantly disregarded.

It was clear by 1879 that in war time no territory could be neutral unless there was a power created to enforce the neutrality, by punishing all who violated it. The Apia residents combined in finding a solution. Under the leadership of the three Consuls, they set up a Municipal Board. This consisted of eight men. Each Consul appointed one, the King appointed one, and the Samoans in Apia one, and four were elected by the Apia residents. They made arrangements for raising revenue, policing the town, construction of public

(1) P.P. 1871. Vol. 65. c. 343. p. 156.

works, supervising sanitation and other useful and necessary works. In particular they demarcated certain boundaries of neutral territory, where all fighting must cease. ⁽¹⁾

The measure was at first only to be for four years until the Samoan Government should be able to take over its functions. In 1883, however, the Convention for the Municipal Government was renewed. It was clear then that the Samoan Government under Malietoa Laupepa was steering a very shaky course in dangerous waters.

The success of the Municipal Government depended upon friendly relations between the Consuls, and the residents and Consuls. After the failure to control the whole native government it represented a determination to enforce some order at least upon the town where most of the foreigners lived and most of the wealth, stores and offices were concentrated. Moreover, with increasing numbers of residents, public works such as roads and bridges became necessary. For this rates were imposed and licences issued. ⁽²⁾ The weakness of the Municipal Government, thus constituted, was that it

(1) See Map.7.

(2) Not merely for selling liquor but for practically almost any trade or profession a licence was required.

depended upon a good feeling among residents which seldom existed. The lawlessness of the '70's was sufficient incentive for those who remembered it to further the work of the municipality, but as the memory of those days became dimmer, disunity threatened and eventually broke up the Municipal Government. The Consuls, upon who the responsibility of its success largely depended, were criticised and blamed, but other residents avoided the duties involved by participation in the Government. Its collapse was occasioned, in 1887, by an open breach between the German, and the English and American Consuls. As a form of Government for the Europeans it was considered of sufficient importance to be revived in 1889 by the Berlin Act. In the years that followed, increasing friction between the Chief Justice and the President of the Municipal Council showed plainly the difficulties of the dual government, one nominally native (1) for the whole group, the other foreign for the township alone.

However open to criticism, it was yet the only attempt to expel disorder from Apia, and as such its efforts deserve praise.

(1) By the Berlin Act of 1889 both Chief Justice and President of the Municipal Council were appointed by the King of Sweden.

CHAPTER VII.

The Problem of the Government of Samoa
1878-81.

The last chapter recounted the events that led to the conclusion of treaties between the various factions that governed Samoa and the United States, Germany and Great Britain respectively. These treaties rendered impossible what had before been improbable, i.e., the establishment of peace on a permanent basis in Samoa. "One cannot help noticing," wrote Maudslay in a memorandum, ⁽¹⁾ "that no representative of a foreign power ever misses an opportunity of telling the natives that there is nothing that his government desires to see more than the establishment of a strong and independent government in Samoa, yet some of the stipulations of the treaties are such that even if the Samoans had the highest capacity for government, the formation of a strong and independent government is rendered impossible."

(2)

All three treaties had certain points in common.

(1) F.O. 244/341. Lister to Russell, 19th Nov. '86.
Encl. memo by A.P. Maudslay, 20th Oct. '80.

(2) For terms of the treaties see:

American	B.F.S.P. Vol. 69.	p. 76.
German	B.F.S.P. " 70.	p.241.
British	B.F.S.P. " 70.	p.133.

Also Appendix A.

Each had a "most favoured nation" clause, so that the privileges of one could be claimed by all. Each had a clause for the acquisition of a naval station. America established her right to use Pago-Pago - the consummation of Meade's unauthorized treaty of 1872. German warships had already seized Saluafata prior to the treaty, so this harbour was conceded to Germany as a naval station. Great Britain, not to be outdone, but also not requiring a harbour, was content with the right to establish a naval station in any harbour other than Pago-Pago, Saluafata or Apia. But she took no advantage of this privilege. By the right of establishing naval stations, the three powers had secured a firm footing upon the islands. America, to bear witness to her rights sent a cargo of coal to Pago-Pago in 1880, ⁽¹⁾ but it was not until 1899 that the station there was constructed. Apia was of much greater importance than Saluafata so the latter port never came to be of particular importance.

All three Powers, further, claimed freedom from import and export duties. Great Britain and Germany

(1) F.O. 244/341. Lister to Russell, 10th March '80.
Encl. 1. dispatch Thornton to Salisbury, 16th Feb.
'80.

supplemented this clause with another giving them full freedom of "commerce, trade and agriculture." Whatever Samoan Government, therefore, was established, it would have to obtain its revenue from sources other than customs. There would be, indeed, little hope of any native government being established on a sound financial basis. The Great Powers snatched the benefits and expected the Samoans to manage.

Another clause effectually dispelling hope of an autonomous native government is in the German treaty. Article VIII. lays down that "all laws and regulations which German subjects will have to submit to . . . shall only come into force after obtaining the confirmation of the German government." It is true exception is made with regard to municipal arrangements in Apia for police, quarantine, harbour, prohibition, sale and supply of spirits to Samoans, which regulations were to be observed by German subjects so long as the German Government has not refused confirmation." Excluding these exceptions then, if the "most favoured nation" clauses in each treaty were to be regarded, every law affecting foreigners would have to be confirmed in Washington, Berlin and London, - truly an

impossible situation! On the one hand the Powers insisted on Samoan independence, on the other they claimed the right to interfere in every legislative act that might affect foreigners.

It is, therefore, little wonder that Malietoa and the chiefs writing to Queen Victoria, the German Emperor and the United States President, appealed for protection and help and says that "these treaties have apparently been framed for the purpose of protecting your own people, and that only. This indeed is right; but it is only we who are in trouble, because our government is of no account, we have no influence; it is as though our hands were tied through these treaties."⁽¹⁾

The most elaborate of the three treaties is the German. The articles are lengthy and the Samoans are accorded rights in Germany similar to those granted to Germans in Samoa!⁽²⁾ Germans were guaranteed "peaceable possession of all lands in Samoa which they have hitherto

(1) F.O. 244/331. Salisbury to Ld. O. Russell, 2nd Dec. '79. Encl. 2. Malietoa to Queen Victoria, 31st Aug. '79.

(2) e.g. exemption from military service and religious toleration.

bought from Samoans in a regular manner and according to the custom of the time," - sufficiently vague phrases to be useful - "and all further interference, with regard to such lands is therefore excluded by this confirmation by the Samoan government of the ownership of the German subjects." A similar article in the British Treaty confirmed British landholders in their Samoan lands. (1) German and British both obtained a clause granting exemption "from the occupation of houses, lands and plantations by war parties."

The American Treaty differed from the other two in offering more and obtaining less. The chief advantages they gained were Pago-Pago harbour and the freedom from customs duties. Article V, further, reads thus: "If, unhappily, any difference have arisen, or shall hereafter arise, between the Samoan government and any other government in amity with the United States, the government of the latter will employ its good offices for the purpose of adjusting those differences upon a satisfactory and solid foundation." This promise was sufficiently vague to make

(1) See map for extent of German, British and American lands 1883. The greater part of the German lands were acquired prior to this treaty of 1879.

it seem possible that the treaty might be the foundation of a protectorate, ⁽¹⁾ but the United States disclaimed any such intention. The drastic action of the Germans in seizing the harbours of Saluafata and Falealili and so obtaining a similar treaty, further dispelled any such idea.

That a large number of Samoans wished for the annexation of Samoa by Great Britain or the United States there can be no doubt. The treaty with America was indeed the result of an appeal for protection. The United States were unwilling to assume any such responsibility, particularly as it would have involved the abandonment of a long established policy. The treaty effectually committed the Government to an interest in, and responsibility for Samoa, but the United States Government were unwilling to co-operate whole-hearted with Germany and England. Condominium was not what America wished and throughout 1879, '80 and '81 when there was accord between the German and British Consuls, the American maintained an aloof policy of non-interference. When joint action was imperative the United States Consul, it is true, joined somewhat

(1) F.O. 244/314. Pauncefote to Russell, 27th Feb. '78, Encl. from Thornton to Derby, 4th Feb. '78.

grudgingly with his fellow Consuls. ⁽¹⁾ The British and German men-of-war co-operated in attempts to bring about peace, but the Americans while friendly, took no active part in these efforts. With regard to the Municipal Convention Evarts, the United States Secretary of State, was very reluctant to commit himself. Thornton wrote that Mr. Evarts "shows great disinclination to informing me the views of the Government with regard to Samoa." ⁽²⁾ He was "far from being pleased with Mr. Dawson ⁽³⁾ (the United States Consul) for having joined with his German and British colleagues in signing the Convention for the establishment of a Municipal Board." Evarts further declared "that the United States Government will be very averse to using force for the support of King Malietoa and still more so to co-operating with European powers in the employment of force." ⁽⁴⁾ The United States had "not entered

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- (1) e.g. in 1879 in the formation of the Municipal Government for Apia. He co-operated also in issuing proclamations to the war party and in an attempted conciliation of the war parties Dec. '79 on board the "Bismarck." His grudging attitude is described by Acting Consul-General Maudslay in "The Pacific 50 Years Ago." pp. 252-3.
- (2) F.O. 244/341. Lister to Russell, 13th Feb. '80. Enclos. 1. Thornton to Salisbury. 26th Jan. '80.
- (3) Dawson's comportment won him the nickname from Maudslay of "Dismal Jimmy" - Maudslay. op. cit. p. 252.
- (4) F.O. 244/341. Lister to Russell. 10th March '80. Enclos. 1. Thornton to Salisbury, 16th Feb. '80, also F.O. 244/341. F.O. to Russell, 8th April '80. Encl. 2. Thornton to Salisbury. 16th March '80.

into the course which has hitherto been followed (by Great Britain and Germany) with the same freedom from reserve which has characterized the conduct of the German Government. . . . Though the vessels of the United States Navy have at intervals visited Samoa, it has apparently been rather with the object of inquiry into the state of affairs, and of supporting individual American traders than of affording a hearty co-operation in any scheme for the general welfare and development of the trade of the islands, and a similar abstinence that may, therefore, result (from a tripartite government) would be that the onus of government would fall on England and Germany, while the United States Government would reap the benefit in question where individual citizens were concerned."⁽¹⁾

The United States Government thus wished to steer clear of any part in tripartite condominium in the islands. Yet having won advantages and an excellent harbour reputed to be the best in that part of the ocean, they effectively barred any arrangement that might otherwise have been made

(1) F.O. 244/341. Granville to Russell, 7th Sept. '80.
Encl. Granville to Drummond, 7th Sept. '80.

for the protection of the islands by any single other power.

The year 1880 proved to be an important one in defining the attitude of Germany towards Samoa, and this was inevitably reflected in the action of the German agents and officials in Samoa. Between 1877-79 the attitude of Germans in Samoa had changed from aggression to conciliation and co-operation. ⁽¹⁾ This change reflects in some measure the feeling of the German Government. By 1879 German trading concerns were established in a number of Pacific islands. In Samoa a second German firm, that of Ruge and Hedemann had begun trading in 1875. But of all trading concerns by far the most active, the wealthiest, the most widespread was the Godeffroy firm.

In the years immediately preceeding 1880 they enlarged the extent of their trade ⁽²⁾ and the number of their ships. ⁽³⁾ The Government support accorded them, enhanced

(1) e.g. action in seizing the harbours, while in 1879 they co-operated in every act with British. This was, of course, partly due to a real desire for peace, and also to the new German Consul General Zembsch.

(2) See Map 3 for extent of trade of the Godeffroy firm 1880.

(3) See Fig. 2. increase of shipping.

German prestige. Trade treaties were made with Samoa, Tonga and island peoples in Micronesia and Melanesia (1876-81). Further, the establishment of two German men-of-war in the Pacific (1877), and the appointment of an Imperial Consul-General (1879) strengthened the position of German traders in the Pacific and raised hopes for yet greater extension of German protection. Alarm in the Pacific on the part of other powers ⁽¹⁾ was thus produced lest Germany should embark on a policy of territorial settlement. The dispatches from British Consuls and officials in the South Seas suggest a growing alarm at the activity of German merchants. ⁽²⁾ Not merely was trade and shipping increasing in volume but individual Germans were by their aggressive manner persuading residents of other nations that there was an immediate prospect of the wholesale annexation of various of the South Sea islands to Germany. Sir Arthur Gordon pointed this out to Granville. "I believe," he wrote, "the Government at Berlin has no wish either to embarrass us or to increase its own

(1) F.O. 244/402. Derby to Russell. Confidential.
26th Nov. '77.
also F.O. 244/341. Pauncefote to Russell (No. 7)
28th Jan. '80. Enclos. Layard to Salisbury,
11th Nov. '79.

(2) Ibid.

responsibilities in the South Seas . . . but it will undoubtedly be due to the Germans and of course it is not easy out here to establish the distinction. . . . I may say in confidence that whilst Captain Zembsch, the Consul General, appears to me a right minded man, anxious to follow the same line as ourselves, there is not a single German Naval officer on the station who is not working eagerly for the annexation of Samoa and Tonga." (1)

Besides the conduct of individual Germans three lines of action between 1875-9 indicated German official interest in the Pacific. The first, of less apparent importance, was the action of the German Government in registering protests against interference by other nations. Amongst these were the protests of German planters against their deprivation of lands in Fiji after British annexation in 1874. (2) Secondly there was the conclusion of trade treaties with various islands where German trade flourished. In 1875 the H.M.S. "Gazelle" was despatched to the Pacific

(1) F.O. 244/341. Lister to Russell, 25th Oct. '80.
Encl. from Gordon to Granville, 3rd Aug. '80.
Confidential.

(2) See supra. Chap. 3.
also Townsend, E.M. "The Origin of Modern
German Colonialism." p. 63.



to report upon German trade. In 1876 the "Hertha" concluded a Trade treaty with Tonga. This was followed by treaties with the Ellice and Gilbert Islands (1878), Marshalls and Ralick Islands where they acquired Jaluit as a coaling station, the Duke of York Islands, New Britain (1878) where they acquired the harbours of Mioko and Makada. The final Samoan treaty with the right to the harbour of Saluafata was in 1879 and in April of the year a treaty drawn up with the Queen of Huahine. In Raiatea and Borabora treaties were refused. (1)

This very wide network of rights was regarded as the prelude to widespread acquisition. Yet Lord Odo Russell writing at this time to Derby represents Bismarck as emphasizing the impossibility of maintaining a colonial empire without a fleet. "Later on, no doubt," wrote Russell (1877), "his successors will have to yield to the pressure of public opinion in regard to the establishment of German Colonies in the Pacific and elsewhere - a contingency we may look forward to some fifteen to twenty years hence." (2)

(1) For extent of Godeffroy trade see map 3. + 6

(2) F.O. 244/305. Russell to Derby. No. 440. Confidential. 6th Dec. '77.

The truer explanation of the treaties seems to be not that Germany wished to acquire South Sea Islands, but that she wished to prevent others from doing so. ⁽¹⁾ In his preamble to the Samoan treaty Bismarck states this expressly:- "Should the Empire continue its policy of refusing the acquisition of Colonies, which has been followed heretofore, it would be all the more imperative for it to preserve the neutrality of its overseas settlements, and, at the same time, to establish the complete equality of opportunity for Germany with all other nations." ⁽²⁾ The complaints of restrictions that followed the cession of Fiji made this policy the more pressing.

A third signal of recognition of the importance of German interests in the Pacific was the decision to station two warships permanently in the Pacific Islands for the protection of German trade (1877). The cost of this

(1) F.O. 244/331. Russell to Salisbury. No. 43. 17th June '79. encl. extracts from speeches by Küsserov and Bülow emphasizing this point of view.

(2) Townsend, M.E. op. cit., p. 65. quoted from Hahn Wippermann. Fürst Bismarck, Sammlung der Reden (1878-91 Berlin). Vol. iii. pp. 714-5.

measure was no less than 700,000 marks ⁽¹⁾ a year. Bülow explained the need for this to M. de Sainte Vallier, the French Ambassador in Berlin, "par la nécessité de défendre contre des aventuriers californiens les intérêts des négociants de Hambourg, installés à Samoa," ⁽²⁾ and he went on to explain that it was the absence of a fleet that forbade further extension. Bülow, he wrote, "ne m'avait pas caché la ferme volonté de son Gouvernement de ne pas tolérer plus longtemps les agressions d'aventuriers Américains, s'intitulant colonels ou généraux des Etats-Unis, contre les factoreries allemandes, pour la défense desquelles deux navires de guerre venaient d'être dirigés sur Samoa." ⁽³⁾ Considering that Colonel Steinberger - evidently referred to in the preceding passage - was on the best terms with the German Consul Poppe, had in his pocket an agreement to promote German trade, was indicted by his own Consul, and deported in a British man-of-war - the need to defend German trade against a like occurrence by means of two German men-of-war seems a little

(1) Zimmermann. "Geschichte Deutsche Kolonialpolitik" p. 17.

(2) Documents Diplomatiques Français 1871-1914. 1re Serie 2. No. 362. p. 402.
M. de Sainte Vallier à M. de Waddington (Conf.) 21st Nov. '78.

(3) Ibid. p. 487.. M. de St. Vallier à M. Waddington (No. 418) 5 Mai '79.

overdrawn! Indeed, the French Ambassador himself was unconvinced. He wrote that the circumstances left him no doubt as to the desire of the Imperial Government for "le prochain établissement d'un Protectorat allemand aux îles Samoa et Tonga."⁽¹⁾ The Samoan Treaty was put before the Reichstag for ratification on 13th June '79. Bülow emphatically declared that Germany wanted equal rights for all. "Germany wants neither to found colonies nor to have a monopoly, only equal rights for navigation and trade."⁽²⁾ The treaty was ratified without opposition.

Early in 1880 came a more crucial test of popular feeling on the matter of government support to extension of German interests in the Pacific. For some years the Hamburg firm of J.C. Godeffroy and Sohn had become involved in financial difficulties, owing to unsuccessful investments in Europe. In 1878 the South Sea Business, the most successful portion of the firm's activities, was consolidated into a Stock Company, - "Die Deutsche Handels und Plantagen-gesellschaft der Südsee Inseln zu Hamburg," but the majority

(1) Ibid. No. 424. p. 494. de St. Vallier à Waddington, 19 Mai '79.

(2) Koschitzky. Deutsche Kolonialgeschichte. Pt. 2. p.13. also F.O. 244/331. Russell to Salisbury (Cons. No. 43). 17th June '79. Encl. Bülow's speech in the Reichstag 13th June '79.

of shares remained in the hands of Godeffroy and Son.⁽¹⁾ On the failure of certain mining speculations in Europe, ruin seemed imminent. This was, however, postponed for a year by a loan from Baring Bros. of London. The Godeffroy shares in the Deutsche Handels und Plantagengesellschaft, and the firm's holdings in Samoa, amounting to about 160,000 Prussian acres, were given as security. The failure of the House of Godeffroy in December 1879, therefore, threatened to throw into English hands the greater part of German interests in Samoa.

At this juncture Bismarck was approached by Geheimrat von Hansemann. He suggested that the South Sea Company might be revived under government auspices. Its work in the Pacific had been successful in the past commercially. It was on the way to becoming a political power in building up for Germany a colonial empire in the Pacific. The plan for supporting the Company would "not only rescue German trade but expand German colonial interests in the South Seas."⁽²⁾ By 1st January '80 Bismarck manifested his approval.

(1) Townsend, E.M. "The Origins of Modern German Colonialism (1871-1885) p. 113. Chap. VI. The Test.

(2) Townsend, E.M. op. cit. p. 115.

It was proposed that the government should guarantee to the Company an annual subsidisation of 4 per cent. of its total capital of ten million Marks for twenty years, or not more than a total of three hundred thousand Marks. This should be repaid as soon as the Company's dividends exceeded (1) a specified per cent.

The proposal, embodied in a Bill which passed the Bundesrat on 14th April '80, came up for discussion in the Reichstag on 22nd April and 27th April. The Bill was then defeated by 128-112 votes. This seemed to show that the feeling in the country was opposed to or at least unprepared for a colonial policy. The debates, however, do not justify this assumption. The chief arguments brought against the Bill were a) that the firm must be unsound to collapse at all; b) that it was bad policy to support a private firm; c) that it would be unfair to other German trading firms if the Government were to lend support to one in particular; d) that as Germany had no fleet, this would lead to disputes and war with other countries. The arguments, all but the last, clearly are not against

(1) Ibid - p. 117. quot. from "Anlagen des Deutschen Reichstages" 1880. Aktenstück No. 101. p. 720.

(2) Stevenson, T. L. "A Footnote to History" p. 80.

colonies but against the support of a private firm.⁽¹⁾
Therefore, though immediately the defeat of the "Samoa
Subsidy Bill" was a set back to German trade, in the long
run it served to give just that necessary pause before she
was able to launch effectively, with popular backing, on
a new course of territorial expansion.

The South Sea interests were saved from Baring
Bros. by the hasty formation of a Board of Directors, who
assumed the debts of Godeffroy and Son.⁽²⁾ The new Company,
the Deutsche Handels and Plantagen Gesellschaft der Süd-See
Inseln zu Hamburg, "in practise shortened to the D.H. & P.G.,
the Old Firm, the German Firm, the Firm, and (among humor-
ists) the Long Handle Firm,"⁽³⁾ carried on the traditions,
methods and policy of its forerunner.

The immediate importance of the rejection of the
Bill to Samoa, was that it became impossible for Germany

(1) Townsend, E.M. op. cit. pp. 121-124.

(2) Russell indeed suggested that if Great Britain
wished to annex Samoa she must act immediately
on the failure of the Bill.
F.O. 244/341. Russell to Granville No. 17.
Confidential and Immediate. 14th May '80.

(3) Stevenson, R.L. "A Footnote to History" p. 86.

to take any greater part than her rivals in the affairs
of the islands. (1) No question of annexation or protection
of Samoa could be put before the Reichstag after this rebuff.
Hence the German Consul in Samoa was instructed to strive
primarily to secure peace in the islands.

Having considered the treaties, and the attitude
of the United States and of Germany in 1880, it remains
to define the situation in the islands that the three
treaty Powers had to face. The British policy is revealed
in her decision as to the Government of Samoa which she
proposed to support.

In 1880 it was abundantly clear that something
must be done about Samoa. Each of the three Powers had
made treaties with Malietoa. (2) The representatives of
all three had given him support (1879). The anarchy, if
not due to white men had certainly been enhanced by their
sale of ammunition and guns and meddling in native affairs.

(1) F.O. 244/341. Lister to Russell. 24th Jan. '80.
Encl. Munster to Salisbury, 20th Jan. '80.
Germany, said Munster, "does not want to strive
for exclusive rights on her own account."

(2) Germany and the U.S. made their treaties with the
Taimua and Faipule but they had been confirmed by
Malietoa when he drove the other party from
Mulinuu (June '79).

The chaos was ruining trade and planting, and making life and property insecure. The Convention for the Municipal Government of Apia of 2nd September '79 certainly seemed to ensure neutrality and self-government for Apia. But it was concluded with Malietoa and therefore depended upon his establishment as King. There was no reason to suppose that every faction would observe it, unless the white men unitedly were prepared to defend and enforce their convention. Having committed themselves to ratifying the establishment of a Municipality in Apia, the three Powers were involved in the setting up of a central authority that would assure its regard by Samoans.

The immediate problem in 1879-81 was the form that this central government should take. There were three apparent alternatives, a) annexation, or at least control by one of the Treaty Powers; b) a tripartite government; c) the restoration and support of a purely native government.

Annexation was the solution proposed and supported by all authorities on the spot. In November 1880, Sir Arthur Gordon noted that even Zembsch and Dawson who had hitherto "deprecat[ed] annexation of Samoa by England or any

other power" were now in favour of it. (1) Earlier in the year Gordon had written that "nothing but external authority can preserve the country and its people from utter ruin." (2) Further, there was a conviction among natives "of their inability to manage their own affairs, and of the necessity for intervention on the part of some Great Power." (3) The Consul Graves reiterates this in 1881, (4) and Maudslay, in a memorandum which he presented to the Foreign Office in 1880 after his official connection with it had ceased, (5) states the position with vehemence:-

"Matters may be left to drift for a few years yet," he wrote, "and we shall hear of more native disturbances, for it is always worth while to encourage a native dispute when it creates a demand for muskets, and lowers the price of land: the taste for gin will increase, and

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- (1) F.O. 244/341. Pauncefote to Walsham, No. 41. 22nd Nov. '80. Encl. Gordon to Granville, 13th Sept. '80.
 - (2) F.O. 244/341. Lister to Russell, 8th April '80. Encl. 1 Gordon to Salisbury, 2nd Feb. '80.
 - (3) F.O. 244/341. Lister to Russell. 12th May '80. Encl. Gordon to Salisbury, 1st March '80.
 - (4) F.O. 58/177. Graves to Granville. 18th Nov. '81.
 - (5) Maudslay returned from the Pacific in '80 and in the succeeding decades won a reputation for his archaeological discoveries of Maya remains in Guatelama.

when the natives have become hopelessly demoralized and have lost all claim to their lands, and a misled Government have succeeded in involving the country in debt, there will be an outcry from the 'owners of the soil' against native depredations and a demand for Chinamen and Indian coolies, and the large estates and interests of Germans and Englishmen will be urged as a strong reason for foreign interference and annexation. It does seem to be a misfortune that England or Germany cannot take possession before matters have gone so far Has either Power sufficient reason to wish to prevent the other accepting the cession of the islands? If annexed before a mixed Government has had charge of its finances, Samoa would have the advantage of coming to us unburdened with debt."⁽¹⁾ He goes on to say that English interests are not sufficient to debar German annexation but that the general feeling among the natives was strongly in favour of English annexation.


Foremost among the natives to desire annexation by any power - preferably England - was the King Malietoa himself. He begged Sir Arthur Gordon that Queen Victoria

(1) F.O. 244/341. Lister to Russell, 19th Nov. '80.
Encl. Memo. by A.P. Maudslay. 20th Oct. '80.

should annex Samoa. He had "no chance of the establishment of permanent peace in Samoa unless its future rule were undertaken by a civilized power. He said that this was the general feeling of all natives, that the presence of so many foreigners in the country made it impossible for Samoans to carry on the government in their own way, while they were wholly unable to do so in a more civilized fashion."⁽¹⁾

Unfortunately for the distraught country and King this was too insignificant a gordian knot to be worth the trouble of disentanglement. Great Britain, Germany and the United States were content to feel assured of co-equal footing for themselves, and they were satisfied to let it rest there. The United States showed no desire to interfere and her interests were least. The Germans, who in Samoa had been anxious to obtain some control of the Government, had received a rebuff in the failure of the Samoan Subsidy Bill and they realised that they could not expect government support. Granville continued the wonted policy of Great Britain in disclaiming any desire for the responsibility of protection. The Government were indeed disinclined to

(1) F.O. 244/331. Pauncefote to Russell. 2nd Dec. '79.
Encl. Gordon to Salisbury. Confidential.
15th Sept. '79.




7.
 MAP SHOWING THE
 PROXIMITY
 OF
 FIJI AND TONGA
 TO
 SAMOA.

The Samoan...
 The proximity...
 Samoa led to...
 instrumental...
 that if Samoa...
 their interests...
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 had changed his...
 in August 1850...
 Granville "Let...
 influence where...
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 part of Fiji."

- (1) F.O. 58/169. Minute by Lister to letter from Graves to Secty. of State, 28th June '60.
- (2) See Map 8.
- (3) Quoted by Maudslayi in his Memorandum. F.O. 244/341. Letter to Russell, 27th Nov. '60. Made by Maudslayi, 20th Oct. 1860.
- (4) F.O. 244/341. Lister to Russell, 25th Oct. '60. Encl. Gordon to Granville - Private and Confidential, 3rd Dec. '60.

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embark on the negotiations that would have been involved in a readjustment of the Treaties.

Unwilling to annex there was also a reluctance on the part of Great Britain to withdraw. "While the Colonial Office feared the former, the Fijian Government the latter."⁽¹⁾ The proximity⁽²⁾ and intercourse between Fiji, Tonga and Samoa led to alarm lest foreign influence in Samoa should be detrimental to Fijian prosperity. Gordon, indeed, feared that if Samoa became German, the Germans would withdraw all their interests to Samoa and thus "a blow would be dealt at the rising prosperity of Fiji from which it would not, I fear, recover."⁽³⁾ By the end of the year, however, Gordon had changed his opinion. In August 1880 he wrote to Granville "Let the Germans annex what they please, and exercise influence where they please, except in Tonga, for that is practically to annex and exercise influence over a large part of Fiji."⁽⁴⁾ Earlier in the year Gordon had proposed

(1) F.O. 58/169. Minute by Lister to letter from Graves to Secty. of State. 28th June '80.

(2) See Map 8.

(3) Quoted by Maudslay in his Memorandum. F.O. 244/341. Lister to Russell, 19th Nov. '80. Memo by Maudslay, 20th Oct. '80.

(4) F.O. 244/341. Lister to Russell 25th Oct. '80. Encl. Gordon to Granville - Private and Confidential, 3rd Aug. '80.

a Commission to discuss annexation, but this had been bluntly answered. "H.M. Government consider that it is not expedient to entertain the question of annexation of Samoa to this country." (1) But apart from the fear of endangering Fijian interests by withdrawing, there was a feeling that Great Britain owed support to Malietoa in finding a solution to the problem of governing his kingdom. (2)

A final setback to any consideration of annexation of the islands by any single power was given by France. In December Lord Lyons wrote to Salisbury from Paris that, though France had no interest in the Samoan islands, "it is nevertheless probable that she would look with dissatisfaction on their being annexed to any one of those Powers without her being consulted. . . . It is possible she might be led to retaliate by taking possession herself of the New Hebrides or of some other island conveniently situated with regard to New Caledonia." (3)

(1) F.O. 244/231. Lister to Russell, 12th May '80.
Encl. Granville to Gordon, 27th May '80.

(2) F.O. 58/169. Minute by Lister to dispatch Graves to F.O. 28th June '80. "I don't see" he wrote "how we can throw over King Malietoa.

(3) F.O. 244/331. Pauncefote to Russell (Cons. No. 59) 18th Dec. '79. Encl. Lyons to Salisbury, 8th Dec. '79.

The unhappy situation, as described by Sir Arthur Gordon, is recorded in the minutes of a meeting of Consuls held at Mulinuu in 1880. "His Excellency, the Consul-General of Germany, and the Consuls of the United States and Great Britain desired to record their unanimous opinion that the establishment of permanent peace and tranquility in Samoa was in the highest degree improbable, if not altogether impossible, unless a more active part **by** one or more great Powers was undertaken, and that the alternative which the future presented was that of chronic anarchy and bloodshed, or the avowed or virtual annexation by one of the great Powers, either by an assumption of sovereignty or the establishment of a protectorate involving the entire control of the affairs of the whites. . . . Sir Arthur Gordon desired to add that he saw no probability of such a conclusion to the present state of affairs. The Government of the United States would not assume the sovereignty of the islands, that of H.I.M. the Emperor of Germany was equally resolved to avoid the onerous responsibilities involved by such a step, and that of Great Britain was firmly determined not to undertake such a task as that proposed. . . .

"This determination was not prompted by any apprehension of national jealousies, but it was a deliberate

resolve on the part of H.M. Government altogether to refuse duties and responsibilities which it did not feel called upon to undertake, even if it were unanimously desired (which it is not) by the Samoans themselves, and were it not (which it is) inconsistent with the provisions of Treaty engagements solemnly entered into by the Samoan Government."⁽¹⁾

As a solution, then, annexation, protection or participation in the native Government by any single power, was passed over, - not because it was not the best solution, but because it involved most trouble at the time. The Great Powers determined to temporize.

Meanwhile on the scene of action the cordial relations of the three Consuls in 1879 were leading them into a resolve to establish a tripartite government for Samoa. A Council of three members, each the nominee of one Consul, was to aid Malietoa in his government. Before it could be properly organized the scheme was rejected in Europe. The British Foreign Office regarded it with disfavour. "Tripartite government," ran a Foreign Office minute, "can only lead to

(1) F.O. 58/169. Graves to Granville. Minutes of a Meeting held at Samoa, 28th Aug. '80.

two things, failure with immediate ruin to the natives, and bad blood among ourselves, or success, involving future rivalry for the possession of the islands." ⁽¹⁾ Granville informed Baron Brincken that H.M. Government were prepared to co-operate heartily in the re-establishment of order, but they considered tripartite government inexpedient. Such a Council as was proposed "would exercise so preponderating an influence over the affairs of Samoa as practically to throw the government of the islands upon the Governments who would be represented." ⁽²⁾ The United States agreed with Great Britain on the impracticability of tripartite government on the grounds that tripartite government of Samoa was "too small an affair for three nations." ⁽³⁾

Consequently the only remaining alternative was autonomous native government. The powers determined to establish Malietoa's position and see what he could do. "That is," said Maudslay, "we are still to rely upon the impossible..."

(1) F.O. 58/169. Minute by C.H. Hill to dispatch. Graves to Granville, 28th June '80.

(2) F.O. 244/231. Granville to Russell, 7th Sept. '80. Encl. account of conversation between Granville and Brincken.

(3) F.O. 244/341. Pauncefote to Russell, 27th Dec. '79. Encl. Thornton to Salisbury, 8th Dec. '79.

No one knows better than Malietoa himself that his recognition as King is not in the least likely to lead to the formation of a strong and independent Government."⁽¹⁾

Gordon's comment is little more encouraging:-



"Although," he wrote, "I believe nothing short of a far more active intervention than any of the three powers interested are prepared to undertake would restore order to Samoa, I, at the same time, am of opinion that the supremacy of Malietoa affords a prospect of rather less disorder than would otherwise probably prevail. . . . I think, therefore, that the retention of power by the present King is slightly preferable to his overthrow."⁽²⁾

With such encouraging words the reign of peace was inaugurated. From 1881 - December '84 there was a sullen peace among the natives, a peace whose disorder dissatisfied natives and whites alike.

(1) Ibid. Memo by Maudslay.
F.O. 244/341. loc cit.

(2) F.O. 244/341. Pauncefote to Walsham, 1st Dec. '80.
Encl. 3. Gordon to Granville, 13th Sept. '80.

TOTAL EXPORTS FROM SAMOA.



TOTAL IMPORTS INTO SAMOA. *Showing a steady increase in trade (years 1876-78 not given)*
 [FROM PARL. ACCOUNTS AND PAPERS.]

CHAPTER VIII.

The Experiment of Native Autonomy
is Proved a Failure.

(1)

July 1881 - November 1884.

The events of the years 1881-4 justified Gordon and Maudslay's scepticism as to Malietoa's power to govern Samoa. By 1884 Samoan affairs had again fallen into an inextricable tangle. The situation had, however, changed on all sides. No longer was it possible to patch up a peace locally on the spot. After 1884 Samoa became a subject of dispute between Germany, Great Britain and the United States, a situation which neither her commercial value, nor her strategic position and harbours warranted.

1884 is, indeed the end of one period, just as it is the beginning of another. By the end of 1884 the British Foreign Office was willing to acknowledge that independent

(1) 12th July 1881. Date of Lackawanna Agreement when Malietoa was acknowledged by all Samoan parties.

10th Nov. 1884. Date of German-Samoan Agreement described in the course of this chapter.

native rule was impossible as well as impracticable. It was impracticable because the natives showed themselves incapable of ruling themselves, let alone foreigners. It was impossible because there was constant interference by Europeans, either as individuals, or as representing a body of opinion, ⁽¹⁾ so that the government whether good or bad, was not a native government. By 1884 the British Government admitted that Malietoa's rule had proved a failure. ⁽²⁾ There was, however, no longer any question of unwillingness on the part of the Powers to annex Samoa. In the intervening years (1881-4) the situation for the three Powers concerned had changed. By the end of 1884 Germany had manifested her intention of embarking upon a colonial policy. ⁽³⁾ The Australasian Colonies, also, had vehemently revived schemes for the neutralization if not the direct absorption of the

(1) either adventurers who influenced King, e.g. a certain J. Hunt 1881, Bartlett 1879 and others, or e.g. representatives of German interference - Weber or - to some extent - Steinberger.

(2) F.O. 58/199. Bramston to Under Secty. of State
F.O. 27th May '84.

(3) e.g. by her annexation of New Guinea, her part
in the Africa Conference 1884-1885.

(1)
Western Pacific Islands. The matter had, in fact, become international. Once the ideal of native autonomy was effectually exploded, the ultimate annexation of Samoa by one or other of the Great Powers was inevitable. The unquiet years that followed the collapse of Malietoa's Government (1884-89) were due, primarily, to a realization of this by the Great Powers and their agents in Samoa. Each power (2) wished to claim ascendancy and rights over the other two. Events in Samoa became of secondary importance to negotiations in Europe and America. The Samoan Islands became a pawn in the diplomatic game, their value assessed and exchangeable for rights, privileges and territory elsewhere.

This part of Samoan history is outside the story of this thesis. The collapse of Malietoa Laupepa was virtually (3) (though not actually) in November '84. The events to be narrated in this chapter then, deal with the cause of

(1) New Guinea to Tonga. see infra.
Inter-Col. Convention.

(2) With Great Britain it was not on her own account but out of consideration for the strong feeling on this matter that existed in New Zealand.

(3) In signing the German-Samoan Agreement the Samoan Government was under German control. He lost prestige among his own people. In 1887 he was deported by the Germans.

that final failure of native government of 1881-84, and the effects upon Samoa of the changed attitude of the Great Powers towards annexation. (1)

i. Samoa.

The general acknowledgment of Malietoa, by the Lackawanna Agreement of 17th July '41, and a widespread desire for peace, produced a temporary lull in Samoa. It had been hoped that a suitable white man might be found to help Malietoa in his task of governing - a disinterested protagonist of native rights who would become a Samoan Pooh-Bah (2) and assume every onerous duty of government, advisor-in-chief, treasurer, head of police, of native troops, interpreter, in fact all the tasks that Samoans appeared unable to do adequately. He would hold his position at the caprice of the natives, with no guarantee, or even mention of emolument. Sooner or later he would inevitably fall foul of either Samoans or whites, so that the risk was of murder or deportation.

(1) particularly the change in Germany and in the Australasian Colonies.

(2) Churchward, W.B. "My Consulate in Samoa" p. 68

Sir Arthur Gordon offered this position to W.B. Churchward in 1881. Churchward indeed went to Apia to inquire further, but on learning the nature of his duties declined the position. So Malietoa, disgusted at Churchward's refusal to become Prime Minister (he acknowledged he had never before been refused, but all previously had been rogues)⁽¹⁾ was left unwillingly to conduct the affairs of his kingdom unaided.

The principal activity of the native Government during these years was the production in 1882 of a code of laws. These were approved by Des Voeux, the British High Commissioner for the Western Pacific to succeed Gordon, as "generally unobjectionable,"⁽²⁾ and it seems that they were also generally unenforced. By 1883 Churchward was able to say that "all warlike feeling toward the present King and Government has subsided into a sullen opposition in council."⁽³⁾ The islands seemed quiet and new native houses were being built - always an indication in Samoa of native expectation

(1) e.g. Hunt, Woods, Bartlett.

Churchward became H.B.M. Acting-Consul in March 1882 when Graves went on furlough to England. He retained this position until 1885. Throughout a difficult period 1884-5 his comportment was wise and conciliatory.

(2) F.O. 58/177. Churchward to Des Voeux. F.S. 5th July '82.

(3) F.O. 58/182. Churchward to Granville. 6th May '83.

(1)
of peace. It was, indeed, the foreigners by their intrigues, who, when the time came, unloosed the dogs of war.

A further change in the condition of Samoa was wrought by the Municipal Government within Apia. Before its establishment in 1879 (2) Apia had a reputation as "the Hell of the Pacific!" (3) It had a population of some hundred or more half castes and many of the white men were the riff raff from the Australasian Colonies and Fiji who had fled to Samoa upon the establishing of law and order in those parts. The urgency of the need was well recognized by all the more respectable white inhabitants and these combined to improve the state of the township. The Municipal Board raised some \$ 5,000 a year by rates, licences and fines. Regulations for the health, cleanliness, the safety and convenience of residents were issued and carried through and Apia emerged "into a well ordered district, with a community particularly jealous of the maintenance of law and order; where property and persons were as safe as they would be anywhere in England, and whose criminal record would compare most favourably, in proportion to its inhabitants, with any seaport

(1) Churchward "My Consulate in Samoa" p. 164

(2) See Chap. 6.

(3) Churchward op. cit. p. 71.

town in the world." (1) Sale of alcohol to natives was
strictly forbidden, (2) and the sale of arms regulated. Some
light is thrown upon the difficulty of this task by an
account by Churchward of an incident in Apia. Some months
after this regulation came into force an inspection of a
store "brought to light over 600 breech loading rifles,
63,000 rounds of ball cartridges, 3 tons of powder, and a
large quantity of cast bullets!" (3)

Such regulations were only carried through amidst
a scorching fire of criticisms from the disgruntled "beach."
The success of the Municipal Government was possible only
so long as the Consuls acted in unision. The departure of
of the German Consul Stuebel from this common accord in 1884
effectively dislocated the Municipality.

ii. New Zealand Intrigue.

Special blame for this cannot be thrust at the
Germans though in the later part of the story (October -
November 1884 onwards) much attaches to them. Trouble came

(1) Churchward op. cit. p. 75.

(2) This was difficult to carry out as half castes -
as European subjects often supplied native relatives

(3) Churchward. op. cit. p. 75.

inevitably upon Samoa - Peace increased the prosperity of the islands, and prosperity brought more traders, from 1880 onwards.

The warning rumble of further upheavals came in 1883. In September of that year there came to the islands a certain Mr. Lundon, a New Zealand Ex-M.P. ⁽¹⁾ His private purpose was to claim back the lands of a notorious New Zealand landowner, Cornwall by name. Failing in his endeavour to get Cornwall's land he began a series of intrigues with natives to get them to appeal to New Zealand and Great Britain for annexation. "He was a man, as I was informed," writes Bates, United States Commissioner in 1886 to Samoa, "of the class who make continual trouble among the South Sea natives." ⁽²⁾ He entirely failed to realize that this was a task of no difficulty as Samoan chiefs had appealed to Great Britain for annexation intermittently since 1845. The occasion for his action was, however, well chosen. In that same year Sir George Grey, now old and somewhat

(1) John Lundon's activities described in:-

- a) F.O. 58/199. dispatches by Act. Consul Churchward for 1884.
- b) United States Papers. 50 Congress 1. Hse. Ex. Doc. No. 238. Appendix A. Report by Bates. N.Z. annexation projects, pp. 158-167.
- c) mention also in Churchward. W. "My Consulate in Samoa." pp. 275-7.

(2) 50 Congress 1. Hse. Ex. Doc. No. 238. Report of Bates. p. 167.

embittered, had recalled his dream of forty years before. He brought forward a Federation Act by which New Zealand should be enabled to "take steps for the establishment of its rule over such islands in the Pacific as are not already occupied by, or under the protection of a foreign power, and the occupation of which by any foreign power would be detrimental to the interests of Australasia."

It was while this Bill was before the House of Representatives that Landon began his Samoan intrigues. He sent articles to the New Zealand Herald calculated to stir up the popular feeling in New Zealand. ⁽¹⁾ Moreover, under his influence Malietoa once again petitioned Great Britain for annexation. ⁽²⁾ Malietoa was, however, suspicious of Landon personally, and asked Churchward for advice as to how to be rid of him. ⁽³⁾ The petition expressed rather a general and long standing wish to be annexed to Great Britain, than any new growth of feeling. ⁽⁴⁾ A Samoan resident writing

(1) New Zealand Herald, 1883. Sept. 17th, 18th.

(2) F.O. 58/199. Malietoa to Her Most Gracious Majesty, 19th Nov. '83.
This petition was never answered - Lord Derby preferred to "shelve the question" and the F.O. only heard of it a year later when another petition (5th Nov. '84) arrived.

(3) Churchward. op. cit. pp. 275-277.

(4) F.O. 58/199. Des Voeux to Derby (confident.) 19th Nov. '83, enclosing Malietoa to Queen Victoria, 19th Nov. '83.

anonymously to the New Zealand papers declared that at no time was there any unanimous or even widespread desire in Samoa to be annexed by New Zealand, and that Lundon's articles in the papers were wilful misinterpretations. ⁽¹⁾ Had Lundon been disinterested in his efforts he would have realized that the problem was not in getting the natives to petition Great Britain, but in understanding the position of the Germans and in persuading the British Colonial and Foreign Offices that there was occasion to act. Des Voeux the High Commissioner of the Western Pacific valiantly attempted to make this clear to the New Zealand Government, while he appealed to them to check this movement in Samoa:-

"Whether the annexation of Samoa to New Zealand be desirable or not," he wrote, "it is to be borne in mind that it would not probably be sanctioned without the previous consent of Germany, which has interests in the islands considerably greater than those of any other power, and which deserves special consideration as having afforded for years past the principal protection to all white settlers by keeping ships of war almost continually in Samoan waters. As Germany is not a colonizing power, it is not impossible that her

(1) N.Z. Herald and Daily Southern Cross. 8th Aug. '84.

Government might regard with favour the annexation of these islands by England, on the assurance that the possession of the private property of German subjects would be thereby guaranteed. But however this may be, a disposition of this kind is not likely to be induced by an agitation which places in immediate peril interests which have hitherto been preserved at so heavy a sacrifice." ⁽¹⁾ (26th Oct. '83).

The British Government indicated its line of policy by withholding its assent to Grey's Act. It had undoubtedly been framed to enable the New Zealand Government to annex Samoa. ⁽²⁾ New Zealand did not in the least appreciate the immediate difficulties that arose with Germany and the United States when she began an aggressive line of action in Samoa.

In the same year (1883) the question of the annexation of Pacific Islands to the Australasian Colonies came into prominence, through the Inter-Colonial Convention held in Sydney (Nov. 28th - Dec. 6th, 1883). Chester's abortive act of annexing New Guinea on behalf of the Queensland

(1) P.P. c. 3863. quoted Scholefield "The Pacific" p. 153.

(2) In 1885 the Samoan native Government passed an Act annexing themselves to New Zealand. Had Grey's Act been law this would have caused a difficult situation with Germany.

Government, and the repudiation of that Act by Great Britain had caused irritation and bitterness in the Australian Colonies. It was felt that the British Government was not only unsympathetic to the demands of Colonies, but also blind to dangers that in the Pacific seemed very real - the dangers of German aggression. The Prime Minister of Queensland, McIlwraith, wrote to the other Australasian Colonies to test their feelings in this matter. ⁽¹⁾ The Colonies also felt that while they were independent and separate their opinion carried less weight with the Home Government than if they had been a single Federated unit. It was suggested that the Convention should discuss Federation as well as the annexation of Pacific Islands. The Convention accordingly met in Sydney in November 1883. ⁽²⁾ Representatives from all the Australian Colonies and from New Zealand took part and Sir William Des Voeux, Governor of Fiji (and High Commissioner of the W. Pacific) who was in Sydney at the time, was invited to attend as representative for Fiji.

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- (1) Victoria 2nd Session, 1883. Papers presented to Parliament. Vol. 3. Correspondence relating to the Australasian Convention of Annexation of adjacent islands and the Federation of Australasia.
- (2) New South Wales Parliament. Votes and Proceedings. 1883-4. Vol. 9. Proceedings of the Inter-Colonial Convention, 28th Nov. - 6th Dec. 1883.

The avowed purpose in proposing the annexation of Pacific Islands was to exclude the possibility of Foreign Powers, in occupation of adjacent islands, proving a menace or inconvenience to the Colonies. The two points uppermost in the minds of Australian Ministers were a) the possible occupation of New Guinea by Germany, b) the great inconvenience caused by the French convict settlements in New Caledonia, and the immediate likelihood of French transport of habitual criminals to New Hebrides. The former point was keenly pressed by Queensland, the latter by New South Wales and Victoria. The question of Samoa did not directly come up. The resolutions were framed to apply only to islands, unoccupied by any European Power, South of the Equator, and where there were no treaty limitations. Sir William Des Voeux⁽¹⁾ contributed an important memorandum upon this. He threw a new light upon the matter by emphasizing the small value of the islands. Tropical products, especially sugar, could be grown in a small and concentrated area. The demand for copra⁽²⁾ was diminishing. His earnest hope, however, was that by

(1) Ibid. N.S.W. Papers 1883-4. Vol. 9. p. 177. Memo. by Des Voeux.

(2) This was not the case. There was a slight falling off in its importation in Gt. Britain but since then the import of copra has steadily risen. His estimates are inaccurate and based upon his knowledge of sugar culture in the West Indies and Fiji. Nevertheless the report is interesting as illustrating a new point of view.

absorption into the Empire of the Pacific Islands, the native races might be preserved from exploitation. This, he said, "is the only rational hope that they will, in centuries to come, prove of any substantial benefit to the world at large." First and foremost, he recommended the discouragement of settlers and the buying of native land. Here, indeed, at the end of our period we find in a representative of the British Crown, the same spirit as permeated the Aborigines Committee of 1837, that the work of the British in the Pacific should be to protect and preserve the weaker races.


The importance of the Convention lay in the unanimity with which all the Colonies supported this measure, and in their offer to "defray, in proportion to the population, such share of the cost . . . as Her Majesty's Government, having reasonable regard to the importance of Imperial and Australasian interests, may deem fair and reasonable."⁽¹⁾

The importance of the Convention in Samoan affairs was not direct. It had, however, an immediate influence upon German opinion and activity.⁽²⁾ Further, it may also

(1) Ibid. 1st Day proceedings. 28th Nov. '83.


(2) e.g. the Consuls at Apia and Sydney protested against the Australian proposals in their home dispatches and Weber and Hanshem pressed the claims of their trading establishments. See German Weissbuch (Auswärtiges Amt) 1885 Pt. 2. pp. 95-185. "Deutsche Interessen in der Süd See."

Figure showing preponderance of
German Interests in Samoa.



IMPORTS AND EXPORTS SAMOAN.

1880 - 1884



EXPORTS


[FROM THE REPORT OF THE GERMAN CONSULATE IN SAMOA 1883 IN PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS 1884
 [FIGURES FOR 1884 FROM U.S. MONTHLY CONSULAR REPORTS. JULY 1885 NO 54 (except German Import 1884) VOL 86
 [U.S. CONSULAR REPORTS GIVE HIGHER FIGURES FOR GERMANY'S EXPORT AND LOWER FOR HER IMPORT

SAMOAN EXPORTS & IMPORTS

1884.

[FROM U. S. MONTHLY CONSULAR REPORTS JULY 1885 No 54]

Compare imports with graph on page opposite taken from German Reports. Though very different both agree in preponderance of German trade. (see also p 78 footnote 1)



safely be inferred that the British Colonial Office, with Lord Derby as Secretary of State for Colonies, realizing that the feeling in the Colonies was undoubtedly genuine, became more sympathetic to their demands, and in succeeding discussions upon the fate of Samoa, the feeling in the Australasian Colonies was put forward as a bar to German annexation of Samoa.⁽¹⁾

iii. The Change in German Attitude.

The intrigues of London gave rise to counter-intrigues by Germans, Weber, Ruge and even the Consul Stuebel. By 1884 German patriots began to see hope of State support, - which in 1880 had not been accorded to their endeavours.

Opinion in Germany was, between 1880-5 undergoing a powerful change. In 1880 the defeat of the Samoan Subsidy Bill had seemed a fatal blow to colonial enterprise. Actually the effect was the reverse. Enthusiasts were stimulated to win popular support. Between 1880 and 1882, for example, no less than forty books and pamphlets were published for this

(1) F.O. 58/199. Branston to Under Secretary of State F.O. 23rd Feb. '84. Derby put the case of the Colonies in such a way as to preclude Granville assenting to Germany obtaining prepondering influence in the islands. Granville, therefore, proposed what in 1881 had been rejected as a solution, i.e. tripartite government.

(1)
purpose. In 1882 the Kolonial Verein, a Society for promoting German colonization was formed. (6th Dec. 1882). The chief promoters in Germany were von Maltzan, a celebrated African traveller, von der Brügggen and Prince Hohenlohe Langenburg. The avowed objects were "To extend to a larger circle the realization of the necessity of applying national energy to the field of colonization. - To form a central organization for the hitherto scattered efforts for expansion - and to create some method for the practical solution of the question."⁽²⁾ By 31st December '83 there were 3,345 members and by 1884 numbers had risen 300 per cent. to 10,275. It was decided to issue a paper. The aim and appeal of this periodical, "Die Deutsche Kolonial Zeitung," was national not political. It was to consolidate the work of German traders. It was affirmed that "it was better to work for a place in the world,"⁽³⁾ than to complain of ill-fortune or the Chancellor."⁽⁴⁾ In the Zeitung, Samoa figured prominently. Long accounts of the islands were given, descriptive, historical and commercial. There were also frequent short

(1) Townsend. "Origins of Modern German Colonialism" p. 86.

(2) Townsend. op. cit. pp. 140-44.

(3) "frisch einen Griff in der Welt zu thun."

(4) Kolonial Zeitung. Vol. 1. p. 2.

entries and extracts "from a correspondent in Samoa," which served to keep in people's minds the importance of the group to Germans.⁽¹⁾ No opportunity was lost to impress the public in Germany with the attractions of the islands and the extent of German interest, and the aggressive and hampering action of the British. The English, ran one article, "might as well say straight out, 'in whatever part of the world there is no acknowledged settlement by a civilized power, that do we take, and it belongs to us English.'⁽²⁾"

Indeed the feeling for colonialism became to some extent an anti-English feeling. The field for expansion had been narrowed chiefly by England. The Anglo-French agreement of 1882 was construed as an unfriendly action, and her tardy settlement of the Fiji claims was a further grievance.

The Australasian Inter-Colonial Convention of 1883 further stirred German feelings of anxiety, particularly in the Pacific, lest British colonists and traders should be enabled - by the absence of German State support to German

(1) e.g. in Vol. 1.
in Vol. 2. 1885 there are 5 articles on Samoa
and Pacific trade.
in Vol. 3. 1886 " " 4 "
in Vol. 4. 1887 " " 6 "

(2) Kolonial Zeitung. Vol. p.

enterprise - to forestall Germany in New Guinea and perhaps even to secure Samoa. Moreover, England's apparent unwillingness to allow other claims, while she herself was unwilling to undertake annexation⁽¹⁾ had the effect of promoting popular support to a colonial policy. Lord Amthill, indeed, warned Granville that Bismarck was being driven "contrary to his convictions and will, into the inauguration of the colonial policy he had hitherto denounced, as detrimental to the concentration of German strength and power."⁽²⁾ When Great Britain protested against the Samoan-German Agreement of 10th November '84, Bismarck complained to Malet "that at every point at which Germany had endeavoured to found a colony, England had closed in, making new acquisitions so as to restrict Germany's power of expansion."⁽³⁾ Further, "The Imperial Government intended to place under the direct protection of the Empire, as had been done in West Africa, so now also in the South Seas, those districts in which German commerce had become predominant, or to which expeditions were about to be undertaken."⁽⁴⁾

(1) e.g. at Angaa Pequana in Africa. vide Townsend. op. cit. p. 168.

(2) Fitzmaurice, Ld. E. "Life of Lord Granville", Vol. ii. p. 355. quoted Scholefield "The Pacific" p. 291.

(3) B.F.S.P. Vol. 76. p. 786. Malet to Granville, 24th Jan. '85.

(4) Ibid p. 789. Count Münster to Granville, 28th Jan. '85.

Although these extracts belong to the period of diplomatic negotiation (1885-9) that followed the collapse of Malietoa's independent Government, they illustrate the support that Bismarck accorded Stuebel in his action of forcing the Agreement of November 1884 upon Malietoa.⁽¹⁾ We may, therefore, assume that it was the realization of the change in German popular feeling and Government policy, that led Stuebel into taking this action. The Germans on Samoa were, indeed, sanguine that Samoa would shortly be annexed by Germany.⁽²⁾ Further, in his book Churchward declared that had Malietoa's request for annexation by New Zealand been granted, the New Zealanders "would not have had the pleasure of seeing their flag flying over the islands, for on the first report of their arrival in the neighbourhood, the Germans were quite determined formally to annex the whole group, and very glad they would have been of the excuse."⁽³⁾

In this atmosphere, when the Germans saw at last the shaping of a policy of State protection to the trader by annexation of those parts where he had acquired interests, it

(1) See p. 243. *infra*.

(2) F.O. 58/199. Churchward to Granville, 28th Oct. '84.

(3) Churchward. "My Consulate in Samoa." p. 275.

is hardly surprising that Germans should have looked with irritation upon London's intrigues. The manifest preference of Samoans for English made the annoyance greater. ⁽¹⁾ So, with hopes for support from Berlin, intrigue was devised to counter intrigue.

Weber's first step in obtaining control of the native government was when he succeeded - to the sorrow of Samoans and to the alarm of the British - in acquiring Mulinuu, the Samoan native capital and seat of government (6th December '83). This step gave him indirect control over the government. "In the event of Malietoa taking any steps that he may consider inimical to his national or private interests," wrote Thurston, "He (Weber) would not hesitate in turning him off the point and putting his opponents in possession, ⁽²⁾ thus virtually ⁽³⁾ giving them the traditional right of rule over all Samoa."

(1) This became, at times, somewhat glaring. For example the Samoans cultivated a habit of wearing the Union Jack as a lava-lava (or waist cloth) an act which certain British residents considered disrespectful. Their attempts to suppress this only made matters worse and a culminating point was reached when a Samoan gentleman walked the length of the town draped in the Royal Standard - He was however, run in -

(2) An action taken by Weber two years later.

(3) A full account of Weber's method of obtaining possession is given in F.O. 58/188. Thurston to Granville, 28th Jan. '84.

Weber's avowed motive in bullying the Samoan Government was to secure what had for long been a grievance, the due punishment of plantation thieves.⁽¹⁾ The Municipal Government had control only over Apia. Neutral territory extended only a little way beyond the bounds of the Municipality. Despite the secession of war, depredations on German plantations had continued because the Samoan Government was too weak to stop thieves, and too lenient to punish offenders.

But though this was Weber's avowed and immediate aim, his general actions as reported by the Consuls leave no doubt that he desired the real and effective control of the islands by Germany. Indeed, it is difficult to say where his efforts for the German commercial firm ended, and where the work for the honour and glory of Germany began. To add to the efficiency and power of the firm was to add to the efficiency and power of Germany in the islands. "In such an atmosphere," wrote Stevenson, "Commercial sharpness has an air of patriotism."⁽²⁾ Thus, ostensibly for the benefit of the wide plantations of the Deutsch Handels und Plantagen Gesellschaft, Weber set his plans.

(1) See chap. 6.

(2) R.L. Stevenson. "A Footnote to History." p.

According to Churchward's despatches⁽¹⁾ feeling in Apia was running high by the end of the year, 1884. The Germans suspected the British of intrigue for annexation, partly justified and partly because the natives were loud in expressing their wish for British protection. In October Weber picked a quarrel with Samoans over Mulinuu Point which he had acquired the previous December. The natives had grumbled over his successful acquisition, and he called upon the Samoan Government to vacate or redeem the property. The opinion of a Samoan was "that the Germans wished to pick a quarrel with their government for annexation purposes. This, they said, was made clear by speeches to them, by the man-of-war placing flags on various parts of their coast,⁽²⁾ and also planting coconuts on the reef islands. . . . There can be no doubt," wrote Churchward, "that the natives are really alarmed at the many reports of German annexation, and as a body resent the idea. The increasingly loud talk of German importance impressed upon them every day of their lives, backed up by newspaper reports of German desire for land acquisition, all of which in a more or less distorted condition they obtain

(1) F.O. 58/199. Churchward to Granville, 28th Oct. '84.

(2) probably surveying flags.

knowledge of and formally discuss, naturally cause them to think very seriously of the matter." Churchward further reported rumours current of German annexation. "Mr. Ruge" he wrote of the head of the second German firm of Ruge, Hedeman & Co. "Mr. Ruge spares no opportunity of publicly stating that a German protectorate has been decided upon and will be established very shortly in spite of all opposition."⁽¹⁾ The fear of this was further enhanced by the arrival of the German corvette "Marie", 31st October '84, and the expected arrival of the H.I.M.S. "Elizabeth." Churchward feared that the Samoans would hoist the British flag on their own initiative!

Meanwhile, King Malietoa on the advice of his chiefs wrote another appeal to Great Britain and to the Government of New Zealand for protection (5th November '84). In the stress of the moment he appealed to the Governor of New Zealand to cable his petition to England.⁽²⁾ Weak, indecisive, the King hoped to shuffle the burden of government onto other shoulders. The petition, he still optimistically hoped, might be answered and his difficulties solved. The next day,

(1) F.O. 58/199. Churchward to Granville, 11th Nov. '84.

(2) F.O. 58/199. Churchward to Granville (No. 23) 11th Nov. '84. enclo. Malietoa to Queen Victoria and to Gov. of N.Z. 5th Nov. '84.

after despatching the petition, he publicly performed before the German consulate the most severe abasement permitted by Samoan custom, but he let it be known that it was only in atonement for sins committed, and not as a sign of any wish to belong to Germany. ⁽¹⁾ He hoped, indeed, by this implied submission to deceive Weber as to his real hopes.

Weber, however, wished for a more definite assurance. Four days later, on 10th November '84 he forced Malietoa, and Tamasese the vice-king to sign an agreement for the future regulation of the government of Samoa. Malietoa submitted for the sake of peace, but the next day appealed again to England. "Your Majesty" he wrote to Queen Victoria, "We are in distress on account of the Government of Germany lest they should take our islands. Therefore we have accepted another treaty with Germany. I wish to make clear to your Majesty in consequence that I have accepted the treaty against my will, likewise against the will of my Government, but I have accepted it on account of my fear, for I have thought that if your Government should be set up in these islands, then that Treaty will be of no effect." ⁽²⁾

(1) Churchward. "My Consulate in Samoa" p. 373.

(2) F.O. 58/199. Churchward to Granville (No. 24)
Encl. No. 2. Malietoa to Queen Victoria,
17th Nov. '84.

Unfortunately for Malietoa the Germans heard of this. Churchward recounts that a scribe sold the document to them for \$30.⁽¹⁾ "The Germans may have been wrong before; they were now in the right to be angry. They had been publicly, solemnly and elaborately fooled."⁽²⁾ From that moment Malietoa was of no account to them. From that incident dates the confusion into which Samoan affairs were plunged. The agreement to which the unwilling Malietoa had assented (16th November '84) virtually handed the control of the Samoan Government to Germany. There was to be a Samoan-German Council of the German Consul and two Germans (appointed by him) two Samoans (appointed one by Malietoa and one by Tamasese - therefore from opposite parties). Arrangements were made for the punishment of Samoans committing injuries to German life and property. An adequate and well guarded prison was to be built to receive such offenders. There was to be a German Secretary and advisor to the King, who would also possess magisterial powers and be able to punish for any term up to two years.⁽³⁾

(1) Churchward. op. cit p. 378.

(2) R.L. Stevenson. p. 96.

(3) F.O. 58/199. Churchward to Granville (No. 14)
19th Nov. '84.

The strife which arose in Samoa as the result of this document, and the reception which it received by the British and American Governments placed Samoan affairs on a new footing. Indeed, by the end of 1884 the British Government was forced into an awkward position. In 1881, unwilling to be driven into too great concern in the islands and feeling safe in their assured neutrality, Granville had refused to entertain the idea of a tripartite condominium. Now in 1884 Germany had suddenly shown a willingness to annex on the grounds of interests which were indubitably preponderant. This was particularly awkward as New Zealand had manifested a great anxiety to annex Samoa since 1883, ⁽¹⁾ and had made an offer to share in the expenses that might be involved. Further, native autonomy, the British standby during the century, had proved in Samoa an acknowledged failure. The aggrieved tone of the Australian Colonies over German annexation of Northern New Guinea was only a foretaste of what the bitterness in New Zealand would be if Germany annexed Samoa. England, therefore,

(1) 19th Nov. '84. Jervois telegraphed N.Z. Ministers hoped G.B. would claim Samoa and Tonga in the negotiations that were proceeding with Germany (F.O. 58/199 Jervois to Derby - 19th Nov. '84 telegram). The attitude of the C.O. is illustrated by a memo. by Herbert that "as far as the C.O. were concerned, they would not be sorry if Germany took Samoa, and perhaps Tonga also." F.O. 58/199. Memorandum for F.O. C.L.H. 16th Dec. '84.

had to resort to reciprocal assurances with Germany that both would regard the integrity of Samoa, ⁽¹⁾ a solution that satisfied neither Germany nor New Zealand nor Samoa, but it saved England the unpleasantness of either annexing or ⁽²⁾ allowing Germany to do so.

iv. The American Standpoint - A further bar to Settlement.

But even supposing the British Government, acknowledging that native autonomy was impracticable, had agreed to German annexation there was yet the third Treaty Power to consider - America had in the years 1880-4 developed her interests in the islands. That President Hayes considered America had future interests in the Pacific Islands is implied by him in ⁽³⁾ 1880. "It would be well," he wrote, "if the consular

(1) F.O. 58/199. Granville to Malet. Cons. 29. 2nd Dec. '84
On the receipt of assurances from Berlin Derby cabled to New Zealand that "foreign interests in the islands precluded H.M. Government from accepting the cession of the Navigator Islands." (F.O. 58/199. F.O. to C.O. 11th Dec. '84).

(2) This had been strongly urged by Des Voeux. "It would be far better for the interests not only of British subjects but of the Samoans that the country should be altogether taken by Germany rather than that the government should be carried on under the conditions indicated in the agreement, which attaches to Germans all the advantages without the corresponding responsibilities of annexation. F.O. 58/199. Des Voeux to Granville, No. 23. 10th Dec. '84.

(3) Richardson, J.D. "Messages of Presidents." Vol. VIII. p. 64. 6th Dec. 1880.

jurisdiction of our representative at Apia were increased in extent and importance so as to guard American interests in the surrounding and outlying islands of Oceania." Here is a clear indication of United States interests in Samoa as a focus for further activity. In the Samoa Conference of 1887 the United States further showed that she considered Samoa of prime strategic importance. As it was in this Conference that the United States first clearly showed her attitude to the problem of the ultimate fate of Samoa, it deserves a brief consideration here, even though it is outside the period immediately under discussion.

The climax in Samoa at the end of 1884 and in 1885 led to an Anglo-German Commission to find a solution to the vexed question of Samoan government. The two Commissioners (the British Sir J. Thurston and Her Krauel the German) presented annexation by a single power as the only solution. The matter was dropped in view of the Anglo-German negotiations for the division of the Pacific into spheres of influence April '86. In 1886, however, a Commission of American, German and British representatives was appointed to report upon the situation in Samoa and upon "how to compass an autonomous

government in the islands." (1) Travers, the German Commissioner, was clear in his assertion that this was not practicable. He recommended annexation by Germany as she had the greatest interests. Bates, the United States Commissioner, recommended annexation by America as she had least interests. Thurston did not consider annexation by a single power permissible as a solution within the scope of his instructions, but he implied its desirability.

On the basis of these reports a Conference was called at Washington June - July 1887. The German delegate, one Alvensleben, suggested that a five year mandate for the government of Samoa should be given to the Power with preponderant interests. This would, of course, be Germany, but if at the end of five years another Power should have acquired as great interests, the government should be transferred. This as a solution was welcomed by Sir Lionel West, the British delegate. Though it would probably have been unpalatable to New Zealand it would have been a settlement on

(1) Hse. Ex. Doc. 50-1. No. 238 -
Travers' Report p. 261. App. B.
Thurston's " p. 268. App. C.
Bates' " p. 137. App. A.

a just and reasonable basis. This proposal was, however, firmly rejected by Bayard, the United States Secretary of State. He flatly declined to consider what he implied would be the eventual absorption of the islands by Germany. His reasons lay bare the United States interest in the Group. Their importance, he said, "is mainly because of their geographical position. They lie in the pathway of a commerce that is just being developed. The opening of the North West Coast of North America to civilization and commerce by means of the trans-continental railways had given to this group of islands an interest which they had never had before.... Moreover," he continued, "we all hope for the penetration of the Isthmus in some way or other. If that occurs a new feature of interest will be added to them . . . There is something beyond the mere material present value of the land and products, and it is for that reason that the United States desires to see that group of islands maintained for the common use of all nations."⁽¹⁾

This, it may be added, was not the German interpretation of American action. "By the Monroe Doctrine," said

(1) B.F.S.P. Vol. 79. Protocols of Conferences between Great Britain, Germany and the United States.

Count Herbert Bismarck to Salisbury, "They seem to wish the Pacific Ocean to become an American lake. They not only want Hawaii (where England has no interests) under their influence, but also Samoa and Tonga as stations on a route through a future Panama Canal to Australia; there are, indeed, Americans who dream of a future republican union and federation of the various Australasian Colonies with the United States."⁽¹⁾

Whatever "arrière pensée" Bayard may have had in the Washington Conference, his refusal to consider the proposed mandatory government, postponed the solution of the Samoan problem until 1889.

v. A Résumé of the Years 1885-1899.

In Samoa, meanwhile, affairs had moved fast. After his submission to the Germans in November '84, Malietoa was no longer of any account either with Samoans or whites. In January (23rd Jan. '85) Stuebel hoisted the German flag at Mulinuu and it remained flying despite the protests of the American and British Consuls. In December (31st December '85) Stuebel proceeded to haul down the Samoan flag. A climax was reached when the Germans accorded their whole-hearted support

(1) Lepsius, Bartholdy and Thumine - Die Grosse Politik. Vol. IV. p. 175. H. Bismarck to Secty. of State for Foreign Affairs, 24th Aug. '87.

to Tamasese, the vice-King, who was a puppet in their hands, and declared war on Malietoa. For the sake of his people, and to prevent civil strife Malietoa magnanimously gave himself up to the Germans, and was deported. Tamasese was installed as King, but with little native support. This, however, did not lead to peace. Another scion of the Malietoa family, Mataafa, won the support of a large party in Samoa and civil war continued in 1887-8, and the beginning of 1889. It seems probable that but for the German support to Tamasese, Mataafa might have established himself. As it was, the Americans and British lent Mataafa moral if not material support, while German marines openly fought for the German nominee. At this stage, in March '89, when the harbour was filled with the hostile warships, American, German and British, a hurricane swept down like an avenging power upon the harbour, and of the seven men-of-war, the British ship, the "Calliope," alone escaped by steaming out into the open ocean, in the teeth of the gale.

This disaster sobered hotheads in Samoa, and politicians in Europe and America. The magnitude of the losses in men and shipping was out of all proportion to the

value attached to the islands. The delegates at the Berlin Conference (April - June 1889) were, consequently, sincere in their desire to come to a reasonable and just settlement for Samoa. All the same the arrangements made at the Berlin Conference of 1889 were unsatisfactory. Autonomous government was no longer considered possible and that certainly showed an advance on previous discussions. But annexation by a single power was precluded. So Samoa was, for ten years, under an arrangement by which the two principal officials should be neither German, nor British nor American, but appointed by the King of Sweden. For ten years Samoa laboured under this unsatisfactory government. Further serious outbreaks of hostilities, 1898-9, led to the much more satisfactory arrangement of 1899 when Western Samoa (Savaii and Upolu) fell to the lot of Germany and Eastern Samoa (Tutuila, Manua and Rose Island) to America. (1) And only then did the distraught islands have peace.

(1) The events of the years 1884-94 in Samoa, told sympathetically from the native point of view, are in R.L. Stevenson's "Vailima Letters" and "A Footnote to History." Other outline sources for the events of these years are -

Scholefield	"The Pacific"
Watson, R.L.	"A History of Samoa"
Henderson	"American Diplomatic Questions Samoa."

CONCLUSION.

We have seen the islands in the short sketch of some fifty-four years pass from a state of primitive but happy disorder to a condition of semi-civilized but unhappy confusion. From the first disinterested service of a few white men, came the later selfish exploitation of others until the bewildered Samoan chiefs, distraught by intrigues, begged that the burden of government might be lifted from them.

What is it, we may now ask, that this study sets out to reveal? The theme is well worn, that of a civilized people encroaching upon a primitive race. In the Pacific this presented certain peculiar features. In Polynesia, within the Pacific, the problem is distinct from that in other parts of the Pacific. Within Polynesia, the history of Samoa illustrates with peculiar aptness and emphasis the problem of the mingling of Polynesian native with invading white men. The problem, at the root of the question, might be posed thus:- "What form of government can be compassed that will admit of white encroachment, and also

of the preservation of the native peoples?" (1)

The intelligence of the Polynesians, and in certain islands their monarchical form of government, made it seem possible that the ideal form of government for them would be an independent monarchy. Great Britain was anxious to preserve native peoples from exploitation, and sufficiently powerful in the Pacific to enforce her wish, determined that the native peoples should be recognised and preserved as native states. Ultimately this was proved to be impossible throughout Polynesia. In Samoa, this was clear from about 1850 onward. The Aborigines Committee, in 1837, had expressed the hope that Great Britain would not "ever exert her power to destroy the political rights of these comparatively feeble and defenceless people: yet it cannot be denied that their national independence cannot be consulted without immediate injury to their social welfare." In this lay much of the problem of British relations with the Pacific islanders. Great Britain attempted to preserve them politically as well as racially, and one rendered the other

(1) A distinct contrast to the problem which arose later (circ. 1884) i.e. "Who is to have which islands and in exchange for what?"

impossible. As Samoans deteriorated racially, it became impossible to preserve them politically, and as they became more inert and helpless politically, disorder led also to racial deterioration and exploitation by white men.

The impossibility of maintaining an autonomous native state was due partly to the weakness of native political organization, and partly to foreign aggression. In Samoa both these features are present in exaggerated form. Nowhere else in Polynesia was native organization looser or more incapable of maintaining order. ⁽¹⁾ Nowhere was the hold of foreign powers more tenacious, nor were foreign rights more evenly balanced.

The causes of the interference of Great Britain, Germany and the United States in Samoa are widely different. The British missionaries first prepared the way for traders. Though the missionaries sought no gain, they won the greatest influence for Great Britain. In the British missionaries and in the Roman Catholic priests only, did the natives see men who came unreservedly to give and not to obtain. It was,

(1) Other native peoples had loose political organization, (e.g. Maoris in New Zealand) but there the second factor, foreign aggression, was simplified to the interference of only one or two powers.

therefore, in the first place the British that they relied upon for help and protection.

At the same time the British policy in the islands had a more practical basis than mere disinterested service to native peoples. The urgent desire of the Australasian Colonies that Samoa should not be allowed to fall into foreign hands, influenced the British Government in its determination, if not to annex, at least to prevent others from doing so.

The German material interests in Samoa were far greater than British or American. Not merely were the German plantations of intrinsic commercial value, representing German capital and years of labour, such as could not lightly be allowed to suffer harm which might accrue from foreign annexation, but also Apia was the centre for a very wide trade among the surrounding Pacific Islands. Further, Germans, glowing with a new patriotism, felt that they might in this remote corner of the world serve their Fatherland, and that when Germany should seek a greater Empire, it would be ready for her to grasp. Yet the selfishness of their aims made Germans unpopular with Samoans. The natives felt that they were being exploited by an unsympathetic but powerful people.

The interests of the third great power, the United States, were throughout strategic. The potential value of the islands as a strategic base in the Pacific was their reason for steadfastly maintaining and demanding rights equal to the other powers in Samoa. Because this did not involve dealings on a large scale with natives nor to any great extent eviction from their land, ⁽¹⁾ the natives never distrusted nor disliked the Americans as a people. American adventurers who influenced native affairs, appeared to Samoans as disinterested helpers. Even rogues often appeared to have an element of service in their personal intrigues, quite unlike the callous dealings of Weber and his agents.

The desire of each power for a foothold upon the islands, lay in the strategic position of Samoa. It was the strategic position in relation to New Zealand that gave rise to the demand in New Zealand for their annexation. Likewise was the propinquity to Fiji put forward, at one time, as a bar to the withdrawal of British influence from Samoa. Similarly it was on the grounds of their strategic importance

(1) The lands bought e.g. by the Polynesian Land & Commercial Company were not planted and so the natives continued to live on them for a time anyhow.

on the trans-Pacific trade routes that America claimed the islands. Germany, it is true put forward her plantations as an especial, incontrovertible, interest but even these depended in the first place upon the selection of Samoa in 1854 as a centre for the Godeffroy trading firm. Because Samoa was an ideal dep^ot for extensive trade amongst the surrounding islands, land for plantations was bought on the islands.

Thus, on account of its strategic position there was foreign intervention on a bigger scale in Samoa than upon other islands.

The second cause of the failure of native self-government was also particularly marked in Samoa. In other native states of importance it was possible for a native King to maintain an apparently successful autonomous rule. This, at least, was achieved in Hawaii, in Tonga, and in Tahiti. Though the guiding hand behind the King's was frequently that of a white man, yet the rule was nominally native and neutral and was such that peace was kept between native factions in the kingdom, and trade could be carried on without frequent disturbance. The Samoan political

organization was too loose for peace to be maintained for any length of time. This made evident the fact that autonomous government was not compatible with foreign exploitation of the islands or encroachment upon them.

The settlement of this question in Samoa was made more difficult because the value of the islands to the great powers was negative. Great Britain and America wished rather to prevent any other power from obtaining Samoa, than that they wanted themselves to annex it. Similarly, it may be said that until 1884 Germany too wished rather that the islands should be neutral than that she should acquire them. Had the natives shown themselves capable of forming an independent government which maintained order, the problem would not have become so acute. It was the failure of native autonomy that led to attempts to control the native government.

This early part of the history of European encroachments in Samoa is not merely the tale of conflicting material interests of three of the Great Powers. The clash is also of ideals. The British ideal of the preservation of the native races and of maintaining their political independence is no

less real than the ideal of the German traders, who, while pursuing material gain were yet working for the honour and glory of Germany. With the failure of the first ideal comes the triumph of the second - a new phase in the history of the islands.

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Book IV. p. 150. p. 175 relates to certain negotiations in 1886, 1887.

Book 14. Pt. 2. Chap. XCVI. pp. 565-675. relates to the negotiations of 1898-9.

- (ii) WEISSBÜCHER - AUSWARTIGES AMT. These are for the most part later than the period under consideration. They include trade reports and correspondence.

Vol. 1.

WEISSBUCH. 1 Sess. 6 leg. periods 1 Teil. Berlin 1885, pp. 131-177.

Deutsche Interessen in der Südsee 1884.

(This gives a full account of the trade of the D.H. & P.G. in the Islands - No. 1 - 2. pp. 131-151).

Vol. 2.

WEISSBUCH. 1 Sess. 6. Teil 2. pp. 95-184. Deutsche Interessen in der Südsee.

There are also four white books devoted to affairs in Samoa between 1886-1893.

Vol. 5	4 Sess.	7	Samoa	I. 1889.	pp. 1-95.
" 6	4-5	" 7	"	II. 1889.	pp. 1-61.
" 8	5	" 7 & 8	"	III. 1890.	pp. 47-99.
" 13	2	" 8	"	IV. 1893.	pp. 1-198.

D. FRANCE.

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Paris 1929. 1871-1914.
1re Serie 2. pp. 402, 486, 494.

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3 Vols.
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CUMMING, (Miss) C.F. Gordon. A Lady's Cruise in a French man-of-war. Edin. 1882.
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- DUMONT D'URVILLE, Jules, S.C. Voyage autour du Monde. Paris 1853. 2 Vols.
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- ELLIS, W. Polynesian Researches. 4 Vols. Lond. 1836.
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(Some descriptive account of Samoa. pp. 34-112).
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(Vol. 3. pp. 58-127. relate to the Navigator Islands).
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- HOOD, T.H. Notes of a Cruise in H.M.S. "Fawn" - in 1862. Edinburgh 1863.
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- HUTTON, James. Missionary Life in the Southern Seas. Lond. 1874.
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(An account of the history and method of translating the Bible).
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- WILLIAMS, John. A Narrative of Missionary Enterprises
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missionary theories as to the ultimate results
of their work).

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(Published by the L.M.S. Missionaries. It throws some light upon the missionaries' work in this period).

SAMOAN TIMES. This is used by U.S. Commissioner G.H. Bates as a source of information in his report 1886. It was published in Apia but I have not been able to examine copies of it in England.

NEW ZEALAND HERALD.

1871 Contains Articles relating to Bishop Patteson's death.

1876 April. Articles relating to Col. Steinberger.

1883-4. Articles by Lundon on Samoa.

(These however only reflect the opinions of certain people in N.Z. upon Samoan affairs and are therefore of minor importance to the general theme).

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New York 1901.
The United States and Samoa. pp. 203-286.

JEANROY, René. L'imperialisme americaine et la lutte pour la
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Map of Upolu showing plantations of the D.H. & P.G.
Map of Apia Municipal and Neutral Territory.

A P P E N D I X.

1. TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP AND COMMERCE BETWEEN THE
UNITED STATES AND THE SAMOAN ISLANDS.

Signed at Washington 17th January 1878.

Ratifications exchanged at Washington 11th February 1878.

The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Samoan Islands, being desirous of concluding a Treaty of Friendship and Commerce, the President of the United States has for this purpose conferred full powers upon William M. Evarts, Secretary of State; and the Government of the Samoan Islands has conferred like powers upon M.K. Le Mamea, its Envoy Extraordinary to the United States.

And the said Plenipotentiaries having exchanged their full powers, which were found to be in due form, have agreed upon the following articles:-

1. There shall be perpetual peace and friendship between the Government of the United States and the Government of the Samoan Islands.
2. Naval vessels of the United States shall have the privilege of entering and using the Port of Pago-pago, and establishing therein and on the shores thereof a station for coal and other naval supplies for their naval and commercial

marine, and the Samoan Government will hereafter neither exercise nor authorize any jurisdiction within the said port adverse to such rights of the United States or restrictive thereof. The same vessels shall also have the privilege of entering other ports of the Samoan Islands. The citizens of the United States shall likewise have free liberty to enter the same ports with their ships and cargoes of whatsoever kind, and to sell the same to any of the inhabitants of these Islands, whether natives or foreigners, or to barter them for the products of the Islands. All such traffic in whatsoever articles of trade or barter shall be free, except that the trade in firearms and munitions of war in the Islands shall be subject to regulations by that Government.

3. (Freedom from import and export duties).
4. All disputes between citizens of the United States in the Samoan Islands, whether relating to civil matters or to offences or crimes, shall be heard and determined by the Consul of the United States at Apia, Samoa, under such regulations and limitations as the United States may provide: and all disputes between citizens of the United States and the people of those Islands shall be heard by the Consul in conjunction with such officer of the Samoan Government as may be designated for that purpose. Crimes and offences in cases where citizens of the United States may be convicted

shall be punished according to the laws of their Country: and in cases where the people of the Samoan Islands may be convicted, they shall be punished pursuant to Samoan laws and by the authorities of that country.

5. If, unhappily, any differences should have arisen, or shall hereafter arise, between the Samoan Government and any other Government in amity with the United States, the Government of the latter will employ its good offices for the purpose of adjusting those differences upon a satisfactory and solid foundation.
6. The Government of Samoa agrees to allow the Government and citizens of the United States free and equal participation in any privileges that may have been or may hereafter be granted to the Government, citizens or subjects of any other nation.
7. The present Treaty shall remain in force for 10 years from its date. If neither party shall have given to the other six months previous notice of its intention then to terminate the same, it shall remain in force until the end of 12 months after either party shall have given notice to the other of such intention.

The present Treaty shall be ratified, and the ratifications exchanged as soon as possible.

In faith whereof the Plenipotentiaries have

signed and sealed this Treaty at Washington the
17th Day of January, 1878.

William Maxwell Evarts.

M.K. Le Mamea.

2. TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN GERMANY AND SAMOA.

Signed at Apia 24th January, 1879.

Translation.

His Majesty the German Emperor, King of Prussia, etc. in the name of the German Empire, of the one part, and their Excellencies the Gentleman of the Taimua, in the name of the Government of Samoa, of the other part, being desirous mutually to further and cement their amicable relations and their interests, have decided to conclude a Treaty of Friendship. (List of Plenipotentiaries of both parties).

1. There shall be peace and perpetual friendship between the German Empire of the one part and Samoa of the other part, and also between their respective subjects without distinction of person or places.

2. The subjects of both Contracting Parties shall enjoy in both countries perfect and perpetual protection of their persons and property, and furthermore Germans in Samoa and Samoans in Germany shall be exempt from all war contributions, military requisitions or military services, and especially the Germans in Samoa shall be exempt from occupation of their houses, lands, and plantations by war parties.

3. The Germans who reside (sojourn) in Samoa, and the Samoans who reside (sojourn) in Germany shall enjoy perfect

liberty of conscience and religious worship ,-----

(Agreement as to rights of burying Germans in Samoa, or Samoans in Germany).

4. There shall be full freedom of commerce for German subjects in all parts and places of Samoa; (Freedom to trade in all parts of Samoa; no taxes or duties, or restrictions with regardsto their vessels and cargoes), but also in this case the German subjects shall always enjoy in Samoa the same rights and advantages as the Samoans or the subjects of the most favoured nation.

5. German ships of war shall be at liberty to enter into the harbour of Saluafata, to anchor and remain there to take in supplies and to repair, and the German Government shall furthermore be at liberty to make there at its own pleasure all such contrivances and arrangements that may be useful for German Ships of war, and their officers and crew. (Also rights to erect buildings for coal, to hoist the German flag, "but the Sovereignty of the Government of Samoa over the harbour of Saluafata shall not in any way be prejudiced or made valueless." The harbour not to be closed to other nations though the Samoan Government pledged not to grant others similar rights- German ships of war to be at liberty to enter, anchor at and remain at any other places, harbours or waters of Samoa.)

The Samoan Government also promises hereby that they will not in any way grant privileges to any other nation before

the German Government with respect to the harbour of Apia and its shores; but that the German Government shall always enjoy also in that respect the same rights as other nations.

6. (Full liberty to subjects of the Contracting Parties in ~~their~~ respective territories, to undertake voyages and journeys, trade, buy or rent lands, cultivate and use them, erect thereon houses or warehouses, stores and shops. Both to submit to laws and taxes as agreed upon, but Germans in Samoa to have same rights as the Samoans or the subjects of the most favoured nation.)

Especially does the Samoan Government hereby guarantee to the German subjects peaceable possession of all lands in Samoa which they have hitherto bought from Samoans in a regular manner and in accordance with the custom at the time, and all further interference with regard to such lands is therefore excluded by this confirmation by the Samoan Government of the ownership of the German subjects. The Germans are therefore at liberty to make use of all their lands in Samoa without interference, to establish plantations thereon, and to procure and employ the necessary labourers as well for such purpose as also in general for their wharves, business premises and houses.

7. (Arrangements for jurisdiction over German subjects.)

8. All laws and regulations which the German subjects and their clients residing (or sojourning) in Samoa will have

to submit to, as well as all taxes and charges which they will have to pay accordingly to the Samoan Government, shall be deliberated upon between the German Consul, or other persons appointed for that purpose by the German Government and officers of the Samoan Government, also all useful measures to bring about the observance of such laws and regulations by Germans in Samoa; but all such laws and measures which have been deliberated upon between the Officers of the two Governments shall only come into force after obtaining the confirmation of the German Government. But any agreements which the officers of the two Governments have come to with regard to municipal arrangements or police, quarantine and Apia Harbour regulations, or with reference to a prohibition or regulations of the sale and supply of spirituous and intoxicating liquors to Samoans and natives from other parts of the Pacific Ocean by Germans in Samoa, shall at once be observed by German subjects in Samoa, and as long as the German Government has not refused the confirmation of the same.

(Again a most favoured nation clause)

9. (A further agreement to be made regulating the civil status of clients of either party).
10. The Government of Samoa promises not to grant in their own country any monopolies, indemnities, or real

advantages to the disadvantage of German commerce or of the flag and the subjects of the German Empire.

11. The Government of Samoa promises to grant the German Government as many rights as the most favoured nation as well in respect to all matters alluded to in the preceding Articles of this Treaty as also generally and as may be granted to any other nation in future.

12. The present Treaty shall come into force and become valid from the day of the signing the same ----- (unless not ratified within two years)

13. (Ratifications -Samoa to be exchanged as soon as possible).

In witness whereof the Plenipotentiaries of the two Governments have signed and sealed this Treaty in two documents of the same tenour.

Done at the Imperial German Consulate at Apia on the 24th day of January, in the year 1879.

VON WERNER.

TH. WEBER.

TUIA.

LEMANA.

MEISAKE.

3.
TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP, ETC. BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND
THE KING AND GOVERNMENT (MALO) OF SAMOA.

Signed at Apia, 28th August, 1879.

Ratifications exchanged at Mulinuu 27th August, 1880.

PREAMBLE.

1. There shall be perpetual peace and friendship between the subjects of Her Britannic Majesty and those of the Samoan State.

2. The King and Government (Malo) of Samoa engage to grant to no other Sovereign or State any rights, privileges, authority, or predominance in Samoa in excess of such as are or may be accorded to Her Britannic Majesty. The subjects of Her Britannic Majesty shall always enjoy in Samoa whatever rights, privileges, and immunities shall be granted to those of the most favoured nation, and no rights, privileges, or immunities shall be granted to the subjects of any foreign State that shall not be equally and unconditionally accorded to the subjects of Her Britannic Majesty.

3. Full liberty for the free pursuit of commerce, trade, and agriculture is guaranteed to British subjects, as well as the peaceable possession of lands heretofore purchased by them from Samoans in a customary and regular manner. (Arrangements for a Commission in the case of disputed title to lands).

All British residents in Samoa shall be exempt from war contributions, military requisitions, and occupation of their

houses and lands by war parties.

4. (Arrangements for the apprehension and trial of British subjects.)

5. (Arrangements for trial of civil suits brought against British subjects)

6. (Samoans to be liable to be summoned as witnesses)

7. Her Britannic Majesty engages to cause regulations to be issued to enforce the observance by British subjects of such of the existing Municipal Laws and Police Regulations of Samoa as may be hereafter agreed upon by agreement between the Government of Her Britannic Majesty and that of the Samoan State, and for the due observance of quarantine by British subjects.

8. Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain may, if she thinks fit, establish on the shores of a Samoan harbour, to be hereafter designated by Her Majesty, a naval station and coaling depot, but this Article shall not apply to the harbours of Apia or Saluafata, or to that part of the harbour of Pago-Pago which may be hereafter selected by the Government of the United States as a station under the provisions of the Treaty concluded between the United States of America and the Samoan Government, on the 17th day of January in the year 1878.

9. The present Treaty shall come into force from the date thereof

10. (Ratifications to be within a year.)

In witness whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries
have signed the same, and have affixed thereto their seals.

Done at Apia, the 28th day of August, in the year
of Our Lord 1879.

ARTHUR GORDON.

ALFRED P. MAUDSLAY.

MALIETOA LAUPEPA.

SAGA LE AUAUNA.

4. "CONVENTION BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN (GERMANY, THE UNITED STATES), AND THE KING AND GOVERNMENT OF SAMOA, FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE TOWN AND DISTRICT OF APIA.

Signed at Apia 2nd September, 1879".

(Ratifications exchanged at Mulinuu, 27th Aug., 1880).

PREAMBLE:

1. Limits of municipal territory.
2. Such town and district shall be placed under the government of a Municipal Board, consisting of those foreign Consuls resident in Apia whose nations have entered into Treaty relations with Samoa. Representatives of every such nation, having a Consul in Samoa, shall, at a future period, be added to the said Board, and shall be chosen in such manner and exercise such functions as may be provided by regulations to be hereafter agreed upon and published by the same Board.
3. The Municipal Board shall have power to make and enforce regulations and bye-laws with regard to police and good order, public works, sanitary regulations, the prevention of the sale and supply of spirituous liquors to Samoans and other islanders of the Pacific Ocean, and other similar matters, within the said district, and such regulations shall be binding upon all persons within the said district, and may be enforced by penalties not exceeding six months, or both fine and imprisonment not exceeding the before mentioned penalties.
4. The Municipal Board of Apia may, for the purpose

of defraying expenses incurred under the above Article, levy rates upon the occupiers of houses or lands within the district of Apia, not exceeding 5 per cent. annually, on the annual assessed value of such premises as calculated on the presumed rental valuation thereof, or 1 per cent. annually on the real value of such property.

5. All offences against the regulations of the Municipal Board by whomsoever committed, shall be tried by a magistrate to be appointed by the Board.

6. If a subject or citizen of any of the Contracting Parties in Apia be charged with an offence against the laws of his own country, he shall be tried according to the jurisdiction provided therefor by the legislation of the nation to which he belongs or according to the stipulations of the Treaty concluded between his nation and Samoa.

7. Every Samoan subject charged with a criminal offence within the limits of the district of Apia, other than an offence against the municipal regulations, shall be liable to trial by the magistrate appointed under the provisions of Article V, in conjunction with a Samoan magistrate.

8. The foregoing Articles shall in no way prejudice the territorial integrity of Samoa, and the Samoan flag shall be hoisted at such place of meeting of the Municipal Board as may be permanently adopted.

9. In case of civil war, the town and district of

Apia, and the adjacent districts comprised between the boundaries of the town and ~~district~~ of Apia and Letogo, Tiapepe Pt, and Siusega, shall be considered as neutral territory, and the Municipal Board may frame and issue such regulations as may be considered necessary for the support and maintenance of such neutrality.

10. The present Convention shall be revised at the end of four years from its date, and if the internal state of Samoa at that time will happily admit thereof, without prejudice to the interests of foreign residents in Samoa, the powers conferred by the present Convention upon the Muniapi Board of Apia shall cease and determine, and the District again pass under the control and authority of the Samoan Government, or such other authority as may be agreed upon between the Samoan Government and the High Contracting Parties.

11. (Agreement of German Representatives).

12. (Agreement of United States Representatives)

13. The present Conyention shall be ratified, and the ratifications exchanged at Apia within one year from the date thereof.

In witness whereof we have signed the same and affixed thereto our seals.

Done at Apia, this 2nd day of September, in the
year of Our Lord, 1879.

ARTHUR GORDON

MALIETOA LAUPEPA

ALFRED P. MAUDSLAY.

SAGA LE AUAUNA.

F. MENSING, Corvetten Captain.

T. WEBER, Municipal German Consul.

R. CHANDLER. Captain, U.S., Navy, Commanding U.S.S.
Lackawanna.

THOMAS DAWSON.

I N D E X.

A.

- ABERDEEN. Earl of - to Cowley p.55.
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