S.C.L.C. OPERATION BREADBASKET, FROM ECONOMIC CIVIL RIGHTS TO BLACK ECONOMIC POWER

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A Thesis Submitted to the University of London for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

2013
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Abstract

Operation Breadbasket was a Southern Christian Leadership Conference project that was founded in 1962, and was dedicated to improving the economic conditions of black communities across the United States. This thesis shows how the economic agenda of the early Operation Breadbasket – to facilitate integration in the workplace – gave way to its later counterpart which embraced a friendlier attitude toward capitalism and was more solicitous of the black middle class. In particular, this thesis identifies the personalities and events responsible for this transformation while pointing to the broader trends in American capitalism that made the advocacy of workplace integration increasingly less important than access to capital and mass consumption. Since there is not a dedicated study on Operation Breadbasket, this thesis begins to fill that gap in historiography.

Drawing on archival research and original oral histories collected through interviews with veterans, this thesis reconsiders Jesse Jackson’s historical role in the success of Operation Breadbasket as an empowerment organization enlarging economic opportunities for black workers and entrepreneurs. In particular, it argues that Operation Breadbasket was a remarkable program that contributed to the convergence of the Black Church-driven Civil Rights Movement and the activist-based Black Power struggle in the economic arena. To fully appreciate the transformation of Operation Breadbasket’s
activities from a more traditional Civil Rights program pursuing job
desegregation to a militant, innovative campaign addressing issues such as
black business development, the more recent scholarly work on Black Power
and its intersection with the Civil Right Movement has been taken into
account.
Declaration and Copyright

Declaration

I declare that this thesis has been composed by myself and that the research reported therein has been conducted by myself unless otherwise indicated.

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Copyright of this thesis rests with the Author. The copy of the thesis deposited in the University library becomes the property of the library and will be available for individual or interlibrary loan (and possible microfilming or photocopying in whole or part). Copies (by any process) either in full, or extracts, may be made only if this page is included in any such copies.
Acknowledgement

One of the few advantages of taking as long to write a thesis as I have taken to write this one is that it has given me the chance to benefit from the generosity of many people. First and foremost, I wish to express my deepest gratitude to John Kirk, Chair of the Department of History and Donaghey Professor of History in the College of Arts, Humanities and Social Sciences of the University of Arkansas at Little Rock, United States. I benefited enormously from his invaluable support, guidance, encouragement and patience throughout my PhD. He was the one who initially suggested Chicago as the geographical location to focus my research. The rest, as has been said, is history. With John, I also shared a phone call from Edmund Pettus Bridge in Selma – not a heroic action in itself, and yet a moral commitment on my side that I will never forget to pursue racial justice everywhere.

I was fortunate in having the precious help of Humayun Ansari and Dawn-Marie Gibson at Royal Holloway, England. Humayun, Professor of Islam and Cultural Diversity, acting as my informal supervisor, constantly advised me to verify empirically my insights and accurately link propositions and evidences; Dawn-Marie, Lecturer in United States History, acting as my secondary supervisor, maintained and protected my connections with the department of History during the long period of research in the United
States. Her deep and wide knowledge on Black History was ultimately crucial in stimulating further discussion on the topic.

I have also benefited from a personal conversation with Peniel E. Joseph, Professor of History at Tufts University and the author of the award-winning *Waiting 'Til the Midnight Hour: A Narrative History of Black Power in America* and *Dark Days, Bright Nights: From Black Power to Barack Obama*. Dr. Joseph is the founder of a growing subfield in American History and Africana Studies that he has characterized as “Black Power Studies,” which is actively rewriting Black Power History as well as the relationship with its “twin,” the Civil Rights Movement.

I am grateful to the staffs of the several archives I visited in connection with this project. A complete list of these libraries appears at the end of this thesis. I want to offer particular thanks to Ms. Cynthia Patterson Lewis, Director of Archives, King Library and Archives at the Martin Luther King, Jr. Center for Nonviolent Social Change, and Ms. Elaine Hall, at the same Center; and Ms. Janice White Sikes Rogers and Dr. Wesley Chenault at Auburn Avenue Research Library, for their precious assistance and gracious help.

I owe special thanks to a number of Civil Rights veterans, scholars, and individuals that have helped me during my work on Operation Breadbasket and made important contributions through conversations, their own research, and their willingness to challenge my suggestions. I also have benefited enormously from conversations with my colleague and PhD
candidate Edward Taylor. He is a pastor in the Baptist Church, and his brilliant reconstruction of the culture of the Black Church has enriched my treatment of the involvement of the clergy in the operations of Operation Breadbasket. His historical analysis and his personal connection with Reverend Jesse Jackson have made my research much easier.

During my work on Operation Breadbasket as a project at the intersection of economic civil rights and black economic power, I have presented papers at conferences and published essays in anthologies.

In particular, extracts of this thesis were delivered as a paper to a number of conferences:

- “The Globalization of African-American Business. The Role of Jesse Jackson,” at the February 2012 Globalization of African-American Business and Consumer Culture conference at the German Historical Institute in Washington, DC. I am grateful to the organizer, Joshua Clark Davis, for the invitation to speak and to the participants for their feedback. I especially thank Davarian Baldwin, Douglas Bristol, and Britta Waldschmidt-Nelson;

- “Reframing Black Power, Reframing Jesse Jackson: Black Economic Power in Chicago, 1966-72,” at the September 2012 Black Power Conference on Reframing Black Power Across the 20th Century and Beyond, Avery Research Center for African American History and Culture, College of Charleston, South Carolina; I am grateful to the organizer, Robert T. Chase, for the invitation to speak and to the participants for their feedback. I especially thank Gordon K. Mantler, Lauren Araiza, and Jackobi Williams;
“From Moral Suasion to Reciprocity: The Case of Operation Breadbasket,” at the 4th World Conference on Remedies to Racial and Ethnic Economic Inequality, Hubert H. Humphrey School of Public Affairs, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, October 11-13, 2012.

Portions of this thesis will be published as book chapters:


Finally, I owe an unpayable debt to my wife, Laura. She suggested history as the academic *locus* to place my interest in justice and equality. While listening to my tales of people possessed by the spirit of God or the anger of racial oppression, she gave me the gift of inward peace and unconditional support and love.
“Moderation is a delusion, and only extremists are in touch with reality.”

Frederick Asals¹
On Operation Breadbasket

Introduction

Despite all of the scholarly work done in the last few decades on the Civil Rights campaigns, this literature does not contain a dedicated work on Operation Breadbasket. Moreover, in terms of interpretation, certainly Operation Breadbasket has suffered from excessive identification with Jesse Jackson. In this chapter, the main historiographical issues are addressed, specifically the apparent irrelevance of Operation Breadbasket in Civil Rights history and the controversial legacy of Jackson as Operation Breadbasket’s leader. However, these interpretative issues can be clarified, if not solved, by reshaping the historical settings, and placing Operation Breadbasket at the intersection of Black Studies and economic (business) history, and consequently within the perimeter of the emerging body of scholarship on the economic narratives of Civil Rights and Black Power. In this chapter, a closer look is given to the literature on the U.S. economy in the 1960s, in transition from growth to inflation, combined with the rapid escalation of the war in Vietnam. Also, attention is paid to the emerging field of research on the business-friendly conservative forces and ideologies that opposed the Civil Rights movement. In addition, the recent scholarship that innovatively deals with the less militant, more moderate wing of the Black Power movement is examined. The dissolving boundaries between the Civil Rights...
and the Black Power movements in the economic domain, is also taken into account.

**Operation Breadbasket**

Operation Breadbasket (henceforth “Breadbasket”) was a program sponsored by the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (henceforth “S.C.L.C.”) to fight economic discrimination against African Americans. The S.C.L.C. was established in 1957, by Martin Luther King, Jr., and other members of the black clergy to coordinate the action of local protest groups throughout the South. As early as 1962, the S.C.L.C. broadened its focus to include issues of economic inequality. Seeing poverty as the root of social inequality, in November 1962, S.C.L.C. established Breadbasket in Atlanta to desegregate jobs and create new employment opportunities in the black community.

Incorporated in Atlanta, the program was initially directed by Fred C. Bennette, Jr., who also served as interim pastor (1964-1965) of the Mount Welcome Baptist Church, which was then located in the Pittsburg Community of Atlanta. Its goal was initially to promote equal employment opportunities for African-American workers. While Breadbasket mobilized buying campaigns to pressure businesses and corporations to hire minorities, it was also under way in a number of smaller Southern cities, as well as in Atlanta. When the S.C.L.C. turned its attention to Chicago, it promoted, together with other organizations, the Chicago Freedom Movement. At that point, the Breadbasket program became an accessory to the main housing
desegregation project. It expanded its activities moving beyond the more traditional goals of job desegregation by addressing non-conventional issues such as access to financial resources, banking, development of brands, and corporate board memberships. The head of Chicago’s Breadbasket office, Jesse Jackson, a student of theology and then “country preacher,” became its national director in place of Bennette in 1967. It was in Chicago and under the direction of Jackson that Breadbasket achieved national recognition. In 1967, Martin Luther King, S.C.L.C. chairman, characterized Breadbasket as the “most spectacularly successful program” in Chicago.

Not without controversy, Breadbasket increasingly became a sort of economic development agency to support African American entrepreneurship, actually working to support the growth of “black capitalism” in Chicago. Later on, King expressed “grave doubts” about Breadbasket’s goals. A conflict arose between Breadbasket’s focus on black capitalism, as envisioned and pursued by Jackson, and King’s increasingly social-democratic economic views. “We were very aware of some of the contradictions [inside Breadbasket], and ambivalent about it,” Calvin Morris, then associate director of Breadbasket, remembered. William (Bill) Rutherford, S.C.L.C. executive director, appreciated that King’s unhappiness with Jackson went beyond spirit and ideology. “He didn’t trust Jesse, he didn’t even like Jesse … If you ask me if there was any suspicion about Jesse’s motives and even devotion to the movement, I would say categorically yes, there was – considerable. And we talked about it.”
After the assassination of King, Breadbasket continued to develop as a program, increasingly distancing itself from the original atmosphere and classic posture of the Black Church in the South, while becoming more aligned with the diverse, militant, and chaotic social atmosphere of Black Chicago. Indeed, in the late 1960s, Breadbasket came to assume its mature and lasting form – a form substantially different from the scope and activities that had shaped the earlier stage of the program.

In this thesis, Breadbasket is framed as a story of transformation. The original incarnation of Breadbasket was a clergy-driven program that was very strongly influenced by the experience of Rev. Leon Sullivan’s rhetoric on the social gospel, and economic justice activism, notably a series of well-organized selective patronage campaigns targeting prominent manufacturers like Tasty Baking Company and Pepsi-Cola in Philadelphia. The initial phase of Breadbasket was marked by the black clergy’s heavy engagement in the program for the sake of economic justice. Economic concerns have been part of the Black Church’s mission in the South since Reconstruction, and clergy has always been committed to social inclusion and economic improvement. For more than a century, the Black Church had served the social, economic, and educational interests of the black community, becoming the most revered institution in the black community, and providing organizational support, strategic direction, and cultural identity. Black evangelical congregations had provided literacy training, established schools, purchased property, and offered housing to the disadvantaged, the poor, the aged, and the sick. However, it was only in the 1960s that, in the
context of the emerging economic reality of the New South, pastors assumed a more aggressive stance, solidified around Breadbasket and other color-conscious programs, and promoted the boycotting of businesses that were notorious for not hiring blacks.\(^{10}\)

The second phase of Breadbasket emerged during the late 1960s when Jackson rethought his convictions about civil rights in response to the realities of the world in which he lived. There was mounting awareness of the incomplete achievements of the Civil Rights Movement and increasing economic concerns, while the economic downfall of 1967-68 was substantially altering the environment in which Breadbasket was acting. This setting was a reality of increasing racial polarization and radicalism, dominated by Black Power and the ideological rationales that sustained and invigorated its success. It was a workplace in which unskilled workers, farmers, porters and barbers, whose interests had inspired Dr. King and his close aids, were rapidly losing their way to American capitalism; it was an economic landscape in which private enterprise and market driven business were regaining confidence, and large-scale government-funded programs were becoming increasingly difficult to fund. Workers, activists, militants, street gangs, and consumers were becoming powerful social groups within the black community, participating in the economic conversation influencing public policy in the city of Chicago. Most of all, this was a world in which both the idea and the reality of business were becoming central to African American culture, while the production of economic outputs and goals was gradually supplanting Civil Rights as the principal focus of black popular
interest and commitment. In a world dominated by the economy, and an
economy dominated by corporations, it is not surprising that Jackson began
to embrace business-oriented assumptions and pursue economic interests. In
Chicago, the redefinition of Breadbasket occurred quickly and at times
almost virally, so much so that in 1971 when the transformation was well
advanced, there was an increase in distance between Jackson and the rest of
the S.C.L.C. leadership, because of this change in focus. The definitive break
came in December 1971, over a question of funds and a power struggle
between Jackson and S.C.L.C.’s new leader, Ralph Abernathy. The program
languished for another year in the hands of the S.C.L.C. and then was finally
closed. Breadbasket in Chicago joined Jackson’s new project, Operation
PUSH - People United to Save (later Serve) Humanity.

While the early years of Breadbasket were dominated by the Black Church’s
concerns for economic justice and economic rights, during its last years the
program became a vehicle for pursuing economic power on behalf of the
black community. In fact, Jackson located Breadbasket, as well as himself, at
the convergence of the Black church-driven Civil Rights Movement and the
activist-based Black Power campaigns in the economic arena. In Chicago,
responding to the uncertainties of this changing world, Breadbasket wrapped
itself in the mantle of the Civil Rights Movement, but showed only partial
fidelity to the scope and activities that had shaped the original program. How
and why Breadbasket changed its focus and agenda, and later joined its
counterpart, Operation PUSH, which embraced a friendlier attitude to
capitalism as it became more solicitous of black middle class, is the subject of this thesis.

**Background**

During the past three decades, a variety of important work has complicated the narrative of the freedom struggle by focusing on local people and communities, particularly outside the South. Scholars have produced a growing number of studies that focus on local activism, especially on the individual campaigns of the Civil Rights Movement in the United States.  

Academic works have been devoted to the main episodes of the history of “the short civil rights movement” (i.e., Montgomery Bus Boycott, Little Rock School Crisis, Freedom Riders, Birmingham, St. Augustine, Mississippi Freedom Summer, Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party, and Selma). However, despite its success, Breadbasket still falls into one of those critical programs and campaigns, such as Albany (1962) and the March on Washington (1963), that have yet to be scrutinized in any great depth. The only author who has written extensively on Breadbasket is David Garrow, in *Chicago 1966: Open Housing Marches, Summit Negotiations, and Operation Breadbasket*, but he nevertheless has deepened only a part of the story covering the period 1965-66.

Because an authoritative history of Breadbasket has yet to be written, the available literature contains a limited amount of information, and a narrow range of interpretation relating to Breadbasket’s roots and development. Studies exist in which Breadbasket’s program is included as an element in a
broader narrative. Traditionally it is included in one of these three narratives: the history of the Chicago Freedom Movement and the Northern “long civil right movement” – a history that began in the 1930s and 1940s and continued at least through the 1970s; the biography of Martin Luther King, Jr., and the related history of the S.C.L.C.; and finally, the biography of Jesse Jackson.

Scholarship locates Breadbasket in the context of the history of the black community in Chicago, and eventually in the familiar “Martin Luther King to Harold Washington” narrative that was re-articulated after the election of Barack Obama to the presidency of the United States. Breadbasket was set in motion in Chicago as a program of the Chicago Freedom Movement. The Chicago Freedom Movement was the most ambitious Civil Rights mobilization ever launched in the North. The product of an alliance of the S.C.L.C. and the Coordinating Council of Community Organizations (CCCO—a coalition of Chicago Civil Rights groups), the Chicago Freedom Movement lasted from 1965 to 1967. It attracted national attention in the summer of 1966 when it launched a series of marches that exposed persistent housing discrimination in metropolitan Chicago. Martin Luther King, Jr., moved to Chicago and launched a campaign for open housing. He received a taste of Northern racism while leading marches in all-white neighborhoods that met with violent responses from the residents. The images of the “open housing” marches through the white neighborhoods of Cicero, the violent resistance to these marches, King being struck with a rock on August 5 in
Marquette Park on the Southwest Side (“Frankly,” he said, “I have never seen as much hatred and hostility on the part of so many people”), the meeting with Mayor Richard J. Daley and other city officials to hammer out a “Summit Agreement,” these images remain inculcated in the collective memory. King’s campaign led to an agreement with Richard Daley, who promised that the city would enforce fair housing laws. It never happened. Chicago was seen, and still remains in the historiography of the Civil Rights Movement, as the place of the housing discrimination campaign. This fact ensures the enduring identification of Chicago with one of the most difficult, battles for housing integration and the place where a humiliating defeat of the Civil Rights Movement occurred.\textsuperscript{16} Over the decades, this assessment has been the dominant narrative in the scholarly work on Chicago. The analysis of this alleged failure of the movement in Chicago has monopolized the attention of historians, and has probably diverted their attention from the dynamics of Breadbasket, which was perceived as a minor project. For this reason, in the studies devoted to the Chicago campaign, references to Breadbasket are very limited. In fact, aside from the anthology edited by Garrow, Breadbasket is literally nothing more than a footnote in the history of the Civil Rights Movement in Chicago.\textsuperscript{17}

Placing Breadbasket in the history of the Chicago Freedom Movement is quite reasonable. In fact, even if established in Atlanta and designed from the outset as a program of national scope, Breadbasket experienced its most significant achievements and established credibility in Chicago. Breadbasket’s
object was not open housing; it was intentionally promoted as “a separate, but related program to the movement.” At the conclusion of the campaign, King left behind a young lieutenant named Rev. Jesse Jackson, who established Breadbasket on the South Side. In 1983, Harold Washington became Chicago’s first black mayor, serving until 1987, building an independent coalition including white independents and Latinos to challenge the Democratic machine. In part inspired by the 1983 win of Chicago’s first black mayor, a young Barack Obama came to the Windy City and settled down on the South Side of Chicago. In 2008, he became the first black president of the United States.

Much of Civil Rights historiography has focused on Martin Luther King Jr., the charismatic preacher, who has been the subject of a large number of studies. King was instrumental – together with Bayard Rustin, Ella Baker, Stanley Levison and approximately sixty other black ministers assembled in Atlanta – in forming the S.C.L.C. in 1957. The S.C.L.C. was established in order to coordinate non-violent protest against segregation, and King served as chairman of the organization from its inception until his assassination in 1968. Since King and the S.C.L.C. established Breadbasket in 1962, it is not a surprise that the program has been often placed in the wider context of King’s and S.C.L.C.’s history. However, in such a context Breadbasket has certainly received less consideration from scholarship than other S.C.L.C. programs and campaigns, particularly those conducted in the South in the first half of the 1960s, i.e., the Birmingham and Selma campaigns. Scholars of Dr. King, including prize-winning biographers Taylor Branch and David J.
Garrow, offer little to no analysis of the campaign itself.\textsuperscript{20} Taylor Branch’s trilogy on King mentions Breadbasket only eight times.\textsuperscript{21} The same can be said of studies that address the social and economic thought of Martin Luther King, in which Breadbasket is confined to a marginal role.\textsuperscript{22} While a number of studies provide perspectives on the S.C.L.C. and the Civil Rights Movement, very few accounts and memories of Breadbasket can be found in the autobiographies of figures that played an important role in the S.C.L.C.\textsuperscript{23}

References to Breadbasket usually increase when scholars focus on the history of King’s final and more radical years from 1965 to 1968. For example, David Garrow’s \textit{Bearing the Cross} discusses Breadbasket for the first time when he acknowledges the 1965 annual report of King as S.C.L.C.’s chairman, and then only in passing.\textsuperscript{24} The connection between Breadbasket and King’s final years is part of the popular narrative that assumes that King focused on economic racial discrimination in the last part of his life, specifically after the Selma campaign, and especially after the Watts riots.\textsuperscript{25} It seems natural to connect Breadbasket – a program created with an economic purpose – with King’s increasing concerns about economy, capitalism and the poor. During that period, some scholars believe King’s focus shifted from Civil Rights to human rights and from desegregation and voting rights to economic inequality.\textsuperscript{26} The studies of King and the S.C.L.C. by Adam Fairclough and David Garrow provide the most extensive discussion on King’s stand against the Vietnam War to date, while Gerald D. McKnight’s
study covers King and the S.C.L.C.’s planned 1968 Poor People’s campaign. However, none of them devotes specific attention to Breadbasket.

Some scholars focus on King’s increasing sense of detachment and alienation from Jackson’s Breadbasket. Certainly King was enthusiastic about the program, thrilled by its results in terms of jobs, income, and contracts, but he nevertheless concluded that these results were too limited and insufficient to achieve real and universal economic justice. In other words, economic equality was too big a target to be accomplished through a program with limited resources like Breadbasket. Accordingly, the intervention of the federal government was not only desirable, but also needed in order to promote a paradigm shift from American liberalism to Swedish social democracy. Furthermore, King’s attention was directed to the poor rather than to the black middle class, which eventually became Breadbasket’s target. This distinction also helped to limit his confidence in the program. Breadbasket became a source of dialectic between King and Jackson. Garrow maps the main points of this debate with King arguing that Breadbasket was designed to improve the quality of life for working class blacks, as well as unemployed black people, and describes Jackson assuming the role of black business champion. However, Garrow does not investigate in detail the causes of this dialectic between the two leaders, and prefers to link it to differences of character, and to King’s doubts about Jackson’s personality and goals.
Finally, some studies address Breadbasket as a major, outstanding and inescapable chapter in Jesse Jackson’s career. In fact, there is no Jackson biography that fails to mention Breadbasket in his early career. This is similar in magnitude to the famous episode of Jackson’s appearance on NBC’s Today Show wearing the same blood-stained turtleneck that he had worn the day before, while claiming that he had been the last person to talk to King, and had held the dying leader in his arms. Breadbasket has been often described as the beginning of Jackson’s career, and has served in the biographies on Jackson as a *bildungsroman* – a description of the intellectual and religious awakening of young Jesse. It is the fascinating chronicle of how he began to develop his skills as a powerbroker, to question white economic privilege, to challenge the S.C.L.C. leadership, and rebel against the Democratic machine in Chicago. He finally came of age, left the S.C.L.C., and pursued his ambitions as a national civil right leader. In such a classic narrative, Breadbasket became the practical vehicle that provided Jackson with the opportunity to build an economic and political base, while establishing the necessary network and credibility to become a Civil Rights leader at the national level. Because of his involvement with Breadbasket, Jackson rapidly became the most influential black leader in Chicago, and in 1971, he even considered the possibility of challenging Richard J. Daley by running for mayor of the city. It is a powerful narrative, and not surprisingly, the major biographies of Jackson never fail to offer a reconstruction of the history of Breadbasket in Chicago.
In some scholarly studies, Breadbasket appears to be at times literally indistinguishable from Jackson. With the appointment of Jesse Jackson as the head of the Chicago office in 1966 in place of James Bevel, Breadbasket not only functioned as a virtually independent project run autonomously from the S.C.L.C. but was progressively shaped by his charismatic personality, powerful rhetorical skills, and apparently inexhaustible energy. Therefore, when Ralph David Abernathy – who had replaced King as chairman of S.C.L.C. – tried to restore the accountability of Breadbasket and the control of S.C.L.C. over the program, Jackson objected, left the S.C.L.C., and established his own organization, Operation PUSH. Breadbasket was deeply affected by the spin-off and survived only one more year. The schism between the S.C.L.C. and Jackson, the public controversy, and the fractured personal relations between the two remaining lieutenants of King’s organization left bitter feelings. Eventually, criticism and skepticism of the organization’s contributions to the collective public memory continued, and continue to affects scholars’ appreciation of the place of Breadbasket in the history of Civil Rights.³²

**Historiographical Issues**

The Civil Rights Movement is continually undergoing a process of reinterpretation. Recently historians have started exploring new perspectives on African American activism, and are re-examining old views and evidence, including rethinking the timeline, the trajectory, and the nature of the Civil Rights Movement. Much of this new scholarship is built upon a revisionist
literature that has critiqued the traditional understanding of the Civil Rights movement as a social and cultural movement, while attempting to revisit an inviolate conception of Civil Rights and Black Power. This new scholarship is occurring during a period of emerging modern conservatism. This recent scholarship has expanded the traditional understanding of the Civil Rights movement to include economics and business, and has connected with other contemporary revisionist projects such as Black Power Studies. It also reaches beyond the borders of the traditional interpretation of liberal politics, seeking out the history of the modern conservative movement and its articulations in economics (economic thought) and management, illustrating the role of academics and corporate executives in promoting or impeding economic equality. Anyone proposing to write today about Breadbasket must recognize the emergence of these vigorous debates over the economic aims and the views of those involved in the Civil Rights Movement, the relationship between Civil Rights and Black Power, and the opposition of conservative forces in the realm of economics and business. Since this is a project that needs to incorporate the recent scholarship on how the Civil Rights movement has been shaped by economic aims, black liberation movements, and conservatism, it is appropriate to explain the ways in which this thesis does and does not come to terms with this scholarship.

Until recently, the scholarship on the Civil Rights Movement has taken for granted that the movement was primarily cultural and political in character. The Civil Rights Movement exists in the American imagination through a series of iconic images – ranging from a black preacher standing on the steps
of the Lincoln Memorial in front of an enormous crowd, to teenagers being hit by high-pressure water jets and attacked by police dogs – that powerfully evoke a sense of mission and redemption, cultural engagement, and political purpose. Unfortunately, these iconic images come with a price, that is, the economic goals, forces, and contexts of the movement have been relegated to a footnote. For example, Adam Fairclough repeatedly makes the point that blacks adopted non-violent actions by means of economic pressure. Sit-ins, protests, and other innovative methods of non-violent direct action exposed the economic weakness of the white business community in Southern towns and cities. The white business community was usually willing to compromise, because they were particularly vulnerable to economic retaliation of their black customers. This vital connection between the economic vulnerability of the white business community and the strategies of Civil Rights campaigns has been highlighted by several authors. For most of these authors, economic concerns were not goals, in and of themselves, but were instrumental to political and cultural goals: desegregation, voting rights, self-respect and identity. A few authors have linked economic development to the Civil Rights Movement, especially in the North. Others have focused their research on job discrimination, access to jobs, and fair treatment in the workplace. However, almost none of them have taken the position that the movement was primarily an economic one. This is unfortunate, as a better understanding of the economic background would help to put the events of the Civil Rights Movement in context. When scrutinizing the literature, one finds that historians in the field of Civil Rights are rarely concerned about
their assumptions about the economic context, because, in most cases, the economic background is not explained by the author at all. Usually scholars tend to be brief in discussing the economic context of their stories, and most studies tacitly locate their narratives in an artificially immutable economic context. In fact, most scholars accept the classic explanation that the post–World War II economic expansion, also known as the postwar economic boom, or the long boom, was an uninterrupted period of economic prosperity that lasted until the early 1970s. The historian Eric Hobsbawm coined the term “Golden Age of capitalism,” to describe this period. 39 Nothing could be further from the truth. In the 1960s, the U.S. economy was in transition from growth to inflation. Examining the period after 1965, for example, economic growth slowed as a result of the exhaustion of the “inner expansion” of American capitalism. After a phase of tumultuous growth, the newly expanded areas of free enterprise (household goods, the entertainment industry and tourism), and branches of industrial production (cars, civilian aircraft and plastics) experienced the effects of market saturation. Further expansion possibilities for investment-friendly capital were simply lacking. It was a period during which the federal government abandoned any real interest in the traditional concept – based upon Keynesian ideas and priorities – of influencing the business cycle by addressing consumption rather than production. The dominant liberal policy, based on the belief that the key for a successful society is economic growth through high consumption, looked fiscally simplistic and was practically inert. This policy lost traction and ultimately ended in disarray. At the end of the 1960s, the
economic consequences of the Vietnam War complicated the situation because the U.S. government covered the escalating costs of the war and social reforms by inflating the dollar. This troubling, uncertain economic landscape, together with the “financialization” of American capitalism – the passage from a more traditional industrial economy to financial capitalism – is exactly the context in which Breadbasket achieved its greatest success.

As for the importance of the economic context, historian Gavin Wright, one of the very few scholars who investigates Civil Rights as an economic movement, has established a clear link between the emergence of the New South and the success of the movement. He maintains that “The South began its convergence towards national per capita income levels around the time of World War II, a full generation prior to its emancipation in the 1960s.” However, he adds that postwar regional economic convergence had a basis in long-term trends such as the “vigorous efforts in southern states to attract business through tax breaks, municipal bonds for plant construction, industrial development corporations, research parks, and expenditures on publicity far beyond those of other regions.”

Numan Bartley writes, “In 1940 the raison d’etre of Southern state governments was the protection of white supremacy and social stability; thirty years later their central purpose was the promotion of business and industrial development.” Of course, Bartely maintains, the South was trying to modernize economically while retaining “white supremacy and social stability.” However, when the forces of boosterism collided with the emerging Civil Rights Movement in the 1950s and 1960s, Elizabeth Jacoway acknowledges, “white businessmen
across the South found themselves pushed – by the federal government and Civil Rights forces as well as by their own economic interests – and values – into becoming reluctant advocates of a new departure in southern race relations.”

The historic milieu of the economic institutions that shaped the intellectual debate in the 1960s also affected Breadbasket’s strategies with regard to job desegregation and economic power. Generations of liberal politicians, Civil Rights activists, labor unionists, corporate executives and managers – in confrontation or in alliance with moderate nationalists and Black Power militants – envisioned, refined and shaped the American social imagination. The right to gain a decent job had been a central concern of African Americans for decades, while accessing capital was also firmly rooted in the historic black struggle for economic advancement. Attention must be paid both to the enemies of fair employment practices, and to the pro-business conservatives that did not oppose the Civil Rights Movement simply to defend segregation. The sovereignty of the corporate executives in the workplace, and ultimately the principles of the free market and the independence of the enterprise from the influence of federal government must also be acknowledged. The truth is, far from being a decade of economic continuity, the 1960s was a period of radical change, in which the political landscape was dominated by a titanic struggle between a declining liberalism and an emerging modern conservatism. Labor unions were repositioning themselves in the light of the partisan realignment, and corporate executives were fighting to maintain or reassume control of the
American workplace. The intellectual debate was focused on the unlimited expectations of consumers and the limits of the federal government, as well as supporting an uncompromising stance against the interventionist state.

Recent, well-researched studies have been investigating the long history of the Civil Rights Movement from an economic perspective, focusing on the struggle of blacks for economic justice, and showing that for black leaders, the fight was always about citizenship and economic advancement, as they really never separated “democracy” and “capitalism” the way historians had done in the past. These studies, especially over the last five years, have emphasized the centrality of economic goals to the larger Black Freedom Movement, and showed how a more nuanced view of the economic narratives of the Civil Rights Movement can be articulated. They have charted a new field of study at the intersection of Black Studies and economic history, exploring the myriad forms of economic strategies and projects, such as business development and economic advancement, self-help and ghetto economics, racial integration in the workplace and black capitalism. The variety of approaches used to promote economic independence firmly places them at the convergence of Civil Rights and Black Power. They urge scholars to take the Black Freedom Movement on board as economic history, and investigate how Civil Rights leaders and black activists pioneered new economic development strategies, often in concert with corporate executives and public officials. They pressed business leaders and corporations to provide jobs to black workers, partnered with the federal government on public policies aiming to support a wide range of economic
advancement, from black entrepreneurship to grassroots experiments in economic self-determination, as well as indigenous attempts to rebuild inner city markets in the wake of disinvestment. Several African American leaders engaged in fierce debates over the role of business and economic markets in creating economic justice and racial equality, and some of them ended by rejecting capitalism, while others embraced it.\textsuperscript{47}

Breadbasket belongs to this economic story. The economy was the center of gravity for Breadbasket, and economic issues are the main context of its story, as it becomes irrelevant when placed outside such an economic narrative. Once it is located in the context of the economics of the Civil Rights Movement, Breadbasket no longer needs to be captured strictly in biographies of such figures as Martin Luther King, Jr. or Rev. Jesse Jackson to be set on the national stage of American history. It no longer needs to be portrayed as the excuse for minor power struggles between charismatic leaders (King and Jackson, or Abernathy and Jackson). It stands on its own. The lack of treatment of the economic factors within Civil Rights scholarship has so far sentenced Breadbasket to irrelevance. Once the financial considerations are acknowledged as a driving force behind the Civil Rights Movement’s strategic initiatives, when the undocumented struggle for economic justice and power is revealed, it is much easier to locate Breadbasket alongside other economic campaigns at the center of the Civil Rights narrative.
Scholarly discussions of Breadbasket inevitably intersect with another important debate over the Civil Rights Movement and its connections with Black Power. Until recently, conventional Civil Rights narratives have tended to isolate the locus of the issues that framed the movement in the 1950s and 1960s from the wider literature of the African American freedom struggle as a whole, and especially the Black Power movement. The histories of the Civil Rights and Black Power movements have been strongly influenced by the idea that the narrative of the 1960s runs along the intersection of politics and social structures. Consequently, scholars correctly envisioned insurmountable differences between Civil Rights and Black Power. In such a narrative, Black Power was portrayed as and understood to be the Civil Rights Movement’s “evil” twin, according to historian Peniel E. Joseph. Where the Civil Rights Movement was lauded for its strategy of non-violent civil disobedience and for exposing the immorality of racism, Black Power was condemned for its radical critique of capitalism, its institutional racism, its advocacy of armed self-defense, and its acceptance of black pride and black nationalism. There is a common bias in depicting the evolution of the Civil Rights Movement in the Black Power era. In fact, scholars mostly accepted as a given that the trajectory of the movement shifted over time, from a struggle for the achievement of the basic rights of citizenship and democracy to a revolt against capitalism. Take, for example, Clayborne Carson’s book In Struggle (1981). Carson focuses on the evolution of SNCC from its integrationist, non-violent, interracialism of the early 1960s to its advocacy of Black Power in the mid-1960s under Stokely Carmichael’s leadership. While Carson offers
a complete treatment of the transformation of SNCC, an organization that bridged and operated within the Civil Rights and Black Power eras, he still attributes its demise to its ill-fated turn toward black nationalism in the mid-1960s. This traditional scholarship has contributed to the bifurcation of the relationship between Civil Rights and Black Power, with profound implications for the study of the black freedom struggle in the 1960s.

There is an increasing amount of scholarship devoted to redefining Black Power as a positive force used to enhance African Americans’ identity and establish a new racial consciousness in the 1960s. Scholars have recently traced the evolution of Black Power over more than three decades, beginning with its origins in Black Nationalist politics, not just as a radical development in response to the moderate Civil Rights Movement, but also as a pragmatic reaction to the existence of racism, injustice and inequality found across the North as well as in the South. In his book *Dark Days, Bright Nights*, Joseph points out that Black Power showed two faces: one face was more radical, aggressive, militant, political in character, and revolutionary in nature. This is the classic picture - an alternative means of combating the racism that persisted in American society despite the efforts of African activists – amidst rhetoric of “any means necessary,” that to this day clings to the American social imagination. However, Professor Joseph explicitly mentions another side, in which “Black Power-era politicians such as Maynard Jackson and Harold Washington... embraced the movement, but with a moderate perspective.”
The Civil Rights Movement manifested both a moderate and a radical face. With a nostalgic view, the orthodox scholarly treatment promotes the idea that the Civil Rights Movement of the 1950s and 1960s was a pivotal force for social justice, where decent people used decent non-violent strategies to end Jim Crow segregation in the South and promote a major advance for racial equality in the North. However, this version covers the story insufficiently; it must be added that Martin Luther King’s strategy of non-violent protest only partially disguised the resentment, frustration, and anger, which was always on the verge of erupting, of the most radical wing of the movement. Among King’s lieutenants and allies, there were moderates such as Andrew Young and Ralph Abernathy, and radicals such as Julian Bond and James Bevan, and it is well known that King became increasingly radical in the last days of his life. He was not afraid, in the last years of his life, to denounce the Vietnam War as “an enemy of the poor,” and described the United States as “the greatest purveyor of violence in the world today.” He predicted that “the bombs that [Americans] are dropping in Vietnam will explode at home in inflation and unemployment.” He was careful to maintain a safe distance from the excesses of militant and radical groups such as the Black Panthers and fell short of embracing the rhetoric of Black Power. King considered protest and boycott as means for mobilizing black communities along liberal or socialist lines in defense of what he saw as continuous capitalistic exploitation. He urged a radical redistribution of wealth and political power in the United States in order to provide medical care, jobs, and education for all of the country’s people.
Challenging the traditional narratives of the “opposed twins”, scholars such as Glenda Elizabeth Gilmore and Peniel E. Joseph propose a much more engaging description of Civil Rights and Black Power. They are examples of the recent authors that aim to bridge the differences between Civil Rights and Black Power, and offer a new paradigm for understanding the origins and the intertwined legacy of the two movements. Gilmore is one of the historians who have recently begun the long overdue process of challenging the sanitized version of the struggle for Civil Rights. In her new book, *Defying Dixie: The Radical Roots of Civil Rights*, she gives a fascinating account of the radical sources of the Civil Rights Movement that would shake U.S. society in the 1950s and 1960s. Rather than stressing the radical origins of the Civil Rights Movement, Joseph assumes the common origins of Civil Rights and Black Power movements. In his paper “The Black Power Movement: A State of the Field,” Joseph takes the case of Timothy Tyson’s *Radio Free Dixie* (1999), a political biography of Robert F. Williams. According to Tyson, the Civil Rights and Black Power movements “grew out of the same soil, confronted the same predicaments, and reflected the same quest for African American freedom.” Moreover, Joseph argues that Tyson found that “virtually all of the elements that we associate with ‘Black Power’ were already present in the small towns and rural communities of the South where ‘the Civil Rights Movement’ was born.” New scholarship has produced important work that unquestionably reshapes the debate over the origins and legacy of the Civil Rights and Black Power movements, giving serious consideration to the complex dynamics of the Black Freedom struggle.
Moreover, the assumption of the “intertwined twins” is perhaps the best way to explain how the various elements of the 1960s were fused together at the level of racial struggle, and articulate the history of how Black Power developed in the womb of Civil Rights. Based on this vague borderline between the Civil Right Movement and Black Power, even the orthodox scholarly treatment about a strict separation between integration and nationalism might be reconsidered.

When the different articulations of Black Power and its outcomes are interrelated with the Civil Rights Movement – and this is true not only with regard to the precursors to the movement but also the descendants, especially when one considers the economic aspects and strategies beyond the traditional King years – it is easier to set the stage for a narrative that recasts Breadbasket during Jackson’s leadership. Within this context, Breadbasket revealed the convergence of the Civil Rights Movement and emerging black capitalism. The central figure here is, of course, Jesse Jackson. He emerges as the first black leader to borrow strategies from the Civil Rights Movement to foster the growth of black capitalism. Obscuring the borders between Civil Rights and black capitalism, Jackson pursued an agenda that both empowered the poor as well as the growing black entrepreneurial class. Consequently, it was not surprising that Breadbasket’s national director tried to develop a new perspective for the program. Jackson’s stroke of genius was to expand Breadbasket’s activities, moving beyond the aim of job desegregation to addressing issues such as access to finance, banking, development of brands, and corporate board memberships.
Jackson agreed with King that employment was a crucial target to reach, along the path to economic equality. However, his connections with urban ghetto life expanded his imagination to the point that he envisioned black-owned banks, black-owned urban mortgage lending corporations, and black small business loans. He thought that if the Civil Rights Movement was really concerned about increasing the economic rights of black people, it would worry less about policymakers and more about finding a way to enable black capitalism to access affordable credit and low interest rate capital, eventually building the infrastructure of a black economy that might support home and car purchases, and any other consumer desires of American black families. He envisioned Breadbasket as an engine to promote black capitalism and accordingly sought to reorient the program and its operations. Increasingly, he began to incorporate the philosophies of black self-help and economic autonomy that were extensively adopted by Black Power activists. He pointed out that the connotation of Black Power in the media might be violence, but the fact is, Black Power is power-sharing. He was adamant in his definition of Black Power: It means “equity.”

Jackson’s hypothesis was very simple. If black people helped themselves, then black people would not be totally reliant on white America. However, if white people became part of the equation, then self-help plus bargaining power would lead to self-reliance, which ultimately would lead to what Jackson thought of as Black Power. Indeed, Jackson rediscovered the economic idea put forward by Booker T. Washington, that the best strategy for blacks is using the capital of the dominant, white community for the
economic improvement of the black economy. At the same time, he assumed a less conciliatory stance in race relations than Washington did, and – biographer Frady points out - he refused Washington's appeal to white philanthropists, instead promoting the concept of “reciprocity.” Accordingly, Jackson’s self-appointed mission was to shape and discipline the growing black awareness and pride in order to build black economic power. He pursued in the economic arena what politicians such as Maynard Jackson and Harold Washington were pursuing in politics, embracing the Black Power movement but with a moderate perspective. He remained visible in the sphere of Civil Rights, but framed Breadbasket as a Black Power vehicle, while simultaneously embracing capitalistic traditions in a quest for Civil Rights and social change.

Yet, Jackson is controversial in the eyes of most Civil Rights scholars, and this complexity does not facilitate an honest assessment of his role as Breadbasket’s leader. In the aftermath of King’s murder, he appeared self-serving in interviews (wearing a turtleneck purportedly with King’s blood on it), twisting facts and trying to capitalize on the death of King. Some observers felt offended by his success in acquiring a net worth on the order of ten million dollars, as a leader of Breadbasket and then of the Civil Rights organization Rainbow/PUSH, which raised skepticism about the true motivation of his involvement in Civil Rights activism. Jackson’s conduct as Breadbasket’s leader received considerable scrutiny and criticism, and he was accused of moral shortcomings, including financial improprieties. Although the divergence between King and Jackson on Breadbasket has been
explained in terms of unaligned tempers and a clash of characters, Jackson’s integrity was openly questioned by King and some of his aides.66 This same clash occurred again in 1971, when tensions between Jackson and Ralph Abernathy, then S.C.L.C. chairman, reached a boiling point. Ralph Abernathy suspended Jackson from the S.C.L.C., citing “administrative improprieties and repeated acts of violation of organizational policy.”67 In summary, Jackson never enjoyed a special moral status as Civil Rights leader similar to Dr. King’s. These doubts about his real commitment to the spirit of the movement, and these criticisms of his excessive self-promotion, inevitably discourage a positive assessment of Jackson’s legacy as Civil Rights leader, including his role as Breadbasket’s director. He had a sort of credibility deficit, and suffered the constant, unmerciful comparison with Dr. King, despite the fact that, when King was killed in Memphis and Abernathy succeeded King as president of the S.C.L.C., it was Jackson who assumed the mantle as Black America’s top Civil Rights leader.68

While Jackson’s own deficiencies are still apparent in the research on Jackson and his involvement with the Civil Rights Movement, his detractors have tried to use these controversies to detract from his Civil Rights record. As Breadbasket’s leader he has rarely received a balanced assessment that included consideration of the context in which he was working. In this thesis, Jackson is placed at the intersection of the Civil Rights and the Black Power Movements, where his ambiguous strategy, distinctly racial tone, and emphasis on conservative economics, can be reassessed. With this in mind, Jackson does not seem to betray the core tradition of the Civil Rights
Movement, but rather he can be viewed as incorporating its core values into a much wider platform. It becomes clear that Black Power and Civil Rights were reconcilable and eventually compatible. The economic context was in flux, and conservatism was emerging as a force, not just as a product of the explosion of black riots in urban centers. The disagreements between King and Jackson on Breadbasket’s aims and strategies requires a more complex explanation, and can’t be simply defined in terms of a clash of ethics or a power struggle between egocentric characters.

By examining the historical context of Jackson as Breadbasket’s leader, it is difficult to escape the impression that he was more in tune than King, with the country that emerged out of 1965. Nineteen sixty five was a transformative year that marked the birth of Black Power, the explosion of black riots in urban centers, and one of the greatest achievements of the Civil Rights Movement, the Voting Act. This period also included the gradual escalation of the Vietnam War, and the end of the Golden Age of American capitalism. Not only did Jackson lead Breadbasket at the convergence of Civil Rights Movement and Black Power, but he also embraced some conservative positions that were just starting to redefine the cultural debate. At the same time, he appeared to recognize the economic and cultural implications of the financialization phenomenon that was generating a new economic and business landscape.⁶⁹

When considering the history of modern conservatism, in the Fifties, not one but two social movements began taking their first steps, only to reach
maturity a decade later. One is the Black Freedom Movement; the other is the modern conservative movement. American conservatism has usually been portrayed as the champion of segregation, and white backlash as a reaction to black radicalism, a backlash that ultimately led to the election of Richard Nixon, and the end of liberalism as the dominant political and cultural tradition in the country. However, a new generation of historians has increasingly begun to view the 1960s as a decade of resurgent conservatism which included faith in a market-centered economy.\textsuperscript{70} Rather than provoking merely a backlash, black radicalism and white conservatism were battling for the soul of America. This is particularly true in the business arena, in which corporate executives, backed by business-friendly legislators, were pushing hard to regain full control of the workplace, hiring and promotion practices, as well as limiting the influence of unions, Civil Rights organizations, and the federal government. This conflict was about protecting segregation and racial discrimination, but also promoted the idea that capitalism and management were rational with regard to matters like efficiency, merit, and profit, and opposed to irrationality in decision-making, and race-thinking.

\textit{Structure and Methodology}

This thesis addresses the complete history of Breadbasket from its beginnings in Atlanta to its end in Chicago. It consists of four chapters, along with an introduction and conclusion.

Chapter One, “Civil Rights in the Workplace,” covers the historical background of Breadbasket, particularly the black struggle for integration in
the workplace and economic power. It sets the stage for the main thrust of this work, the recent (1940-1960) story of the search for racial integration in the workplace. Labor unions, Civil Rights organizations, and clergymen became activists, and through direct action, such as protests and boycotts, struggled to inject economic justice into American capitalism. In addition, the federal government played an active role during this period. On the other side, corporate executives and business-friendly conservatives engaged in a fiery offensive to retain control of the workplace and reduce the influence of the federal government, the employees and labor unions. Rather than framing the white backlash as simply a reaction to the black radicalism of the second part of the decade, this chapter sustains the view that the resurgent conservatism and faith in a market-centered economy was a major trend in the 1960s, which ultimately led to the election of Richard Nixon and his administration, and the end of liberalism as the dominant political and cultural tradition in the country. While describing the partial alignment between Civil Rights and Black Power in the economic realm, the chapter also provides a full description of the state of the economy, addressed through the argument that the basic structure of the economy changed during the 1960s. In the light of this reality, this thesis assumes that during the decade, the American economy and Civil Rights Movement underwent a major transformation, with the former having its sense of unlimited growth dissipated over the course of the decade, and the latter intersecting with the nascent Black Power Movement.
Chapter Two, “Breadbasket in Atlanta - 1962-66,” addresses the first part of the story of Breadbasket. Breadbasket was officially founded as a project of the S.C.L.C. in Atlanta on October 29, 1962, to “negotiate a more equitable employment practice,” as Dr. King will declare years later. Influenced by the example of Reverend Leon Sullivan in Philadelphia, the aim of the organization was to utilize the bargaining power of African American church leaders and their congregations to foster “selective buying” (boycotts) as a means to pressure white businesses to open up private sector jobs to blacks. In October 1962, King brought Leon Sullivan to Atlanta to meet local ministers and discuss replicating the program. As a result of this meeting, Breadbasket was born. Its mission was to organize black ministers to promote more employment opportunities for local African Americans, and it rapidly became the economic arm of the S.C.L.C. It was operated by Rev. Fred C. Bennette of Atlanta, and its first activities were in Atlanta and other Southern cities.

Chapter Three, “Breadbasket in Chicago - 1966-72,” sketches Breadbasket under the leadership of Jesse Jackson. Breadbasket expanded to the Windy City in 1966 as part of S.C.L.C.’s Chicago Campaign. King called Chicago Theological Seminary student Jesse Jackson to head the Chicago chapter of Breadbasket. Jackson wholly reinvented it. In Chicago, Breadbasket expanded its scope and became very successful at getting major corporations with large presences in the black community to purchase goods and services from black contractors. Jackson became the national director of
Breadbasket’s programs in 1967. After King’s assassination in 1968, Jackson continued to lead the program. Going beyond jobs and patronage for black-owned businesses, Chicago-based Breadbasket became a black cultural enterprise, focused around weekly Saturday workshops, and annual expos and events. Ultimately, Breadbasket became instrumental in building and protecting the economic autonomy of the black community in Chicago. In 1971, tensions emerged between Jackson and S.C.L.C.’s new leader, Ralph Abernathy, over the location of Breadbasket’s national headquarters, and these disagreements eventually lead to the withholding of funds. Jackson refused to relocate, rejected the allegations about the misuse of funds, and resigned from S.C.L.C. in December. A week later, he launched his own economic empowerment organization called Operation PUSH (People United to Save Humanity). Breadbasket continued through the next year, before its eventual demise.

Chapter Four, “Birth of a Leader,” examines Jesse Jackson’s basic ideas and his view of the ghetto economy and, black capitalism as Breadbasket’s leader. Portrayed in popular and scholarly books as lacking integrity and commitment to the cause of the disadvantaged, this chapter describes Jackson as recognizing the economic gulf between the haves and the have-nots in the black community, as he actively worked to collect resources from local enterprises that would raise the level of the whole community. He envisioned different images for blacks, such as black as consumer or as entrepreneur, while offering new ideas and adapting existing resources and strategies to changing situations and processes. He pointed at the lack of
suitable conditions necessary to the development of black entrepreneurship. He promoted love of power, the desire to excel or to prove the equality or superiority of the black race, and pursued opportunities to open up capitalism to include blacks as consumers and entrepreneurs, as bankers and businesspeople.

In all, Breadbasket survived about 10 years, from its launch in Atlanta during autumn 1962 to its end in Chicago in 1972, after the schism between the S.C.L.C. and Jesse Jackson. The main repositories for Breadbasket materials are not surprisingly in Atlanta and Chicago. In Atlanta there are four boxes dedicated to Breadbasket at the Martin Luther King, Jr. Center for Nonviolent Social Change in Atlanta. In the same location, other information about the major players involved in the project can be found in the Records of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference at the Martin Luther King, Jr. Center for Nonviolent Change, Inc., King Library and Archives, Atlanta. A major source of material for the investigation of the role that King played in the project is the Dr. Martin Luther, Jr. Papers at the Martin Luther King, Jr. Center for Nonviolent Social Change, Inc., King Library and Archives, Atlanta. In Atlanta, at the Auburn Avenue Research Library, there are two boxes focused on the first Breadbasket executive director. The collection of Fred C. Bennette covers the years 1960 to 1985. The collection contains photographs, news articles, and minutes, and other printed materials which document Fred C. Bennette’s involvement with the Civil Rights Movement in Atlanta. The Emory University Archives in Atlanta maintains three boxes (boxes 576-578) of Operation Breadbasket records, 1966-1991, as part of the
S.C.L.C. series, including a number of files pertaining to the regional campaigns and boycotts waged by Operation Breadbasket after its heyday. For additional speeches relating to Operation Breadbasket, see Series 11: Martin Luther King Speaks and Series 19: Audiovisual (which contains Jackson, Joseph E. Lowery, and King speeches about Operation Breadbasket). Finally, files on Breadbasket are included in the Morehouse College, Martin Luther King, Jr., Collection Series 6: Southern Christian Leadership Conference Organizational Records at Robert W. Woodruff Library of the Atlanta University Center. These four archives, the Martin Luther King, Jr. Center for Nonviolent Social Change, the Auburn Avenue Research Library, the Emory University Archives, and the Morehouse College Martin Luther King, Jr., Collection are the main sources for chapter two (“Breadbasket in Atlanta”).

Chicago is an major source of information about Breadbasket under the leadership of Jackson. The Rainbow PUSH Coalition’s headquarter is like a Jesse Jackson museum, more a collection of artifacts rather than written sources, that embraces most of the activities of Jesse Jackson and his team, from the beginnings at Breadbasket to the present day, and this material is useful for contextualizing other historical materials. The Chicago Museum that hosts a permanent exhibition on the Chicago Freedom Movement is a major contributor to this research. Another source is the Afro-American Collection at the Central Library, Chicago. The Collection is one of the most important and extensive on the subject in the United States and is an invaluable source of information on the struggles of Blacks in Chicago. In
particular, the Reverend Addie Wyatt Collection, 1851-2010 contains several folders (folders 1-13 in Box 149, folder 15 in Box 148) that were relevant to this research. Reverend Wyatt attended the march on Washington and was a founding member of Operation Breadbasket. He would also serve as national secretary and as a board member of Breadbasket’s successor, Operation PUSH, founded by Rev. Jesse Jackson Sr. The Reverend Addie Wyatt Collection represents the legacy of service and activism exemplified by the lives of Reverend Addie and the late Rev. Claude Wyatt and have been available to the public for reference and research since 2010. The W. Alvin Pitcher Papers are hosted at the Special Collections Research Center, University of Chicago Library. William Alvin Pitcher (1913-1996) spent much of his academic career at the University of Chicago and was deeply involved in civic life on the South Side of Chicago, working with Breadbasket. He served on the staff of Breadbasket, working closely with Reverend Jesse Jackson, as coordinator for the Construction Spoke of the Breadbasket Commercial Association, a subsidiary group assisting black contractors and tradesmen. Series I includes 14 boxes (boxes 1-14) with several folders on Breadbasket, and Series VII includes folders in 3 boxes (96-8). These archives and collections are the major primary sources that are the basis for chapter three (“Breadbasket in Chicago”).

I was also lucky enough to acquire a collection of original photos and related notes on Breadbasket and Jesse Jackson in Chicago. They cover the period 1968-72, and consist in a series of photos of Jackson at Breadbasket, in conversation with white corporate executives, and meetings and celebrations
at Breadbasket’s headquarters. They are used as primary sources in chapter four (“Birth of a Leader”).

A valuable source of information was the national and local press, in particular the local press in Atlanta and Chicago. Most of the newspapers and magazines of the period are in the archives mentioned above. Particularly important were the interviews with Jackson by the national press in such publications as Time, Playboy, and Life. I also found important sources of information in the Black press, especially Jet and Ebony.

In terms of video sources, I reviewed all videos portraying Reverend Jesse Jackson, and his involvement in civil rights activism related, even indirectly, to the history of Breadbasket. Other video I viewed for this project included “King in Chicago,” and the interview with Rev. Willie T. Barrow, who has earned her nickname, the “Little Warrior,” through her never-ending pursuit of justice. I watched the movie “Alice's Ordinary People”, a documentary about Alice Tregay. In 1966, when Dr. King came to Chicago she and her husband James Tregay, marched alongside Dr. King, often at great personal risk. It was at this time that Dr. King joined the Reverend Jesse Jackson, and the Reverend James Bevel to form Operation Breadbasket. Breadbasket fought racism on many fronts, but its main task was jobs for African Americans, particularly from those businesses drawing profits from the African American community. Under the leadership of Reverend Jackson, the months that Alice and her group of ordinary people spent picketing led to real change. But it was through her political education class, as a part of
Operation Breadbasket, that Alice had her most significant impact. Over a four year period, thousands were trained to work in independent political campaigns in her classes.

Together with archives and video and written sources, another important source of information about Breadbasket has been oral stories from veterans of the campaign, especially a long interview with Vincent Harding. In alphabetical order, I contacted Robert Adams (Chief Operating Officer of the newly formed Martin Luther King III Institute for Social Justice & Human Rights); Lerone Bennett (former executive editor for Ebony Magazine); Dorothy Cotton (former Education Director of the S.C.L.C.); Aljosie Aldrich Knight (Harding's friend); Fred Harris (former U.S. Senator (Oak) and member of Kerner Commission); Lester McKeever (managing principal of Washington, Pittman & McKeever LLC, the accounting firm of Breadbasket and S.C.L.C. in Chicago, and former chairman of the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago). They showed different levels of cooperation, from very helpful to simple courtesy. Although I planned to interview Rev. Jesse Jackson in Chicago, and I contacted him repeatedly, I failed in this endeavor. His profile is the result of the interviews with people – including Edward Taylor - who met him in different stages of his life. Other important sources can be found in the “Bibliography” section of this document. All of these sources helped to shape chapter one (“Civil Rights in the Workplace”).
Conclusion

Breadbasket began in Atlanta and ended in Chicago, straddling both the Southern and the Northern struggle for Civil Rights. It exposed the commitment of the Black Church for economic justice, and showed the convergence of Civil Rights and Black Power Movements. The program dealt with economic issues, and was definitively affected by the changing mood of the economic milieu in the second half of the 1960s.

Despite being downplayed in Civil Rights and Black Power historiography, Breadbasket was a S.C.L.C. program that achieved national recognition and some success in improving economic opportunities for blacks. It was also the only program that created a schism within King’s organization. For these reasons, it deserves attention and examination. Characters and events related to Breadbasket can be found in existing studies focused on the Chicago Freedom Movement and Black Chicago, Martin Luther King Jr. and the S.C.L.C., and Jesse Jackson. These studies, however, offer only fragmented reconstructions of the ten years of Breadbasket's life, and they mainly concentrate on the second half of the history of the program. This material offers insights into Breadbasket in Chicago, leaving the earlier period in Atlanta barely touched.

Less epic in character as a campaign than the Freedom Rides and not concentrated in one place like the Birmingham and Selma campaigns; Breadbasket is a more complicated story. It attracted both the sympathy and the skepticism of the leader of the Civil Rights Movement, Dr. King, and
became instrumental in the ascension of Jackson on the national stage. Because of the interplay between the economic dynamics, the interdependence and interconnection among the diverse wings of the Black Freedom Movement, and the civil engagement of the Black Church, Breadbasket does not seem to fit in the traditional narrative of the history of the Civil Rights movement, which concentrates on political and cultural issues, and assumes a strict separation between Civil Rights and Black Power. Placed in a different historical context, however, Breadbasket assumes greater significance than scholars have previously understood.

The traditional narrative presents a linear view of the Civil Rights Movement, moving from the South to the North, expanding the scope of the movement from segregation to discrimination, and emphasizing the goal of political and economic integration as a “right.” Scholars identify the passage of two important pieces of legislations, the Civil Right Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as turning points. This period is marked by the expansion of Civil Rights activities from the South to Northern cities, from the fight against *de jure* segregation to the one against *de facto* discrimination. This period included increasing involvement by Martin Luther King, Jr., emphasizing economic justice, and the rising radicalism of black people in urban settings. New scholarship, however, identifies 1965 as a moment of discontinuity. In January of that year, President Lyndon Johnson proclaimed that the country had “no irreconcilable conflicts,” and less than 12 months later, the country found itself deeply divided because of episodes of racial violence exploding in the Watts area of Los Angeles. The landing of the first
battalion of marines in Vietnam occurred, Black Power appeared as a significant force for change, and there was a resurgence of social conservatism. Because of immense social upheaval was occurring at this time, the traditional “from segregation-to-discrimination” narrative is not very useful when it comes to Breadbasket.

Historians have recently re-framed the Civil Rights Movement within the context of an ongoing struggle for black freedom and economic equality, and sought to place the movement within the larger context of the Black Freedom Movement. They also have suggested that an emerging modern conservative movement had great influence on this period. The Civil Rights literature that deals with the implications of economics, the Black Power era, the intersection of Black Power and Civil Rights, and the involvement of conservatives in the economy, offer a more rounded historical view of Breadbasket. As a result of these studies and their new perspectives, it is possible to place Breadbasket at the convergence of the Black Church-driven Civil Rights Movement and the activist-based Black Power efforts in the economic arena. This allows for the rediscovery of Breadbasket as a pivotal program in the history of the Civil Rights Movement, while recognizing the role and legacy of Jackson as Breadbasket’s leader.
Chapter One: Civil Rights in the Workplace

Introduction

Breadbasket’s purpose was to expand access to jobs and to provide access to business and commercial opportunities to those who lived in the segregated South, or in the black ghettos in the urban North. The program had its roots in the enthusiasm created by an Executive Order issued by the Kennedy Administration, and by the success achieved by a boycott campaign in Philadelphia. Breadbasket’s leadership did not act in a vacuum; it continuously monitored the degree of employment of black workers both at national and local levels and put civil rights activism in that context. In 1967, for example, Breadbasket prepared a report investigating the economic forces that were perceived as causes for high black unemployment in the 1960s, in spite of a booming economy. Since Breadbasket’s leadership paid so much attention to the economic context, and elaborated its strategies and vision based on the economic dynamics of the time, it seems worthwhile to continue in the same vein by attending to the consequences of the economic context when approaching the history of the program.

This chapter outlines the economic background and historical events that were instrumental in the birth of Breadbasket, and identifies its primary goals and activities throughout its existence. To provide a sufficiently wide
overview, this chapter traces the intellectual origins of Breadbasket to earlier efforts to promote racial inclusion in the workplace during the 1930s and 1940s, which was mostly a product of the Civil Rights activism of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), black-conscious boycotts and more radical protests. The chapter also investigates how the alliance between Civil Rights leaders and labor unions worked during the 1950s and 1960s. This alliance produced mixed feelings and results, and provides a reinterpretation of the classic narrative of the fruitful alliance between Civil Rights and union labor. This is a more nuanced description of the events being discussed.

This chapter further addresses the executive orders and important legislation designed to reduce the job divide between black and white workers, and investigates how different strategies – fair employment and preferential treatment – were adopted and pursued by the Civil Rights Movement and other institutions. The chapter investigates boycotts as a Civil Rights strategy. Boycotts have been a weapon long used by protesters in search of economic justice, and they have been integral to the history of 20th century Civil Rights protests in urban North America. Finally, the chapter addresses the rise of pro-business conservatism, the unpredictable consequences of the ascent of affirmative action, and the convergence of black separatism and white conservatism in a number of areas that ultimately coalesced around the ideas of economic self-determination and black capitalism.
African Americans and Job Discrimination

The opportunity to obtain a decent job has been a central concern of African Americans for decades. At the beginning of the twentieth century, however, few organizations, namely the NAACP, which was founded in 1909, the National Urban League (NUL), which was established in 1910, and black leaders such as A. Philip Randolph, W.E.B. DuBois, Walter White, and Clarence Mitchell, declared fair opportunity for black workers a central concern of their activism. Despite some advancement in the first decades of the century, white workers and labor unions maintained firm control of the workplace, enforcing job discrimination practices against blacks (and other minorities). It was more than just racism; it was a confluence of factors: tradition, nepotism, seniority, and defense of established interests. It was a sort of white labor monopoly. During the Great Depression, African Americans dealt with dramatic levels of unemployment. To unlock the job marketplace during the Great Depression and before the war, black activists pursued two different strategies: they asked for jobs specifically for blacks; and they demanded fair hiring and promotion policies.

In the first case, black activists aimed to convince employers to reserve jobs for blacks. The idea of racial quotas had been already implemented by the federal government in the 1930s, as both the Tennessee Valley Authority and the Public Works Administration practiced a quota system that reserved jobs for blacks. The goal was pursued through diplomacy by the National Urban League officials, visiting companies intending to convince corporate
executives to hire a certain number of black workers. The goal was also addressed through boycott, protests, and actions of civil disobedience. The “Don’t Buy Where You Can’t Work” movement, which was successfully organized in Chicago in 1929, established the right to work on blacks’ status as consumers. The movement became a major form of black activism in cities across the country, and achieved important results in Philadelphia, Atlanta and New York. At times the adoption of an intimidating approach, that is, demanding that white store owners hire blacks in proportion to the black population in the area, or in proportion to their consumer power (patronage), was offered as an alternative to retaliatory boycotts.

Living in segregated communities, blacks resented the presence in their neighborhoods of white-owned stores that refused to employ blacks or employed them only in menial positions. Plus, without laws barring racial discrimination in private industry, such discriminatory practices continued unabated. Not surprisingly, African Americans organized boycotts against white employers in black neighborhoods who sold to blacks but refused to hire them. In 1929, protestors picketing stores on Chicago’s South Side officially started the “Don’t Buy Where You Can’t Work” movement. The protest soon expanded to other cities such as Los Angeles, Cleveland and New York. Blacks in Brooklyn and Harlem initiated “Don’t Buy” campaigns against white stores under the leadership of the charismatic black minister Adam Clayton Powell, Jr. The New Negro Alliance (NNA) in Washington, D.C. was founded in 1933 precisely to combat white-owned businesses in black neighborhoods that would not hire black employees. By 1940, the
organization had secured 5,106 jobs for blacks. In response to the organized or threatened boycotts against white-owned businesses, some white business people arranged for an injunction to stop the picketing. With the assistance of the NAACP, the NNA fought back – all the way to the United States Supreme Court, which in *New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co.* (1938), confirmed the constitutional right of boycotting. This decision became a landmark case in the struggle by African Americans against discriminatory hiring practices, and “Don’t Buy Where You Can’t Work” groups multiplied throughout the nation. During the Great Depression, the emerging movement adopted mass protest and direct action tactics such as economic boycotts and picketing to force businesses to negotiate. Hence, the “Don’t Buy” pickets and boycotts became viable weapons that forced white-owned stores in black communities to hire blacks in skilled and white-collar positions. As these campaigns grew in popularity during the Depression, they spread to more than 30 cities across the country, becoming one of the first black direct action movements of that era.\(^80\) While the early boycott campaigns became the prototype for the post world war II Civil Rights Movement, historian of black business Juliet Walker concludes that those campaigns increased black employment in white businesses, but were “less effective in helping black business.”\(^81\) The movement lost momentum at the beginning of the World War II.\(^82\)

Black leaders applied the founders’ principle of no taxation without representation, asking for equal employment opportunities, based on their status as taxpayers. Some Civil Rights activists pushed the point even further,
and claimed that their status as consumers entitled them to the same rights as their white counterparts. Despite some episodic collaboration with NNA, traditional Civil Rights groups such as the NAACP and the National Urban League remained reticent about the use of direct action tactics with regard to boycotts. These more traditional groups were reluctant to endorse the idea of quotas at all. These organizations were skeptical of the racial, divisive, “black only” requests for employment. They thought it would establish a win-lose game, a win for a black worker was a loss for a white worker, with the potential to foster additional racial animosity. They argued that “preferential treatment” was based on the assumption that American capitalism was inadequate to provide a sufficient number of jobs for all, and preferential treatment of Blacks would have created the opportunity for a white backlash. These moderate civil rights institutions preferred not to challenge white workers and employers, preferring to work together with labor unions and the federal government to promote social change and fair employment policies. Accordingly, they suggested shifting the conversation from preferential treatment to fair employment. The point was, rather than demanding jobs specifically for blacks, a more effective option was pursuing fair hiring and promotion procedures through anti-discrimination policies.

In order to put pressure on a reticent federal government, civil rights leaders had the option to fight alone or to forge partnerships, and among the most important of these alliances were labor unions. However, the improvements for working people gained by labor, excluded minorities such as black and other non-white workers – including American Indians, Asians, Hispanics,
and women. Black people remained constantly discriminated against in the workplace as far as hiring, advancement, and wages were concerned, in spite of the progress made by the unions and their work with civil rights leaders and their affiliated groups. Conservative unions like the AFL were known as the most hostile to blacks. Progressive unions consistently showed prudence when working with blacks because they did not want to lose white members. Labor unions important in construction, plumbing, sheet metal fabrication, and electrical work obstinately excluded black workers from membership, and the main labor unions continued to be dominated by whites.\textsuperscript{83} The Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) was a remarkable exception as its leaders appealed to workers regardless of race, or level of skill in a particular trade. This approach was based on the belief that the security of any worker depended on the commitment of all. Although the CIO did not challenge workplace discrimination like the other unions, it provided black workers with powerful tools to tackle it: collective bargaining as a means to compel employers to agree to union demands, seniority to prevent arbitrary firings, grievance systems to appeal violations of workers’ right, and one of the country’s most powerful lobbying bodies committed to economic justice and an expand welfare state.\textsuperscript{84}

The CIO was a remarkable exception in the landscape of race-biased labor organizations. The attention to the precarious situation of black workers paid off. By 1943, some 400,000 black workers had joined the CIO. By 1945, black membership in labor unions had doubled to 1.25 million.\textsuperscript{85}

In September 1940, a coalition of civil rights and black labor union leaders including Walter White of the NAACP, T. Arnold Hill of the National Urban
League, and A. Philip Randolph of the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters, met with President Franklin Delano Roosevelt to discuss black participation in the armed forces, and employment in the defense industries. The president made promises, but Randolph was skeptical. The coalition of civil rights and union leaders decided to march on the national's capital to protest the racial discrimination that was commonly pursued by companies and unions engaged in war work on government contracts. The march on Washington also received the endorsement of the CIO, a labor organization which, once again, rejected the strategy of exclusionary and segregationist craft unionism. The march was cancelled when President Roosevelt, fearful that the demonstration could distract from military preparations, issued Executive Order No. 8802, which outlawed discrimination in the defense industries, and created a federal agency to enforce that order, the Fair Employment Practices Committee (FEPC). Executive Order No. 8802 was the first presidential order to benefit blacks since Reconstruction, and it forbade discriminatory employment practices by unions and companies with government contracts, or engaged in war-related work. The establishment of the FEPC, and the labor shortage caused by the draft and booming military production created the opportunity for 2 million blacks to be employed in defense plants, and for another 200,000 to find employment in the federal government.

Randolph’s gambit produced substantial progress in the cause of workplace integration. Over the course of its six-year existence (1941-46), the wartime FEPC received 11,200 complaints of racial discrimination. The FEPC’s
enforcement options were constrained by a shortage of funds, bureaucratic inefficiencies, and the fact that the burden of proof relied on the individual to prove intentional discrimination.\textsuperscript{89} Despite these limits, the FEPC was able to proceed with hearings and investigations, interview corporate executives and discuss with them the option of ending segregation and promoting black workers, while making the point that discrimination was unfair and wrong. In the private sector, the FEPC was generally successful in enforcing non-discrimination practices in the North, although it did not attempt to challenge segregation in the South. More importantly, it built the precedent that the federal government was on the side of those at a disadvantage and of those being discriminated against, making a desegregated workplace a palatable option, and quotas and boycotts a less attractive proposition.

Beginning in mid-century, both strategies, quotas and fair employment, became interchangeable and were pursued simultaneously. During that period, a wide spectrum of economic and political alternatives, from moral persuasion to boycotts, were put in place in to open access to employment for African Americans. There was a concentrated effort on the part of Civil Rights leaders, labor unions, the federal government to integrate the workplace. They were supportive of, and sometimes advocates for, fair employment practice legislation through coalitions of interests, legal actions, and moral persuasion. In addition, the same Civil Rights leaders, alone or in cooperation with the black clergy, black nationalists and other radicals, promoted grass-roots protests and pursued preferential treatment strategies through a widespread use of boycotts meant to force employers to capitulate
and hire, promote and advance African Americans. A case in point is the S.C.L.C., which lobbied for Civil Rights legislation, fair employment practices, color-blind legislation, and simultaneously established Breadbasket, a color-conscious campaign, promoting vigorous boycott campaigns and mass protest to secure more and better jobs for African Americans. While the S.C.L.C. was committed to a tactical use of protest, among other strategies, more moderate Civil Rights organizations and leaders such as the NAACP, and eventually, Bayard Rustin in the late 1960s, promoted the idea that integration in the workplace would be better pursued through the traditional vehicle of coalition politics in conjunction with the labor movement.  

**Ascent and Decline of Fair Employment**

In the 1950s, labor and Civil Rights leaders shared the idea of fair employment practices legislation, a set of laws prohibiting racial discrimination and promoting equal opportunity in the workplace, as well as the establishment of agencies responsible for enforcing those laws. They committed to move forward the fundamental assumptions and the underlying philosophy of the Executive Order No. 8802 and FEPC. They envisioned a federal legislation that might establish and enforce non-discriminatory hiring and promotion practices in the workplace, and equal treatment and fair employment both in the public and private sector. The problem was the existing low degree of democratization of the job market. In the aftermath of the conflict, there was a general confidence that black
people could benefit from the dramatic increase in affluence across all levels of society and from the improving strength of the economy. Fundamental changes were at work in the very fabric of American society and the economy was booming. The spectacular rate of economic growth opened up more and better-paid jobs to black people, and increased their social status and self-confidence. The whole job landscape was affected. In 1939, still 42.5 percent of African Americans were employed in agriculture, forestry and fisheries. Twenty years later, it was only 12.5 percent. Blacks lost interest in these agricultural opportunities for employment, and placed their hopes on pursuing industrial work. In the 1940s and early 1950s, they left the South and migrated to the North to find industrial work in the booming manufacturing sector. As result, by 1970, only 53 percent of black people lived in the South compared to 77 percent in 1940. This massive migration did not necessarily provide employment opportunities for all. In 1950, African Americans numbered 15.8 million people, and 19 million a decade later. Unemployment was twice as high for blacks as for whites, and poverty afflicted 50 percent or more of blacks. The problem was that the U.S. economy was already involved in another major change: de-industrialization. The problem was a modification of job patterns.

Automation was the single most influential factor in the de-industrialization of the American economy in the Fifties. Automation increased outputs and reduced labor cost, that is, reduced the number of workers. A closer investigation into the period following World War II reveals that manufacturing employment achieved its peak in the early 1950s, only to drop
rapidly from that point on, back down to pre-war levels by the end of the next decade. The American work force changed significantly in the post-World War II period. During the 1950s, the number of workers providing services grew until it equaled and then surpassed the number who produced goods. It became fashionable to propose the advent of some sort of post-industrial society, where corporations were depending less on manual labor and more on service and office-based workers. By 1956, a majority of U.S. workers held white-collar rather than blue-collar jobs. However, “white-collar” was a vague description, not a standard definition. Among a total of 27.2 million “white-collar” workers in 1960, 14.4 million were not professional or managerial workers, but were rather clerical staff and employees involved in sales. At the same time, blue-collar workers remained central to the economy of the 1950s, and only in the 1960s did the shift away from manufacturing jobs become evident. In fact, while the percentage of people defined by occupation as manual laborers declined over time, the raw number of laborers continued to increase, from 23.7 million in 1950, to 25.6 million in 1960, to 29.1 million in 1970. While American jobs migrated away from manufacturing in urban centers, the industrial boom of the early twentieth century came to an end and, with it, the promise of high-paying jobs for unskilled laborers that had boosted urban population. Only a few decades earlier, millions of immigrants from Europe had benefited from the availability of unskilled, heavy-lifting jobs in the booming steel, railroads and mining industries. The early impact of automation (or cybernation) caused the decline of manufacturing employment and created a new job crisis for
workers without advanced education or vocational training. The decline of manufacturing employment by the late fifties and early sixties created a sense of desperation in urban black communities, and created an urgent need for some sort of economic relief. Blacks moved to major urban centers at the same time when whites were moving out of the cities to the suburbs. “There is an irony in this for the Negro,” noted a Chicago Urban League forum speaker, years later: “He may be winning the right to get a job just the time when the job itself is disappearing.” In other words, work integration was coming at edge together with another important economic trend: deindustrialization.

Black workers were regularly and consistently excluded from good jobs. When African Americans were employed, they were rarely in secure, remunerative jobs. When employed, black workers were employed in unskilled industrial and service activities, while white employers maintained a monopoly in sales, management and professional jobs. In the fifties, it was rare to see black professionals, black white-collars workers, or even skilled black blue-collars workers. In 1950, only 2.2 percent of black men and 5.7 percent of black women worked as professionals, and nearly all of them were in black-owned businesses. African Americans were regularly assigned to less desirable job categories such as maid, cook and porter. Managers refused to hire blacks in sales and clerical positions because it often involved contact with – and inevitably the reaction of – white clientele, and white co-workers. For African Americans, it was a humiliating experience as well as a practical barrier to better jobs. To avoid what Herbert Hill, the labor director of
the NAACP, envisioned as “a permanent black underclass,” a group in “permanent unemployment” or underemployed, the solution was *fair employment* mandated by federal legislation designed to eliminate workplace discrimination, promote a better level of inclusion in the workplace, and offer equality of opportunity to black individuals.

In the moderate, mainstream America of the fifties, black leaders resurrected alliances of Civil Rights organizations and labor unions initially created in the previous decade. Once again, the strategy was to build an alternative to the legal actions against state laws barring employment discrimination proposed by the NAACP, and apply pressure on the federal government to create legislation or Presidential Executive Orders designed to support this approach. In 1952, the CIO was instrumental in the creation of the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights (LCCR) – an organization founded by A. Philip Randolph, head of the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters; Roy Wilkins of the NAACP; and Arnold Aronson, a leader of the National Jewish Community Relations Advisory Council, to promote equal opportunity and social justice in America. However, after its merger with the AFL in 1955, the CIO’s interest in black workers declined. Labor unions and the Civil Rights Movement did not always act in sync, and their alliance was marked by complexity and impermanency. For example, in 1957, Dr. King pointed out that “organized labor can be one of the most powerful instrument[s]” to achieve racial equality, only to note in 1961, the “weaknesses of our relationship” with labor unions. NALC leadership believed in union activism, and the NAACP stressed legal challenges and urged government to use its
power to promote and pursue equality of opportunity. In 1960, seventy-five black trade unions established the Negro American Labor Council (NALC), led by A. Philip Randolph. He invited the members of NALC to engage in practical actions to repair “the crisis of confidence between the Negro community and the labor community.”

By 1960, the LCCR – the organization founded by Randolph, Wilkins, and Aronson, with the support of the CIO, represented more than 75 organizations and was the center of a potential labor–Civil Rights coalition capable of lobbying for a Civil Rights bill and promoting a social democratic agenda. In 1961, Randolph built another coalition of trade unions and Civil Rights leaders including Percy Sutton, Louis Micheaux and the Nation of Islam minister, Malcolm X, to demand equal job opportunities.

In the early 1960s, Randolph’s strategy seemed on the verge of paying off dramatically. With the election of John F. Kennedy and the Democratic takeover of Congress in 1960, political momentum for Congressional legislation seemed at hand, and the futility of the action against state laws barring employment discrimination proposed by the NAACP and AFL-CIO seemed to be crystal clear. Moreover, economic growth looked relentless, fueling the most ambitious plans for race realignment and ubiquitous prosperity.

In March 1961, President Kennedy issued Executive Order No. 10925 to create a Presidential Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity. Kennedy’s order was based on precedents that included President
Roosevelt’s Committee on Fair Employment Practice and President Eisenhower’s Committee in Government Employment Policy, chaired by Vice President Nixon. Consequently, Vice President Johnson was asked to chair the newly established Committee. He privately advised Kennedy that the Eisenhower administration’s non-discrimination clause for governmental contractors should “be revised to impose not merely the negative obligation of avoiding discrimination but the affirmative duty to employ applicants.”

The term affirmative action resonated in the lexicon of the Civil Rights Movement in early 1960s, allied as was to phrases like positive effort and affirmative program. In fact, it was adopted for the very first time by Hobart Taylor, Jr., a young black lawyer from Houston, in a draft of this order written for Lyndon Johnson. However, under the language of Executive Order No. 10925, affirmative action did not mean compensatory actions or special treatment of particular groups. It only meant positive action against race discrimination.

The CEEO surged to political prominence in the aftermath of the campaign in Birmingham, Alabama. In May 1963, the Justice Department figures counted 1,412 different demonstrations, nearly 800 boycotts, marches, and sit-ins in some 200 cities and towns in the South. Major examples were the demonstrations for construction jobs promoted by NAACP branches in Philadelphia, Cleveland, Newark, New York, and Pittsburgh. The NAACP protested against job discrimination in construction sites and building trades. In April and May of 1963, protests in Birmingham, Alabama, incited a brutal police reaction, which encouraged the Kennedy
administration to engage more deeply with Civil Rights issues. The attorney general, Robert Kennedy, sent Burke Marshall, his assistant attorney general for Civil Rights, to Birmingham to survey the situation. He complained that he did not find black employees in the federal offices in the city. On May 29, 1963, when the CEEO met, Kennedy also acknowledged that only 15 out of 2,000 federal employees in Birmingham were black, 1 percent in a city that was 37 percent black. On the same occasion, the attorney general protested that, with $3.5 billion in contracts, NASA had only two people working on equal employment. President Kennedy decided to expand the CEEO’s jurisdiction and include not only government contracts but also highway and other programs which were entitled to receive a portion of federal funds. On June 11, President Kennedy called the Civil Rights bill a priority. “We face a moral crisis,” he told the nation in June 1963, “it is time to act in Congress.” His bill did not include a number of provisions deemed essential by Civil Rights leaders, such as ending discrimination in private employment, granting the Justice Department power to initiate desegregation or job discrimination lawsuits, and an FEPC provision.

In the summer of 1963, a string of protests that included thousands of protesters in months-long campaigns to provide jobs to blacks, including organizations not involved in the Birmingham events such as NAACP and CORE, began advocating for full and nondiscriminatory employment and the vital right to earn money. The national business press took note. *Fortune* magazine predicted that “the problem of race relations may become a major – at times the major preoccupation of top management for a number
of years to come.” *Business Week* pointed out that businesspeople might recognize the increasing pressure applied by individuals and organizations for more jobs and better jobs for blacks. It added that the campaign was “comparable to the American worker’s drive to unionize as the turn of the century.” Many businesses decided that temperance and accommodation would have been a better option than disorder and turbulence. The case of Birmingham, in which corporate leaders tried to convince local governments to negotiate peacefully their difference with Civil Rights leaders, became a benchmark.

While the attempts to prevent boycotts and avoid retaliation by the black customers was a main cause for the small, local white-owned businesses to embrace “appeasement” (a diplomatic policy aimed at avoiding conflict by making concessions to an aggressor), a more genuine interest in racial integration in the corporate world was the explicit scope of executives and businesspeople in the same period. As pressure from Civil Rights organizations and the federal government increased in the late 1950s and early 1960s, executives at the largest corporations began integrating their organization. They proclaimed that they were not responding to the pressure of Civil Rights activists, or to the incoming legislation of the federal government and the enforcing actions of its agencies, or “by the desire to be well-regarded,” but – according to historian Delton - rather as a moral obligation to do the right thing. More realistically, executives were claiming alignment to the philosophy of racial integration in the workplace, while performing fair employment free from the constraints of
government coercion, and ultimately maintaining control of their organizations.

During the first half of the decade, a main concern for Civil Rights organizations was their relationship with the federal government, which increasingly revolved around racial issues. While most of these organizations considered it crucial to have access to the presidency and executive power, but some of them preferred to assume a more detached posture, deciding on a case by case basis if partnering with the federal was the best option in a particular situation. For example, the NACCP’s leader, Roy Wilkins, strongly believed that the federal government was an indispensable element of the civil rights project because it was responsible for the enforcement of fair employment practices legislation. The S.C.L.C. leader, Dr. King, assumed the position of non-alignment with the government, so that he could look at the federal government’s policies with a certain amount of distance, and be able to endorse governmental policies as he saw fit. Because the S.C.L.C. was perceived as largely responsible for the success of the Civil Right movement, or at least for the tone and direction of its campaigns, King’s strategy of non-alignment with the federal government would greatly affect the whole movement.

This ambivalent approach confused the relationship of Civil Rights groups with the federal government, especially regarding workplace integration issues. In December 1962, A. Philip Randolph and Bayard Rustin had the idea to plan a march on Washington for economic justice, centered on
demands for an increased minimum wage and the passage of fair employment legislation. CORE, S.C.L.C. and other Civil Rights organizations approved the project, others such as NAACP and National Urban League did not. The idea received more traction when it was associated with the motto, “Jobs and Freedom,” that had the power to unify the Northern wing of the movement, which focused on employment, and the Southern wing, which prioritized desegregation. In the summer of 1963, the United Auto Workers president Walter Reuther joined Randolph and Rustin as the organizers of the March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom.108 Departing from the “neutrality” of most other unions, the UAW actively involved itself in the organization of the event and proclaimed that “Civil Rights Plus Full Employment Equals Freedom.” On August 28, more than a quarter of a million Americans gathered in the nation’s capital to demand passage of the Civil Rights bill that was then pending in Congress, adoption of a $2-an-hour federal minimum wage, and amendment of the Fair Labor Standards Act, so that agricultural and domestic workers—the vast majority of them were black—would be included in the law’s wage and workplace protections. The march reflected Civil Rights advocates’ concern for economic justice as well as social equality and their awareness, in Reuther’s words, that “without a job and a paycheck,” triumph over Jim Crow would be “a largely abstract and empty victory.”109 It also represented the UAW conviction that the black freedom struggle could provide the kind of mass mobilization required to forge an enduring realignment in American politics. The Civil Rights Movement promised to deliver black votes that were needed to break the
hold of white supremacy in the South. The final goal was to undermine the alliance of conservative Republicans and segregationist southern Democrats that had frustrated efforts at reorganizing the nation’s economy and redistributing its abundance.\textsuperscript{110} The historic march on Washington on August 28, 1963 – nearly a quarter of a million attended the event – was a dramatic effort to influence Congress, when it seemed that a large coalition of Civil Rights activists, labor unions, and religious leaders was on the verge of successfully lobbying for full and fair employment.\textsuperscript{111}

The vision of full employment would eventually affect the view of Civil Rights leaders like King and other black leaders that focused their attention on the economic problems of working-class and unemployed African Americans. In fact, the economic growth and the rising expectation of economic justice in the 1960s instigated a profound shift in American culture that acted to promote workplace integration as never before. As a practical solution to job discrimination, Civil Rights leaders envisioned a mix of policies of \textit{fair employment} and \textit{full employment}, that is, a reformed and expanded role of government to promote the restructuring of the operation of American society – in the words of Martin Luther King, Jr., “a restructuring of the architecture of American society” – in order to provide a higher level of economic justice.\textsuperscript{112} Rather than “compensatory treatment,” Randolph argued that “special and preferential treatment, in the form of preparation in training and education to enable it (Negro labor) effectively to move forward.” The point also resonated with the New York Commission on Human Rights that included the option of “preferential treatment” of
“qualified” blacks “for a limited period.” An editor of *Fortune* magazine, Charles E. Silberman, considered it, “Inevitable in 1963 that Negro organizations would use their power to increase job opportunities for Negroes. Indeed, Negroes are not content with equal opportunity anymore; they are demanding preference, or ‘positive discrimination’ in their favor.” He was right. The statement that detailed the compromise that ended protests in Birmingham (“The Birmingham Truce Agreement,” 10 May 1963) explicitly mentioned an ongoing “program of upgrading Negro employment,” which meant awarding set numbers of jobs to eligible black applicants.

In 1963, the idea that some sort of “affirmative action” might be implemented was elaborated on by Civil Rights and labor leaders. In his book *Why We Can’t Wait*, King pointed out:

> The nation must not only radically readjust its attitude toward [African Americans] in the compelling present, but must incorporate in its planning some compensatory consideration for the handicaps [African Americans have] inherited from the past. It is impossible to create a formula for the future, which does not take into account that our society has done something special against [African Americans] for hundreds of years. How then can [African Americans] be absorbed into the mainstream of American life if we do not do something special for [them] now, in order to balance the equation and equip [them] to compete on a just and equal basis? Whenever this issue of compensatory or preferential treatment for [African Americans] is raised, some of our friends recoil in horror. [African Americans] should be granted equality, they agree; but [they] should ask nothing more. On the surface, this appears reasonable, but it is not realistic. For it is obvious that if a [person] entered at the starting line in a race three hundred years after another [person], the [latter] would have to perform some impossible feat in order to catch up with his fellow runner.
Job discrimination was a part of a ubiquitous, systematic, devastating economic inequality. It started at home, where black children were trapped in segregated neighborhoods with high rates of illness, and poor medical care and it continued at school, where black students were receiving education that was not as good as their white counterparts. Black students were denied access to advanced education and training, and ultimately marginalized from the intellectual milieu – in this regard, the National Urban League stressed “the damaging effects of generations of deprivation and denial” on blacks.\textsuperscript{117}

The main barrier to defeating economic inequality was the perception of whites that equality had been already achieved. As reported by historian MacLean, in 1963, half of Southern whites and 45 percent of Northern whites stated that blacks already had “as good a chance” as whites “to get any kind of job for which they are qualified.”\textsuperscript{118} Of course, blacks were never qualified enough. During a 1962 study of Atlanta employers, a manager made clear that sales and service office jobs were destined to whites, and another stated that blacks were suitable only for production jobs.\textsuperscript{119} A black-excluding job system was perpetuating itself and creating the false perception that it was the natural order of things. The complexity and the magnitude of the job discrimination phenomenon created space for more extensive remedies. Randolph proposed the investment of billions of federal funds to sustain “a nationwide drive for massive public works,” providing “fair employment and full employment.” This was the so-called “Freedom Budget,” a proposal for a massive, systematic attack on all the causes of poverty. It called on the federal government to spend $185 billion over a ten-year period in housing,
education, guaranteed annual income, expanded medical care and social insurance. Most importantly, the funds would be used to eliminate unemployment, create jobs that would engage the poor in rebuilding their own neighborhoods, in the construction of homes, schools, mass transit, and hospitals, and in creating useful, socially supportive jobs such as teachers’ aides. The Freedom Budget was backed by a coalition of Civil Rights leaders such as Bayard Rustin, Whitney Young, James Farmer, John Lewis, Row Wilkins, and Martin Luther King, Jr., along with an assortment of labor unions, white liberals, radicals, religious groups, and other ethnic minorities. At the same time, the National Urban League demanded a domestic Marshall Plan. What was needed to overcome the preferential system that had benefited whites for generations was a “special effort.” Whitney Young, the national director of the National Urban League, conceded that “the concept of special effort for Negro citizens may be difficult for the majority of white citizens to accept.”

The notion of “special effort” (or Freedom Budget, or Domestic Marshall Plan) gained consensus mostly because in the United States the post-World War II period was one of economic prosperity. It was a time of low unemployment, increasing consumerism, and a positive attitude about the future. It was a time of national optimism, great expectations, faith in progress and the American Dream. It was a time of grace: Americans had triumphed over the Great Depression, Fascism and Nazism, won the war against Japan, and become members of the healthiest, wealthiest and happiest country in the world. America, they believed, was inevitably destined to win
the Cold War. A long period of consistent economic growth in the United States began at the end of World War II and ended in the late 1960s. The nation’s gross national product (GNP) rose from about $200,000 million in 1940 to $300,000 million in 1950 and to more than $500,000 million in 1960. At one point, in the late 1940s, the American economy accounted for 57 percent of the world’s steel production, 62 percent of the oil and 80 percent of the cars produced worldwide. The United States had three-fourths of the planet’s gold reserves. The GNP grew in the 1940s—especially in the first half of the decade—and by 1950 it had increased 56.3 percent for the 1940s as a whole. The Fifties were, in the words of historian Patterson, “an age of astonishing material affluence.” The GNP rose constantly during this period, and by 1960 it had increased 37 percent over the 1950s as a whole. By 1960, the average American family income was 30 percent higher in purchasing power than in 1950. An amazing 61.9 percent of homes were owner-occupied in 1960, compared to 43.6 percent in 1940 and 55 percent in 1950. By 1960, nearly 80 percent of American families had at least one car, and 15 percent had two or more. There were then 73.8 million cars registered, as opposed to 39.3 million a decade earlier. The Eisenhower administration carefully monitored and managed inflation through fiscal restraints, while unemployment remained at a very low level, between 4.1 and 4.4 percent between 1955 and 1957 (in the recession year of 1958, however, unemployment suddenly skyrocketed to 6.8 percent). This prosperity accelerated even more rapidly in the “golden age” of the 1960s, when per capita income increased by 41 percent over the decade. Prices remained
stable until the late 1960s and unemployment stayed quite low, falling to 3.5 percent in 1969. Poverty, as measured by the government, declined from 22 percent of the population in 1960 to 12 percent in 1969. Fundamental during the “golden age” to sustaining and securing continued economic growth was the tax cut proposed by John Kennedy in 1963, which was then passed early the following year by his successor. The 1964 tax cut was designed to stimulate production, not consumption, as happened in the 1980s. It was intended to increase the GNP, the number of jobs, disposable personal and family income, and corporate profits. It worked. The GNP increased by more than 10 percent in 1965 and disposable personal income by 12 percent in the year following. By December 1965, the unemployment rate was 4.1 percent; a month later it fell to 3.9 percent.

The post-War War II economy was booming and full employment seemed at hand. New York Herald Tribune columnist, Walter Lippmann described, in a nutshell, his understanding of the post-scarcity economics in regards to the 1960s:

A generation ago it would have been taken for granted that a war on poverty meant taxing money away from the haves and turning it over to the have not's … But in this generation a revolutionary idea has taken hold. The size of the pie can be increased by intention.

For the very first time in the history of the country, the possibility of expanding job opportunities for African Americans can happen at no consequences for white workers. While Lippmann was not speaking about jobs and employment specifically, in his article he clearly defined the
fundamental assumption that lies behind the right of any American citizen to access jobs, and the transformation of American society from one of “have’s” and “have not’s” to one where the “have not’s” simply disappear. The equation appeared to have validity due to the previous quarter-century of extraordinary economic growth. Unlimited economic growth gave hope that the traditional Aristotelian notion of transfer of wealth from the “have’s” to the “have not’s” had simply been replaced with economic expansion in which “have not’s” become “have’s” without a transfer of wealth. Ultimately, the purpose of this economic growth was a society of “have’s” only, which was capable of providing access to full employment for all Americans.

Despite the country’s amazing economic growth, the huge divide between the economic growth of the country and the stagnant level of employment of Black America remained a reality. While the economic cycle embraced the most extraordinary period of growth in the history of mankind, the disparity between the level of employment of white individuals and black individuals remained huge. African Americans continued to suffer from a high rate of unemployment despite the economic prosperity, and American people showed an increasing confidence in the government’s political solutions to economic problems. Since the Great Depression, the federal government had been actively involved in handling the economy, during the New Deal through a regulated form of capitalism, then – inspired by economist John Maynard Keynes – through a managerial government. With regard to this approach, Alan Brinkley has noted that:
In its pursuit of full employment, the government would not seek to regulate corporate institutions so much as it would try to influence the business cycle. It would not try to redistribute economic power and limit inequality so much as it would create a compensatory welfare system (what later generations would call a “safety net”) for those whom capitalism had failed. It would not reshape capitalist institutions. It would reshape the economic and social environment in which those institutions worked.\textsuperscript{131}

Brinkley explains how the federal government carefully moved from a regulatory strategy to compensatory policy. For at least three generations of Americans, government direction of U.S. capitalism came to seem like common sense. They agreed that unemployment was not as an act of nature, but something that the government could prevent. There was a sincere belief that the high rate of unemployment during the Great Depression was a nightmare of the past. Politicians were expected to create full employment. According to the economic philosophy of the era, the federal government had the responsibility to make a substantial effort to close the massive gap between blacks and whites’ levels of employment. Full employment backed by the government was essential in pursuit of economic equality.\textsuperscript{132}

The vision of full employment backed by the government that labor union and Civil Right leaders shared in the first part of the Sixties did not survive 1965. The same can be said of the social programs of the Great Society, the title of a 1919 book penned by social psychologist Graham Wallis that later became the hallmark of president Johnson’s commitment to the notion of government action to end racial discrimination, guarantee equal opportunities, and aid the disadvantaged. At the beginning of that year, the United States seemed on the cusp of an economic golden age. By the end of
1965, the U.S. economy was in a state of inflation; that is, industrial capitalists were unable to expand production without undertaking major capital investments that would expand industry’s physical ability to produce. As the American economy was slowing due to the escalating costs of the war in Vietnam and the social reforms of the Great Society, further expansion of government-driven employment was simply improbable. The level of economic growth was not enough to sustain the domestic programs envisioned by the Great Society coupled with the increasing expense of funding a foreign conflict in Vietnam. The Great Society ran out of fuel as the government ran out of funds, creating a federal deficit that contributed significantly to rising inflation and interest rates. President Johnson had declined the option to increase taxes and the result was an increase of 4.5 percent in consumer prices, followed by a policy of price stability. In 1966, the Johnson administration was forced to divert funds from welfare to warfare, and the decision was made to cut all federal expenditures on structures and equipment. In 1967, there were clear signals of an economic downturn, “slowdown in capital investment, less residential construction, flat industrial production, disappointing retail sales and lower corporate profits.” Johnson could not help but propose a temporary 6 percent surcharge on corporate and individual income taxes, as well as proposing a restoration of the 7 percent investment tax credit, given these circumstances. These decisions were not only unpopular, more importantly, they failed to restore public confidence, reduce inflation, and balance the federal budget. Soon, the economy entered into the so-called mini-recession of 1966-67.
This was only the beginning of a spectacular, unpredictable change in the economic cycle. A confused and at times violent debate about whether to concentrate the economic resources of the federal government on pursuing social justice or on foreign military policy became common during this period. King sided against funding the Vietnam War. He famously predicted that “the bombs that [Americans] are dropping in Vietnam will explode at home in inflation and unemployment.” His prediction was correct, however, inflation and unemployment were not only the consequences of the war. While American capitalism was in a middle of an epochal shift, from an industrial economy to financial capitalism, attention and interest was diverted from employment and labor. By the end of 1965, an inflationary cycle was beginning to redefine the economic scene, marking the birth of the tumultuous era now known as “financialization.” Since a major element of financialization was consumer credit (especially credit cards, the use of which began to grow rapidly in the late 1960s), access to credit became a major concern for some Civil Rights leaders. While the extension of credit was mostly driven by the Civil Rights movement that portrayed consumer credit as a basic right that should be applied as broadly as possible, the federal government expanded its own visions of the Great Society, and planned to extend its programs to include the mortgage industry. In the light of this reality, it is clear that the most distressing effect of rising inflation during this period was the threat to the serenity and security of the mortgage-paying middle class. While annual consumer credit for housing and cars escalated, in 1966 the Federal Reserve Board moved to tighten credit. Credit became
unavailable or it was available only at extravagant interest rates, and the U.S. economy experienced a credit-crunch—a situation where the demand for credit exceeds the supply.

Despite being unrealistic in practice, the vision of full employment would eventually affect the view of Civil Rights leaders who looked at the economic problems of working-class and unemployed African Americans. These unrealistic expectations would provoke frustration that would end in general dissatisfaction and promote a surge of radicalism. The mark of partial failure was the result of unmatched expectations, the swing of long term economic cycles, and the emergence of a deepening ambivalence of the American public toward national politics. The federal government faced increasing criticism from the American people, who would become less inclined to pay taxes, and allow the investments that welfare required. Ultimately, the rise of modern conservatism fragmented the already fragile coalition between labor unions and Civil Rights, and transformed the role of government. Over time, a conservative coalition inside and outside Congress opposed and weakened fair employment legislation and its effects, while labor unions faced declining influence in the political realm. Historian Chen points out that problems between unions and Civil Rights organizations also emerged due to “a debilitating surge of antiradicalism among labor liberals” and “the decline of interracial unionism.” When Civil Rights leaders and religious leaders tried to open up the building trades to black workers, the unions did not commit. In the North, the target was the construction industry, a bastion of racial exclusion. Construction was worth more than $100 billion in
revenues, paid the nation’s highest wages for blue-collar work, and depended extensively on government funds. Moreover, big construction projects tended to be in urban locations rather than in the newly suburbanized manufacturing areas. However, here the unions were part of the problem, not the solution. In St. Louis, as in other cities, black leaders turned increasingly to the government, and not to labor unions, for help. Chen argues that “Gradual acquiescence ... to a two-party political system” weakened the connection of blacks with the unions and Civil Rights organizations, while “the systematic purge of Left-led unions from the CIO and the subsequent would weaken and disempowering the practical effects of the fair employment legislation issued in 1964.”

Indeed, the most valuable result of the Civil Rights Movement, the Civil Rights Act (technically, the Mansfield-Dickson-Humphrey-Kuchel amendment), approved in 1964, was at stake. It stated in Title VII the principle of equality of opportunity in employment, and made explicitly clear that employers were not obliged to redress racial imbalances caused by past discriminatory practices. The general counsel of the Congress on Racial Equality (CORE), Carl Rachlin, explained that in Title VII “preferential treatment to right past wrong is not required.” Title VII also created the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) to replace a similar commission created by executive order under President Kennedy and chaired by then-Vice President Johnson. During the Senate debate, Republican Sen. Everett Dirksen endorsed the creation of an EEOC, in order to limit the action of the Justice Department, and made sure that the federal government
was called in only if local agencies proved themselves unable to handle job discrimination complaints. Congress also stripped out of this section the authority of the EEOC to file suit on its own behalf (a power gained in 1972) and issue “cease and desist” orders. This forced individuals to go to court to defend their rights in instances where discriminatory behavior persisted. Basically, as Herbert Hill argued, “Title VII is not self-enforcing.” And yet, Title VII provided the right to sue for fair treatment.

After the passage of the Civil Rights Act and the creation of the EEOC and the related Secretary of Labor’s Office of Federal Contract Compliance (OFCC), an epic shift occurred, as they helped to recognize inequality, and provided mechanisms for correcting it. In fact, Title VII had awarded blacks the right to sue for fair job employment, and EEOC and OFCC had encouraging workers to apply for jobs, and supported them in case of resistance. Lawsuits became a concrete threat for corporate executives, together with boycotts and other acts of protest. Activists in the South organized black consumers to stop shopping in downtown stores until they hired black cashiers and workers. However, despite its historical importance and the practical results achieved in the integration of the workplace, Title VII was rapidly succeeded by affirmation action, another policy promoted by the federal government.

**Affirmative Action and Rise of Conservative Business**

Although unions and Civil Rights organizations were the first to articulate a tentative concept of affirmative action as preferential treatment, its
emergence has more to do – although unintentionally – with the conservative coalition inside and outside of Congress opposing and weakening fair employment legislation. The origins of affirmative action policies in employment were reinterpreted by historian Anthony Chen. The remarkable affluence of the 1960s created a social context of ever greater expectations. Millions of middle-class Americans already enjoyed rising level of prosperity in the 1950s. And yet, trapped as they were by a vision of inevitable economic progress, they came to expect, in the 1960s, an even more comfortable life and professional success, “that featured high-speed air travel, credit card transactions, and generous expense accounts.” People, who had enjoyed the spectacular economic boom of the 1950s, were nevertheless ready by the 1960s, to look at the previous decade as only partially satisfactory. An unprecedented faith in social and technological progress, the same progress that was occurring in the employment of African Americans in urban Northern America, allowed Americans to increase their expectations. Americans came to consider it a right to be a part of the affluent society. As never before in human history, Americans felt that there were no limits to personal gratification, social advancement, and economic prosperity. Economic growth and affluence, it was thought at the time, would work to further erode the economic, racial and religious divisions in American society. This thought was shared and sustained by the Johnson administration and the Great Society programs.

During the economically successful years of the mid-1960s, despite apparent progress, government compliance committees, and grassroots activism,
corporate obstruction was growing. Government enforcement was notably feeble during this period, and consensus among liberal intellectuals persisted that fair employment and equal opportunity legislation and practices could be pursued with moderation. In order to avoid a backlash by political conservatives, a political and economic bloc of corporate business, small-government intellectuals and conservative Republicans resisted creation of legislation aimed at controlling the workplace. They challenged the idea of a centralized, federal government driven-system for enforcing fair employment and equal treatment in the workplace. After the frustrating years of the Great Depression, they thought the time had come to restore confidence in the markets and the private sector. They intended to liberate markets from government control, and maintain economic inequality as a natural, inevitable effect of capitalism.

Well before the spread of market values in the 1970s, an intellectual counterrevolution had taken place in the 1950s. Decades before the phrases “free market economy” and “free enterprise” entered popular parlance, hundreds of legislators, businesspeople, and executives – mostly business-friendly conservatives – made it a common cause to promote an economic system that provided individuals the opportunity to make their own economic decisions free of government constraints, for the sake of private profit. Resurgent business hegemony took place in the country after the end of World War II. The Republican Party and the business community fought to block or reverse expansion of the New Deal and the corporate privileges they had lost during the Depression years. They intended to re-establish
managerial autonomy and corporate political hegemony in the workplace. The primary belief of the pro-business conservative movement was that the market, not the government, was the center of gravity of American capitalism.

Roosevelt's sudden death and the war's end in 1945 left the Fair Employment Practices Committee, established with Executive Order No. 8802, in limbo. Between 1946 and 1948, a confusing legislative debate occurred around the permanence of the FEPC. Congress was split over how best to address the issue and debated whether to extend the FEPC for a few years, make it a permanent commission, or to not renew its charter. Congress never enacted FEPC into law and ultimately the FEPC died in 1946, while two further bills calling for a permanent FEPC also failed. In February 1948, President Harry Truman submitted a Civil Rights package to Congress, including a permanent FEPC, and also proposed the creation of several federal offices devoted to issues such as fair employment practices and voting rights. Instead of addressing Civil Rights on a case-by-case basis, Truman wanted to address Civil Rights on a national level. This provoked a storm of criticism from Southern Democrats, and after the elections of 1948 Truman declined to press Congress to enact Civil Rights legislation.\textsuperscript{144} In 1948, President Truman called again for a permanent FEPC and the conservative coalition in a Democratic-controlled Congress prevented it.\textsuperscript{145} Frustrated by the uselessness of the state laws barring employment discrimination, the NAACP pressed the government to take executive action to deny federal contracts to employers who discriminated, based on the
precedent of Executive Order No. 8802 and the FEPC. This was a reasonable political target because in cases related to federal contracts, private property rights could not be raised. The legal system defined the rules of the industrial order, and so employers understood their freedom of contract as an extension of the nation’s founding commitment to the rights of property. This understanding of private property rights was directly challenged by the request for fair employment and equal access to jobs. Federal contracts were a big political target also because they involved nearly a third of the country’s business. Harry Truman embraced the cause and in 1950 the House would approve a permanent FEPC bill. However, southern senators filibustered and the bill failed. Five states enacted and enforced their own FEPC laws: New York, New Jersey, Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Washington. Finally, in late 1951, Truman established the President’s Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity (PCEEO). Despite these achievements, corporations mainly ignored appeals for change, and the PCEEO did nothing to enforce them. Few corporations voluntarily adopted fairer employment practices. At the core of this disagreement was the rejection of the federal government’s ability to influence in the economy, which executives saw as undermining, rather than serving, the public interest. The belief was that individualistic executives were better able, than bureaucrats and politicians, to build more efficient businesses and liberate human creativity while doing so. At the top of these executives’ agenda, along with the preservation of their managerial autonomy from meddling by
fair employment practices legislation, was attacking the influence of labor unions in the marketplace.

In 1947, Republicans gained a majority in both chambers of Congress and passed the landmark Taft–Hartley Act, a response by the business community to the post-World War II labor upsurge of 1946. The Taft–Hartley Act was seen as a means of demobilizing the labor movement by imposing limits on labor’s ability to strike and boycott, and by prohibiting radicals (socialists, communists, and left wing radicals in general) from joining the leadership of labor unions. Following World War II and the rise of the Soviet Union, many Americans feared that Communism would triumph throughout the entire world and eventually become a direct threat to the U.S. government. The Cold War put labor on the defensive. The rising concern about communism turned out to be a liability for labor radicalism. Radical unions’ leaders came under attack, and became increasingly vulnerable to accusations of anti-patriotism. By 1952, the Republican Party had control of the presidency as well as both houses of Congress. As economic historian Philips-Fein points out, “For the first time in twenty years, friends of business dominated government in Washington.” The effects of this shift in Washington would become evident in the following years. Increasingly anxious to protect labor unions from federal investigation, and to detach themselves from the accusation of acting as agents of a foreign state, leaders of the CIO pushed out radical members who might pose a threat under the current political climate. Driven by the anti-labor Taft-Hartley Act of 1947, the CIO distanced itself from
communists, purged its ranks, and expelled more than 1 million members. In 1955, the more progressive CIO merged with its longtime rival, the AFL, into the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO), a coalition of autonomous labor unions in the United States. While the AFL was founded by socialists, it later adopted a more conservative philosophy of “business unionism” that emphasized unions’ contribution to businesses’ profits and to national economic growth. The business unionist approach also focused on skilled workers’ immediate job-related interests, while ignoring larger political issues. Both the AFL and CIO regarded the Eisenhower administration as essentially antagonistic to the interests of organized labor.

During the McCarthy era, the idea of economic equality became synonymous with disloyalty, subversion or treason. Radicals and activists on the political left tried to expand social and economic citizenship into new areas of American society. New segments of the nation were accused of being communists or communist sympathizers, involved in anti-American activities. During the Eisenhower Administration, the Senate created the Select Committee on Improper Activities in Labor and Management (also known as the McClellan Committee), and directed it to study the extent of criminal or other improper practices within labor unions. The McClellan Committee was also instrumental in the issuing of the Landrum-Griffin Act in 1959, that was designed to regulate the internal affairs of labor unions’.
Labor unions achieved their peak in the mid-1950s – when they represented about one fourth of all workers – and then they fell into a slow but irreversible decline of political and social power.\textsuperscript{149} The decline happened despite the fact that almost two and a half times more Americans joined the labor force between 1965 and 1980 than between 1950 and 1965.\textsuperscript{150} Labor unions that partnered with the Civil Rights organizations in late 1950s and early 1960s were already in decline, and were under attack for communist penetration, under pressure over union leadership corruption allegations, and facing a decline in number of members and political influence. Several forces drove labor unions toward this end, among them the increasing percentage of white-collar workers, who were less interested than manufacturing workers in joining the unions. Although a few unions that represented retail clerks, service employees, and communication workers expanded in the 1960s, most did not.\textsuperscript{151} In addition, many employers moved away from the more unionized Northeast and Midwest to the non-union South and the less unionized West.\textsuperscript{152} Since the 1950s, labor leaders had been showing little interest in representing unskilled and semi-skilled workers, mobilizing low-paid workers, or advancing unions in the South.\textsuperscript{153}

American executives’ efforts to limit unions ran second only to their dislike for antidiscrimination legislation. They claimed such legislation was an intolerable intrusion into the traditional prerogatives of management over hiring, promoting and firing, as well as a direct attack on the authority of corporate executives. They claimed it was a violation of one of the most protected values of American capitalism, the notion of merit and business as
a meritocracy.\textsuperscript{154} According to this notion, the workplace is a color-blind institution. People succeed or fail, are promoted or fired; move up or out, according to the principles of scientific management, a rational technique for efficiency. The labor scholar, David Roediger, who researches the relationship between labor management and the formation of racial identities in the United States, holds the opposite view. Despite the claims of merit as an indisputable value, the history of management in the United States has been an uninterrupted attempt by management to control the workers. Managers explicitly ranked racial groups, both in terms of which type of labor they were best suited for, and in terms of their relative value compared to others. White executives relied on such alleged racial knowledge to manage workers, and believed that the “lesser races” could only benefit from their tutelage. These views were woven into managerial strategies and promoted white supremacy, not only ideologically but also in practical everyday processes used in many workplaces. Even in factories governed by scientific management, the impulse to play the races against each other, and to slot workers into jobs categorized by race, were powerful management tools used to enforce discipline, lower wages, keep workers in dangerous jobs, and undermine working-class solidarity.\textsuperscript{155} The myth of merit at work has never had any substantial foundation; it simply serves to allow executives and businesspeople to maintain control of the workplace.

Despite labor unions’ focus on establishing job rights protected by contracts, the efforts of the federal government and the Civil Rights organizations to end the monopoly of whites on managerial roles, and the exclusion of
African American workers from better jobs, there was a final, epic challenge to employers’ authority, and to their power to hire and promote according to internal, corporate criteria. The history of the slow and imperfect reception of Title VII in labor management remains a testament of the strength and stubbornness of corporate executives in defending their prerogatives.

How affirmative action became the landmark integration policy of the era, rather than fair employment practices legislation, is a remarkable example of unintended consequences. Interests converged between the federal government and Civil Rights groups during the Johnson Administration, in spite of the ideological and moral distance between the liberalism of the time and the marginal reactionary forces of the conservative movement. This is only part of the story; the distance between liberals and conservatives, as far as the governance of capitalism is concerned, was probably shorter than the distance between liberals and Civil Rights leaders, as the events in post-1965 confirm. It was true that liberals aimed to support and protect consumers and promote mass consumption, while conservatives believed in safeguarding producers and encouraging savings. They strongly, vibrantly and at times virulently disagreed with each other on the nature and the moral foundations of compensatory measures. Surprisingly, they did not disagree on a crucial fact - that America may be a land of equal opportunity, but surely not of equal result. The latter would be, to use a catch phrase of that period, “socialism” or worse. Liberals like President Johnson never really agreed with civil rights leaders, such as King, on the fact that capitalism was wrong, and the problems of poverty and minority unemployment might be solved – in
Kind's words - with “public service employment for those less able to compete in the labor market” and income guarantees for those unable to “participate in the job economy.” What King was envisioning was an equality of outputs. In contrast, liberals strongly believed that capitalism was fundamentally sound and only in need of specific reforms and adjustments in order to provide opportunity to everyone. According to scholar Patterson,

The essence of Great Society liberalism was that government had the tools and the resources to help people help themselves. It sought to advance equality of opportunity, not to establish greater equality of social condition.

The system was in place to provide opportunity, and therefore, the right to work was meant to be the right to have the same opportunity as anyone else to be hired, promoted, and obtain a better salary. In other words, there was a vast consensus on what constituted equality in the 1960s. However, for the large majority of the politicians and businesspeople – both conservative and liberal – this meant equality of opportunities not equality of outcome. This is not to say that conservatives and liberals shared the same values, but rather that they emphasized different expressions of the basic tension in the American system between the constitutional guarantees of liberty and equality. Though equal under the law, Americans were conspicuously unequal in many other ways, the most obvious being inequality of income. According to Judith Shklar, a political philosopher, income is – together with voting – one of the twin pillars of American citizenship. Consequently, work was the main road to a better life, including more social options, better benefits, and more economic security. It was also the gateway to the American dream,
that is, the belief that those who work hard and honestly, whatever their status, could provide themselves with a better future, and increase the prospects of their children. Capitalism was not supposed to reduce the gap between the “have’s” and the “have not’s” because this gap reflects differences in effort and innate skill – according to conservatives – or different advantages and disadvantages of birth – according to liberals. Nobody was supposed to correct this gap, according to conservatives; government was eventually supposed to do so, according to liberals. A crucial premise of liberalism, in fact, was that Americans did not all start at more or less the same place, and therefore, do not share the same opportunities to succeed in life. In other words, not everyone has the same chance to succeed, that is, to get a job, to be promoted, to increase his or her salary. Not everyone fails on his or her own merits. This leads to various forms of economic inequality: employment inequality, career inequality, income inequality. That’s why there is a permanent tension between the desire to honor excellence and the need to protect the disadvantaged. However, this line of thought, when accepted, quite inevitably led to the inadequacies of the color-blind fair employment strategy, and the demand for proportional, preferential employment policies. This was the logic on which affirmative action was based.

In July 1965, President Johnson suddenly seemed to be moving beyond the original goal and promises of the Great Society, that is, equality of opportunity, and endorsing equality of results.
You do not wipe away the scars of centuries by saying: Now you are free to go where you want, and do as you desire, and choose the leaders as you please. You do not take a person who, for years, has been hobbled by chains and liberate him, bring him up to the starting line and then say, ‘You are free to compete with all of the others,’ and still justly believe that you have been completely fair.

Declaring this to be the next and more profound stage of the battle for Civil Rights, the president declared before his audience at Howard University in his commencement address that

It is not enough just to open the gates of opportunity. All our citizens must have the ability to walk through those gates … We seek not just freedom but opportunity. We seek not just legal equality but human ability, not just equality as a right and a theory but equality as a fact and equality as a result.¹⁵⁹

Two months later, he issued Executive Order No. 11246, which stated that contractors should

Take affirmative action to ensure that applicants are employed, and that employees are treated during employment, without regard to their race, color, religion, sex (as amended in 1967), or national origins.¹⁶⁰

What exactly did President Johnson mean in his speech at Howard University? Did he really envision racial equality as equality of result, or was his aim to remove racial discrimination and provide equality of opportunity? He envisioned the latter. However, the law itself did not appear to clarify these questions.¹⁶¹ The problem was that Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act proclaimed preferential treatment and quotas illegal; however, as Hugh Davis Graham has pointed out, how would affirmative action have been possible without preferences or quotas?²¹⁶² The EEOC lacked the resources to process individual complaints – which by April 1966 were more than
5,000, rising to 77,000 by 1975. Chaired by Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jr., the former president’s son, the agency became receptive to alternative options. Two months after the EEOC began work, the labor secretary of the NAACP called on the commission to investigate “the entire southern textile manufacturing industry.” The new agency received 869 complaints from North Carolina, the industry’s center. These complaints forced the EEOC to conduct its first public hearing in Charlotte, North Carolina in January 1967, on the textile industry which was by far the largest manufacturing employer in the South. In the same year, the Office of Federal Contract Compliance (OFCC), established a year before within the Labor Department, chose ten large textile companies for a pilot program to enforce equal employment among government contractors.

The EEOC dispatched racial reporting forms to all the employers and unions under its jurisdiction, collected the forms, created a massive data center on racial patterns of employment, and used these statistics to deduce discriminatory acts rather than investigating individual complaints of discrimination. Thanks to these statistics the agency was able to pressure companies and whole industries. Gradually, affirmative action shifted from a public policy to protect individuals from discrimination, to correcting the effects of past racial discrimination against minority groups. In 1968, President Johnson issued an executive order to request federal contractors to recruit and hire qualified minority job applicants; the same year the Labor Department elaborated on Executive Order No. 11246 and demanded that major contractors prepare ethnic censuses of potential workers, develop
“specific goals and timetables for the prompt achievement of full and equal employment opportunity,” and adopt a “written affirmative action compliance program.” As James Patterson has noted,

There were guidelines that still focused on enhancing employment opportunity for disadvantaged individuals. They did not establish quotas for groups, and they were yet to be implemented. Still, a trend toward governmental enforcement of equal rights seemed clear.\textsuperscript{166}

Only slowly did the outlines and implications of affirmative action become evident over the next decade or so.\textsuperscript{167}

Nixon, a Republican with a more liberal record on Civil Rights and black support than Adlai Stevenson or John Kennedy in the 1950s, began surfing the waves of partisan realignment, as liberal-conservative political lines became simply unsustainable. Historian of Civil Rights Movement David Chappell argues that:

Nixon’s political masterstroke was affirmative action. Initiated by LBJ and strongly supported by M.L. King, the policy was soon abandoned by LBJ because it clearly violated the 1964 Civil Rights act.\textsuperscript{168}

Historian Katznelson adds that during the Nixon administration, action against specific, intentional acts of discrimination was supplanted by policies that gave advantages, even actual points, to membership in a specific racial group. Compensatory policies were adopted where black individuals could be chosen even if white applicants had more appropriate qualifications judged by customary measures.\textsuperscript{169}
The Nixon administration also enforced the Philadelphia Plan, first drafted by Department of Labor in 1967, which required that minority workers in the construction trades be hired in proportion to their percentage in the local labor force. The goals were modest: the percentage of minority employees affected by the Philadelphia Plan was projected to begin at four to six percent for the employer's 1970 work force, and increase to a high of 20 percent in each trade after four years. All were to be hired to only fill new vacancies; no white workers were to be displaced. Nevertheless, the white backlash against government bureaucracies, Civil Rights, and race relations skyrocketed. Construction unions and contractors joined forces to oppose what they called “reverse discrimination.” The Philadelphia Plan was instrumental in reaching the ultimate goal of the Nixon administration was to generate a split between labor unions and Civil Rights leaders. However, the Philadelphia Plan also created little progress for black workers. An increasing percentage of whites started to believe that affirmative action meant quotas, and quotas exceeded equal opportunity. As events in the following years showed, Americans became increasingly less sympathetic to the “rights narrative,” the demand of rights-conscious groups for the “right” to economic equality, employment, or special entitlements. And yet, the 1970s were marked by an increasing adoption of the affirmative action. In *Griggs v. Duke Power Company* in 1971, for example, the Supreme Court found that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 applied not only to intentional acts of job discrimination but also to recruitment procedures. The decision marked an important constitutional turning point because it shifted the burden of proof
from individuals to employers. In the 1970s, the United States became a more racially inclusive and less equalitarian society.

However, the government became less committed in correcting cases of job discrimination. The resistance from contractors and unions to integration in the workplace continued, and government did little to correct it. The Nixon administration blocked adequate funding, and also blocked the enforcement powers for the EEOC and the OFCC. In 1972, the entire New York regional OFCC office consisted of three people. The same year, *The New York Times* reported that “no public construction project anywhere in the country has even been cancelled because of civil-rights violations, as required under Federal law, although dozens of courts have documented violations.” During the presidential election, more than one in two union households voted for Nixon’s re-election. The appointment of Peter Brennan, who had previously been the president of both the Building and Construction Trades Council of Greater New York and the Building and Construction Trades Council of New York, and a strong opponent of affirmative action measures to increase the number of minority construction workers, as Secretary of Labor, was the culmination of a political turnaround.

Although in the Sixties the federal government remained a major player in fighting job discrimination, its goal gradually shifted. In the early 1960s the primary focus of its strategy for racial integration in the workplace was fair employment. Later on the political discourse became more militant and aggressive, and ultimately turned the color-blind, universal intent of the Civil
Rights Movement, and of the Civil Right Act, into color-conscious policies promoting court-sanctioned affirmative action to achieve legislation covering and prosecuting job discrimination. Initially, the unusual character of the policy regime governing the regulation of affirmative action was not openly quota-driven but ultimately became a sort of preferential treatment.

**Preferential Treatment and Black Power**

Despite increasing job opportunities made available through the military and the federal government in the 1940s, it was thought that a disciplined attack designed to finally reach economic equality was possible. However, loyalty to the country during wartime was more important than racial advancement. This made grass-roots participation and aggressive social actions in matters involving employment opportunities be perceived as illegal, or at least inappropriate and unpatriotic. The trend continued after the war, because economic advancement and the fear of being discredited as a communist during the McCarthy era had convinced black leaders to avoid direct action, to distance themselves from protests and radicalism, and to dissociate themselves from Marxists, communists and radical black leaders on the left politically. The responsibility to fight voting segregation in the South and employment and housing discrimination in the North was based on the litigation and lobbying skills of the NAACP. By 1953, twelve states and thirty cities had adopted fair employment laws of varying effectiveness. The 381 days of the Montgomery bus boycott and the final victory of Martin Luther King, Jr., and his Montgomery Improvement Association was a huge turnaround, instrumental in moving the fight for Civil Rights from the
courtrooms into the streets. The Montgomery struggle demonstrated the unlimited possibilities of “organized collective action as an effective agent of social change.”

More importantly, increasing racial consciousness, combined with a new assertiveness among activists, gave additional prominence to boycotts and protests as viable Civil Rights strategies. The events in Montgomery became the blueprint for a series of local social protests and grassroots activism that became instrumental in promoting job opportunities for black workers. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, a variety of organizations were working actively to fight job discrimination and promote fair employment. CORE relaunched the “Don’t Buy Where You Can’t Work” campaign of the Depression, boycotting employers in North Carolina, California, and New York, and urged them to hire black workers. In Philadelphia, the Reverend Leon Sullivan of the Zion Baptist Church recognized the limitations of addressing job discrimination primarily through legislation, and in 1958 promoted campaigns based on “selective patronage.” Inspired by the sit-ins in the South, Sullivan and his clergy allies envisioned programs to increase economic justice, organized boycotts against Sunoco-Gas, Breyer’s Ice Cream, and Tastykakes, and demanded these companies to hire a number of blacks in specific roles. The threat of boycotts was the top reason companies were hiring African Americans into traditionally white jobs, according to Jack Gourlay. He wrote a guide at that time to help companies deal with “Negro demonstrations and boycotts.” There was no reason, he concluded in his guide, to think your company could avoid a boycott. In 1959, protestors
who walked a picket line outside of Brandt’s Liquors on 145th Street in Harlem aspired to open up jobs in a predominantly black neighborhood. Like the “Don’t Buy Where You Can’t Work” campaigns of the 1930s, these protesters boycotted white-owned retailers that were restricting black liquor salesmen to designated establishments. Northern CORE chapters began adopting selective patronage’s boycott techniques in the early 1960s. In 1961, CORE activists mounted a boycott of Brooklyn’s Sealtest Dairy. A year later, Ebinger’s Bakery was the target of a boycott. These boycotts were very similar to the selective patronage program developed in Philadelphia. In 1962, King’s S.C.L.C. established Breadbasket in Atlanta based on the same principles, and supported strikes and protests across the entire South. The National Urban League focused on employment development, job training and placement, and in 1963, instituted its National Skills Bank in Los Angeles that trained workers and developed their skills for jobs in industry. Another function of the Skills Bank was to build a list of skilled negroes and members of other minority groups and give local employers access to these lists.

In the 1960s, while organizations that preferred a legal or political approach to Civil Rights abhorred protests in the streets, more assertive organizations adopted consumer boycotts as a weapon for activists who demanded employers change their hiring practices. Boycotts and protests were pursuing color-conscious employment policies, employment based upon race, not just fair employment practices. Often the same moderate civil rights leaders, who pursued color-blind antidiscrimination policies in Washington in alliance with liberals and unions, showed their more radical inclination toward direct
action though boycotts and protest. While they assumed a moderate stance and sought to gain fair employment for all, they also militantly demanded jobs for blacks. Their ambiguity was rooted in frustration with the federal government and self-proclaimed progressive political and business leaders, who had demonstrated in the recent past nothing more than a rhetorical commitment to equal employment opportunity. Although consumer boycotts remained color-conscious vehicles of integration, their goals shifted during the 1960s. What started as a Civil Rights campaign to expand employment opportunities for African Americans by forcing employers to adopt nondiscrimination practices, quickly became a form of affirmative action. In fact, boycotters based their specific color conscious hiring requests upon the concept of preference. Then, in order to quantify their demands, Civil Rights activists instituted a criteria of flexible racial proportionalism. An increase in the employment of racial minorities was seen as a demonstration of good will, the adoption of nondiscrimination practices as a new beginning, and in the case of a more demanding request, that is, a specific numbers of hires that leading to more substantive racial integration in the workplace. This could lead finally to compensatory hiring. In other words, result-oriented strategies for promoting racially conscious hiring and promotion practices might end in preferential treatment, quotas, or compensatory action as compensation for past discrimination.

The transition from color-blind policies to color-conscious strategies accelerated in August 1965 with the eruption of violence in the Los Angeles community of Watts. Hundreds of riots followed. When the Department of
Justice’s community relations field staff investigated the reasons for these disorders, unemployment, under-employment and low-pay emerged as main sources of anger. Civil Rights leaders such as Randolph and King both recommended that President Johnson “make work available for those in the ghetto” and to “provide a job for every person who needs work,” that is, full employment. Very soon, after the Watts riots however, the racial revolution exploded. Between 1965 and 1968, records show 250 African Americans died, more than 8,000 were wounded, and some 50,000 were arrested in the nearly 300 race riots that took place. After Watts, the west side of Chicago erupted in August 1965. A year later, National Guard troops protected the streets of Chicago, Cleveland, Dayton, Milwaukee and San Francisco. In 1967, violence erupted in Boston, Buffalo, Cincinnati, New Haven, Providence, Wilmington, Cambridge, Maryland, and hundreds of other cities. Sitkoff notes that “Ghetto blacks rioted to enter the mainstream of,” American society. “They rioted to protest the pervasiveness and depth of white racism.” At the same time, Civil Rights organizations such as CORE and the SNCC changed their leadership – respectively with Floyd McKissick and Stokely Carmichael – and transformed their primary goal from desegregation to self-determination. In the post-1965 era, color-conscious employment policies were considered moderate, and historically linked to the right for fair employment practices, while the purpose of boycotts shifted to self-determination. An increasing number of activists, organizations, and communities began engaging in grassroots activities that empowered black communities and gave them control of their own destiny.
As Stokely Carmichael put it, “Power is the only thing respected in this world, and we must get it at any cost.”\textsuperscript{186} Black militants in radical groups came to see boycotts and protests as the means for mobilizing black communities and developing a non-capitalist economic structure. Black activists in more moderate organizations came to recognize boycotts and protests as vehicles for promoting economic development and building black capitalism.

During the Nixon Administration, a short but unambiguous convergence of interests between black capitalism and pro-business conservatism emerged, as black separatism and white conservatism joined together around the idea of economic self-determination. While black militants and activists saw self-determination as an expression of racial pride, all-black institutions, and economic independence, white conservatives associated it with ideals of self-reliance, private enterprise, and individualism. In short, black capitalism and affirmative action (regardless of whatever notion of “proportion” it ended adopting), played down the importance of integration and color-blind strategies, and replaced nondiscrimination and anti-poverty programs as effective strategies to promote racial coexistence.

**Conclusion**

The late scholar Manning Marable famously noted that the Civil Rights movement lacked a clear and concise economic agenda.\textsuperscript{187} However, at least as far as employment is concerned, this opinion goes too far. During the two critical decades of the 1950s and 1960s, an articulate set of strategies and
activities which included a wide range of activities including alliances with labor unions, protests and boycotts against private businesses, the formation of partnerships with the federal government. Other methods that were pursued included application of pressure on the government, civil rights activism to the promotion of federal legislation with the goal of more and better jobs to black workers. These efforts were instrumental in promoting federal government action and ultimately resulted in anti-discrimination laws, in particular, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, and other manifestations of affirmative action. Affirmative action legislation in 1965 permanently changed the legal landscape of the workplace. Initially promoted by the Johnson Administration and modified by other interested parties inside and outside the government, affirmative action primarily promoted the “right to work” by changing hiring policies, and consequently increasing the concrete chances for African Americans to be less discriminated against. Through these acts of “corrective justice,” affirmative action was practically able to increase the opportunity for gaining fair employment by minorities.188

However, instead of lauding the federal government’s commitment to promoting the reforms of the hiring and promotion practices they had always considered essential, Civil Rights leaders lamented what they then considered a failure. They criticized the Johnson Administration for having turned its attention to the Vietnam War and abandoned the poor, the unemployed, and the underemployed, and as a result, these Civil Rights leaders were in turn treated by Johnson with increasing distance and mistrust. King, in particular, fully embraced the goal of full employment and felt frustrated when he
realized, in the last two years of his life, that his concern was not shared by
the Johnson Administration. Surely King was right to be disappointed, as
Johnson had several times openly spoken about full employment as a
practical possibility. And yet King was wrong, because in their pursuit of full
employment, liberals and President Johnson believed that full employment
comes naturally with economic growth, while the eventual surplus generated
by growth may be allocated in order to offer opportunities to those whom
capitalism had failed. Johnson did not plan to interfere with the internal
dynamics of capitalism, but rather to focus on economic growth. It was
social progress without the specific intent to reform capitalism.

The federal government never really believed in regulating corporate
organizations and the restructuring of capitalism but did emphasize
influencing the economic cycle. Although they misunderstood the intention
of the government in managing the economy, King and other Civil Rights
leaders correctly recognized the limitations of addressing job discrimination
primarily through legislation. Civil rights leaders promoted campaigns and
programs to increase economic justice, such as Breadbasket, and supported
strikes and protests such as the garbage workers in Memphis, Tennessee,
where King was eventually assassinated. The criticism from Marable and
others fails to recognize the immense amount of progress made by the work
of Civil Rights leaders in pressuring the federal government to expand its
efforts for the urban poor and the economically disadvantaged, as well as to
pressure the business community to open the job market to minorities.
The reform of the job market and the regulation of discrimination practices in the workplace was a result of the failures of acclimated alliances and unintended consequences of legislation issued by the federal government in the 1960s. The alliance between Civil Rights leaders and labor unions, the latter already in decline, in transition from a strictly liberal orthodoxy to two-party political dynamics, did not help. Not surprisingly, the struggle between preferential treatment and fair employment as the most effective strategy to deliver more and better jobs to black workers ended with the success of the former, although in unpredictable way. Unlike boycotts and protests, preferential treatment became a piece of federal legislation, instigating a profound shift in American law and culture that greatly accelerated workplace integration, with implications far beyond what even the Civil Rights leaders, themselves, had imagined. It is also interesting that, despite the classical, color-blind narrative empathetically embraced by the Civil Rights movement and, especially by Dr. King, it was in effect, a color-conscious strategy that ultimately succeeded, both on the legislative floor and in the streets. Approaching workplace integration from a color-conscious perspective, Civil Rights leaders found a common ground not only with liberals and the federal government, but also with the most moderate wing of the Black Freedom Movement.
Chapter Two: Breadbasket in Atlanta (1962-66)

Introduction

Breadbasket was officially founded in Atlanta in 1962 to “negotiate a more equitable employment practice.” It was modeled after a selective patronage program developed four years earlier in Philadelphia. Leon Sullivan, a Baptist minister, started boycotts of various businesses that did not hire blacks. In affiliation with other ministers, he referred to this practice as “Selective Patronage.” When The New York Times and Fortune magazine brought the program to greater public attention on a national scale, it came to the attention of Martin Luther King. In October 1962, King brought Sullivan to Atlanta to meet local ministers and discuss adopting the program. He hoped that Atlanta’s ministers could replicate what Sullivan and his colleagues had done in Philadelphia. Breadbasket emerged from that meeting. Its mission was to “negotiate a more equitable employment practice” on behalf of African Americans. The organization was successful in Atlanta as well as in Georgia, and by 1967 had won 5,000 jobs, equal to $22 million a year in new income for the black community.

In this chapter, the initial successes of the program in Georgia are framed as part of what historian David L. Chappell has recently describes as “something called Prophetic religion.” Chappell has defined “Prophetic
religion” narrowly, identifying it with (a few) prophetic black leaders who rejected classic liberalism based on voluntary, gradual progress, and the spread of education and economic development. God’s will would undo the evils of segregation and disfranchisement. These prophetic Civil Rights leaders often rebelled against the duly constituted leaders of their denominations and displayed public contempt for worldly comforts, recognition and “success,” which were the source of inspiration for their followers, the hidden force for solidarity and self-sacrifice.

The first phase of Breadbasket is the history of prophetic figures who assumed the same posture as the Hebrew prophets (“speaking truth to power”, so to speak), shared the same pessimism about the general purpose of the institutions of the society in which they served, and showed the same skepticism about society’s pretensions to justice. They did not merely attack the culture of their oppressors, they separated themselves from that culture and society – including their families, and their Baptist fellows. Standing apart from one’s own community is crucial to the prophetic life. Not surprisingly, it is a religious practice that situates people in the world and yet maintains those people as separate from the world. Prophets are in the world but do not belong to the world (John 17:11-16). Finally, these clergymen understood that Prophetic religion is contrapuntal. Prophetic religion accompanies religious crisis as it locates itself at the limes, at the border of time and space. It appears during crisis, in periods of transition from one era to another. It is a religion of prophets, a church of charismatic ministry.
**Origins of Breadbasket**

At 11 am, on Thursday, May 19, 1966, Reverend J.E. Ross stood up before the members of the local chapter of the S.C.L.C. Breadbasket. The group was composed of black ministers – Rev. D.H. Jackson, host of the meeting; Rev. G.D. Grier, Jr., Rev. Otis Smith, Rev. E.P. Yorpp, Rev. B.W. Chambers, Rev. E.M. Davis, Rev. Ralph M. Allen, Rev. Fred C. Lofton, Rev. C.M. Alexander, Rev. J. C. Ward, Rev. J.P. Collins, Rev. M.B. Jordan, Rev. P. Harold Fray, Rev. Howard Creecy Sr., Rev. Fred Bennette, and of course, Rev. Ross – the only exception being Ms. E.T. Kehrer, Southern Director for the AFL-CIO Civil Rights Department. The meeting was at the Gaines Chappell African Methodist Episcopal (A.M.E.) Church of Waycross, a nice little church with a facade of red bricks that exudes an air of antiquity and character. Located in the southern part of the small town – less than 10,000 residents, more than half African Americans – in South Georgia, the church was in the countryside, surrounded by few buildings, not far from downtown. Reverend Ross lived the opposite side of town, exactly two miles away. Most of the other ministers were from Atlanta and small cities in Georgia, including Augusta, Albany, Columbus and Macon. Every two weeks, the group of pastors in charge of Breadbasket reunited in a church in a different city in Georgia. This peripatetic behavior was quite unusual for clergymen, and definitely added a special flavor to their ministry. In fact, the black preachers worked at the local level, as well as at the level of the individual community church, as they operated closest to their people in this way. They preferred to concentrate on their local parish rather than at the
level of larger constituencies. When they committed time and energy in building and maintaining a bigger project, they normally devoted only a fraction of their time to it.\textsuperscript{196} That is why the preachers involved in Breadbasket were a unique group, bound together due to their special calling through this project.

They all stood up, ready to begin their devotions with \textit{What a Friend We Have in Jesus}.\textsuperscript{197} On this particular day, Reverend Ross proposed a departure from the classic text. He proposed lyrics he had written to be sung to the tune of \textit{What a Friend We Have in Jesus}, instead of the conventional lyrics. The lyrics, a less a sentimental hymn, was a hymn to beg Jesus to provide merciful relief to a son and mother who were living apart.\textsuperscript{198} Gone was the comforting tone of the hymn. The new text was a little more bitter and militant. It mentioned words like “army,” “fighting,” “enemies,” and “kill,” although metaphorically.\textsuperscript{199} The music was still in the original key of F Major, but the new text had changed the general feeling of the song. “Citizens we have come together – the group started – Something we have to understand.” The hymn resounded in the chapel for a few minutes, and slowly, the group completed its task. “We must work to kill the mean crimes. For we must inherit this land.” After this last call for commitment and engagement, the group took a seat.

First, Rev. Ross led the whole group in prayer. Then, he led the group in singing, “What a Fellowship.” Once again the walls of the church resounded with prayer and praise. This time the tone was peaceful and hopeful. “What a
fellowship, what a joy divine, leaning on the everlasting arms; what blessedness, what a peace is mine, leaning on the everlasting arms.” At the end, the group stood in silence, waiting for the service to continue. Next was the reading of the first verse of Psalm 133, followed by a reading from the Scriptures. Following the reading from the Scriptures, they sang a hymn universally known as a blessings of brotherly unity, “Behold, how good and how pleasant it is / for brethren to dwell together in unity!” The verse is often quoted in Latin to express the sense of brotherhood, unity and community. Ecce quam bonum et quam jucundum habitare fratres in unum. As the Biblical scholar Dummerlow points out, the hymn is an exquisite gem, “describing the blessings of unity was especially suitable as a Pilgrim Song, when rich and poor, priest and peasant would fraternize on their pilgrimage to Jerusalem.” Most biblical commentaries point out that “brethren” is usually understood as referring to our relatives, which it does; but it also can be used to describe a group of people with something special in common. Why is unity among a group of people so important? Why is unity among believers so important? Because theologically it supposes a covenant, a nation of “brothers” that worship together in Jerusalem.

After blessing the brotherly unity in the church, the pastors then celebrated their unity of intent. They sang the militant hymn, “Citizens that have come together,” and prepared their minds and bodies for the possibility of redemptive sufferance, after having prayed and worshipped the Lord together, making His presence as tangible and evident as it could be. After having celebrated the joy of divine fellowship together, and shared the feeling
of a blessed election; after all that, reading the first verse of Psalm 133, surely helped the group of pastors show the depth of their commitment, as well as confirming the bonds that bound them together. They were thus encouraged to embark on the next step of their campaign for economic justice on earth. In the first part of their meeting at Gaines Chapel African Methodist Episcopal Church of Waycross, the pastors reaffirmed their call to ministry through worship, prayer and hymns.

At that point, the “call man,” Reverend G.D. Grier, Jr., of Fort Street Methodist Church in Atlanta, was asked to chair the group. In the simple organization of S.C.L.C. Breadbasket, the “call man” played a key-role. He was the chairman of the meeting. Breadbasket was a program established by the S.C.L.C. to fight job discrimination against African Americans. Its goal was initially to promote equal employment opportunities for African-American workers in Atlanta. It then focused on expanding its operations throughout the whole state of Georgia. The program mobilized buying campaigns to force businesses and corporations to hire minorities.

The idea of Breadbasket came to King and his aides as a confluence of two events. The first was a conference in Macon, Georgia organized by Fisk University (Nashville, Tennessee) that was meant to answer questions that came up as a result of the new governmental regulations in employment, and second, Reverend Leon Sullivan’s highly successful “Selective Patronage Program” in Philadelphia, a boycott campaign focusing on creating more and better jobs for black people. On March 6, 1961, President John F. Kennedy
signed Executive Order 10925, requiring government contractors to “take affirmative action [emphasized in the original text] to ensure that applicants are employed, and that employees are treated during employment, without regard to their race, creed, color, or national origin.” It also established the President’s Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity (CEEO), an agency created to prevent racial discrimination by corporations holding government contracts. President John F. Kennedy appointed Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson as chairman of this agency, as well as having Johnson act as leader for other agencies. The attorney general, Robert F. Kennedy, and the secretary of labor, Arthur Goldberg, were also members of the CEEO. The committee was an experimental body, the first official federal commission to address racial discrimination in the workplace; later it became the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) as established by the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Among the CEEO’s activities, two programs created the highest expectations: Plans for Progress, an agreement with 85 firms holding government contracts, and Plans for Fair Practices, a pact with 117 international unions and 300 local AFL-CIO affiliates. Plans for Progress was the brainchild of Robert Troutman, an attorney and President Kennedy’s close friend from Atlanta. The idea was to win the active support of a list of large corporations for ending racial discrimination in hiring practices. Kennedy seemed enthusiastic about the plan. “I think this can be one of the most important things we will be able to do this term,” he wrote to his vice president.
The anti-discrimination rules stated by this Executive Order immediately influenced government contractors and subcontractors. They were requested to not “discriminate against any employee or applicant for employment because of race, creed, color, or national origin.” The contractors had consequently the responsibility to take affirmative action with regard to employment, upgrading, demotion or transfer; recruitment or recruitment advertising; layoff or termination; rates of pay or other forms of compensation; and selection for training, including apprenticeship. The contractor also had to agree to post notices setting forth the provisions of this nondiscrimination clause, educate employees that all qualified applicants will receive consideration for employment without regard to race, creed, color or national origin, send each labor union or representative of workers a copy of this notice and advise employees of the contractor’s commitments under this section. Employers were obligated to post copies of the notice in conspicuous places available to employees and applicants for employment. Sanctions and penalties for the contractor’s non-compliance with the nondiscrimination clauses of this Executive Order were clearly stated: government contracts may be cancelled in whole or in part and the contractor may be declared ineligible for further government contracts.205

One of the immediate effects of the Executive Order was the proliferation in various sections of the country of agencies that contacted with companies holding federal government contracts, offering assistance to executives in desegregating their working forces. A Quaker organization with offices in Atlanta, the American Friends Service Committee, was one of those agencies
offering assistance in applying the new executive order. It also offered other services to corporate clients, including a list of highly skilled candidates for jobs in companies that had adopted a policy of employment solely based on merit, regardless of race. “We note – informed a letter from the Committee – that some companies … have had and are having difficulty in finding qualified applicants,” which is why the Committee was contacting the Personnel Departments of these companies, making referrals of black job candidates ready to be employed in skilled, technical, and professional jobs. The Committee was in touch with counselors and placement officers in colleges and high schools, and tapped in to an extensive network of key persons and organizations in the black community. Assistance to those companies was free of charge. “We seek neither financial remuneration nor publicity for our services. We offer them because we are convinced of the basic morality and economic validity of employing people on the basis of their ability to perform rather than upon the basis of their race, religion, or place or origin.”

While the interest around the potential effects of the Executive Order was rising, Fisk University (Nashville, Tennessee) decided to organize a Working Conference on Equal Job Opportunities in Macon, Georgia, in order to answer the growing number of questions that were arising as a result of the new governmental regulations related to employment. “Getting the Job Done,” was the title of the conference sponsored by the Georgia Council on Human Relations and the American Friends Service Committee and under the direction of Dr. Vivian W. Henderson, professor at the Department of
Economics at Fisk University. The conference took place exactly a year after President Kennedy’s Executive Order. The keynote speaker was John I. Binkley, Director of Education, President's Committee on Equal Employment Opportunities. The last part of the conference was dedicated to the new opportunities available to companies hiring in private businesses outside of government contracting. Among the participants were representatives of the National and the Atlanta Urban League, Morehouse College, and Atlanta University. The S.C.L.C. took note of the conference and compiled a list of the federal government contractors in Atlanta, Georgia. The list consisted of about 20 names, including Lockheed Aircraft (in Marietta, Georgia), Henry C. Beck Construction for Power, AAA Electric Construction and Engineering, William B. Corbin Table Food Preparation, among others.

The “Selective Patronage Program” was initiated in Philadelphia by black ministers a year before the Executive Order. It was established to create more and better jobs for black people, beginning locally and then on a national scale. The “Selective Patronage Program” created innovative methods based on the classic boycott tactic which blossomed in the mid-Thirties. While traditional boycott methods in the “Selective Patronage Program” had been directed against all white merchants, in Philadelphia it was directed at only one company at a time. Since March 1960, when the program started, over 20 companies had been affected and more than 1,000 new white-collar jobs for black people had been won. Ministers groups in Baltimore, Detroit, Atlantic City, Boston, Providence, New Haven,
Chattanooga, Wilmington, and Atlanta had started selective consumer campaigns in the months following the campaign in March, 1960. The program was considered successful as it had forced several companies to hire and promote black employees. For the most part, the ministers found that fighting more than one company in an industry unnecessary. The others learned by example.299 The pastors were more concerned about the quality of the jobs than their number, and were battling to win what they called “sensitive jobs,” junior executive and supervisory posts. Besides, more qualified black people had applied for qualified jobs after the boycott had started, and shown more confidence in their skills and competences.

In March 1960, fifteen black ministers met in Philadelphia and decided that the permanent unemployment of young black people was creating a situation of emergency and required immediate action. The black clergy decided to enlist black buying power in the fight for jobs.210 Leon Sullivan would argue later that “thousands of Negro boys and girls were walking the streets of Philadelphia, unable to obtain jobs, but white boys and girls who had graduated from the same high schools were working.” In an interview with The New York Times two years later, Leon Sullivan remembered the genesis of the program: “some of us were picketing the five-and-ten to support the lunch counter sit-ins in the South, when we realized that the North and East had problems that were just as acute.”211 In May 1960, a few months later, 400 ministers in Philadelphia started persuading one company after another to employ and up-grade the jobs of more black people in their employ. Boycotting one company after the other, the ministers believed, would make
things simple and no protestor, pastor, or even target, would be confused. It was a change from the old strategy, as previously boycotts had encompassed entire business districts. Black leaders had adopted boycotts to force businesses in Southern cities to employ black people and desegregate store facilities. Another main difference between the Philadelphia boycott and the previous campaigns in the South resided in its technique. There was no need to march or hold sit-ins or other public demonstrations, and consequently, it was less likely to lead to violence and police action.

Ministers in Philadelphia called their campaign of persuasion “Selective Patronage Program.” This program consisted of three phases. In the first phase, a delegation of ministers, about four and five, called on whatever company the group of pastors decided to approach and politely inquired how many black people were employed and in what jobs. The management of the company then released this information, but the ministers had already gathered the information, unofficially. The information was usually provided by people inside the company. To make their work easier, the ministers addressed one industry at the time. In this way, they were able to collect the information, compare the different corporate employment policies, the total number of employees, and the number of the black employees. They could investigate how many black workers were employed in each department, and compare the salaries earned by a white worker with the salary earned by a black employee. The first meeting was always exploratory, but after a week or two a second meeting was requested. It was at this second meeting that ministers became specific about what they wanted. According to the
ministers, the initial request was merely a way for the company to show its concern and commitment for race equality. The ministers set a date for their request to be met and asked for assurances that nondiscriminatory policies would be enforced. At this point, the corporate management was left alone to decide how it preferred to deal with the requests. Executives could decide to accept the requests and hire the new black employees or argue that these new hires were really not needed, and complain that the company already had tens or hundreds of black employees. In this second case, the clergy would move from negotiation to protest. After explaining the discouraging situation of black employment, ministers urged their parishioners to start selective buying tactics against that company.

The boycott itself proceeded in two or three phases, according to the level of resistance of the executives to the requests of the clergy. The first phase involved a simple announcement from pulpits by the ministers making the requests, suggesting use of the selective patronage tactics against that company. This phase normally lasted three weeks. The second phase, usually lasting two weeks, was marked by stronger urging from the pulpit coupled with wider community participation. Signs were placed in beauty and barber shops, and in some cities like Atlanta, also in social and civic clubs. The third and final phase involved the use of hand-outs and other publicity devices. It was at this point that the maximum cooperation of the black community was reached.
The first company to be targeted by ministers in Philadelphia with the Selective Patronage Movement was Tastykake, a Philadelphia-based bakery still in existence today. The boycott lasted a single summer and seriously hurt Tastykake. The company depended on the sales generated by changes in people’s diets in the summer and kids out of school. Blacks made up 20% of Philadelphia's population and Tastykake’s executives could not deny they needed that 20% of the local market to stay afloat. To end the boycott, the management agreed to meet the demands set by Sullivan and his colleagues. These demands included hiring African-Americans as drivers and white collars to work in office positions. The second company to be targeted was Tasty Baking Company, a bakery that sold cakes and pies. In the summer of 1960, a delegation of ministers, lead by Rev. Leon Sullivan asked the management to hire two black salesmen, two black clerical workers, and three to four young black women in the icing department, where the workers had traditionally been all white. Not surprisingly, at Tasty Baking the salaries for the sales and office jobs were higher than in the other parts of the organization and in traditionally all-white departments. Mr. Pass and Mr. Kaiser, the personnel manager and the president of the company, respectively, tried unsuccessfully to explain that the Tasty Baking Company already had hundreds of black employees, and there was no need for more salesmen or clerical workers. The pastors made it clear, politely but firmly, that they hoped these people could be hired within two weeks. The new employees suggested by the ministers were not hired within two weeks, and the pastors told their congregations not to buy any products from Tasty
Baking Company until further notice. The boycott lasted two months and was a source of social pressure and economic difficulty for the company. Printed advertisements suddenly appeared in coffee bars, beauty parlors and barbershops. In the end, the company employed two black salesmen, two clerical workers, and a few young women in the ice department.\textsuperscript{215}

In the Fall, a delegation of the Selective Patronage Program contacted the Pepsi-Cola Company. Negotiations were in place in September, but in this case, the management felt manipulated and decided to resist. On October 2, a boycott was called for from 400 pulpits. Two days later, the spokesman of the delegation received a telegram stating that Pepsi-Cola had already hired the requested black people. The boycott was actually called off two weeks later, because it was a policy of the ministers not to end a boycott until the new employees were actually at work. In December 1960, during the period of peak usage of heating oil, Gulf Oil was cautiously approached by Rev. Joshua E. Licorish, of Zion Methodist Church, the spokesman for a delegation of the Selective Patronage Program. The management showed no interest in meeting with the delegation. After three weeks, with no appointment having been arranged, a boycott of Gulf products was called for on Sunday. The day after, clients started calling the switchboards at Gulf and asking to cancel their oil contracts. The corporate management immediately displayed an efficient damage control plan. The requests were accepted, candidates were interviewed and the entire hiring process was complete in a week. The reaction of the management was instantaneous and so amazingly efficient that the whole boycott lasted only a week.
And yet, this was not the end of the story. To avoid possible retaliations against the new employees, the ministers included a without-cause clause in the contract to protect new employees from potentially being laid off. This clause was part of the stipulation between the ministers and the management. However, union officials saw this clause as conflicting with seniority provisions in Gulf’s union contract. Union officials met with the ministers and explained that they were sympathetic with their aims but not when they collided with union bargaining. A first attempt to compromise was to ask the new employees to join the union. Three black truck drivers had been hired and after 30 days they joined the union. However, this was not enough to avoid the collision between the ministers and the union officers. The union representatives made it abundantly clear that when seasonal layoffs had begun, drivers with less seniority would be laid off first. Union officers and ministers were pursuing the same purposes - to employ as many people as possible, to provide a salary to every family, to help as many young people as possible to find a job and have a decent life. In addition, they faced another threat – technology change was rapidly moving unskilled workers out of market. The challenge was more dangerous for the black community, as most of the black workers were unskilled.

The next target of Selected Patronage was Sun Oil, known in its consumer business as Sunoco. It provided gas and oil for trucks and cars, and Sun fuel oil to heat homes. On March 19, 1961, the congregations of 400 ministers were called on to start the boycott. The confrontation between the ministers and the management of Sun Oil had begun at the end of January, when Rev.
Alfred G. Dunston, pastor of the Wesley A.M.E. Zion Church, the spokesman of the Selective Patronage program with Sun Oil, phoned the company and requested a meeting. The meeting readily arranged for February 3. Management was confident that no trouble could come from this meeting. In fact, a year before, the management had asked the Reverend Leon Sullivan and Dr. Jerome Holland, president of Hampton Institute, to advise it in setting up a program for increased black employment in white-collar jobs. At that time, Sun Oil had hired two black clerks. The company had records of hundreds of black employees at its Marcus Hook refinery, some in responsible supervisory jobs. The management had just decided to include three black colleges in its yearly talent search. Executives felt they were protected against any chance of retaliation. This was not how the ministers looked at the situation. They were not interested in the number of black employees working in the refinery. They were much more interested in the black workers in positions of responsibility, with higher salaries. “You hired two Negro clerks a year ago, but none since,” they said. “Two in an office force of 1,500 isn’t much, is it? And you have no Negroes driving trucks. And even though you plan to include Negroes in your talent search, you haven’t actually hired any.”

The executives protested, they had already hundreds of black people working for the company, their reply fallen on deaf ears. The ministers were interested not in the unskilled, low-paid jobs, but in specific jobs. The real purpose of the Selective Patronage Program was not just to provide jobs to black people, or desegregate employment and personnel policies. The jobs
that the ministers wanted to open up were what they called “sensitive” jobs. These jobs were very junior executive and supervisory posts, clerical and stenographic positions, jobs as skilled manual workers and as salesmen. In other words, jobs in which people come into close personal association with other people, and use the same lunchrooms and restrooms. Although Philadelphia had a population of 534,000 black people, nearly 27 percent of the entire city’s population, the ministers estimated that only 1 percent or less of the black population held some sort of “sensitive” jobs. These “sensitive” jobs were not only jobs with a higher salary; they were also jobs with the potential to provide employees with self-esteem, opportunities for a successful career, and hope of a better life. They were jobs that might prove that black people had the competence needed to conduct managerial activities, and establish young blacks with college educations as an added resource for leadership. More than anything else, they were jobs that would offer black junior executives the opportunity to be in charge of white people. These young black executives would gain respect within the black community and provide credibility to the whole black community. Those black people who became junior executives might act as benchmarks for other young blacks; offering a living example, a possible target, and a success story for other young blacks. It was accidental that the Selective Patronage Program focused on promotion as well as employment. Promotion was the gateway to break the invisible barrier that blocked black people from the roles of command in the corporate world, and that locked them out of the real power of management. When it comes to promotion practices, it is not
accurate to align the Selective Patronage Program with a traditional civil
rights campaign, as the pastors were not simply trying to exercise the right of
the black population to be employed. What this program really envisioned
was a corporate world where black and white could work together at the
bottom as well as at the top of the hierarchy, where people could make
money, and have successful careers based on merit rather than the color of
their skin. However strange it may seem, these ideal results were pursued
through a type of coercion.  

Sun management must have thought they were struck by a bombshell. At
that time, business had fallen off, and costs had to be kept as low as possible.
Managers had to move more slowly when it came to costs, but were now
going ahead as quickly as they could to match the request of the ministers. At
the second meeting, two weeks later, the ministers made their proposal clear.
They wanted Sun to hire 24 black employees: 19 additional office workers,
three permanent truck drivers, and a motor-products salesman and all the
new employees must be hired within two weeks. Management’s reaction was
even more dramatic at this meeting than at the previous meeting. They
claimed that it wasn’t possible, not even within a month. They would not be
able to offer 19 new jobs in the office anytime soon. The also pointed out
they were just about to lay off 35 truck drivers as soon as the heating season
ended, and couldn’t be expected to hire new employees at that time. The
ministers replied that 21 black employees (19 new hires, plus the 2 workers
already in place) in an office setting already employing 1,500 is not much to
ask. The Urban League could supply the new employees, if the company was
not ready to or was unable to so by itself. The ministers could even supply candidates if asked. The bottom line was that all the workers requested had to be hired on the time line put forward by the ministers. This was not the end of the negotiation. The terms of the agreement were discussed, and the ministers accepted Sun’s stand that the company could not take on new truck drivers when it was about to lay some off. The ministers would settle for having three blacks who were already employed by Sun upgraded in their job descriptions and duties to truck driver three. As far as the 19 new employees for clerical jobs were concerned, the hiring process was a little more complicated. By March 16, the last meeting before the boycott deadline, Sun had interviewed 19 black applicants and hired one of them. The others, the management said, did not have the necessary qualifications. The Sun managers had also hired one black salesman, and upgraded one worker from mechanic to truck driver. They had not asked the ministers to provide a list of potential candidates, but they had been in touch with the Urban League in this regard. As of late April, Sun had hired about half the people requested by the ministers. There were seven more black women in the home office, two more black salesmen, and three drivers had been upgraded from work in the garage and the refinery. The company did not release any information about the loss of revenues due to the boycott, as a spokesman for the firm said it was difficult to estimate. However, the ministers estimated that Sun was losing some $7,000 a week, while the annual salaries of the clerical workers that were requested by the ministers were around $130,000 a year. Given
these figures, the boycott would have cost the company more than the total amount of the investment required for adding clerical workers.

After Sun Oil, the Selective Patronage Program targeted other industries. Since March 1960, when the program began locally, until January 1963, when it achieved national recognition, it had involved a total of 20 companies. Eight companies had been boycotted for a period up to 11 weeks. They were Tasty Baking Company, Pepsi Cola, Gulf Oil, Sun Oil, Breyers Ice Cream division of National Dairy Products Corp, Metropolitan Bottling Co., Evening Bulletin (a daily newspaper), and A&P, Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. George Schermer, executive director of The Philadelphia Commission on Human Relations (PCHR) and an expert on race relations, supported the action of the ministers, and claimed that they had “increased job opportunities for a significant number of Negroes.”

Of course, boycotts were not inevitable. Ministers preferred negotiation; in fact, they successful negotiated (and did not boycott) with Bind Bread, Freihofer Bread, Coca-Cola, and Seven-Up, Esso, Cities Service, Atlantic, Mobile. Thanks to these negotiations, several banks and insurance companies employed black people in “sensitive” jobs for the first time. Other firms had seen the threat headed in their direction and had begun hiring more black people. These firms found the ministers’ requests reasonable, and they agreed to their demands as soon as they were contacted by the ministers who were using Selective Patronage. None of these companies had to cope with a boycott. Some of the Philadelphia-area companies that had been boycott
targets conceded that, in retrospect, they weren’t entirely unhappy about the
final result. At Atlantic Corporation, not to be confused with A&P, managers
acknowledged that they were pleased with the quality of work of the black
employees and the positive quality of office morale. Several executives
noted that more qualified black job seekers were applying for positions than
formerly. The reason for this increase in applicants may have been because
of changing perceptions. Now young and ambitious black candidates were
no longer afraid to get turned down. An oil company reported that following
a boycott, it had begun to hire more black people in Philadelphia, as well as
in other cities. The same oil company also had reported that sales had been
stronger after the boycott than they were before it. This was a sign that the
black ministers and their congregations did not create resentment. Among
these companies, Atlantic had been frequently mentioned by ministers as an
example of how smoothly their projects went when everyone co-operated.
The company, which already had some black employees in clerical and
executive roles before the ministers came to call, increased the number of
black employees in white-collar jobs, including a chemist, a psychologist, and
a former football hero in a sales position. It was not a coincidence that the
number of jobs requested for new black employees from Sun Oil was nearly
equivalent to the number of the white-collar positions held by black people
at Atlantic. Both Sun and Atlantic were based in Philadelphia, and each of
them had about 1,500 people working in its home office; the two companies
seemed comparable. Part of the reason for these easy victories was the
modest nature of ministers’ demands. In December 1962, a boycott was
called against the 150 A&P stores in the Philadelphia-area until the chain had employed six black office workers, 40 additional black store employees and 20 meat and produce workers. The ministers also demanded that A&P change practices that allegedly prevented the advancement of black warehouse workers. According to scholar Hannah Lees, the reasoning behind the six black office workers was simple, “a committee of ministers visited A&P’s offices and found the company had 250 employees in its main office here, all white. We figure 10% of the nation’s population is Negro but that it would be unreasonable to demand 25 Negroes he hired. We think 12 would be fair.” Then they added: “but we’re only asking half that, just as a token to show A&P won’t discriminate in the future.”

These details offer an inside perspective on the program. The ministers really thought they were involved in a mission to bring justice to the corporate world, not just create a few more jobs to black families. Since the beginning, when 15 pastors had envisioned the program, the ministers considered themselves “the only moral organized network of communication” in the black community. The program received its moral imperative straight from the mass involvement of the black community, and its authority from the moral principle of justice. For these ministers, this was a Biblical, spiritual movement. They were adamant with their congregations, saying that “we cannot in good conscience remain quiet while our people patronize companies that discriminate against our people.” The remark about “good conscience” was a clear reference to their moral commitment to justice, and it resounded again and again in the later incarnations of the program.
Another significant detail is the mention of “our people,” which was not simple a reference to black people, but a Biblical quote. It comes from Exodus 5, when Moses faces the pharaoh and orders him to “let my people go.” The pastors were facing the white-owned and managed companies as Moses challenged the Egyptians, asking them to act justly. The ministers felt that God was backing them, just as He did when Moses was before the Pharaoh. The Selected Patronage program was designed to pursue justice, and was conducted without resentment or prejudice, but managed with the clear purpose to pursue a fair game. Frequently, the ministers made clear that they did not want to hurt the companies they were boycotting. “We aren’t mad at anybody. We just want to see our boys and girls in decent jobs.”

The founders of the Selective Patronage Program realized that its success would depend on the ministers’ ability to persuade their congregations to stop buying a given product and eventually pass the word among non-churchgoers. In fact, the opposite would have been true. Despite the claim from some sources that a large portion of the black community of 500,000 in Philadelphia had some connection with the program, the ministers involved in the program came out with a more reasonable estimate of a quarter of a million. Certainly, the fraternal organizations, social clubs, insurance agents, bartenders, beauticians, the NAACP, and the black newspapers were lined up solidly behind the ministers. However, some black businesses had been hurt by the boycotts, and some black people just did not approve of the strategy. It is fair to say that not the whole black community was necessarily behind the Selective Patronage Program and the clergy who
promoted it. Eventually, the number of black consumers might increase or
decrease if the ministers were charged and taken to court.\textsuperscript{228} Usually, three
weeks were needed for the full effect of Selective Patronage to be felt.
Sometimes, then the target was a big company with a lot of resources to
absorb the financial consequences of a boycott, it took longer. A campaign
against Breyers, the ice-cream company, was faltering until the ministers
discovered that its products were sold in the public schools. Black students
were enlisted, and the campaign was won. The ability to identify the
weakness of the target was matched by the standing and moral authority of
each minister with his congregation. In order to protect such moral authority,
the founders of the program decided to appears as if they were not taking
order from anybody, a minister or a civil rights leader, but eventually from
God himself, they did not use a formal organization, by-laws, officers,
treasury, dues, staff. “Selective patronage,” insofar as the congregation of a
particular church is concerned, could be invoked and revoked only by its
minister. In the eyes of each congregation, its minister was the leader of the
program.\textsuperscript{229}

The Selective Patronage Program in Philadelphia was operated by 400
ministers, who chose to protect themselves from the threat of lawsuits, and
in general, from risks and liabilities. The names of the ministers who called
on the various companies were a matter of public record, but there was a
different delegation with a different spokesman for each company. No one
could say who among the ministers belonged to the organizing committee,
which had no chairman and always met at a different place. Also, the
membership of the organizing committee shifted. This type of organization was used by the Program in case of potential legal retaliation. The Tasty Baking Company consulted both the Chamber of Commerce and its own lawyers to see if there was any way to stop the boycott. The conclusion was that it was pretty hard to bring a group of unorganized ministers to court. Eventually, there was not a clear subject for a lawsuit. However, finding someone to suit was as difficult as finding a reason to suit. In fact, controversial and arbitrary as the Selective Patronage Program might seem, there wasn’t anything illegal or even unethical about it. The ministers were simply exercising their democratic right to advise their friends about what to buy and what not to buy. Even if they could to be taken to court, this action probably would not have helped Tasty’s position within the black community. The managers and lawyers of Tasty would have been surprised to discover why the apparently unorganized ministers intentionally organized themselves this way. The reason was not only to avoid potential liabilities, but also to protect themselves from an even more dangerous risk, the temptation of power. “Power corrupts, you know the old saying,” said one of the ministers. The ministers knew very well that a consistent complaint of both liberals and conservatives had been that the black community did not do enough for itself, did not exercise enough leadership in solving its own problems. These black ministers were certainly exercising leadership, but always with the concern that influence can open the door to something worse – the temptation of power, and consequently the corruption of the soul. This was the reason they did not develop an overt organization with
leaders and factions, but pursued a crusade without an official army. Because “we haven’t any heroes to feed on that power, we haven’t any leaders or bosses. And we aren’t going to have any. As long as we can make out without them, we’ll do fine.” Despite black leaders who claimed they had no formal leader, national publications (*Fortune* and *The New York Times*) identified Selective Patronage Program as Reverend Sullivan’s brainchild.

The ministers were using their buying power and influence to pressure these companies into hiring employees they may not have needed at the time. Legal repercussions might have included damages due to slanderous actions or attempts to win injunctions against the ministers on the grounds that they constitute a conspiracy to retrain trade. To prevent this possibility they refrained from using the word “boycott” from the pulpit. In addition, they did not literally ask their congregations to boycott the company they were in negotiations with, but preferred to make a more vague statement. “I am not going to buy any more products from that company until they start hiring our people. But it’s up to you to decide whether to do something in this drive for Negro freedom.” Another main criticism of the Selective Patronage Program centered on the rigid deadlines set by the ministers and the lack of concern for company problems. The ministers were used to saying, “That’s your problem.” However, the ministers’ position on this issue was that if they had waited for any of these companies to need that many black employees, they would have waited a long time. The ministers pointed out that some 3,000 young black men and women graduated from Philadelphia high schools every year and usually took the jobs that nobody else wanted because
they were the last to be chosen. Many of these young people, the ministers admitted, were not as highly qualified as they should have been, but even the qualified ones had to fight the preconceived idea that they were not qualified. This was the moral foundation of their battle and the cornerstone of the Selective Patronage Program. On the other hand, nothing illegal was found in the corporate hiring policies. The Philadelphia Commission on Human Relations (PCHR), a city agency charged with policing the state’s Fair Employment Practices Law, investigated the Tasty boycott at the request of the Chamber of Commerce and found no illegal discrimination but no evidence of positive integration either.\(^{232}\)

**Breadbasket Begins**

On Sunday, April 9, 1961, ministers in Philadelphia began the first part of what they called the second phase of the Selective Patronage Program which was to spread their boycott strategy progressively, first across the state and then across the country.\(^{233}\) A few months later, *The New York Times* reported that black clergy were “quietly building a national network to employ Negroes’ purchasing power systematically to force concerns that discriminate in hiring and promotion to mend their way.”\(^{234}\) The program was supposed to be established in every major city with a black population large enough to make its buying power felt by local firms. New York City was one of the first cities to host the program. The first boycott started in early November 1961. In Baltimore, Rev. Robert T. Newbold, chairman of a year-old ministers’ movement, reported seven companies had met demands ahead of the ministers’ deadline. One company that was balking at the demands of the
program was about to be boycotted. After journeying to Philadelphia to study the local program, three Detroit ministers organized a boycott campaign there. Within a few months, Border Co., the dairy products firm, and a local baking company had been boycotted in Detroit.\textsuperscript{235} Other cities ready to host the program were Chicago, Detroit, Pittsburgh, Cincinnati and Wilmington, and Atlanta, where the program was supposed to start in November. In Atlanta in late 1962, Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr., had envisioned a multi-city, if not a national, boycott of companies thought to discriminate against black people in hiring.\textsuperscript{236}

When Reverend Sullivan announced his trip to Atlanta, on October 24, 1962, King, as President of the S.C.L.C., and Ralph D. Abernathy, as Chairman of Operation Bread Basket (at the time, the two words were still separated) sent an invitation to a select group of black ministers for a luncheon meeting in the dining room at B.B. Beamons’ Restaurant in Atlanta, October 29. Thirty leaders from the Atlanta area, Benjamin E. Mays, Julian Bond, Martin Luther King, Sr., Andrew Young, and Fred C. Bennette, among the others, were invited by letter and phone. In anticipation of this meeting, Reverend John Middleton, president of the Atlanta chapter of S.C.L.C., announced employment discrimination was the new target of racial bias. He declared that the first target-industry would be named at Allen Temple A.M.E. Church, in which Reverend Sullivan was scheduled to present an address the 29th at 8 p.m. Middleton also claimed the new project received full support from the national office of S.C.L.C., and finally that Rev. Albernathy had been appointed as chairman of the project. The meeting, sponsored by the
Atlanta chapter of S.C.L.C. and scheduled on October 29, was built around the presence of Reverend Sullivan, “the architect of the Philadelphia Selective Buying program which resulted in the employment of over a thousand Negroes in white collar jobs”\textsuperscript{237}

In the previous two months, Abernathy and other pastors conducted a study on job discrimination in the Atlanta area discovering that “many, many industries with a high percentage of Negro patronage … hire Negro for menial tasks only or not at all.” Abernathy and Sullivan wrote a statement just before the event, “if we buy their product then we want some job.”\textsuperscript{238}

The event at Allen Temple A.M.E. Church was preceded by a series of meetings during the day to familiarize key leaders and organizations in Atlanta with the details of the program. The ministers heard of the poor results of negotiations toward “equalization of employment” by a committee of black businessmen over the previous two years that resulted in little else than promises to do better.\textsuperscript{239} “This program can only be successful with broad community support and especially the cooperation of the clergy,” emphasized Abernathy.\textsuperscript{240}

At the luncheon, Rev. Sullivan graciously conceded that the idea of the boycott originated in Montgomery, Alabama. The Montgomery Bus Boycott had officially started on December 1, 1955, when the black citizens of Montgomery, Alabama decided that they would boycott the city buses until they could sit anywhere they wanted, instead of being relegated to the back when a white person boarded. During the boycott, the group leading the
boycott program that called itself the Montgomery Improvement Association, met with officials and lawyers from the bus company, as well as the city commissioners, to present a moderate desegregation plan. During the year-long boycott, however, some members of Montgomery’s business community became frustrated with the Montgomery Improvement Association for costing them thousands of dollars because blacks were less likely to shop in downtown stores. Although they were as opposed to integration as other white Montgomery residents, they realized that the boycott was bad for business, and therefore wanted the boycott to end. They formed a group called the Men of Montgomery and tried negotiating directly with the boycotterers. Eventually, however, these discussions broke down, and the boycott continued.

The Montgomery Boycott was an event of greater scale and historical relevance than the Selective Patronage Program. Focusing not on the outputs, but rather on the nature and aim of the two programs, they were subtly different from one another. The latter was a voluntary, self-promoted and premature example of affirmative action. It implicitly showed the idea of self-development that became prominent later, during the age of Black Power. The former was a voluntary, self-promoted and self-organized boycott, specifically interested in promoting human dignity and self-respect based on race, in response to the indignity inflicted on black citizens by limiting where they could sit on a bus. There was no seek of practical advantage or final return from the boycott in Montgomery other than a sense of self-esteem, pride and the good feeling that naturally and inevitably come
together when a downtrodden group becomes a winner in a race conflict in the deep South. Although Sullivan had been concerned with respect and dignity, he showed a more practical, concrete point of view. His main goal had been to assure black men not pride but a source of income, not more self-esteem but more jobs. Even when Sullivan had been focused on “sensitive” jobs, his intention was not merely to provide pride and respect to the black community, but to offer opportunity to a few ambitious young well-trained blacks. His approach was less universal, more specific and more tangible. Another difference between the two campaigns was in the area of casualties and damages. The Montgomery Boycott produced negative economic effects for the bus companies, but this was definitely a secondary effect of the campaign. The Selective Patronage Program had been established to produce economic retaliation. Economic damage was part of the program, it stayed at its very core, and was included in the plan as a way to obtain results.

However, the Montgomery boycott had been inspirational in another sense, in that it added black clergy to the existing Civil Rights leadership (union labors, black activists, white liberals). Soon after the end of the Montgomery protest, black clergymen began to draft similar campaigns in Tallahassee, Florida, Birmingham, Alabama, and Atlanta and Savannah, Georgia. In February 1957, King was appointed president of the S.C.L.C., and the preaching of nonviolent resistance and protest became mainstream in the struggle for racial equality. Not surprisingly, Aldon Morris, author of the seminal *The Origins of the Civil Rights Movements*, refers to the S.C.L.C. as a
church-related protest organization. The S.C.L.C. leveraged the infrastructure of the Black Church on behalf of local movements that emerged across the South during the late 1950s, linking them into a regionwide organization of organizations. The involvement of the Black Church in the African America freedom movement provided an infrastructure of leaders economically independent, a mass of supporters, financial resources, and support for logistics. But more importantly, the Black Church offered moral capital and a justification for civil disobedience. As American society is “based on law, rather than on passion and power,” at least according to historian Chappell, and has always had difficulties “in coping with political movements that challenge its most basic assumptions,” the clergy provided a Bible-based commitment to a cause as an impeccable moral justification to break the law. As King has stated after a bomb had exploded in front of his house (January 30, 1956), “What we are doing is just and God is with us.” The alignment of the movement with Christian values was a way to profess faith and to acknowledge a religious identity and also a means to protect the activists from the accusation of being communist. Years later, a close aide of King, Andrew Young, would have explained that “everything we did was considered Communist. I think almost to survive we tended to phrase everything in religious terms and to avoid issues that smacked of economic change.” In other words, King and the other religious leaders were able to shift the conversation from passivity and accommodation, which had become equivalent to cooperation with evil to protest and resistance, which became synonyms for good will and justice. They
transformed a wrong into a virtue and a right into a sin. It was a remarkable turnaround.

*Breadbasket Grows*

Thirty ministers representing five Ministerial Unions met soon after the launch of Operation Bread Basket at the Tabernacle Baptist Church to continue plans for establishing the program. Four hundred black ministers sponsored the program on November 7. Ministers of twelve denominations pledged to work together in a manner similar to that employed by the black clergy in Philadelphia, to “no longer cooperate (sic!) with practices of employment which were essentially evil.” Rev. Abernathy served in the capacity of “call man” (or chairman) for the meetings of the Priority Committee providing direction to the project. Decisions were made at weekly meetings of the Priority Committee and the strategy for the coming negotiations were hashed out. Abernathy was assisted in his task by Rev. John Middleton and Rev. J.D. Grier.\(^{248}\) The ministers stated that they “cannot remain silent while our members (of the Church) are victimized by such unfair and immoral practices.” “The time has now come – they added – for us to act because (sic) God does not will for any of his children to be cast into an inferior role simply because of the color he gave them.”\(^{249}\) The initial concern focused on black girls with one or two years of college training working as maids and black young men with college diplomas, sorting mail at the Post Office, or other such menial labor. The ministers were also worried about the hundreds of black youth dropping out of school every year in disgust, even if they were trained, because they were not able to get decent
jobs beyond the level of menial servitude. On their first visit to Colonial Bakery, they found that there were 55 black employees in a work force of 275. The black employees were confined to jobs in the sanitation and dish washing departments, with one or two in the garage and shipping departments. A negotiation committee of seven members (six pastors and Dr. Hattie McCoy Hightower) met, for a second time, with the management of Colonial Bakery in the first half of November. The negotiation committee was acting on behalf of the priority committee. It was the priority committee that suggested the number of new black employees to Colonial Bakery, and what those roles should be. Specifically, they asked for 18 additional black hires - six in the offices, eight in the production department, and four in the distribution and stale bread department. The management of Colonial Bakery accepted the request without further negotiations.

For the Atlanta Baking Company, maker of Betsy Ross and Sunbeam Breads, the Negotiation Committee followed the same process. The Atlanta Baking Company employed a total of 215 workers but only 70 of them were black. None of them worked in the offices or as route salesmen. Consequently, the negotiation committee of Bread basket asked for eight new jobs, one at the office and seven in the sales department. At Southern Bakery, 70 black people were employed out of a total of 235 employees. Similarly, black workers had no access to the offices or the sales department. Breadbasket asked management to consider hiring 15 new black employees, four in the office and sales department, and the rest in the production, maintenance, and relay departments. The management was granted a two-week period to reply
to the proposal in writing. The ministers also negotiated with Merita Bakery, which at the time was employing only 30 black people out of a total work force of more than 200 employees. Their intention was to gain 16 new jobs for black workers.\textsuperscript{251}

While Breadbasket’s operations were growing and the list of potential targets was increasing, the organization set up its internal roles and rules. Breadbasket was initially directed by Fred C. Bennette, Jr., who was a personal friend of the King family, and also served as interim pastor (1964-1965) of the Mount Welcome Baptist Church which was then located in the Pittsburg community of Atlanta. The S.C.L.C. had been considered the operational arm of the Black Church.\textsuperscript{252} The leadership of the program, Bennette, Abernathy, Middleton, and the other clergymen, came from the ranks of the Black Church which as a practical matter, provided the infrastructure, paid the bills, and brought people in to manage the program. The Black Church played a monumental role in the initial phase of the operations of Breadbasket. Since Breadbasket was modeled on the Selective Patronage Program, it adopted the same rules, the same process, and the same philosophy. A sort of to-do list was prepared and distributed to ministers involved with Breadbasket. Starting with the assumption that “unfair employment practices” posed a moral issue, these were the instructions:

1. In speaking of the movement, use “Selective Buying” instead of boycott.
2. To avoid questions about the leaders of the movement, no special person or persons are leaders. Every minister is a leader.

3. Make no statements to the press, including press releases. Refer all requests for news statements to the Call Men.

4. Be sure the information which you follow comes from the Priority Committee. Written notices will be mailed at regular times.

5. Make no contacts with companies but report any contacts made by companies to you to the Priority Committee.

6. Please attend all meetings when called or notified.

7. Urge your congregation to apply for jobs when openings are made known.

8. Keep notices before your congregations weekly by making announcements from the pulpit and including inserts in the church bulletin. For example: “Watch for notices on Operation Breadbasket. For information, contact your minister.”

Breadbasket was shaped as a program to acquire and up-grade current jobs of black citizens in the bread industries (it would enlarge its scope later). At Highland Bakery, 32 black people were employed out of a total of 149. Twenty-five of them were working in the production department. The negotiation committee of Breadbasket asked for eight new hires, six in offices and the sales department, and two in production. Established to promote nondiscrimination practices in the workplace, Breadbasket inevitably shifted into promoting the practice of preferential treatment.
Something went wrong with the negotiations with Colonial Bakery, as on November 30, 1962, all ministers were urged to participate in a meeting at West Mitchell Street C.M.E. Church at 575 W. Mitchell St. They were invited to “hear the final report of the Negotiating Committee and decide whether or not we can in good conscience, continue to buy Colonial Bread or whether we must tell our congregations to buy some other kind of bread until Colonial begins a fair hiring policy.” The resistance of the corporate management did not last long. Already in January 1963, the company had agreed to promote 18 black employees into jobs not previously held by black workers, providing a combined income of $80,000. Negotiations were more successful with Southern Bakery. On February 10, 1963, the company had accepted all the employment requests of Breadbasket and 400 black ministers announced the news to their congregations and asked them to cancel plans for a selective buying campaign. The company agreed to promote 15 black employees into new positions. This was the second time a company had met all of Breadbasket’s requests. Negotiations were also successful with Atlanta Baking Company. Not only the management of the corporation accept the request to hire eight new black employees, one at the office and seven in the sales department, it also granted the Negotiation Committee’s request and desegregated restroom and lunchroom facilities and also agreed to a non-discriminatory hiring policy in the future. According to Rev. Grier, “many people in Atlanta will rest better because of this agreement. The management of Atlanta Bakery can go to bed with a tremendous burden lifted from their conscience, and eight Negro families
will sleep with the assurance that their children will have an opportunity for a wholesome upbringing.”  

The Rev. J.D. Grier of Fort Street Methodist Church reported on the successful negotiation with the corporation. The nine members of the Negotiation Committee were delighted – he said – that they were able to help the management of the company to realize its responsibility to its black customers.

Slowly, Breadbasket increased traction, and a few months later, in March 1963, the total number of additional jobs for black people had already reached 65. More surprising was the amount of additional income added to the black community - $275,000.00. Five bakeries Merita Bakery, Southern, Sunbeam, Highland, and Colonial had accepted the requests to employ black workers. The list of jobs were included shipping and sales departments, as well as in engineering and office positions. New employees in the sales department were entitled to a salary of more than $6,000, while the employees in the shipping department were earning almost half of that.  

This acceptance did not come without resistance on the part of the bakeries, and mobilization on the part of Breadbasket. Four hundred ministers from Atlanta and the vicinity were involved in the selective patronage of Highland Bakery, Inc. in January 1963. The Negotiation Committee of Breadbasket had tried to obtain improved job opportunities for black workers for five weeks, but apparently the company refused to collaborate in the employment of qualified black workers. Actually, the management replied to the request for hiring eight people that one black worker had been already hired and another one upgraded to a better job, and that further requests for changes
would be met with fewer jobs for black workers. The Negotiation Committee considered this result unsatisfactory and concluded that it had been unable to reach an agreement. The pastors involved in the negotiation reportedly told the bakery firm officials that “we do not feel that we are asking too much for this company to hire more Negroes, since they come into our community and sell their products and furnish baking goods to chain stores that are patronized by Negroes. We only ask that they respect us as they respect our dollars.”

Contemporary ministers were informed about the situation, and asked to invite their congregations to join Breadbasket and stop “buying bread, cookies and cakes” in a place where they cannot get a job without discrimination.” The inevitable consequence was to ask black people to not buy from Highland, as the company “does not treat Negros fairly about jobs; they have been asked to do so; they have refused.” Apparently the invitation was widely accepted and Highland surrounded. A meeting was called at the end of the month to update both the black ministers and their congregations about Highland and incoming negotiations with other bakeries, and also to ask for an offering from ministers’ churches to help pay off some of the expenses of the program. Finally, a selected delegation of ministers picketed the Highland Bakery for a couple of hours.

Although these initial successes were outstanding, the ministers made it clear that they did not look upon these results as the solution of the discrimination problem in hiring and promoting that black people faced in Atlanta. “Rather – one minister explained – we see these (results) as minimal requests. Their fulfillment demonstrates the good-will of the companies at this point but we
will continue our efforts for equal employment of all races.”

Dr. Abernathy added that “we can only consider this a beginning.” The black community “is in a desperate situation as far as employment is concerned. With automation and its effects on the unskilled worker, the Negro must not continually be deprived of job opportunity and advancement. The unemployment situation is critical enough as it is, and for it to assume a strictly racial character might be a dilemma serious enough to shatter the very foundations of democracy. We cannot let this happen to our people or to our country.”

The scope was limited in size primarily because resources were very limited. Breadbasket’s operations were made by a peripatetic network of pastors, no more than fifty ministers always busy in meetings, lunches and dinners, permanently engaged in discussion of strategies, boycotts and negotiations. The flux of communications, letters, announcements and press releases was constant. The excitement of the involved clergy was high, and so was the motivation to be part of this project, coupled with a serious, disciplined organizational posture, as the method used in this project was crucial. For example, the communications to the companies were following a precise order: the draft, the typed copy, the revised typed copy of the invitation letter. Then the amended revised typed copy, the list of recipients, and the new list of recipients with the revised addresses and phone numbers.

Breadbasket’s scope was limited in size also because the black preachers did not share a business mindset. They did not count new black employees by thousands of jobs and new income for black families by millions of dollars. In a time of economic growth and affluence, a few new people employed
might not seem enough to make a difference. These pastors, however, shared a different, specific mindset. As every new convert to Christianity is important, so every job counts. This religious attitude was evident in their dialogues with white managers, during meetings discussing the possibility of more jobs for black workers. The notes from these meetings show that, in a time of material prosperity, economic justice and racial equality was not a generally accepted value. In the first half of the Sixties, Atlanta was in a period of unique growth and development; the city was rapidly becoming a leader among the nation’s Sunbelt cities. The metropolitan Atlanta population was increasing by 30,000 a year. The central problem was that blacks were not sharing proportionally in Georgia’s civic boom. The average income of a black family in Atlanta was less than half of the average white family’s $6,350. Atlanta’s 200,000 Blacks represented 40% of the population but lived on 24% of the residential land. Consequently, the preachers involved in Breadbasket preferred avoiding triumphal rhetoric, knowing too well the other side of the economic growth, the desperation and defeat and poverty of the African Americans. The notes of these meeting between white corporate executives and black ministers also showed the degree of misunderstanding between the two sides, the level of verbal abuse from one side, and patience on the other. The black ministers had needed to immerse themselves in the study of payroll policy and financial forecast, decide on business strategies and corporate protocols, and stop short of rejecting explicit expressions of superiority. They had moments when they saw themselves as working for Breadbasket in vain; they had moments when they
knew how desperately black men and families needed their help. And yet there was a sort of disciplined passion, a religious hope in the ultimate aim of the program, and a hardened faith in God’s will. From this perspective, Breadbasket and its boycotts were considered a means of moral persuasion. Despite the lack of resources and business mindset, Breadbasket slowly expanded from Atlanta to the rest of Georgia: Albany, Augusta, Camilla, Columbus, Dawson, Macon, Riceboro, Sylvania, Tifton, and Waycross. It also tried to cross the border and operate in Alabama (Birmingham), South Carolina (Greensville), and Virginia (Petersburg). For a couple of years, a chapter of Breadbasket was active in Tallahassee, selecting targets and maintaining a connection with the main office in Atlanta.267

The Selective Patronage Program and Breadbasket presented significant similarities and differences. The most important similarity was that they both did not try to target federal government contractors. They did not leverage the Executive Order 10925, and preferred instead to focus their attention on companies – no matter the size, international, national or local – with a strong local base. Another similarity is that for both programs – as King said once – “it is all a matter of the margin of profit and loss over against the buying of the Negro community.”268 Plus, both programs were not limited in scope. Initially Breadbasket decided to challenge one type of food producer - the bakery, and only later expanded its activities to other fresh food grocery chains. In a report written in April 1965, Breadbasket Executive Director Fred Bennette assesses the state of the art of the program. While reviewing the history of the program, from inception to date, he reported that in
February 1965, Breadbasket had started negotiating with Ford Motor Company, and 115 workers were hired, representing an increase of $525,000 per year in salaries. The agreement also guaranteed a minimum wage of $100 per week, a decent amount at that time (for example, janitors were making $2.82 an hour, working at night). Also, important department store chains such as Rich’s, Davidson’s, Sears, and Kessler’s were approached by Breadbasket, and more than 250 people were hired or had their positions upgraded. Variety store chains such as K-Mart, Kress, HL Green, Newberry’s, and John Bargain Stores also agreed to hire and promote black workers. Coca Cola and other soft drinks companies finally agreed to the hiring of 11 black workers as driver salesmen - workers who drove and acted as salesmen, a well paid and respectful job - and in the case of Pepsi Cola, the increase in income went completely to black employees. Following the path of Selective Patronage, Breadbasket also contacted Gulf Oil and signed an agreement for hiring three sale representatives which included the use of an automobile, while meetings at Avon Cosmetics’ headquarter in New York and with Bell Telephone were scheduled to continue pressing for more and better jobs. Selective Patronage was less overtly religious in its approach. The program targeted one company after another, and one industry after another, gas and oil, soft drinks, cakes and pies. It was the power of buying of the black community that was used as leverage more than anything else.

While the two programs shared the same strategies and goals with both Sullivan and King fighting against discrimination in the workplace, what was emphasized was quite different. The Selective Patronage Program was
ultimately a program for the creation of human capital, as it dealt with the problems of the blacks with special reference to the training, utilization, and deployment of human potential, as well as the emphasizing the importance of advanced training. The program paid attention to the role of black educational institutions in the formation of human potential, in the same way Booker T. Washington had stressed intermediate-level manpower needs in his educational philosophy of vocational and technical education. In fact, Rev. Sullivan soon moved the Selective Patronage Program from boycotts to training activities, realizing that convincing corporations to hire black employees was only the beginning – and not the end – of his job. Once hired, people needed to be trained. Even better, to be hired at higher levels than they usually they – i.e., office assistants, administrators, etc. – they needed training in advance. Although the companies might be forced to hire black people through a range of sources of persuasion, they would have welcomed these new employees if they thought the new employees were well educated enough to feel at home in a corporate environment, and to know the rudiments of the job they were going to do. Rev. Sullivan himself became a board member of GM, the car manufacturing giant. The move resonated naturally. The ultimate success of the boycott activity was to incorporate into internal corporate processes that it was the norm to hire people without discrimination. In other words, the final goal of the boycotts was to make minority hiring an established rule, a permanent posture of Human Resources strategies. Once this goal was achieved, boycotts became obsolete. Civil Rights leaders and corporate executives moved from confrontation to
cooperation, and it was reasonable that they looked to keep their dialogue going. With this continuing aim, the Board of Directors was the perfect place for Rev. Sullivan. It was far enough removed from daily practice of the company to give its members a detached perspective on the situation, and allowed the board to retain the responsibility for the major decisions that affected the life and the future of the company. It was a small group of people who shared the privilege of managing corporate governance, and it also provided an opportunity for Civil Rights leaders to have direct access to information and exercise control over decision-making in progress. However, Reverend Sullivan was instantaneously transformed into an insider by moving onto the Board of GM. This was not the path chosen by Breadbasket. During its history of protests, boycotts and negotiations in Atlanta, and also when the program went national, Breadbasket insisted on remaining outside the perimeter of the corporate world. It was successful enough to force the corporations it approached, and sometimes harassed, to hire black people. Later, it escalated its spectrum of activities but always maintained a distinct character, not necessary radical, though confrontational.

While Breadbasket never wooed corporate executives, it frequently allied itself with labor unions. Bennette reported boycotts, marches and protests in cooperation with labor unions for the sake of labor and Civil Rights advancement. Breadbasket coordinated a mass march in Atlanta, Albany, and Columbus, and formed an Alliance for Social Economic and Political progress with labor unions such as AFL-CIO (local and state branches), the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Laundry Workers, International
Labor Union, ICWU, the AFC-CIO Civil Rights Department, the Printing Pressmen Union (locally), Worker's Circle, the State Country, the Municipal Imperial Union, and many others. The purpose of these alliances was primarily to coordinate activities of labor and Civil Rights organizations in order to provide training for job employment and other capacities. During 1965, the S.C.L.C., Breadbasket, and the unions, worked together for months against the Scripto plant in Georgia, in which 700 employee out of 900 were blacks. The case is an exemplar as Scripto was one of the country’s leading manufacturers of pens, pencils and cigarette lighters, and involved leaders such as Hosea Williams, Reverend C.T Vivian, and Randolph Blackwell (S.C.L.C. Director of Political Education, Director of Affiliates, and Program Director). The case is an exemplar also because the boycott was initially local but became national within a few days, and the activism was not motivated by the intention to increase employment opportunities for black workers but to counter an abusive attitude pursued by the company’s management. For example, when an election was held by Scripto employees to determine if they wanted to be represented by a union, and the employees decided to support the union, the company filed a legal objection based on the argument that the black employees were not in their sober mind. The company argued that black workers were carried away because of the bombing in Birmingham and the March on Washington. Their minds, the company contended, were confused because black ministers were preaching from their pulpits that if the employees were for the authorization of the union, and they did not sign the authorization paperwork, then they were
branded as “Uncle Toms.” Breadbasket also built direct relationships with state representatives and pursued federal and state jobs. In January 1965, Bennette met Georgia Governor Carl E. Sanders and asked for jobs for black workers as department heads as well as on boards, agencies and committees. During the same period, Breadbasket held a conference with Mrs. Bruce Schaefer, director of the State Department of Family and Children Services, Georgia, to appoint blacks to the advisory board, and to the Anti-Poverty Program at the state level.

Gradually Breadbasket enlarged its scope, from job hiring to job promotion, and finally became, effectively, the economic arm of the S.C.L.C. Whenever an economic aim was at stake, the S.C.L.C. engaged Breadbasket as its economic arm, usually alone, but sometimes in cooperation with other religious institutions, but rarely with labor unions. In fact, locally, Breadbasket pursued the same type of relationships with labor unions that the S.C.L.C. maintained at the national level. King and the leadership of the S.C.L.C. still believed that Civil Rights organizations, labor unions, and eventually the federal government – once forced to take action – could bring justice to black people and make a difference in the economic realm. Of course, at the local level, the S.C.L.C. was free to assume a more aggressive posture and be more antagonistic with the state bureaucracy and corporate executives. In spite of the somewhat antagonistic stance taken by the S.C.L.C., the meetings and conferences with the Georgia state representatives do show a positive intention and constructive approach. Breadbasket’s decision to try to build common ground with politicians indicates a desire to
progress with its work, in spite of the segregationist tendencies shown by those politicians. On the other hand, the fight with corporate executives was brutal. Before committing to hire and promote 60 black workers, Sears used the issue of race against Dr. King and Breadbasket. On April 28, 1965, speaking at the third biennial Institute on Corporate Law in Atlanta, Robert Wood, counsel for the company’s southern territory and a long-time leader in community relations work in Atlanta, accused Breadbasket of unfair labor practices under the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Wood said that a literal interpretation of the law would result in the program (he also mentioned the S.C.L.C. and Dr. King by name) being defined as an employment agency. As an employment agency, Breadbasket would be prohibited from seeking employment for persons on the basis of race. He added that, at least theoretically, an executive who had been approached with demands to hire blacks, could appeal to the Fair Employment Opportunities Commission against unfair labor practices and, if unsatisfied there, could institute a court suit as an injured party. Wood ignited a tense debate at the conference and in the media after his remark, given that – when a literal interpretation was applied to the definition in 701-C – virtually every Civil Rights organization in the country would be classified as an employment agency, since all were concerned in varying degrees with securing employment for black workers. Worse, as employment agencies, they were expressly forbidden by section 703-B of Title VII, “to classify or refer for employment any individual on the basis of his [sic!] race.” Although Sears did not follow up on Wood’s remark with a lawsuit, the comment was powerful enough to put
Breadbasket on the defensive, as it was able to connect the race-conscious character of Breadbasket and the color-blind attitude of Title VII, and use the historic Civil Rights Act against the movement itself. This incident showed the S.C.L.C.’s internal contradiction between the universalistic approach adopted at the national level and race-conscious local activism. The bottom line in 1965 was that the rights-based strategy of the S.C.L.C. was caught in a paradoxical situation and demonstrated signs of exhaustion as a result.

The paradoxical situation was even more marked as Breadbasket never showed independence from the S.C.L.C. or assumed autonomous governance. The same pastors who were engaged with Breadbasket were also involved in other branches and activities of the S.C.L.C.. The S.C.L.C. executive team, King and eventually Abernathy and Andy Young, were also active in Breadbasket, or at least in supervising it. Bennette was working part-time with Breadbasket, and part-time with his congregation, and he occasionally acted as Dr. King’s personal body guard. Breadbasket crossed the borders of Florida and Alabama, but never really became a national program, or even a program that covered the whole South. Although Bennette claimed that Breadbasket had built liaisons outside Georgia, the program remained confined to the Peach State. Its achievements were important, but not big enough to make a real difference in black unemployment. It provided new jobs but only a small number, and the effect on corporate workplaces was nominal at best. Not surprisingly, the program never reached the front pages of the national newspapers and received
coverage only at the local level. When exported to the North, it was a far-
from successful program. Breadbasket was the S.C.L.C.’s only real economic
program; full of promise, but still in its infancy after four years in operation.

The clergymen were brave enough to challenge the executives, risk lawsuits,
and accept the consequences, but they were not in search of power, only
justice. They wanted to promote equality by convincing the corporate world
to do the right thing, stop discriminating, and act according to the Scriptures.
Their motivation was practical, but not substantial enough, as they preferred
to remain at a symbolic level, promoting a “redeeming the soul of corporate
America” type of mission, which was deeply influenced by the social gospel
and prophetic religion. Consequently, as a color-conscious program,
Breadbasket never acted militantly, never showed the nerve required to move
the program to the next level, and didn’t manage to meet these expectations
with practical results. It is not the case that King, despite his constant and
public appreciation of Breadbasket, still believed that unemployment could
only be eradicated by the federal government through a huge infusion of
capital. Therefore, by the spring of 1966, the black clergymen involved in
Breadbasket still constituted an itinerant group, traveling the state of Georgia
by car, and setting up Breadbasket campaigns and offices in cities and
counties. They were engaged in more than just protests against racial
injustice, as they also developed their own particular set of emotional
valuation and expression inspired by the biblical tradition of prophetic
religion. Rather than adopting the traditional escapist posture of the Black
Church, the predominantly other-worldly outlook of the black clergy, they
shared their sense of connection with the biblical story, and the eschatological vision of the black community of a better world in this life. They believed that the Kingdom of God can’t be in heaven if it is not also on earth.

**Prophetic Religion**

Back at the Gaines Chappell African Methodist Episcopal (A.M.E.) Church of Waycross, the call man, Reverend G.D. Grier, Jr., took his place at the center of the group and called for the reading of the minutes of the previous meeting. The previous meeting had been held in Augusta, on April 21, at the Williams Memorial Christian Methodist Episcopal (C.M.E.) Church. In the previous meeting, the long liturgy of the first hymn, the prayer, and the second hymn had been accomplished. Finally, the first verse of psalm 133 had been read and Reverend J.E. Ross had provided the related sermon. The sermon was not written, and Rev. Ross had simply elaborated on the basis of his familiarity with the Scriptures.

The minutes were read and approved with minor corrections. Then, different pastors – Rev. Otis Smith, Rev. Ross (Waycross), and Rev. Bennette, among others – presented the updates of Breadbasket in different cities: Augusta, Albany, Waycross, Macon, and Atlanta. Five or more black people would be employed in Augusta, three in Albany (and another two received Social Security), four in Macon, and finally no new jobs in Atlanta, but several other bits of good news. No news from Waycross, Columbus, Jesup, and Savannah. The level of employment of black workers at companies like
Standard Oil, the Southern Bell Telephone Co., Georgia Power Co., Atlanta Gas Light Co., Georgia Telecom Co., Georgia Department of Welfare, and finally the Georgia State office for Employment and the Marine Corps Logistics Base in Albany were reviewed. The gap between the total number of employees and the number of black employees in the same companies had been revealed and discussed. At the end of discussion, Rev. Bennette had tried to capture the feeling of the whole group. Bennette was tall and naturally muscular. Previously, he had taken advantage of his size to act as an improvised body guard for his friend Martin Luther King, Jr., and defended him from potential attacks from the crowd or from harassment from the police during events and marches. However, despite his size, which might be intimidating to some, Bennette was gifted with an open, friendly, sunny smile, and his presence radiated peace and solidarity. He stood up and talked passionately about the moral implications of the job he and the other pastors were doing through Breadbasket. In his speech, he had created a connection between the black adults who found a job and the aspirations of young black people, who were still at school or hoped to one day work. He built a link between visibility and inspiration, the visibility of a society where job discrimination was erased, or at least reduced. Black people can be employed and have careers, receive decent salaries, raise families in desegregated neighborhoods, live in nice houses, send their kids to school, offering them new possibilities, and finally provide a source of inspiration. What he and the other pastors were doing was not just providing some work opportunities to a few African American men, they were trying to offer hope, provide
leadership and build a different mindset. The second link between identification and aspiration is directly related to the idea that the next generation have the hope and ambition to move forward from the hardships endured by their parents, that young people can leave poor, rural neighborhoods and urban ghettos, and build a life of economic stability and racial integration. Facing job segregation, and the pain of racial harassment, young blacks shared the need to identify with engaged, hardworking, savvy black parents. Having a job was good for blacks, not only because it provided a salary and ultimately economic health to their families, but also because it reinforced their dignity and self-esteem. A job made black people feel more comfortable about the availability of opportunities for them in society, as well as encouraging them to be self-confident, hopeful of a better future, and better integrated into the American mainstream.

Most of the people at the meeting had a dual commitment; they were pastors at their congregations, and they were Civil Rights activists. As pastors, they were involved in pastoral work, maintenance of social and economic infrastructures, and provided for the spiritual, and some personal needs of the members of their congregations. As Civil Rights activists, they were involved in boycotts for the sake of job desegregation. They had two loves: the church and the Civil Rights Movement. In fact, their involvement in the Civil Rights Movement was an extension of their call to the ministry. They agreed with Martin Luther King, Jr., when he proclaimed that “our church is becoming militant, stressing the social gospel as well as a gospel of personal salvation.” They saw their practical, concrete efforts to pressure white-
owned and managed companies to hire black people through the eyes of the Bible. Divine Providence was at work to restore health to the earth, and a prophetic religion deals in realities. In fact, their commitment was not based on some sort of secular ethical vision or a liberal faith in human and social progress. They did not simply feel they needed to be on the right side of history. It was not the rightness of their actions that made them so exceptionally sure of the final triumph against injustice and racism. It was their Christian faith, the granitic conviction that God was on their side because, as King had pointed out years earlier, “God is on the side of truth and love and justice.”

With God on their side, the redemptive aim of the movement was guaranteed. The walls of discrimination that divided blacks from the American dream would fall like the walls of Jericho after Joshua's Israelite army marched around the city blowing their trumpets: “Joshua fit the battle of Jericho, and walls came a-tumblin’ down.”

The movement was a “divine gift,” the theological locus of God’s work in history.

“God is working in history to bring about this new age,” King stated in 1956 during the Montgomery Improvement Association campaign. This new age, the fall of the “old order” and the emergence of the “new age,” was a kairological moment, the time when God acts (Mark 1:15, the kairos is fulfilled). It is when God breaks into human history, and the chronological, linear sequence of time is disrupted, that something special happens. It is a “time of urgent and providential election,” the appointed time in the purpose of God, a “moment of grace” that gives a sense of urgency and commitment to the lives of Christians. They did not share the hope that voluntary,
gradual progress and the spread of education and economic development would ever undo the evils of segregation and disfranchisement. They had identified themselves with “prophetic religion,” that is, with (a few) prophetic black leaders like Martin Luther King, Jr., who rejected the liberal view that moderation would inevitably gain racial justice. In fact, Prophetic religion is contrapuntal and accompanies religious crisis. It appears during crisis, in periods of transition from one age to another.

Prophetic religion is a religion of prophets and a church of charismatic ministry. These prophetic Civil Rights leaders had embraced public contempt while rejecting worldly comforts, recognition and “success,” and this was a source of inspiration for their followers, and the hidden force of solidarity and self-sacrifice. As prophetic figures, they had assumed the same posture as the Hebrew prophets, shared the same pessimism about the general tendency of the institutions of the society in which they lived, and the same skepticism of their society’s pretensions to justice. They did not merely attack the culture of their oppressors. They had to separate themselves from their society—often from their families and churches. To stand apart from one’s own community is crucial to the Prophetic life. Not surprisingly, the prophetic Civil Rights leaders distanced themselves from mainstream society as well as from the institutional church. They might not have intentionally embraced a “charismatic opposed to institutional” viewpoint in which the charismatic ministry stands as the justice seeking arm of the church, and the institutional ministry as a moderate, accommodating, even false, failed and unchristian force in the church, but they felt short.
Of course, they belong to the same Black Church that, since the beginning, has been the primary community institution owned and controlled by blacks themselves. This was a safe island of organized economic and social life in a hostile world dominated by white supremacy combined with abusive racism. In fact, traditional black preachers typically preach about heaven and propose a “compensatory” service, the church as a spiritual retreat, or alternatively, a community-centered institution, which became a refuge in a hostile, segregated, and racist social environment. Historically, black preachers had appeared more interested in discussing Scripture’s passages than in talking about civic or political issues. They embraced a basically nonmilitant orientation of the church that dismisses political action and – according to the célèbre scholar Frazier - accepted “the sufferings and injustices of this world as temporary and transient.” Black preachers were used to dealing with an unjust, racist world and to pointing out that the world is sick, not their congregations. Of course, they sought funds for their families and congregations, because they believed you can’t have people isolated on these lonely islands of poverty in this sea of prosperity. However, they sought funds using the classic posture of the apostles. That is, that you first seek the Kingdom of God and all these things will be given unto you. On the contrary, these preachers at the Gaines Chappell A.M.E. Church of Waycross rejected the traditional reluctance of black ministers to place themselves in opposition to the white power structure and accepted the risks of retaliation. They shared the view of the Black Church as a dynamic agency for social change and the fundamental belief of the absolute invulnerability of the black
people as people of God.\textsuperscript{287} Rather than promoting an otherworldly withdrawal, they felt the calling to protect the souls of their congregation’s members, and save the world from racism, poverty, and war. They rebelled against the duly constituted leaders of their denomination.\textsuperscript{288} E. Franklin Frazier’s conclusions about the relationship of the Black Church to American society (he called the Black Church a “nation within a nation”) would resonate, with regard to the relationship of the group of pastors who were also involved with Breadbasket and the Black Church as a whole.\textsuperscript{289}

As the meeting at the Gaines Chappell A.M.E. Church was approaching the end, the call man, Reverend G.D. Grier, Jr., had called Rev. Howard Creecy, Sr., pastor of the Month Moriah Baptist Church in Atlanta, to deliver the sermon. With Reverend G.H. Williams of Macon presiding, Rev. Creecy slowly read verses 34-40 from chapter 27 of the Book of Genesis: “And when Esau heard the words of his father, he cried with a great and exceeding bitter cry, and said unto his father, Bless me, even me also, O my father.” It is a story of human deceit and the creative power of the word of God. In Chapter 27, the promises of the land of Canaan had come down to Isaac, who was now about 135 years of age. He had not duly considered the Divine word concerning his two sons, that Esau (the elder) should serve Jacob (the younger), but resolved to give all the honor and power that were in the promise to Esau. Jacob, with a trick, got the blessing. When Esau understood that Jacob received the blessing in his stead, he cried with great bitterness. Isaac, when he became aware of the deceitfulness of his son, trembled exceedingly. Soon after, he recovered and confirmed the blessing he had
given to Jacob, saying, I have blessed him, and he shall be blessed. “And Isaac his father answered and said unto him, Behold, thy dwelling shall be the fatness of the earth, and of the dew of heaven from above; / and by thy sword shalt thou live, / and shalt serve thy brother: and it shall come to pass when thou shalt have the dominion, that thou shalt break his yoke from off thy neck.”290 It is a shocking resolution to Western ears, used as they were to judge an act, such as a stolen blessing, from a jurisprudential viewpoint, and consequently inclined to invalidate Isaac’s blessing by virtue of a legal argument.291

The people at the Gaines Chappell A.M.E. Church of Waycross were pastors. They shared the same clerical mode of emotional expression. Consequently, that shaped the encounter with Breadbasket as a liturgical session and a spiritual retreat rather than as an ordinary business meeting. The Scriptures, the chants, the dialogues, had functioned in the meeting – and in all the previous meetings – as part of the narrative process of identification. The prayerful reading of selected verses of the Psalms and the homilies helped the preachers to identify themselves with the feelings and thoughts of the psalmist, and to grasp the very core of these human emotions. The group inevitably succumbed to their common bond with the psalmist and an emotional community suddenly emerged from it.292 In fact, celebration was at least as much an emotional context as a cultural one.293 Through this meeting and previous meetings of Breadbasket, the community of clergy had been developing a common feeling, sharing the same emotions, and expressing the same commitment.294 They had attempted to create a
symbolic, interpretative framework for addressing their emotions. In fact, if they felt the tension and the pressure of the movement and expressed signs of emotional breakdown, it was because they shared the same frustrations as segregated enterprises - the wiretapping of their phones by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the pain of the rumors of King’s extramarital affairs (which had just surfaced in the previous months), and the on-going fear of possibly being killed.\textsuperscript{295}

Through this process, they developed a collective identity as “men of God.”\textsuperscript{296} In public, they had commanding voices and could easily silence a room. They could project sincerity and energy at the same time, and shared the same concerns, such as feeding the hungry, clothing the naked, and sheltering the homeless. But what had made the pastors at the Gaines Chappell A.M.E. Church of Waycross different from the other ministers was their prophetic posture. In fact, social movements are discursively constructed states of consciousness. In the case of Breadbasket, the main point, and the only point that matters, was that the God was with the movement.\textsuperscript{297} To place their meeting in theological prospective, the preachers’ task was to create a “total experience” of the presence of God. The whole aim of the meeting was to help preachers bring the Word to life and have an experience of the Word, and feel the presence of Jesus in their hearts.\textsuperscript{298} It was this precise, specific, undisputed certainty of the Presence that had made this community of pastors (and the individuals within their own home churches) define social engagement as a crusade, and assess it as a call to a prophetic understanding of their vocation. It was the sense of
connection with the biblical story of the Hebrew prophets that had permeated the movement’s consciousness and built the consequent prophetic identity.

Their prayers, speeches, and sermons were intentionally and repeatedly framed in the biblical narrative. Biblical episodes like the stolen blessing functioned as an archetypical events that resonate not only for the Hebrews, but also with African American clergy. Black preachers were sympathetic to the extra-judicial solution of Isaac because they identified themselves with God’s chosen people. Like the Israelites under the harsh rule of Pharaoh, African Americans had suffered under the unjust laws of the whites. The elements of correspondence between the ancient Israelites and the pastors working with Breadbasket had been pushed to the limits by their prophetic attitude. Kairological time is sacred time that replaces chronological time. Consequently, Scriptures, sermons, and songs “emotionally transported them into experiences that transcended the boundaries of geography and chronology,” as scholar Selby points out.²⁹⁹

Though a discursively created religious experience, the preachers at the Gaines Chappell A.M.E. Church of Waycross were able to activate a sophisticated and powerful emotional engine that aroused them from lethargy, drained their anguish, and healed their wounds. Thanks to the elaborate body of prayers, Biblical verses, and homilies, they successfully built “a feeling of divinely granted protection” that provided an emotional reserve of positive feelings in the context of physical threat and psychological
sufferance. Since they framed their present experience of tension and pain within a redemptive religious myth, they made themselves ready to engage in social action. Once they convinced themselves of the presence of the Divine, their uncertainty was gone. God was aware of their commitment and would have never left them alone. With God on their side, they were not afraid anymore.

The whole meeting was a celebration of religious confidence in God’s providence (Rom. 8:28). Its main aim was to sustain spiritual growth and help the group of pastors to be calm and trust God in times of hard travail. Scriptures and sermons and chants were pursued not so much for theological knowledge or rational validation but for the spiritual power that radiates out of the officiant and into listeners’ gut-level trust under stress. The group of preachers wished to be used by the Spirit to pursue a life modeled by Jesus Christ. Consequently, the encounter with the Bible was a collective, shared, living experience that inspired the members of the group to reinforce their trusting obedience in God’s will and maintain some form of Spirit-guided discipline.

**Conclusion**

The next meeting was arranged at the Reverend Fred C. Lofton’s First African Baptist Church, 901 Fifth Ave., Columbus, Georgia, on June 30, 1966, at 11 a.m. However, an event of historical magnitude happened in the period between the meeting of Breadbasket in Waycross and the one in Columbus. On June 16, 1966, Stokely Carmichael made his famous Black
Power speech. As a consequence, soon thereafter the tempo of change became too fast for the black clergy. The rush of daily events would have not allowed calm and experienced ministers to apply their practical and tested responses. On July 11, 1966, less than a month later, Gerard Reed, Chairman of the SCLC’s Employment Committee, recognized that “the black Muslims are growing in strength every day, and just last week Atlantans [sic] read about the Black Power thrust in our city. Does Atlanta really believe that it can continue ‘business as usual’ while these movements grow more powerful?”

Like a pendulum, history was rapidly swinging to the more radical side. On September 6, the city was at the edge of a race riot for the first time since September 22, 1906. Firemen were on strike. Anti-Vietnam War pickets and firefighters pickets marched in front of the City Hall. That very same day, a white policeman shot a suspected car thief who was black, because he resisted arrest and fled. Within hours, houses started burning in Summerhill, and Carmichael urged blacks to “tear this place up.” Sixteen people were hospitalized and 75 arrested. The black clergy sought to use ministerial skills to mobilize blacks, and theology to win over whites. However, these kinds of religious appeal were no longer socially appealing in the late Sixties, because an increasing segment of society, coming from both blacks and whites, had become less receptive to moral pronouncements, and were more concerned about black consciousness and white colorblindness.
Chapter Three: Breadbasket in Chicago (1966-72)

Introduction

King’s Chicago Freedom Movement was intended to demonstrate the viability of the Civil Rights Movement outside the South. S.C.L.C. announced the campaign in January 1966, which would begin by challenging the city’s racial housing discrimination. As the clergy was not uniformly supportive of the Chicago Freedom Movement, Breadbasket would be a concession by several ministers who wanted to pursue a program under their own supervision. Inspired by the previous victories in the South, King and the S.C.L.C. folded the Breadbasket program into its attempt to bring the Civil Rights Movement north to Chicago, where it was planning a comprehensive campaign for black equality. It was in Chicago where Breadbasket would rise to prominence under the leadership of Jesse Jackson, an S.C.L.C. veteran, Chicago Theological Seminary student, and associate pastor at Fellowship Baptist Church, who would become Breadbasket’s director and spokesman. Jackson literally transformed Breadbasket.

This chapter describes Chicago-based Breadbasket from its inception in 1966 to its end in 1971. In Chicago, Breadbasket expanded its scope and activities
and became very successful at persuading white-owned chains with large presences in the black community to purchase goods and services from black contractors. Jackson became the national director of Breadbasket’s programs in 1967 with King’s public congratulations: “We came to the realization that Jesse Jackson was the man to run Operation Breadbasket in Chicago, but we had no idea what a good job he would do.”307 After King’s assassination in 1968, Jackson continued to lead the program and moved Breadbasket beyond jobs and patronage for black-owned businesses. Chicago-based Breadbasket became a black cultural enterprise, focused around Saturday workshops, annual expos, and other events. Ultimately, Breadbasket became instrumental in building and protecting the economic autonomy of the black community in Chicago. In 1971, tensions emerged between Jackson and S.C.L.C.’s new leader, Ralph Abernathy, over the location of Breadbasket’s national headquarters and the eventual withholding of funds. Jackson refused to relocate, rejected the allegations on the misuse of funds, and resigned from S.C.L.C. in December. A week later he launched his own economic empowerment organization called Operation PUSH (People United to Save Humanity). Breadbasket continued through the next year, before its eventual demise.

**Origins**

In Chicago in January 1966, Martin Luther King, Jr. and the S.C.L.C. announced a campaign to end the practice of racial discrimination in housing. In alliance with the Coordinating Council of Community
Organizations (CCCO), the S.C.L.C. formed the Chicago Freedom Movement under the leadership of Bernard LaFayette and James Bevel. Simultaneously a second initiative was taking shape in Chicago, a local chapter of S.C.L.C.’s four-year-old Breadbasket program was at also work. Although the Atlanta ministers who comprised the initial unit had won an impressive series of black employment gains from local industries, Director Rev. Fred Bennette had been slow to pursue the coast-to-coast expansion of the program Martin Luther King envisioned, and after four years, Breadbasket was still relegated to the South. Bennette was the Director of Breadbasket from the beginning. The Breadbasket plan particularly appealed to Jesse Jackson, a ministerial student and Chicago staffer who had had his first exposure to S.C.L.C. when Breadbasket began its Chicago activities in 1965 as a biracial committee composed of 50 percent black and 50 percent white membership. Among the members were Jesse Jackson and a Texan named David Wallace, a fellow student of Jackson’s at Chicago Theological Seminary. Later they were joined by two other clergymen, Gary Massoni and Alvin Pitcher, both associated with the seminary, as a student and as a teacher, respectively. Later the team would include Mozella Duncan, Brenda LeMay, Rev. Calvin Morris, and Rev. Ms. Willie Barrow. Aided by advice from Al Pitcher, one of his divinity school professors, Jackson pursued the Breadbasket idea when he found many black clergy unreceptive to the protest campaign Bevel was promoting. “It was clear that the ministers preferred a separate, but related program to the movement,” Jackson explained. “The introduction of Breadbasket into Chicago,” Jackson’s closest
colleague, Gary Massoni later said, “was at first something of a concession to several ministers who agreed with the overall goals of the movement, but who wanted to pursue a program under their own supervision rather than merge into the mass actions being projected.”

In other words, the clergy was not uniformly supportive of the Chicago Freedom Movement. Joseph Jackson, the head of the largest black denomination, the National Baptist Convention, and the pastor of Olivet Baptist Church in Chicago, was vividly against it. The story is well known. Jackson bitterly opposed King’s civil-disobedience campaign and so vigorously quashed liberal opposition and left them with no support within his denomination. As a result, King and a group of ministers from the National Baptist Convention in 1961 formed the Progressive Baptist Convention. Baldwin assumes that “the so-called power struggle between progressives who backed King and conservatives who sided with Jackson … is commonly viewed as the source of the schism.” The divergence between King and Jackson was not only a struggle for power or between different political options – progressives and conservatives – it was also a theological dispute between two pastors on the interpretation and relevance of the social gospel. Jackson stubbornly rejected the implications of the social gospel, and publicly denounced King for his interventionist posture. According to Jackson, “The progress of the race lies not in continued street demonstrations, and the liberation of an oppressed people shall not come by acts of revenge and retaliation but by the constructive use of all available opportunities and a creative expansion of the circumstances of the past into
stepping stones to higher things.” King made his point in his *Letter from a Birmingham Jail*, justice is more valuable than order because it lies on the truth, and the law must be accepted and followed only if it is right. Their confrontational relationship was, in part, a testament to the diversity of opinion that existed among the ministers of the Black Church regarding the appropriate role for the church in securing social change. The involvement of the church in social justice was at the core of their ecclesiastic dilemma. Interestingly enough, the Rev. Joseph H. Jackson and the Rev. King, Jr., shared the same theological premises, that the present Black Church must recall the old-fashioned suffering servant image from Isaiah. “The difference between Negro Christians and white Christians,” said Jackson, “is the meaning of the cross of Jesus Christ. Our forefathers were cross-bearers. They believed in it.” King assumed that the same option of nonviolence was a metaphor, concretely embedded in the flow of life as well as in the history of the church, of the redemptive suffering of Christ. However, this shared image was not sufficient to establish a common ecclesiology. There was more than a generation gap between Jackson and King. Jackson was a product of the Cold War. In his view, patriotism and religion sustained each other. He was a proud Republican and one of the few black leaders to endorse Richard Nixon (with little effect) in the presidential election in 1968; outspokenly dedicated to “law and order,” he won the “Patriot of the Year” award from Ultra-Right-wing Billy James Hargis in 1968. Jackson earnestly preached national unity. “The most important thing now,” he says, “is to save the nation, in order to save the individual citizen, and the race.” In his
view, the Civil Rights struggle was not always disruptive of that unity; he proposed nuances. Christianity, he argued, permits protest against unjust laws but not rebellion against civil order. However, there were no doubts that King’s Civil Rights leadership was disruptive enough. “It was supposed to be a struggle for first-class citizenship, not for getting Whitey,” Jackson maintains. “Those who wanted their rights are being sold another bill of goods now. There are Negroes who believe their mission is to destroy America.” In Jackson’s opinion, the real nature of the Black Church was priestly, and he saw himself as the high priest. As a conscious member of the American establishment, he was a church-state alliance advocate. He was an insider. The high priest could not take care any longer of the spiritual needs of his congregation without also being concerned with the unity, the health, and the good order of the nation. A divided nation would also mean a divided church. The “external” and the “internal” aspects of ecclesiastical life were inseparable. The “internal” priestly and sacramental life of the Black Church depended upon the vitality of the government, which had to be enervated and sustained by the spiritual strength of the church. Government and church had to cooperate and sustain each other in harmony. Consequently, he supported and assisted the government and assigned to himself the role of protector of the nation unity. Unity, race integration and order were the essential elements of Jackson’s thought, and they stand inseparable from the interest and the responsibilities of the Black Church. Jackson’s ecclesiology was simple, the church is an instrument in the running of society. He charged the Black Church with civic responsibilities such as
maintaining order and observing the law. In his view, church and government have to run together, and become entwined. He probably believed this to be part of his divinely authorized function. With this prospective, led by an authoritarian clergy, and at ease with the temporal power of the government, the Black Church’s organizational structure could solidify into the shape of the nation.

King assumed an interventionist posture. The church has the responsibility to intervene in the public affairs, and engage herself in the public conversation when justice was missing and when the people of God were suffering. King was well aware of the social history of the Black Church as well as being concerned about social change. But his primary intent was theological; he wanted to do God’s will. He tried to outline a different mission for the Black Church based on her historical theology rather than a sociological theory. He was an outsider. He presided over the limes, the boundary between church and government, raising his voice when he perceived that he and the nation were living through a kairos, a “time of urgency and providential election.” The famous “urgency of now” is the “providential time,” the moment of grace that may bring justice on earth or pass without effect. It was the kairos that gives a sense of urgency to King’s calls for national renewal, universal brotherhood, and social justice, and places him apart from the other Civil Rights leaders (including Jackson). This sense of urgency provided him with the mantle of prophecy and offered him the opportunity for martyrdom. The divergences in ecclesiology between Jackson and King were mirrored by the strong support or the intentional
passivity of the black clergy with regard to the Civil Rights activities, specifically those of the Chicago Freedom Movement. Breadbasket was a program led by the church in the South that had a limited scope of providing job opportunities to black workers, especially the ones requiring limited skills. Although a boycott-based program, it was less confrontational than the housing desegregation campaign and, more importantly, not so high-profile. It could offer the opportunity for the clergymen to get involved with the movement without jeopardizing their reputations or their ties with the rest of ecclesiastic community. This is the ecclesiological and social context that existed when Breadbasket in Chicago was founded.317

Jackson arranged for King to promote Breadbasket at a mid-November meeting of city pastors. That this speech was King’s only major address in Chicago in the fall of 1965 and was delivered at a gathering of Baptist ministers hosted by Clay Evans, attested to his desire for support from the Black Church. Jackson had talked throughout the fall with Rev. Clay Evans, president of the Chicago Baptist Ministers Conference, about how the city’s hundreds of black pastors could be drawn into the Freedom Movement. To reach out further to the black religious leadership, King met with a core group of clergy, including William L. Lambert of Great Mount Hope Baptist church, Frank Sims of the Ebenezer Baptist Church, and John Porter of the Christ Methodist Church. King found considerable interest, felt encouraged, and authorized Jackson to proceed. King assumed a leading role in cultivating ministerial support for a Chicago version of Breadbasket. The Southern movement, King knew, relied heavily on the leadership of black
ministers. By contrast, even though black (and white) clergy and denomination-based organizations had made great contributions to the Chicago struggle for justice, the leading figures on the local Civil Rights scene were not men of the cloth. Al Raby, for example, was a teacher, and Bill Berry was a race relations professional.

On February 11, 1966, King ran a meeting to recruit over two hundred black ministers that marked the kickoff of Breadbasket in Chicago. The address was well received and in the subsequent days a group of forty clergymen set up committees to gather racial employment statistics from four industries – bakeries, milk companies, soft drink bottlers, and soup companies – suspected of employing too few blacks relative to the heavy minority patronage of their products. The work of these committees marked the definitive emergence of Chicago’s Breadbasket. Although formally an overall steering committee composed of ministers active in the program governed Breadbasket, Jesse Jackson, by this time an associate pastor at Clay Evans’s church, coordinated the group’s efforts. In effect, he became the director of Breadbasket and its spokesperson. Caretaker of an important source of institutional power, Jackson now joined the front ranks of Chicago Civil Rights leaders. In the aftermath of the kickoff meeting for Chicago’s Breadbasket, whose initial objective was to abolish racist hiring practices by employers in African American neighborhoods, a multicultural and multi-denominational collection of 200 clergy attended, and it was from this group that the project’s leadership emerged. Forty of these religious leaders stayed afterward to meet in committees that would investigate hiring practices in
four areas of the food industry: bread, milk, soft drinks and soup. The committees would survey companies serving the black community and then reconvene to plot a course of action. Jackson became one of the organization’s coordinators during this process.  

The tactics of Breadbasket in Chicago were largely based on the previous experiences in the South, and were generally carried out in the same way. The Breadbasket team looked for companies that did a significant amount of business in the black community and determined if they employed blacks in numbers proportionate to the percentage of the population. But they were interested in more than mere figures. They wanted to know at what levels within the companies blacks were employed and, even more importantly, how well blacks were paid in comparison with whites. In order to determine the answers to these questions they sent a letter of inquiry and followed up with personal investigations as they discovered early on that white corporate executives would often provide misleading data in order to avoid confrontation. Next, they paid a call on the company managers, interspersing their conversation with prayers and denunciations of undeniable corporate sins. After surrendering, a High Low (or “Hi-Lo”) Food executive told the audience that “If at any time, any store, whether it be a High Low or any of the competitors, do something which the public feels, especially the community feels, is against the community, then I for one firmly believe that the store ought to fail by lack of support.” That’s quite a remarkable statement for a corporate executive to make, and quite an exceptional demonstration of power for a community organization to show. Notably,
High Low’s surrender came after pursuing an injunction against Breadbasket picketing. The attempted court action ended up in public apostasy. Chicago reporter Barbara Reynolds reports that they would even determine beforehand which two callers would play the role of “hatchet men,” the irascible pair who could never be satisfied no matter what the company promised or affirmed. The technique quickly brought the harassed officials to the bargaining table with the apparently saner, more reasonable blacks, who were invariably those most adept at driving the hardest bargain and employing calming and smoothing speech. Of course, more than occasionally they ran into a hard-nosed corporate executive whose attitude was more or less, “Hell, no, I won’t give in to those bastards. They won’t tell me how to run my business.” They were the ones who were targeted by the picket lines, the leaflets, the firebrand sermons, and – most terrifying of all – the boycotts. Sales graphs plunged off the charts, the word got back to the directors, and very soon a board meeting was called. Eventually, the same irate executive found his way to Breadbasket headquarters, to be introduced to the Rev. Jesse Jackson in order to tell the crowd what a terrible racist he had been and that his only wish was to cooperate with the Rev. Jesse Jackson to make amends for his and his company’s past sins. After capitulation, a formal agreement would be signed, spelling out all the terms of the covenant between Breadbasket and the corporation. Initially, flushed with a series of easy victories, the Breadbasket team rushed on to the next conquest, never questioning whether or not the last company officials to make oral promises were as good as their word. When somebody finally bothered to check, they
found out that very few of the jobs and promotions promised during the negotiations between Breadbasket and the corporation ever went on the payroll. In fact, one reporter checked back with Breadbasket’s initial target after four years and found that it had delivered on less than 25 percent of the jobs promised – a record that was no better or worse than the other companies that made agreements. Soon, everything was put into writing.\textsuperscript{322}

Breadbasket targeted businesses that dealt primarily or exclusively with black clients. Its leadership realized that although white merchants had a bigger – and vastly more affluent – white market to cushion the potential blow of the black consumer boycotts, Chicago’s 1 million black consumers spent $1.5 billion on goods and services every year, and were more than enough to damage the company’s financial results.\textsuperscript{323} Breadbasket used the organizational strength of the Black Church for support and as leverage. Ministers helped Breadbasket collect employment statistics from businesses operating, vending, or supplying stores in black areas. If it was discovered that black people were underemployed or relegated to non-executive roles, Breadbasket opened talks with the management those companies. If management would not negotiate, the ministers pursued retaliatory action. They organized pickets at stores, boycotts of the products of parent companies, and alerted their parishioners to the discriminatory practices of these local businesses. On Sundays, churches became media centers informing Chicago’s African American community which stores to avoid.\textsuperscript{324}
Beginnings in Chicago

With the Black Church behind it, Breadbasket quickly took hold in Chicago. An important part of its strategy was to target companies that specialized in fresh food, as they were the most vulnerable to relatively short boycotts. The average commercial life of milk, bread, fruit and vegetables is a few days. The effects of these boycotts therefore happened nearly in real time as targeted companies quickly felt the sting. As they capitulated, black pastors negotiated with corporate management and signed agreements that pledged expanded employment and promotional opportunities for African Americans in exchange for an end to the protests, and a promise to help these companies recover their lost credibility. Importantly, these campaigns showed that the efforts of relatively few people for a relatively short time could make a big impact. In the first fifteen months of its Chicago operation, mostly under Jackson’s leadership, Breadbasket created 2,000 new jobs worth $15 million a year in new income to the African American community. King called Breadbasket the “most spectacularly successful program” of his Chicago movement.325

Breadbasket’s first target was Country Delight Inc., a local dairy that employed no blacks, but was based in black neighborhoods on Chicago’s South Side. Jackson asked the Reverend Hiram Crawford to lead the initial confrontation with company officials. Barbara Reynolds reports the dialogue between black preacher Hiram Crawford and a Country Delight representative:
Official: Who do you people think you are? I don’t let union officials tell me how to run my company and I am not about to let a bunch of Negro preachers tell me what to do. What do you think this is? … This is a business not a playground.

Crawford: We are not here to argue but to find out the sins of your corporation so we might work together to solve some of the evils of this society.

Official: You must be kidding.

Crawford: We are very serious. When we walked in here we did not see any black secretaries, key punch or computer operators, or clerk typists.

Official: We do ‘em, they are in the back.

Crawford: You mean sweeping floors?

Official: Yeah, but they are earning a decent living. I know all about you people. You do not want to work. My brother-in-law, who was a contractor, hired some colored people once to get them off welfare. You know what they did? They worked for two weeks and quit because they said they could earn more on welfare. That experience taught me a lesson. You people are lazy. You don’t want to work. You want welfare.326

Of course, it was not only the prejudice against black workers, seen as unskilled, lazy and unreliable, but also the control of the workplace that was at stake. White corporate executives had to pass through a painful process and discuss with black clergymen their internal hiring practices. Not surprisingly, the initial discussion with the head of Country Delight Inc., ended in a standoff. The following Sunday, a hundred black preachers took to their pulpits and instructed their congregations to boycott Country Delight products. During the four-day Easter weekend, Country Delight lost more than half a million dollars as black consumers left cartons of milk, butter and cream to sour on the shelves. Within a matter of days, the company called
Jackson to capitulate, offering 44 jobs to blacks. It was a modest beginning, but its implications were enormous. Jackson's method worked. Breadbasket had won its first battle. Word traveled fast through the corporate community. Even before the first black employees could be trained and sent out in the dairy trucks, other dairy companies serving black areas in Chicago called Jackson to negotiate. In the following months, the ministers of Breadbasket won 75 new jobs from two dairy firms they had targeted, Borden and Hawthorn-Mellody, and were on the verge of a forty-four job settlement with a third, Wanzer Dairy. On July 22, 1966, Jesse Jackson reported to S.C.L.C.'s executive board that Breadbasket had completed its fifth successful negotiation, this time with Bowman Dairy for 45 jobs for blacks with an annual payroll of $350,000. This brought Breadbasket's total to 224 jobs with an annual payroll of $1,800,000. King commented that this was the movement's "most concrete program, one with tangible results," and the "public needs to know about it. Why is the white press holding back?" he asked. The ensuing discussion focused on the inadequacies of the Tribune's Civil Rights coverage, with Jackson suggesting a boycott of that paper.

In July and August 1966, Breadbasket continued to register victories, even though its director Jesse Jackson, who acted as Northern director while Fred Bennette was still the Southern director, moonlighted as a leader of open-housing marches. In late July, Breadbasket switched its target from dairy firms to soft drink bottlers. Jackson and his aides did their homework, and went around to corporate offices armed with charts and diagrams that demonstrated the importance of black consumers, threatening a boycott if
the companies didn’t pledge to hire more black employees. Before the summer was over, with temperatures in the 80s, all three major suppliers – Pepsi, Coke, and 7UP – agreed. Jackson was on a roll. In the fall, with the open-housing protest over, Breadbasket enlarged its staff and broadened its aims. Instead of confronting distributors, it now challenged supermarkets patronized by blacks, demanding that the stores stock black-made products and channel some of their assets into black-owned banks.

Jackson felt encouraged by the previous successes to extend Breadbasket’s goals and expand its operational scope. Instead of merely hitting distributors, Breadbasket directly challenged supermarket chains that summer. It no longer just demanded jobs but also pressured major companies to extend business ties with the black community. Breadbasket promoted patronage for black-owned businesses as a means of persuading whites to purchase goods and services from black contractors or deposit funds in black-owned banks. Breadbasket leaders believed that blacks needed jobs, contracts and capital to compete in the market. The strategy change revealed an understanding of the operations of supermarket chains. Supermarkets are similar to stores that sell primarily dairy products. In fact they suffer a higher level of vulnerability. This is not so much in the short life of the product—fresh food only represents a small percentage of their portfolio—as in the structure of the business model. The supermarket model is very similar to that of banks; they make profits through cash management. The store collects money from customers now and pays suppliers later. To increase liquidity, it sometimes has to reduce prices. Lower prices lead to increased sales. It is obvious that if
prices are to remain low, then costs (labor in particular) must also be kept low. Supermarket chains therefore try to balance costs and revenue streams to create an uninterrupted daily flow of money running through the operation’s circulatory system. The company can then withdraw a small portion of this as investment capital that will be used to make the company’s profit while the remaining part circulates through the daily operation. An abrupt cessation of the flow of revenue in the form of a boycott can be devastating to companies where cash management has the full responsibility to produce profits. Without reliable revenue streams, supermarkets can’t pay suppliers, who stop delivering. The store’s stock is depleted and customers go elsewhere. The company may be able to sustain itself for a few days or weeks, depending on its size. The larger the company is, the less effect a boycott will on it. The more cash available to the company, the longer the protest has to last. Breadbasket targeted businesses in industries where the margin of profitability was small. In those situations, even if black customers were only a fraction of the total, they could still determine the success or failure of the firm. Breadbasket’s strategy tended to capitalize on “the disproportionate effect of a concentrated minority force applied to the fractions of decisive margin in an otherwise impossible larger equation.”

Jackson was careful to choose targets where he had the leverage to win, for example, grocery chains that depended on black customers. The first of these was Hi-Lo stores, a white-owned grocery chain that operated primarily in black neighborhoods. After winning an agreement from management to provide 184 new jobs for blacks, including positions as store managers,
Jackson presented a new demand, that Hi-Lo guarantee shelf space for products made by minority-owned businesses. The shift in strategy was immediately reflected in the internal documents:

Operation Breadbasket seek not only to open a few jobs, but to challenge institutional or corporate arrangements that are exploitive by virtue of the structural racism they sustain; especially is this the case with respect to allocation of jobs and monopoly of the existent markets for trade.

What products did Jackson push? Those made by a handful of black businessmen, who had supported his projects and were paying for his operation. At his Saturday morning meetings, Jackson would exhort the crowd to buy Joe Louis Milk and Grove Fresh orange juice, inventing rhyming jingles as he warmed up and engaged the crowd. Before he was done, Hi-Lo not only stocked those products but other products created by blacks, such as Archie’s Mumbo Barbecue Sauce, Staff of Life Bread, and King Solomon Deodorant. “He gets dollars from white corporations to help his black buddies who in turn contributed to his organization,” charged Barbara Reynolds. Jackson publicly acknowledged the quid pro quo relationship with the black business community in Chicago. In response to criticism that he was “tithing” black businessmen in exchange for his services as an intermediary, Jackson said, “Absolutely. It’s like a tax. You pay taxes to the government for your services, don’t you?... We are all family here, but you have to pay to play. You cannot ride to freedom free in Pharaoh’s chariot.”

Jackson’s “boycott for business” approach generated controversy within the Civil Rights Movement itself. The Reverend Hiram Crawford, who was
instrumental in energizing the Chicago black clergy to support the Breadbasket boycotts, grew disenchanted with Jackson and accused him of cutting a secret deal with the businessmen behind the backs of the black pastors. “Dr. Martin Luther King and Jesse Jackson were introduced to black businessmen in Chicago at the old H&H restaurant on 51st street in 1966,” he wrote. “The wound which I received was to discover later that Rev. Jesse Jackson and George Jones of the Joe Louis Milk Co. had been holding private meetings” and that Jackson “had collected pledges” from him in exchange for Breadbasket boycotts. “I brought this to the attention of the general body of Breadbasket and revealed money had been raised without our knowledge or consent.” Despite these disagreements, when King convened a two-day executive staff meeting in Atlanta to discuss possible fund-raising strategies, new responsibilities for searching out money had been delegated to Jesse Jackson, whose Chicago Breadbasket program had won sizable job gains from soft drink firms and grocery store chains. Jackson had hopes of branching out in new directions, and Breadbasket’s most recent agreement – with High Low, a string of fifty supermarkets – reflected the possibilities. Beyond a commitment to hire 183 black workers, each of its fourteen ghetto stores (20 percent of Hi-Lo’s business) agreed to open accounts at the black-owned Seaway National Bank. High Low also promised to open accounts at another black bank and to stock the products – e.g. Joe Louis Milk, Parker House sausage, Stewart Bleach – of six black manufacturing firms. In this way, Jackson argued, Breadbasket’s goal could be expanded into a far-reaching program for economic development of black
communities. In addition, he suggested by bringing together progressive private investors and government-supported housing-improvement programs, S.C.L.C. could pursue redevelopment of the black communities’ housing stock. Jackson said that National Tea Company, another grocery chain, was the next target, but he claimed that there was a “blackout in the newspapers” on Breadbasket.\textsuperscript{341} An impressed King – who several weeks earlier had doubled Jackson’s S.C.L.C. salary from $3,000 to $6,000 – voiced praise for his creative proposals.\textsuperscript{342}

Banks, finance and credit were regarded as playing a key role in Breadbasket’s vision of the advancement of the black community. Already in May 1966, Jackson made his point in an internal report to Andrew Young:

> Another problem that Operation Breadbasket is discussing is the problem to securing decent finance and credit (...) We can find a bank such a Seaway National Bank, which is Negro owned and directed, as well as sympathetic to the Negro financial and credit problem, and make that into a major bank. We could do that by a mass transference of funds of churches and members of the congregations from downtown white owned banks to one, maybe two banks. In that way we can create a major Negro financial institution that will be a source of economic activity for investment, decent credit, and loans that Negroes in the slums now have no access to for creative venture.\textsuperscript{343}

The original idea soon evolved. While the goal of one or two black-owned financial institutions remained, the source of funds would become black businesspeople, rather than churchmen and congregations. To this end, the program actively sought to obtain deposits for the Seaway National Bank and the Independence Bank of Chicago, predominantly black banks that were founded in the mid-Sixties. A business owner’s committee was formed to
urge black entrepreneurs, bankers, and professionals to use the black-owned banks and savings and loan associations. On December 31, 1966, Seaway National had total resources of $7.4 million and the Independence Bank of Chicago $6.1 million. A year later, the figures were $12.6 million and $9.0 million respectively, for a combined increase in assets of 60 percent. The president of Seaway National, Howard Algar, stated that of his bank’s $5.2 million increase in deposits around 10 percent came either directly or indirectly through the efforts of Breadbasket. He also pointed out that Seaway had recently made a $500,000 rehabilitation loan to a black mortgage banker. In the same period, Illinois State Treasurer Adlai Stevenson III deposited state funds in Seaway National, Independence Bank of Chicago and in other three savings and loan associations, which he described as “serving the extraordinary needs of Negro neighborhoods.” He acknowledged Jesse Jackson and Breadbasket as a source of encouragement. The banks were reported to have received $300,000 each in state deposits.344 Later, the source of funds would become white-owned companies under the threat of boycotts.

Jackson showed a clear fascination for, and an evident appreciation of financial capitalism. “I keep telling you that capitalism without capital is just plain ism – and can’t live off ism.” He tried to convince consumers and businesspeople, clergymen and families, to take their money out of the banks in Chicago downtown (the white-owned banks outside the ghetto) and put it in black banks in the ghetto. He recognized that it was asking them to “go through an entire psychological revolution,” as black people did not trust
black banks, and had this prejudice that black banks were natural candidates for insolvency and bankruptcy, and that was actually not just a prejudice, but a matter of fact. Jackson also made the point that not only black politicians, but also key black business actors and emerging entrepreneurs had their money in white banks downtown, and this fact, that their economic base was outside of the ghetto, was the reason Chicago’s black leadership was insensitive to the needs of the black community.\(^{345}\)

At the steering committee meeting of December 13, 1966, Jesse Jackson reported that agreements with Nation Tea and Del Farms had produced 383 new jobs. The supermarket chain also agreed to market the products of fifteen black-owned enterprises and to transfer the accounts of their stores located in the ghetto to Seaway and Independence banks, both of which were black-owned. “One of the most significant projects we can do this winter,” he said, “is a bank-in movement, asking concerned whites to put money in Negro banks. The money could extend their lending power. The whole money market could change.” The other problem on Jackson’s mind was training programs. He wanted something independent of Breadbasket. “The Urban League,” he said, “needs a full department” to train people for Breadbasket-negotiated jobs. Breadbasket, he said, had “turned into an economic movement.” It was “understaffed” and needed “help and suggestions.” The Urban League representatives agreed to see about adding staff “to coordinate, recruit, place, and follow-up on Breadbasket jobs.” Another of Breadbasket’s ventures was a project called Operation Love that was apparently subject to misunderstanding as a result of its name. It had
been presented as a proposal for Coca-Cola to sponsor. Rumors immediately spread that Breadbasket was demanding money, presumably under threat of demonstrations. The object was to raise some $5 million for new Negro businesses. About $260,000 was targeted for a media campaign to promote change in the presentation of blacks. Jackson tried to clarify the nature of Operation Love, but the relation of the steering committee to this project was not clear. The project soon collapsed.\textsuperscript{346}

Jackson moved Breadbasket to the next level when he launched a boycott against the national food chain Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company (A&P), which operated 40 stores in Chicago’s black ghetto. It was Breadbaskets’ shining hour that put it on the map, and Jackson considered it one of his main successes. It was the biggest settlement with a chain in a single city, and set a precedent for other food chain negotiations across the country, even if, according to Hurly Green, Jackson was not personally involved. “Willie Barrow actually led the boycott (...) she was out there every day for 16 weeks.”\textsuperscript{347} A&P was no easy win, as Jackson’s other targets had been. This was a national chain, and it had deep pockets. When Breadbasket took on A&P, its stores were everywhere in America’s inner cities. In fact, A&P was so pervasive that the company had run afoul of the Sherman Antitrust legislation.\textsuperscript{348} Although the black ministers used their pulpits to exhort the faithful to boycott A&P, profit from other parts of the country steeled company management against giving in to Jackson’s demands. For 16 weeks Jackson’s picketers surrounded A&P stores on the South Side of Chicago. A&P gave up after sixteen weeks of boycotts. The A&P agreement was
especially significant because in addition to a guarantee of 286 jobs, some of them executive and managerial positions, Jackson forced A&P to stock a total of 25 products from black manufacturers. A&P also conceded to the use of black service companies such as exterminators, garbage collectors, and janitorial firms. Later Jackson capitalized on the agreement with the A&P Company, which provided a total 770 new jobs to blacks at the end of the year, and celebrated the success of Breadbasket. Monthly meetings between representatives of A&P and the Breadbasket team were designed to assure the company was not shirking its agreements. On a personal level, sensitivity seminars attended by A&P executives attempted to awaken management to the existence and effects of racial prejudice. Breadbasket was achieving spectacular results. Its leadership contacted one major supermarket chain after another in Chicago, including the National Team Company, Jewel Foods, A&P, and High Low Food, whose fifty supermarkets included fourteen locations in black neighborhoods. One by one the big chains, surrendered to Breadbasket requests. So swift was Breadbasket’s progress that in late 1966 King promoted the young Jackson to an executive position in S.C.L.C.

Negotiations with other chains proved more problematic. Many did not meet the job requests, while new talks stalled with both Walgreens drug stores and Red Rooster food stores. The latter was a particularly bad actor only found in the poorest neighborhoods, and accused of disguising bad meat and other offenses. The Red Rooster food stores were notorious for the poor quality of their products and their high prices. The Chicago city authorities, not
famous for cracking down on lapses in hygiene, had fined them 32 times for flagrant violations, from selling spoiled meat to short weighting. Moreover, they were unlike Jackson’s other targets, because in fact, they had black employees, some of them prominent in the chain’s management. Despite this resistance, Red Rooster’s management eventually caved. The price of Jackson’s boycott was unusual; he demanded, for unknown reasons, that the company increase its payroll by hiring 22 members of the Black Stone Rangers, the one of the biggest and most violent street gangs from the South Side.

On March 9-10, 1967, three new departments were created inside S.C.L.C.. Among them was a labor and economic affairs department to be headed by Jesse Jackson that would expand Breadbasket into a national program. It seemed that Dr. King’s plan that had previously been tabled, to scale Breadbasket up, was finally at hand. A few months later, on July 9, 1967, King was back in Chicago, not to push for open housing but to head a two-day conference aimed at turning Breadbasket into a nationwide program. In front of 150 black churchmen from 42 major cities throughout the country, it was stated during the conference that in Chicago alone, Breadbasket had won 2,200 jobs worth more than $15 million in annual income for blacks. Breadbasket was the success story of the Chicago campaign. King drew headlines, however, for his supportive statements about the progress in Chicago. It was King’s way of explaining why there were and would be no massive demonstrations that summer in Chicago. “Our weapon is noncooperation with economic injustice,” he explained. That was the new
thrust, and Breadbasket was the vehicle.\textsuperscript{358} King also announced Breadbasket’s biggest pact so far, an agreement with the Jewel food store chain that provided for 512 new jobs, shelf space for black manufacturers’ products, and expanded company patronage of black firms.\textsuperscript{359}

More than a hundred black ministers from a score of major cities attended the session at the Chicago Theological Seminary, and Breadbasket’s leaders, such as Jesse Jackson, spoke about how an expanded effort could win thousands of jobs for blacks by targeting companies like General Motors, Kellogg, Kraft and Del Monte in locations all around the country. King claimed that a program of national magnitude would mean more than 60,000 new jobs annually for black people and millions of dollars deposited in black banking and savings and loan institutions.\textsuperscript{360} King’s statements reflected his increasingly harsh view of America’s shortcomings, and a rare wistfulness about the past. “Most whites are not committed to equal opportunities for Negroes,” he told one interviewer, while informing the Breadbasket conference that “America has been, and she continues to be, largely a racist society … Maybe something is wrong with our economic system the way it’s presently going.” King noted that in democratic socialist societies such as Sweden there was no poverty, no unemployment and no slums. “There comes a time when any system must be re-evaluated,” said King, and America’s time was at hand.

The movement must address itself to restructuring the whole of American society. The problems we are dealing with … are not going to be solved until there is a radical redistribution of economic and political power.\textsuperscript{361}
King reminded 150 ministers that corporations might yield concessions under pressure, but they were still the primary culprits in perpetuating urban poverty. In one of his most radical statements, made again before a black activist audience, King criticized corporate power and not just policy failure. Negroes living in slums faced “economic exploitation.” King stated that

American industry and business, as part as the broader power structure, is in a large part responsible for the economic malady which grips and crushes down people in the ghetto.\footnote{362} At a July 12 Breadbasket meeting, King demanded that his audience rigorously question the capitalist economy, preaching that, “the earth is the Lord’s and the fullness thereof.” He claimed that a minister’s first concern should be with the “least of these.” So as they negotiated with businessmen for jobs, they should pressure corporate leaders to “set aside profit for the greater good” and advocate “restructuring of our whole society.” King had always seen the need to work with black businessmen who professed a commitment to race advancement. Black unity and collective economic advancement still trumped any overt advocacy of class conflict. But privately, King agreed with William (Bill) Rutherford, S.C.L.C.’s new executive director that to replace “white bastards with black bastards” as exploiters of black workers would be a cruel joke.\footnote{363}

Breadbasket was achieving success in Chicago and Cleveland. King journeyed to Cleveland, where he announced a Breadbasket agreement with Sealtest. The agreement was about a number of jobs, which would bring almost five
hundred thousand dollars of new income to the Negro community a year. Along with the demand for jobs, King said,

We also demand that you put money in the Negro savings and loan association and that you take ads, advertise, in the *Cleveland Call & Post*, the Negro newspaper.

Along with the new jobs, Sealtest deposited thousands of dollars in the black bank of Cleveland and started taking ads in the Negro newspaper in that city. King made two more visits to Cleveland, where he was pleased with Andrew Young’s evaluation of the project, that it was off to “a very successful beginning.” Breadbasket had focused on local milk companies, and James Orange was working with several tenant’s unions in Hough.

Breadbasket never achieved national recognition; despite the fact that steps were made to increase it’s the infrastructure, for example, by involving black students in the program – that “the Negro student is an important commodity in Operation Breadbasket,” is mentioned in an internal memo, an explicit reminiscence of Birmingham. In the following years, especially after Dr. King’s assassination, the program made efforts to expand in size and scopes outside Chicago, and yet remaining a local program. Breadbasket opened up new operations in other cities, but Jackson was more interested in building his political and economic base in Chicago, instead of flying from one city to another to build a national network of Breadbasket’s operations.

At that time, Chicago was a vibrant black economic environment, home of an emerging black entrepreneurial class, a large and depressed ghetto economy, and an increasing amount of poor and unemployed people. It had
everything to keep Jackson busy, but his disinterest in making Breadbasket into a national organization, and his Chicago-centric strategy were some of the reasons for the eventual ending of the program.

**Controversies**

The original contact between the S.C.L.C. and local gangs was established by another mentor of Jackson’s, James Bevel. When Bevel went to Chicago in 1966 as King’s advance man for S.C.L.C.’s ill-fated national opening of the housing campaign, he was program director of the Westside Christian Parish, where he had extensive dealings with gangs, recalcitrant political leaders, and a rapidly growing antagonism between older, more moderate black leaders, on the one hand, and young militants on the other. Bevel, who probably conducted as many non-violence seminars as any other single activist, used his skills in demanding that the Black Stone Rangers and other local gangs (such as the Gangster Disciples and the Vice Lords) eschew violence as an avenue toward social change. He even went so far as to show a film on the 1965 Watts riot in an attempt to forestall violent confrontations with Chicago’s police during demonstrations. Though they respected Bevel, the young people of Chicago were not as receptive to Bevel’s message as other southern audiences. Then, King met the Black Stone Rangers’ leadership. Gary Massoni remembers that “When we first came here in 1966 with Dr. King, the idea of the urban gangs was a phenomenon we had not known in the South. (...) Clearly there was no such underground movement of gangs that we later found to be very connected to the higher-up Mafia. It was not
innocent children, but real, real stuff.” Dr. King thought he could redeem them, Jackson says. More than a hundred members of Chicago’s most notorious street gangs convened in a downtown hotel on a June afternoon in 1966. Martin Luther King, Jr. sat with them. His Southern Christian Leadership Conference had sponsored the meeting. At the gang summit, Dr. King asked Chicago’s gangs to channel their energies into nonviolent protest against poverty and inequality. King and his allies in the Chicago community hoped to mobilize the gangs toward nonviolent direct action in service of the Chicago Freedom Movement. And they hoped to turn them away from the fratricidal violence that had recently begun tearing through the city’s black neighborhoods, where gunfire had become a soundtrack to the daily lives of many residents. 395 people had been murdered the previous year -- many of them in gang wars, almost all of them with guns.\textsuperscript{367} “People said Dr. King was naïve about his capacity to change them. It was in this context – the Black Stone Rangers, the Disciples -- that we got to know Jeff Fort,” Massoni says. At that point, Fort was the undisputed leader of the Black Stone Rangers.\textsuperscript{368} Dr. King’s interest with street gangs was not limited to Chicago. During the last years of his life, he met street gangs in many cities, including Los Angeles and Oakland among the others. His nonviolent message was always recognized, usually listened to, and less often well received.\textsuperscript{369} It was part of the S.C.L.C. vocation to try to establish a dialogue with the militant wings of the poor, and to try to change their hearts.

Connections between Breadbasket and Black Stone Rangers are well documented. For example, Leonard Dickerson (a.k.a. Leonard Sengali) was
the local Black Stone Rangers leader on 46th Street. For example, Dickerson was driving Jackson to the Stones’ clubhouse at 4630 Greenwood, where Jackson had bought an old church. “They were driving east on 47th Street, just east of Drexel, when somebody opened fire on the car,” says retired Chicago police detective Richard Kolovitz. Neither Dickerson nor Jackson was hurt in the spray of bullets. Jackson still recalls the shooting. “It was a very tense period. The post-King period was full of riots … lots of threats. Civil Rights leaders and ministers had to have bodyguards (because of) threats by gang members on their church.” However, it is only when Noah Robinson Jr. joined Breadbasket that the liaison between Breadbasket and the Blackstone Rangers was formally established. Less than one year after Jesse Jackson was born, Noah Robinson’s wife gave birth to a son they named Noah R. Robinson Jr. Jackson and his younger half-brother attended the same schools as Noah Robinson, but he and his half brother returned home to separated households every evening. Noah Robinson Jr. graduated with an MBA from the prestigious Wharton School at the University of Pennsylvania in 1969, and set up his own management consulting firm in Philadelphia that was hailed by Fortune magazine as “one of the most successfully and enthusiastically supported programs of its kind in the nation.” Noah also wanted to help Jesse, and reportedly turned down thirty-two job offers, preferring to join Jackson at Breadbasket in 1969. For a short time Robinson took over Breadbasket on behalf of the S.C.L.C. after Jackson left, then devoted himself full time to running the Breadbasket Commercial Association (BCA), the private company he set up with some
Noah’s brief association with the S.C.L.C. in 1971 gave him legitimacy and helped to win a $155,000 per year grant from the federal Office of Minority Business Enterprise to train minorities in setting up and operating their own businesses. Then Noah entered into a closer relationship with Black Stone Rangers. He was arrested and sentenced to life in prison. Glenn Bone III, now pastor of Good Seed Ministries in Chicago, says that “everybody knew he (Noah Robinson) was into drugs and gangs,” he recalls. However, no connection between Noah Robinson’s illegal activities and Jesse Jackson’s step-brother, and Breadbasket was ever proved.

Together with allegations of a direct connection with criminals, another source of controversy for Jackson was Breadbasket’s new strategy. Jackson envisioned the program not only as a boycott-based campaign to promote integration in the workplace, but also as a development agency to promote the black community and entrepreneurship. The shift from job hiring to economic development occurred as part of the planning by Breadbasket’s leadership smoothly at first, and continued to progress. It mirrored a complex and wider evolution taking place in the black community, as well as in the larger economic setting. Jackson was aware of the multiple forces at work inside the Black Freedom Movement and was also developing his own vision. He consistently tried to play a unifying role between integrationists and separationists, blaming nobody, and enlarging his network of allies. In a few years, he was able to provide a very sophisticated analysis of the race divide and proposed an innovative, integrationist approach to American
capitalism. He clearly identified the potential of creating a connection between the ghetto economy and black business, and was committed to making this possible connection work. However, his innovative approach while it was still being formed, did not attract King’s approval. To his credit, Jackson never criticized King, publicly or in private, always consistent in his strategy to be seen as King’s only natural heir.

As for King, he was not immediately skeptical; at the beginning, King was simply enthusiastic about Breadbasket. Breadbasket was S.C.L.C.’s first effort to address the crisis of joblessness that, according to historian Jackson, “became King’s principal preoccupation” in the mid-1960s. One of S.C.L.C.’s social programs became King’s central concern during his last years; the unemployment and low wages that produced poverty. King was supportive of the shift from “job discrimination” to “stimulate Negro businesses, financial institutions and services.” As reported in internal Breadbasket notes, he agreed that Breadbasket would open “markets in large chain stores to Negro products and services” and persuade large companies to bank at black-owned banks, enabling black companies to win, for the first time, important service contracts, in the construction industry, for example. He credited Jackson with Breadbasket’s success. Jackson managed Breadbasket in Chicago and built an impressive network of 120 ministers and more than 100 businessmen who took the original idea in the direction of black capitalism. Describing the slums as an American bantustan, an “underdeveloped nation” with abundant labor and insufficient capital, Jackson summoned the nation to “provide the bootless with boots”
in the form of jobs, and to teach “those with boots to pull themselves up” through business development. Breadbasket won support from several Chicago trade unions as it challenged and boycotted Country Delight and High Low Foods, and waged a successful sixteen-week campaign against A&P with forty stores in the black community. Not only that, Breadbasket helped black hospital workers, teachers, and bus drivers during local strikes. King called Jackson “a great dreamer and the great implementer of dreams” for winning jobs in white firms and for “building the economic base through Negro business.”

Behind mutual compliments and public expressions of esteem, Breadbasket leadership was divided between two conflicting visions, Jackson’s black capitalism, and King’s social democratic welfare. “We were very aware of some of the contradictions, and ambivalent about it,” Morris remembered, but other staffers could see that King had “grave doubts” about Breadbasket’s goals. This is, when Rutherford raised the issue with King about replacing “‘white bastards with black bastards.’ ‘If the whole thrust of assuring oneself profit is to exploit whoever’s there, what the hell are we doing with black people, trying to put them in the same odious position where you have to exploit someone else to turn your profit?’ King replied, ‘Bill, there’s so much to be done that people are not ready to do right now.’” Rutherford understood King’s point. “ Obviously we’ve got to have some form of socialism, but America’s not ready to hear it yet.” Rutherford appreciated that King’s unhappiness with Jackson went beyond spirit and ideology.
He didn’t trust Jesse, he didn’t even like Jesse … If you ask me if there was any suspicion about Jesse’s motives and even devotion to the movement, I would say categorically yes, there was – considerable. And we talked about it.  

The divergence between King and Jackson was explained in terms of a clash of characters. King assigned a special mission to Bill Rutherford when Rutherford became S.C.L.C. executive director. 

He said, ‘The second thing I want you to do is, Jesse Jackson’s so independent, I either want him in S.C.L.C. or out – you go whichever way you want to, but one way or the other, he’s a part of S.C.L.C. or he’s not a part of S.C.L.C. 

Breadbasket was achieving success in Chicago and Cleveland, but Jackson was viewed as an outsider, an egotistical self-promoter by many S.C.L.C. staffers. Later that year, in Chicago, James Bevel had taken Jackson under his wing, and put him on S.C.L.C.’s staff. “Bevel was the real genius of that period,” Jackson remembered, “one of the most creative thinkers I’ve ever been exposed to.” Just as Bevel’s eccentricities and single-mindedness rubbed many colleagues the wrong way, Jackson’s aggressive efforts to expand Breadbasket into a nation-wide program for fostering black capitalism also troubled many S.C.L.C. activists. Although part of the tension was rooted in the Atlanta staffers’ desire to keep a tight rein on Chicago-based programs, much of the trouble stemmed from a distrust of Jackson’s personal motives. “Jesse was really an outsider in a way, striving very hard to get in, to be accepted, to be respected,” recalled Calvin Morris, who became associate director of Breadbasket during that winter. “The doubt about Jesse is what is it for, is it for Jesse or for the movement?” Stanley Levison said to Coretta King six months later, “[I] know on this Martin had many deep doubts.”
Bevel often defended Jackson, telling King, “He’s just crude ‘cause he’s young.” King disagreed, saying, “NO, he’s ambitious,” and voiced his unease to close friends. “Jesse had irritating ways,” King’s Chicago confidant Chauncey Eskridge explained. “I don’t think we cared much for him.” Those sympathetic to Jackson saw the dynamics differently. “Martin had problems with Jesse because Jesse would ask questions, “but others perceived a fundamental spiritual difference between the two men. “Martin saw it in Jesse,” one former S.C.L.C. executive recalled. “He used to tell Jesse, ‘Jesse, you have no love.’” However, their divergence was also rooted in a generation gap, different priorities, and dissimilar strategies.

Jackson’s drift toward black capitalism troubled King, he thought it failed to address black poverty, labor exploitation, and political exclusion. King told a March 1967 meeting of Breadbasket in Chicago that a white man who preached black capital accumulation to poor people reminded him of somebody “telling you to lift yourself up by your bootstraps” while he was standing on your foot. As the movement advocated guaranteed incomes, programs like Breadbasket could provide a means of self-help. King “was quite rough on Jesse,” Andrew Young remembered, because he believed that adequate jobs would have to come through the public sector, while “Breadbasket was essentially a private sector program.” King never championed the cause of minority small businesses, as did people as diverse as Floyd McKissick (who was a supporter of Black Power and turned the Congress of Racial Equality, or CORE, into a more radical movement, while still endorsing Nixon in 1968), Robert Kennedy, and Richard Nixon. In
September, King met the Chicago owner of a gift shop facing bankruptcy.
The entrepreneur asked King for help in requesting funds from the Small
Business Administration to make up the shortfall of capital. When King
deprecated, she thanked him for his participation in the “fight for jobs,” but
insisted, “if we do not now begin the establishment of businesses, we may
very well find that in another 100 years we will be no better off in our fight
for economic power and human dignity.”

**Breadbasket after King**

What most clearly characterized the intellectual landscape of the black
movement in Chicago in the second half of the 1960s was an exceptionally
wide range of approaches, perspectives and goals. Some were rooted in the
tradition of the Civil Rights Movement, others in the experiences of more
radical, militant groups, with still others in-between. The intellectual life of
Black Chicago was particularly diverse and fluid. The era was explosive, the
racial struggle difficult and ongoing, and the passion great enough to permit
the coexistence of many different agendas within the black community.
While some black leaders tried to emphasize the differences, others – like
Jackson – worked to unify the different fragments of the movement.

Jackson, unlike King, had emphasized the originality, the uniqueness, the
overwhelming importance of being black. King shied away from the kind of
Black Nationalism and Pan-Africanism that attracted more militant leaders
such as Stokely Carmichael. But as soon as King was dead, Jackson began to
move Breadbasket in that direction, and his results were electrifying. His first
innovation came in 1968, the year of King’s death, with the inauguration of what he called “Black Christmas,” which was both a seasonal celebration and a hard-nosed economic venture. Born of a desire in other leaders to punish white businessmen by boycotting their businesses at Christmastime, Black Christmas was a more positive and more pragmatic alternative. In a sense, it was the black version of the Macy’s parade that had become an important introduction to holiday season on television. Instead of watching Mickey Mouse and Santa Claus cavort in faraway New York, blacks in Chicago would put on their own parade, with their own floats, their own bands, their own beauty queens, their own jovial advertisements. And black businesses also set up a “Breadbasket Black Christmas Center.” But the event was not pure merriment, any more than it was mere commercialism. There was something else present as well – a new symbolism, the beginnings of an attempt to change the traditional iconography of Christmas, to give it a distinctly and exclusively black meaning. This element is perhaps the best example of Jesse Jackson’s imagination at work, his genius in the invention of new images and rituals, an essential element in the transformation of any society. For instead of Santa Claus – who according to Jackson was too old, fat and white – Jackson featured at Black Christmas a new character known as “Black Soul Saint,” who, according to Jackson, came from the South Pole rather than the North Pole and lingered along the equator sufficiently to turn up wearing a dashiki of black, with yellow, red, and green trimmings, the colors of the flag of Ghana. Henceforth, the Soul Saint would preside over the season of Christmas, a black figure whose gifts were not toys or sugar
plums but “love, justice, peace, and power.” Christmas underwent a magical transformation that year in Chicago, becoming an ethnic holiday with overtones of the political. The Black Christmas parade was headed by a horse-drawn wagon, symbolizing “the poverty of the nation’s masses.” And since that time Black Christmas has been held annually in Chicago, and each year its symbolism and its message further emphasize the separateness of blacks from the white community, a message which Jackson himself has only infrequently proclaimed within earshot of the national press. Following the success of Black Christmas, Jackson and Breadbasket introduced Black Easter, as a follow-up celebration based on the Christian calendar. Like Black Christmas, Black Easter was an attempt to “capture” the holiday for blacks, to free it from white domination, to separate it from its traditional association. Instead of Soul Saint, Jackson used a simpler, more poignant symbol for the idea of resurrection - a black lamb, which both suggested Christ the Lamb of God, and identified Him with the proverbial creature cast out from the rest of the flock because of his color. Black Easter also featured a black passion play written and directed by a black woman, a drama which equated the passion of Christ with the suffering of the black people. And as if to emphasize further the more recent historical meaning of the celebration, floats were named after dead black heroes like W.E.B. Dubois, Malcolm X, Medger Evers, and of course, Martin Luther King, Jr. Yet Jackson did not forget the more pragmatic responsibilities of Breadbasket, such as his emphasis on buying Easter gifts at black businesses. “If we are proud to be black,” he said, “we can spend our money where we are.” And in 1969 Easter
bonnets and Easter suits were bought on the south and west sides rather than in white-owned stores in the Loop.

Then came Black Expo, perhaps Jackson’s most famous commercial idea. The concept that produced Black Expo was nothing new in the business world. In retrospect it seems like an idea that anyone might have dreamed up. After all, every industry has its annual market, where those in the trade buy booths, display their wares and services, and compete for their share of the business. Retailers meet wholesalers. Cards are exchanged. Deals struck. But it took Jesse Jackson to take this marketing idea – as old as the medieval fair – and apply it to the problems of black business in a white-dominated economy. Black Expo was an annual trade fair for black businesses, both local and national, as well as a general celebration of black capitalism, complete with parties, concerts by black artists, an exhibition of paintings and sculptures by black artists, and other attractions associated with economic expositions. Central to this splendid spectacle were the business booths themselves, predominately (though not exclusively) black-owned. White exhibitors were invited and allowed to set up in limited numbers, but they paid many times the amount that black exhibitors paid, and there were those who grumbled that it was more like tribute than rent. In spite of this, they came because they were convinced that it was a way of insuring themselves against future boycotts of one kind or another, some came because they knew it was an excellent way to pick up a share of the money spent in ever-increasing amounts by black consumers. In the case of Black Christmas and Black Easter, the theme of each Black Expo was openly
ethnocentric; in 1969 it was “From Chains to Change”; in 1970 “Rhythm Ain’t All We Got”; in 1971 “See the Dream Coming True”; in 1972 “Save the Children” and so on. The Expo spoke to blacks of their own blackness as it promoted economic opportunity, and in many ways it was the triumph of Jesse Jackson’s entrepreneurial genius. It was synthesis of two ideas that became so perfectly wedded that Black Expo seemed likely to outlast all his other efforts in Chicago.383

At this point, Jackson was framing himself as a champion of black capitalism. In the evolution of his vision, and that of other black leaders’, a role was played by the poor results of the Poor People’s Campaign. Historian Mantler Gordon writes that Jackson tried to frame the Poor People’s Campaign more directly within the increasingly popular concept of black capitalism, which was championed by the Black Power advocates, and also because the Poor People’s Campaign experience reinforced his understanding that the time for an effective dialogue with liberal politics were over. Gordon points out that the hundreds of Chicagoans who participated in the campaign – the most from one city – witnessed firsthand the limited assistance Congress was willing to provide. Thus, they returned to the city more open to the more aggressive strategy offered by Breadbasket. It is possible that Jackson, who was among them, took note of the disastrous end of the King’s last campaign in Washington, a campaign that he led reluctantly. However, it is also possible that Chicago was simply the right place to absorb the influence of Black Power and the other radical forces at work within the black urban community. In addition, Jackson was a generation younger that King, and
more sensitive to the post-1965 cultural and economic climate. People saw the Chicago operation as the embodiment of Civil Rights’ ideals, claimed Calvin Morris, Breadbasket’s associate director. “It unleashed a kind of new spirit of boldness here,” Morris said, adding, “One of my regrets was our inability to really have the kind of apparatus to put those kind of people to work and hold them. We were just swamped with people. Breadbasket meetings, Saturday mornings, just exploded.”

Yet, the size of the mission, erasing poverty, and the availability of resources, did not match. In 1968, black leaders were struggling between two frustrating options: requiring the assistance of a federal government increasingly disinterested in their destiny, or promoting self-developing programs that were affected by an endemic scarcity of resources. This is the context in which Jackson envisioned a further step for Breadbasket, not simply engineering black capitalism, but assuring economic autonomy to the black community in Chicago.

In 1970, in the first four years of activities, Breadbasket had effectively coerced 15 companies in Chicago’s heavily black South Side into opening up 5,000 new jobs for blacks. The organization was led by Jackson, the associate director, Rev. Calvin Morris, and the Rev. Mrs. Willie P. Barrow, a minister. In addition, Jackson discouraged whites’ participation in the leadership of Breadbasket. He pointed out that blacks “need and want to encourage the technical and financial aids of whites,” but discouraged whites participation because blacks should make their own decisions. Outside Chicago, Breadbasket had set up other operations in eight cities, including Los Angeles, Milwaukee, Indianapolis, Brooklyn, Houston and Cleveland.
Sometimes boycotts were broadened to include political action. In Cleveland, for example, a Breadbasket group (Cannonball Adderley, Nat Adderley, Joe Zawinul, Walter Booker, and Roy McCundy) was sent, accompanied by some 600 black teenagers, into black areas at 5 a.m. on Election Day, November 1969. They raised such a racket that thousands of irate residents awoke, just to be told to vote early in the morning for the incumbent black mayor Carl B. Stokes. In 1969, Breadbasket negotiated with the supermarkets in the ghetto to put products from the Southwest Alabama Farmers’ Cooperative on the shelves or face boycotts, as black Alabama farmers had found that they were unable to find markets for their products in their home state. In this case, Breadbasket acted as an agent for the Southwest Alabama Farmers’ Cooperative.

In summary, the expanding number of targets coupled with lack of resources, an erratic agenda, and a mounting ambition to pursue new strategies destroyed Breadbasket’s focus. A collateral effect was that not all companies complied with their agreements with Breadbasket. A review concluded that the A&P food chain had been one of the worst in meeting its agreements. In a coordinated effort on July 6, 1968, white and black Breadbasket supporters began picketing their neighborhood A&P stores in inner-city and suburban areas, eventually bringing executives – according to Gary Massoni - back to the table to negotiate “the most comprehensive covenant Breadbasket had ever designed,” agreeing to hire black businessmen to oversee closely the company’s training and employment programs from the inside. In general, Breadbasket faced a consistently serious problem with checking the post-
agreement follow-through of corporate executives, who learned how to capitulate early — to reduce the boycotts effect — and then forgot their commitments as soon as they signed them.

The end of Breadbasket coincided with the growth of the Black Expo. The exhibition was a media, cultural, and financial success. Under the arrangement with the S.C.L.C., Jackson was to remit 25 percent of the Black Expo proceeds to Atlanta. But the accounts he submitted to Ralph Abernathy, then the vice president at large of S.C.L.C., were spotty at best. For the first year's operation, he remitted $60,000. But in 1970, that amount dropped to a mere $11,000.\footnote{389} In 1971, the last year of Jackson's association with the S.C.L.C., Jackson claimed that more than 700,000 people visited Black Expo in 1971, where the daily admission fee cost a dollar for adults and 50 cents for children. Another 66,000 people attended six nights of entertainment, paying $4 each. Almost all of this money was paid in cash. In addition, hundreds of exhibitors paid substantial fees for their stands, many of them upwards to $10,000 each. Yet, Jackson reported just over $500,000 in gross receipts for the entire event, an amount so paltry that he had to have Black Expo bookkeepers present at a news conference, where reporters hammered them as they tried to explain away the paucity of receipts with elaborate charts.\footnote{390} Jackson himself would later claim that in his generosity he had let in half the visitors for free. Biographer Barbara Reynolds, quoting show promoter International Amphitheatre, expressed serious doubt that any more than 20,000 people per day had attended, bringing the total attendance to 100,000.\footnote{391} But Hermene Hartman, who helped plan the Black Expos,
recalls that the events were so popular that they were deluged with visitors.\textsuperscript{392} This still did not explain the huge discrepancy between the amount shown by the receipts and the amount Black Expo had earned, according to Jackson. A Chicago judge later slapped a contempt of court motion on Jackson for failing to produce financial records demanded by the promoter, who remained unpaid.\textsuperscript{393} According to Hurley Green, who stopped ghostwriting for Jackson in 1971 to become the editor of the \textit{Chicago Defender}, “Jesse made a deal with the Black Stone Rangers.”\textsuperscript{394} When Jackson was counting the cash from the ticket sales, a group of young toughs burst into his office with sawed-off shotguns. “They were members of the Black Stone Rangers,” Green says. Five people were in the room with Jackson when the gang members burst in. One was Hermene Hartman.\textsuperscript{395} The presence of the members of the Black Stone Rangers at the Exhibition once again fueled rumors about a potential connection between black street gangs and Breadbasket.

By combing through state records, \textit{Chicago Tribune} reporter Angela Parker discovered that on September 29, 1970, Jackson and his friends had incorporated Black Expo as a nonprofit foundation, totally independent of the S.C.L.C., and then as a corporation on September 14, 1971.\textsuperscript{396} As a further shield from the S.C.L.C., they established two other corporations, Black Expo Inc. and the Breadbasket Commercial Association.\textsuperscript{397} The \textit{Tribune} charged that both moves were made “under the direction of the Rev. Jesse L. Jackson, national director of Breadbasket, without the knowledge or approval of Dr. Abernathy or S.C.L.C.’s board of directors.” On the board of
directors of Black Expo Inc. were Jackson’s most trusted associates. In addition to Reverend Clay Evans, the board included Chicago businessmen Celion Herderson, George Jones, Thomas Todd, and Al Johnson, a Cadillac dealer who was helping to bankroll Jackson’s personal lifestyle. “We secretly incorporated BCA (Breadbasket Commercial Association) as a separate entity from Breadbasket,” Robinson told Jackson biographer Barbara Reynolds. “We were not pushing the name because we didn’t want S.C.L.C. to know about it, because Jesse thought he might have to leave and he wanted BCA to be underground, so we could get up and run if we had to. When we decided to make the break out the door, we would have a concerted effort because the businessmen would underwrite the new movement.” Abernathy summoned Jackson and Robinson to Atlanta in April 1971 suspecting that something was amiss. “All during the meeting with Abernathy, I heard later, Jesse denied that BCA existed,” Robinson told Barbara Reynolds.

Parker’s editors at the Tribune flew her down to Atlanta on November 27, 1971, to show Abernathy the evidence of Jackson’s betrayal and get his comments. Abernathy was stunned as he went through the documents. “This is most unusual,” Abernathy told Parker.

I find it difficult to believe. Although there may not have been any mishandling of funds by this move, if it is still true, it is wrong and should not have been incorporated without approval and knowledge of the board of directors and the S.C.L.C. president. … If it is true, the Rev. Jesse Jackson had no right to direct the founding of either a foundation or a corporation – no department has that right under the policies of the national organization. It cannot make any legal move
without the approval of the president and the board of directors of the national office, we cannot at this time allow a department to get out of line, it can hurt the entire organization.\textsuperscript{400}

At first, Abernathy phoned Jackson, summoning him to Atlanta to explain his actions. When Jackson refused, Abernathy and his board flew to Chicago and set up shop in the Marriot Hotel near O’Hare Airport on December 3, 1971. Jackson alerted the press, who came in abundance. Once the news cameras were turning, Jackson supporters packed the hotel lobby carrying picket signs that said, “Don’t get Messy with Jesse.”\textsuperscript{401}

Although Jackson showed up with a briefcase full of documents to make his case, Abernathy kept him outside the conference room for three full hours. Twice Jackson attempted to force his way in, but he was tossed out. Finally, after a long, tense meeting, Jackson stormed out into the crowd of reporters. For perhaps the only time in his life, he brushed them off with a curt “no comment.” Abernathy emerged shortly afterwards to announce that the S.C.L.C. had suspended, with pay, Jackson for sixty days “for administrative improprieties and repeats acts of violation of organizational policy,” and had forbidden him to take part of any S.C.L.C. activities during that time. He also pledged that the S.C.L.C. board would conduct a detailed investigation of the Black Expo finances.\textsuperscript{402} That Saturday, Jackson appeared at the weekly “prayer meeting” of Breadbasket, introduced no longer as an S.C.L.C. staff member but as a guest speaker. He denied outright Abernathy’s accusation that he had acted without the consent of the S.C.L.C. executive board and took a swipe at the Internal Revenue Service, which he said has been looking
at our books for months: “My record needs no defense. We don’t owe the IRS anything, but in case we do, we’re going to pay.” Then he went after Angela Parker, the Chicago Tribune reporter who had exposed his corruption to Abernathy. Addressing Parker, who was among the reporters in the room, Jackson said:

Dr. Abernathy is not the problem or the issue. The issue is that last Friday a black woman reporter left Chicago with her mission being to separate great black men. She took a plan from the Tribune Tower to Atlanta. Now we know who our enemy is.

Barbara Reynolds notes that the crowd greeted Parker with “a hail of boos,” and Jackson went on for a full fifteen minutes, railing about “the treachery of black women.” At one point, Jackson compared Parker to the woman who stabbed Dr. King in New York in the early 1960s, a remark that produced “thunderous applause” from the audience. Within hours, pickets arrived to surround Angela Parker’s apartment. Jackson didn’t waste time plotting his next move. Just days after Abernathy had publicly rebuked him, Jackson fired off a contemptuous letter, resigning from the S.C.L.C. “Since the time has come when I cannot any longer give my active service to the organization,” Jackson wrote, “I consider sixty days too long for this vital work to be endangered by my leave of absence and hereby submit my resignation effective Friday, December 17, 1971.” He signed the letter, “Jesse Louis Jackson, The Country Preacher.”

Jackson unveiled his S.C.L.C. resignation letter at an emotional press conference the next Saturday, attended by 3,000 supporters. “I need air. I
need to grow,” he said, vowing to begin his own organization. “Whatever its name shall be, we are going to organize and to keep on pushing.”

Furious at Jackson’s tactics, Abernathy issued a scathing rebuke in the name of the S.C.L.C. board.

We will not accept the resignation of the Reverend Jesse L. Jackson until he gives an accounting of hundreds of thousands of dollars and explain the operation of Black Expo. Mr. Jackson must clean his house before he leaves. I never thought it would come to the point that a brother would quit and walk out on the movement started by the late Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., rather than to deal forthrightly with the issues.

Jackson eventually hired an accounting firm, Washington, Pittman & McKeever, to go through the Black Expo ‘71 books and transfer the S.C.L.C. share of the take to Atlanta. But even after this audit, which was remitted to the S.C.L.C. board the following April, it showed several anomalies that were never resolved, including a $100,000 loan from Stax Record Company in Memphis, Tennessee. It was unclear whether Jackson ever repaid the loan.

The controversy was not to be simply settled. S.C.L.C.’s executive director, Stoney Cooks, pointed out that in 1969, Breadbasket contributed about $85,000 to S.C.L.C., but he added S.C.L.C. contributed almost twice that amount to Breadbasket the same year. “Any money that came in [to S.C.L.C.] from Chicago was merely the Operation Breadbasket staff trying to pay its own way.” However, Jackson pointed out that too much money, particularly from Black Expo, was funneled from Chicago back to Atlanta. Other sources explained that Breadbasket in Chicago was the main fount of funds of the parent body, the S.C.L.C. in Atlanta. Internal paperwork shows
that there was a constant flux of financial information between Chicago and Atlanta. Jackson usually corresponded with Bill Rutherford, the S.C.L.C. executive director, but also with Andy Young, Ralph Abernathy, and Dr. King with regard to funds. Initially, Atlanta was financially sustaining Chicago’s Breadbasket, and Jackson had to request not only the funds to operate but also the authorization for the use of these funds. The operational costs of the program were rising together with the amount going to salaries. While Jackson saw his salary rising, he tried to enlarge Breadbasket’s staff and provide decent salaries for his aids. An example of this would be that a national research director’s yearly salary quickly moved from $4,500 to $8,000.

What happened later is not very clear, as the available documents do not provide a complete assessment of the financial situation between Breadbasket in Chicago and the S.C.L.C. in Atlanta. However, it is likely that the increasing success of Black Expo changed the balance of power between the two potential heirs of Dr. King. Chicago suddenly became a contributor to Atlanta, although Stoney Cooks contested this affirmation. After the assassination of King, fund raising was becoming more difficult for S.C.L.C., while Breadbasket in Chicago was booming in terms of revenues and contributions. In the end, it was likely that the subsidiary, Breadbasket, which was completely owned and controlled by S.C.L.C., was financially contributing the controlling entity, the S.C.L.C.

In this context, it would not be surprising if Jackson, acknowledging the possibility of financial independence, decided to built Breadbasket’s financial autonomy by cheating
the headquarters in Atlanta, and diverting some revenues to a local entity. Of course, other options were available at the time. For example, Jackson could have resigned, to establish his own organization in the late 1960s. Another alternative could have been pursued by Abernathy when he realized that the balance of power between the subsidiary and the controlling entity had changed. He could have given Jackson financial autonomy, and renegotiated the relationship between Breadbasket and the S.C.L.C. Both alternatives would have been very painful for Jackson and Abernathy. Jackson preferred to maintain his role inside the S.C.L.C. and where progressively built his base, eventually gaining financial autonomy, while waiting for the right opportunity or reason to leave. Abernathy preferred to maintain his role as the chairman of the S.C.L.C. without recognizing that the S.C.L.C.’s financial resources were increasingly dependent on Jackson. It is likely that Abernathy held the unrealistic idea that Jackson would accept his subordinate role and continue to finance the S.C.L.C., while continuing to support Abernathy’s position as the head of the organization. In the end, it was an unstable relationship and destined to end, either when Jackson was ready to leave or when Abernathy was ready to accept the situation. This situation was resolved when Jackson resigned.

On December 12, the day after he announced his resignation, Jackson called a group of former Breadbasket supporters to the Commodore Hotel in New York to gather public pledges of loyalty and renewed support. Among the crowd were singers Aretha Franklin and Roberta Flack, black politicians Carl Stokes and Richard Hatcher, black reporters and publishers, and even a
member of the S.C.L.C. board, W.A. Saunders. Also in the crowd were some of Jackson’s black business supporters, including Chicago Cadillac dealer Al Johnson. At a public ceremony, Jackson signed the papers to establish his new organization on December 18, 1971. On Christmas Day, Jackson announced the birth of his own organization: People United to Save Humanity (PUSH). With Jackson’s resignation, Breadbasket eventually collapsed.

Jackson’s departure from the S.C.L.C. and Breadbasket was considered the final straw ending a long-standing feud between Jackson and Abernathy, with Jackson being on the losing side of the dispute. But the widow of Dr. King, Coretta, disagreed. She immediately made it clear that

Having worked with him [Jackson] in the past, individually, and in my capacity as resident of the Martin Luther King Center, I will continue to do so, just as I feel I will also be working with the Rev. Abernathy and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference.

In addition, Andrew Young, who ran unsuccessfully for Congress the previous year, did not dramatize the split and did not take part. “Usually – he said – you end up with two strong churches. I hope that this is the case with S.C.L.C. and Operation PUSH.”

Jackson pointed out that he was the last member of the executive staff of the S.C.L.C. after the assassination of Dr. King. Bernard Lafayette, Andrew Young, James Bevel and Hosea Williams, all left their executive positions before him. He noted that he had received suggestions earlier, that he should have left the S.C.L.C. a long time before because of the strains between himself and Rev. Abernathy. He made clear
that Operation PUSH was an expansion from S.C.L.C., not a split. He called his departure from the S.C.L.C. an amicable divorce.\textsuperscript{419} Abernathy went on to say:

\begin{quote}
It’s right of every individual in Chicago, or across the nation, to support Rev. Jackson – to support him because he’s a fine wonderful person.
\end{quote}

His last remark made even clearer the ideological differences between him and Jackson. The S.C.L.C. would work to provide alternatives which could be pursued in the “political arena, the economic arena, and in organizing the \textit{working poor} and building the black community [the emphasis is mine].”\textsuperscript{420} Also, the black press like \textit{Jet}, preferred to “spend no time debating whether their support should remain with S.C.L.C. or shift to PUSH,” since it was assumed that

\begin{quote}
both PUSH and S.C.L.C. will be about the business of continuing efforts to make real the dream of the late Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., that, someday, all Black folks will be free.\textsuperscript{421}
\end{quote}

Finally, Jackson was partially protected from public stigma by the social capital he had built in his years of activism on behalf of the black community. His uncompromising loyalty to the black cause made him less vulnerable to harsh criticism for his departure from Breadbasket. “Whether we are called Operation Breadbasket or Black Panthers or niggers, we know who the enemy is.”\textsuperscript{422} As Jackson himself pointed out, “every black man who has won the loyalty of his community has indicated some expression of defiance for the white man.”\textsuperscript{423}
Conclusion

This chapter addressed the story of Breadbasket in Chicago. Jackson became the national director of Breadbasket’s programs in 1967. After King’s assassination in 1968, Jackson continued to lead the program, until December 1971, when he refused to move Breadbasket from Chicago to Atlanta, and resigned from the S.C.L.C.. A week later, he launched his own economic empowerment organization called Operation PUSH. Ostensibly, Breadbasket in Chicago provided jobs for low-income black people by threatening boycotts of white-owned and white-managed businesses in black neighborhoods. Jackson expanded the scope of the program, and sought to work out deals by which businesses agreed to hire blacks to work in stores in black ghettos, to end discriminatory practices, to deposit some of their money in black banks, to use the services of black contractors, black agencies, and black advertising firms. However, in Jackson’s Breadbasket (and later in PUSH) there was a change of attitude, a clearer focus on black capitalism and business than in King’s. PUSH took the place of Breadbasket, and soon became both a social agent of dignity and economic leadership, and an indispensable tool for wealth creation and economic autonomy. PUSH was a symbol of the new economic climate, a move toward independence, and a vehicle of identity and self-expression. PUSH was important to the next chapter in the story of the African American freedom struggle from economic rights to Black Power.
Chapter Four: Birth of a Leader

Introduction

Breadbasket is not simply the story of the transformation of a Civil Rights program, but also a story of intellectual adaptation. Originating in Atlanta, it was at the end of the decade in Chicago under the leadership of Jesse Jackson that the organization made its strongest gains. This chapter addresses the reasons Breadbasket, established to fight economic discrimination against African Americans, became an important part of the black capitalism movement of the late 1960s and early 1970s. Jackson moved Breadbasket beyond traditional Civil Rights platforms of desegregation and voting rights and addressed issues such as black employment and access to capital. He placed Breadbasket at the center of black capitalism in Chicago, the nation’s most vibrant black economy. By the time of King’s assassination, Jackson was already Breadbasket’s national director and had energized the organization’s standard repertoire, fighting for economic opportunities for black people. Jackson negotiated with white-owned businesses to hire African Americans to work in stores located in black areas, deposit funds in black-owned banks, and enlist the services of black contractors, agencies, and advertising firms. Breadbasket changed its nature under Jackson’s leadership. Although difficult to quantify, under Jackson the organization had an intensity and energy that had not previously existed. Jackson embodied the
cultural moment focused on black consciousness far more than King did, and stressed “power” rather than “rights.” He claimed that “the Civil Rights movement is a lifetime struggle for power” – and connected Breadbasket to a much wider range of community organizations. In 1969, The New York Times wrote that Jackson “sounds a little like the late Reverend Martin Luther King and a little like a Black Panther.” Finally, Jackson was not as critical of capitalism as King, and openly embraced a more conservative view of capitalism for the sake of black liberation. The story of Breadbasket in Chicago under Jackson’s leadership suggests that during the Black Power era the entrepreneur moved alongside the radical as an iconic image and source of socio-cultural change.

**A Militant Preacher**

On January 15, 1971, the Reverend Jesse Jackson, national director of Breadbasket, was the principal speaker at a program in the old Capital Theatre, located at 7941 South Halsted, Chicago. It was one of several services in the city marking Dr. Martin Luther King’s birthday. The 6,000-seat movie theatre, recently purchased by Breadbasket, had been renamed Dr. King’s Workshop, in memory of the leader of the Civil Rights Movement. The Reverend Curtis Melson led members of Breadbasket in a song and a raised right fist salute to the Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. When Rev. Jackson presented his eulogy, he praised Dr. King as a man who became “a world authority” despite “crippling circumstances.” Then Jackson elaborated on his initial remark by saying that King was a man who “had
everything against him. He was black. He was short. He was from the South-Georgia.” But, according to Jackson, Dr. King overcame all these challenges and met them proudly. 427

“He was black. He was short. He was from the South-Georgia” – unusual words to commemorate a leader who was allowed to go to the mountaintop. Jackson was preaching. What he meant, what he wanted to say, was that King seemed to be an improbable leader, struggling as he did with his own finiteness. He suffered a number of limitations such as physical constraints (“He was short”) along with his race, which was uncommon at the time for an American leader (“He was black”). Rev. Jackson also inserted references to the Gospel, where he mentioned the place of Dr. King’s birth (“He was from the South-Georgia”). This was proverbial, and similar to the reference in John to Jesus’ own origins (“Nazareth! Can anything good come from there?” (John 1:46)). It seemed highly unlikely that the Messiah would come from a place like that. Yet, despite his finitude, King was a great man because he was a man of God. That’s how he convinced the people in Montgomery “not to ride the buses.” That’s why he was successful in “all of those sit-ins and marches,” 428 because God was with him. It matters not where a man comes from, or where he was born, or how tall he is, or the color of his skin, provided he be authorized by God, and qualified for His work. This is what Jackson meant. 429 Yet, his words were surprising. Apparently, Jackson did not need to be affected by the same racial and physical limitations as King to be a man qualified for His work. Jackson was 220 pounds of muscle rippling through a six-foot, two inch frame with a billowing Afro, with a demeanor
of a handsome, proud black man. As such, it needs to be emphasized, he was proud of being black. When he spoke of King, race was part of the “crippling circumstances.” But when he spoke of himself, race was part of his assets: “I am black – beautiful – proud – I must be respected.” He sells pride as he is preaching. Jackson was clearly embracing a different rhetorical code than King. He was pursuing a specific rhetorical strategy.

His rhetorical strategy was based on the tradition of the Black Church, although with a bitter taste. In his early career as a civil right leader and a pastor, Jackson’s activism was shaped by his strong convictions about the crucial role played by social issues related to the advancement of racial justice. In an internal document, there is passage that links theological questions and social concerns that, although not written by Jackson himself, undoubtedly received his approval.

Theology is not and cannot be a “… study of those things pertaining to God … “ alone (...) Theology is also social and ethical in content (...) Given this understanding, Operation Breadbasket is engaged, at least in part, in a theological task.

In the same document, it is clarified that:

…any theological task with respect to Operation Breadbasket it is to offer some perspective for altering the very context of some social realities.

The document also states that:

…a covenant translates Black Power into black cooperation so that black firms can demand the type of consideration in bidding.
In other words, the rise of the Black Power did not coincide with the extinguishing of the involvement of the clergy in Civil Rights but with a different stance of prophetic religion, a profound transformation that led to a more racial self-conscious practice. Certainly, when it comes to Jackson, his prophetic stance is difficult to be identify because of the racial tone of his preaching style. If compared with King’s, Jackson’s sermons in the late 1960s clearly projected an ecclesiastical vision, and are shaped with a different rhetorical scope that resonated, but not necessary identified, with the Black Theology of Liberation. According to James Cone, “The rise of Black Power created a decisive turning point in black religious thought. Black Power forced black clergy to raise the theological question about the relation between black faith and white religion,” but it is safe to say that not every clergymen answered in the same way. Plus, this transformation from rural to urban social landscape did not happen without consequences, and the history of Breadbasket is a testament to the dramatic, somewhat painful evolution from the traditional civil involvement of black preachers in the South to a more militant black priesthood in the North. In fact, Breadbasket covers a period of ten years, from 1962 to 1972, and was operated for its entire existence by Black Church ministers. It was led by black clergy in Atlanta and in Chicago. The only difference is in Atlanta and in the South, the pastors had to deal with local Civil Rights leaders and campaigns, while in Chicago they dealt with black politicians, gangsters, and nationalistic militants.
Before concluding that prophetic religion was gone by the Breadbasket relocated to Chicago, a deeper assessment of Jackson as a pastor is needed. Jackson merged the tradition of the pastors who led the Civil Rights Movement with the wave of radicals who looked to the economy as the new political terrain of social change and racial pride. While the Black Theology of Liberation stresses racial consciousness, its core lies in its methodology. It emphasizes praxis and social analysis, especially of racism, as tools to aid in understanding why the social, economic and political orders are arranged as they are.\textsuperscript{437} Jackson envisioned himself at the intersection of religion and social activism, inventing a new profile of a pastor; a clergyman who was involved in the social issues and economic troubles of his community not as an extension of his ministry, but as a core response to his call. In a communication with Andrew Young, he stated that:

\begin{quote}

The church stands out as a crucial institution in the campaign to end slums (...) Our approach to the church is one of opening it up and releasing the seeds of renewal and power that are presently encapsulated within its walls. Ministers need training to awaken their sensibilities to root issues. Then they should learn the sensible use of the potential power at their disposal for bringing about creative change in the city.\textsuperscript{438}
\end{quote}

The church had power, the church was power, she just needed to be awakened to her power, to recognize her mission on earth, and to learn how to use this power. As a result, Jackson built a church (a congregation, an ecclesiastical community) around a movement – literally, since the theatre that was Breadbasket’s headquarters was converted into a place of worship every Saturday morning at 10 a.m. - rather than the other way around, as King did.\textsuperscript{439} Breadbasket was ultimately the congregation Jackson built
around a social program, and racial protest. A female civil rights worker from Mississippi, upon visiting one Saturday morning session, called it “my kind of church.” Breadbasket was a movement as well as an ecclesiastical community, and the template of Operation PUSH, a Civil Rights organization that is headquartered in a real church. Historians have only begun to explore the Black Church’s activism after the mid-1960s. When the movement shifted North, becoming involved in an urban and more secularized landscape, and when King’s vision shifted from the integration of black people into existing societal structures to a more radical and systemic transformation of society, prophetic religion did not lose traction in the midst of a decidedly secular, white Christian America. Jackson worked hard to maintain the influence of the Black Church. Gradually, the role once played by moderate clergymen was taken over by the Black Power nationalists, and the message of integration, nonviolence, and brotherhood of black preachers was rapidly challenged by the more militant call for the liberation of the oppressed.

For Jackson, economic justice was not only an ethical principle or a basis for social advancement, but the one of the prerequisite to full humanity and a basic part to help people become fully functioning human beings. Here lies the difference between Jackson’s and King’s vocation. “In the quiet recesses of my heart,” Martin Luther King, Jr. often said, “I am fundamentally a clergyman, a Baptist preacher.” Of course, only Jackson knows what is in the very recesses of his own heart. But his early career as Breadbasket’s leader shows a much less quiet posture than King’s. He did not seem to
enjoy the same private, intimate conversations with God; he rather preferred to encounter God on the social battlefield. Much less of a reluctant leader than King, Jackson showed that he was a passionate, vocal, engaged soul in sync with the Zeitgeist, and seemed to enjoy the social engagement, the game, power, and the direct involvement in economic issues. He was a social activist preacher, with a special – but not exclusive – attachment to the black middle class. For him, social activism, economic justice, and priesthood were intermingled. Consequently, rather than “a conscience of a community,” the church for Jackson was a militant community in search of common good. As stated in internal documents, “Operation Breadbasket seeks to build a community.” She (the church) took the side of the oppressed without rejecting the oppressors.

**From Rights to Power**

After the assassination of Dr. King, analysts and commentators noticed that Jackson went from a more subdued wardrobe of dark, vested suits to his Day-Glo designer dashiks and black leather vests; a symbol of rebellion and existentialism. When Playboy’s Associate Articles Editor, Arthur Kretchmer, was sent to the old Capital Theatre to conduct an interview with Jackson, he noted that “he was dressed, like a Mod black emperor, in a brilliantly colored dashiki, bell-bottom jeans and high-top country shoes.” Around his neck he always was a gold-plated medallion of Dr. King. Jackson adopted the male fashion of wearing a medallion but with a more discrete open-collar shirt. When invited to talk at Harvard University’s Eliot House
in the winter of 1970, he changed the medallion, and instead wore another huge medallion bearing an image of U.S. Olympic track stars John Carlos and Tommie Smith, whose clenched fists were raised high in their defiant Black Power salute at Mexico City.  

Jackson was not afraid to raise his own fist in the air. In Watts, on August 20, 1972, wearing the black radical uniform – multicolored dashiki, bushy sideburns and medallion – he gave the invocation in front of more than 100,000 people at the Los Angeles Coliseum. He then urged the audience to raise their right fists in the air and repeat while he recited his poem, “I Am Somebody.” People stood and raised their fists in the air. Photos from the event featured Rev. Jackson and Al Bell, Executive Vice President and Board Chairman of Stax Records, giving clenched fist salutes during the playing of “Lift Ev’ry Voice and Sing,” often referred to as the “Black National Anthem,” at the opening ceremonies of Wattstax, a seven-hour festival.

During the brief invocation, Jackson carefully delivered a message of consciousness and self-determination:

> Today is a day of black awareness. Today is a day of black people taking care of black people’s business [...] When we are together we have power.” In Watts we’ve shifted from burn, baby, burn, into learn, baby, learn, [...] We have shifted from bed bugs and big ticks to community control and politics.

Between December 1970 and February 1971, Jackson expressed a desire to run for mayor of Chicago as an independent. He announced that he was “certainly serious about the mayoral race,” and he “may run for mayor.”

Two weeks after his eulogy in memory of Dr. King, on January 27, 1971, at
the old Capital Theatre, Jackson announced that he will “try to qualify” for the mayoral primary election. He flirted publicly with the idea for months beforehand. Just the fact that he was dealing with the possibility was enough to have the media interested. Eventually, he decided not to enter the mayoral race in Chicago and destroyed prospects of a complicated political confrontation. Not that many felt Jackson could defeat Mayor Richard Daley. After all, Daley rode to an easy fifth term mayoral victory in 1971 carrying 78 percent of the vote. A decade later, however, the Chicago Machine fell apart, and Harold Washington emerged as the victor in the three-way primary election. If Jackson had decided otherwise, he would have become part of a new generation of black people running for public office, and joined what Professor Joseph calls the “Black Power-era politicians such as Maynard Jackson and Harold Washington,” who “embraced the movement, but with a moderate perspective.”

Politics was a secondary area of strength for Jackson during that period. Jackson considered himself more of a national leader than someone only interested in Chicago politics. When he finally ran for President of the United States it was a different period, well beyond the Black Power era (1966-1975). It was “I am somebody” no more. It was primarily “never surrender. Keep hope alive.” During the Reagan era, hope had replaced pride.

Jackson has been described as someone who was engaged in raising the black consciousness. Along with many other black leaders in the late 1960s, he jumped on the trend of cultural nationalism. He did not simply adopt a dashiki, Afro hairstyle, and a medallion; he literally rethought events from a
Although his immense rhetorical skills have received universal recognition, Jackson was not a towering figure in the realm of black culture and consciousness during the Black Power era. He did not attempt to transform the way black people thought about themselves. For example, he did not try to change the psyche of the blacks, or decolonize the black mind as Malcolm X did. He was missing the intellectual stamina needed to deal with the fundamental archetypes of the black community. Apparently Jackson acknowledged this fact and qualified himself as a “moral engineer.” He preferred to offer psychological relief and heal damaged souls, like every good preacher does. He enjoyed empowering black people’s hearts, rather than digging deeper into their minds. From an internal document, Breadbasket dealt with the memory, as “community is sustained partly by memory – thus the leadership of Operation Breadbasket continually reminds the participants of where we as black people have come.”

We can find a more concrete connection between Jackson and Black Power in Jackson’s search for economic power. As he acknowledged, it’s not eloquence, it’s power, that provides respect. Jackson’s self-appointed mission was to shape and discipline the growing black awareness and pride in order to build black economic power. “Say it loudly, I’m black and I’m proud and I drink Joe Louis milk.” Time correspondent Jacob Simms placed Jackson’s strength in “his use of evangelistic fervor to achieve pragmatic ends.” Biographer Barbara Reynolds also pointed this out, writing about his “use of rhetorical inspiration to fire up the ordinary people into Buy Black consumers, as well as economic foot soldiers.” When he was asked
in the early 1970s what his occupation was, Jackson modestly answered that “you can be an orator or an organizer. I am an organizer.” Actually, he was a blend of both.\textsuperscript{467} He had learned from his mentor, Dr. King, about “how to organize local communities, how to use the press to give visibility to an issue, and to force confrontation through national attention.”\textsuperscript{468} He applied this experience to Breadbasket.

\textit{King’s Economic Views}

King was embracing the cause of the disadvantaged, and stretching the principle of “rights” to the point of social democracy and perhaps beyond. Jackson was championing black advancement and promoting black capitalism as a meeting point between Black Power and modern conservatism. King and Jackson were reacting differently to the same tumultuous post-1965 era. Their differences mirrored a complex evolution taking place in the black community and in the larger economic climate. In the last years of his life, refining his reflection on the true nature of American capitalism, King’s main concern was the poor:

\begin{quote}
There are forty million poor people here. And one day we must ask the question, Why are there forty million poor people in America? And when you begin to ask that question, you are raising questions about the economic system, about a broader distribution of wealth. When you ask that question, you begin to question the capitalist economy.\textsuperscript{469}
\end{quote}

In this passage, King clearly connected the existence of the poor with the nature of the economic system. Previously King had simply pointed the finger toward capitalism for its inappropriate effect on the person – the extreme individualism – rather than the social injustice it caused through its
intrinsic operational mechanisms. Now he claimed that the economic system of the United States, capitalism itself, should be called into question. But he did not stop there. He identified the major element of the economic system that needed to be reformed, the distribution of wealth. King did not explain how this “broader distribution of wealth” could be accomplished, but it is very likely that he regarded the government as the primary agent, at least partially in charge of the distribution of wealth. In King’s mind, great wealth was available; what was missing was its just distribution. King was increasingly embracing a social democratic economic agenda. In his view, America was enjoying growth and potentially unlimited economic prosperity, and it was a specific responsibility of the federal government to make sure that the distribution of this wealth was accomplished with justice. From his perspective, poverty was a remediable inconvenience, as the economic means were abundant, and the possibility to make poverty obsolete was concrete. It was only a matter of political will.

In his view, American capitalism produced injustice because it distributed wealth unfairly. According to this premise, it was the responsibility of the government to introduce corrections to mitigate the dangerous and predictable economic effects of capitalism. How was it possible that the wealthiest nation in the world could accept the persistent existence of slums and ghettos? How was it possible that the government could continue spending for war, when there is rampant poverty in the urban neighborhoods in the North, as well as in the rural villages in the South? When King realized that it was not in Lyndon Johnson’s plans to stop the war in Vietnam and
keep his promise alive for a Great Society, he began accepting the inevitable conclusion that the federal government was part of the problem rather than the solution. He broke with Johnson and appealed for a regeneration of the whole nation. Addressing the drama of poverty helped him to expand his view about the moral fiber of his country, and to see how only a structural renewal of the fabric of the nation might save it from collapse. This is a story that leads some scholars to talk about King as a “radical” in the last period of his life – especially after the Voting Act and Watts riots – compared with a more “moderate” King in his earlier years of Civil Rights activism.471

However, there is more to say about King’s economic thought. King spent his adulthood in the long era of prosperity. In the post-war years, America was an affluent society. In 1967, King stated that it did not cost America anything to desegregate lunch counters and transportation, implicitly claiming that the time had come for the country to pay a price for economic integration. King’s strategy was focused on wealth distribution, and did not focus on wealth production. Not coincidentally, King came to promote the idea of a guaranteed annual income. This guaranteed income would have assigned a role to blacks alongside whites in the construction of national wealth. It would have reduced economic inequalities and assured everyone, blacks and whites, the right to a minimal self-sustenance. This support would not only defeat poverty, but would also ensure the dignity and self-esteem of new workers, expanding the boundaries of capitalism, creating new consumers. “Early in the century” – King stated – “this proposal would have been greeted with ridicule and denunciation as destructive of initiative and
responsibility,” but now it made much more sense, due to the historic period of economic growth and the prevailing economic ideology of welfare.\textsuperscript{472} The Constitution states that all men are equal, and so the liberal ideal continued to assert that all people have the right to work and gain a decent salary.\textsuperscript{473} King expressed a mechanistic as well as bureaucratic view of capitalism. Capitalism is a mechanism that must be governed by a bureaucracy. Of course, there is economic inequality in America; this gap is not intrinsic in the economic system itself but due to the behavior of its leadership. These leaders are pursuing the segregation in the sphere of labor and business. Therefore, the people with the most influence over the workings of the capitalist system are the target of the civil right movement. Wealth is available, and what is missing is a just distribution of it. This unequal distribution may be treated not by appealing to courts of law, but by dealing with the hearts of people and the values that should guide them.\textsuperscript{474} Therefore, his vision targeted capitalism’s most powerful executives.

In 1967, King shared his view of the economy, presenting the economy as a social reality, a space where people and enterprises pursue social purposes. In King’s mind, the corporation performed a social mission. It played a social role; that is why it should return to society in equal measure whatever it took from society. In other words, he looked at business as an entity that could offer jobs, advancement, and other social benefits. Even the ultimate goal of the corporation, i.e., profit, was subject to the higher aims of society. This is the reason companies should return profits, at least in part, to the community where the profits were generated. “Many retail businesses and consumer-
goods industries,” King explained, “deplete the ghetto by selling to Negroes without returning to the community any of the profits through fair hiring practices.” He refined his idea of a privately funded welfare system by insisting that the mission as well as the nature of the company was social, as it should reflect the society to which it belonged. For this reason, if the company generated a profit through black customers, those same black customers (at least figuratively) should have earned the right to work for that company. In his view, private sector firms played a role similar to that of government agencies in the public arena. They pursue economic justice, and ensure the redistribution of wealth. He maintained that this should be their goal, but in practice they often did the opposite. Breadbasket acted as a corrective. In King’s perspective, as the marches against Jim Crow broke the law, but were legitimized and justified by the Constitution, and by a higher moral law, likewise the pickets and boycotts were meant to “put justice in business.”

King also believed that unequal distribution of wealth would be ultimately addressed not by appealing to courts of law, but by dealing with people’s hearts and values. From King’s viewpoint, corporations such as High Low Food were a vehicle for racial integration, rather than businesses focusing on making money. The enterprise was interpreted as a social entity, not as a profit-driven project. That’s why the agreement proposed by Breadbasket lacked any reference to the labor costs of the new hires, and their financial impact on the balance sheet. In fact, if profitability does not increase because of new hiring, the new hire ends up being a source of increasing costs. The
low profit margins in the supermarket industry produce constant financial pressure, and since supermarkets are labor intensive, supermarket chains keep personnel costs low by standardizing operations at the store level. To inflict an unplanned increase in labor and training costs could be lethal for a supermarket chain, as happened with the Red Rooster chain of food stores, which had to file for bankruptcy after it was targeted by Breadbasket. King also expressed a peculiar view of the role of management. In 1967, he demanded that his ministers go to the top managers to negotiate for jobs and then asked them to “set aside profit for the greater good” and promote a better world. Management would never really cooperate with this idea because its goal was to maximize profit (as well as maintain control of the organization).

King saw business as an activity that could offer jobs, advancement and other social benefits. It had a social obligation to return to society in equal measure whatever it took from society. Even the profit goal was subject to these higher aims, so companies should return profits to communities wherever they were generated. “Many retail businesses and consumer-goods industries,” King explained, “deplete the ghetto by selling to Negroes without returning to the community any of the profits through fair hiring practices.” If the company generated profits through black customers, those same black customers (at least figuratively) have earned the right to work for the company. King felt, however, that over time, Breadbasket could bring capitalism closer to his overall vision of the economy as a fair space where people and enterprises pursued mutually beneficial purposes. “The
fundamental premise of Breadbasket is a simple one,” he said at a press conference. “Negroes need not patronize a business which denies them jobs, or advancement, [or] plain courtesy.”

The list of Breadbasket’s accomplishments of was growing, and the project was becoming national in scope, but it was still too small to address the larger crisis of unemployment. Breadbasket’s scope was limited to gaining a piece of the pie, based on the idea of an organization of black consumers leveraging purchasing power to influence the management decisions of firms owned by whites, or even “monopolies of white contractors.” This is the connecting ring in the chain of thought that moved King from Breadbasket to Poor People’s Campaign. Demonstrating an increasingly sophisticated class-based – rather than race-based – analysis, King aimed to transform the African American freedom struggle into a larger multiethnic coalition to liberate all oppressed people in the United States. Later, King crystallized his ideas of economic justice in the Poor People’s Campaign. The Poor People’s Campaign asked the federal government to prioritize helping the poor with a $30 billion anti-poverty package that included a commitment to full employment, a guaranteed annual income measure and more low-income housing. The campaign would also re-establish the doctrine of non-violence as a viable strategy moving towards social justice. The importance of this point was heightened in the context of the urban rebellions – and the emerging Black Power movement – that kept erupting in the summers from 1965 on. The Poor People’s Campaign was a product of King’s crystal clear vision of a large, economically conscious, non-violent, multiethnic coalition
of the poor and their allies. A historian of black business, Juliet Walker, points out that King’s shift away from Civil Rights and toward black poverty after 1967 led him to criticize the structural racial injustice of American capitalism, as well as to depreciate black capitalism as a basis for empowerment. Simultaneously, he asked blacks to seek work in white establishments. Attacking institutional racism while downplaying black business as an avenue of progress put him, she notes, “to both the right and left of mainstream black economic nationalism in the late 1960s.”

A Moderate Black Power Leader

Living on the city’s South Side, in a comfortably affluent section of Jackson Park Highlands, Rev. Jesse Jackson must ultimately have realized, working side by side with black militants, preachers, gangs, Civil Rights activists, and sharing their frustrations on the slow path to racial equality, that by the time of the assassination of Dr. King the first phase of Breadbasket had largely come to an end. There was the on-going emphasis of the integration of blacks in to predominantly white workplaces, occasional boycott initiatives, some of real importance, and sporadic triumphs in the years that followed. At that time, despite the rise in unemployment among African Americans, Rev. Jesse Jackson must have decided that the “urgency of now” was making it inevitable that Breadbasket move to embrace a greater task than just employment. Breadbasket’s engagement with economic justice could not be confined only to jobs. The program had sufficient credibility, and its leader
the audacity to pursue a far bigger goal, and commit to a much wider idea - building a bridge between the ghetto economy and American capitalism.

Particularly in Chicago, 1968 was a pivotal time for an expression of opposition to the so-called “old system.” Jackson was a product of this counterculture as much as of the Civil Rights Movement. He expressed this solidarity, both with his hairstyle and with his approach, which was the challenging, confrontational, protesting attitude of his generation towards the old system. Jackson’s biographers, and historians of Breadbasket, tell extravagant stories about the meetings between white top managers and black radicals. It was not only a clash of cultures, but also of generations, represented by Black Nationalism and the hippie counterculture coming up against the custodians of the treasure of American capitalism. And yet the old system was changing. Radicals protested against authority, the hierarchical structure of power, the effects of the generation gap, and expressed frustration at the slow pace of reform. At the same time, they feared the end of the age of prosperity and expansive government, which were two of the most enduring legacies of the post-World War II economic boom. In 1967, the U.S. economy was already showing signs of some minor economic problems, although not enough to indicate the end of the age of prosperity, growth and welfare that had characterized the two decades after World War II. Richard Nixon was still focused on politics, rather than economics, especially working on the idea of building a Republican majority around a new conservative bloc in the South. In this way, he hoped to solve and bypass the problem posed by George Wallace, the Alabama governor
who also wanted to run for president of the United States. A year later, Martin Luther King was assassinated in Memphis, and Nixon became the U.S. president. Soon after the Tet Offensive of January 1968, the United States economy entered a depressive phase. That same year, the Federal Reserve increased the interest rate to 5.5%, the highest since the Great Depression. Inflation was growing at a rate of 4 percent per year, and was soon to become the main problem for American households.483

This was only the beginning of a spectacular, unpredictable change in the economic cycle. Within a couple of years, the direct convertibility of dollars to gold was abandoned because of attacks on the U.S. currency by international speculators. Two years later, the Yom Kippur War provoked the first energy crisis in the country. It was a time of economic and social troubles. Nixon did not attack the welfare system and did not indulge in racist tendencies. But nevertheless, he changed the face of welfare by decentralizing it. He promoted affirmative action, but at the same time pursued his project of a new coalition to hold together the conservative South and the white working-class of the North. What Jackson encapsulates is this ambivalence, the growing skepticism of young people and minorities towards institutions in general, together with the feeling that an era of social justice and economic equality was over. The derailment of liberal America and the reduction of its welfare programs meant that communities needed to focus on their own resources.484 As he pointed out, “welfare [alone] is a form of humiliation.”485
Jackson was a post-1965 black leader, significantly influenced by the counterculture of the mid- to late-1960s, and the growth of the feeling that liberalism had failed. His clothing, hair-style and rhetorical style made clear his connections with the former, but it was this failure of liberalism that played an enduring influence on his activity as a Civil Rights leader. Jackson’s attitude incorporated distrust of the federal government and authority in general, with a fear of the inevitable crisis facing the welfare state. Jackson agreed with King that government played a crucial role in eliminating economic discrimination, but gifted with a better understanding than King of where the economy was heading. He positioned himself opposite King (and Ralph Abernathy), who continued to overestimate the potential of American capitalism, blaming the unjust system instead of recognizing it was just not powerful enough to satisfy everybody. Jackson wondered who, with the coalition of liberals, laborites and minorities in derailment, was willing to pay to provide high-paying jobs, well-equipped schools, and affordable housing to black people. The coalition of liberals, laborites and minorities who might promote this agenda of economic development no longer existed. More specifically, Jackson did not really believe that blacks were part of what he called “the power structure,” the business-labor-government that “meet downtown” and decide for all. Moreover, Jackson had to bear in mind that the effects of a failed war and an economic crisis threatened to permanently undermine social cohesion, and therefore race relations. Contemporary political, economic, and cultural realities forced Jackson to compensate for the declining appeal of government-funded welfare with an increasing
attention to business as a way to ignite economic development inside the African American community. This was definitely a different view than King’s (and Abernathy’s), who still believed in the compensatory role of the government, and the possibility of an alliance between the Civil Rights Movement and labor unions.

Already in 1967, a Breadbasket internal document discussed the different economic policy options at hand, especially resurgent free-market economics, which was called for the occasion, “the post-New Deal-Keynesian capitalist system.” The document also contained a penetrating analysis of Keynesian economics, in which the role of government in the economy is understood not as regulative – in King’s fashion – but rather as a partner to business – in Lyndon Johnson’s fashion. The document states that

Government relates its spending to the otherwise uncertainties of the market (...) but basically not to redirect and restructure, the market.

The fact is, King’s vision of a full-blown welfare state seemed unlikely with the presidency in Nixon’s hands, and the Johnson Administration’s Great Society programs under attack. Nonetheless, the white establishment seemed willing to pay to provide high-paying jobs, well-equipped schools, and affordable housing to black people. Jackson liberated himself from the vision of an economic wealth made available to everybody; a Utopian society with no poor. Jackson also understood that the decline of the affluent society, and the emerging economic concerns, largely associated with the increasing costs of the Vietnam War, forced the black community to learn how to reduce
their economic dependence on white liberals, as well as central government, increasing their autonomy.488

While Jackson’s attitude incorporated distrust of the federal government and authority in general, he was also carefully listening to the rising voices of despair from the ghetto. More than the desire to end poverty, black families yearned to be consumers in an affluent society, and in the final years of the Age of Prosperity, credit became as important for black families as income. Accessing consumer credit was based on the premise of solvency – the concrete probability, and the personal will to meet one’s own obligations. The illusion of permanent economic growth and the right of participation in the American Dream made solvency a concrete possibility, and credit, a reasonable desire. After World War II, an increase in income and wealth, coupled with the expansion of product quantity and diversity became available to a growing percentage of the American population, who had access to consumer credit. This was a sort of “democratization” of financial services.489 As more people were able to get mortgages and purchase homes, buy products from retail chains and higher end products such as automobiles, a consumer nation developed. Access to credit was the gateway to consumption, the modern passport to the American Dream. Borrowing money became easier for the ordinary suburbanite and the middle class in general. Access to credit became a fiat proof of citizenship, a respected status symbol, and an economic advantage, while the persistent belief remained that economic growth and the increasing level of salaries guaranteed solvency. In other words, credit had enlarged consumer’s options by providing liquidity
and economic prosperity, and protected borrowers against the risks of insolvency. However, it was a privilege largely reserved for white males only, and women and minorities were, for the most part, excluded.

By the late 1960s, the Great Society combined with the Civil Rights Movement had successfully created a context in which consumer credit could be seen as a right. Martin Luther King, in 1966, at the S.C.L.C., targeted Chicago’s dual housing market, and staged open-housing marches in all-white city neighborhoods and suburbs. The dual housing market was the reason for the white suburbanites to turn against their black neighbors, but the reality was that whites could live anywhere they could afford, while African Americans and other minorities faced restricted access, especially to the most exclusive suburbs. In 1967, Johnson had appointed the Commission on Civil Disorders, known as the Kerner Commission after its chair, Governor Otto Kerner, Jr. of Illinois. The Commission was to investigate the causes of the race riots that had been spreading across the country since 1965, the sources of black urban violence, and to provide recommendations for the future. The Kerner report concluded that white racism was the main cause of urban violence. The remedy was to simply reduce the race divide. That is, stop de facto racial discrimination, and invest billions in housing programs in order to break up residential segregation. The commission’s recommendations were adamant that it would be the federal government that would have to be the source of reducing this racial divide by “opening suburban residential areas to Negroes and encouraging them to move closer to industrial
centers...;” it also recommended an effort to de-radicalize urban blacks by giving greater access to credit at a fair price. President Johnson ignored the report and rejected the Kerner Commission’s recommendations. In April 1968, one month after the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr. President Johnson took a different path and signed the Civil Rights Act of 1968. Title VIII of the Act introduced fair housing policies and outlawed discrimination in the rental or purchase of homes, and across a broad range of other housing-related transactions, such as advertising, mortgage lending, homeowner’s insurance and zoning. This bill opened up new residential areas to the rising African-American middle class that aspired to move into the suburbs.

Another conclusion of the Commission was that black residents burned stores in the ghetto during the riots because they did not own them. According to the Commission, the reasons behind vandalism against properties during the riots were fundamentally tied to the desire for retaliation against exploitation, as well as credit abuse. The Commission emphasized several issues: the high rate of unemployment, a lack of business ownership, “the exploitation of disadvantaged consumers.” The Washington Post accurately reported that when D.C. rioters broke into many stores, they burned the credit records before they stole the merchandise. Rather than an explosion of consumer desire, the riots were an opportunity to cancel the debts with perceived usurious lenders. “Burn those damn records!” was reported in the Washington Post. Also Time Magazine gave visibility to the
story of a mother advising her son during a riot, to “Burn those damn records,” with reference to the books that held the records of debts of neighborhood residents, including hers.493

Jackson’s Breadbasket joined the campaign for the extension of credit to blacks and portrayed consumer credit as a basic right that should be applied to the black minority. Breadbasket openly mentioned “credit gougers, entrepreneurial markups and price inflated-short selling on all types of good of services,” while Jackson was making the point in an interview in Playboy.494

The companies [like GM] will lend us the money to buy cars, which leads to profits for them only. They could lend us the money to buy agencies [dealerships], but they won’t, because that would let us profit also.

Accordingly, Jackson felt that consumer credit to blacks was an economic area that black lenders must control.

General Motors, you will not sell cars in the black community unless you guarantee us [Operation Breadbasket] a franchise [dealership] here next year and help us finance it.495

He added that the Government was involved with lending. It was supposed to lend capital to black businessmen “according to the soundness of the idea.”496 Jackson agreed with King that employment was a crucial target, along the troubling path of economic discrimination. Nevertheless, he realized that more than merely desiring to end poverty, black families yearned to be a part of the affluence that was so visible in America during the 1960s. Blacks were seeing themselves as participants in a consumer society. They did not contest capitalism, only exclusion from it.497 During the “golden age of
capitalism,” mortgages and car financing were easy to obtain for white people, but nearly impossible for black people. In a consumer society based on credit, even stable salaries did not assure black families the option to purchase a house or a car. In the daily life of Chicago’s South Side, credit cards were unknown, mortgage requests were constantly declined, and credit access at ghetto retailers was expensive. “Urban retailers, unable to resell their customers’ debts, charged higher prices both for cash and for credit purchases.” Moreover, inequality in accessing credit was an issue not only for poor blacks in the ghettos, but also for the black bourgeoisie and those who aspired to move into the suburbs. Jackson realized better than King that employment discrimination came together with credit discrimination. Therefore, fighting the former without taking care of the latter was pointless.

Examining the intersection of income and credit in everyday life, Jackson examined the financial realities of black families and tried to make modern lending possible for them. He recognized that America was at the edge of a massive shift toward financialization. Most notably, that consumer credit was becoming more profitable than financing manufacturing investments.

Jackson’s connections with urban ghetto life guided his vision of black-owned banks, black-owned urban mortgage lending, and small business loans. Historically, most black enterprises had been small, undercapitalized, and in constant danger of insolvency. He acknowledged the underlying reality of the inner city black economy. Insular, depredated, with no financial resources to approach the consumer, isolated from the larger mainstream of
American capitalism, black business was blocked off from the affluent society. Jackson wanted to construct a bridge between the ghetto economy and American capitalism. During the first half of the 20th century, black entrepreneurs had focused on black customers. Such a strategy seemed to be a fruitful expedient for self-help. Jackson acknowledged that for black entrepreneurs working inside a market based primarily on members of their own race was a disadvantage. The black economy was not big enough to procure enough resources to promote economic growth for black businesses. Economic justice across racial lines sounded like a more reasonable and effective slogan than “buy black.” Rather, he envisioned for black business access to white financial resources as a possibility to promote growth.502 Somehow, he thought, money had to be diverted from white corporations, banks, retailers, and transferred to black businesses. He adopted the metaphor of the “island:”

The ghetto is an island. Every decision on the island is made by white people (...) Black people control nothing in the ghetto. The island has to exist in a capitalist system without any capital. Any area of capitalism without a circular flow of capital is a slum (...) many whites have made kind overtures but nothing has been done systematically to start capital flowing into the island. Even the War on Poverty does not bank here.503

Black-owned banks with sufficient funds and huge deposits might provide the access to credit that white-owned banks denied. In addition, since the relationship between a borrower and a lender involved many additional areas of the economy, such as home builders, car dealers, publishers, consumer goods, manufacturers needed to sustain and encourage the black community’s entrée into the larger consumer society. Because the Civil
Rights Movement was primarily concerned about increasing the stake of black people in American capitalism, Jackson believed more emphasis should be placed on access to affordable credit. The priority was building the infrastructure of a black economy that might support home and car purchases, in addition to any other consumer products desired by American black families.  

Like King, Jackson recognized the inherent tension between race and capitalism, but rather than trying to change the latter, he worked hard to make the former more accommodating. He made it clear that he had not “changed the hearts of the executives,” only “the behaviors of the corporations.” He proclaimed that justice is the opportunity to share the benefits of capitalism with the whole nation. In this context, Breadbasket revealed the convergence of the Civil Rights Movement and emerging black capitalism. It was a remarkable merger, considering that black business people were used to being self-centered, and had “previously viewed the Civil Rights Movement as their enemy.” Moreover, it was the very first time that black insurance salesmen, building contractors, lawyers and numerous others who had previously been estranged entrepreneurs had come together under Breadbasket’s umbrella. Every Saturday, at 8 a.m., before the “prayer meeting,” a “businessmen’s meeting” was scheduled, in which 75-100 people usually spent two hours together; the first hour of the meeting was fraternal, and consisting simply of breakfast and conversation, the second hour consisted of reporting and discussing Breadbasket’s progress. “These people have never been together,” Jackson pointed out, and bringing all
these people together was one of his primary goals. He was the first black leader to borrow strategies from the Civil Rights Movement to foster the growth of black capitalism. Blurring the borders between the Civil Rights Movement and black capitalism, Jackson pursued an agenda that empowered the poor as well as the emerging black entrepreneurial class. While he did not forget to demand public policies for the advancement of the poor people of the ghetto – [If I was the mayor of a major American city] “I would declare the poor communities in a state of emergency and (…) set up tents on the streets” – he focused his action on the empowerment and funding of minority-run businesses. Unlike King, who never fought for minority-owned small business, Jackson looked toward entrepreneurship as a key route to African American empowerment. Increasingly, he began to incorporate the philosophies of black self-help and economic independence common to Black Power. Thus he finally came to accept the concept of Black Power as a rationale for black capitalism, as well as the development of new relationships between black businesspeople and corporate America. In April 1968, Jackson discussed Breadbasket in a long newspaper interview that was friendly to his aims, as a project paralleling Black Power in its battle to achieve economic independence for the ghetto community.

Jackson articulated his “quiet” and “moderate” understanding of Black Power ideology colloquially during the Saturday-morning meetings at Breadbasket. The lobby of the Capital Theatre was filled with tables displaying black merchandise, and the auditorium itself was festooned with signs exhorting the gathering to “Buy Black Products” and “Use Black
Services.” For over an hour, Jackson usually delivered a passionate sermon filled with street talk, down-home slang and quotations from the Bible. It was during these sermons that he emphasized his view of community self-help organizations, improvement of communities, the pursuit of self-reliance, and economic and political independence from white authority. According to Jackson, a call to arms without a call to responsibility would pave the way for racial separation and open the door to white backlash. He tried to balance his appeal for privately funded welfare with a sense of pride and self-esteem. Along with correcting an inclination to passivity, he tried to build a new social posture. The keywords were “self-determination” and “self-respect.” Breadbasket became a vehicle to procure resources to foster economic growth for black businesses, build job opportunities, and reduce poverty. It also became a cultural force under Jackson, focused around the weekly Saturday workshops that drew thousands to hear him preach. His message was that the African American community had to reduce its economic dependence on white liberals and the federal government by increasing its autonomy. Jackson’s leadership redefined Breadbasket’s relationship with whites. What might have seemed an expression of generosity or private welfare paid by whites became instead, a merchant exchange. Jackson would speak of “reciprocity,” meaning the need for a relationship between equals. In Jackson’s model, the hiring of black workers, use of black firms and contractors, and investment in black banks was framed not in terms of social justice but rather as interdependence, an exchange of goods, services, and monies between equals. The black
community had to learn how to reduce their economic dependence on white liberals as well as the central government and increase their autonomy. They had to definitively change the relationship with whites. What might have seemed an expression of generosity, or private welfare paid by whites, had to instead, become a merchant exchange. Not coincidentally, Jackson often talked of “reciprocity,” meaning the need for a relationship between equals. He pointed out that the connotation of Black Power in the media might be violence, but in fact, Black Power is power sharing. It is equity. 512 “We want ownership, we want our share, we want investment,” became his mantra in the following two decades. 513

As Breadbasket’s leader, Jackson had, at times, been portrayed as a black conservative, since he championed minority entrepreneurship and the conservative values of self-reliance, private enterprise, and individualism, but this is poor history. 514 Jackson never asserted that federal court decisions and Civil Rights legislation had created a color-blind society that made the perpetuation of self-help or ethnic-uplift strategies obsolete, and affirmative action practices socially unacceptable. On the contrary, he claimed that the permanence of a color-conscious American capitalism was an obstacle to racial integration, adding that the request for a stake in the American economy was not only reasonable, but also preferable to economic separatism. This is one of the primary differences between Jackson and Richard Nixon - the latter insisted upon maintaining law and order above all else and considered economic separatism a source of potential social troubles. As a consequence, he proposed funds to promote black capitalism
as an antidote to the possibility of social disorder. The former insisted upon alleviating “dependency” above all else and considered economic separatism a viable option, while requesting fund to promote black capitalism as a vehicle of racial economic integration and a tool for dismantling race-based corporate monopolies. Jackson did not urge white businessmen to inject credit, risk capital or create contracts within the black economy because it was the lesser of two evils, but rather because it was the best option.

Jackson has been also described as a black conservative cause his fascination with free-market economy and doctrines of free enterprise, rather than welfare. However, in the late 1960s, the pro-integrationist position was considered more moderate that it was in the early 1960s, and less historically linked with the federal government’s compensatory policies. While Jackson did not share the dissatisfaction of many African Americans, who rejected the Civil Rights Movement’s strategy based on nonviolence, interracial coalitions, and government measures to alleviate poverty and achieve integration, Jackson had mixed feelings about federal programs, acknowledging that “expanding the pie” was not an option because in the late 1960s economic expansion had slowed down. This was particularly apparent because a highly specialized technical manufacturing sector needed skilled personnel. More precisely, Jackson merged Black Power and modern conservatism, since he was a champion of capitalism, and was a more color-conscious activist than King and Abernathy of the SC.L.C..
He never embraced the rhetoric of “any means necessary,” which persists to this day, and clings to the American social imagination, as far as Black Power is concerned. He did not choose violence first, and he pointed out that there was a *pragmatic* case for nonviolence.\(^{515}\) He pointed out “the futility of thinking in exclusively white-black terms,” as “black is not always good, just as white is not always bad.”\(^{516}\) He never joined the separatist wing of the movement, saying, “We’re already separated – and blacks did not do the separating – and we do not have the power to do the integrating.” He held the belief that blacks were forced to stay separate, “so the question becomes whether we remain separate and dependent or separate and independent.”\(^{517}\) According to Jackson, independence was a consequence of separation, not a goal in itself. Meanwhile, Jackson blurred the traditional distinction between integration and nationalism. In doing so, he also blurred the borderline between the Civil Rights Movement and Black Power.\(^{518}\) The traditional narrative points out, while Civil Rights leaders such as the Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., fought for racial integration and redistribution of wealth, other black leaders such as Malcolm X and Stokely Carmichael emphasized separatism and self-determination. The Nation of Islam built an organization that was also a vehicle of black uplift and self-help. The black Muslims also emphasized the creation of black businesses in the context of Black Nationalism and separatism. However, Black Power does not necessarily imply separatism, while it definitively promotes self-determination.\(^{519}\) As Jackson clarified, “that’s my kind of Black Nationalism - blacks helping one another on a national scale.”\(^{520}\) At the same time, the Civil Rights Movement
does not necessary imply distribution of wealth while it definitely implies integration. At the turn of the century, Booker T. Washington – a black icon Jackson has been frequently associated with – and his followers emphasized racial solidarity, economic self-sufficiency, and black self-help, with the perspective of assimilation. Self-determination can work for both strategies of integration and separatism. Jackson represented this connection between integration and self-determination. He pursued a strategy of integration through self-determination.

He definitively championed “control” (power) - “ultimately, the black ghetto must be controlled by black people.” He did not want the white-owned, white-managed companies to leave the ghetto but wanted them dismissing their “colonial” attitude, their strategies of “exploitation.” He wanted them to recognize the new set of rules at work in the ghetto, submit to an informal yet effective black-controlled governing body, which would be eventually embedded in Breadbasket, and accept being charged for the privilege of working in the ghetto, and selling to black consumer. He wanted to limit white-owned and white-managed companies’ operational independence, force them to recognize a sort of black national sovereignty in the ghetto community, and still maintain themselves as operative. It was like building invisible boundaries around the ghetto and activating a reverse-tax zone policy for foreign ventures and business. However, Jackson did not plan on killing the companies (Red Rooster was an exception), just squeezing them. It was a power struggle for the sake of conquering economic power, specifically the control of the ghetto economy. It was a power struggle, not a religious
conversion. As Jackson recognized, “We are not trying to talk to people, but rather to institutions. Only power speaks to power. What we need is not individual genius, but organized power.” It was a remarkable clarity of vision for young man only 25 years old, although he was also gifted with a highly creative mind and persuasive rhetoric.

It was at this point that the urban legend of Jackson as a powerbroker emerged. Jackson sought to reorient Breadbasket and its operations. He stated with perfect clarity that

The essential purpose of Breadbasket is to have blacks control the basic resources of their community. We want to control the banks, the trades, the building constructions and the education of our children. This desire on our part is a defensive strategy evolved in order to stop whites from controlling our community and removing the profits and income that belong to black people. Our programs are dictated by the private-enterprise economy in which we find ourselves.

It is not surprising that Breadbasket’s national director tried to develop a new perspective for the program. Breadbasket was at the center of a dense network of relationships acting as agent; it convinced white-managed companies to deposit money in banks owned by blacks. Banks can then grant loans to black people in the ghetto, and in particular to their businesses. Within this complex system of relationships among organizations, the problem Jesse Jackson faced in the late 1960s was how to bring together different forms of black capitalism. He envisioned Breadbasket as an engine to promote black capitalism because he saw the multiplicity of connections between financial capitalism and consumer
capitalism and applied this vision to his community. In 1969, Breadbasket launched Black Expo, a successful professional trade fair, to bring black companies and white clients together. This and others projects placed Jackson and Breadbasket at the crossroads of heterodox forms of black capitalism. These included black street gangs such as the Black Stone Rangers, the more recently created ideological Black Nationalism groups, such as the Nation of Islam and the Black Panthers, and finally the new black entrepreneurial class, a few black businessmen who were willing to expand beyond the narrow confines of the black community. King never envisioned anything more – and nothing less – than a coalition of integrationist institutions. Although Core remembers that in the last days of his life, King talked about “temporary segregation” (25 March 1968), he concedes that he never abrogated his perspective of an integrated society. In contrast, the ultimate goal of Jesse Jackson was the building of a broad and unprecedented coalition across the lines of Black Nationalism and integration. “My job is (...) to preach unity,” he said. He envisioned Breadbasket as encouraging “the kind of confrontation and interaction between people who share different vocations,” according to “the injunction of the Apostles that “there is neither Jew nor Greek, Scythian or Barbarian, bond nor free … but all are one.” He envisioned a broad-based pluralistic united front, spearheaded by Breadbasket, which would mobilize integrationist organizations, non-political organizations, civic groups. The whole coalition would operate under the banner of building black empowerment, human dignity, economic development, and political mobilization. He already envisioned the Nation of
Islam playing a role cooperatively with integrationist organizations. He anticipated, 20 years ahead of time, his two presidential campaigns. Already in the late 1960s, Jackson foresaw, even while he was in the S.C.L.C., a black progressive strategy to unify black people across ideological, class, and denominational religious lines, Christians, as well as Muslims, and build a strong movement for justice and empowerment. In an anonymous internal memo, Breadbasket already in 1967 is depicted as a program that has the potential to “solidifying the Civil Rights movement (...) gaining unquestionable leadership for SCLC in the Civil Rights movement”, while providing “support from various facets of the Negro community.”

Through Breadbasket, Jackson tried to create a common consciousness among differing fragments of black community. Chicago was the perfect place, as during the late 1960s and early 1970s it was home to a multitude of economic ventures and business initiatives that connected Black Nationalism, business, and welfare. It hosted an impressive series of programs that promoted economic opportunity to the African American community, especially its growing middle class. Chicago became arguably the national center of black business with the largest and strongest financial base of any African American community in the United States. Jackson leveraged the entrepreneurial inclination of young urban African Americans who had a growing desire for business ownership. He also coordinated community boycotts to address economic segregation in large corporations and called upon the federal government to aid the disadvantaged and unemployed people of the slums.
Jackson embraced both protest and production as central tenets of Breadbasket’s purpose, in an attempt to integrate Civil Rights with black capitalism. He maintained a welfare approach while supporting black capital accumulation. On one hand, he built partnerships with several Chicago trade unions, challenged grocery and supermarket chains to hire more blacks, and supported the local strikes of black hospital workers, teachers, and bus drivers. On the other, he celebrated the rise of black capitalism with his annual black exhibitions. He organized parties, concerts and spectacles centered on the idea of blackness as an economic opportunity. Jackson stressed that black equity must stay inside the African American community. He always maintained a foot in both camps, welfare and capitalism, but gradually shifted Breadbasket’s priorities from creating jobs for poor black people to supporting small, black-owned companies.

Not surprisingly, Breadbasket and Jackson eventually parted ways. Breadbasket had liberal origins, and despite its innovations and successes, it still operated under the presumption of a growing economy, the continuing expansion of welfare, and Keynesian logic. In this context, government was responsible for providing adequate jobs to reduce black poverty and labor exploitation. Breadbasket’s aim was to force the government to do exactly that. Jackson took note, however, not only of the down-turn of economic prosperity, but also of the emergence of a conservative political climate. The rising ideology of self-help required the construction of infrastructures that would facilitate the emergence of a black middle class. Jackson broke with the S.C.L.C. over the organization’s decision to relocate Breadbasket back to
Atlanta at the end of 1971, and resigned his position as Breadbasket’s national director. Shortly thereafter he launched his own economic empowerment organization called Operation PUSH (People United to Save Humanity).

**Conclusion**

The dap – the Black Power handshake – as an expression of solidarity between blacks, was de rigueur when “brothers” met. However, in September 29, 1971, Jackson exchanged a “Black Power handshake” with Chicago’s Mayor Richard Daley. Jackson initiated the Black Power handshake when he met the Mayor and the latter responded, presumably as a gesture of good will. Obviously, Jackson did not want to enlist Richard Daley in the movement. However, he unintentionally achieved the opposite, he de-ideologized the Black Power handshake. This is how we can look at Jessie Jackson during the roaring years of the Black Power, as a pragmatic black leader at home in any part of the black movement, promoting unity despite ideological differences. “When we are together, we have power,” he said at Watts. Therefore, there is a bit of Black Power in Jackson as well as in Dr. King. It is in his search for black economic power, however, that we can find the real, concrete connection between Jackson and Black Power.
Breadbasket: A New History

Introduction

Breadbasket is a history of transformation in a decade of radical change. In the critical period from 1962 to 1972, the emergence of black radicalism and modern conservatism exposed the limits of the Civil Rights Movement’s strategies for workplace integration and economic equality, and imposed as inevitable a shift from “right” to “power” as the operational principle of action. Labor union leaders, liberal and conservative politicians, black moderates, radicals, and corporate executives were linked in a struggle for economic power in an economic system where the rules of the game had changed. This chapter traces the detailed connections between African Americans’ involvement in integration of the workplace and Breadbasket’s metamorphosis, from “right” to “power,” identifying 1965 as a point of inflection, and revisiting the economic views of King and Jacksons and the causes of their disagreements. In fact, Breadbasket reflects the ongoing general conversation of integration of the workplace and black economic power within the S.C.L.C. leadership. While these topics, economic justice and Breadbasket, are usually treated separately, this chapter not only offers a unified economic view of the period but also reassess controversies and
events that punctuated Breadbasket’s colorful history of operational evolution and intellectual adaptation.

**Revisiting King and the Struggle for Jobs**

Over the last twenty-five years, historians have produced several fine studies on the key events that affected racial integration in the workplace in the 1950s and 1960s. To date, most historical attention has focused on the struggle to secure equal rights legislation in the workplace, specifically the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the 1965 Executive Order that encourages affirmative action as we know it. Some standard biographies and studies on King’s engagement with economic justice dispute if he was a radical or a moderate, and when he eventually became radicalized. Rightly identified as the most significant leader of the Civil Right movement, King was instrumental in ending legal segregation within quite a short period of time, and became the conscience of the nation. It is important to realize, however, that relevant social and economic forces were already at work in that period, and institutions and organizations were fighting the “good fight” on both sides, to reduce or increase the influence of the federal government in the workplace. The efforts of the federal government and its allies to establish hiring and promotion practices that do not depend on the corporation’s internal rules, but are set by law has been investigated at length. Less attention has been received on the “other side,” the business-friendly conservatives and corporate executives that opposed this trend and fought to retain control of the workplace after World War II. While claiming to restore
merit as the basic principle of American enterprise and in pursuit of efficiency, corporate executives explicitly ranked racial groups, deciding who was best suited for the best jobs, by profiling workers. The executives ultimately merged managerial strategies and white supremacy for the sake of control of the workplace.

Within the liberal coalition of Civil Rights, labor unions, and political liberals aiming to increase black employment opportunities, different options and sensibilities were at work. Some leaders – King among them – kept their options open, and pursued a dialogue with liberal politicians while boycotting private corporations. It did not help that a gigantic disagreement between equality of opportunity and equality of results did not surface in the debate until the eleventh hour, in the second part of the 1960s. It was when the Johnson administration shifted its goals, quietly dealing with the Vietnam war and leaving the dreams of the Great Society behind to become a vague memory. The long arc of liberalism was coming to an end, and a master politician, Richard Nixon, was surfing the waves of partisan realignment, making liberal-conservative lines indistinguishable. It did not help that labor unions were already declining in terms of membership and influence, showing gradual acquiescence to a two-party political system and attention to the increasing conservative voice of the white low skilled workers. Examining this context is important, because it helps explain the resistance of white executives to change. Seeing the inconsistencies inside the liberal coalition, white executives felt authorized to resist integration in the workplace. The Civil Rights Act did not match the great expectations with which it was
welcomed; in fact, the national Civil Rights legislation was not designed to overcome the legacy of legal and practical racial segregation and discrimination, but was intended as a more modest attempt to assure that these practices were coming to an end.

Looking at the economic landscape in the 1960s, and at the ramifications of the different economic dynamics at work, it is easy to see why full employment, main strategy for pursuing integration in the workplace, had never been a viable option. In fact, the exhaustion of the long post-war economic cycle and the effects of automation undermined the effects of the Civil Rights legislation and efforts to remedy racial inequality in the workplace. Inflation was rising as a result of increasing federal deficits. The Johnson administration, then, the Nixon administration later embraced fiscal prudence, and dealt with the costs of the Vietnam War. They compressed social programs, in an attempt to mitigate the budget deficits, while the Federal Reserve was increasing interest rates in an attempt to curb inflation. The unemployment that emerged in the 1950s and 1960s due to the rise in the use of technology was not unexpected, as economists had already predicted automation-induced unemployment in the 1930s, although misunderstanding its effects. Manufacturing job loss was explained as inexorable, and part of a greater trend away from manufacturing to services. America was becoming a “post-industrial economy,” moving beyond commodity-based production and entering into a new phase of evolution, a more advanced economy based on knowledge and services. Although the history of the shift from manufacturing jobs to service jobs is complex
(manufacturing employment had a peak in the late 1970s and a regular decline thereafter), it is a matter of fact that growth in services began accelerating in the 1960s and has not stopped since. While economic growth increased per capita income in the 1960s, the average number of hours per manufacturing work week declined, making the effects of deindustrialization for unskilled workers devastating.

In the critical period from 1965 to 1968, the emergence of a new economic cycle exposed the limits of federal government’s programs that were based on the implicit premise of unstoppable economic growth. As there was a clear and transparent connection between economic growth and integration of African Americans in the economic realm, King concentrated his criticism on the Vietnam War. He thought that by ending the war, the federal government could liberate resources to be used to create opportunities for blacks and integrate them into the economic structure of American society. He acknowledged the increasing influence the war on the economy as it progressed, and the immediate effects of policy responses that shifted the government’s focus. He also correctly recognized the impact of the war on the economic system, and how the economy was increasingly affected by the war. However, the secretive attitude of the Johnson Administration and its decision to keep the true costs of the war secret from the American public and from the government’s economic advisors prevented King from identifying the real costs and the economic effects of the war on integration strategies and goals.
In his *The Economic Consequences of the Vietnam War*, scholar of economics, Anthony Campagna, shows that important microeconomic trends, *in primis* the first OPEC oil embargo, can be traced, in part, to the inflationary consequences of American economic policies during and after the Vietnam War. He also suggests that the mismanagement of the macro-economy and the misuse (or non-use) of fiscal policy by the Johnson administration ended up in the eventual shift from liberal Keynesian economics to the period of post-war stagflation and conservative monetary policy *à la* Milton Friedman.

In reality, this shift was already in place before the war. While an earlier generation of economists revisited their market-centered worldviews following the New Deal, postwar economic thought was marked by an increasingly consistent social philosophy that suggested significant constraints to government intervention in the economy. It was in the 1960s that Friedman and his contemporaries developed a more solid defense of the unfettered market and a monumental shift to monetarism, the economic theory that would take the place of Keynesianism in the 1970s. Their arguments provided a rhetorical foundation for the resurgent conservatism of Barry Goldwater, and inspired much of the political and economic agenda of the United States in the ensuing decades.\(^{530}\) The fact is, the 1960s can be understood as a decade of conservatism, as much as one of liberalism.

King seemed unaware of the challenge posed by inflation to consumer credit and, in general, to the economic cycle; neither did he apparently acknowledge the transformation of capitalism from manufacturing to the provision of services. He also ignored the incoming shift from Keynesianism to
monetarism. According King, economic inequality could be cured through a massive distribution of wealth. Tired of the ineffectiveness of the federal government in fighting economic inequality, King challenged what he considered white America’s racial prejudice toward black people. In his view, economic opportunities for African Americans were at hand thanks to the post-war economic boom. Consequently, by ending the war in Vietnam, the federal government would create the opportunity to redirect its efforts to correcting economic injustice. At the core of King’s economic thought was the distribution of wealth, not of power. Here lies the difference between King and Black Power. However, as the distribution of wealth was not an option at hand, King began to criticize the basic values of American capitalism and its prejudice against economic distribution. The fabric of American capitalism was at stake. In the last years of his life, King envisioned a new economic system based on the poor, minorities, and the unemployed and finally came to denounce a failure of capitalism. In his view, the federal government would compensate for the effects of economic injustice that was produced by capitalism or, even better, take over managing capitalism itself, and eventually reform it. He failed to recognize the limits of the federal government, the deteriorating economic context, and the rise of modern conservatism that emphasized a business-friendly culture.

Several biographers have identified openly with King and his idea of a reformed, social democratic form of capitalism. Others historians have reshaped King as a radical with regard to economics, who articulated a non-capitalist vision for Black America. In many ways, the ambiguity of this
scholarship that has only begun to explore King’s economic thought after the mid-1960s. At that time, the option of a poor, marginal, vulnerable and needs-driven economic system was unpopular in the same black community, which these ideas were intended to help. There was much lively discussion over the merits and flaws of capitalism and non-capitalist strategies to revitalize the economic status of African Americans. The debate between the two options, capitalism and non-capitalist alternatives, crossed the line between in African American history between integration and nationalism. While nationalism seems to align better with non-capitalist economic strategies such as self-help and economic self-determination, and integration aligns more closely with capitalism, hybrid and mixed surrogates were also investigated. King assumed a hybrid position, calling capitalism to self-reform, while venting frustration to his close advisors and lieutenants over his dream of a different economic system.

**Reconsidering Breadbasket**

If King was the ultimate defender of derelicts and the poor, Jackson was the militant voice of black consciousness and pride. Not surprisingly, this basic difference between the two leaders influenced the narrative of Breadbasket. In the last months of his life, King repeatedly clashed with Jackson. He accused Jackson of pursuing a personal agenda and supporting black capitalists rather than the black poor. If the first accusation was the reason for their last disagreement which occurred just a couple of days before King’s assassination, it is the second that was most devastating and left more
enduring damage. At the point when King was building an interracial coalition to press the federal government to end the war in Vietnam and to provide the poor with an improved chance to better themselves, Jackson was working with black entrepreneurs and bankers to advance black business and empower black capitalism. King “was quite rough on Jesse,” Andrew Young remembered, because he believed that adequate jobs would have to come through the public sector, while “Breadbasket was essentially a private sector program.”

Scholarship traditionally portrays Breadbasket as a program born in Atlanta that achieved success in Chicago. But Breadbasket was more than that. When Breadbasket moved to Chicago, it lost its way and innocence. It was no longer purely a Civil Rights campaign, but an economic advancement program for an emerging black middle class including finance and businesspeople, entrepreneurs and media moguls. Actually, it was re-modeled as a vehicle for self-advancement, an opportunity for self-promotion by Jackson, the self-appointed heir of King. It is no surprise that the literature on Breadbasket is usually included in Jackson’s biography. The program became Jackson-centric and abandoned the mainstream narrative of the S.C.L.C. and the history of the Civil Rights movement. Not only did Breadbasket change its scope, from black workers to black entrepreneurs, but it also became a perfect vehicle for the Napoleonic ambitions of the young civil right activist. Finally, it became the reason for the split inside the S.C.L.C. between Jackson and a group of King’s most intimate lieutenants.
The bottom line is that Breadbasket is a history of disappointments and betrayals, of diversion and opportunism.

The dominant narrative that emphasizes the clash of character between the two leaders only scratches the surface of the ideological differences between King and Jackson. Breadbasket remains a far more complex story needing to be articulated. While it maintained its color-conscious attitude, it changed its character and aims, from economic Civil Rights to black economic power. In its decade-long history from 1962 to 1972, the program dealt with the effects of the shift from the Great Society’s liberalism to modern conservatism, from economic growth to rising inflation, from boycotts to riots. It is easy to see Breadbasket as one campaign among many others, but it can also be seen as a microcosm, a single program that contains most of the ingredients and dynamics of an era.

Rather than a narrative of derailment, a narrative of transformation seems more suitable to Breadbasket. It is impossible to escape the impression that Breadbasket changed when Jackson replaced Rev. Fred C. Bennette as the national leader of the program. The difference between Bennette’s Breadbasket and Jackson’s could not be greater. The former was led by an executive team of pastors that met once a week, shared leadership, and avoided the media, while fighting the good fight to provide employment and job advancement opportunities to black families. When they met corporate executives, they talked about love and justice, sins and forgiving. They were serving the cause, without keeping anything for themselves –
money, privileges, notoriety – and relying on their congregations for funds and support. The latter was a chaotic organization run by a charismatic, undisciplined leader, who hieratically moved from one agenda to the other – “being with Jesse was like a jamboree,” one of his advisors remembers – but who was always very careful about remaining in the center of media and public attention. He fought the good fight for the black poor and workers, but also became increasingly fascinated by the possibility of facilitating the emergence of black capitalism. He was not shy when it came to asking for the cause, for the organization, and for himself. With this attitude, he was facilitated by his role as a pastor, and the old consuetude in the black community of taking care of the needs of its pastors, since “we could not have him as our leader and not supply the appearance and the satisfaction that go with it,” as one of his sponsors pointed out.

Breadbasket was a sincere and serious project articulated by the Black Church to provide economic opportunities to black poor and job promotion to black workers. It represented an important step in King’s own understanding of capitalism and his first direct, personal involvement in the economic struggle of the African American community. When King brought Sullivan to Atlanta in October 1962 to meet with local ministers and replicate the selective patronage program developed in Philadelphia, the American economy was at the edge of omnipotence. In a 1962 study, University of Michigan researchers determined that the cost to end poverty was less than two percent of the Gross National Product. Columnist Walter Lippermann explained that the size of the pie could be increased by intention, and
unlimited economic growth would have taken care of all. President Johnson provided his personal contribution to building the idea of a post-scarcity economy. In his 1964 State of the Union Address, Johnson made clear his purpose and it was no less than eradicating poverty in America. “This administration today, here and now, declares unconditional war on poverty in America. Our aim is not only to relieve the symptoms of poverty, but to cure it and, above all, to prevent it.” Eliminating poverty was, for Johnson, a matter of political will and economic resources, and America, according to this President, was short of neither. It is not surprisingly, then, that the black pastors in Atlanta were approaching corporate executives in terms of love and brotherhood, while calling on the federal government to set fair and full employment policies. In a post-scarcity economy, there are no costs that cannot be afforded, balance sheets that cannot be fixed, and minimum wages that cannot be paid. Unlimited economic growth – the size of the pie in Lipperman’s article – will guarantee the resources needed to eliminate employment discrimination. It was a matter of will, legislation and enforcement. After Watts, King developed a better and deeper comprehension of the economic implications of discrimination, and raised his voice to denounce the racial divide in the economy that the federal government had to fill. More importantly, he elaborated a vision of institutional racism that could be challenged only with a historical, monumental effort led by the federal government to restore justice in the economic realm. King acknowledged the limits of campaigns such as Breadbasket and demanded full employment, minimum wage, and a more
just distribution of wealth, while criticizing corporate power and the executive insensitivity to racial discrimination.

While King and the old guard of the S.C.L.C. called for a redistribution of wealth from the “have’s” to the “have not’s,” Jackson envisioned white-owned businesses infusing needed cash into minority-owned businesses, local economic development projects, small business advancement, job training, financial and trade institutions, and other community programs that would contribute to the advancement of the whole black community. They were living in “parallel universes.” In fact, they disagreed on the basic premise, that black underdevelopment was a product of capitalist development. Consequently, they also disagreed on the solution. King argued that in order for African Americans to advance economically, they would have to be integrated into the dominant economic structure in American capitalism once that structure had been changed. Jackson proposed black-controlled economic institutions in dialogue with white-controlled economic institutions, within the context of greater American capitalism.

When Jackson became the national director of Breadbasket in 1967, the economy was showing clear signs of a downturn. At that point, the level of economic growth was not enough to sustain the domestic programs envisioned by the Great Society. Of course, the increasing expense of funding a foreign conflict in Vietnam, for all intents and purposes, a disgraced war, was another cause of concern. The Great Society was running out of fuel as the government was running out of funds. The increase in
expenses created a federal deficit that contributed significantly to the rise of inflation, as Johnson had declined to increase taxes. The result was an increase of 4.5 percent in consumer prices, a policy of price stability, and in the words of historian Dallek, a “slowdown in capital investment, less residential construction, flat industrial production, disappointing retail sales and lower corporate profits”. The size of the pie could not be increased anymore. Once the basic laws of economics were restored, the size of the pie remained the same, and the good fight for employment and job promotion for blacks was a zero-sum game that required the bitter logic of power, reciprocity, and leverage. In other words, it was one thing to break racial discrimination barriers in the workplace in a growing economy, but another in a downturn.

Together with the economic climate, the racial climate was also evolving. Confronting increasing poverty, unemployment, and an emerging urban crisis, Northern black radicals added their voices, full of resentment and anger, to the voices of King and the other Civil Rights leaders who were more conciliatory and reconciling. In his book *Dark Days, Bright Nights*, Peniel E. Joseph points out that the Black Power movement showed two sides. The first was a more radical, aggressive, militant posture that was political in character and revolutionary in nature; and the second was a “quiet” and “moderate” side, focusing on developing self-help campaigns, organizing communities, and pursuing self-reliance. This second approach was usually interpreted as movement toward economic and political independence, as well as autonomy from white authority. However, the same
can be said about the Civil Rights Movement. In truth, there was a vague border between the Civil Right Movement and the Black Power movement, and activists often simultaneously participated in both. Jackson had a foot in both camps, as his main message is firmly rooted in the notion of Civil Rights and integration, but in his aggressively pursuit of the renegotiation of the economic racial covenant, his behavior fell in another, much more ambitious camp focuses on self-determination.

Few scholarly works connect Civil Rights activism with Black Power militancy in the realm of economics and business affairs. Most studies draw the line with the conciliatory, federal government-friendly Civil Rights moderates on one side, and the radical nationalists, on the other. This is unfortunate, as the border between the two movements is difficult to identify when it comes to economics and business. More conservative strategies such as black capitalism and more radical strategies such as black self-help not only historically coexisted but they eventually merged in a unique, authoritative message of pride and power. Jackson is a case in point. Radicals proclaimed that racial hostility was an effect of the unequal character of capitalism, and that to minimize the former it would be necessary to overcome the latter. Jackson recognized that the core question black leaders had to discuss was, what is achievable within the existing limitations of American capitalism, certainly not within the less realistic parameters of a black nation. He proclaimed that justice is the opportunity to share the benefits of capitalism with the whole community. Jackson was adamant before an audience of three thousand black nationalists and Pan-Africanists
in Atlanta in September 1970, as he explained that African Americans are part of the capitalist system, even if “morally you are not.” He pointed out that if African Americans were to advance economically, it was clear that they would have to be integrated into the dominant economic structures in American capitalism and yet maintain control of their own resources. In this way, he declined to adopt separatism and yet he endorsed the option of all-black institutions, economic independence, and racial pride. With his message of black capitalism, Jackson appealed to both the integrationist and self-determinist values of the black community without moving beyond the confines of American capitalism. He adopted the original principle of modern conservatism in economics, that not everybody can be wealthy. Not surprisingly, his engagement with black capitalism has been criticized by black radicals, because he failed to admit the value of socialist alternatives to capitalism. Certainly, Jackson was ambiguous in his view of black capitalism, due to his plan to accommodate the concept of black capitalism into the frameworks of both Civil Rights and Black Power. Embracing both Black Power and modern conservatism, Jackson eventually came to accept the concept of Black Power as a rationale for black capitalism and the development of new relationships between black businesspeople and corporate America.

Jackson recognized the effects of a failed war and an economic crisis that risked permanently undermining social cohesion and race relations. He understood that without a personal call to action, the black community could accept the effect of the economic crisis and wait passively for aid from the
government. Jackson tried to balance his appeal for boycotts and protests with a strong call to racial pride and self-esteem. Along with correcting an inclination to passivity, he tried to build a new anthropological posture. The black community had to learn how to reduce their economic dependence on white liberals as well as on the central government, and increase their autonomy. This definitively changed the relationship with whites. Jackson often talked of “reciprocity,” meaning the need for a relationship between equals.

**Toward a New History of Breadbasket**

Based on the traditional narrative of the political and cultural character of the Civil Rights Movement, scholarship does not usually pay too much attention to the economic context of the 1960s. It takes for granted that the 1960s were a long decade of economic growth, which eventually ends in 1972. The period, 1945-1972, was a period of enduring economic progress and increasing wealth, and 1965 was a transformative year that marked the birth of Black Power, the explosion of black riots in urban centers, and the origins of the white backlash. The white backlash was a reaction to the black radicalism of the second part of the decade, and ultimately led to the election of the Nixon administration and the end of liberalism as the dominant political and cultural tradition in the country. Once it was the accepted wisdom that Black Power and Civil Rights were reciprocally incompatible, the economic context became invariant, and conservatism was seen as a failed ideology after the defeat of Barry Goldwater. In this context, the
transformation of Breadbasket from a program led by black ministers to promote integration in the workplace and employment opportunities for African Americans, to a vehicle to promote back capitalism and protect the economic autonomy of black community in Chicago, was a sort of derailment. It was the result of Jackson’s unfair, unjust and unjustifiable decision, against Kings’ preferred option for the poor. The consequent disagreements between King and Jackson on Breadbasket’s aims and strategies were based on ethical issues, a struggle for power, and a clash of egos. In addition, Jackson is not particularly loved by scholars, which quite unanimously take King’s side.

This thesis offers a different approach. First, it takes into account the results of the most recent scholarship within a wide area of advanced studies, particularly the research on the economic character of the Civil Rights Movement, and the new subfield that Peniel E. Joseph calls “Black Power Studies.” It also embraces the opinions of a new generation of historians that has increasingly begun to view the 1960s as a decade of resurgent conservatism with faith in a market-centered economy. Secondly, it takes a closer look at the economy, in transition from boom to inflation, combined with the rapid escalation the war against Vietnam. By the end of 1965, an inflationary cycle was beginning to redefine the economic landscape, marking the birth of the tumultuous era we now know as “financialization.” In the light of this reality, this thesis assumes that during the 1960s, the American economy and Civil Rights Movement both underwent a major transformation, with the former having its sense of unlimited growth
dissipated over the course of the decade, and the latter intersecting with the mounting Black Power movement. Meanwhile, a declining liberalism and a rising conservatism were fighting for the economic soul of America. In addition, this thesis offers an analysis of the broader trends in American capitalism that made the search for workplace integration increasingly less important than access to capital and consumer credit. This thesis argues that the evolution of Breadbasket from economic Civil Rights to black economic power mirrors the changing social and economic context. The disagreements between King and Jackson on Breadbasket’s aims and strategies were ideological in character, and show their different reactions to this change, especially in the realm of economy.

Under Jackson’s leadership, Breadbasket became not only the legacy of a charismatic and enigmatic leader, but also a result of changing times. Those were times of expanding rights, black radicalism and pride, a crisis of the welfare state, the decline of the Great Society, and collapse of the New Deal coalition. It was a complex period, marked by a sharp deterioration in the economic conditions of the country, which was intellectually caught by a mounting laissez-faire philosophy, and the stirrings of a financial capitalism that would come to full maturity only in the following decade. The ideological conflict between the government and the market would come to a head during the Reagan presidency, and Jackson would be a protagonist during this period. But all the elements were already present in the late 1960s. Breadbasket mirrored a profound transformation of the collective perception of the economy during the decade. Its history marks the passage
from politics to economics as a major field of social debate and the transition from Civil Rights to the surge in the creation of a black business class. More succinctly, Breadbasket tells the story of a creative merger between two figures: the reformist hero, King, and entrepreneurial icon, Jackson.

Since there is not a dedicated study on Breadbasket, the main contribution of this thesis is an entire history of Breadbasket that fills a gap in the historiography. This thesis also attempts to provide a contribution to three topics relating to King and the history of the S.C.L.C.. The first contribution addresses the classic interpretation that asserts that King and the S.C.L.C. would place economic justice at the center of their activism, addressing issues of redistribution of wealth and economic power, only in the final years of King’s life.\textsuperscript{543} The second contribution disputes another traditional interpretation, that is, King focused on achieving what he conceived as universal rights, authorized by the Declaration of Independence and rooted in the wisdom of the Scriptures, in color-blind campaigns throughout his life. The third and last contribution challenges the popular understanding of the controversy between King and Jackson on the nature and destiny of Breadbasket as rooted in a clash of character.

Scholarship has been quite consistent in promoting the idea that in the mid-to late-1960s King and the S.C.L.C. were beginning to switch the focus of their attention to a broader struggle for economic justice. Historians have identified the riots in Watts as the turning point. On August 11, 1965, riots ignited in Watts, a predominantly black section of Los Angeles, after the
arrest of a 21-year-old for drunk driving. The riots occurred only five days after President Lyndon Johnson signed the Voting Rights Act. According to the classic narrative, King’s less than gentle reception among Watts’ poorest communities during the riot’s aftermath opened his eyes to an incredible level of urban poverty. The rioting in Watts turns the attention of King and other Civil Rights activists to the urban race problem. Until 1965, King regarded race as a peculiarly Southern problem that could be solved by extending political and Civil Rights to Southern blacks. Beginning in 1965, however, he learned that discrimination and racial prejudice were nationwide problems and that black Americans were demanding not just desegregation in the South, but equality in all parts of the country. In the North, African Americans suffered, not from _de jure_ (legal) segregation, but from _de facto_ discrimination in housing, schooling, and employment – discrimination that lacked the overt sanction of law. “De facto segregation,” wrote James Baldwin, “means that Negroes are segregated but nobody did it.”

Accordingly, the story of King and the S.C.L.C. can be divided in two phases, the first is related to the non-violent protest against segregation in the South, the second is against economic, housing, and discrimination in education in the North.

The history of Breadbasket seems to be consistent with the classic narrative of the Civil Rights movement in the South, centered on voting rights and judicial and legislative successes, and of the commitment of King and the S.C.L.C. to challenge economic discrimination beginning only in 1965. Most scholarship addresses Breadbasket as a campaign developed in Chicago, and
this obscures the earlier period, the first four years of operations – from the beginnings in Atlanta in 1962 to the expansion into Chicago in 1966. In other words, the biographies of King and Jackson, as well as the narratives of the S.C.L.C. and the Black Freedom Movement, converge in Chicago as the place where Breadbasket held its major events and became relevant.\textsuperscript{545} This may promote the perception that it is in Chicago that the program started. However, the period between 1962 and 1966, the undocumented time span from the incorporation in Atlanta to the expansion into Chicago, can be described as “the lost years of Breadbasket.” Concentrating on activist’s effort in the North, classic scholarship on Breadbasket only partially covers the story. In fact, the early years of Breadbasket show the commitment of King and S.C.L.C. to correcting economic injustice well before 1965. Moreover, when articles on Breadbasket pay attention to its Southern operations, they minimize the output of the organization there, quite immediately shifting to the late 1960s success in Chicago. That shift in geographical focus leads to the conclusion that Breadbasket didn’t accomplish very much in the South. The truth is, successes in Chicago have their own importance and their own history, but Breadbasket, as such, was a Southern phenomenon, with economic goals that resonated in the context of the rising New South. Accordingly, a history of Breadbasket that encompassed the early years of the program not only fills a gap in the historiography but also reveals the importance of the first years of Breadbasket and is instrumental in dispelling the myth that King and the S.C.L.C. became involved in the strategy of non-violent protest against the
structures of economic discrimination only after the Voting Rights Act, and especially after the explosion of riots in Watts.

Scholarship has been consistent in addressing another topic, King’s vision of the “beloved community,” the dream of full and equitable integration of blacks, which would be accomplished by way of color-blind legislation on behalf of all Americans. This would also include a moral appeal to the conscience of white America for the sake of universal principles of equality and justice. For example, later on, King emphasized the more universal focus of the Poor People’s Campaign, i.e., the building of an interracial coalition for the rights of all poor people, rather than the color-conscious militancy of the Black Power activists. Breadbasket shows that King’s attitude toward color-conscious programs was more nuanced and less critical that scholarship normally assumes. For example, in June 1967 he pointed out that “Breadbasket is essentially a program of self-help.”

The South where the activities of the S.C.L.C. and Breadbasket took place was the poorest region in the country. Here African Americans were rigidly politically segregated and economically powerless despite the fact that the region was in a period of metamorphosis, the phase of incubation of the New South, an economically booming, biracial democracy. Historian Gavin Wright believes that “modern acceleration of economic growth in the South clearly pre-dates the Civil Rights era.” (In fact, his own research suggests labor legislation during the New Deal had spurred some of it, by destroying the basis for regional isolationism.) Nevertheless, he says, “It’s even harder to picture the South enjoying its modern prosperity in the absence of the sharp 1960s break
with the past.” Barriers to economic progress may have been less from efficiency losses, he says, than from “the inability of a segregationist South to join and take advantage of national and international networks of knowledge and culture.” Southern blacks as a group clearly benefited from the movement, Wright adds, however “the South’s economic success largely has been limited to metropolitan areas, not unlike the rest of the country.”

Segregation may already have seemed expensive and anachronistic, and southern businessmen may have seen the economic damage caused by traditional patterns of race relations and by the ensuing negative national publicity that deterred outside investment. However, desegregation in the workplace was still slow and residual, and not surprisingly became a priority of King and the S.C.L.C., which tried to change the South in many ways. In addition, they pursued integration in the workplace through color-conscious boycotts and protests.

At a national level, the S.C.L.C. was a church-based, cross-class movement that stressed universal legalistic Civil Rights, and was powered by leftist and biracial trade unions. At the local level, the level where Breadbasket operated, it was focused more on boycotts and aggressive efforts to address the persistent realities of injustice and economic discrimination against black workers. The color-conscious character of Breadbasket also helps illuminate why Breadbasket changed its nature when it expanded in Chicago, and embraced continuance between Civil Rights and Black Power. During the Roaring Twenties, African Americans rapidly transformed their Chicago into
a “black metropolis.” In his book, *The Rise of Chicago’s Black Metropolis, 1920-1929*, Christopher Robert Reed describes the rise of African Americans in Chicago’s political economy, the labor issues and the struggle for control of black politics and black business. However, it was only in the 1960s that the efforts of black and Civil Rights leaders were transformed through dynamic social forces to promote black businesses and the establishment of a black professional class. Although there has always been some recognition of class diversity within the black community, the growth of the black middle class in the 1960s generated a debate within the black community on the relative influence of race in the lives of middle-class blacks. The consensus that emerged acknowledged the increasing influence of the entrepreneurial class, the competitive ideologies within the black community, while documenting the continued role of race in limiting black middle-class achievement in business and the workplace.

In Chicago, Breadbasket found itself involved in a completely different process than in the South. Breadbasket became involved in the emergence of the entrepreneurial black middle class and a black capitalism outside of the traditional racial economic enclaves, while radical and militant expressions of Black Power were fomenting revolution. Jackson and the other black preachers placed Breadbasket at the intersection of economic justice and black capitalism, promoting coalitions among the different voices of Black Chicago that addressed the aspirations of the poor, as well as the more affluent and consumer-oriented requests of the bourgeoisie. This intersection
between economic justice and black capitalism is what makes Breadbasket in Chicago so unusual. Twenty years before Manning Marable explained *How Capitalism Underdeveloped Black America*, the Black Church was pursuing a Breadbasket project to actually, in the words of Marable, improve “the economic conditions that scar the soul” and the life of the black people, and challenge the structure of American capitalism.\(^{550}\)

King was not sympathetic to “black capitalism” and criticized Jackson for being a champion of black entrepreneurship and the black bourgeoisie. In 1964, he had advocated for a “Bill of Rights for the Disadvantaged” guaranteeing education, jobs, and social services to impoverished citizens, white as well as black, pushed the idea of a multi-billion dollar “domestic Marshall Plan” – a proposal developed by Whitney Young, Jr., and the National Urban League. The plan was to eliminate poverty and rebuild the inner cities, a plan more ambitious than the Johnson administration’s War on Poverty. However, for the sake of economic justice, rather than mere equality, he established Breadbasket to promote “compensatory or preferential treatment” for black workers, and embraced affirmative action programs.\(^{551}\) He elaborated moral principles of compensatory justice for the history of wrongs committed against African Americans, which served as the basis not only of affirmative action, but also of Breadbasket’s campaigns for “black jobs.” “The moral justification for special measures for Negroes,” he wrote in 1963, “is rooted in the robberies inherent in the institution of slavery.” As historian Stewart Burns notes, King
gave then rationalized extending these entitlements to poor whites, the majority of the poor, on the grounds of what he called “derivative bondage” – the impact of slavery on capitalists’ control and exploitation of the white labor force. But this corollary argument seemed a bit specious, since a justification that might have been appropriate for a “chosen people” liberated from slavery did not have the same moral charge when applied to a larger group that did not share this heritage.552

Breadbasket at least reveals that King’s engagement with integration of the workplace reflects ambivalence about grounding a compelling program in the color-blind as well as in color-conscious fashion.

The story of Breadbasket is not simply the story of important campaigns and economic accomplishments but also one of intellectual adaptation. Hence the title of this thesis, *From Economic Rights to Black Economic Power*, which refers to different approaches to American capitalism. A brief comparison of the economic analysis of Dr. King and Jesse Jackson explains the point. Like the progressives and the left-wing liberal around him, Dr. King was critical, if not entirely hostile toward capitalism. Especially in the last three years of his life, King shared the belief that something was wrong with capitalism and that the government should find a way to compensate for capitalism’s flaws. Among the most important manifestations of his criticism was a preoccupation with the issues related to economic redistribution. On the edges of liberal economic thought were more radical ideas; the conviction that race struggles had revealed the incapacity of capitalism to provide economic justice, and the need for a fundamentally new system. King embraced such beliefs. At the heart of the economic liberalism of the 1960s was the commitment to increase the rights and freedoms of individuals and social and racial groups,
to protect and expand the institutions of the welfare state, and sustain economic growth. King correctly linked the growth of the economy with the possibility of full employment. He also became aware of the decline of manufacturing’s centrality to the economy and the rise of services, especially knowledge production. Science and technology were being systematically integrated into production – and this was the source of tremendous threat for low-skilled black workers. This change, in turn, placed increasing demands on government to fund education, sustain diffusion of technological expertise, coordinate processes of technological change, and build some of the key infrastructure required by new technologies. While the black leadership had long been aware of these needs, and the Black Church had fulfilled these functions, sometimes under the cover of training and educational classes, King argued that the scale and complexity of such problems would require public sector efforts.

However, when the idea of full employment became a mirage and the failure of President Johnson’s War on Poverty became evident, King was convinced that his dream of 1963 had been turned into a nightmare. He complained about the Vietnam War, and showed his concern about restructuring the capitalist system rather than acknowledging the limits of its growth. He embraced the assumption – that was not shared by Lyndon Johnson – that liberalism meant a commitment to reform, and that it is appropriate and fair to ask government to deal with the key point of the modern economy in the post-World War II era, the distribution of power and wealth. However, he misunderstood the profound implications of the end of economic growth for
fiscal policy – the collecting and spending of funds by the federal government. The limits to economic growth had immense effects on the ability of the federal government to sustain and maintain the welfare state. More importantly, he missed seeing the fiscal revolution that was coming, the deepening ambivalence of the American public toward paying taxes and growing government. King completely failed to recognize that Americans would become increasingly reliant on entitlements and increasingly disinclined to pay taxes or make the productive investments that society needs.

Jackson found himself less alienated and threatening by the degenerative effects of capitalism, than an earlier generation of black liberals would have been. The critique of modern capitalism that was so important for King was largely missed in Jackson’s view. At least it was so attenuated as to seem to be little more that rhetorical artifice. He expressed a set of moderate ideas, essentially reconciled to the existing structure of American capitalism, and committed himself to use the art of bargaining to gain economic power for the black community. One broad assumption was particularly important to Jackson, the assumption that the black community’s greatest problems were rooted in the structure of modern industrial capitalism. In addition, it was the mission of the larger Black Freedom Movement to somehow deal with the flaws in that structure. His commitment was the product of two overlapping missions. The first was an attempt to expand the effects of capitalism to blacks previously excluded, and the second was the acknowledgement of the decline of rights-based liberalism, and the search for economic autonomy.
Described in biographies and articles as a polyhedric personality with a kaleidoscopic mind, Jackson could easily describe himself, at least in his early days, as a moderate in economics, a liberal in politics, and a conservative in culture. This trinity might annoy almost everyone, but Jackson’s heterodoxy may have helped him to see what others could not, that well before the Reagan Revolution and the end of welfare as we know it, American capitalism would grapple with the question of the free market and private choices for decades to come. He had, by then, rearticulated the classic Civil Rights narrative, and had worked intensively to shape his own, peculiar meaning of the struggle for power. Not surprisingly, he redefined the black struggle for freedom in relation to what he considered the central issue of his times: consumer capitalism. Jackson incorporated in his vision the fact that the rise of a consumer culture from the 1920s to the 1960s had completely failed to include black consumers. He might or might not have predicted the implications of the consumer culture for the black movement, especially the undermining of race as a source of identity, but he certainly would have included it in his strategy for the advancement of the black middle class.

**Potential Further Research**

Further areas in need of research include the history of racial integration in the workplace, Jesse Jackson’ early career, and King’s economic thought. On February 18, 2009, in his first major speech since being confirmed, the nation’s first black attorney general, Eric Holder, took the opportunity to give a speech celebrating Black History Month, where he defined the
American people as “essentially a nation of cowards” on matters of race. In a blunt assessment of race relations in the United States, Holder told hundreds of Justice Department employees gathered for the event, that race issues continue to be a topic of political discussion, but “we, as average Americans, simply do not talk enough with each other about race.” No doubt, in order to balance the highly controversial – for some even incendiary – nature of his powerful opening statement, Holder immediately limited the extension of the issue. He stated that:

As a nation we have done a pretty good job in melding the races in the workplace. We work with one another, lunch together and, when the event is at the workplace during work hours or shortly thereafter, we socialize with one another fairly well, irrespective of race. (…) Outside the workplace the situation is even bleaker in that there is almost no significant interaction between us. On Saturdays and Sundays America in the year 2009 does not, in some ways, differ significantly from the country that existed some fifty years ago.

Of course, the reference is to one of Martin Luther King, Jr.’s most famous quotes concerning race and the American church. “It is appalling that the most segregated hour of Christian America is 11 o’clock on Sunday morning…” King remarked in 1963. However, what is significant in this statement is the choice of the workplace as a fine example of racial integration. According to Holder, work is an island of racial decency and mutual understanding in an ocean of social shaming and public embarrassment. Remarkably, fifty years ago that’s the way it was not. Fifty years ago, King and other clergymen established Breadbasket in order to provide job opportunities to black workers, fight discrimination in the workplace, and promote justice in hiring and promotion practices.
Discussing the Civil Rights Movement as a whole, historian of the U.S. South, C. Vann Woodward pointed out in the late 1960s that “all those stirring events [of the movement] were quite recent, so recent that the sound of them was still in our ears. And yet they seem at the same time so remote, so improbable.” To say “improbable” shows Van Woodward’s firm rejection of historical determinism as well as an acute recognition of the unpredictability of history and the degree of complexity of social dynamics. He advises historians to refuse any notion of cycle, recursion, or analogy between one period and another. History does not follow the laws of physics and consequently is not subject to the cause-effect process. History is – assuming an intimate bond between the two words – counterintuitive. This bond is surely true as far as the history of workplace desegregation is concerned. In what it might be considered a major irony of the struggle for integration in the workplace, blacks remained underrepresented in employment statistics during the age of America’s economic prosperity and capitalism’s major advances, and became fairly represented in the following era of recessions, inflation, financial crises, and relative economic decline. Although it is counterintuitive, the extraordinary transformation of the workplace has been taking place during an era of increasing unemployment and underemployment, rather than in the Golden Age of American capitalism, also known as the post-war economic boom. This point is important, because during the post–World War II economic expansion, fair employment and full employment became the primary rhetoric of liberals, labor unions, and Civil Rights leaders, just the same. The opposite is true, the
American workplace became less racially exclusionary with regard to employment policy with widespread adopted equal employment opportunity, and some forms of affirmative action, only after the optimism and expectation of full employment was over.\textsuperscript{558} Moreover, a whole series of adverse economic trends had a disproportionate impact on the black community, North and South. Their breakthrough into the labor market was followed by the general collapse in unskilled wages, which is a national and international trend, and the problems of agriculture in the South and of urban society in the North were real and had a race-specific dimension.\textsuperscript{559} However, the whole history is still to be written.

A few months earlier, on November 4, 2008, the Obama family celebrated with the newly elected president along with hundreds of thousands of supporters in Chicago’s Grant Park. Forty years after the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr., the country ended the long interlude, and welcomed a new black leader – this time no longer a Baptist pastor from the South but a community organizer from the Midwest. Standing with more than 200,000 Obama supporters in Grant Park that Tuesday, the Rev. Jesse Jackson cried as he learned that Barack Obama would become America’s first African-American president. His tears have only a partial redemptive power, and the fact the not everybody believed in his sincerity speaks loudly about the relationship that the veteran Civil Rights leader, who ran for president in 1984 and 1988, has with the national audience.\textsuperscript{560} During his career, Jackson’s unapologetic and confrontational style has upset a large part of the country while his long track record of divisive accusations along with a few scandals
and lies have made people skeptical about his good intentions and sincerity. Now, at 71 years of age, he remains an enigma. He dresses as a businessman, or a pastor, and has dismissed his Day-Glo designer dashikis, yet people still remember the six-foot-two, 200 pound leader, asking the crowd in Los Angeles, in the aftermaths of the Watts riots, “What time is it? Nation time!” His megalomaniac ego, hyperbolic proclamations and media overexposure did not help his reputation. Jackson has also been all but erased from the narrative of current Civil Rights history. Jackson is seen by many scholars as old and wrong, too polarizing a figure to have around as they try to build an arc that goes from Martin Luther King, Jr., to Barack Obama. The black man who ran Breadbasket as the first serious, history-making (and magazine cover-making) experiment in the late 1960s and early 1970s to merge economic Civil Rights and black economic power, and who promised to lead the black people of America to the capitalist promised land, is a sort of invisible man in the recent historiography. The opposite happened to Jackson’s mentor. During his life, Martin Luther King, Jr was considered by white conservatives in both major parties to be a dangerous rebel and a puppet in the hand of sneaky, vicious, and anti-American members of the Communist Party. For black radicals, he was a “house Negro.” However, after his assassination, he became the prophet of non-violence. Gone was the radical stance, the black preacher in a black suit who did not want to stay in his place, gone was the troublemaker who J. Edgar Hoover, the FBI executive director, in November 1964, publically called “the most notorious liar in the country.”. The later revelations about his adulteries and acts of
plagiarism did not have too much of an affect on the reputation of an icon, which has already been sanitized and consigned to legend.

In fact, it is Jackson, not King, who has been all but erased from the narrative of current Civil Rights history. Today Jackson is seen as too conservative in his economic stance by historians of the Black Power movement, as old and wrong, too polarizing a figure to have around and not inline enough with the core values of the Civil Rights Movement, as the scholarship of the movement tries to build an arc that goes from Martin Luther King, Jr., to Barack Obama.\textsuperscript{562} It is now the right time to re-evaluate him.\textsuperscript{563}

Finally, there is the eventual recognition of the differences between King and Johnson in terms of economic policy. Although the relationship between the Civil Rights leader and the 36\textsuperscript{th} president has been investigates extensively (see for example Kotz, Nick. \textit{Judgment Days: Lyndon Baines Johnson, Martin Luther King, Jr., and the Laws That Changed America}. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2005) a major investigation of their differing views in terms of economic policy and the political economy is still missing. The point is, the traditional narrative often assumes that King “broke” with Johnson on the Vietnam War, which was, among other problems, deflecting resources from the programs of the Great Society. King increasingly realized, this is still the classic scholarship, that Johnson was shifting his attention from domestic to international affairs, from economic justice to military power, and consequently altering the “center of gravity” of his economic policy.
However, this was only a part of King’s increasing dissatisfaction with capitalism. In the last years of his life, King escalated his criticism of the Johnson Administration, pointing out an unsatisfactory distribution of wealth, the limited pursuit of economic equality, and called for a reformation of capitalism, without recognizing that the idea of the reform of capitalism was already passé. It has been since the 1940s that liberalism had been concerned with providing a safe environment for the corporate world to flourish in, and the government is no longer much concerned with reform. It might seem a small detail, of little relevance in the history of the Civil Rights Movement. But in fact, it is a fine example of the importance of explorations in the history of economic thought. In fact, it clarifies a basic misunderstanding between King and Johnson. While it might be true that Johnson changed his economic policy because of the increasing costs of the Vietnam War, it is different than saying that Johnson changed his views of the political economy during his presidency. In fact, the opposite is true. Johnson does not seem to have changed his views of the political economy. He never envisioned a reformation of capitalism, he never showed any interest in modifying the structure of capitalism in order to pursue specific goals. He just made the wrong assumption that American capitalism could sustain the cost of the Great Society’s programs at home, and the domino strategy abroad. More simply, the politics of his economic view was different from King’s from the beginning. It was King who’s perspective matured, changing his political and economic views, and he found himself in a different spot than Johnson. Due to the basic differences in terms of political
and economic thought between King and Johnson, it would be interesting to investigate why King thought he had to break with Johnson, assuming a previous convergence that had never been in place.  

Conclusion

The S.C.L.C. established Breadbasket in 1962 as a Civil Rights program to promote economic opportunity in the workplace. In its post-1965 reincarnation, the program ended up utilizing the same means, boycotts and protests, for different ends. Specifically, the S.C.L.C. emphasized black capitalism and the pursuit of economic self-determination. Breadbasket changed its goals, shifting from giving blacks the right to share the same employment opportunities as whites, to gaining power for black entrepreneurs, bankers, and consumers. Rather than the general objective of equality, the program emphasized its choices in promoting economic autonomy and racial respect. Although it changed its goals, Breadbasket remained a color-conscious program, limiting its focus. It lacked the resources to be more than just a symbolic Civil Rights program for promoting integration in the workplace, and it also the will to be more than a rhetoric challenge to the primary structure of American capitalism.
Abbreviations

CFM   Chicago Freedom Movement
CIO   Congress of Industrial Organizations
CORE  Congress of Racial Equality
FBI   Federal Bureau of Investigation
FEPC  Fair Employment Practices Committee
MLK   Martin Luther King
MLKC  Martin Luther King, Jr., Center for Nonviolent Social Change
MCMLK Morehouse College Martin Luther King, Jr., Collection
NAACP National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
OB   Operation Breadbasket
OEO   Office of Economic Opportunity
PA   Operation Breadbasket, Private Collection
SCLC  Southern Christian Leadership Conference
SNCC  Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee
UAW  United Auto Workers
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Notes

2 Throughout the thesis, the terms “African American” and “black” are used interchangeably. Also, the expression “Civil Rights” will be used to indicate the field of study of the whole movement, or every time a collective enterprise is considered. Alternatively, the expression “civil right” will be used.


6 See note no. 380.


10 Recently, several authors have established a connection between the rise of the New South and the Civil Rights Movement. See notes no. 40 and 41. The main point of this literature is that not only the Civil Rights Movement delivered economic gains for black southerners, but also, with few exceptions, preserved southern whites, who did not lose economically from desegregation; instead they also gained. See for example: Whatley, Warren C. “The Collapse of the Cotton South and the Origins of the Civil Rights Movement.” Paper presented to the Economic History Association meetings, Montreal, September 1990.


12 “The short Civil Rights Movement” is the traditional narrative of the Civil Rights Movement as a 1950s and 1960s phenomenon (“Montgomery to Memphis narrative”). It is centered on the King-led nonviolent movement in the South and its outstanding role in the fight against Jim Crow. It is a ten-year period that begins with King's rise to leadership during the 1955 Montgomery bus boycott in Alabama, and ends with his 1968 assassination in Memphis, Tennessee. On the contrary, “the long Civil Rights Movement” story rejects the dominant, epic, and romantic narrative, and sustains that the Civil Rights Movement did not start with Martin Luther King, Jr., and it did not end with his assassination. This approach expands the regional focus of the Civil Rights Movement beyond the South, particularly in the North in reaction to racial discrimination in housing, labor markets, policing and criminal justice practices. It explores the origins and the precursors of the movement in the early XX century, and investigates the omissions. Consequently, it incorporates the study not just of the struggles for social justice, but also of the forces arrayed against them, and deals with the dialectic (and less frequently, with the convergence) between Civil Rights Movement and Black Power. It stretches the Civil Rights Movement timeline to include the movement's origins in the 1930s and 1940s, as well as the activism it inspired through the end of the


21 Actually, in the first two volumes of Branch’s epic trilogy, there is no mention of Breadbasket.
23 Two cases in place are Ralph David Abernathy and Andrew Young’s biographies. Abernathy, Ralph. And the Walls Came Tumbling Down: An Autobiography. New York: Harper & Row, 1989; Young, Andrew. An Easy Burden: The Civil Rights Movement and the Transformation of America. New York: HarperCollins, 1996. The former was King’s successor as president of the S.C.L.C., the latter was active in the S.C.L.C. from 1961, and later became its executive director at large. Chicago represented a bitter defeat for King, and in Abernathy’s judgment, King probably never recovered from it. Perhaps the only notable result from Chicago was S.C.L.C.’s eventual establishment of Operation Breadbasket under Jesse Jackson, who,
Despite some harsh criticisms from Abernathy, receives a balanced treatment in one full chapter of this autobiography.


25 See for example Cone, James H. Martin & Malcolm & America: A Dream or a Nightmare. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1991, p. 222. However, Louis Lomax, for instance, declares that the turning point occurred not at Watts, but during and after the Selma campaign in 1965. Selma “marked the end of the nonviolent civil rights era that began in Montgomery.” King then “shifted both his target and his goals,” determining to focus on economic oppression. Yet, the main point, the switch of the focus of King and the S.C.L.C. attention to economic justice in 1965, perseveres. Lomax, Luis. Source unknown, 1984, pp.166-167. In “The FBI and Martin Luther King, Jr.,” historian Garrow argues that in the last years of his life, King was considered a real threat to the establishment, having become so radical in his views. See Garrow, David J. The FBI and Martin Luther King, Jr.: From “Solo” to Memphis. New York: W.W. Norton, 1981, pp.204-219. See also note no. 26.

26 Several sources: see for example Jackson, Thomas F. From Civil Rights to Human Rights: Martin Luther King, Jr., and the Struggle for Economic Justice. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007, although Jackson’s main point is that King was in fact radical throughout his civil rights leadership, and not just in his later years. Also: Zepp, Ira G. The Social Vision of Martin Luther King, Jr. Brooklyn, NY: Carlson Pub., 1989.


29 Jackson, From Civil Rights to Human Rights: Martin Luther King, Jr., and the Struggle for Economic Justice, pp. 301-304.


34 Fairclough, Adam. To Redeem the Soul of America: The Southern Christian Leadership Conference and Martin Luther King, Jr. Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1987. Aldon Morris points out that, in Birmingham, King signed an agreement which depended on the good graces of the Birmingham merchants. In fact, King’s and S.C.L.C.’s accomplishment in getting the businessmen to capitulate on a set of demands, historian Morris argues that “their second objective was to score a victory that would serve as a pivotal example to be used by other black communities and would force the federal government to take a firm stand against racial domination.” Morris, Aldon D. The Origins of the Civil Rights Movement: Black Communities Organizing for Change. New York: Free Press, 1984, p. 251. See also notes 40, 41, and 42, specially Jacoway, Elizabeth, and David R. Colburn (eds.). Southern Businessmen and Desegregation. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1982.


41 Historian Gavin Wright sustains that “I argue first, that the Civil Rights revolution was an economic as well as a political and social revolution, and that its effects included economic gains for blacks in the South that were tangible and enduring; second, that the Civil Rights revolution was a liberating economic breakthrough for the Southern regional economy as well as for its black population; and third, that the black presence in economic as well as political life continues to be a distinguishing feature of the South, another lasting consequence of the Civil Rights revolution of the 1960s.” Gavin Wright, *The Economics of the Civil Rights Revolution,* in Moore, Winfred B., and Orville Vernon Burton (eds.). *Toward the Meeting of the Waters: Currents in the Civil Rights Movement of South Carolina during the Twentieth Century.* Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 2008.


57 University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007. See also note no. 25
58 Human Rights: Martin Luther King, Jr., and the Struggle for Economic Justice
59 Religious Ethics
60 Books, 1996; Douglas Sturm, Martin Luther King, Jr., as Democratic Socialist,
355
Luther King, Jr., and the Struggle for Economic Justice, p. 304. In his final speech—delivered in Memphis on April 3, 1968, in support of a sanitation workers’ strike—Martin Luther King Jr. said, “I’ve been to the mountaintop.” Then he hinted that he might not live long. Had he survived, the speech might well be known for another passage, which called for black economic empowerment. “Now the other thing we’ll have to do is this: Always anchor our external direct action with the power of economic withdrawal. Now, we are poor people. Individually, we are poor when you compare us with white society in America. We are poor. Never stop and forget that collectively -- that means all of us together -- collectively we are richer than all the nations in the world, with the exception of nine. Did you ever think about that? After you leave the United States, Soviet Russia, Great Britain, West Germany, France, and I could name the others, the American Negro collectively is richer than most nations of the world. We have an annual income of more than thirty billion dollars a year, which is more than all of the exports of the United States, and more than the national budget of Canada. Did you know that? That's power right there, if we know how to pool it. We don’t have to argue with anybody. We don’t have to curse and go around acting bad with our words. We don’t need any bricks and bottles. We don’t need any Molotov cocktails. We just need to go around to these stores, and to these massive industries in our country, and say, “God sent us by here, to say to you that you’re not treating his children right. And we’ve come by here to ask you to make the first item on your agenda fair treatment, where God’s children are concerned. Now, if you are not prepared to do that, we do have an agenda that we must follow. And our agenda calls for withdrawing economic support from you. And so, as a result of this, we are asking you tonight, to go out and tell your neighbors not to buy Coca-Cola in Memphis. Go by and tell them not to buy Sealtest milk. Tell them not to buy -- what is the other bread? -- Wonder Bread. And what is the other bread company, Jesse? Tell them not to buy Hart’s bread. As Jesse Jackson has said, up to now, only the garbage men have been feeling pain; now we must kind of redistribute the pain. We are choosing these companies because they haven’t been fair in their hiring policies; and we are choosing them because they can begin the process of saying they are going to support the needs and the rights of these men who are on strike. And then they can move on town -- downtown and tell Mayor Loeb to do what is right. But not only that, we’ve got to strengthen black institutions [italics mine]. I call upon you to take your money out of the banks downtown and deposit your money in Tri-State Bank. We want a “bank-in” movement in Memphis. Go by the savings and loan association. I’m not asking you something that we don’t do ourselves at SCLC. Judge Hooks and others will tell you that we have an account here in the savings and loan association from the Southern Christian Leadership Conference. We are telling you to follow what we are doing. Put your money there. You have six or seven black insurance companies here in the city of Memphis. Take out your insurance there. We want to have an “insurance-in. Now these are some practical things that we can do. We begin the process of building a greater economic base. And at the same time, we are putting pressure where it really hurts. I ask you to follow through here.” It might be easily confused for a Breadbasket’s strategic plan. See: Martin Luther King, Jr, “I’ve Been to the Mountaintop” delivered 3 April 1968, Mason Temple (Church of God in Christ Headquarters), Memphis, Tennessee.


61 See chapter four, “The Birth of a Leader,” in particular note no. 525.

62 The original quotation is: “The connotation of Black Power in the media was violence. The fact is Black Power was power sharing. It was equity.” See: Madison Davis Lacey, Jr. and Henry Hampton, *Eyes on the Prize II*. Interview with Jesse Jackson, April 11, 1989, accessed September 3, 2012, http://digital.wustl.edu/e/eii/eiiweb/jac5427.0519.072marc_record_interviewer_process.htm The same as note no. 525.


64 Historian Burns assumes that King did the same. “A decade later, he [King] shifted from the interracial coalition building that had won historic civil rights reforms to local urban campaigns to establish “black power”. (I use the term deliberately) in Chicago and then in Cleveland, as well as in a number of other cities where the Southern Christian Leadership Conference’s (S.C.L.C.’s) “Operation Breadbasket” pressured corporations for inner-city jobs. It is evident from his later writings that he embraced “black power” as a strategy while rejecting it as a slogan.” Stewart Burns, From the Mountaintop: The Changing Political Vision of Martin Luther King, Jr., *The History Teacher*, Vol. 27, No. 1 (Nov., 1993), pp. 7-18, p. 10. Martin Luther King, Jr., *Where Do We Go from Here: Chaos or Community?*. (New York: Harper & Row, 1967), pp. 30-31.


66 See notes no. 6, 7 and 380.


It is the classic narrative. See for example: Cone, James H. Martin & Malcolm & America: A Dream or a Nightmare. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1991; Peniel E. Joseph, The Black Power Movement: A State of the Field, The Journal of American History, December 2009, 751-776. Historian Joseph points out that the August 1965 riots in the Watts section of Los Angeles came to be regarded as the unofficial prelude to black power’s national rise, punctuated by Martin Luther King being heckled by inner-city residents inmune to his eloquent pleas for nonviolence. Second, King’s efforts in Chicago, where his advocacy of open housing and slum clearance produced limited results, were interpreted as a harbinger of both the coming wave of black militancy and the purported shift to the north of the civil rights struggle. Finally, Stokely Carmichael’s election as SNCC chairman, barely a month before his signature moment during the Meredith march, These three events have come to constitute the genesis of the black power era. See: Peniel E. Joseph, The Black Power Movement: A State of the Field, The Journal of American History, December 2009, pp. 751-776, p. 760. While this thesis does not address this main point, it shares Joseph’s criticism to this classic narrative, that is, Black Power’s novelty, on the basis that economic radicalism was already in place before Watts. Moreover, Watts was not a turning point, at least as far as King’s activism for the sake of economic justice and integration in the workplace is concerned, as he was already aware of the importance of the economic issues.


72 It is the classic narrative. See for example: Cone, James H. Martin & Malcolm & America: A Dream or a Nightmare. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1991; Peniel E. Joseph, The Black Power Movement: A State of the Field, The Journal of American History, December 2009, 751-776. Historian Joseph points out that the August 1965 riots in the Watts section of Los Angeles came to be regarded as the unofficial prelude to black power’s national rise, punctuated by Martin Luther King being heckled by inner-city residents inmune to his eloquent pleas for nonviolence. Second, King’s efforts in Chicago, where his advocacy of open housing and slum clearance produced limited results, were interpreted as a harbinger of both the coming wave of black militancy and the purported shift to the north of the civil rights struggle. Finally, Stokely Carmichael’s election as SNCC chairman, barely a month before his signature moment during the Meredith march, These three events have come to constitute the genesis of the black power era. See: Peniel E. Joseph, The Black Power Movement: A State of the Field, The Journal of American History, December 2009, pp. 751-776, p. 760. While this thesis does not address this main point, it shares Joseph’s criticism to this classic narrative, that is, Black Power’s novelty, on the basis that economic radicalism was already in place before Watts. Moreover, Watts was not a turning point, at least as far as King’s activism for the sake of economic justice and integration in the workplace is concerned, as he was already aware of the importance of the economic issues.


75 In previous scholar works on the subject, Alan Draper examined the relationship between organized labor and the black freedom struggle, and Michael K. Honey focused on blacks and organized labor in Memphis before the Brown decision. Merl E. Reed probed the Fair Employment Practices Committee (FEPC) of the 1940s, and Brian K. Landsberg charted the history of the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice. Draper, Alan. Conflict of Interests: Organized Labor and the Civil Rights Movement in the South, 1954-1968. Ithaca, NY: ILR


77 The Great Depression of the 1930s was catastrophic for all workers. But as usual, Blacks suffered worse, pushed out of unskilled jobs previously scorned by whites before the depression. Blacks faced unemployment of 50 percent or more, compared with about 30 percent for whites. Black wages were at least 30 percent below those of white workers, who themselves were barely at subsistence level.


79 Their target was a small chain of grocery stores in Chicago’s black ghetto that refused to employ African Americans. Referred to as ‘Spend Your Money Where You Can Work,’ this first campaign sparked a larger boycott against Woolworth stores located in Chicago’s ‘Black Belt’ that also resisted hiring black employees. An aggressive black newspaper, the Chicago Whip, published fiery editorials endorsing the campaign.


86 Randolph was the chairman of the first predominantly black labor union. In a discriminated division of labor in the railroad industry, black workers were still enjoying a job better paid than most jobs blacks could get. In the 1930s, after decades of organizing attempts, the porters won a union representation election and Randolph became its chairman. In 1940, he built the March on Washington movement.

87 In 1943, Roosevelt greatly strengthened the FEPC with a new executive order, Executive Order 9346. It required that all government contracts have a non-discrimination clause.


In 1964, 28 states had such laws in place, none was effective; some even lacked any enforcement rule. MacLean, Freedom Is Not Enough: The Opening of the American Work Place, p. 43.


In order to safeguard the image of his brother’s administration as Civil Rights-friendly, the attorney general Robert Kennedy asked vice president Lyndon Johnson to provide the updated records of integration in the workplace. As chairman of the President’s Committee in Government Employment Policy, unfortunately Johnson had achieved only modest results in convincing government contractors to hire more black workers; in Birmingham, Alabama, for example, blacks counted for 37 percent of the population but they held 1 percent of non-menial federal jobs. African Americans still held only low-wage and menial jobs, in the private sector as well as in the federal government, and the Kennedy administration had done nothing to change the situation. On May 29, 1963, Kennedy humiliated Johnson: he asked detailed statistics on black employment by city, by occupation, and by region. When the staff could not respond immediately, the attorney general loudly complained.


MacLean, Freedom Is Not Enough: The Opening of the American Work Place, p. 65

MacLean, Freedom Is Not Enough: The Opening of the American Work Place, p. 53.

MacLean, Freedom Is Not Enough: The Opening of the American Work Place, p. 54.

Protest actions began in Birmingham in 1962, when students from local colleges arranged for a year of staggered boycotts. They caused downtown business to decline by as much as 40 percent, which attracted attention from Chamber of Commerce president Sidney Smyer, who commented that the “racial incidents have given us a black eye that we’ll be a long time trying to forget.” The S.C.L.C. decided that economic pressure on Birmingham businesses would be more effective than pressure on politicians, a lesson learned in Albany. In the spring of 1963, before Easter, the Birmingham boycott intensified during the second-busiest shopping season of the year. Pastors urged their congregations to avoid shopping in Birmingham stores in the downtown district. For six weeks supporters of the boycott patrolled the downtown area to make sure blacks were not patronizing stores that promoted or tolerated segregation. If black shoppers were found in these stores, organizers confronted them and shamed them into participating in the boycott. Reverend Fred Shuttlesworth, the legendary native pastor of Birmingham, recalled a woman whose $15 hat was destroyed by boycott enforcers. Campaign participant Joe Dickson recalled, “We had to go under strict surveillance. We had to tell people, say look: if you go downtown and buy something, you’re going to have to answer to us.” After several business owners in Birmingham took down “white only” and “colored only” signs, Commissioner of Public Safety, Eugene “Bull” Connor told business owners that if they did not obey the segregation ordinances, they would lose their business licenses. Fairclough, Adam. To Redeem the Soul of America: The Southern Christian Leadership Conference and Martin Luther King, Jr. Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1987, p. 113.

Delton, Racial Integration in Corporate America. 1940-1990, p. 163.

The UAW leaders rallied support from white religious and civil liberties organizations in what Reuther called a “coalition of conscience.” With strong support from Roy Wilkins, Reuther encouraged Randolph to add the Protestant notable Rev. Eugene Carson Blake, the Jewish leader Rabbi Joachim Prinz and the Catholic layman Matthew Ahmann to the ‘Big
Six Civil Rights leaders (King, Wilkins, Randolph and SNCC’s John Lewis, the Urban League’s Whitney Young and CORE’s James Farmer) who composed the March on Washington steering committee. This restructuring into a ‘Big Ten’ also included Reuther. Walter Reuther strongly supported the Civil Rights Movement; he was an active supporter of African American Civil Rights and participated in both the March on Washington for Freedom and Jobs (August, 1963) and the Selma to Montgomery March (March, 1965). He stood beside Martin Luther King Jr. while he made the “I Have A Dream“ speech, during the 1963 March on Washington. Several sources, see for example: Barnard, John. American Vanguard: The United Auto Workers during the Reuther Years, 1935-1970. Wayne State U. Press, 2004.

In terms of religious leaders, a special mention probably deserves the National Catholic Conference for Interracial Justice (NCCIJ), founded in 1960, two years after the U.S. Catholic bishops’ statement on racial discrimination and segregation, to coordinate the efforts of Catholic interracial councils, first established in the 1930s under the leadership of John LaFarge, SJ. During its heyday in the 1960s, when it was headquartered in Chicago, the NCCIJ served as catalyst for the historic interfaith National Conference on Religion and Race and for Catholic involvement in the March on Washington and demonstrations in Selma, Alabama, and elsewhere in support of federal Civil Rights legislation. Notable initiatives included programs to combat employment discrimination (the interdenominational Project Equality, which became an independent organization in 1971) and provide human relations training for teachers.

MacLean, Freedom Is Not Enough: The Opening of the American Work Place, pp. 54 and 58.

The Birmingham Truce Agreement states: “1. Within 3 days after close of demonstrations, fitting rooms will be desegregated. 2. Within 30 days after the city government is established by court order, signs on wash rooms, rest rooms and drinking fountains will be removed. 3. Within 60 days after the city government is established by court order, a program of lunchroom counter desegregation will be commenced. 4. When the city government is established by court order, a program of upgrading Negro employment will be continued and there will be meetings with responsible local leadership to consider further steps.” “The Birmingham Truce Agreement,” 10 May 1963, in Carson, Clayborne. The Eyes on the Prize: Civil Rights Reader: Documents, Speeches, and Firsthand Accounts from the Black Freedom Struggle, 1954-1990. New York, N.Y., U.S.A.: Penguin Books, 1991. MacLean, Freedom Is Not Enough: The Opening of the American Work Place, p. 71.

Chappell makes the important point that the later affirmative action, as well as the constitutional justification, the coalition of beneficiaries, and the cultural appeal of affirmative action are radically different from the affirmative action that King supported. David L. Chappell. Waking from the Dream: the Battle over Martin Luther King’s Legacy (Random House).

The popular narrative is that America enjoyed a constant growth from 1945 to 1972. In reality, based on the definition of recession as “a significant decline in economic activity spread across the economy, lasting more than a few months, normally visible in real gross

124 Patterson, Great Expectation. The United States, 1945-1974, p. 312.
125 Patterson, Great Expectation. The United States, 1945-1974, p. 312.
126 Patterson, Great Expectation. The United States, 1945-1974, p. 316.
127 Patterson, Great Expectation. The United States, 1945-1974, p. 312.
134 See note no. 55.
135 On credit cards, see: Steven Mercatante, The Deregulation of Usury Ceilings, Rise of Easy Credit, and Increasing Consumer Debt, South Dakota Law Review, Spring 2008, assessed on October 24, 2012, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m6528/is_1_53/ai_n25019601. On financial market deregulation. “The Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 had established a firm separation between commerce and banking in the financial world. Banks began lobbying Congress as early as the 1960s to loosen the restrictions of Glass-Steagall. With money market mutual funds and other complex financial instruments that blurred the lines between deposits and securities, the banking industry complained the Glass-Steagall restrictions were becoming obsolete. Banks wanted to enter the municipal bond market, among other securities markets, to remain competitive. Regulators in government were sympathetic to the industry’s concerns on some accounts. There was always a fear that financial deregulation in foreign countries would entice firms to take their capital abroad, and many in government shared the free market ideology of deregulation. A third topic is securitization. In previous decades, banks had essentially been portfolio lenders, holding assets on their books until they reached maturity. Now, by a process of securitization, assets could be pooled together and repackaged into securities. Financial institutions could turn the illiquid assets on their books into highly-liquid securities that could be sold off to investors. The first securitized assets, mortgage loans, were packaged into mortgage-backed securities in 1970 at the Government National Mortgage Association (Ginnie Mae). The Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac) and the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) soon followed suit in the nationwide push to foster homeownership; these government-sponsored agencies (GSEs) bought up mortgage loans to facilitate a secondary market. The securities carried an implicit guarantee from the federal government, and they were required to conform to underwriting standards that ensured loan quality and limited risk.” Source: Matthew Sherman, A Short History of Financial Deregulation in the United States, Center for Economic and Policy Research, July 2009.
137 MacLean, Freedom Is Not Enough: The Opening of the American Work Place, p. 88.
140 Andrew III, Lyndon Johnson and the Great Society, pp. 26 and 29-30.
145 Truman also made three executive orders that eventually became a structure for future Civil Rights legislation. The first executive order, Executive Order 9981 in 1948, is generally
understood to be the act that desegregated the armed services. This was a milestone on a long road to desegregation of the Armed Forces. The second, also in 1948, made it illegal to discriminate against persons applying for civil service positions based on race. The third executive order, in 1951, established Committee on Government Contract Compliance (CGCC). This committee ensured that defense contractors to the armed forces could not discriminate against a person because of their race.

146 MacLean, Freedom Is Not Enough: The Opening of the American Work Place, pp. 21-22.
149 Patterson, Great Expectation. The United States, 1945-1974, pp. 320-1.
150 Andrew III, Lyndon Johnson and the Great Society, p. 17.
151 Patterson, Great Expectation. The United States, 1945-1974, p. 326.
153 Patterson, Great Expectation. The United States, 1945-1974, pp. 322 and 326.
154 For previous literature focused on resistance to desegregation, see note n. 45.
157 Patterson, Great Expectation. The United States, 1945-1974, p. 590.
158 MacLean, Freedom Is Not Enough: The Opening of the American Work Place, p. 6.
161 Andrew III, Lyndon Johnson and the Great Society, p. 54.
163 MacLean, Freedom Is Not Enough: The Opening of the American Work Place, pp. 77-8.
164 MacLean, Freedom Is Not Enough: The Opening of the American Work Place, p. 82.
166 Patterson, Great Expectation. The United States, 1945-1974, p. 642.
167 Andrew III, Lyndon Johnson and the Great Society, pp. 55 and 44.
171 MacLean, Freedom Is Not Enough: The Opening of the American Work Place, p. 95.
In his 1966 speech, Martin Luther King, Jr., had stated, “The only thing that is really wrong with this country is the existence of poverty in an affluent society.” He was thinking of the tragedy of the Dust Bowl. Despite the depression, whites received the full benefit of rising prosperity while blacks were deliberately left out. See: Timmerman, Kenneth R. *Shakedown: Exposing the Real Jesse Jackson*. Washington, D.C.: Regnery Pub., 2002; p. 24; SCLC’s “Operation Breadbasket: How to Win Jobs and Influence Business Men”, report by Fred C. Bennette and Jesse Jackson, 1967 August (printed document, 4pp [2 copies]), Morehouse College Martin Luther King, Jr., MCMLK, Series 6: Southern Christian Leadership Conference Organizational Records.


182 MacLean, Freedom Is Not Enough: The Opening of the American Work Place, pp. 105-6.


186 Here is the whole quotation: “Stokely replied by saying that the question of violence versus nonviolence was irrelevant. The real question was the need for black people to consolidate their political and economic resources to achieve power. “Power,” he said, “is the only thing respected in this world, and we must get it at any cost.” Then he looked me squarely in the eye and said, “Martin, you know as well as I do that practically every other ethnic group in America has done just this. The Jews, the Irish and the Italians did it, why can’t we?” King, Martin Luther, Jr. *Where Do We Go from Here: Chaos or Community?* New York: Harper & Row, 1967, p. 30.


188 An act of ‘corrective justice’ is a form of public policy that is in place to correct the injustice that the members of a specific group have inflicted on the members of another specific group. As its name indicates, corrective justice has a compensatory function. By rectifying, corrective justice asserts a connection between the present remedy and the past wrong. From the perspective of corrective justice, the public policy does not treat the situation being adjudicated as a morally neutral given and then ask what is the best course for the future all things considered. Rather, because the public policy aims to correct the injustice done by one group to the other, the remedy responds to the injustice and endeavors, so far as possible, to undo it. Katznelson, *When Affirmative Action Was White: An Untold History of Racial Inequality in Twentieth-century America*, p. 149.


192 The main primary source of this chapter is the Fred C. Bennette, Jr. Collection, hosted at Auburn Avenue Research Library in Atlanta, Georgia. References to the meeting in Waycross come quite integrally from that Collection. In particular, Box 002-003-01, folders 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9. They contain Breadbaskets manually written notes of various Breadbasket meetings from 1964 to 1966. If not specified otherwise, they are the source of the meeting at the Gaines Chappell African Methodist Episcopal (A.M.E.) Church of Waycross, Thursday, May 19, 1966.

The area now known as Waycross was first settled around 1820, locally known as “Old Nine” or “Number Nine” and then Pendleton. It was renamed Tebeauville in 1857, incorporated in 1866 and designated county seat of Ware County in 1873. Then it was incorporated as “Way Cross” on March 3, 1935. Waycross gets its name from the city’s location at key railroad junctions. Lines from six directions meet at the city. Its name signifies its strategic position where “Ways Cross.”

The Gaines Chappell African Methodist Episcopal (AME) Church of Waycross was at 802 Reynolds (now at 801 S Georgia Pkwy E), the residence of Rev. Ross was at 913 Daniel Street.


“What a Friend We Have in Jesus” is a Christian hymn originally written by Joseph M. Scriven as a poem in 1855 to comfort his mother who was living in Ireland while he was in Canada. When Scriven’s mother became ill in Ireland, he wrote a comforting letter to her, enclosing the words of his newly written poem with the prayer that these brief lines would remind her of a never-failing heavenly Friend. Scriven originally published the poem anonymously, and only received full credit for it in the 1880s. The tune to the hymn was composed by Charles Crozat Converse in 1868.

Here is the Lyric: “What a friend we have in Jesus, / all our sins and griefs to bear! / What a privilege to carry / everything to God in prayer! / O what peace we often forfeit, / O what needless pain we bear, / all because we do not carry / everything to God in prayer. / Have we trials and temptations? / Is there trouble anywhere? / We should never be discouraged; / take it to the Lord in prayer. / Can we find a friend so faithful / who will all our sorrows share? / Jesus knows our every weakness; / take it to the Lord in prayer. / Are we weak and heavy laden, / cumbered with a load of care? / Precious Savior, still our refuge; / take it to the Lord in prayer. / Do thy friends despise, forsake thee? / Take it to the Lord in prayer! / In his arms he’ll take and shield thee; / thou wilt find a solace there.”

Here is Reverend J.E. Ross’s version: “Citizens we have come together, / something we must understand / We must not think to the weather / We must value in this land / In this world men are growing / this is no time to be a boy / We must leave this whole world knowing / that we mean to have some joy. / We have been registering in the army / but we did not have a voice / Now we mean to live in harmony / We are fighting for a choice. / Yes my brother we are going / for we mean to wear our coats / with discord the enemies sowing / We are going to cast our votes / We must blend our every motions / that this job we are trying to do / We must kill all crazy notions / for we mean to travel through / We have been laboring for a long time / Slavering for the other man / We must work to kill the mean crimes / for we must inherit this land.”

Here is the Lyric: “What a fellowship, what a joy divine, / Leaning on the everlasting arms; / What a blessedness, what a peace is mine, / Leaning on the everlasting arms. / Leaning, leaning, safe and secure from all alarms; / Leaning, leaning, leaning on the everlasting arms. / Oh, how sweet to walk in this pilgrim way, / Leaning on the everlasting arms; / Oh, how bright the path grows from day to day, / Leaning on the everlasting arms. / What have I to dread, what have I to fear, / Leaning on the everlasting arms? / I have blessed peace with my Lord so near, / Leaning on the everlasting arms.”


The whole text says: “The contractor will not discriminate against any employee or applicant for employment because of race, creed, color, or national origin. The contractor will take affirmative action to ensure that applicants are employed, and that employees are
treated during employment, without regard to their race, creed, color, or national origin. Such action shall include, but not be limited to, the following: employment, upgrading, demotion or transfer; recruitment or recruitment advertising; layoff or termination; rates of pay or other forms of compensation; and selection for training, including apprenticeship. The contractor agrees to post in conspicuous places, available to employees and applicants for employment, notices to be provided by the contracting officer setting forth the provisions of this nondiscrimination clause.” Executive Order 10925. Establishing The President's Committee On Equal Employment Opportunity. March 6, 1961.


218 It refers to the unintentional consequences of intentional actions.


Negroes Step Up Use of Boycotts to Back Clerics

Philadelphia: Macrae Smith, 1969;


Invitation to the luncheon, Oct 24, 1962, 1 p, Southern Christian Leadership Conference Records, MLKC, Box 172:41; Invitation to the meeting at Allen Temple, date unknown, 1 p, Southern Christian Leadership Conference Records, MLKC, Box 172:41; Document called “Atlanta SCLC to Launch “Operation Bread Basket” with list of people to contact, date unknown, 5 p, Southern Christian Leadership Conference Records, MLKC, Box 172:41.

S.C.L.C.’s press release, October 23, 1962, 1 p, Southern Christian Leadership Conference Records, MLKC, Box 172:41. For the reports about the level and type of employment of African American workers in the companies, see: Southern Bakery Report, date unknown (probably Fall 1962), 1 p, Southern Christian Leadership Conference Records, MLKC, Box 172:1; Highland Bakery Report, date unknown (probably Fall 1962), 1 p, Southern Christian Leadership Conference Records, MLKC, Box 172:1; Atlanta Baking Company Report, date unknown (probably Fall 1962), 1 p, Southern Christian Leadership Conference Records,
Here is the full quotation: “Don’t get panicky. Don’t do anything panicky. Don’t get your weapons. If you have weapons, take them home. He who lives by the sword will perish by the sword. Remember that is what Jesus said. We are not advocating violence. We want to love our enemies. I want you to love our enemies. Be good to them. This is what we must live by. We must meet hate with love. I did not start this boycott. I was asked by you to serve as your spokesman. I want it to be known the length and breadth of this land that if I am stopped, this movement will not stop. If I am stopped, our work will not stop. For what we are doing is right. What we are doing is just. And God is with us.” Source: Branch, Taylor. *Parting the Waters: America in the King Years, 1954-63*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1988, p. 164-7.


Document from The Negro Ministers of Atlanta, press release, date unknown (estimated Spring 1963), 2 p, Southern Christian Leadership Conference Records, MLKC, Box 172:2. The details are included in a untitled document with company, position (role), the number of new employees, level of salary, and total, unknown date (estimated Winter 1963), 1 p, Southern Christian Leadership Conference Records, MLKC, Box 172:2.


Document from The Negro Ministers of Atlanta, press release, date unknown (estimated Spring 1963), 2 p, Southern Christian Leadership Conference Records, MLKC, Box 172:2. For example, the handwritten paper “Steering Committee”, date unknown, 1 p, Southern Christian Leadership Conference Records, MLKC, Box 172:2.


At least, this is the S.C.I.C. and labor unions’ point of view. See: A Conference with Mr. R.T. Blackwell, Program Director of the S.C.I.C., and Mr. Jerry Levine, Special Representative of the International Union Local 754, 8 pp and attachment, Southern Christian Leadership Conference Records, MLKC, 172:39. The purpose of the conference was to ascertain the specific facts that brought the Scipto plant to the point of strike.


Ted Simmons, Dr. King's Job Push A Rights Violation?, The Atlanta Constitution, April 29, 1965. See also King Drive Violation of Rights Act?, Journal of Atlanta, April 27, 1965.

The address was – and still is - 1630 15th St., Augusta, Georgia. See previous note no. 191: references to the meeting in Waycross come quite integrally from that Collection. In particular, Box 002-003-01, folders 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9. They contain Breadbaskets manually written notes of various Breadbasket meetings from 1964 to 1966. If not specified otherwise, they are the source of the meeting at the Gaines Chappell African Methodist Episcopal (A.M.E.) Church of Waycross, Thursday, May 19, 1966.
Reverend Fred C. Bennette, Jr. was born to Annie Mae (McDowell) and Columbus Bennette, Jr. on December 2, 1928 in Atlanta, Ga. After graduation from David T. Howard High School, Reverend Bennette joined the United States Army where he served for several years as Sergeant. After completing his military service, he returned to Atlanta where he attended Morris Brown College and the Turner Theological Seminary at Morris Brown. During this time Reverend Bennette was friends with A. D. King which led to the meeting of Reverend Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. in 1960. He was also a member of Ebenezer Baptist Church. This meeting led to many major accomplishments and significant involvement in the Civil Rights Movement in Atlanta. In 1960 Fred C. Bennette became a key organizer in the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (S.C.L.C.) organization. In that same year he became staff coordinator for the Sit-In campaign to desegregate Rich's Department Store. From 1961 to 1964 he served as the Director of the “All Citizens Committee for Voter Registration” and as the Deputy Director of the Georgia Voters League. In 1964 Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. appointed Reverend Bennette as the first Director of S.C.L.C.'s Operation Bread Basket. This organization mobilized buying campaigns to pressure businesses and corporations to hire minorities. Fred Bennette served in this capacity until 1967. Reverend Bennette also served as interim Pastor (1964-1965) of the Mount Welcome Baptist Church which was then located in the Pittsburg Community of Atlanta. After the Civil Rights Movement, Reverend Bennette continued his work as advisor on issues in the Black community to Jimmy Carter during his campaign and tenure as Governor of Georgia (1970-1976). He also served as a staff member and advisor to Congressman Andrew Young and during Young's tenure (1982-1989) as Mayor of Atlanta. Reverend Bennette was a personal friend of Coretta King and a member of the Board of Advisors for The Martin Luther King, Jr. Center for Non-Violent Social Change and was the King Center's Security Director. He died in 1994 after a long and successful career as a civic leader.

274 Martin Luther King’s address to the Montgomery Improvement Association, Institute on Nonviolence and Social Change, Holt Street Baptist Church, December 1956. See: King, Martin Luther, J. Stewart Burns, and Clayborne Carson. The Papers of Martin Luther King, Jr. vol. 3, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997, p. 452. In his The Origins of the Civil Rights Movement: Black Communities Organizing for Change, Aldon Morris points out that “this ‘militant’ view of religion has always existed in the black church, as the fact that such leaders of slave revolts as Nat Turner and Denmark Vesey adopted it attests. This view of religion guided the efforts of Frederick Douglass and Harriet Tubman as they fought the slave regime and transported slaves through the underground railroad. This religious view became institutionalized through songs, sermons, and the literature of the church. Dr. Benjamin Mays, an authority on black religion and a minister who taught King and many other civil rights leaders the militant view of religion, maintains that ‘the Negro was selective in his preaching. He usually selected Biblical passages which emphasized that all men are children of God.’ Mays pointed out that such a position suggests equal treatment and social equality… In addition, the view of religion as a dynamic force for social change was a cornerstone of the ‘social gospel’ movement. A significant portion of the S.C.L.C.’s leadership was familiar with the main doctrines of the ‘social gospel’ movement, and King studied them while in graduate school.” See: Morris, Aldon D. The Origins of the Civil Rights Movement: Black Communities Organizing for Change. New York: Free Press, 1984, 97.


279 King, Martin Luther, J. Stewart Burns, and Clayborne Carson. The Papers of Martin Luther King, Jr. vol. 3, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997, p. 126-73. See also: Chappell, David L. A
For example, see: Morris, Aldon D. The Origins of the Civil Rights Movement: Black Communities Organizing for Change, p. 86.


Martin Luther King, Jr., Sermon at Temple Israel of Hollywood delivered 26 February 1965. Here is the original sentence: “We will discover that there are some 10 million families that are considered poverty stricken families. These families have an average of four or five members, which means there are some 40 -- between 40 and 50 million of our brothers and sisters in this country who are poverty stricken. There they find themselves perishing on a lonely island of poverty in the midst of a vast ocean of material prosperity. And certainly if we are to be a great nation, we must solve this problem.”


A generation divide was at place in black Atlanta. The old generation – Martin Luther King, Sr., Jesse B. Blayton, Lorimer D. Milton, Clayton R. Yates, the college presidents like Benjamin Mays - has pursued for decades a strategy of accommodation and compromise and was not at easy with the new generation, more inclined to protest and action. See: Pomerantz, Gary M. When Peachtree Meets Sweet Auburn: a Saga of Race and Family. New York: Penguin Books, 1997, p. 254.


Genesis 27:34-40. The verses are from the King James Version of the Holy Bible. “And when Esau heard the words of his father, he cried with a great and exceeding bitter cry, and said unto his father, Bless me, even me also, O my father. / And he said, Thy brother came with subtilty, and hath taken away thy blessing. / And he said, Is not he rightly named Jacob? for he hath supplanted me these two times: he took away my birthright; and, behold, now he hath taken away my blessing. / And he said, Is not he rightly named Jacob? for he hath supplanted me these two times: he took away my birthright; and, behold, now he hath taken away my blessing. And he said, Hast thou not reserved a blessing for me? / And Isaac answered and said unto Esau, Behold, I have made him thy lord, and all his brethren have I given to him for servants; and with corn and wine have I sustained him: and what shall I do now unto thee, my son? / And Esau said unto his father, Hast thou but one blessing, my father? bless me, even me also, O my father. And Esau lifted up his voice, and wept. / And Isaac his father answered and said unto him, Behold, thy dwelling shall be the fatness of the earth, and of the dew of heaven from above; / and by thy sword shalt thou live, / and shalt serve thy brother: and it shall come to pass when thou shalt have the dominion, that thou shalt break his yoke from off thy neck.”

But, in fact, a blessing is not a legal act; it is a sacred act that implies the impact on the human history of the word of God. The word of God – especially when it is evoked in a situation of sacredness, generates the reality, and creates a social state of the-art. The word of God is creative action in concrete reality. More specifically, it is the word of God that constitutes endowment, provides wealth, and assures procreation. It is the word of God that establishes, then transforms and modifies the personal identity, i.e., constitutes primogeniture. In the original text in Hebrew, the word “berakah” (blessing) and the word “bekora” (birthright) sound alike. It is the act of blessing – “berakah” - that institutes the state of birthright – “bekora.” Despite the fact that Esau is the first born and the primogeniture belongs to him, it is Jacob that receives the blessing. The word of God inverts the order made by human beings: the elder shall serve the younger. What seems a natural order between superiority and inferiority, dominance and submission among people, can be subverted by the word of God. In the process, an act of apparent deceit actually serves God better than an act of rightness. This is the message of Genesis 27:34-40.
Rev. Howard Creecy, Sr., had closed his sermon on “Blessings and Curses” with a clear message: don’t you have another blessing (referred to Esau). God’s will can’t be challenged. Then, the notes of What a Friend We have in Jesus had resounded once again in the church. The opposition between Esau and Jacob has traditionally been understood by Christians to symbolize the opposition between Jews and Christians. In fact, if Jacob, the younger, had supplanted Esau’s birthright and the paternal blessing, the same had happened with the Christians, who have supplanted the Jews as recipients of the divine promise.


This paragraph is inspired by: Thomas, Frank A., They Like To Never Quit Praisin’ God. The Role of Celebration in Preaching. Cleveland, Ohio: United Church Press, 1997, pp. 4-5.

The key point here is what we mean with ‘emotion’ in the context of the African American preaching tradition. “Usually, when confronted with the preaching tradition of African American preachers, people take great notice of the emotional intensity, energy, and freedom of the preacher and the people in the sermon and worship event … But for the purpose of this work … African American preaching is about helping people experience the assurance of grace that is the gospel.” Thomas, Frank A., They Like To Never Quit Praisin’ God. The Role of Celebration in Preaching. Cleveland, Ohio: United Church Press, 1997, p. 3.

Interview of the author with Vincent Harding, in San Francisco, November 21, 2011. According to Harding, Ralph Abernathy and other leaders of the civil rights movement were used to make extravagant comments on the phone to impress and make fun of the FBI agents on the other side of the line.


Mitchell, Henry H., Celebration and Experience in Preaching. Nashville: Abington Press (revised edition), 2008, p. 121. Miller also points out that there is an “unquestionable evidence of a deep concern in Hebrew tradition for the holistic commitment to persons to and in the faith. Such commitment was seen as the very will of God.” Mitchell, Henry H., Celebration and Experience in Preaching, p. 129.


LaRue describes the first posture as ‘escapist:’ “Christians … have been called out of the world to live separate and apart from the present order.” He then describes the second posture, focusing on social justice: “God’s power is believed to be at work on systemic and capricious structures of evil and inequality, and God is understood as acting mightily to make things right for all people.” LaRue, Cleophus J., The Heart of Black Preaching. Louisville, London: Westminster John Knox Press, 2000, p. 26.

This paragraph is inspired by: Miller, Henry H., Celebration and Experience in Preaching. Nashville: Abington Press (revised edition), 2008, pp. 13-18. Miller also sustains that the goal of “the very creeds traditionally included in Christian liturgy … was to answer abstract theological questions in a manner that appeals to reason. The goal was to provide a basis for unity in great empires and ecclesiastical bodies. The point is that this confession if faith was focused on issues almost completely irrelevant to existential concerns and spiritual wholeness.” Miller, Henry H., Celebration and Experience in Preaching, p. 130. Thomas assures that “the point was not abstract answers to suffering and evil, but an experience of assurance, hope, empowerment, and victory.” Thomas, Frank A., They Like To Never Quit Praisin’ God. The Role of Celebration in Preaching. Cleveland, Ohio: United Church Press, 1997, p. 3. LaRue addresses the same point in a more technical way: “Sacred stories … form consciousness rather than being among the objects of which consciousness is directly aware.” LaRue, Cleophus J., The Heart of Black Preaching. Louisville, London: Westminster John Knox Press, 2000, p. 3. He also provides the theological foundations of such a liturgy: “a mighty God who takes up the cause of dispossessed African Americans is the major
premise that undergirds powerful black preaching.” But not only that. God also “acts in very concrete and practical ways in matters pertaining to their (i.e., African American, author’s note) survival, deliverance, advancement, prosperity, and over-all well-being.” LaRue, Cleophus J., The Heart of Black Preaching, Louisville, London: Westminster John Knox Press, 2000, p. 5.

303 Famously, Stokely Carmichael pointed out that “This is the twenty-seventh time I have been arrested, and I ain't going to jail no more! The only way we gonna stop them white men from whuppin' us is to take over. We been saying freedom for six years and we ain't got nothin'. What we gonna start saying now is Black Power!” The suddenly unified mass shouted back “Black Power!” whereupon Willie Ricks leaped up beside Carmichael and shouted to the crowd: “What do you want?” ”Black Power!” ”What do you want?” ”Black Power!! Black Power!!! Black Power!!!!”


Breadbasket was not the first economic rights program in Chicago. Breadbasket built upon momentum that already existed in Chicago and demonstrated that the economic phase of the Civil Rights Movement was happening well before it was particularly termed “black capitalism.” In 1929, for example, the Chicago Whip, a militant black newspaper, urged its readers “to spend your money where you can work.” The threat of boycotts was especially effective during the Great Depression. Breadbasket built upon this tradition. One of Leon Sullivan’s precursors was T.R.M. Howard, a wealthy South Side doctor and entrepreneur and a key financial contributor to Breadbasket. Before he moved to Chicago from Mississippi in 1956, Howard was the head of the Regional Council of Negro Leadership, which had successfully organized a boycott against service stations that refused to provide restrooms for blacks. During the summer of 1963, area black ministers led by Howard formed the Clergy Alliance of Chicago and began a boycott of the Bowman Dairy Company. The boycott failed, but the idea of ‘selective buying’ took hold. Chicago was a particularly effective locale for such action because it has always played a pivotal role in the history of political awareness of the African American community. From Oscar S. De Priest to Barack Obama—through William Dawson, Harold Washington, Jesse Jackson, and Carol Moseley Braun—the city has a unique history of launching the careers of powerful black politicians. Ralph, James R. Northern Protest: Martin Luther King, Jr., Chicago, and the Civil Rights Movement. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993, pp. 67-68; Reynolds, Barbara A. Jesse Jackson: America’s David. Washington, D.C.: JFJ Associates, 1985, p. 113. FBI 100-106670-NR, 22 November 1965; Garrow, Bearing the Cross: Martin Luther King, Jr., and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, p. 462; Chicago Defender 5-11 Feb. 1966, pp. 1-2; Massoni, Gary. “Perspective on Operation Breadbasket”. M.Div. Thesis, Chicago Theological Seminary, 1971, pp. 194-5. Anderson, Alan B, and George W. Pickering. Confronting the Color Line: The Broken Promise of the Civil Rights Movement in Chicago. Athens GA: University of Georgia Press, 1986, p. 152. The African Methodist Episcopal Church offered its support to the Chicago crusade in September. Chicago Sun-Times, 10 Sept. 1965, p. 32. FBI 100-106670-2303, 14 Feb. 1966; FBI 100-106670-2325, 21 Feb. 1965; Massoni, “Perspective on Operation Breadbasket”, pp. 198-199.


562 Garrow, Bearing the Cross: Martin Luther King, Jr., and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, p. 572.


564 Garrow, Bearing the Cross: Martin Luther King, Jr., and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, p. 572.

565 Garrow, Bearing the Cross: Martin Luther King, Jr., and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, p. 568.


571 Reynolds, Jesse Jackson: America’s David, p 170.

572 Timmerman, Shakedown: Exposing the Real Jesse Jackson, p. 46.

573 Timmerman, Shakedown: Exposing the Real Jesse Jackson, p. 46.


575 “The West Side Organization is primarily a “Grass Roots” neighborhood representative, and it is this capacity they will serve the businessmen sponsors, and the neighborhood needs.” Operation Breadbasket West Side organization salesman training program proposals; sources of income and budget for Operation Breadbasket in Chicago, 05/08/1967, 9 pp, Southern Christian Leadership Conference Records, MLKC, Box 172:9.

576 Jackson, From Civil Rights to Human Rights: Martin Luther King, Jr., and the Struggle for Economic Justice, p. 17.


Landess and Quinn, Jesse Jackson & the Politics of Race, pp. 47-50.


Several sources. See for example: Reynolds, Jesse Jackson: America’s David, pp. 141-143.

Breadbasket’s band was instrumental, together with Breadbasket’s Gospel choir, in capturing the rhythm of black people during Breadbasket’s meetings, which were deeply based in religion. Actually the Breadbasket’s band director, Ben Branch, was the last man Dr. King talked – the subject was the songs for the next day’s rally in Memphis – with when the assassin’s bullet was fired. Breadbasket also cooperated with other black organization around the country.


Reynolds, Jesse Jackson: America’s David, p. 327; Landess and Quinn, Jesse Jackson & the Politics of Race, pp. 52-53; Timmerman, Shakedown: Exposing the Real Jesse Jackson, p. 46.

Reynolds, Jesse Jackson: America’s David, pp. 327-332; Landess and Quinn, Jesse Jackson & the Politics of Race, p. 53; Timmerman, Shakedown: Exposing the Real Jesse Jackson, p. 38.

Reynolds, Jesse Jackson: America’s David, p. 331; Timmerman, Shakedown: Exposing the Real Jesse Jackson, p. 38.


Timmerman, Shakedown: Exposing the Real Jesse Jackson, p. 38.

Timmerman, Shakedown: Exposing the Real Jesse Jackson, p. 39.


Reynolds, Jesse Jackson: America’s David, p. 324.


Chicago Tribune 5/12/1971; Reynolds, Jesse Jackson: America’s David, p. 348; Landess and Quinn, Jesse Jackson & the Politics of Race, p. 62; Timmerman, Shakedown: Exposing the Real Jesse Jackson, p. 42.


Timmerman, Shakedown: Exposing the Real Jesse Jackson, p. 42.


Reynolds, Jesse Jackson: America’s David, pp. 353-354; Timmerman, Shakedown: Exposing the Real Jesse Jackson, p. 43.

Reynolds, Jesse Jackson: America’s David, pp. 155-156; Timmerman, Shakedown: Exposing the Real Jesse Jackson, p. 44.


Will the SCLC Split Kill Dr. King’s Dream?, Jet, Jan 13, 1972.

The key-document here is the Audit Report prepared on Feb 29, 1972, by Washington, Pittman & McKeever (WPM). Founded in 1939 by Mary T. Washington who was the first African-American female CPA in the United States, now WPM is one of Chicago’s most established professional accounting and consulting firms. In the late 1960s, WPM was the accounting firm of both the S.C.L.C. and Breadbasket in Chicago. After the divorce between Abernathy and Jackson, the firm continued working with the S.C.L.C. and Operation PUSH. See: Reynolds, Jesse Jackson: America’s David, Appendix E: Black Expo ’71. Audit Report, pp. 455-64. See also: “Sources of income and budget for Operation Breadbasket in Chicago”, 07/29/1967. Principal Correspondents: Martin Luther King, Jr.; Cirilo McSween; Jesse L. Jackson; Ralph D. Abernathy; William Rutherford, 9 pp, Southern

415 Landess and Quinn, _Jesse Jackson & the Politics of Race_, p. 64. Timmerman, _Shakedown: Exposing the Real Jesse Jackson_, p. 44.

416 Timmerman, _Shakedown: Exposing the Real Jesse Jackson_, p. 44.

417 Timmerman, _Shakedown: Exposing the Real Jesse Jackson_, p. 44.

418 Will the SCLC Split Kill Dr. King's Dream?, _Jet_, Jan 13, 1972.

419 Will the SCLC Split Kill Dr. King's Dream?, _Jet_, Jan 13, 1972. Also, in his autobiography, Ralph Abernathy offers a balanced treatment in one full chapter. See note no. 23.


424 Arthur Kretchmer, Playboy Interview: Jesse Jackson, p. 108. Emphasis is mine.

425 Quoted in Arthur Kretchmer, Playboy Interview: Jesse Jackson, p. 85.


430 Jackson, Jesse. _I Am Somebody_. Poem.


On the contrary, Jackson did not embrace other, crucial principles of Black Theology. For example, taking the side of the poor, the so-called “option for the poor” and against those who are responsible for their poverty.


David Llorens, Apostle of Economics, Ebony, August 1967, 78-86.

Several sources. See for example: Carson, Clayborne (ed.), *King, Martin Luther, Jr. The Papers of Martin Luther King, Jr.: Birth of a New Age, December 1955-December 1956*, Vols 4. Berkeley: Univ of Cali Press, 1992, p. 1. The whole quotation is: “[In] the quiet recesses of my heart, I am fundamentally a clergyman, a Baptist preacher. This is my being and my heritage for I am also the son of a Baptist preacher, the grandson of a Baptist preacher and the great-grandson of a Baptist preacher.” Martin Luther King, Jr., 1965.


This is a classic Baptist ecclesiological posture: the Church is the church of sinners.

Whereas King and the other executives at S.C.L.C. made it a point to dress in a suit and tie, Jackson dressed casually. For this, Jackson was usually the object of many jibes from the staff for his casual attitude towards dress.


Jacob Simms, Jesse Jackson: One Leader Among Many, p. 16.


The Cook County Democratic Organization is one of the most powerful political machines in U.S. history. Traditionally called the “Chicago Democratic machine”, or simply the “Chicago Machine”, the organization has dominated Chicago and Illinois politics since the 1930s.


Quoted in Jacob Simms, Jesse Jackson: One Leader Among Many, p. 15.

According to Henry Mitchell, “the goal of one sermon is not comprehensive knowledge of so little as one whole verse; it is the faithful change of life in the direction of no more than one Christlike characteristic, as called in the Word.” In other words, the preacher does not lecture, he facilitates a meaningful encounter with a biblical text and has a behavioral purpose. Mitchell, Henry H., *Celebration and Experience in Preaching*. Nashville: Abington Press (revised edition), 2008, p. 14-5.


Jacob Simms, Jesse Jackson: One Leader Among Many, p. 15.


Jacob Simms, Jesse Jackson: One Leader Among Many, p. 15.


474 Of course, the complex and articulate view of King on capitalism could be the subject of an essay on its own. See also notes no. 156 and 578.


480 For a more extensive literature, see note no. 46.

481 “I have a sense of urgency about what has to be done”. Arthur Kretchmer, Playboy Interview: Jesse Jackson, p. 290.


486 Arthur Kretchmer, Playboy Interview: Jesse Jackson, p. 112.


489 David Llorens, Apostle of Economics, Ebony, August 1967, 78-86.

490 Arthur Morris, founder of the Morris Plan consumer lending banks, claimed to have coined this term. Arthur J. Morris papers, Library of Congress, Box 17, Speeches and Writings File, 1918-60.


Arthur Kretchmer, Playboy Interview: Jesse Jackson, p 108.

Arthur Kretchmer, Playboy Interview: Jesse Jackson, p. 110.

In 1969, a population of less than 23 million African Americans spent more than $35 billion on goods and services - only slightly less than the total population of 21 million citizens of Canada. “Situation Report,” *Time*, April 6, 1970, 43.

According to a ‘Situation Report’ published by *Time*, since World War II, Government has financed only 800,000 urban units, where black people was concentrated, while insuring the financing of 10 million suburban homes, where white families were moving. “Situation Report,” *Time*, April 6, 1970, 55.

According to the same ‘Situation Report,’ black families paid more than white families for comparable houses and were more likely to live in substandard housing in the late 1960s and early 1970s. “Situation Report,” *Time*, April 6, 1970, 55.


David Llorens, Apostle of Economics, *Ebony*, pp. 78, 84, 86.

Here is the whole quotation: “In 1969, Jackson was asked what he would do as mayor of a major U.S. city: “I would declare poor communities in a state of emergency and deal with the unemployment rate, the mortality rate, and the T.B. rate. I would set up medicine tents and embarrass the governments into opening up their food storehouses. I would enlarge all the city departments that feed and heal people. The welfare of the people would be attended to before any new golf courses or stadiums were built. I would call the National Guard to deal with injustices that make the ghetto a permanent disaster area. There’s no reason the Army couldn’t come down the street looking for slum landlords. The Army would force unions to let minorities in. And those who did not pick up the garbage would themselves be picked up. An Army like that wouldn’t have any trouble getting volunteer soldiers because it would be engaged in a relevant war.”” Quote in Henry, Charles P. *Jesse Jackson: The Search for Common Ground*. Oakland, CA: BlackScholar Press, 1991, p. 137.


Arthur Kretchmer, Playboy Interview: Jesse Jackson, p. 86.

The original quotation is: “The connotation of Black Power in the media was violence. The fact is Black Power was power sharing. It was equity.” See: Madison Davis Lacey, Jr. and Henry Hampton, Eyes on the Prize II. Interview with Jesse Jackson, April 11, 1989, accessed September 3, 2012, http://digital.wustl.edu/e/eii/eiiweb/jac5427.0519.072marc_record_interviewer_process.html

Jesse Jackson Threatens Companies with Boycott, Florence Times, January 10, 1982, 45.

A few days before King’s assassination, he criticized Jackson for following his own agenda rather than supporting the group. Jackson, hurt by his mentor’s disapproval, told him, “Everything’s going to be all right” (Frady, Marshall. Jesse: the Life and Pilgrimage of Jesse Jackson. New York: Random House, 1996, p. 225). King angrily replied that everything was not going to be all right and that he needed Jackson and all of the S.C.L.C. staff to work toward a common vision for America. King and Jackson reconciled in Memphis, Tennessee, after King called Jackson in Chicago and asked him to join him. Jackson was talking with King from below the balcony of the Lorraine Motel when King was killed. “The Long Pilgrimage of Jesse Jackson”, PBS.org, 1995. Produced by Frontline with the Lennon Production Group. Executive producer, David Fanning; senior producers, Thomas Lennon, Michael Sullivan; producer, Mark Zwonitzer; writers, Marshall Frady, Zwonitzer.

Jackson, From Civil Rights to Human Rights: Martin Luther King, Jr., and the Struggle for Economic Justice, p. 304. At a conference of the New Orleans Business League in July 1982, Jackson made this preference for the private sector very clear. “We want our share of opportunities
for risks, and rewards! There’s something tricky and vicious about the way we’re locked out of the private sector.” Source: Marable, Manning. Black American Politics: from the Washington Marches to Jesse Jackson. [S.l.]: Pub By Ve, 1985, p. 264.


537 It was only in 1967 that Stokely Carmichael and Charles Hamilton coined the term ‘institutional racism,’ that ‘has not been on the level of the individual acts of discrimination between individual whites against individual Negroes, but as total acts by the white community against the Negro community. In trying to clarify the real effect of power and race in society, we came up with a concept we called institutional racism, Thelwell is always saying we should take credit for coining the term. Maybe, but who needs it? There have been traditionally two communities in America. The white community, which controlled and defined the forms that all institutions within the society would take, and the Negro community, which has been excluded from participation in the power decisions that shaped the society, and has traditionally been dependent upon, and subservient to, the white community. This has not been accidental. The history of every institution of this society indicates that a major concern in the ordering and structuring of the society has been the maintaining of the Negro community in its condition of dependence and oppression. This has not been on the level of the individual acts of discrimination between individual whites against individual Negroes, but as total acts by the white community against the Negro community, Institutional Racism. For example, when an unknown racist bombs a church and kills four children, that is an act of individual racism, widely deplored by most segments of the society. But when in that same city of Birmingham, Alabama, not five but five hundred Negro babies die each year because of a lack of proper food, shelter, and medical facilities, and thousands more are destroyed physically, emotionally, and intellectually because of conditions of poverty and deprivation in the ghetto, that is a function of institutional racism. But the society either Pretends it doesn’t know of this situation, or is incapable of doing anything about it. And this resistance to do anything meaningful about conditions in that ghetto comes from the fact that the ghetto itself is a product of a combination of forces and special interests in the white community.” Carmichael, Stokely, and Michael Thelwell. Ready for Revolution: The Life and Struggles of Stokely Carmichael (Kwame Ture). New York: Scribner, 2003, pp. 532-533.


539 In 1966, two key civil rights organizations--SNCC and CORE (the Congress of Racial Equality)--embraced Black Nationalism. In May, Stokely Carmichael was elected chairman of SNCC and proceeded to transform SNCC from an interracial organization committed to nonviolence and integration into an all-black organization committed to “black power.” “Integration is irrelevant,” declared Carmichael. “Political and economic power is what the black people have to have.” Although Carmichael initially denied that “black power” implied racial separatism, he eventually called on blacks to form their own separate political organizations.


543 A number of historians have also pointed to King’s final years, 1965–8, as being a period of radicalization. See notes no. 25 and 26.

See Introduction, paragraph on Background.


It might be said that, in its early years, Breadbasket was operating in the early stage of the economic modernization of the South. In that period, the rise of the new metropolitan elites and moderates in the South helped making racial change possible. See note no. 10.


Sidney M. Willhelm notes that while the early King stressed “equality to the virtual exclusion of justice” the late King emphasized justice almost exclusively (p.6). Willhelm argues that such a transition would allow King to endorse affirmative action as a just policy in contrast to mere equality opportunity. See: Sidney M. Willhelm, “Martin Luther King, Jr., and the Black Experience in America,” *Journal of Black Studies*, vol. 10, no. 1 (Sep. 1979), pp. 3-19.


On many occasions, Martin King talked about his dream of 1963 being turned into a nightmare. The most informative reference in this regard is his “Christmas Sermon on Peace,” delivered in Ebenezer Baptist Church at Atlanta, December 24, 1967. The quotation is: “I saw that dream turn into a nightmare as I watched the war in Vietnam escalating, and as I saw so-called military advisors, sixteen thousand strong, turn into fighting soldiers until today over five hundred thousand American boys are fighting on Asian soil.” King, Martin Luther, Jr. “Massey Lecture # 5: A Christmas Sermon on Peace, Sermon delivered at Ebenezer Baptist Church.” 2/24/67. Atlanta, Ga. (At) 25.8 min. (1 sound cassette: analog.) MLKC 671224-000.

The whole statement says: “though this nation has proudly thought of itself as an ethnic melting pot, in things racial we have always been and continue to be, in too many ways, essentially a nation of cowards.” Attorney General Eric Holder at the Department of Justice African American History Month Program, Wednesday, February 18, 2009. Remarks as prepared for delivery. U.S. Department of Justice.

“As a preacher, I would certainly have to agree with this. I must admit that I have gone through those moments when I was greatly disappointed with the church and what it has done in this period of social change. We must face the fact that in America, the church is still the most segregated major institution in America. At 11:00 on Sunday morning when we stand and sing and Christ has no east or west, we stand at the most segregated hour in this nation”. Martin Luther King, Jr., interview after his Social Justice and the Emerging New Age Address at the Herman W. Read Fieldhouse, Western Michigan University. King made the same point several other times. For example: “Unfortunately, most of the major denominations still practice segregation in local churches, hospitals, schools, and other church institutions. It is appalling that the most segregated hour of Christian America is eleven o’clock on Sunday morning, the same hour when many are standing to sing ‘In Christ There Is No East Nor West.” King, Martin Luther, J., *Stride Toward Freedom: The Montgomery Story*. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1958, p. 207-8. “I make a plea to the white churches to remove the yoke of segregation form its own body. Unfortunately most of the major denominations still practice segregation in local churches, hospitals, schools, and other church institutions. It is appalling that the most segregated hour of Christian America is 11 o’clock on Sunday morning -- the same hour many are standing to sing ‘In Christ There Is
No East Or West.’ Equally appalling is the fact that the most segregated school of the week is the Sunday school.” Martin Luther King, Jr., at a civic banquet celebrating his receipt of the 1964 Nobel Peace Prize, Atlanta (Georgia), February 4, 1965. The remark is actually a quotation from Yale Divinity School dean Liston Pope, The Kingdom Beyond Caste, New York, Friendship Press, 1957: “The Church is the most segregated major institution American society. It has lagged behind the Supreme Court as the conscience of the nation on questions of race, and it has fallen far behind trade unions, factories, schools, department stores, athletic gatherings and most other major areas of human association as far as the achievement of integration in its own life is concerned.”


See: Kevin Stainback, Corre L. Robinson and Donald Tomaskovic-Devey, Race and Workplace Integration. A Politically Mediated Process? in American Behavioral Scientist, Vol. 48 No. 9, May 2005, pp. 1200-1228. The authors claim that “although federal and state equal employment opportunity pressures had initial successes in reducing racial segregation in workplaces, little progress has been made since the early 1980s.”


Jackson explained his tears in an interview with National Public Radio (as transcribed by the Tribune’s Mark Silva): “Well, on the one hand, I saw President Barack Obama standing there looking so majestic. And I knew that people in the villages of Kenya and Haiti, and mansions and palaces in Europe and China, were all watching this young African-American male assume the leadership to take our nation out of a pit to a higher place. “And then, I thought of who was not there,” Jackson said on NPR News’ Tell Me More. “As mentioned, Medgar Evers, the husband of Sister Myrlie. ...So the martyrs and murdered whose blood made last night possible. I could not help think that this was their night.” “And if I had one wish: if Medgar, or if Dr. King could have just been there for a second in time, would have made my heart rejoice. And so it was kind of duo-fold - his ascension into leadership and the price that was paid to get him there.”

In the last 20 years, three major works have been published on Jackson: Timmerman, Kenneth R. Shakedown: Exposing the Real Jesse Jackson. Washington, D.C.: Regnery Pub., 2002; Stanford, Karin L. Beyond the Boundaries: Reverend Jesse Jackson in International Affairs. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997; and Frady, Marshall. Jesse: the Life and Pilgrimage of Jesse Jackson. New York: Random House, 1996, p. 280. However, only the last one may be considered offering a balanced view on Jackson. In other words, the last serious investigation on Jackson is 20 years old, and was provided by the late Frady, a celebrated author and civil rights reporter (also the author of the critically acclaimed biographies, Wallace and Billy Graham: A Parable of American Righteousness).


In-person conversation with Peniel Joseph, May 2011, Atlanta, GA.

See note no. 156.