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Physicalism, Conceptual Analysis and Acts of Faith

Not very long after the publication of *From Metaphysics to Ethics*¹, I spoke about the role of conceptual analysis in the vindication of physicalism at the A.N.U.'s Philosophy Thursday Seminar Series. The Thursday seminar being on a Monday, and Frank Jackson at that time being Director of the Institute, he had to go out of his way to be present. This he generously did. It was predictable not only that Frank would disagree with almost everything I said but also that he would respond in the gracious and urbane way that is Frank's alone. I disagreed with a great deal of what Frank said on that occasion, but realized that I'd allowed the argument between us to turn on matters of relative detail. The invitation to contribute to a volume in his honour gives me an opportunity to step back.

Frank Jackson and I each take the other to hold a position in philosophy of mind which is extremely difficult to sustain. Here I shall confine myself to trying to say something about how that can be.² My objective is more to demonstrate the sanity of Jackson's opponents and the fragility of his own position than the truth of any particular doctrine. I want to bring to the surface an assumption in ontology which I see as a crucial part of the grounding of Jackson's particular version of physicalism. I think that when it is appreciated that this assumption may be rejected, Jackson's opponents are seen in a different light from the one in which they appear in his writings. (More generally, a connection is made between the vast literature on physicalism as a topic in philosophy of mind and the equally vast literature on material constitution as a topic in metaphysics.)

I should start by setting up the difference of opinion in broad outline. I can use Jackson's own words to characterize both what he and opponents may agree about and what they certainly disagree about. What (at least for present purposes) everyone may agree about is (P).³

(P) Any world which is a minimal physical duplicate of our world is a psychological duplicate of our world (p.14).

What us anti-reductionists dissent from is the thesis that 'Everyday psychological explanations are understandable in terms of, or are reducible to, physical ones' (2000, p.188). The assumption which I want to suggest separates physicalists of

¹ Jackson (1998). Otherwise unattributed page references here will be to this.

² Jackson's recent work has provoked a vast amount of debate about species of necessity. But I want to avoid engaging in that particular debate here.

Another issue set to one side here is how physicalism might be affected by considerations about consciousness—specifically about 'qualia' which have been argued to be 'epiphenomenal'. This is an issue that Jackson did not address in (1998), assuming there (as I am happy to assume here) that such considerations make no special problem for physicalism.

³ The significance of 'minimal' in (P) need not detain us now; but see n.26 and §4 below. And see n.27 for the explanation of my '(for present purposes)' qualification.

Jackson's stripe from many of those who reject this reductionist thesis is, as I said, an assumption in ontology. I start by drawing attention to what Jackson takes (P) to import, which, thanks to the assumption, goes well beyond what I think (P) actually implies (§1). Then I look at the claims about conceptual analysis which Jackson uses to secure the commitments he takes (P) to incur (§2). Jackson says that those of us who aren't willing to undertake these commitments have to engage in 'an act of faith'. I shall suggest that physicalists who reject the reductionist thesis can make a virtue of faithlessness as much as anyone else (§3).

1. Physicalism

One could quibble about (P). But my main quarrel is with what Jackson hopes to get out of it, so that I want to bypass quibbles and to work as if (P) could do duty for a doctrine which is likely to appeal to anyone who doesn't espouse any substantial dualism. Call this doctrine, which (P) encapsulates, PHYSICALISM. In order that it should have a definite content, we need to be explicit about what 'physical' and 'psychological' mean in (P). By 'psychological' is meant what is variously called *everyday* or *commonsense* or *folk* psychological. 'Physical', meanwhile, as Jackson says, must have a somewhat specialized sense; and I shall speak of *physical science* to signal this.⁴ Thus PHYSICALISTS hold that the everyday psychological facts cannot vary without some variation in the facts of physical science.

Consider someone *a* (*Anna*, as it might be), and suppose that some everyday psychological property ψ is correctly attributed to her (it might be that *Anna believes that John is now in Norway*). According to (P), *a*'s not being ψ would involve some difference in the physical-scientific facts. So where Φ is the hugely complicated conjunction saying in the terms of physical science how physical things are at some time, we have:

$$\Phi \rightarrow \psi a^5$$

(P) is a thesis of global supervenience. It admits, as a local supervenience thesis would not, that objects other than *x* may play a part in fixing what psychological properties *x* possesses. In the case at hand, there are two points which explain why one might want to endorse only supervenience theses that are global in this sense.⁶

⁴ Jackson gives three accounts of what might be meant by 'physical' in (P) which all advert to science. He says that it doesn't matter which we pick (pp.6–8).

⁵ The ' \rightarrow ' of this conditional corresponds to what Jackson calls 'entailment': he says that 'any putative psychological fact [such as our fact that ψa] has its place in the physicalists' world view only if it is entailed by Φ '. Some people might not want to use 'entail' at this point, and I hope that we will soon be able to understand their reservations. I shan't make an issue of the word, however, because, as I see it, their reservations turn on more than a merely terminological matter.

⁶ See Haugeland (1982) and (1984) and Petrie (1987) on what makes global supervenience attractive.

First, well-known anti-individualist arguments demonstrate that how things in our environment are contributes to determining the contents of our psychological states: facts about people's surroundings may be relevant to whether anyone is ψ .⁷ Secondly, it may be doubted that the things to which everyday psychological predicates apply—us, people, as I shall say⁸—are the same as the objects which physical science describes from moment to moment. These two points may be thought of as relating respectively to the predications of everyday psychology—to its *ideology*—and to the things of which it makes its predications—to its *ontology*. A global supervenience thesis can accommodate both points inasmuch as it allows that facts about other particulars than those mentioned in Φ can be determined by Φ .

Jackson's formulations suggest that he resists the second point and takes it for granted that physical science and everyday psychology share an ontology. He often speaks of 'how things are in one vocabulary being made true by how things are as told in some other vocabulary'. But a question then must be '*Which things?*' Call the things in physical science's domain φ -things (so that Φ is an account of the φ -things) and the things in everyday psychology's domain Ψ -things (so that the fact about a —that she is ψ —is a fact about one of the Ψ -things). Given (P), variation in how any Ψ -thing is requires variation in how one or more φ -things are: if a weren't ψ , for instance, then some physical thing would be different from how it actually is. But this does not mean that there is any vocabulary in which it could be told how things in general are—how the φ -things are *and* how the Ψ -things are. It is compatible with (P) that our world, in which there are fundamental particles of physical science and people (and other things besides, no doubt), should not be characterized exhaustively in vocabulary suited to saying everything there is to say about the φ -things—about the particulars favoured by physical science.

Thus PHYSICALISTS may take issue with Jackson when he writes:

A complete account of what our world is like .. can in principle be told in terms of a relatively small set of favoured particulars, properties, and relations—the physical ones. (p.6)

The response to this now, on the part of some anti-reductionists, will be that a complete account of what our world is like must tell one *all the facts about people, as well as* the facts about the φ -things. And the facts about people cannot be told

⁷ At n.11 to Ch.1 (pp.8 &10), Jackson notes that there are 'issues about the role of a subject's environment in settling intentional content and psychological nature'—issues which he says don't have to be settled if our focus is 'physicalism in the wider sense that concerns us'.

⁸ One does not need to choose a single term for the things of which everyday psychological predications are made unless one thinks (as Jackson does—see further below) that a network of specific concepts constitutes everyday psychology. Obligated to choose a single term for the sake of argument, I use 'person' with the plural 'people'. But I acknowledge that things that we would not call people might possess some (or perhaps in a view like Jackson's very many) everyday psychological properties: see further n.20 below.

in the favoured vocabulary of physical science even if variation in those facts ensures variation at the level of physical science. Presumably Jackson will counter by saying that people can be identified in a vocabulary suitable for describing physical science's favoured particulars, so that the facts about people just *are* some of the facts about fundamental physical particles. But the present point is that if Jackson makes this claim in ontology, then he is going beyond the thesis (P). For all that (P) says, a specification in the language of physical science of a duplicate of our world tells one nothing whatever about any person. This is not to deny that physical scientists' vocabulary has the resources to speak about things the size of people. (One might be inclined to think of physical scientists as speaking of very tiny things. But the language of physical science can include mereological words like 'part' and 'sum' without losing its pretensions to be scientific, so that its terms can denote arbitrarily large things.) What a PHYSICALIST can perfectly well deny is that a person is the *same* as any sum of things that physical science is concerned with. Indeed an anti-reductionist PHYSICALIST is likely to hold that one could never *identify* a person by identifying such a sum. She may think that people do not belong in the domain of physical science.⁹

Well, Jackson would surely say that anyone who resists his claim in ontology is not a 'serious metaphysician'. For Jackson tells us that the idea 'that a full inventory of the instantiated physical properties and relations would be a full inventory *simpliciter*' is part of 'physicalists' distinctive doctrine' (p.9). And he tells us this after he has outlined his project of serious metaphysics but before he invokes (P) as the way to capture physicalism. Still, given that someone can be committed to (P) without endorsing 'the distinctive doctrine', the question has to be why Jackson should think that someone is less than serious if they settle for (P) but reject his claim in ontology.

Jackson says that 'metaphysics is about what there is and what it is like' (p.4). And it must be that he thinks that no serious physicalist can countenance among 'what there is' anything except the φ -things. Certainly it seems right to think that a physicalist will subscribe to an ontological doctrine (about what there is), as well as to an ideological one (about what the things there are like). Physicalists of any persuasion will rule it out that people are psychologically as they are in virtue of their mental life being sustained by immaterial stuff. Those who take Jackson's side may claim that in order for this really to be ruled out, what there is in our world, the particulars there, must be restricted to the φ -things.¹⁰

But we can find an answer to this claim by looking at Jackson's own distinction between two senses in which *properties* may fail to be physical. On the one hand,

⁹ The anti-reductionist need be no more precise than this about what she denies: it is for the reductionist to say exactly how an ontology of people is supposed to be captured in the language of the φ -things. See further n.29 below.

¹⁰ I speak of those who take Jackson's side, rather than of Jackson, at this point because Jackson himself wants to rule this out in a different way: see n.26 below.

there are the (putative) properties whose instantiation is inconsistent with physicalism—anti-physical properties, one might say: the property of being made of ectoplasm would be an example. On the other hand, there are properties which, although not themselves physical, need not be thought of as anti-physical, at least not by PHYSICALISTS. Jackson calls these latter properties ‘onlookers’ in the debate about physicalism (p.16): everyday psychological properties are examples. Now a parallel distinction may be made in respect of *particulars*, between two senses in which they may fail to be physical. On the one hand, there are those (putative) particulars whose existence is inconsistent with PHYSICALISM—anti-physical things, one might say: anything made of ectoplasm would be an example. On the other hand, there are those particulars that PHYSICALISTS have no need think of as anti-physical. And just as PHYSICALISTS accept the instantiation of what Jackson calls onlooker properties, so they may accept the existence of things that aren’t φ -things. A, for instance, might not be identifiable in vocabulary suitable for describing physical science’s favoured particulars, yet not be such that a PHYSICALIST need think of her as an anti-physical thing.

It is easy now to see that PHYSICALISTS can take the existence of particulars that are not among the φ -things in their stride. Even if they deny that everything can be picked out using the language of physical science, they can still assert that everything is physical according to one quite ordinary conception of this. This ordinary conception requires no more of something than that it not be (or be composed of) any anti-physical thing (or things). Any person is made up exclusively of physical matter, so that many of their parts, and certainly all of their tiniest parts, instantiate physical science’s favoured properties. This fact about the material constitution of any person suffices for people to be physical in an intuitive sense. And this in turn is at least enough to ensure that people need not be thought to be anti-physical just because they are refused membership in the domain of physical science. PHYSICALISM, then, need no more be flouted when people are mentioned in saying how things are than when onlooker properties are applied in saying how things are. The facts of everyday psychology can supervene on facts of physical science even if none of the facts of physical science is a fact about any person.

For present purposes, the assumption that Jackson brings to his understanding of (P) is the fundamental bone of contention.¹¹ Uncovering this assumption helps to explain why Jackson should so often talk of ‘the psychological nature of our world’

¹¹ Not that it is the only assumption of Jackson’s that PHYSICALISTS may want to resist: they may object to Jackson’s understanding of supervenience itself. Anti-reductionists find supervenience theses—whether global or local—appealing because (we say) holding them is consistent with holding that an understanding of supervening terms could not be conveyed in the vocabulary of the level supervened upon. Since local supervenience theses speak of items in a certain domain, Jackson’s ontological assumption is not an issue in assessing them. So anti-reductionists’ quarrel with Jackson cannot be confined to the assumption that he brings to a claim of global supervenience (even if it suits me so to confine it for the purposes of the present paper).

as ‘entailed by the physical account of our world’. And it highlights one very fundamental point of dispute. Anti-reductionists, who say that everyday psychological explanations cannot be reduced to physical scientists’ explanations, may insist upon a distinction between things in whose nature it is to have everyday psychological properties and things whose nature is the concern of physical scientists. That distinction can be part of a general distinction between material things and their matter. (A familiar example, on which I say more below: a statue is not the same as the clay from which it is made.¹²) Henceforth I shall take ANTI-REDUCTIONIST PHYSICALISTS to deny and REDUCTIONIST PHYSICALISTS to accept, that everything (temporal¹³) belongs in the domain of physical science.¹⁴

2. Conceptual analysis

Jackson assumes that all of (P)’s adherents think that Φ , which is cast exclusively in the language of physical science, *entails* every other truth. Thus in Jackson’s book, PHYSICALISM brings in its train many ‘entailment theses between matters described in the vocabulary of physical science and matters described in other vocabularies’ (p.28). The job of securing these entailment theses is the job of conceptual analysis—of using one’s intuitions to determine what we would say about possible cases.¹⁵

When it comes to everyday psychology, Jackson treats its concepts as comprising a network, the identity of each being secured by its place within the network. ‘The network itself’, Jackson says, ‘is the theory known as folk psychology, a theory we have a partly tacit and partly explicit grasp of’ (p.130). His idea is that, by using conceptual analysis, one could tease out the patterns that implicitly guide

¹² Familiar because it was an example used early on to illustrate the non-identity of a thing with that which materially constitutes it: see e.g. Wiggins (1967) and Perry (1970).

¹³ I qualify with ‘temporal’ in order to set aside issues about numbers and the like. There may be disagreements about how best to set them aside. But since Jackson sets them aside himself (p.8), it is safe to assume that believing in numbers etc. is not enough to make one deny the assumption which I want to treat as the bone of contention.

¹⁴ I acknowledge that there are anti-reductionist physicalists who do not fit within this scheme of things. Davidson’s anomalous monism, which is the best-known version of anti-reductionist physicalism, addresses an ontology of mental events, and it may incorporate a local supervenience thesis to which mental/physical identities—sc. between events—are presupposed. (I comment on this in n.35 below.)

Note that my ANTI-REDUCTIONIST denies that people are identifiable in vocabulary suitable for describing physical science’s favoured particulars, *whatever these are*. And REDUCTIONIST PHYSICALISTS may want to claim that events (or states: see n.23) are what any person is a sum or fusion of. My focus here, however, is on a REDUCTIONIST PHYSICALISM which takes material things (not in the category of events or states) to be what a person is composed from, since this indeed proves to be Jackson’s view: see §4 below.

¹⁵ As Jackson has noted, conceptual analysis is not to be understood—as perhaps it usually used to be—as providing statements that give *necessary and* sufficient conditions for concepts’ application. Jackson’s entailment theses would be delivered if we could give plenty of sufficient conditions for concepts’ application.

us when we apply psychological concepts, and thus reach a theory containing a host of truths ‘that could only come false by virtue of meaning change’ (p.45). This theory in its turn could be used to provide an implicit definition of all our psychological terms, the definition being given in non-psychological vocabulary. Here we have the doctrine that Jackson has defended for many years, to which he gave the name ‘analytic functionalism’.¹⁶

Some people do not share Jackson’s optimism about the possible achievements of conceptual analysis in this area. They have concentrated on objections of two sorts. I shall rehearse these now, wanting then to connect them with the larger project of PHYSICALISM and with the present bone of contention.

The first objection has us notice the paucity of candidates for analytic truths that employ everyday psychological language. It is all very well for Jackson to tell us that ‘those good enough at theory construction could extract and articulate the patterns that guide us in classifying the various possible cases’. The trouble is that those who have attempted to state some relevant analytic truths have very soon found themselves very stuck.¹⁷

The second objection is that even such analytic truths as might be accepted lend no immediate support to entailment theses of the kind Jackson believes in. To understand this objection, it helps to remind oneself what a rich and subtle collection of concepts figure in the psychological understanding of people. To mention just a few candidates (out of hundreds, presumably), we have: *babble*, *baptize*, *believe*, *belligerent*, *bemoan*, *bisexual*. If we consider the sorts of claims containing concepts such as these which we might be willing to accept on the basis of engaging in conceptual analysis, then the non-psychological terms within them will certainly not be those of physical science. For the properties that might be connected with everyday psychological ones as a part of some *a priori* philosophical endeavour are surely those in terms of which people think of one another and of the other things around them. These are (roughly) macrophysical properties, rather than the physical scientists’ properties which interest Jackson.¹⁸ Well, presumably Jackson envisages a two-stage process: everyday psychological concepts are to be seen as caught up with the everyday macrophysical ones, and the everyday macrophysical ones in turn are to be subjected to analysis to connect them with the concepts of physical science. This means that we need to believe in very many

¹⁶ See e.g. Jackson and Pettit (1990).

¹⁷ See e.g. Schiffer (1987) Ch.2, §2.4.

¹⁸ Functionalists say that when mental states are defined in the context of a network of their interrelations and their relations to inputs and outputs, inputs and outputs have to be ‘describable in non mental terms’. (This is said to be ‘crucial to [the] enterprise’ in Braddon-Mitchell and Jackson (1996) p.53.) The present point is that when analytic functionalism is a component of a physicalism characterized by reference to physical science, inputs and outputs have to be describable, or at least come to be shown to be describable, in the terms of physical science.

more analytic entailment theses than those that were supposed to be uncovered in the first instance. Again we may feel simply stuck.

If questions are raised about which categories—macrophysical? psychological? scientific physical?—concepts belong in, then one starts to wonder how the line is supposed to be drawn between the everyday psychological ones and the rest. (When the doctrine of analytic functionalism first had its adherents, the question of where this line comes may not have seemed pressing. The project then was to deal with a specific group of what can appear to be particularly problematic everyday psychological concepts, sometimes said to figure in ‘the belief-desire theory’. But when analytic functionalism takes its place as part of a larger metaphysical enterprise of establishing an overall physicalist doctrine, the question what does and what does not count as comprising everyday psychology can seem more pressing.¹⁹) If you consider our short list of six (*babble*, *baptize*, etc.), then you may think that some of them are borderline, or at least that it isn’t clear whether they are everyday psychological or not. But however that may be (however exactly the line is supposed to be drawn), the analytic functionalist reckons on there being a distinctive group of interdependent concepts, interdependencies between which are to be uncovered by armchair reflection. What makes the group distinctive and holds the theory together is surely the concepts having application to things of a certain kind (to people, as we have been saying²⁰). Thus even if it is not clear exactly which concepts have the status of the everyday psychological, it can be clear that the obvious candidates for such status are some of those we actually apply to people. (People sometimes babble; people usually believe many things; people may be belligerent, and so on.)

When Jackson speaks of a ‘sentence which tells us something about the psychological nature of our world’, he makes it sound as if psychological terms might latch onto nothing in particular (just to ‘the world’). And when he and other analytic functionalists gesture towards truths of the sort that they think belong in folk psychology, they are apt to say such things as ‘it is platitudinous that sharp pain typically causes wincing’; and here it seems as if nothing need exist of which ‘feels pain’ and ‘winces’ may be true. Presumably, though, ‘a sentence about psychological nature’ says something about the nature of some individual person (or, as it might be, of several, or many, or all, individual people). And presumably the reason why any putative platitude of folk psychology recommends itself is that it appears to record some generalization about folk psychological subjects: any

¹⁹ Though it is not a question Jackson himself attempts to answer in (1998): his own examples of everyday psychological concepts there are ‘believe’ and ‘desire’ (p.63).

²⁰ One natural way to distinguish folk psychology (for those who accept that it is a theory) is to think of it as a theory whose application is to the very things that use it. If this was right, then we should think of things of the kind in question as ‘members of the folk’. Some will want to allow things other than people into the domain of folk psychology. Others may want to tell a more complicated story in which some everyday psychological concepts have a wider range of application than others (see n.8 above). This would make the ontological question that I insist upon raising more tangled, but it would not make it go away.

folk psychological subject x , is such that x 's feeling sharp pain causes x to wince, or whatever.

Simplifying drastically, and ignoring relativization to times, we can say that the form that the theory that analytic functionalists call folk psychology needs to assume is 'T[z, ψ_1 , ψ_2 , ..., ψ_n]', where 'z' is a variable whose range is folk psychological subjects.²¹ So even when the theory is 'ramsified'²² in order to yield an implicit definition of its psychological terms ψ_1 , ψ_2 , ..., ψ_n , people will not be defined out of existence. This may become more obvious when one thinks of particular everyday psychological terms. Imagine that one characterizes someone as belligerent in order to explain a pugnacious reaction on her part. One then takes this person's reaction to be explained by her possessing a particular property. If the property is thought of along functionalists' lines, it will be treated as 'a state that plays a causal role'. But an ontology of people is still not dispensed with. For the state is then 'a state *in her*'—or so the functionalists say.²³ (And presumably a state of belligerence *in her* directly causes *her* pugnacious reaction rather than anyone else's.) Even if folk psychology could be spelled out in a theory, then, and even if that theory could be used in an implicit definition of its theoretical terms, no ontological *elimination* would be effected.

3. Acts of Faith

A debate about what conceptual analysis affords can reach a standoff. Jackson's opponents think the paucity of known candidates for analytic truths that employ everyday psychological terms argues for an actual absence of many such truths. Jackson, on the other hand, thinks that we can know our concepts to be amenable to analysis without actually being able to provide analyses: abortive analytical endeavours only expose philosophers' inability explicitly to articulate what they tacitly know. It was in order that we should be able to get past this standoff that I located Jackson's assumption in ontology as one source of his belief that conceptual analysis is guaranteed in principle to yield certain results. When this assumption is allowed to be a real bone of contention, the whole character of the dispute between Jackson and anti-reductionists is affected.

²¹ See Loar (1981), Ch.1 on this.

²² I follow others in using 'ramsification' as the name of the method of David Lewis (1970) which draws on work of Ramsey. See pp.140–1 for Jackson's employment of it in respect of 'mature folk morality', on which I comment in n.28 below.

²³ I don't have to quarrel with this talk of states here, since my ANTI-REDUCTIONIST takes no definite stand on what things they are whose existence we may be committed to in making everyday psychological predications (except inasmuch as I think that we are committed to the entities of which such predications are made): see n.14 above. So my objection here is not to treating what Lewis (1970) calls T-terms as names. My claim is that insofar as they are names, they name states *of* things of some sort.

The first thing to notice is that Jackson's defence of conceptual analysis is in one way indirect.²⁴ He says that IF his physicalism (i.e. REDUCTIONIST-PHYSICALISM) is true, then the prospects for conceptual analysis must be bright. As he puts it: if serious metaphysics 'is committed to an account of how things are in one vocabulary being made true by how things are as told in some other vocabulary, then it had better have to hand an account of how accounts in the two vocabularies are interconnected' (p.29). But anyone who thinks that the vocabularies of everyday psychology and physical science are not interconnected would wish to contrapose. No conceptual truths link everyday psychology with science, we think. So physicalism of Jackson's sort is false. Jackson's conviction that conceptual analysis can deliver entailment theses comes to look like an act of faith at this point.

Of course Jackson sees things differently. From his point of view, it is anti-reductionists who make an act of faith.

Physicalists who are not eliminativists about intentional states have to say something about how the physical story about our world makes true the intentional story about it. Otherwise their realism about intentional states will be more an act of faith than anything else. For they will have nothing to say to one who insists that their view that a complete account of the nature of our world can be given in purely physical terms without recourse to intentional vocabulary is precisely the view that there are no intentional states. (Pp.29–30).

I believe that Jackson's picture of the dialectical situation results from foisting his ontological assumption onto all PHYSICALISTS. So I think that we can turn the tables on Jackson now. (1) Eliminativism is actually a very serious threat for his own position. (2) ANTI-REDUCTIONIST PHYSICALISTS do not take their realism on faith. (3) Nor do they take PHYSICALISM on faith. I shall argue these things in turn, before concluding with a brief look at why Jackson's ontological assumption may be contested even when questions about physicalism are not at issue (§4).

(1) Suppose that some concept resists containment within Jackson's analytic physicalist project—that it does not occur in enough conceptual truths to provide entailment theses of the needed sort. The concept in that case fails to live up to the standards of those which, in Jackson's view, belong in a 'description of reality'. By his lights, it should be dispensed with. If concepts in some area suffer this fate, then Jackson is set on a path to eliminativism about the area.

When it comes to everyday psychology, the eliminativism takes a particularly serious form. Jackson says 'our classifications of things into categories ... is not done at random and is not a miracle' (p.64). Insofar as a concept is not amenable to his analytic treatment, then, Jackson will be forced to conclude that we give a

²⁴ Jackson has other routes to defending conceptual analysis. (a) He has things to say to opponents of the possibility of conceptual analysis generally (not only to opponents of the idea that physicalism needs conceptual analysis for its defence): see his Ch.4. (b) He believes in an account of necessity which would ensure that there are plenty of *a priori* claims such as conceptual analysis is supposed to yield. (On his account of necessity, conceptual analysis comes to embrace the elucidation of A-intensions—a subject I don't touch on here.)

perfect appearance of going in for classification using that concept even while we actually proceed at random or miraculously. This is worrying. The worry could seem to be a relatively local one: if conceptual analysis failed us only here or there, then it would only be in particular areas that we unknowingly proceeded at random. But it is much worse than this. For to possess any concept is to be in an everyday psychological state. So a black mark against any concept is a black mark in turn for everyday psychology. But everyday psychological concepts were supposed to comprise a network, so that a threat in one place would, at least potentially, be a threat to the whole. Jackson's entailment theses now might be thought of as potentially constituting a huge edifice, based on endorsing realism about everyday psychology, but ready to topple if, at any point, it cannot be supported by deliverances of the method Jackson favours. Of course Jackson is convinced that conceptual analysis is capable of turning up the goods; but his conviction, as we saw, is bound to strike his opponents as an act of faith.

(2) We saw that it is *not* the view of every PHYSICALIST that 'a complete account of the nature of our world can be given in purely physical terms'. (This is the view only of those of (P)'s proponents who allow themselves to be boxed into a corner by Jackson when he treats it as a foregone conclusion that everything is a φ -thing.) Certainly purely physical terms can be used to give a complete account of the φ -things—of the particulars recognized by physical scientists. But a complete account of our world must record the facts about people. And it is only to be expected that a complete account of the φ -things will not contain all the facts about people if, as the ANTI-REDUCTIONIST PHYSICALIST says, people are not themselves φ -things.

In one sense, however, Jackson is right that anti-reductionists 'have nothing say to say to justify calling themselves realists rather than eliminativists'. For ANTI-REDUCTIONIST PHYSICALISTS do not accept that when it comes to claims about the reality of anything, the burden of proof is on serious metaphysicians. Thinking as they do that there are people, they take it for granted that people think things, and want things, and so on—just as anyone who ever attributes an intentional state of mind to herself or to another takes this for granted. And whatever might be said for or against such realism, Jackson himself is obliged to assume it when he engages in the philosophical project of proving it. For Jackson's entailment theses, which are supposed to reveal our concepts as in good physicalist standing, are meant to record things that we all (perhaps only tacitly) *know*. Unless it is assumed, then, that we are psychological subjects, who, among other things, know things, Jackson's project cannot get started. If the ANTI-REDUCTIONIST PHYSICALIST really did require an act of faith, then that act would be required of the REDUCTIONIST PHYSICALIST too.

(3) Whether or not realism about everyday psychology is assured, it may be thought an objection to the ANTI-REDUCTIONIST that she takes her *PHYSICALISM* on faith. How else is it to be ruled out that the world contains what I earlier called anti-physical things? Well, the easy answer is that, a hundred and fifty years on from Darwin, it is a reasonable view that nothing more than natural processes

in a world of regular material stuff has ensured the presence here of beings with everyday psychological properties. The alternative can nowadays seem simply unmotivated. Of course arguments for Cartesian dualism need to be answered.²⁵ But I suggest that in the twenty-first century, rather little needs to be said in favour of a rather unexciting sort of physicalism.

It is a question why Jackson himself should be confident that when the conceptual analysts and the physical scientists had done their work, the actual world would be revealed as containing only material stuff. This question arises for Jackson because he endorses only a contingently true physicalism, thinking that there are possible worlds which are ‘physically exactly like ours but which contain as an *addition* a lot of mental life sustained in non-material stuff’ (p.12).²⁶ If he were to tell us why he is willing to affirm that *actually* persons are made only of material stuff, then perhaps he too would need to appeal to the rather obvious considerations of the sort contained in what I call the easy answer.

Suppose it can indeed be made to seem rather obvious that actually, despite the absence of anything anti-physical, we exist and have our everyday psychological properties. Then it should not need very much work to make it credible that physical conditions suffice in some sense for there to be beings with psychological properties. If people and all the macrophysical things to which they relate are made up entirely of tiny physical things, then any variation in facts about people may be expected to go hand in hand with variation at the level of physical science. An unexciting physicalism can then be dressed up as PHYSICALISM.²⁷

4. Material Things

The assumption isolated in §1 as the bone of contention was that everything (temporal) belongs in the domain of physical science. The assumption hardly comes to the surface in Jackson. The effect of Jackson’s formulating (P) as a doctrine about *minimal* physical duplicates of our world is to dissociate ontological questions—about whether there are anti-physical things—from ideological questions—about whether anything has anti-physical properties. When Jackson claims that the psychological facts are fixed by *minimal* physical duplicates of our world, he intends to rule it out that there is actually any of the additional non-

²⁵ And also arguments for epiphenomenalism: see n.2 above.

²⁶ This explains why Jackson formulates (P) as a doctrine only about *minimal* physical duplicates: see n.3 above, and see further text below.

²⁷ Or anyway something like PHYSICALISM. But quibbles about (P), which I set aside at the beginning, might enter at this point. I should acknowledge that one may well not endorse (P) if one is opposed to Jackson’s reductionist thesis. Still, the point of introducing the ANTI-REDUCTIONIST PHYSICALIST (whose endorsement of (P) is a matter of my stipulation) has been to uncover a position that Jackson keeps hidden, rather than to arrive at a definitive view of exactly what those who reject the reductionist thesis but don’t call themselves anti-physicalists ought to say.

material stuff that he believes there to be in some possible worlds. Thus insofar as any ontological assumption is in place in Jackson, it is simply that (actually) the only stuff is material stuff.

The only point in (1998) where ontological questions are salient is when Jackson illustrates what he calls conceptual analysis in its (in his view unacceptable) *immodest* role: an argument against four-dimensionalism is used as the example there (pp.42–3).²⁸ It is a mark of how well concealed Jackson usually keeps his ontological assumption that the discussion of folk psychology contains no hint that he takes folk psychological subjects to be φ -things. But we see an explicit sign of the assumption in his (2000), where Jackson speaks of human beings as among other '*parcels of matter*' (p.190).

Many philosophers have rejected Jackson's assumption. Their reason is the fact that everyday macroscopic material things appear to differ in their properties from parcels of matter or coincident φ -things,²⁹ so that, by Leibniz's law, such material things cannot be the same as the φ -things.³⁰ In the familiar case of the statue made of clay, the statue may have come into existence at t , and be well-made, Romanesque and admired .., even while the coincident piece of clay existed before t , and is not well-made or Romanesque or admired. (I take over Kit Fine's examples here.³¹ Fine's paper is particularly useful in a dispute with Jackson, because

²⁸ It is true that Jackson locates his disagreement with those whom he calls Cornell realists (in ethics) as a disagreement over '*ontological descriptivism*' (p.146); but no ontological question of the kind I am pressing here arises in his arguments against the position (pp.147–50). I guess that Cornell realists want to say about ethics what my anti-reductionist physicalists say about everyday psychology (and to make the point about supervenience in n.11 above). Certainly my bone of contention is not special to any particular subject matter. And unsurprisingly I think that Jackson rides roughshod over ontological questions in his treatment of '*mature folk morality*' at pp.140–1.

²⁹ Some reductionists might care about whether they call something made of material stuff a parcel or a piece of matter, or a collection or a sum of parts: '*collection/sum of parts*' implies, as '*parcel or piece of matter*' perhaps does not, an *articulated* something. But here I can speak of coincident φ -things, intending to include all of the candidates for reductionist identities. Jackson's parcels of matter surely must be articulated: unless they are supposed to be composed of things in the domain of physical science, it is impossible to understand the claim that how they are is '*made true by how things are as told in physical vocabulary*'.

Once the domain is acknowledged to contain articulated things, there may not be very much point in the reductionist's caring which word ('parcel' or 'sum' or whatever) is used. The obvious way to ground Jackson's assumption in ontology is to endorse what Rea (1995) calls the thesis of mereological extensionality: $(x)(y)(x \text{ is composed of } m_1 \dots m_n \text{ and } y \text{ is composed of } m_1 \dots m_n \rightarrow x = y)$; and if this were true, then there would only be, as it were, one candidate for identity with any material thing.

³⁰ Admittedly it is controversial whether this appearance can be sustained, and some think that they have arguments in favour of the disputed identities. In n.12, I mentioned Wiggins and Perry; more recent articles on the anti-reductionists' side include Doepke (1982), Johnston (1992), Baker (1997) and Fine (2003); see also Wiggins (2001). All these authors use Leibniz's Law to argue for non-identities: the examples are many and various.

³¹ P.206 (2003). Fine shows that the case against the reductionists' identities is best made without fixating, as so many discussions have, on temporal and modal properties. And he

although Fine's considerations are mostly conceptual/linguistic, they do not give intuitions about possibilities a large place, thus give to conceptual analysis what Jackson would call a 'modest role', and thus ought to be acceptable to Jackson.)

Such differences in properties as these can seem to reveal the point of having statues and other works of art in our ontology. Someone who wanted to know why we talk about these things would need to grasp what kind of properties they may have—that they are created, that they may be defective, well or badly made, valuable, ugly, Romanesque, admired . . . It is no help to grasp that they may have properties that are attributable to mere pieces of matter.

Now Jackson's reductionist thesis concerns explanations of everyday psychology. (It says, to recall, that everyday psychological explanations are understandable in terms of, or are reducible to, physical ones.) We start to see why such a thesis may be rejected when we appreciate that the concepts used in such explanations may be denied to have application to ϕ -things. No doubt the point of having people in our everyday ontology is rather different from the point of having statues. But just as being in a position to talk about statues goes hand in hand with using concepts applicable to them, so recognizing that there are people goes hand in hand with being able to give explanations using the vocabulary of everyday psychology. And if people are not identical with physical scientists' items, which now seems very plausible (given that physical scientists' concepts are generally of no actual help in understanding people), then explanations of facts about people using everyday psychological concepts will not be understandable in the terms of physical science.³²

When Jackson outlines his account of theory reduction, he makes use of a classic example: temperature in gases is mean kinetic energy.³³ Well, it is only to be expected that the behaviour of a (quantity of) gas can be explained in terms of the behaviour of its parts. Discoveries about gases included the decisive discovery

demonstrates the intolerable consequences that accrue from attempts to disallow the conclusion of the arguments from Leibniz's Law.

³² See Lynne Rudder Baker (1997) and (2000) (a) for an extended defence of the claim that individuals may be constituted by fundamental particles without explanations in terms of fundamental particles being explanations of the behavior of the individuals, and (b) an account of how things which aren't ϕ -things (i.e. not in the domain of particulars favoured by physical science) can perfectly well have some of the properties of ϕ -things.

I note that Baker's own view about persons—that they are not the same as the human bodies that constitute them—might or might not be endorsed by ANTI-REDUCTIONIST PHYSICALISTS. The analogy with statues helps to make it clear that it need not be endorsed. And the analogy may also help to show that insofar as I fail to share Jackson's 'conception of humans, [which] regards them as fully a part of nature' (2000, p.190), I must, in his view, be implicated in a conception of statues which regards *them* as not fully part of nature. Jackson thinks that my position 'belongs with the dualists'. But I should surely be reckoned a pluralist by his lights, thinking as I do that things of many kinds are not ϕ -things.

³³ Pp.57–60. Jackson's purpose in using the example is to show that conceptual analysis is involved in scientific reduction—a claim that need not be at issue here.

that (quantities of) gases simply *are* collections of molecules. There seems to be no similar expectation of theoretical reduction in respect of subject matters which deal with things that are not collections or sums or parcels of their parts. So I think that when Jackson's assumption in ontology is in the open, we shall question his overall attitude to the possibilities of reduction.

Someone who rejects the ontological assumption will say that it is simply impossible to give 'the interesting account' which Jackson tells us that PHYSICALISTS 'must give' of 'how and why the physical account of our world makes true the psychological account of our world' (p.30). Thus PHYSICALISTS can be absolved of the hard work demanded of Jackson's serious metaphysicians. (Not that they need have anything against honest toil: we saw that ANTI-REDUCTIONIST PHYSICALISTS at least cannot be accused of taking their philosophical doctrines on faith.)

I may have managed to make it look very hard to defend physicalism of Jackson's sort and very easy to defend physicalism of a different sort. But if I have made anything look hard or easy, then that is because I have trodden a path so much of my own choosing. I have relied on Jackson's bold and lucid statement of his version of physicalism in order to pit it against another. I have relied upon setting things up so as to avoid assessing certain claims which Jackson uses in support of his own position (see n.24 above). And I have only gestured towards arguments for the claim on which I am suggesting a defence of PHYSICALISM of an anti-reductionist sort might rest—arguments for rejecting Jackson's assumption in ontology.

Perhaps, however, there is a general lesson here. Physicalists need not subscribe to the idea that 'the world' or 'reality' is something of which accounts are given.³⁴ Accounts are accounts of things; and there can be more to the things of which some accounts are given than the material stuff which constitutes them.^{35 36}

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³⁴ Using 'the world' in Jackson's way, one readily comes to assume the position of what Fine (2003) calls the *fanatical mono-referentialist*, who thinks that every singular term refers to the 'One' (p.202). Jackson is not alone in speaking in this sort of way: many philosophers speak as if 'reality' were something that we describe.

³⁵ It is a question whether mental events (and/or states) depend for their existence upon the existence of the things to which everyday psychological concepts have application. If the answer is Yes, then the ontological assumption at issue here might also be put in question in assessing versions of physicalism very different from Jackson's (such as anomalous monism, mentioned at n.14 above).

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