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The case of a flexible public transport system**

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Abstract

Instead of explaining the outcomes of a policy process with reference to a rational planning logic, this paper scrutinises the circumstances in which decisions actually are taken. It follows issues when they displace between different decision-making settings. The approach is applied to a case of decision-making about a flexible public transport system in and around Hoogeveen, the Netherlands: a case in which the decision-making process was distributed over no less than fifteen settings. The main result of the analysis is a typology of five different displacements based on typical framing effects, which could form the basis of a theory with which complex, interactive and opportunistic decision-making processes can be understood in more general terms.

Keywords: decision-making, transport policy, innovation, public transport, displaced politics

Introduction

There is not much realism in the view that a new and innovative public transport service is rationally designed and straightforwardly implemented. The rational policy planning model assumes a linear sequence of steps, from defining the objectives, to constructing a causal model, to applying instruments, to defining targets, and to implementing policy. By implication, it assumes one central actor who controls this process (Birkland, 2001; Hoogerwerf & Herweijer, 2003). This is an ideal and a reduction. There is rarely one central actor in charge of a planning process. Action in general, and innovative activities in particular, take place in complex networks of stakeholders and is much better characterised as an iterative, interactive and incremental process (Linblom, 1959; Nelson & Winter, 1977; Smits, 2002). Actors behave boundedly rational at best, meaning that there is always an

important element of opportunism in decision-making and policy planning (Simon, 1955). Clearly, this constrains the possibility to derive generally applicable lessons from studying particular cases of decision-making.

This article argues why it is important to focus on settings as the local circumstances for decision-making. It proposes and applies a conceptual framework for understanding the interactions and contingencies in decision-making given the opportunities that the actual settings offer. The claim is that, despite its complexity and despite opportunism, the decision-making process is still patterned in a certain way. Because the bounds of rationality coincide with the bounds of settings, one can understand the decision-making process by studying the characteristics of settings where issues are dealt with.

The conceptual framework developed for this approach is presented in the next section after the core concepts of 'issues', 'settings', 'framing' and 'displacements' are introduced. The framework is subsequently applied to the case of decision-making about a flexible public transport system in and around Hoogeveen, the Netherlands: a case in which the decision-making process was distributed over no less than fifteen settings, partly because of a national policy shift towards liberalisation and decentralisation. Three major issues are followed to show how displacements between these settings led to a certain reframing of issues and to their final outcome. The main result of the analysis is a typology of five different displacements based on typical framing effects. In addition, an attempt is made to explain why issues displace according to these five types. The main claim of this study is that if these results can be confirmed by other studies, then a theory of displacements might be offered with which complex, interactive and opportunistic decision-making processes can be understood in more general terms. The article ends with the suggestion that the typology can also be a very helpful aid for evaluating the (democratic) quality of the process.

Issues: action and anti-programs

In this case study, 'issues' are followed when they displace between settings. Especially in controversial cases that justify a conflict-model, issues are the central element of the decision-making process. Issues consist of opposed opinions, interests or visions; they are not settled until one of the

contesting parties succeeds to recruit sufficient support from allies and bystanders and forces opponents to capitulate for whatever reason (Lukes, 1974; Schattschneider, 1960).

In a similar vein, but with regard to innovation processes, Latour has coined the notions of action programs and antiprograms to describe decision-making processes (Latour, 1991). An action program is a vision of the future in which discoveries and inventions are transformed into a working artefact that is developed, used and maintained by a diversity of actors. Action programs also include supportive elements, such as funding, legislation and public support. The expression and promotion of an action programs always implies a certain distribution of roles and responsibilities among actors and for this reason action programs are hardly ever without contestation.

Antiprograms are action programs of others, which run counter to the original action program. Opponents may engage in antiprograms that aim at objection, rejection or adjustment of the action programs they are confronted with. The clash between an action program and an anti-program defines an issue in what can be called the politics of innovation.

Settings as a theatre stage

Issues are not free-floating entities, but are articulated, discussed and settled in 'settings'. Settings are the direct contexts of the clashes between action and antiprograms. Examples of settings are negotiation structures, sites for demonstration of innovative technology, forums for debate, political institutions, and protest actions. Settings are not neutral. Some actors have better access than others; some issues enter the agenda more easily than others. In this sense, settings are biased and politically loaded, because they impose constraints on the process (Schattschneider, 1960). Bias, however, also has a positive meaning: settings not only constrain, but also enable more or less effective participation in the decision-making process (Gomart & Hajer, 2003).

To conceptualise these constraining and enabling qualities of settings I use the dramaturgical metaphor of the stage where an act is performed. This metaphor emphasises three dimensions on which settings are characterized. First, the access conditions refer to the reasons why settings allow some actors to participate while others are part of the audience or excluded altogether. Access conditions define *who*

is allowed to enter a particular setting in order to find support (among participants and attributes) for his action program.

The second dimension is attributes. Settings provide the attributes with which the performance is enacted. Attributes are those *supports that are valid* in a particular kind of setting. Attributes may strengthen one action program or link different action programs together; in both cases they shift the balance of power.

The third dimension is audience. The audience of a setting comprises those who are *indirectly involved*, either by asserting influence on the participants in the setting or by asserting influence in subsequent settings. An example of the first is the general public whose opinion and judgment do the participants anticipate. An example of concrete influence in subsequent settings is the electorate, who pass judgment about politicians by voting when the issue displaces to polling stations.

These three characteristics of settings make up the (negative *or* positive) bias of settings. Due to their biases, settings *frame* a ‘performance’: they co-determine which issues are central or peripheral and which aspects of issues are relevant in a particular setting; issues might even appear or disappear due to the bias of a setting. The framing of issues is thus the direct effect of their appearance in settings (note the related meanings of the verbs ‘to set’ and ‘to frame’).

Displacements between settings

Because of the different framings of settings, displacements of issues between settings highly matter in the politics of innovation. A ‘displacement’ is defined as the movement of an issue to another setting or as a significant change on one of the three dimensions of the setting. Displacements come about because the decision-making context often still needs to be built; developing procedures and structures is a process of continuous exploration and learning itself. Actors deliberate *in* settings, but simultaneously *about* settings. They search for appropriate forms and devise the conditions for deliberation. But how do they succeed in such endeavours?

The underlying dynamics of displacements can be divided in a ‘how’ question and a ‘why’ question. The how question concerns the *routes* of displacements in terms of the settings involved. Reframing is an effect of routes of displacements, because this depends on the relative differences between the

characteristics of settings. Therefore, one question is whether the different reframing effects are patterned by routes of displacements.

The why question concerns the *conditions* and *driving forces* of displacements. These can be divided in internal and external conditions. An internal condition is, for example, the ‘mobilization of bias’ (Schattschneider, 1960): actors purposefully try to displace the issue to settings that are biased in favour of their action program. External conditions of displacement include institutional arrangements or contingent events. Institutional arrangements are procedures for decision-making that are part of more general policies or politics. Contingent events may also lead to displacements. For example, in debates about the introduction of chip technology in the Dutch public transport system arguments about tariff differentiation have suddenly become much less relevant than arguments related to social safety since 9/11 and the Madrid railway bombs.

Figure 1 schematically presents the conceptual framework and illustrate the central role of displacements therein.

<<Figure 1. The conceptual framework>>

The case of a flexible public transport system

For the understanding of displacements, we use the metaphor of settings as a theatre stage, which comprises the characterization of settings in terms of access conditions, attributes, and audiences. Displacements are then conceived of as mutations of the access conditions, of the availability and allowance of attributes and of the presence, composition and role of the audience. This characterization expresses in detail what displacement entails and why this leads to a certain reframing. The following empirical questions are therefore addressed in a case study: (i) how do the characteristics of settings influence the (re)framing of issues? (ii) Is it possible to characterize different types of displacements based on reframing effects? And (iii) what are the main conditions for these displacements to take place?

The case comprises the introduction between 1999 and 2004 of a flexible and user driven public transport concept in and between Hogeveen and Meppel, two small towns in the province of Drenthe in the northern part of the Netherlands. Decision-making took place in a large variety of settings. For example, major decisions were taken in Provincial States; a Development Group supervised the project; a panel of users was supposed to decide about operational issues; on the work floor two strikes took place; separate bilateral meetings were organized to settle conflicts; and one of those conflicts ended in court. This variety of settings results in an interesting case for the exploration of the metaphor of a setting as a theatre stage and the specific role of settings in the dynamics of displacements.

To identify the relevant settings, a statement that expresses an interesting action program is taken as the starting point. Next, this action program is confronted with statements that express antiprograms. This confrontation always happens in a particular setting, the conditions of which can be subsequently scrutinized: an interrogation of the settings based on the theatre metaphor is done to explain why these action and antiprograms are stated as they are.¹

The data used for this case study are derived from archival records, policy documents, evaluation reports, and, most importantly, minutes of meetings. Archives of newspaper articles were effective starting points, because popular media spend a lot of attention to innovative activity in public transport. By means of a snowball method (Bijker, 1995) references to meetings, policy documents, project proposals, and other sources of information are found. For scrutiny of settings this study makes additional use of thought experiments by consequently asking: what are in this particular setting the access conditions, the attributes, and the audience?

Manoeuvring through the institutional landscape

The case starts in 1999, when a former civil servant and his American companion negotiated with the provincial authorities to provide a transport service with small buses for elderly and disabled in Hogeveen. Those days multinational transport company Arriva provided regular public bus transport within the town, as it did in and between nearly all regions in the north. In addition, a railway operated by the Dutch Railways connects the town to the cities of Groningen and Zwolle. The transport system

which these two entrepreneurs had in mind was supposed to serve the ‘bottom of the market’, thus complementing regular public transport.² They proposed a quite innovative service concept for a number of reasons.³ In proportion with the town size and target group, the buses were just large enough to transport eight passengers. Instead of at designated bus stops, the buses stopped for anyone on the route who raised his hand. It was even possible to pick up (disabled) people from their homes if that would not disrupt the time schedule. Panels of users determined the principle routes, time schedules, and tariffs. These features amounted to a highly flexible and demand-driven system. In sum: a very attractive concept for small towns. With a permit and loan from the province of Drenthe and subsidies from the Ministry of Traffic & Transport the two entrepreneurs set up an experiment to develop the system. For the exploitation of the system they founded a company called Millennium Transport International (MTI), a company that initially employed merely drivers besides its two directors. The company’s ambitious action program was to “introduce the transport concept in ten regions or areas in the Netherlands.”⁴ The case comprises the politics involved in the realisation of part of this action program: providing *regular* public transport in and between Hoogeveen and Meppel. The realisation of MTI’s action program depended on its manoeuvring through the institutional landscape composed of a variety of political settings. The company had to encounter action programs of other actors participating in these settings, like authorities, other transport companies, drivers, and consumer organisations. In the course of the project MTI’s action program was challenged and transformed in fifteen settings. Figure 2, which can be used as a map of the case, depicts these settings. It will become clear that there were three major issues, each represented by one chain of displacements. Later on, these chains are followed in order to explore the effects of settings on the reframing of the issues. First, however, these settings are one-by-one and chronologically described in terms of their characteristics, their frame, and their framing effects on issues (in terms action programs). A chronological order is preferred to avoid forward-referring, when for example developments in one chain triggered or delayed displacements in the other chain. In this article, the storyline is presented in the main text; the analysis is presented in the next section in table 1, but can be read in parallel. Each paragraph corresponds to one column comprising the characteristics of

settings, the frame of these settings, and their effects on issue framing. The reasons for displacements are also included in the table.

<<Figure 2. Displacements between fifteen settings⁵>>

Setting 1. Structures for negotiation (about Arriva's tender)

While MTI started up the experiment for elderly in Hoozevee in 1999, provincial authorities put the regular public bus transport network out to tender for the first time. The forthcoming Passenger Transport Act 2000 would oblige provincial authorities to invite tenders for its public transport and Drenthe was one of the first to anticipate this obligation. But due to historical circumstances, this first invitation was only open for one provider: Arriva. The province wanted to invite together with the neighbouring province of Groningen and the city of Groningen in order to establish an optimally connected transport network (Drenthe's own action program), but because Groningen-city had a continuing contract with Arriva, the three authorities exclusively negotiated with this 'monopolist'.⁶ Yet, Arriva may have been too confident about its position when it disagreed with one phrase in the program of requirements: "Arriva is expected to realize a substantial decrease of costs in the next four years. The savings should be used for improvement measures."⁷ Arriva wanted to meet all requirements except investing in innovation.⁸ The first setting in this case comprised the structures in which these negotiations took place.

Setting 2. Provincial States (part 1)

Facing Arriva's standpoint Drenthe's deputy returned to Provincial States. Within Provincial States, the second setting, several members recalled the small company that developed a new user driven transport service concept for elderly in Hoozevee and suggested a more prominent role for MTI in regular public transport.⁹ State members received the initiative with great enthusiasm. They did not think new entrants to the market should have to wait for four years, just because Arriva needed this time for its quality improvement. And they found that liberalization is a farce with Arriva's exclusive candidacy. MTI was one of those rare transport companies willing to exploit the thin lines of transport

networks: the lines that are far from profitable to operate with standard buses. State members showed growing appreciation for this willingness.¹⁰ They had raised the issue whether the focus on costs would not go at the expense of the less profitable thin lines in rural areas and the interests of elderly and disabled. They considered a social system of transport more important than increased efficiency. Moreover, a positive evaluation report commissioned by the province recommended to scale up the Hooegeveen experiment in order to assess its viability.¹¹

Setting 3. Structures for negotiation (about MTI's inclusion in Arriva's tender)

As a result of the discussions in Provincial States, the tender invitation could not be redone without somehow including MTI. The Board of Provincial Deputies decided to limit the tender period to two years and, more important, proposed a distinction between a 'connecting network' and a 'disclosing network' in order to negotiate with more parties about parts of the whole.¹² MTI could operate three parts: the province granted regular public transport in the towns of Hooegeveen and Meppel and in the so-called InterHoMe region (in between the towns) to MTI, the 'big' winner of these renegotiations. What started as an experiment at the 'bottom of the market', quite remote from the provincial responsibility for regular public transport, suddenly became an ally of the province in their negotiations with Arriva. When the company agreed to execute the three projects as Arriva's subcontractor, its action program (to provide regular public transport in more than one town) started to take off.

Setting 4. Development Group (part 1)

This action program, however, was to be realized in conjunction with programs and interests of actors in the fourth setting: the supervising Development Group Southwest Drenthe, founded and chaired by the province to look after the continuation of the MTI project among other things. The group held two-weekly meetings. Participants were representatives of the province and the municipalities in the region, as well as someone from traveller organization ROVER, who represented a platform of consumer organizations. Furthermore, the participation of both Arriva (board and drivers) and MTI

reflected constructive intentions: the group could directly allocate tasks to those actually serving the region.

The most important issue the Development Group had to decide about was the concrete transport service plan as proposed by MTI.¹³ In MTI's philosophy users determined the routes: the proposal was based on public gatherings and questionnaires. Yet, MTI's board had to compromise many more desires and fit them into their cost-benefit calculations. Municipalities expressed desires about routes and considerations about municipal policies (like 30 km/h zones).¹⁴ The group insisted on good connections with trains and with the Arriva lines to other parts of the province.¹⁵ It drew attention to the peak loads at opening and closing hours of schools and factories, which was easily neglected in MTI's user research.¹⁶ For these peaks, MTI had to make arrangements with Arriva about back-up equipment and drivers. In addition, the two companies also had to agree upon the transition of personnel and the division of earnings from the National Tariff System.¹⁷ Although many of the costs and benefits were highly uncertain, MTI had to fix routes, time schedules, required equipment and personnel, and season-ticket tariffs before the concept could definitely be approved. The Development Group gave MTI the opportunity to deal with this complex situation within a relatively short period of time. The company presented a draft, included comments from the group, and finalized a definitive plan just in time.¹⁸

Setting 5. Arriva's council of employees

The Development Group framed the transport plan from a client perspective. This, however, bypassed the perspective of drivers: signs of possible resistance among drivers were easily ignored in the Development Group.¹⁹ The provincial chair said that persuasion of employees is a task for Arriva's board, not for the group.²⁰ The group underemphasized the resistance among Arriva's drivers and insufficiently realized that the council of employees had a formal mandate to disapprove the whole transport plan.²¹

The forthcoming Passenger Transport Act 2000 would arrange the transition of personnel if a new company wins a tender in order to protect drivers against unemployment. Because the law had not been enforced yet, the involved companies voluntarily arranged the transition. MTI hired personnel

from Arriva, provided that the former would apply all labour conditions as formalized in the Collective Labour Agreement (CLA), a document negotiated between employers and labour unions.²² As part of the procedure Arriva's council of employees (which consults the board of Arriva about decisions that possibly affect employees) had to approve the arrangement.²³ However, the council disapproved the proposed contract, because MTI's intentions did not match formal requirements.²⁴ MTI appeared to give a slightly different interpretation of some aspects of the public transport CLA: drivers did not get two breaks of 21 minutes every 4½ hour, but four times 13 minutes in accordance with MTI's time schedule and similar to its own employees.²⁵ To its own employees the company applied the taxi-CLA, because they drove the small 8p buses and did not have to possess a driving license for buses. However, Arriva's council of employees rejected this interpretation as far as the hired drivers were concerned. This standpoint resulted in a deadlock between diverging interests, especially when MTI stuck with its own interpretation for financial reasons and Arriva's board took sides with its employees, because it thought MTI competed unjustly on labour conditions.²⁶ What is more, labour unions consulted by the council stated that compliance with the public transport CLA should not only apply to the hired drivers, but also to MTI's own employees, because MTI now provided regular public transport.²⁷ Labour union CNV considered starting a legal suit.

Setting 6. Private meetings (province, Arriva and MTI)

The start of the tender had meanwhile been postponed at least half a year.²⁸ Initially, the province had taken a background position and conceived of the deadlock as a conflict between two private parties. However, when the parties failed to agree, provincial officials intervened and succeeded to persuade MTI to comply with the CLA, partly because further delay would really harm the company's financial situation. MTI included 21 minutes break times, but only in the schedules of those lines operated by Arriva employees.²⁹ The province decided to tolerate this situation.³⁰ Perhaps officials or the Deputy should have acted more decisive: either force MTI to comply or stop the project. That decision, however, would have been a decision for Provincial States and, more striking, a shame for the initiators and for the very idea of liberalization. In the current setting, the province tried to settle the

conflict silently by excluding as many actors and aspects as necessary. The boards of the two companies indeed reached agreement, although labour unions started preparing legal procedures.³¹

Setting 7. MTI's office (strikes)

When the issue displaced to the actual work floor, the detached employees themselves got involved. In cooperation with Arriva's schedule makers MTI adjusted the time schedules to the 21-minutes break time requirement. Drivers had to be fit into the schedules in hectic circumstances.³² The postponed start date neared and MTI's schedule makers had neither experience nor proper sight on the contents of the public transport CLA. MTI cancelled a planned information gathering for the selected drivers because of time constraints. Drivers faced the outcomes of schedule making work from which they had been excluded, although the feasibility of these outcomes depended on their agreement. In this stage they raised their voice. First, with a strike they expressed dissatisfaction with ever changing driving schedules by incompetent schedule makers. Second, with another strike they objected to simplistic revision of the schedules (lines would depart *and* arrive nine minutes late, causing passengers to complain about missed train connections). Third, over time more and more drivers noticed stress and sickness. Out of twelve initially hired drivers, only two were still on the bus in the second year.³³

Setting 8. Correspondence MTI/Arriva

Instead of giving in, MTI tried to displace the issue. In a letter to Arriva, MTI accused 'sick' drivers of work refusal, and therefore it did not want to pay the bills to Arriva. Arriva, however, ascribed the high illness-rate to bad management by MTI and reported so to the Development Group.³⁴ The province's official asked MTI and Arriva to solve the issue bilaterally, which Arriva understood as permission to initiate a legal procedure that should attribute responsibility on this issue.³⁵ This step made further cooperation between Arriva and MTI impossible and the province concluded that the only remaining solution was to discontinue the detachment arrangement. The tender ended by the end of the year anyway.³⁶

Setting 9. User panel

User involvement was claimed to be a main feature of the MTI concept, and the concept's appeal to authorities originated in part of this feature. The company announced to organize user panels to decide by majority about operational issues like routes, frequencies, and tariffs.³⁷ As soon as the Hoogeveen experiment had been approved, the company recruited a large number of participants for the user panel in canteens of old people's homes.³⁸ The panel held regular meetings every month. This user panel would remain the only one in the case. At the time MTI had been contracted for public transport in the InterHoMe region, it first promised to install additional panels and later to aggregate the Hoogeveen panel into one panel for the whole region.³⁹ However, this panel never came about despite pressure from within the Development Group. The small MTI board prioritised solving CLA troubles over organizing the panel.⁴⁰

The user panel is an exceptional setting in this case, because it remained isolated in the institutional landscape. Issues neither moved to nor moved from the user panel, so one would not trace this setting by following the issues. Yet, because its existence featured so prominently in any presentation of the company (in media, to authorities, in subsidy requests), it seems worthwhile to look at the discussions that took place within the panel.

The Hoogeveen user panel in its early stage highly identified with the MTI management. For example, MTI made a lot of announcements, which the panel hardly disputed.⁴¹ Applause among the participants after MTI reported about the hundredth subscriber underscored this 'we' feeling.⁴² Nevertheless, the user panel did achieve important modifications of MTI's action program. On proposal of the panel MTI lengthened, shortened, diverted and combined routes; it instructed drivers to stop as near to the sidewalk as possible; it installed grips in the buses for better accessibility and a light bulb at the front window for better visibility in dark; and it provided relevant public buildings with time schedules.⁴³

Right when the panel discovered the opportunities of participation, the director of MTI did not show up on a number of subsequent meetings and the panel started fearing not being taken seriously enough.⁴⁴ Ever more, the panel meetings showed a confrontation between the company's perspective

and the user perspective. A number of recurring issues were not settled but by overruling the panel. First, MTI transported a lot of employees of social workplace Alescon. This caused capacity shortage around 4 pm, even after MTI used a larger bus. An extra bus would have been required, but the company stated that it could not afford hiring an extra driver for this bus.⁴⁵ Second, MTI rejected a request from users to divert one route to the Carstenstraat and the cemetery. Unlike the panel, MTI believed that there was not enough demand at these locations.⁴⁶ Third, elderly, the original target group, complained about a lack of service by drivers and the company. The panel repeatedly issued the possibility to take walking aids on the bus. MTI's simply advised elderly to avoid peak hours.⁴⁷ Fourth, at the moment MTI started operating in Meppel and the InterHoMe region, it announced to level all tariffs. This implied a price increase of about 30% for a Hoogeveen season ticket, which invoked a lot of resistance in the panel. But MTI closed the discussion: "It cannot be changed anymore. Passengers who often make use of public transport in Hoogeveen will still profit from a season-ticket."⁴⁸ To sum up, the panel indeed achieved some victories, but it lacked power to resist being overruled on the controversial issues; merely 'innocent' issues were open for discussion.

Setting 10. Development Group (part 2)

Meanwhile another issue had risen in the Development Group, which would seriously threaten MTI's chances in the next tender. The agenda of the group showed a number of small issues that would not have been mentioned here if they had not added up to a fast growing action list. MTI postponed or did not execute its tasks and after time the list turned into an issue itself. Most of the actions had to do with travel information and communication.⁴⁹ For example:

- The national internet service for travel information should get the MTI data.
- There should be more information along the routes.
- Drivers should be able to communicate in case a back-up bus meets with peak demand.
- It should be clear how buses deviate from the routes in case of road works.
- Drivers should be able to communicate with the office otherwise than by mobile phones.

- MTI should make clear how it deals with complaints.
- MTI should organize a user panel for the InterHoMe region.
- MTI should develop a communication plan.
- MTI should sell tickets in the bus and not let people without a pre-paid ticket travel for free.

The province presented an overview to the Development Group, which summarized thirty-eight not (sufficiently) executed tasks from five meetings, most of them allocated to MTI. Follow-ups of these tasks remained unclear as the director of MTI mostly happened to be excused. He was late once, replaced by subordinates twice, and just absent on the last meeting.⁵⁰ The conclusion of the overview clearly reflected the group's annoyance:

“Unfortunately, MTI time and again shows its unprofessional side in spite of guidance by the province. There is a number of reasons, like a lack of experience in public transport, the small board of MTI, the many miscommunications within the company, and the non-attendance of meetings. There is a strong hierarchy at MTI, where the top decides what happens. The other parties in the development group unanimously find MTI unprofessional and there is explicit doubt whether MTI is capable of operating public transport services at all.”⁵¹

Setting 11. Private meeting (province, MTI)

Whereas MTI already argued with Arriva about driver sickness, it now also faced an annoyed Development Group. If MTI were to survive in the next tender, then it needed renewed support from at least the province.

A first step towards rehabilitation was a ‘clarifying conversation’ in which the deputy of the province reassured the board of MTI that the company should work on the action list.⁵² The province was authorized to commission public transport, on which MTI's existence depended. If MTI wanted to be involved in the next tender, then it now had to obey the province. The province in turn wanted the project to become a success. The action list, an initiative of provincial officials, already reduced the

variety of issues to one single issue: MTI's capability to operate a public transport system. In the conversation, the two actors made arrangements about this most urgent issue without interferences and irritations of the other actors. As a result, the action list returned on the agenda of subsequent meetings and MTI reported task by task about the state of affairs. In this refreshed atmosphere the Development Group did not raise new issues and the most controversial ones gradually disappeared from the agenda.⁵³

Setting 12. Office of evaluators

A second step towards rehabilitations of MTI and renewed support from the province was an evaluation of the project. Peculiarly, the evaluation did not hold MTI primarily accountable for the current conflicts and tensions. The province had commissioned the evaluation, but rather than evaluating MTI's performance the evaluation aimed at lessons for the province regarding forthcoming tenders.⁵⁴ The evaluators mentioned a lot of problems, miscommunications and ignorance, but they only drew conclusions about how the province should have prevented or solved these problems. For example, they ascribed the growing action list to a lack of steering by the province: "In the implementation phase the province insufficiently controls the execution of arrangements between Arriva and MTI [...] and MTI gets too much freedom in (not) living up with appointments" (p.28). It concluded that the project was indeed innovative and feasible and would have been better managed if the province had played a better part. This focus on policy lessons offered valuable input for the new tender invitation, but it also neutralized the annoyance and 'excused' MTI for its incapacity.

Setting 13. Provincial States (part 2)

The provincial Board of Deputies prepared the new tender invitation and Provincial States controlled the Board. Thus, because the Board wanted to continue with MTI it needed to convince Provincial States of the capability of MTI to operate a public transport system. The Board indeed believed that public transport in rural areas could benefit from experiments like these.⁵⁵ The fact that the company was suited by labour union CNV for not complying with the CLA was countered with the argument that politicians should not occupy the position of judges. Waiting for a verdict the Board considered

MTI innocent.⁵⁶ What is more, without much discussion it had prepared a tender invitation that clearly favoured MTI. The Board had invited three transport companies to compete for the contract, but the competitors did not have a fair chance. The program of requirements reinforced the existing situation (except user panel): the winner should drive the same lines with the same time schedules and kind of equipment as MTI had been doing for the last two years. The program even required the absence of regular bus stops (except for unsafe locations), which was another one of the specific features of the MTI concept.⁵⁷ Moreover, the contract would just last for one and half year, because Drenthe and its southern neighbour Overijssel had already agreed to invite tenders for an extension of the region around July 2005.⁵⁸ This short period was of little attraction to newcomers. While the requirements obviously favoured MTI, at the end of the selection procedure the company indeed appeared to have made the most economic tender and was selected on that ground.⁵⁹

Setting 14. Court

For the new invitation MTI again prepared a tender, though without need to hire drivers this time. Simultaneously it developed a CLA of its own, adjusted to the flexibility of its transport concept.⁶⁰ But while the company indeed succeeded to win the tender,⁶¹ its CLA would be disapproved in court. Labour union CNV had suited MTI in spite of the fear among a group of drivers that a verdict would cause MTI's bankruptcy (the group even threatened with legal procedures against the unions). CNV continued nevertheless: "If MTI ceases to exist, another company will come and need drivers".⁶² In court private interests, like the fear that a changeover from a taxi-CLA (or MTI's own CLA) to a public transport CLA would cause MTI's bankruptcy, did not count; neither did MTI's opinion that the 'entirely obsolete regulation and a very rigid CLA' frustrate necessary innovation in public transport.⁶³ The verdict was merely based on laws. The judge concluded that the CLA carried more weight than MTI's exceptional situation and obliged the company to comply with all conditions of the public transport CLA, meaning that it should give up developing an alternative CLA. The verdict included obligatory 21 minutes breaks each four and a half hour, an extra payment for weekend work, and days off instead of shorter workweeks.⁶⁴

Setting 15. A public debate

Although MTI won the tender competition, it lost the legal suit. Time schedules had to be revised in order to integrate the 21 minutes breaks. With regard to weekend work: MTI either had to increase rewards or skip weekend services. Because weekend services had always been the least beneficial ones it chose to do the latter. But due to that decision, state subsidies also decreased.⁶⁵ For these reasons, MTI had cut down expenses, fired 13 out of 70 employees, and blamed the labour unions for that.⁶⁶ By blaming labour unions, the director of MTI tried to trigger a public debate about the inadequacy of the current regulatory regime.

Media are often used for lobbies towards decision-making structures. Via the media MTI succeeded to put its case on the agenda of another setting: the meeting between the employers' association and labour unions. In this meeting CLA's are negotiated.⁶⁷ MTI did not participate itself, but because other transport companies faced similar problems in consequence of the Passenger Transport Act 2000 and the subsequent changes of the economic structure of the sector, employers and unions agreed to modernise the CLA: "Particularly issues like flexibility, customer-orientation, and cost-control should be translated to organization structure, working processes, and desired culture. This raises the question whether the current CLA still suit external developments."⁶⁸ By the end of 2003 the parties commissioned a working group to advise about this issue. MTI's case became part of the rethinking.

Meanwhile, the company itself went bankrupt due to circumstances in another project to which it had extended its activities: the province of Brabant cut down subsidies because the company did not meet its objectives in the town of Oss and MTI could not pay the rent of buses anymore.⁶⁹

A typology of displacements

The case description shows that decision-making about the project occurred in many different settings in a complex institutional landscape. Issues were not settled until they displaced between various settings. This section addresses the research questions formulated earlier. First, conclusions are drawn about how the characteristics of settings amount to the framing of issues. Next, based on these framing effects, different types of displacements are discerned together with the main conditions underlying

these displacements.

The role of settings in the reframing of issues

An issue can be defined in terms of conflicting antiprograms (Latour, 1991). These action- and antiprograms are supported by actors and empowered by political means like arrangements, contracts, rights, knowledge, alliances, public support, etc. The assumption that settings are actively present involves the proposition that actors have or do not have access to these settings, that (beneficial) attributes are or are not available to them, and that audiences do or do not influence the course of action. These conditions amount to a certain framing of issues. Tables 1 characterize all settings in terms of the theatre stage metaphor and illustrate how they frame and reframe the issues at stake in the project. In the case presentation, these settings are presented chronologically. In the table, settings are ordered according to three main issues that can be discerned in the case: the quality/cost ratio of the tender, labour conditions in MTI's plan, and service provision in practice (recall figure 2).

<<Table 1. Displacements, settings, and framing of issues>>

The case study shows a clear relation between the characteristics of settings and the framing of issues. For example, a strong attribute empowering Arriva in its negotiations with the authorities was its ongoing contract with Groningen-city. The audience of these negotiations consisted of the constituencies of the different negotiators, including Arriva's shareholders. Arriva, aware of its privileged position, had to get a profitable deal to satisfy its shareholders. This explains why the focus was mainly on costs and why one paragraph in the program of requirements could cause a paralysing deadlock.

Another example is Provincial States, where the issue displaced to, which framed the same issue in a completely different way. Relevant attributes in Provincial States were ideologically inspired arguments. Moreover, (part of) the audience expected provincial authorities to organize good public transport, especially for those who depend on public transport for their mobility. Due to these

circumstances, MTI's willingness to exploit the thin lines of the transport network became a strong and ultimately decisive argument in the redefinition of the mandate for negotiators.

A third example of the impact of the characteristics of a specific setting on the framing of issues is the Development Group, which was a typical solution oriented stakeholder meeting due to the absence of a general audience. The province defined the access conditions. The setting reflected the main interest of the province: it was arranged to facilitate the realisation of MTI's action program. This resulted in a constructive atmosphere, though one that did not tolerate conflicts and internal tensions. The provincial chair deliberately tried to exclude the threat of driver resistance and the issue of labour conditions.

Patterns of displacements

Based on different reframing effects, it is possible to discern five types of displacement: delegation, politicisation, depoliticisation, articulation, and authorisation. In addition, drawing on the characterization of settings the case study learns why these five types of displacements reframe issues as they do. Finally, it is possible to identify the most important conditions and drivers for these displacements.

The first type of displacement, *delegation*, can be defined as the attempt to realize an action program on the base of a broadly supported mandate. The realisation of ones action program often depends on cooperation with others. In order to align complementary action programs representatives are delegated to negotiate with representatives of other stakeholders. Displacement to settings for tender negotiations (see table 1: setting 1 and 3) are examples of delegation. Another example is the foundation of the Development Group to align the action programs of the province/MTI with action programs of the consumer organizations and municipalities involved (4). Typical for delegation is that participants in setting A become the audience in setting B and check whether the mandate is treated with care. The success of delegation relies in part on attributes that link action programs together. For example, the revised program of requirements was a crucial attribute leading to agreement between province, Arriva and MTI. With regard to the dynamics of displacement, the most important condition

for delegation is a mandate enabling representatives to engage in negotiations. This mandate protects participants from the scorn of the audience.

The second type of displacement, *politicisation*, is the discussion of the most controversial parts of an action program in its wider context. Due to politicisation new arguments and perspectives can enter the debate and surprising solutions become possible. The displacement to Provincial States to solve the conflict between Drenthe's negotiator and Arriva (2) offers a telling example, because this opened up the possibility to include MTI based on ideologically inspired arguments. Politicisation is most importantly driven by explicit consultation of the audience, which in this case the shortcomings of the mandate begged for.

The third type of displacement, *(partial) depoliticisation*, involves the bracketing and disappearance of antiprograms. Depoliticisation occurred when the province mediated in conflicts (6 and 11), in the evaluation for the sake of policy lessons (12) and in the user panel (9). Depoliticisation is characterized by access limited to one or two actors, by an independency of participants from audience (if there is an audience at all), and in one instance (12) by a decisive attribute that already contained the conditions for depoliticisation. Depoliticisation of 'bad management' was completed when the results of two partial depoliticisations doubly bracketed the issue in a setting where participants had never even been fully aware of the issue (13). Depoliticisation in the user panel (9) happened because only one participant controlled decisive attributes, while an audience and possibilities for displacement (politicisation) were lacking. Depoliticisation is a strategic move of dominant actors, who are able to define the characteristics of a setting.

The fourth type of displacement, *articulation*, is defined as the public demonstration against (part of) an action program. Examples of articulation are the judgment of Arriva's council of employees (5), driver strikes (7), accusations between the two transport companies (8), and MTI's protest against an 'obsolete CLA' (15). In each of these examples the CLA features prominently as an empowering attribute, either as a ground to contest a dominant action program or as an object of contestation itself. Articulation is thus an effect of the recognition and use of hitherto undervalued attributes. It is a strategic move of dominated actors, even in the case of Arriva's council of employees. Although

displacement to this setting was already arranged in the detachment contract, the joint use of two attributes (the veto right and the CLA) appeared to be a very effective counterstrategy.

The fifth type of displacement, *authorisation*, is the solution for a conflict on the base of acknowledged authority. This fifth type of displacement is introduced to capture the lawsuit between CNV and MTI. A clear-cut conflict was settled when the judge decided about the relevance and applicability of predefined attributes (established laws and contracts). The audience did not matter. Authorisation is a strategy to strengthen action programs with formal attributes; it is made possible by our legal system.

Conclusion

The rational planning model is flawed for those who seek to align public transport provision to the specific demand characteristics of a certain region and who are willing to experiment with new forms of public transport. Likewise, the model is flawed for those who endeavour an empirically adequate understanding of policy making in such circumstances. Outcomes of decision-making processes hardly ever reflect rational intentions only. Rather than being the results of a certain transport planning and optimisation logic, these outcomes reflect the interactions, power disparities and strategic manoeuvring along the way. Any understanding of decision-making processes, at least in controversial cases, should therefore start at the local level, and only from there on try to derive at more generally applicable explanations.

This study proposes an alternative approach that is much better able to accommodate the interactive, opportunistic and distributed nature of decision-making about transport issues. What is more, the results of this study go beyond demonstrating the usefulness of the approach. Based on the notions of issues, settings and displacements, the possibility of a new theory of decision-making about innovation and innovation policy is explored as this study demonstrates how opportunistic behaviour at the local level is patterned at the level of settings. Such patterns are understood in terms of displacements.

The case study shows that all displacements can be characterized with a typology of five distinguished ways of reframing. Delegation is the realisation of an action program on the base of a broadly

supported mandate. Articulation is the public demonstration against (part of) an action program. Politicisation is the discussion of controversial parts of an action program in its wider context. Authorisation is the solution for a conflict on the base of acknowledged authority. And (partial) depoliticisation is the bracketing and disappearance of antiprograms. These five patterns can rather consistently be explained by changes in the characteristics of settings in terms of access conditions, attributes and audience.

The typology can be used for evaluative purposes. Elsewhere I have compared three case studies and derived a set of hypotheses that explain why different types of displacements provoke each other and how the interaction between types of displacements affects democratic quality (Nahuis, 2007). But if such an evaluation is to have a genuine impact on democratisation policy, then it should also be able to look beyond the contingencies and opportunism in the politics of innovation. By tracing the patterns underlying these politics, a first attempt towards a more general theory of displacements is made.

Notes

¹ See Nahuis (2007) for the specific merits of this heuristic.

² *Provinciale regeling openbaar vervoer 2000*, Provincie Drenthe, Assen.

³ Schlingmann, Martine (2002) 'Contact met de reiziger essentieel voor plattelandsvervoer', *OV-Magazine* 8/7, p. 16-17.

⁴ Project proposal on <http://www.move-mobiliteit.nl/html/projecten/ketenpr-12.htm>. Viewed on 15 November 2004.

⁵ Note that settings are not always easily and unambiguously defined. Where, for example, took evaluation exactly place?

⁶ Statenstuk 732. Programma van eisen stads- en streekvervoer Groningen en Drenthe, Provincie Drenthe, 20 December 1999.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Statencommissie Ruimte, Infrastructuur en Mobiliteit (RIM), Provincie Drenthe, 21 December 2000.

⁹ Statencommissie RIM 16 October 2000. Provinciale Staten 7 November 2000. Statencommissie RIM 19 December 2000. Statencommissie RIM 21 December 2000. Statencommissie RIM 15 January 2001.

¹⁰ Statencommissie RIM 17 January 2000. Provinciale Staten 9 February 2000.

¹¹ Diepens & Okkema (2000) *Evaluatie MTI Hoogeveen*, Provincie Drenthe, Assen. The header in the press report from the Province of Drenthe reads: “Extension of experiment necessary,” http://www.drenthe.nl/actueel/pers/2001/van_tape/pb01-013.htm, viewed on 24 June 2005.

¹² *Concessiebeschikking openbaar vervoer Arriva*, Provincie Drenthe, Assen, 24 January 2001.

¹³ Minutes of Development Group Southwest Drenthe (DG), Province of Drenthe, Assen, 16 May 2001 and subsequent two-weekly meetings.

¹⁴ DG 3 October 2001.

¹⁵ DG 30 May 2001, 4 July 2001, 18 June 2001, 3 October 2001.

¹⁶ DG 4 July 2001, 14 November 2001.

¹⁷ The Netherlands has a national system of tariffs for bus transport. Prepaid tickets are stamped in the bus. The earnings from ticket sales are collected nationwide and distributed among transport companies according to the national WROOV system, proportionate to the number of passengers. In the current situation Arriva received the money and the sharing between Arriva and MTI should be arranged bilaterally. Source: DG, 5 September 2001.

¹⁸ DG 14 November 2001.

¹⁹ An Arriva spokesman mentioned such signs, but the consequences were not discussed. DG 19 September 2001, 3 October 2001.

²⁰ DG 19 September 2001.

²¹ Diepens & Okkema (2003) *Procesevaluatie experiment InterHoMe*, Provincie of Drenthe, Assen.

²² MTI hired the personnel formerly operating the lines served by Arriva: Hoogeveen and the regional lines. In the case of Meppel a transition was not needed, because Meppel did not have a city transport network of its own.

²³ Diepens & Okkema, op. cit., note 21.

²⁴ Minutes of a meeting about the negotiations Arriva/MTI, Provincie of Drenthe, Assen, 21 January 2002.

²⁵ Zwama, Jaap (2002) 'Interview: 'Het openbaar vervoer moet meer een supermarktmentaliteit krijgen'', *OV-Magazine* 8/7, p. 6-9.

²⁶ Op. cit., note 20.

²⁷ Dagblad van het Noorden 27 February 2003, 22 October 2003, 27 October 2003. DG 13 January 2003.

²⁸ *Arriva en MTI bereiken akkoord. Gezamenlijk persbericht van de provincie Drenthe, de gemeenten Hoogeveen, Meppel, Westerveld, De Wolden en vervoersbedrijf Arriva en vervoersbedrijf MTI*, Assen, 14 August 2002.

²⁹ Dagblad van het Noorden, 22 October 2003.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ DG 10 February 2003, Diepens & Okkema, Op. cit., note 21.

³² Diepens & Okkema, op. cit. note 21. DG, 15 August 2002.

³³ *ibid.*

³⁴ *ibid.*

³⁵ The province also considered the conflict a legal issue. In response to a councillor's questions by letter, the province's deputies rejected a political qualification of the conflict. "The province is not the prime controlling institute in matters of compliance with CLA conditions." Source: Letter 3/6.12/2004000306 to State member Beerda, Province of Drenthe, 20 January 2004.

³⁶ Letter from provincial official Rijpstra to the Development Group, 21 August 2003. Minutes of Consumer Platform, provincie Drenthe, Assen, 27 October 2003.

³⁷ Het Financieële Dagblad, 25 April 2001.

³⁸ *ibid.*

³⁹ DG 21 October 2002, 18 November 2002, Minutes of user panel (UP) 4 December 2002.

⁴⁰ Diepens & Okkema, op. cit., note 21.

⁴¹ UP 30 January 2001, 27 July 2001, 8 October 2001, 3 July 2002.

⁴² UP 27 June 2001.

⁴³ UP 17 September 2001, 6 November 2002, 4 December 2002, 6 March 2003.

⁴⁴ UP 27 October 2002.

⁴⁵ UP 6 March 2003.

⁴⁶ UP 8 January 2003, 5 February 2003.

⁴⁷ UP 4 December 2002.

⁴⁸ UP 17 September 2001, 5 November 2003.

⁴⁹ The overview was sent to members of the Development Group as an appendix to the minutes of the meeting of 13 January 2003.

⁵⁰ *ibid.*

⁵¹ *ibid.*

⁵² DG 10 February 2003. Diepens & Okkema, op. cit. note 21.

⁵³ E.g. DG 19 May 2003, 16 June 2003.

⁵⁴ Diepens & Okkema, op. cit., note 21.

⁵⁵ Statencommissie RIM 19 January 2004.

⁵⁶ Ibid. Provinciale Staten 17-3-2004.

⁵⁷ *Aanbestedingsdocument InterHoMe concessie Zuidwest Drenthe*, Provincie Drenthe, Assen, 16 October 2003. Statencommissie RIM 19 January 2004. Provinciale Staten 17 March 2004.

⁵⁸ *ibid.*

⁵⁹ Statencommissie RIM 19 January 2004. Provinciale Staten 17 March 2004.

⁶⁰ User panel (UP), MTI, Hoogeveen, 5 November 2003.

⁶¹ Dagblad van het Noorden, 15 January 2004.

⁶² Dagblad van het Noorden, 27 October 2003.

⁶³ Brabants Dagblad, 20 February 2004.

⁶⁴ Dagblad van het Noorden 6 February 2004.

⁶⁵ E-mail from Rover representative Wippoo to the other members of the Consumer Platform, 25 March 2004.

⁶⁶ Dagblad van het Noorden, 9 March 2004.

⁶⁷ MTI was not a member of the employer's association, had not signed the current CLA, and therefore thought that it could develop a company CLA. However, to prevent companies to compete on labour conditions, the minister has ordered general-applicability of the CLA, even for public transport companies that have not signed it. In other words, MTI should have become a member of the employer's association to have direct impact on the content of the CLA.


⁶⁸ <http://vakwijzer.adp.nl/nieuws/CLAs/2003/11/21-3/> viewed on 12 June 2006.

⁶⁹ Het Financieële Dagblad 29 April 2004. Dagblad van het Noorden, 5 May 2004.

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<< Figure 1. The conceptual framework>>



<<Figure 2. Displacements between fifteen settings>>



<<Table 1. Displacements, settings, and framing of issues>>

Issue 1: mismatches between the requirements to and the quality level of the service					
Displacement	Setting	Characteristics	Issue framing	Action program	Antiprogram
Mandate for deputy: negotiate good contract with Arriva	1. Negotiation structures: Arriva's tender	Access: Three authorities invited Arriva Attributes: Arriva had ongoing contract Audience: Constituencies (Arriva's shareholders wanted profits)	Negotiations reduced to bargaining about costs, because attributes empowered Arriva and Arriva's audience wanted profits	Authorities wanted to continue Arriva's contract against best costs Arriva refused innovation costs
Deadlock urged negotiating deputy to return mandate	2. Provincial States (1)	Access: Elected States members Attributes: Variety of (ideological) arguments, appreciation for MTI, first evaluation Audience: Electorate expects good public services	Exploitation of network of thin lines became <i>relevant</i> argument due to compatibility with prevailing kind of attributes and with expectations of audience; and became <i>strong</i> argument due to evaluation-attribute empowering MTI advocates in Provincial States	Deputy wanted to continue Arriva's contract against best costs Consider alternative providers + MTI experiment + MTI evaluation report + distinction between thick and thin lines ...
New mandate for deputy: negotiate inclusion of MTI	3. Negotiation structures: Arriva & MTI	Access: Authorities invited Arriva and MTI Attributes: Revised requirements Audience: Constituencies of participants	Same as in 1, but now with less emphasis on Arriva's interests. New attributes and alliance with MTI empowered province. Levelled positions urged for compromise.	... Redesigned tender + formal distinction between disclosing and connecting + compromised contract with Arriva + subcontract with MTI	-
Contracts signed. Supervision delegated to Development Group	4. Development Group (1)	Access: Province invited stakeholders Attributes: Distributed knowledge about demand Audience (constituencies at a considerable distance)	Strong focus on service characteristics. Due to lack of audience the interests of stakeholders determined the agenda; due to the composition of the group, a client perspective prevailed	MTI proposal + knowledge derived from existing services + user research Same + adjustments based on recommendations	... Recommendations about routes, connections, frequencies, travel information and equipment ... -

<<Table 1. Displacements, settings, and framing of issues>>

Displacement	Setting	Characteristics	Issue framing	Action program	Antiprogram
No displacements, issue translated within DG	10. Development Group (2)	Access: Idem, but MTI did not show up Attributes: Decreasing trust, action list, shared dissatisfaction Audience: (constituencies at a considerable distance)	MTI project appears as innovative though badly managed, because 'negative' attributes come to dominate the framing of the project	Making schedules + dealing with strikes + small staff Trust crisis + many other tasks waiting for execution + stakeholders annoyed + MTI-director excused at meetings ...
At top of trust crisis provincial officials invited MTI for a 'good conversation'	11. Private meeting: Province/MTI	Access: Provincial officials approach MTI Attributes: Province authorised to decide about next tender No audience, only results are reported to DG	Distrust is bracketed (via exclusion of audience) in order to discuss conditions for continuation constructively	... Arrangements about how to clean up the action list + renewed alliance	(Trust crisis)
Because the tender period ended the province commissioned an independent evaluation	12. Office of evaluators	Access: Independent bureau commissioned Attributes: Instructions, interviews, minutes Audience: Provincial States	Distrust is bracketed and MTI excused for bad management particularly due to one crucial attribute: instruction to focus on policy lessons	Policy lessons + excused MTI	(Trust crisis)
Tender period ended: new tender invitation	13. Provincial States (2)	Access: Elected State members Attributes: Outcomes of 11 and 12 Audience: Electorate not very interested	Attributes support perception of MTI project as interesting innovation (bad management is no issue)	MTI is invited to offer + biased program of requirements "MTI is not guilty until there is a verdict" + very economic offer MTI selected	... MTI is involved in legal suit Two other offers + companies not really interested ... -

<<Table 1. Displacements, settings, and framing of issues>>

Issue 2: The conflict about the Collective Labour Agreement (CLA)					
Displacement	Setting	Characteristics	Issue framing	Action program	Antiprogram
Provincial States delegated supervision to Development Group	4. Development Group (1)	Access: Province invited regional stakeholders Attributes: Distributed knowledge about demand Audience: (constituencies at a considerable distance)	Strong focus on service characteristics; driver resistance no issue	MTI proposal + knowledge derived from existing services + user research Same + adjustments based on recommendations	... Recommendations about routes, connections, frequencies, travel information and equipment ... -
Arriva's council of employees was to be consulted as part of the procedure because of detachment contract.	5. Meeting of Arriva's council of employees	Access: Elected employees, some member of labor union Attributes: Veto right, public transport CLA, support from unions Audience: Sceptical employees, Development Group is also interested	MTI project and time schedules reframed as breach of CLA. Disapproval reflects scepticism of main audience	(Adjusted) transport plan as agreed by the Development Group Council's disapproval + resistance among Arriva drivers + veto + support from labour unions + support from Arriva's board
The province tries to hush up the conflict as time proceeds.	6. Private meetings: province/ Arriva/ MTI	Access: Provincial officials approached directors of MTI and Arriva Attributes: Arguments about the costs of delay, reputations were put at stake No audience present, behind the scenes	By bracketing antiprograms of employees (via limitations to access and exclusion of audience) persuasion of Arriva's board sufficed to remove the CLA conflict from the centre of the stage	Proposal as agreed in Development Group + provincial toleration + Arriva's board gives up protest (Angry council of employees + angry labour unions + resistance among drivers)
Entrance of implementation phase, displacement to the office of schedule makers	7. MTI's office: strikes	Access: Drivers who question work of schedule makers Attributes: CLA, shared dissatisfaction, support from labor unions Audience: Boards of MTI and Arriva	CLA conflict could return at the centre of the stage, now as sickness generator, because attributes empowered drivers	Concrete driving schedules Revised schedules Driver dissatisfaction + strike Still dissatisfaction + another strike + epidemic sickness ...

<<Table 1. Displacements, settings, and framing of issues>>

Displacement	Setting	Characteristics	Issue framing	Action program	Antiprogram
Unpaid bills for sick drivers is problem for Arriva and MTI	8. Correspondence: MTI/ Arriva	Access: MTI and Arriva accuse each other Attributes: Sick drivers, detachment contract, formal letters Audience: Development Group, not very interested	Interpretation of driver sickness and ascription of costs again divided MTI and Arriva	... Sick drivers + "work refusal" + breach of detachment contract Sick drivers + "bad management" + unpaid bills + labour unions + CLA
Labour union CNV started a legal suit, because MTI would not apply public transport CLA to all employees	14. Court	Access: Labour union CNV suits MTI, judge Attributes: MTI's exceptional situation versus general applicability of CLA Audience: Other stakeholders (merely passive)	Court reduced the entire MTI project to one aspect: labour conditions. Attributes relating to other aspects were not relevant in this setting	Flexible application of CLA + "exceptional situation" MTI should fully comply with public transport CLA ...
MTI started a public debate about the adequacy of the current CLA	15. Public debate: newspapers	Access: depended on interesting cases Attributes: Controversial case, links with societal trends Audience: Everybody in principle, CLA negotiators in particular	Access conditions and attributes enabled MTI to frame the CLA as an innovation barrier instead of labour protection	... CLA + "rigidity and obsolesce" + MTI's innovative concept + verdict + collective dismissal	-

<<Table 1. Displacements, settings, and framing of issues>>

Issue 3: Tensions on the level of the practicalities of the service					
Displacement	Setting	Characteristics	Issue framing	Action program	Antiprogram
User panel was part of contract between MTI, Arriva and province	User panel	<p>Access: MTI management and recruited season-ticket holders</p> <p>Attributes: Information from MTI management, own experience. Financial responsibility and decision-making authority remained at MTI board</p> <p>No audience present. DG treated decisions as if they were MTI's</p>	<p>Due to the absence of an audience, the interests of the participants determined the framing of issues in terms of service characteristics.</p> <p>In conflicts MTI was clearly better empowered: it possessed the decisive attributes and the audience-at-a-distance was particularly watching MTI's performance</p>	<p>"Routes do not meet demand optimally" + demand estimations + own experience ...</p> <p>"Elderly have difficulty to enter buses" + examples + suggestions ...</p> <p>"Buses hardly visible in dark" + suggestions ...</p> <p>"Lack of information" + suggestions ...</p> <p>"Capacity shortage at 4pm" + Alescon transport + passengers refused ...</p> <p>Request to include Carstenstraat and cemetery + demand estimation based on own experience ...</p> <p>Elderly want to take walking aids on board ...</p> <p>30% tariff increase is too much ...</p>	<p>... Some routes diverted or combined</p> <p>... buses stop near sidewalk + grips installed</p> <p>... light bulbs installed</p> <p>... public buildings provided with schedules</p> <p>... "Cannot afford extra bus and driver"</p> <p>... "There is not enough demand"</p> <p>... MTI advises elderly to avoid peak hours</p> <p>... "It cannot be changed anymore"</p>