Mediation in Situations of Conflict

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Abstract

We study the effectiveness of mediators in situations of conflict. In a game of cheap talk a principal may employ a mediator whose task is to gather information and make non–binding proposals. We show that mediators facilitate information transmission and are helpful if and only if the likelihood of a conflict of interest is strictly positive but not too high. Mediation increases the amount of information that can be induced in equilibrium and is helpful when full information revelation is not feasible. The insights of this paper extend to general models of mechanism design with imperfect commitment of the contract designer.

Keywords: mediation, mechanism design, communication equilibrium, imperfect commitment *JEL Classification No.: D82, C72*

1 Introduction

Mediators play a vital role in many situations of conflict. They are indispensable for set-
tling conflicts between sovereign nations and resolving labor disputes between employers
and employees. Also in every day life mediators play an important, albeit less formal role
by defusing many quarrels between family members, friends, and colleagues. Overall, the
popularity of mediation is increasing and spreading. American businesses, for example,
started to use mediation as late as 1980 to resolve legal disputes (R. Smith 1995) and
resulted in a new type of services by so-called centers for Alternative Dispute Resolution
(ADR) that act as formal mediators. The increased interest in mediation is also reflected
in modern education. Nowadays its students range from sixth graders in elementary
school to undergraduates at Harvard Law School. Mediation has thereby become part of
the standard curriculum.

Yet, even though mediation is common place, there does not exist an economic under-
standing of why and under which circumstances it is helpful.[1] This is the more surprising,
since an extensive theory of mediation itself is available (e.g. Myerson 1985, 1986 and
Forges 1986). Although this theory provides specific examples which indicate that medi-
ation may indeed be helpful, it does not offer any robust results or intuition.

This paper tries to address the gap between theory and practice and thereby arrive at
a better understanding of mediation in practice. More specifically, we contrast mediation
to non–mediation in a model of cheap talk in which the uninformed party, the principal,
has all bargaining power. We derive necessary and sufficient conditions under which
mediation is strictly helpful to the principal. Moreover, we provide a straightforward and
general intuition for this result.

We show that mediation is only helpful if the incentives between the conflicting par-
ties are partially aligned such that it is unsure whether a genuine conflict of interests
exists. We obtain three cases. First, if the ex ante probability of conflict is relatively
small, mediators are helpful in increasing the amount of information that is revealed in
equilibrium. In this case the mediator becomes more valuable as the ex ante probability
of conflict rises. Second, when the probability of conflict lies in an intermediate range,
the principal without a mediator would be unable to induce her agent to reveal any infor-
mation. Yet, with the help of a mediator information revelation is possible and desirable
to the principal. Last, if the likelihood of a conflict is large, then even a mediator is
unable to induce information revelation in equilibrium. Hence, the value of mediation in
this range is zero. We show that the value of mediation changes continuously over the

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[1]Matthews and Postlewaite (1989) obtain the negative result that in a two-person sealed-bid double
auction mediation is never helpful.

three different regions, first increasing and then decreasing.

The intuition behind our result is straightforward and extends to general situations of conflict with one–sided asymmetric information in which the contractual ability of the uninformed party is limited (e.g. Dewatripont 1986; Hart and Tirole 1988 and Laffont and Tirole 1988;1990; Bester and Strausz 1999). The non–standard feature of these contracting settings is that from an ex ante point of view an uninformed principal may not want to obtain all information from her agent. Rather, the principal may be better off if she obtains only a *partial* revelation of information. Clearly, such a partial revelation requires that the agent's message does not uniquely identify his information. Hence, the agent must use the available messages in some stochastic way. Therefore, in a setting without commitment the extent to which a principal can induce a stochastic mixture of messages becomes important. In this respect a mediator is helpful: Without a mediator an agent must perform the randomization himself and must therefore be indifferent between the allocations that his messages induce. This is not required when a mediator is present, as one of his tasks is to perform the randomization on part of the agent. With a mediator a specific type of agent must only prefer the *mixture over allocations* that is designed for him, but need not be *indifferent between the allocations* over which the randomization occurs.[2]

Given that mediators may alleviate contracting, this paper has an interesting implication for the general theory of contracting with limited commitment of the contract designer. Our result implies that in general contracting parties benefit from using a third party as a mediator. An important question is therefore whether mediators should be included in the analysis of optimal contracts. The existing literature (e.g. Laffont and Tirole 1988,1990, Dewatripont 1986, Hart and Tirole 1988) excludes mediators from their analysis. Yet, since contract theory intends to study how economic agents use contracts optimally, a consideration of mediators seems natural: If contracting parties gain by using mediators, there does not seem a reason why they will not do so.[3] This line of reasoning leads to a further observation. If mediation is generally helpful to contracting parties, then one may expect the existence of economic institutions that play this role. For some institutions, such as the aforementioned centers of ADR, this role is explicit. Yet, for others it may be hidden. For instance, in Mitusch and Strausz (1999) we explain consultants as playing the role of mediators in a situation of conflict within the firm. Apart from consultants, one may use a similar argument to motivate the existence of, for

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[2]Myerson (1985) and Forges (1986) already identified the function of the mediator as a garbling device, but do not explain why and under which circumstances this function may be helpful.

[3]The question is also relevant if one is only interested in the set of implementable allocations, as for instance in Crawford and Sobel (1982).

example, lawyers as mediating between a privately informed defendant and the court and a regulatory agency as mediating between a privately informed firm and a government susceptible to the ratchet effect.

Since this paper combines and contrasts two strands of literature, the contracting literature with ex ante hidden information and limited commitment (e.g. Laffont and Tirole 1988, 1991 and Hart and Tirole 1988) and the literature on communication (e.g. Myerson 1985, 1986 and Forges 1986), it is worthwhile to review the similarities and differences between the two bodies of literature. Both study an implementation problem in which the ex ante contracting possibilities are limited. In this sense the literature on communication is more rigorous and excludes any form of commitment before communication takes place. In contrast, the literature on contracting with limited commitment usually allows still some limited form of contractual commitment.[4] A further, more pragmatic difference is that the literature on communication takes a rather abstract and general approach providing little applications,[5] while the literature on contracting with limited commitment is much more application driven.

The reason for these differences may be found in the different objectives and origins of the theories. The literature on communication was developed to provide a general and uniform framework to analyze the power of communication in games with multiple players and multi–sided asymmetric information. Its generality was extended to repeated games (Forges 1988) and multi–stage games with repeated acquisition of private information (Myerson 1988). On the other hand, the literature on contracting with limited commitment was developed for a much more practical reason. It grew out of the concern that for many real–life applications the standard theory of contracting made too stark assumptions concerning the contract designer's commitment. For instance, Dewatripont (1986) noted that many ex ante optimal contracts tend to exhibit ex post inefficiencies and argued that, in reality, contracting parties will renegotiate these inefficiencies away. Another concern of this literature has been the observation that contracting parties in reality are unable to commit over longer periods of time. This inability implies that parties can only commit to short term contracts. An example of this kind is the infamous ratchet effect (e.g. Laffont and Tirole 1988).

Although the two strands of literature developed quite independently, this paper shows and emphasizes that they are closely related. From a theoretical point of view they only differ in the solution concept applied. Interpreting this difference as the presence of a mediator yields our insights into the beneficial character of mediation in every day life.

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[4]An exception is Green and Laffont (1987) who analyze an implementation problem without any ex ante commitment and introduce the concept of ex post implementability.

[5]A notable exception is Forges (1990).

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we present the model and derive some basic properties. We then analyze the problem as a standard mechanism design problem to identify settings in which mediation will not be helpful. Moreover, we show that the solution may depend crucially on the mechanism designer's ability to commit. In Section 4 we analyze the cheap talk version of the model. In Section 5 we introduce the mediator and derive necessary and sufficient conditions under which mediation is beneficial to the principal. In Section 6 we address the optimal use of mediation and discuss its value to the principal. Finally, Section 7 discusses results and points to extensions. All proofs are relegated to the appendix.

2 Model and Preliminaries

Consider two players, a principal and an agent. The principal must implement an option $y \in \mathbb{R}$, which affects both players. The effect of the implemented option y depends on the state of the world on which the agent is privately informed. For simplicity, we assume that the agent's information may only take on two values. With probability $1 - \pi$ he possesses the information 1 and with probability $\pi \in (0,1)$ his private information is 2.

We suppose that both players have each some preferred option $y \in \mathbb{R}$ and the farther the implemented option is from this preferred option the more they dislike it and increasingly so. We capture this idea by assuming that the players have Von–Neumann Morgenstern utility functions which are strictly concave and attain a maximum on $\mathbb{R}$.[6] The utility functions depend on the private information of the agent. We write the principal's utility function as $V_i(y)$ when the agent has the private information $i = 1, 2$. Similarly, we denote agent i's utility function as $U_i(y)$. For technical reasons we assume that the utility functions are well defined over $\mathbb{R}$ and three times continuously differentiable.

Moreover, we adopt a *monotonicity condition* concerning the agent's utility functions:

$$U_1'(y) < U_2'(y) \quad \text{for all } y \in \mathbb{R}.$$

The condition is similar to a standard sorting condition in screening models and will fulfill a similar role. First of all, it implies that the preferred options of the agents

$$y_i^a \equiv \arg\max_y U_i(y)$$

exhibit the ordering $y_1^a < y_2^a$. It implies further that if one agent is indifferent between two distinct allocations y_1 and y_2, the other agent must have a strict preference. More generally:

[6]The model is similar to Crawford and Sobel (1982) with two types.

Figure 1: An example

Lemma 1 *Let $y_1 < y_2$.*

$$\text{If } U_1(y_1) \; \leq \; U_1(y_2) \quad then \quad U_2(y_1) \; < \; U_2(y_2).$$
$$\text{If } U_2(y_1) \; \geq \; U_2(y_2) \quad then \quad U_1(y_1) \; > \; U_1(y_2).$$

We denote similarly the principal's preferred options by

$$y_i^p \equiv \arg\max_y V_i(y).$$

We make no explicit assumptions about the relation between $V_1(y)$ and $V_2(y)$, and hence between y_1^p and y_2^p, except that $y_1^p \neq y_2^p$ so that information about i is of interest for the principal. Figure 1 illustrates the utility functions U_i and V_i for the ordering $y_1^p < y_1^a < y_2^a < y_2^p$.

This paper studies games of cheap talk. In such games the principal is unable to commit to some implementation function ex ante.[7] This distinguishes the current model from standard principal agent models with adverse selection.[8] As a consequence the implemented option will in the end only depend on the beliefs of the principal concerning the agent's private information. Since there exist only two possible types of private information, these beliefs are fully described by some $p \in [0, 1]$, representing the probability that the agent is of type 2. Given a belief p, the principal implements

$$y(p) \equiv \arg\max_y \; (1 - p)V_1(y) + pV_2(y).$$

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[7] I.e., the principal is also unable to commit to any form of conditional payments.

[8] We have nevertheless chosen the connotation principal and agent rather than receiver and sender, since we follow the standard approach of principal agent theory and allow the principal to select among different equilibria. Moreover, we give the principal all bargaining power in connection with the mediator.

The following lemma gives already some indication about the possible outcome and will be helpful in the subsequent analysis.

Lemma 2 *For any belief $p \in [0,1]$ principal will choose the option $y(p)$, which lies in between y_1^p and y_2^p, i.e.*

$$\min\{y_1^p, y_2^p\} \leq y(p) \leq \max\{y_1^p, y_2^p\}.$$

Moreover, if $y_1^p < y_2^p$, then $y(p)$ is monotonically increasing. The function $y(p)$ is monotonically decreasing if $y_1^p > y_2^p$.

3   Contractual Commitment

Before analyzing the cheap talk version of the model, it is helpful to analyze the model as a standard mechanism design problem and assume that the principal can commit contractually to a mechanism before she asks her agent for information. In this version of our model the classical revelation principle applies and the optimal mechanism may be found in the set of direct mechanisms that induce the agent to reveal his information truthfully. Consequently, an optimal mechanism is the solution to the problem,

$$\max_{y_1, y_2} \quad (1-\pi)V_1(y_1) + \pi V_2(y_2)$$
$$\text{s.t.} \qquad U_1(y_1) \geq U_1(y_2) \tag{1}$$
$$U_2(y_2) \geq U_2(y_1), \tag{2}$$

where inequalities (1) and (2) represent the two incentive compatibility constraints. There are no individual rationality constraints, as we assume that the principal must choose some option and no outside option exists. Alternatively, one may assume that the outside options are so low that they will not be binding, i.e. agent i's outside option is smaller than $\min\{U_i(y_1^p), U_i(y_2^p)\}$.

Naturally, the solution depends on the severeness of the conflict of interest between principal and agent. The following proposition identifies two extremes:

Proposition 1 *1. If $y_1^p > y_2^p$, the pooling mechanism $y_1 = y_2 = y(\pi)$ is optimal.*

2. If $y_1^p < y_2^p$, $U_1(y_1^p) \geq U_1(y_2^p)$, and $U_2(y_2^p) \geq U_2(y_1^p)$, the optimal contract is the principal's first best $(y_1, y_2) = (y_1^p, y_2^p)$.

The intuition behind Proposition 1 is straightforward. In the first case, the incentive problem between principal and agent is extremely severe. The two incentive compatibility

conditions (1) and (2) imply $y_1 \leq y_2$. Yet, if $y_1^p > y_2^p$, the principal prefers to set y_1 greater than y_2. The interests of the principal and agent are diametrically opposed and the principal is unable to benefit from a separation of types. Taking the idea of a direct mechanism literally, this result implies that it is optimal for the principal to commit not to use the information which the agent's message represents. That is, if $y_1^p > y_2^p$, the principal is unable to induce information revelation in a beneficial way.

On the other hand, when preferences fulfill the conditions of Proposition 1.2 we obtain the other extreme. Here the principal can extract the agent's information costlessly and implement her first best, $y_1 = y_1^p$ and $y_2 = y_2^p$. In this setting the incentive problem is trivial and there does not exist a genuine conflict of interest between agent and principal.

Proposition 1 has two important consequences concerning our analysis of beneficial mediation. First, it shows that if $y_1^p > y_2^p$ then even with contractual commitment a principal cannot do better than offering a single, pooling contract $y = y(\pi)$. Obviously, this must also hold if the principal is unable to commit to her option y, as with full commitment she can imitate any behavior under non-commitment. Therefore, if $y_1^p > y_2^p$, the principal cannot benefit from employing a mediator. Second, if $y_1^p < y_2^p$, $U_1(y_1^p) \geq U_1(y_2^p)$, and $U_2(y_2^p) \geq U_2(y_1^p)$, the principal has no ex post incentive to deviate from the contractual implementation, y_1^p resp. y_2^p, since it is her first best. Consequently, also without commitment to y the principal will be able to implement it. Naturally, the principal cannot do better than achieving her first best, and a mediator will not be helpful. The two arguments lead to the conclusion that the only remaining constellation in which the mediator may be helpful is when $y_1^p < y_2^p$ and when $U_1(y_1^p) < U_1(y_2^p)$ or $U_2(y_2^p) < U_2(y_2^p)$ holds. Hence, in the remainder of this paper we will focus on this parameter constellation.[9]

Effectively, a type i for which $U_i(y_i^p) < U_i(y_j^p)$ $(j \neq i)$ prevents the principal from achieving her first best. This observation motivates the following definition. We say that the interests of type i are *incompatible* with those of the principal if and only if $U_i(y_i^p) < U_i(y_j^p)$ $(j \neq i)$. We will refer to such a type as *incompatible*.

Lemma 3 *If $y_1^p < y_2^p$, there exists at most one incompatible type.*

Since Proposition 1 indicates that the question of beneficial mediation is uninteresting if neither type is incompatible, we assume in the following that there exists an incompatible type. Given $y_1^p < y_2^p$, Lemma 3 shows that due to the monotonicty condition,

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[9]Caveat: Since we disregarded stochastic direct mechanisms, the previous argument is not completely exhaustive in that, in the case $y_1^p > y_2^p$, the principal could possibly attain more by using stochastic mechanisms. For completeness sake, we will therefore return to the case $y_1^p > y_2^p$ and show that with a mediator a pooling contract is indeed generally optimal.

there is at most one incompatible agent. We assume that this is type 2. This assumption is without loss of generality, because if the incompatible type is type 1, then we may "mirror" our problem by redefining the options as $y' = -y$ and exchange the roles of type 1 and 2.

Assumption 1 *The agent of type 2 is incompatible and $y_1^p < y_2^p$.*

Under Assumption 1 the parameter π measures the probability of conflict between the agent and the principal. In order to arrive at a more intuitive classification of the ex ante probability of conflict, we introduce two threshold levels $\pi_1 \geq 0$ and $\pi_2 \geq 0$. Let $\pi_i \geq 0$ be such that

$$\pi_i \equiv \arg \max_{p \in [0,1]} \{p | U_i(y(p)) = U_i(y_1^p)\}.$$

Note that $\pi_1 \leq \pi_2 < 1$, and that $\pi_i > 0$ if and only if $y_i^a > y_1^p$. Figure 1 illustrates the two thresholds for the case $\pi_1 > 0$.

Given π_1 and π_2, we use the following classification of the ex ante probability of conflict. We say that the ex ante probability of conflict is *small* if $\pi < \pi_1$ and that the ex ante probability of conflict is *large* if $\pi > \pi_2$. Note that if $y_1^a \leq y_1^p$ then there does not exist a small ex ante probability of conflict, because in this case $\pi_1 = 0$. Likewise, if $y_2^a \leq y_1^p$ then $\pi_2 = 0$ and any π represents a large probability of conflict.

Proposition 2 *Suppose Assumption 1 holds, then the optimal separation contract exhibits $y_1 < y_1^p$ and $y_2 < y_2^p$, and leaves agent 2's incentive constraint binding.*

If type 2 is incompatible, the principal's first best is not attainable, since it violates type 2's incentive constraint. Yet, for $y_1^p < y_2^p$ the requirements of the incentive constraints, that $y_1 \leq y_2$, are nevertheless aligned with the principal's preferences. In contrast to the case $y_1^p > y_2^p$, the principal may therefore prefer a separation contract to a pooling one. The optimal separation contract requires that y_1 and y_2 are smaller than y_1^p and y_2^p respectively. The choice of $y_2 < y_2^p$ is intuitive: Starting from the first best (y_1^p, y_2^p) —which violates type 2's incentive compatibility constraint (2)— lowering y_2 relaxes the constraint. At first sight it may be surprising that it is optimal to set y_1 below y_1^p, since a y_1 lower than y_1^p reduces the principal's utility from a truthful revelation of type 1. Yet, starting from the principal's first best this loss is only of the second order, since y_1^p is the optimal restructuring choice under type 1, i.e. $V_1'(y_1^p) = 0$. In contrast, a y_1 lower than y_1^p relaxes type 2's incentive constraint, which represents a first order gain.

Concerning our question of beneficial mediation, Proposition 2 reveals two important features of the optimal separation mechanism. First, the options prescribed by the optimal revelation contract are suboptimal ex post. Since the agent reveals himself perfectly

by his choice of contract, the principal will have an ex post incentive to implement the options y_1^p and y_2^p rather than the options prescribed by the mechanism. The credibility of the principal's commitment is therefore crucial. In the cheap talk version of our implementation game there is no such commitment and the ex ante incentives to report truthfully are destroyed.

Second, the optimal information revealing mechanism commits the principal to an option $y_1 < y_1^p$. Yet, Lemma 2 established that there does not exist a belief for the principal that would lead to such a choice. Therefore, when the principal has no possibility to commit herself, she would never take this option. In the cheap talk version of the model the principal can therefore not achieve the outcome of the optimal separation mechanism. As this result is independent of whether the principal uses a mediator, it shows that we cannot expect the mediator to mitigate completely the limitations due to a lack of commitment of the principal.

4   Cheap Talk without a Mediator

In the following we assume that the principal is unable to commit to a mechanism. This transforms the implementation problem into a game of cheap talk in which the principal cannot propose a menu from which the agent may pick his preferred option. Nevertheless, the principal may want to communicate with her agent in the hope that this leads to some revelation of information.

In this section we assume that there is no mediator, so that communication must take place directly between principal and agent. The direct communication game is as follows:

1. The principal sets some message space M for the agent.

2. The agent announces a message $m \in M$.

3. The principal updates her beliefs.

4. The principal chooses an option y.

We apply the solution concept of Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) to this game. Such an equilibrium specifies a message space M, an announcement strategy α_i for the agent, a belief $p = (p_1, \ldots, p_{|M|})$ of the principal, and an implementation strategy $y = (y_1, \ldots, y_{|M|})$. That is, if the agent sends the message $m \in M$, the principal's belief that the agent is of type 2 is p_m and induces her to implement restructuring option y_m. Since we are interested in the question whether the principal can do strictly better with

a mediator than without, we will concentrate on the PBE that yields the principal the highest utility.[10]

Due to a generalized revelation principle proven in Bester and Strausz (1998), we may without loss of generality assume that the message space corresponds to the set of types, i.e. $M = I = \{1, 2\}$. This implies that the agent effectively announces some type i. Consequently, we may represent a strategy of agent i by some $\alpha_i \in [0, 1]$ which denotes the probability that the agent announces that he is of type 1. Moreover, there is no loss of generality in assuming that $\alpha_1 > 0$, $\alpha_2 < 1$, and $\alpha_1 \geq \alpha_2$.[11]

Thus we will look for a PBE with $M = \{1, 2\}$. The combination $(\alpha_1, \alpha_2, p_1, p_2, y_1, y_2)$ constitutes a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium if it satisfies the following three conditions:

1. The agent's announcement strategy is optimal given the principal's implementation strategy, i.e.

$$\alpha_i U_i(y_1) + (1 - \alpha_i)U_i(y_2) = \max_\alpha \ \alpha U_i(y_1) + (1 - \alpha)U_i(y_2). \tag{3}$$

2. The principal's belief is Bayes' consistent with the agent's strategy, whenever possible. This implies that

$$p_1 = p(\alpha_1, \alpha_2) \quad \text{and} \quad p_2 = p(1 - \alpha_1, 1 - \alpha_2),$$

with

$$p(x, y) \equiv \frac{y\pi}{x(1 - \pi) + y\pi}. \tag{4}$$

Note that since $\alpha_1 \in (0, 1]$ and $\alpha_2 \in [0, 1)$ both $p(\alpha_1, \alpha_2)$ and $p(1 - \alpha_1, 1 - \alpha_2)$ are well–defined.

3. The principal's implementation strategy is optimal given her belief p, i.e.

$$y_i = y(p_i).$$

In equilibrium, the agent's strategy combination (α_1, α_2) yields the principal the utility

$$V(\alpha_1, \alpha_2) = (1 - \pi)[\alpha_1 V_1(y(p(\alpha_1, \alpha_2))) + (1 - \alpha_1)V_1(y(p(1 - \alpha_1, 1 - \alpha_2)))]$$
$$+ \pi[\alpha_2 V_2(y(p(\alpha_1, \alpha_2))) + (1 - \alpha_2)V_2(y(p(1 - \alpha_1, 1 - \alpha_2)))].$$

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[10]It is well known that in cheap talk games there always exists an uninformative "babbling" equilibrium yielding no information revelation.

[11]This implies that the agent tells the truth with a strict positive probability, but, in contrast to the standard revelation principle, it may be optimal for the principal to let some type lie with a positive probability. For more details see Bester and Strausz (1998).

The principal's utility is increasing in α_1 and decreasing in α_2.[12] This reflects the intuitive fact that more information is better for the principal. Since the principal's utility depends on the degree of information the agent reveals, it will be helpful to distinguish between the following five types of equilibria:

1. A *full revelation* equilibrium in which the agent's type is perfectly revealed: $\alpha_1 = 1$, $\alpha_2 = 0$.

2. A *non–revelation* equilibrium in which the agent's announcement does not reveal anything: $\alpha_1 = \alpha_2$.

3. A *partial revelation* equilibrium in which the announcement of each agent reveals some, but not all information: $\alpha_1 < 1$, $\alpha_2 > 0$, and $\alpha_1 \neq \alpha_2$.

4. A *type 1 partially full revelation* equilibrium that leads to a full revelation of agent 1 with positive probability, but not of agent 2: $\alpha_1 < 1$ and $\alpha_2 = 0$.

5. A *type 2 partially full revelation* equilibrium that leads to a full revelation of agent 2 with positive probability, but not of agent 1: $\alpha_1 = 1$ and $\alpha_2 > 0$.

Under Assumption 1 a full revelation equilibrium does not exist. In such an equilibrium the principal chooses y_1^p and y_2^p, which leads agent 2 to pool with agent 1 rather than revealing himself truthfully. As is familiar from the literature on cheap talk, a non–revelation equilibrium always exists, but yields the principal less than any other type of equilibrium. Any of the remaining types of equilibria involves at least one message that reveals the agents only partially, which requires that both agents use this message with positive probability. The agent who uses also the other message is actively mixing over the two messages and must therefore be indifferent between the allocations which they induce. Due to the monotonicity assumption the two agents cannot be indifferent between two different allocations at the same time. Hence, a partial revelation equilibrium will not exist.

Now consider the two partially full revelation equilibria. A type i partially full revelation equilibrium implies $y_i = y_i^p$ and requires, first, that agent i is indifferent between y_i^p and the other option $y_j \neq y_i^p$ $(j \neq i)$ while, second, agent j always prefers y_j so that he reveals himself truthfully. First consider the type 2 partially full revelation equilibrium. It implies $y_1^p < y_1 < y_2 = y_2^p$ and requires that agent 2 is indifferent between y_1 and y_2^p. However, under Assumption 1 agent 2 is incompatible, which implies that in the range

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[12]The envelope theorem yields $dV/d\alpha_1 = (1 - \pi)(V_1(y_1) - V_1(y_2)) \geq 0$ and $dV/d\alpha_2 = -\pi(V_2(y_2) - V_2(y_1)) \leq 0$. The sign follows due to $\alpha_1 \geq \alpha_2$, which implies $y_1 = y(p(\alpha_1, \alpha_2)) \leq y_2 = y(p(1 - \alpha_1, 1 - \alpha_2))$ in equilibrium.

$[y_1^p, y_2^p]$ the outcome y_2^p is his worst possible outcome. Therefore, he will strictly prefer any $y_1 \in [y_1^p, y_2^p)$ and an equilibrium of type 5 does not exist.

Hence, under Assumption 1 the only remaining candidate besides the non–revelation equilibrium is an equilibrium of type 4 which leads to a full revelation of type 1 with positive probability. This equilibrium implies $y_1 = y_1^p < y_2 < y_2^p$ and requires that agent 1 is indifferent between the allocation y_1^p and a different allocation y_2. This is only possible if $y_1^a > y_1^p$. Hence, if $\pi_1 = 0$ only the non–revelation equilibrium exists. On the other hand, if $\pi_1 > 0$, the concavity of the agent's utility function implies that there exists exactly one restructuring option $y_2 > y_1^p$ for which this indifference obtains. Namely, $y(\pi_1)$, as illustrated in Figure 1. The equilibrium therefore exists if there exists a mixing behavior of agent 1 which leads to the belief π_1 upon observing the message 2. Bayes' consistent updating implies that this is the case if and only if $\pi < \pi_1$. We therefore arrive at the following proposition.

Proposition 3 *Suppose Assumption 1 holds, then the optimal Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium with direct communication exhibits the following structure:*

1. *If the ex ante probability of conflict is small, i.e. $\pi < \pi_1$, the optimal PBE is $(y_1, y_2) = (y_1^p, y(\pi_1))$ and agent 1 is perfectly revealed with probability $(\pi_1 - \pi)/((1 - \pi)\pi_1) > 0$.*

2. *If the ex ante probability of conflict is not small, i.e. $\pi \geq \pi_1$, the optimal PBE is $(y_1, y_2) = (y(\pi), y(\pi))$ and no information is revealed in equilibrium.*

A direct comparison between Proposition 2 and Proposition 3 reveals that non–commitment not only makes it more difficult for the principal to induce information revelation, it may actually make it impossible. Only if the ex ante probability of a conflict of interest is small, is the principal able to extract information from the agent. But also in the informative equilibrium there remain three sources of inefficiencies as compared to the commitment case. First, the allocation y_1 is suboptimally high, as without commitment it is not possible for the principal to implement an option $y < y_1^p$. Second, there is a "stochastic misallocation", since agent 1 misrepresents his type with positive probability. Third, the allocation y_2 is suboptimally low as compared to the solution under full commitment. The latter two inefficiencies have the same origin: In order to induce agent 1 to mix, the principal must make him indifferent between the two equilibrium outcomes. Stochastic misallocation is therefore a necessary feature for information revelation under non–commitment and, in contrast to the full–commitment case, agent 1 rather than agent 2 is made indifferent in equilibrium.

An interesting interpretation of the solution is what may be called an "underrevelation principle": In equilibrium information revelation is only possible if the compatible

Figure 2: A communication rule

type, who has no problem to reveal himself when the principal offers her two preferable options, underreveals himself. The imperfect revelation of type 1 provides cover for the incompatible type 2, making information revelation possible. In fact, inducing type 1 to provide such cover for agent 2 is the principal's main problem. She has to choose her option y_2 in such a way, that type 1 is indeed willing not to reveal himself completely. Since her choice y_2 has to be Bayesian incentive compatible, it limits the amount of information that can be revealed in equilibrium and restricts the set of parameter constellations for which the principal can induce information revelation.

5　Cheap Talk with a Mediator

In this section we allow the principal to employ a third party, the mediator, who may help with the communication between principal and agent.[13] The mediator's role is to communicate first with the agent and then with the principal. Since the principal employs the mediator, we assume that she designs the exact rules of communication. A general communication rule prescribes the following. First, it specifies a message space M_1 from which the agent has to send a message to the mediator. Second, it specifies a message space M_2 from which the mediator sends a message to the principal. Third, it specifies the probability with which the mediator sends a message $m_2 \in M_2$ when the agent sent the message $m_1 \in M_1$. A communication structure P may therefore be written as a tuple (M_1, M_2, α) where α maps M_1 into a probability distribution over M_2. Figure 2 illustrates a communication rule with two messages for the agent and two for the principal.

The game between the principal and the agent when a mediator is available runs as follows:

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[13]In contrast to standard models of third–party delegation, the principal in our framework does not delegate the final implementation decision. It should be clear that this makes the role of the third party much weaker. In line with standard literature on delegation, we assume that there exist no possibilities of collusion.

1. The principal announces publicly the mediator's communication rule $P = (M_1, M_2, \alpha)$.

2. The agent sends a message $m_1 \in M_1$ to the mediator. The message is communicated in private such that the principal does not observe it.

3. The mediator sends the message $m_2 \in M_2$ according to the probability distribution $\alpha(m_1)$ to the principal.

4. The principal updates her beliefs and decides which project to implement.

Note that the principal's choice of a communication rule P at stage 1 induces a proper subgame as of stage 2. A Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of this subgame describes for each type of agent an announcement strategy, which may be represented by a probability distribution over the set M_1, and an implementation strategy for the principal that describes which option $y \in \mathbb{R}$ the principal chooses given the mediator's message. In principle also the principal's strategy may involve randomization. Last, a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium describes a belief function p for the principal, which represents the belief of the principal given that the mediator sent a message $m_2 \in M_2$. Similarly to the previous section, a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium has to satisfy three requirements: 1) the agent's announcement strategy is optimal given the principal's implementation strategy; 2) the principal's belief is Bayes' consistent with the agent's strategy, whenever possible; and 3) the principal's implementation strategy is optimal with respect to her beliefs.

Importantly, the mediator's description coincides with his role in the literature on communication. The following lemma expresses an important result of this literature.

Lemma 4 *Without loss of generality the principal may restrict attention to communication rules for which the message of the agent is his type and the message to the principal is a recommendation about the option y. Moreover, the principal may restrict attention to communication rules that are (Bayesian) incentive compatible, i.e., induce the principal to follow the mediator's recommendation and induce the agent to report his type truthfully.*

Lemma 4 is a generalized version of the classical revelation principle.[14] It shows that one may assume without loss of generality that the optimal communication rule uses a message space $M_1 = \{1, 2\}$ for the agent and the message space $M_2 = \mathbb{R}$ for the mediator. That is, we may restrict attention to communication rules which give an intuitive role to the mediator and is consistent with standard observation of mediation in real-life: The mediator first gathers information during private consultations and then makes a public proposal.

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[14] For details see Myerson (1985, 1986) and Forges (1986).

Due to the revelation principle we have only to consider incentive compatible communication rules $P = (\{1, 2\}, \mathbb{R}, \alpha_1, \alpha_2)$ with α_i a probability measure over $\mathbb{R}$. To circumvent measure–theoretical considerations we restrict attention to the class of communication rules that randomize over a finite, but arbitrarily large number of recommendations in $\mathbb{R}$. That is, we consider communication rules of the form $P = (\{1, 2\}, R, \alpha_1, \alpha_2)$ with $R \subset \mathbb{R}$ finite and $\alpha_i \in \mathbb{R}_+^{|R|}$ and $\sum_{j=1}^{|R|} \alpha_{ij} = 1$ for $i = 1, 2$. Without further loss of generality we adopt the following ordering assumption

$$\alpha_{2(j+1)}\alpha_{1j} \geq \alpha_{1(j+1)}\alpha_{2j} \tag{5}$$

for all $j = 1, 2, \ldots, |R| - 1$.

An incentive compatible communication rule entails two different forms of incentive compatibility. First, the recommendations must be incentive compatible in the sense that the principal has no strict incentive to diverge from the mediator's proposal. For a recommendation r_j this obtains if

$$r_j = y(p(\alpha_{1j}, \alpha_{2j})) \tag{6}$$

where $p(\cdot)$ is given by (4) and ensures Bayes' consistent updating. We call a recommendation r_j for which equality (6) holds incentive compatible. Under Assumption 1 $y(p)$ is increasing and the ordering condition (5) implies that an incentive compatible communication rule exhibits $r_j \leq r_{j+1}$ for all $j = 1, 2, \ldots, |R| - 1$.

Second, the communication rule must be incentive compatible in the sense that the agent does not have a strict incentive to misreport his type. A communication rule P is *incentive compatible with respect to type 1* if

$$\sum_j \alpha_{1j} U_1(r_j) \geq \sum_j \alpha_{2j} U_1(r_j). \tag{7}$$

A communication rule P is *incentive compatible with respect to type 2* if

$$\sum_j \alpha_{2j} U_2(r_j) \geq \sum_j \alpha_{1j} U_2(r_j). \tag{8}$$

A communication rule P is incentive compatible if all its recommendations are incentive compatible and if it is incentive compatible with respect to both types. As is well known, the need for incentive compatibility puts restrictions on the set of implementable communication rules:

Lemma 5 *Suppose Assumption 1. If an incentive compatible communication rule P induces some revelation of information then*

1. the ex ante probability of conflict may not be large, i.e. $\pi < \pi_2$.

2. if one type's incentive constraint holds with equality, the other one's is satisfied with strict inequality.

3. there must be recommendations $r_j \in R$ such that $y(\pi) < r_j < y_2^p$.

Lemma 5 shows that if the ex ante probability of conflict is large, information revelation is impossible. In this case the principal does not benefit from the mediator. In order to show that a mediator is helpful if the probability of conflict is not large, we focus first on *incentive compatible 2–proposal rules* for which the number of proposals to the principal coincides with the number of types. An incentive compatible 2–proposal rules has the form $P = (\{1, 2\}, \{r_1, r_2\}, (\alpha_{11}, \alpha_{12}), (\alpha_{21}, \alpha_{22}))$ and is illustrated in Figure 2. The ordering assumption (5) implies $\alpha_{11} \geq \alpha_{21}$, i.e. the recommendation r_1 (weakly) indicates that the agent is of type 1, while the recommendation r_2 is more indicative of type 2. Moreover, using $\alpha_{i2} = 1 - \alpha_{i1}$, the incentive compatibility conditions with respect to the agents, (7) and (8), reduce to

$$U_1(r_1) \geq U_1(r_2) \quad \text{and} \quad U_2(r_2) \geq U_2(r_1),\qquad(9)$$

respectively. Note that these constraints coincide with the incentive compatibility conditions (1) and (2) of the full commitment framework. The incentive compatibility conditions with respect to the principal are given by (6) for $j = 1, 2$. Given these incentive constraints an optimal incentive compatible 2–proposal rule is a solution to the following maximization problem:

$$\max_{\alpha_{11}, \alpha_{21}, r_1, r_2} V(P) \equiv \ (1 - \pi)\{\alpha_{11}V_1(r_1) + (1 - \alpha_{11})V_1(r_2)\}$$
$$+ \pi\{\alpha_{21}V_2(r_1) + (1 - \alpha_{21})V_2(r_2)\}$$
$$\text{s.t.} \qquad (6) \text{ and } (9).$$

In order to derive the optimal 2–proposal rule it is helpful to introduce the following definition of informativeness. We say that *an incentive compatible recommendation pair (r'_k, r_l) is more informative than an incentive compatible recommendation pair (r_k, r_l) if* the distance $|r'_k - r_l|$ is larger than the distance $|r_k - r_l|$. Incentive compatibility motivates the definition, since the distance is larger only if the recommendations r_k and r_l are more informative about the agent's type.

Lemma 6 *The principal's utility is increasing in the informativeness of an incentive compatible recommendation pair (r_1, r_2).*

Lemma 6 shows that our notion of informativeness is consistent with the intuitive idea that more information is better for the principal. Yet, this result is not obvious, since increasing informativeness has both a positive and a negative effect. Obviously, a

more informative recommendation is beneficial, since it enables the principal to tailor her options more accurately. A negative effect, however, is caused by the need for incentive compatibility. If a pair (r'_k, r_l) is more informative than a pair (r_k, r_l), then incentive compatibility requires that both types induce the recommendation r_k less often. That is, also the type of agent for which recommendation r_k is indicative. This is a negative effect. Still, by Lemma 6, the positive effect outweighs the negative one.

Having established that more informative, incentive compatible recommendations are beneficial, we are able to derive the optimal 2–proposal rule in the case that the ex ante probability of conflict is not high.

Proposition 4 *Suppose Assumption 1 and $\pi < \pi_2$. The optimal incentive compatible 2–proposal rule is $(y_1, y_2) = (y_1^p, y(\pi_2))$. The incentive constraint of agent 2 binds and agent 1 is perfectly revealed with probability $(\pi_2 - \pi)/((1 - \pi)\pi_2) > 0$.*

The optimal 2-proposal rule resembles the equilibrium of the game with direct communication. In both equilibria the incompatible agent is not fully revealed. More importantly, also the compatible agent does not reveal himself completely, but pools with a positive probability with the incompatible type. Even though he is the compatible, unproblematic type from the principal's perspective, his type is underrevealed in order to provide cover for the incompatible agent so that this latter agent is never fully exposed.

The important difference between the two equilibria is that the degree of underrevelation is less when the principal uses a mediator. This difference constitutes the beneficial effect of the mediator. He is able to provide cover for agent 2 more efficiently and thereby attain more informative allocations than the principal. Yet, type 2's incentive constraint restricts the mediator in inducing information revelation and the constraint is binding at the optimum.[15]

Since Lemma 5 shows that for $\pi > \pi_2$ mediators are not helpful to the principal, we arrive at our main result.[16]

Theorem 1 *Mediation is beneficial to the principal if and only if the following conditions hold: (i) $y_1^p < y_2^p$, (ii) type 2 is incompatible, and (iii) the ex ante probability of conflict is positive but not large, i.e. $\pi \in (0, \pi_2)$.*

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[15] Note the similarity with the optimal full–commitment contract.

[16] For completeness sake, we show in the appendix that for $y_1^p > y_2^p$, the mediator is unable to induce information revelation with a *general* communication rule. Hence, the equilibrium outcome coincides with the pooling equilibrium outcome, as already indicated by Proposition 1 (see also footnote 9). Moreover, if a mediator is unable to induce information revelation for $y_1^p > y_2^p$, then this necessarily also holds with direct communication, since a mediator may mimic any equilibrium in the game with direct mechanism.

We may explain the beneficial effect of the mediator by referring to the equilibrium requirement (3) of direct communication and the incentive constraints (9) of mediated communication. The principal's utility is increasing in the amount of information that is revealed. Due to her limited commitment the principal is, however, unable to induce full information revelation and can achieve at most a partial revelation of information by inducing an underrevelation of the compatible type. As explained, underrevelation requires that the compatible type actively mixes over his messages. Hence, without a mediator the compatible type has to be indifferent between the allocation over which he mixes. This is expressed by the equilibrium requirement (3). With a mediator the agent's indifference is not required. With mediation the mediator performs the mixing and the compatible agent only has to prefer his mixing package over the mixing package of the other type. This requirement yields the incentive constraints (9), which are weaker than the equilibrium requirement (3).

6 Optimal Communication Rules and the Value of Mediation

Allowing general communication rules with more than two recommendations complicates the analysis of the optimal rule for those constellations in which the conditions for beneficial mediation of Theorem 1 hold. Such additional recommendations lead to an artificial randomness of the communication rule. From standard theory of mechanism design it is well known that artificial randomness may relax incentive constraints and may therefore be part of an optimal mechanism even when players are risk averse. This result extends to our setting with limited commitment and prevents a simple characterization of the optimal contract. Instead, the following partial characterization of the optimal communication rule may be obtained.

Proposition 5 *Suppose the necessary and sufficient conditions of Theorem 1 for beneficial mediation are met. Then an optimal communication rule has the following properties:*
(i) Agent 2's incentive constraint binds.
(ii) Agent 1 is revealed with a probability strictly between zero and one, i.e. $r_1 = y_1^p$.
(iii) All recommendations except for r_1 are more indicative of agent 2 than of agent 1; more precisely, $r_j > \max\{y(\pi), y_2^a\}$ for all $j > 1$.

Reflecting the fact that stochastic schemes may be optimal, we cannot exclude that the optimal communication rule uses more than two recommendations. However, a standard approach in implementation theory is to derive sufficient conditions on the risk attitudes of the parties that render stochastic mechanisms suboptimal. Naturally, these conditions

regard the parties whose incentive constraints bind at the optimum. Since in the present model there exist incentive constraints with respect to the agent as well as to the principal, the conditions involve the risk attitudes of both parties. The following proposition shows that if the principal's utility function exhibits decreasing absolute risk aversion and the combined absolute risk aversion of principal 1 and type 2 concerning the restructuring option y is large enough the optimal rule does not involve artificial randomness.[17]

Proposition 6 *Given the conditions of Theorem 1, a sufficient condition for a 2–proposal rule to be optimal is that* $V_i''' \geq 0$ *for* $i = 1, 2$ *and for all* $y \in (y_2^a, y_2^p)$ *it holds that*

$$\frac{U_2''(y)}{U_2'(y)} + 2\frac{V_1''(y)}{V_1'(y)} \geq -\frac{V_1'(y)}{V_1(y_1^p) - V_1(y)}. \tag{10}$$

Under the conditions stated in Proposition 6 the optimal incentive compatible 2–proposal rule that we characterized in Proposition 4 is *generally* optimal. Its actual form, however, depends on the ex ante probability of conflict π. Similarly, the optimal communication without a mediator also depends on this parameter. Both communication settings seem to exhibit a discontinuity, since the type of communication changes from information revealing to non–revealing at the threshold level π_2, respectively π_1. To investigate this issue more closely let $V^{NM}(\pi)$ denote the principal's maximum payoff if there is no mediator, and $V^M(\pi)$ if there is a mediator. The next proposition shows that the principal's payoff function does not exhibit a discontinuous jump at the respective threshold levels.

Proposition 7 *Suppose the conditions of Theorem 1 and Proposition 6 are met. Then, if* $\pi_1 > 0$*, the function* $V^{NM}(\pi)$ *is linear on the interval* $(0, \pi_1)$ *and continuous at* $\pi = \pi_1$*. Likewise, if* $\pi_2 > 0$*, the function* $V^M(\pi)$ *is linear on the interval* $(0, \pi_2)$ *and continuous at* $\pi = \pi_2$*.*

Under the conditions mentioned in Proposition 6, a 2–proposal rule is optimal and we can discuss the *value of mediation* $W(\pi) \equiv V^M(\pi) - V^{NM}(\pi)$ to the principal. The function W is quasi–concave and attains a unique maximum.[18] Figure 3 illustrates the typical shape of W.

Considering that mediators are costly to employ in real life, the humped shape of W has an important empirical implication. With costly mediation, the interval of π

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[17]Note that the conditions are satisfied for any function U_2 if $V_1''' = 0$ and $V_2''' \geq 0$. E.g., a quadratic V_i.

[18]Straightforward calculations show that W is strictly concave on $[\pi_1, \pi_2]$. If $\pi_1 > 0$, it is linearly increasing on $[0, \pi_1]$.

Figure 3: The value of mediation

in which mediation is beneficial shrinks from both sides. Consequently, one would see mediation only for intermediate levels of π, i.e. in situations in which the probability of conflict is neither too high nor too low. In contrast, the principal does not resort to a mediator, but relies on direct communication if the probability of conflict is quite low. These two implications seem consistent with stylized facts about mediation and are testable empirically.

7   Concluding Remarks

In this paper we studied mediation in a model of cheap talk. As is well known, cheap talk is helpful only if there exists both a conflict and some shared interest between the sender and receiver. We introduced the ex ante probability π as a measure of this shared interest and showed that mediation enlarges the range for which information revelation can be induced in equilibrium. Moreover, for a fixed degree of shared interest, i.e. a fixed π, mediation increases the amount of information that can be revealed in equilibrium. These two effects may lead to a demand for mediators in situations of conflict.

We close this paper with a discussion about the generality and possible extensions of our framework.

Imperfect commitment and an "underrevelation" principle — We provided an intuition for our results by stressing the inability of commitment by the principal. Indeed, with full commitment a mediator is not helpful, since the principal can simply commit herself to any behavior of the mediator. The inability to commit is the principal's central problem. It leads her to respond myopically to a supply of information, thus discouraging the agent to reveal himself. Under imperfect commitment partial revelation

requires an underrevelation of the compatible type even though this type is by definition willing to reveal himself truthfully. An underrevelation of the compatible type is nevertheless required to provide cover for the other type so that the latter is never fully exposed.[19] This requirement restricts the potential to communicate, with or without mediator, and leads to inefficiencies, which are smaller when a mediator is available.

A mediator alleviates the principal's commitment problem to some degree. Yet, the enhanced commitment is rather subtle. It does not address the commitment problem directly, as also with a mediator the principal reacts myopically to information. Instead, the enhanced commitment is found in the way the principal can process information. With a mediator it is *as if* the principal is able to commit to a specific garbling of information before acting upon it. This she cannot do without a mediator, since to apply the correct garbling probabilities the agent's type must be known.

The mediator as an economic agent — According to Smith (1995) *"One of the hallmarks of mediation, and one of its important advantages, is mediation's generally private, confidential nature. Mediation's confidentiality may be one of the main reasons for its success in creating settlements. Parties are often unwilling to disclose confidential information about their view of the case to the opposing party during direct negotiation. Perhaps they intend to use the information for the first time at trial, or perhaps disclosure would be harmful to the party who possesses the information."* Following Smith and taking the mediator trustworthiness for granted we showed that his services are beneficial. Indeed, since the agent has no stake in the game he has no incentive to diverge from the communication rule and sticking to it is incentive compatible. Yet, this is of course a rather limited treatment of the mediator as an economic agent and may become problematic if there exists, for example, a computational cost with following the optimal communication rule. More importantly, there exist collusive pressures once the mediator has obtained the agent's private information. In exchange for a small bribe the principal may ask the mediator to reveal more information than the communication rule prescribes.

Empirical observation indicates that the success of mediation depends indeed on the reputation and fairness of the mediator. In practice formal procedures of mediation are structured to guarantee confidentiality. For instance, the formal mediation procedure of the London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA) states:

Article 10 Confidentiality and Privacy

10.1 All mediation sessions shall be private, and shall be attended only by the mediator, the parties and those individuals identified pursuant to Article 5.4.

10.2 The mediation process and all negotiations, and statements and documents pre-

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[19]Bester and Strausz (1998) show that partial information revelation is a general feature of optimal mechanisms in contracting problems with imperfect commitment.

pared for the purposes of the mediation, shall be confidential and covered by "without prejudice" or negotiation privilege.

10.3 The mediation shall be confidential. Unless agreed among the parties, or required by law, neither the mediator nor the parties may disclose to any person any information regarding the mediation or any settlement terms, or the outcome of the mediation.

10.4 All documents or other information produced for or arising in relation to the mediation will be privileged and will not be admissible in evidence or otherwise discoverable in any litigation or arbitration in connection with the dispute referred to mediation, except for any documents or other information which would in any event be admissible or discoverable in any such litigation or arbitration.

10.5 There shall be no formal record or transcript of the mediation.

Yet, we want to emphasize that the mediator may be given strict incentives to follow the communication rule in a repeated version of our static model. More specifically, consider a dynamic model in which in each period a different principal and agent apply for the mediator's help and pay a fee for his services. In such a setting the recommendations are imperfect signals in the sense of Fudenberg, Levine, and Maskin (1994) about the mediator's action. We conjecture that a reputation equilibrium exists that sustains the truthful behavior of the mediator.

More general situations of conflict — By modeling the situation of conflict as a simple game of cheap talk with two types, we were able to derive the optimal mechanisms under mediation and non–mediation explicitly. In more complicated settings the analysis of optimal mechanisms becomes rather involved. Laffont and Tirole (1993, p.377) claim for instance that *"the lack of commitment in repeated adverse–selection situations leads to substantial difficulties for contract theory"*. Yet, given our intuition we expect to obtain a similar beneficial role for a mediator for more complicated models of conflict. As soon as the optimal non–mediated contract involves partial information revelation, a mediator may improve outcomes. As shown in Bester and Strausz (1998) partial information revelation is a typical feature of mechanism design models with imperfect commitment (see also Hart and Tirole 1988 and Laffont and Tirole 1988,1990).

Mutually beneficial mediation — In this paper we assumed that the principal has all bargaining power. As a result she could dictate the use of a mediator without considering its effect on the agent. Indeed, comparing the respective equilibrium outcomes, the incompatible agent always prefers the equilibrium without mediator. Consequently, the beneficial effect of the mediator occurs partly at the expense of the agent. Although this setting may be applicable in some situations, in many settings the use of mediators requires the consent of both parties. A proper analysis of mutually beneficial mediation

is however more complicated, since the agent's decision to accept or reject a mediator may be interpreted as a signal about the agent's type and therefore out–of–equilibrium beliefs will play a role.

To see this, suppose $y_1^a < y_1^p$ such that $\pi_1 = 0$. In this case, type 1 prefers the outcome with a mediator, while type 2 does not. Rejecting mediation may therefore be interpreted as revealing that the agent is of type 2, leading to a choice $y = y_2^p$ which type 2 finds worse than the mediation equilibrium outcome $y = y(\pi_2)$. Consequently, an equilibrium exists in which mediation occurs. This equilibrium depends on the out–of–equilibrium belief that the agent is of type 2 if mediation is rejected. Similarly, there exists an equilibrium in which mediation is rejected, which depends on the out–of–equilibrium belief that if it is accepted, the principal believes that this is agent 2.[20] This illustrates the additional problems that arise when the agent has a more active role than just sending messages.

Appendix

Proof of Lemma 1
The statement follows directly from

$$U_1(y_2) - U_1(y_1) = \int_{y_1}^{y_2} U_1'(y)dy < \int_{y_1}^{y_2} U_2'(y)dy = U_2(y_2) - U_2(y_1).$$

Proof of Lemma 2
First, note that $y(p)$ is implicitly defined by the first order condition

$$(1-p)V_1'(y(p)) + pV_2'(y(p)) = 0. \tag{11}$$

Let $y < \min\{y_1^p, y_2^p\}$, then due to concavity of V_i it follows $V_i(y) < 0$. Therefore, there does not exist a $p \in [0,1]$ such that (11) is satisfied for some $y(p) < \min\{y_1^p, y_2^p\}$. Likewise, let $y > \max\{y_1^p, y_2^p\}$, then $V_i(y) > 0$. Hence, there does not exist a $p \in [0,1]$ such that (11) is satisfied for some $y(p) > \max\{y_1^p, y_2^p\}$.

To prove the second statement differentiate 11 w.r.t. p to obtain $\partial y/\partial p = [V_1'(y) - V_2'(y)]/[(1-p)V_1''(y) + pV_2''(y)]$, where $y \in [\min\{y_1^p, y_2^p\}, \max\{y_1^p, y_2^p\}]$. Due to concavity of V_i the denominator is negative. If $y_1^p < y_2^p$ it follows that the numerator is negative as $V_1(y) \leq 0$ and $V_2(y) \geq 0$ with at least one strict inequality for all $\min y_1^p, y_2^p \leq y \leq \max y_1^p, y_2^p]$. Hence, $y'(p)$ is positive. If $y_1^p > y_2^p$, the numerator is positive and $y(p)$ is decreasing.

Proof of Proposition 1

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[20] A refinement on out–of–equilibrium may select the equilibrium leading to mediation, but overall this would lead to a complication of things.

Claim 2 trivial. To prove claim 1 we show that if $y_1^p > y_2^p$ then the optimal mechanism exhibits $y_1 = y_2$. First, we show that a direct mechanism with $y_1 > y_2$ is not incentive compatible. Obviously, at least one IC is binding at the optimum. If this is type 1 it follows from $0 = U_1(y_1) - U_1(y_2) = \int_{y_2}^{y_1} U_1'(y)\,dy < \int_{y_2}^{y_1} U_2'(y)\,dy = U_2(y_1) - U_2(y_2)$ that the mechanism is not incentive compatible for agent 2. Similarly, if agent 2's incentive constraint is binding, it follows from $0 = U_2(y_1) - U_2(y_2) = \int_{y_2}^{y_1} U_2'(y)\,dy > \int_{y_2}^{y_1} U_1'(y)\,dy = U_1(y_1) - U_1(y_2)$ that the mechanism is not incentive compatible for type 1.

Now suppose $y_1 < y_2$ and compare the principal's utility from this mechanism with that from the optimal pooling mechanism $\bar{y} = y(\pi) \in (y_2^p, y_1^p)$:

$$\Delta V \equiv (1 - \pi)[V_1(y_1) - V_1(\bar{y})] + \pi[V_2(y_2) - V_2(\bar{y})] = \int_{\bar{y}}^{y_1} (1 - \pi)V_1'(y)\,dy + \int_{\bar{y}}^{y_2} \pi V_2'(y)\,dy$$

$$< \int_{\bar{y}}^{y_1} (1 - \pi)V_1'(\bar{y})\,dy + \int_{\bar{y}}^{y_2} \pi V_2'(\bar{y})\,dy < \int_{\bar{y}}^{y_1} [(1 - \pi)V_1'(\bar{y}) + \pi V_2'(\bar{y})]\,dy = 0.$$

The first inequality follows from the concavity of V_i and the second because $V_2'(\bar{y}) < 0$ and $y_1 < y_2$ imply $\int_{y_2}^{y_1} V_2'(\bar{y})dy > 0$. The final equality follows from the first order condition determining $y(\pi)$.

Proof of Lemma 3

Suppose agent 1 is incompatible and $y_1^p < y_2^p$, it then follows from

$$0 > U_1(y_2^p) - U_1(y_1^p) = \int_{y_1^p}^{y_2^p} u_1'(y)dy > \int_{y_1^p}^{y_2^p} u_2'(y)dy = U_2(y_2^p) - U_2(y_1^p)$$

that agent 2 is compatible.

Proof of Proposition 2

Note first that the optimal separation mechanism exhibits $y_1^* < y_2^*$. Next, note that at least one agent's incentive constraint must be binding at the optimum. Lemma 1 then implies that the other agent's IC has slack. Suppose agent i's IC binds and define the function $y_2^i(y)$ for the range $y_1^* < y_i^a$ implicitly by $U_i(y_1) = U_i(y_2^i(y))$. Hence, y_1^* maximizes $(1 - \pi)V_1(y) + \pi V_2(y_2^i(y))$ and satisfies the first order condition $(1 - \pi)V_1'(y_1^*) = -\pi V_2'(y_2^i(y_1^*))\partial y_2^i(y_1^*)/\partial y$. Since $\partial y_2^i(y)/\partial y < 0$, it follows that y_1^* and y_2^* are such that $\mathrm{Sign}(V_1'(y_1^*)) = \mathrm{Sign}(V_2'(y_2^*))$. Consequently, either $y_1^* < y_1^p$ and $y_2^* < y_2^p$ or $y_1^* > y_1^p$ and $y_2^* > y_2^p$. But since agent 2 is incompatible while agent 1 is compatible, there does not exist a $y > y_1^p$ such that $y_2^i(y) > y_2^p$. We therefore conclude that the optimal separating mechanism exhibits $y_1^* < y_1^p$ and $y_2^* < y_2^p$.

To show that the incentive constraint of agent 2 is binding, suppose by contradiction that agent 1's IC binds, i.e. (1) is satisfied with equality. Lemma 1 implies that (2) is strictly satisfied. Now consider a small raise in y_2^* such that inequality (2) remains satisfied. As established, an optimal contract satisfies $y_1^* < y_1^p < y_2^* < y_2^p$, which implies

$V_2'(y_2^*) > 0$ and $U_1'(y_2^*) < 0$, the raise in y_2^* therefore increases the principal's utility, while rendering (1) satisfied with strict inequality. Hence, a binding incentive constraint of agent 2 is not optimal.

Proof of Proposition 3

We first show non–existence of equilibria of the types 1, 3, and 5.

In a full revelation outcome necessarily $(\alpha_1, \alpha_2) = (1, 0)$. The principal's beliefs must therefore satisfy $p_1 = p(1, 0) = 0$ and $p_2 = p(0, 1) = 1$ and implement $y_1 = y(1) = y_1^p$ and $y_2 = y(0) = y_2^p$, which due to $U_2(y_2^p) < U_2(y_1^p)$ contradicts (3). A full revelation equilibrium does therefore not exist.

A partial revelation equilibrium does not exist, since in such an equilibrium $\alpha_i \in (0, 1)$ for both $i = 1, 2$ and $y_1 \neq y_2$. By (3) this would require $U_i(y_1) = U_i(y_2)$ for both $i = 1, 2$. Lemma 1 shows this is not possible.

Also a type 2 partially full revelation equilibrium does not exist. Such an equilibrium exhibits $\alpha_1 = 1$ and $0 < \alpha_2 < 1$. Consequently, $p_1 = p(1, \alpha_2) \in (0, 1)$ and $p_2 = p(0, 1 - \alpha_2) = 1$, which implies $y_1 \in (y_1^p, y_2^p)$ and $y_2 = y(0) = y_2^p$. Moreover, due to (3) $0 < \alpha_2 < 1$ requires $U_2(y_1) = U_2(y_2^p)$. However, such a $y_1 \in (y_1^p, y_2^p)$ does not exist, because $U_2(y_2^p) < U_2(y_1^p)$ and the concavity of U_2 implies $U_2(y_2^p) < U_2(y)$ for all $y \in [y_1^p, y_2^p)$.

Hence, only two equilibrium candidates are left. The non–revelation equilibrium, which always exists in the form $(\alpha_1, \alpha_2, p_1, p_2, y_1, y_2) = (\alpha, \alpha, \pi, \pi, y(\pi), y(\pi))$ with $\alpha \in (0, 1)$, and the partially full revelation equilibrium. Obviously, the latter yields the principal a higher payoff. However, a type 1 partially full revelation equilibrium exists if and only if $\pi < \pi_1$. This follows from the observation that in a type 1 partially full revelation equilibrium $0 < \alpha_1 < 1$ and $\alpha_2 = 0$. Consequently, $p_1 = p(\alpha_1, 0) = 0$ and $p_2 = p(1 - \alpha_1, 1) < 1$, which implies $y_1 = y(0) = y_1^p$ and $y_2 \in (y_1^p, y_2^p)$. Moreover, due to (3) $0 < \alpha_1 < 1$ requires $U_1(y_2) = U_1(y_1^p)$ and thus $y_2 = y(\pi_1)$. This in turn requires $p_2 = p(1 - \alpha_1, 1) = \pi_1$ and hence, by (4), $\alpha_1 = (\pi_1 - \pi)/[(1 - \pi)\pi_1]$. However, α_1 must be non–negative and, in order to have some information revelation, must differ from $\alpha_2 = 0$. Therefore, an informative equilibrium requires $\pi < \pi_1$. For its existence it remains to be checked that $\alpha_2 = 0$ satisfies the incentive constraint (3) of agent 2; this follows from Lemma 1.

Proof of Lemma 5

If an incentive compatible communication rule $(\{1, 2\}, R, \alpha_1, \alpha_2)$ induces information revelation then there is some $r_j \in R$ with $\alpha_{1j} \neq \alpha_{2j}$. Since $\sum \alpha_{1j} = \sum \alpha_{2j} = 1$, there exist $r_j, r_k \in R$ with $\alpha_{1j} > \alpha_{2j}$ and $\alpha_{1k} < \alpha_{2k}$. Incentive compatibility of a recommendation r_j implies $\text{Sign}(\alpha_{2j} - \alpha_{1j}) = \text{Sign}(r_j - y(\pi))$, i.e. r_j and r_k satisfy $r_k > y(\pi) > r_j$.

If $\pi \geq \pi_2$ it follows $U_2(y(\pi)) \leq U_2(y_1^p)$. Consequently, due to the concavity of U_2, $\alpha_{2j} > \alpha_{1j}$ implies $U_2(r_j) < U_2(y(\pi))$, while $\alpha_{2j} < \alpha_{1j}$ implies $U_2(r_j) > U_2(y(\pi))$. It

therefore follows that $\sum_j(\alpha_{2j} - \alpha_{1j})U_2(r_j) = \sum_j \max\{\alpha_{2j} - \alpha_{1j}, 0\}U_2(r_j) - \sum_j \max\{\alpha_{1j} - \alpha_{2j}, 0\}U_2(r_j) < \sum_j \max\{\alpha_{2j} - \alpha_{1j}, 0\}U_2(y(\pi)) - \sum_j \max\{\alpha_{1j} - \alpha_{2j}, 0\}U_2(y(\pi)) = 0$, contradicting the incentive compatibility condition (8). Therefore if an incentive compatible rule P induces information revelation, then necessarily $\pi < \pi_2$.

To prove the second statement note first that for $i = 1, 2$:

$$\sum_{j=1}^{|R|}(\alpha_{1j} - \alpha_{2j})U_i(r_j) = \sum_{j=1}^{|R|-1}\left(\sum_{k=1}^{j}\alpha_{1k} - \sum_{k=1}^{j}\alpha_{2k}\right)[U_i(r_j) - U_i(r_{j+1})].$$

Due to (5), one has $\sum_{k=1}^{j}\alpha_{1k} - \sum_{k=1}^{j}\alpha_{2k} > 0$ for all $j = 1, \ldots, |R| - 1$. Hence, by the monotonicity assumption and recalling that $r_j \leq r_{j+1}$,

$$\sum_{j=1}^{|R|}(\alpha_{1j} - \alpha_{2j})U_1(r_j) = -\sum_{j=1}^{|R|-1}\left(\sum_{k=1}^{j}\alpha_{1k} - \sum_{k=1}^{j}\alpha_{2k}\right)\int_{r_j}^{r_{j+1}} U_1'(y)\,dy$$

$$> -\sum_{j=1}^{|R|-1}\left(\sum_{k=1}^{j}\alpha_{1k} - \sum_{k=1}^{j}\alpha_{2k}\right)\int_{r_j}^{r_{j+1}} U_2'(y)\,dy = \sum_{j=1}^{|R|}(\alpha_{1j} - \alpha_{2j})U_2(r_j).$$

Therefore, if (7) holds with equality, (8) is satisfied with strict inequality and vice versa.

For the third statement, note that if $\pi < \pi_2$ then for all $r_l < y(\pi)$ it holds $U_2(r_l) \geq U_2(y(\pi))$. Now suppose that for all $r_k > y(\pi)$ it holds $r_k = y_2^p$, then $U_2(r_k) < U_2(y_1^p)$ for all k such $\alpha_{2k} > \alpha_{1k}$. It follows $\sum_j(\alpha_{2j} - \alpha_{1j})U_2(r_j) = \sum_j \max\{\alpha_{2j} - \alpha_{1j}, 0\}U_2(r_j) - \sum_j \max\{\alpha_{1j} - \alpha_{2j}, 0\}U_2(r_j) < \sum_j \max\{\alpha_{2j} - \alpha_{1j}, 0\}U_2(y(\pi)) - \sum_j \max\{\alpha_{1j} - \alpha_{2j}, 0\}U_2(y(\pi)) = 0$, contradicting the incentive compatibility condition (8). Therefore if an incentive compatible rule P induces information revelation, then there exists an r_j such that $y(\pi) < r_j < y_2^p$.

Proof of Lemma 6

Consider a communication rule P with some recommendation r_k such that $r_k \in (y_1^p, y_2^p)$. Define, for $\delta > 0$ but small, the proposal $P^{kl}(\delta)$ as the following transformation of P:

$$\begin{array}{lll} \alpha_{1k}(\delta) \equiv \alpha_{1k} - \delta\alpha_{1l} & \alpha_{2k}(\delta) \equiv \alpha_{2k} - \delta\alpha_{2l} & r_k(\delta) \equiv y(p(\alpha_{1k}(\delta), \alpha_{2k}(\delta))) \\ \alpha_{1l}(\delta) \equiv \alpha_{1l} + \delta\alpha_{1l} & \alpha_{2l}(\delta) \equiv \alpha_{2l} + \delta\alpha_{2l} & r_l(\delta) = r_l \\ \alpha_{1j}(\delta) \equiv \alpha_{1j} & \alpha_{2j}(\delta) \equiv \alpha_{2j} & r_j(\delta) = r_j \quad \text{for } j \neq k, l.^{21} \end{array}$$

The transformation is structured in such a way that if the recommendations of the original proposal P are incentive compatible then this also holds for the recommendations in $P^{kl}(\delta)$. Moreover, if δ rises, the pair $(r_k(\delta), r_l)$ becomes more informative, since $|r_k(\delta) - r_l|$ is increasing in δ due to $\mathrm{Sign}(\partial r_k/\partial\delta) = \mathrm{Sign}(\alpha_{1l}\alpha_{2k} - \alpha_{1k}\alpha_{2l})$. It suffices to show that

---

[21] We prove the property for general communication rules which may have more than two recommendations.

$dV(P^{kl})/d\delta > 0$. To see this note first that, since rule P is incentive compatible it holds for any $r_j \in R$

$$(1 - p_j)V_1'(r_j) + p_j V_2'(r_j) = 0, \tag{12}$$

where $p_j = p(\alpha_{1j}, \alpha_{2j})$. Moreover the concavity of V_1 and V_2 imply that

$$\text{Sign}(r_j - y) = \text{Sign}((1 - p_j)V_1'(y) + p_j V_2'(y)). \tag{13}$$

Using (12) one obtains

$$\begin{aligned}
\frac{dV(P^{kl}(\delta))}{d\delta} &= (1 - \pi)\alpha_{1l}[V_1(r_l) - V_1(r_k)] + \pi\alpha_{2l}[V_2(r_l) - V_2(r_k)] \\
&= (\pi\alpha_{2l} + (1 - \pi)\alpha_{1l}) \int_{r_k}^{r_l} (1 - p_l)V_1'(y) + p_l V_2'(y) \, dy > 0
\end{aligned}$$

where the sign follows from (13).

Proof of Proposition 4

Since agent 2 is incompatible, full revelation is not possible so that at least one incentive constraint must be binding. By Lemma 1 at most one incentive constraint is binding when some information revelation occurs. Since $U_i(y_1^p) > U_i(y_2^p)$ for both i, a binding incentive constraint implies that in an equilibrium with some information revelation $r_1 < r_2 < y_2^p$ and thus $\alpha_{21} < \alpha_{11} < 1$.

Now suppose an incentive compatible communication rule P is such that agent 1's incentive constraint is binding, i.e. $U_1(r_1) = U_1(r_2)$ and $U_1'(r_2) < 0$. Feasibility requires moreover $y_1^a > y_1^p$. Consider the communication rule $P^{21}(\delta)$ as defined in the proof of Lemma 6. Note that for $\delta > 0$ small enough the communication rule $P^{21}(\delta)$ is feasible and prescribes the incentive compatible recommendations $r_1(\delta) = r_1$ and $r_2(\delta) > r_2$. We now show that the communication rule $P^{21}(\delta)$ with $\delta > 0$ remains incentive compatible with respect to both agents. Recall that $P^{21}(0) = P$ is such that the incentive compatibility constraint of agent 2 is slack. Due to continuity the constraint remains slack for a communication rule $P^{21}(\delta)$ with $\delta > 0$ small enough. Note furthermore that for $\delta > 0$ one has $r_2(\delta) > r_2$, and since $U_1'(r_2) < 0$, one obtains $U_1(r_1) = U_1(r_2) > U_1(r_2(\delta))$. Therefore, if P is incentive compatible, then also $P^{21}(\delta)$ for $\delta > 0$ small enough. Since by Lemma 6 the principal's utility increases with $\delta > 0$, a communication rule $P = P^{21}(0)$ for which $U_1(r_1) = U_1(r_2)$ cannot be optimal.

Now suppose P is such that the incentive constraint of agent 2 is binding and $\alpha_{21} > 0$. Consider the communication rule $P^{12}(\delta)$ with $\delta > 0$. Using the same argument as above, $P^{12}(\delta)$ remains incentive compatible for $\delta > 0$ small enough and increases the principal's utility. Hence, a communication rule P with a binding incentive constraint of agent 2 and $\alpha_{21} > 0$ cannot be optimal. We therefore conclude that the optimal 2–proposal

rule P is characterized by a binding incentive constraint of agent 2 and $\alpha_{21} = 0$. This implies $(y_1, y_2) = (y_1^p, y(\pi_2))$ which in turn implies $p(1 - \alpha_{11}, 1) = \pi_2$ and hence, by (4), $\alpha_{11} = (\pi_2 - \pi)/[(1 - \pi)\pi_2]$. However, α_{11} must be non–negative and, in order to have some information revelation, must differ from $\alpha_{21} = 0$. Therefore, an informative equilibrium requires $\pi < \pi_2$, which obviously requires $\pi_2 > 0$.

Proof of Theorem 1

We prove that for $y_1^p > y_2^p$ no information revelation can occur in equilibrium. The Theorem then follows directly from Lemma 5 and Proposition 4. Let $y_1^p > y_2^p$ and suppose an incentive compatible proposal rule exists that induces some information revelation, i.e. P^* is such that $\alpha_{1j} > \alpha_{2j}$ for at least some $j = 1, \ldots, |R|$. Due to (5), one has $\sum_{k=1}^{j} \alpha_{1k} - \sum_{k=1}^{j} \alpha_{2k} \geq 0$ for all $j = 1, \ldots, |R| - 1$ with at least one strict inequality. Due to Lemma 2 incentive compatibility of the recommendations require $r_j \geq r_{j+1}$ with at least one strict inequality. Hence, by using (12) and the monotonicity assumption, it follows

$$
\begin{aligned}
\sum_{j=1}^{|R|} (\alpha_{1j} - \alpha_{2j}) U_1(r_j) &= \sum_{j=1}^{|R|-1} \left(\sum_{k=1}^{j} \alpha_{1k} - \sum_{k=1}^{j} \alpha_{2k} \right) \int_{r_{j+1}}^{r_j} U_1'(y)\, dy \\
&< \sum_{j=1}^{|R|-1} \left(\sum_{k=1}^{j} \alpha_{1k} - \sum_{k=1}^{j} \alpha_{2k} \right) \int_{r_{j+1}}^{r_j} U_2'(y)\, dy = \sum_{j=1}^{|R|} (\alpha_{1j} - \alpha_{2j}) U_2(r_j).
\end{aligned} \tag{14}
$$

From (14) it follows that if a proposal rule is incentive compatible w.r.t. type 1 it is not incentive compatible w.r.t. type 2 and vice versa. Therefore an incentive compatible proposal rule that induces some information revelation does not exist.

Proof of Proposition 5

Assume $\pi < \pi_2$, i.e. $y_2^a > y_1^p$. It follows from Theorem 1 that the optimal communication rule induces some amount of information revelation. Since full revelation is not possible some, and by Lemma 5 one, incentive constraint is binding at the optimum.

For some $r_k, r_l \in R$ with $r_k \in (y_1^p, y_2^p)$ consider the transformation P^{kl} as defined in the proof of Lemma 6. In order to evaluate the impact of the transformation on the incentive constraints, define the functions

$$
\begin{aligned}
f_i^{kl}(\delta) &\equiv \sum_{j=1}^{|R|} [\alpha_{1j}(\delta) - \alpha_{2j}(\delta)] U_i(r_j(\delta)) - \sum_{j=1}^{|R|} [\alpha_{1j} - \alpha_{2j}] U_i(r_j) \\
&= \delta(\alpha_{1l} - \alpha_{2l})[U_i(r_l) - U_i(r_k(\delta))] + (\alpha_{1k} - \alpha_{2k})[U_i(r_k(\delta)) - U_i(r_k)].
\end{aligned} \tag{15}
$$

Now consider the derivative of $f_i^{kl}(\delta)$ evaluated at $\delta = 0$:

$$
\frac{df_i^{kl}(0)}{d\delta} = (\alpha_{1l} - \alpha_{2l})[U_i(r_l) - U_i(r_k)] + (\alpha_{1k} - \alpha_{2k}) U_i'(r_k) r_k'(0), \tag{16}
$$

where

$$\text{Sign}\,(r'_k(0)) = \text{Sign}(\alpha_{1l}\alpha_{2k} - \alpha_{1k}\alpha_{2l}) = \text{Sign}(r_k - r_l). \tag{17}$$

For statement (i), suppose by contradiction that P is such that agent 1's IC binds which is only feasible if $y_1^a > y_1^p$. An incentive compatible communication rule P that induces information revelation contains a pair (r_k, r_l) such that $y_2^p > r_k > y(\pi) > r_l$, by statement 3 of Lemma 5. Incentive compatibility implies $\alpha_{1k} < \alpha_{2k}$, $\alpha_{1l} > \alpha_{2l}$, while (17) implies $r'_k(0) > 0$.

If $U_1(r_k) \le U_1(r_l)$, it follows, due to $r_k > r_l$, that $r_k > y_1^a$. Consequently, $U'_1(r_k) < 0$. These properties imply $df_1^{kl}(0)/d\delta > 0$, which means that agent 1's IC (7) remains satisfied for small $\delta > 0$. Agent 2's IC is also satisfied since, for $\delta = 0$, it has slack. Hence, there exists a $\delta > 0$ for which the transformation $P^{kl}(\delta)$ is feasible. By Lemma 6 such a P is not optimal.

Now consider the case $U_1(r_k) > U_1(r_l)$, which due to $r_k > r_l$ implies $r_l < y_1^a$. If there exists an $\varepsilon > 0$ such that for all $\delta \in (0, \varepsilon)$ it holds that $f_1^{kl}(\delta) \ge 0$, then P is not optimal by the above argument. If such an ε does not exist, then $f_1^{kl}(\delta) < 0$ for δ sufficiently close to zero. But then there exists a $\hat{\delta} > 0$ such that $f_1^{kl}(\hat{\delta}) = 0$. This follows from continuity of $f_1^{kl}(\delta)$ and the fact that there exists a $\delta' > 0$ such that $U_1(r_k(\delta')) = U_1(r_l)$, which implies $f_1^{kl}(\delta') > 0$. The transformation $P^{kl}(\hat{\delta})$ is feasible because, due to $f_1^{kl}(\hat{\delta}) = 0$, agent 1's IC still holds in equality, which, by Lemma 5, implies that also agent 2's IC is satisfied. Since $\hat{\delta} > 0$, Lemma 6 implies that P is not optimal. It therefore cannot be optimal to have agent 1's IC bind. Hence, at the optimum agent 2's IC binds.

For the remainder of the proof consider an incentive compatible communication rule P that induces some revelation of information and for which agent 2's IC binds. For statement (ii), let now $r_k < y(\pi) < r_l$, which implies $\alpha_{1k} > \alpha_{2k}$, $\alpha_{1l} < \alpha_{2l}$, and, by (17), $r'_k(0) < 0$. Assume by contradiction that $r_k > y_1^p$.

If $U_2(r_k) \le U_2(r_l)$, it follows, due to $r_k < r_l$, that $r_k < y_2^a$. Consequently, $U'_2(r_k) > 0$. These properties imply $df_2^{kl}(0)/d\delta < 0$, which means that agent 2's IC (8) is satisfied for small $\delta > 0$. For $\delta > 0$ but small also agent 1's IC remains satisfied, since, for $\delta = 0$, it has slack. Hence, there exists a $\delta > 0$ for which the transformation $P^{kl}(\delta)$ is feasible. Lemma 6 implies that P is not optimal.

Now consider the case $U_2(r_k) > U_2(r_l)$, which due to $r_k < r_l$ implies $r_l > y_2^a$. If there exists an $\varepsilon > 0$ such that for all $\delta \in (0, \varepsilon)$ it holds that $f_2^{kl}(\delta) \le 0$, then P is not optimal by the above argument. If such an ε does not exist, then $f_2^{kl}(\delta) > 0$ for δ sufficiently close to zero. But then there exists a $\hat{\delta} > 0$ such that $f_2^{kl}(\hat{\delta}) = 0$. This follows from continuity of $f_2^{kl}(\delta)$ and the fact that there exists a $\delta' > 0$ such that $U_2(r_k(\delta')) = U_2(r_l)$, which implies $f_2^{kl}(\delta') < 0$. The transformation $P^{kl}(\hat{\delta})$ is feasible because agent 2's IC still holds in equality which, by Lemma 5, implies that agent 1's still has slack. Since

$\hat{\delta} > 0$, Lemma 6 implies that P is not optimal. Thus it is never optimal to have an $r_k \in (y_1^p, y(\pi))$. Since there must be an $r_k < y(\pi)$, we conclude that an optimal incentive compatible recommendation rule exhibits $r_1 = y_1^p$ and $r_j \geq y(\pi)$ for all $j > 1$.

For statement (iii), consider an optimal P, i.e. P exhibits $r_1 = y_1^p$ and $r_j \geq y(\pi)$ for all $j > 1$. Now consider the transformation $P^{k1}(\delta)$ with $k > 1$. Since $\alpha_{21} = 0$, it follows

$$\frac{df_2^{k1}(0)}{d\delta} = \alpha_{11}[U_2(y_1^p) - U_2(r_k)] + (\alpha_{1k} - \alpha_{2k})U_2'(r_k)r_k'(0), \tag{18}$$

and since $r_k > r_1 = y_1^p$ it holds $r_k'(0) > 0$. Now if $y(\pi) \leq y_2^a$ and P contains an $r_k \in [y(\pi), y_2^a]$, then $U_2'(r_k) \geq 0$ and $\alpha_{1k} \leq \alpha_{2k}$. Moreover, $U_2(y_1^p) < U_2(r_k)$ and it follows that (18) is negative. Hence, for some small $\delta > 0$ the transformation $P^{k1}(\delta)$ is feasible and yields the principal more. Consequently, P is not optimal. If $y_2^a < y(\pi)$ and P contains an $r_k = y(\pi)$, then $\alpha_{1k} = \alpha_{2k}$. Since $\pi < \pi_2$ implies $U_2(y(\pi)) > U_2(y_1^p)$, it follows that (18) is negative and P is suboptimal.

Proof of Proposition 6

We must prove that an incentive compatible communication rule with $|R| > 2$ and $r_j \neq r_k$ for all $k \neq j$ cannot be optimal. Suppose by contradiction that such a P is optimal, then by Proposition 5 it satisfies $r_1 = y_1^p$ and $\max\{y(\pi), y_2^a\} < r_2 < r_3 \leq y_2^p$. Moreover, since agent 2's incentive constraint binds at the optimum, it holds that $r_2 < y(\pi_2)$ and there must also exist an $r_3 > y(\pi_2)$. This implies $U_2(r_2) > U_2(y_1^p) > U_2(r_3)$.

Denote by $P(\delta_2, \delta_3)$ the proposal rule which results from a joint transformation $P^{21}(\delta_2)$, $P^{31}(\delta_3)$, as defined in the proof of Lemma 6. Write as $V(\delta_2, \delta_3)$ the principal's payoff associated with $P(\delta_2, \delta_3)$. Its partial derivative with respect to δ_j evaluated at $\delta_2 = \delta_3 = 0$ is

$$\frac{\partial V(0, 0)}{\partial \delta_j} = (1 - \pi)\alpha_{11}[V_1(y_1^p) - V_1(r_j)].$$

The principal's marginal gain from a joint transformation with $\delta_3 = \delta_3(\delta_2) = -\beta\delta_2$ with $\beta > 0$ is therefore

$$\left.\frac{dV(\delta_2, \delta_3(\delta_2))}{d\delta_2}\right|_{\delta_2=0} = \frac{\partial V(0, 0)}{\partial \delta_2} - \frac{\partial V(0, 0)}{\partial \delta_3}\beta$$

$$= (1 - \pi)\alpha_{11}[V_1(y_1^p) - V_1(r_2) - \beta(V_1(y_1^p) - V_1(r_3))]. \tag{19}$$

To evaluate the impact of a marginal change of $P(0, 0)$ on the incentive constraint of agent 2 define

$$F(\delta_2, \delta_3) = f_2^{21}(\delta_2) + f_2^{31}(\delta_3).$$

Recalling (18) and using $\delta_3(\delta_2) = -\beta\delta_2$ the total derivative of $F(\delta_2, \delta_3(\delta_2))$ evaluated at $\delta_2 = 0$ is:

$$
\begin{aligned}
\frac{dF(0,0)}{d\delta_2} &= \frac{\partial F(0,0)}{\partial\delta_2} - \frac{\partial F(0,0)}{\partial\delta_3}\beta \\
&= \alpha_{11}[U_2(y_1^p) - U_2(r_2)] - (\alpha_{22} - \alpha_{12})U_2'(r_2)r_2'(0) \\
&\quad - \beta\left(\alpha_{11}[U_2(y_1^p) - U_2(r_3)] - (\alpha_{23} - \alpha_{13})U_2'(r_3)r_3'(0)\right) \\
&= \alpha_{11}\left\{[U_2(y_1^p) - U_2(r_2)] - U_2'(r_2)y'(p_2)p_2\frac{p_2 - \pi}{\pi}\right. \\
&\quad \left. - \beta\left([U_2(y_1^p) - U_2(r_3)] - U_2'(r_3)y'(p_3)p_3\frac{p_3 - \pi}{\pi}\right)\right\}
\end{aligned} \tag{20}
$$

where the last equation follows from $r_j'(0) = y'(p_j)p_j'(0)$ and $p_j'(0)(\alpha_{2j} - \alpha_{1j})/\alpha_{11} = p_j(p_j - \pi)/\pi$ with

$$
p_j(\delta_j) \equiv p(\alpha_{1j}(\delta_j), \alpha_{2j}(\delta_j)).
$$

A marginal change of P satisfies incentive compatibility of agent 2 if (20) is negative, i.e. if

$$
\beta \geq \frac{[U_2(y_1^p) - U_2(r_2)] - U_2'(r_2)y'(p_2)p_2\frac{p_2 - \pi}{\pi}}{[U_2(y_1^p) - U_2(r_3)] - U_2'(r_3)y'(p_3)p_3\frac{p_3 - \pi}{\pi}}.
$$

By (19) a marginal change of P (weakly) increases the principal's utility if

$$
\beta \leq \frac{V_1(y_1^p) - V_1(r_2)}{V_1(y_1^p) - V_1(r_3)}.
$$

Thus, a marginal change of P which (weakly) increases the principal's utility while leaving the rule incentive compatible exists, if

$$
\frac{V_1(y_1^p) - V_1(r_2)}{V_1(y_1^p) - V_1(r_3)} \geq \frac{[U_2(y_1^p) - U_2(r_2)] - U_2'(r_2)y'(p_2)p_2\frac{p_2 - \pi}{\pi}}{[U_2(y_1^p) - U_2(r_3)] - U_2'(r_3)y'(p_3)p_3\frac{p_3 - \pi}{\pi}} \tag{21}
$$

where $r_j = y(p_j)$. Since $U_2(r_2) > U_2(y_1^p) > U_2(r_3)$ and $U'(r_j) < 0 < y'(p_j)$ and $p_3 > p_2 > \pi$, condition (21) is strictly satisfied for any π if and only if

$$
D(p_2) \leq D(p_3) \tag{22}
$$

with

$$
D(p) \equiv \frac{V_1(y_1^p) - V_1(y(p))}{U_2'(y(p))y'(p)p^2}. \tag{23}
$$

Therefore, if $D(p)$ is weakly increasing a proposal with $|R| > 2$ is not optimal. Straightforward calculations yield that the derivative of $D(p)$ is larger or equal to zero when

$$
\frac{U_2''(y(p))}{U_2'(y(p))} + \frac{2y'(p) + py''(p)}{py'(p)^2} \geq -\frac{V_1'(y(p))}{\Delta V(y(p))} \tag{24}
$$

with

$$
\Delta V(y) \equiv V_1(y_1^p) - V_1(y).
$$

The definition of $y(p)$ implies $2y'(p) + py''(p) = (2V_1''(y(p)) - py'(p)b(y(p)))y'(p)/a(y(p))$ and $py'(p) = V_1'(y(p))/a(y(p))$ with

$$
\begin{aligned}
a(y) &\equiv (1-p)V_1''(y) + pV_2''(y) < 0, \\
b(y) &\equiv (1-p)V_1'''(y) + pV_2'''(y).
\end{aligned}
$$

Hence, dropping the dependence on p we may rewrite (24) as

$$
\frac{U_2''(y)}{U_2'(y)} + \frac{2V_1''(y)}{V_1'(y)} - \frac{b(y)}{a(y)} \geq -\frac{V_1'(y)}{\Delta V(y)}. \tag{25}
$$

Now if $V_1'''(y) \geq 0$ and $V_2'''(y) \geq 0$ then $b(y) \geq 0$ and (25) is satisfied if

$$
U_2''(y)/U_2'(y) + 2V_1''(y)/V_1'(y) \geq -V_1'(y)/\Delta V(y).
$$

Proof of Proposition 7

If there is no mediator, the principal's payoff for $\pi < \pi_1$ is

$$
\begin{aligned}
V^{NC}(\pi) &= (1-\pi)\left[\frac{\pi_1 - \pi}{\pi_1(1-\pi)}V_1(y_1^p) + \left(1 - \frac{\pi_1 - \pi}{\pi_1(1-\pi)}\right)V_1(y(\pi_1))\right] + \pi V_2(y(\pi_1)) \\
&= \frac{\pi_1 - \pi}{\pi_1}V_1(y_1^p) + \frac{\pi(1-\pi_1)}{\pi_1}V_1(y(\pi_1)) + \pi V_2(y(\pi_1)) \tag{26}
\end{aligned}
$$

which is linear in π. For $\pi \geq \pi_1$ the payoff is $V^{NC}(\pi) = (1-\pi)V_1(y(\pi)) + \pi V_2(y(\pi))$. Since (26) converges to this payoff as π approaches π_1, the function $V^{NC}(\pi)$ is continuous at π_1. For the case with a mediator the proof runs analogously.

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