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# Do teachers matter? Measuring the variation in teacher effectiveness in England 

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#### Abstract

Using a unique primary dataset for the UK, we estimate the effect of individual teachers on student outcomes, and the variability in teacher quality. This links over 7000 pupils to the individual teachers who taught them, in each of their compulsory subjects in the high-stakes exams at age 16 . We use point-in-time fixed effects and prior attainment to control for pupil heterogeneity. We find considerable variability in teacher effectiveness, a little higher than the estimates found in the few US studies. We also corroborate recent findings that observed teachers' characteristics explain very little of the differences in estimated effectiveness.


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## 1. Introduction

It seems common sense that teachers matter, and that pupils will achieve more with an inspirational teacher than with an average or poor teacher. Anecdotes abound of the transformational effect of excellent teaching. Yet trying to quantify this is difficult, principally because of the data requirements. To a degree, social science research has emphasised family and home rather than teachers and school in the production of human capital ${ }^{1}$. Disentangling the separate contributions of schools, teachers, classes, peers and pupils themselves needs extremely rich and full disaggregate data. Whilst a small number of papers have been able to make progress here, we do not yet have a settled view on the importance of teachers.

Using a unique primary dataset for the UK, we estimate the effect of individual teachers on student outcomes, and the variability in teacher quality ${ }^{2}$. We show that teachers matter a great deal: being taught by a high quality ( $75^{\text {th }}$ percentile) rather than low quality ( $25^{\text {th }}$ percentile) teacher adds 0.425 of a GCSE point per subject to a given student, or $25 \%$ of the standard deviation of GCSE points. This shows the strong potential for improving educational standards by improving average teacher quality. However, implementing such a policy would not be straightforward, as we also corroborate recent US findings that good teachers are difficult to identify ex ante.

As Rockoff (2004) notes, most of the issues in this field relate to data quality. We use a unique primary dataset that matches a short panel of pupils to a short panel of teachers. We link over 7000 pupils, their exam results and prior attainment to the individual teachers who taught them, in each of their compulsory subjects in the crucial high-stakes exams at age 16. These exams provide access to higher education and are highly valued in the job market.

Our dataset complements and in some ways extends the current leading datasets in this field used by Aaronson, Barrow and Sander (2007) (ABS), Kane, Rockoff and Staiger (2007) (KRS), Rivkin, Hanushek and Kain (2005) RHK and Rockoff (2004) (R). Like ABS and R, but unlike RHK and KRS, we can match a student to her/his actual teacher, rather than to the school-grade average teacher. Unlike ABS, KRS,

[^0]RHK and R, our context is one of students taking exams that are very important to them and to the school. Unlike ABS, KRS, RHK and R, we exploit the fact that we observe students taking three exams at the same date, allowing us to use a point-intime student fixed effect, in addition to subject-specific prior attainment. We believe that this allows us to control well for variations in student ability that might otherwise corrupt our measures of teacher effectiveness if students are not randomly assigned to teachers (see Rothstein, 2008). Finally, and also unlike ABS, KRS and RHK, our student-teacher data are matched in and by the school, thus ensuring a high-quality match. Nevertheless, while our data have these advantages relative to existing datasets, there are other issues with our data, and we detail below these short-comings and what we can and cannot estimate.

We show that the standard deviation of teacher effectiveness is $32.6 \%$ of a GCSE point, or $18.9 \%$ of a standard deviation (1.722 GCSE points), from Table 5 column 1. The lowest bound estimate we have is $28.8 \%$ of a GCSE point or $16.7 \%$ of the standard deviation. These estimates are in line with those found in the US, which tend to be around a $10 \%$ impact on test scores of a unit standard deviation change in teacher quality. Using another metric, teacher effectiveness is about a quarter as variable as pupil effectiveness. However, a teacher's effectiveness influences the GCSE outcomes of the entire class, and so the teacher's effectiveness has greater leverage.

The next section reviews the current datasets used and highlights the advantages and disadvantages of ours; we also summarise the results from these studies. Section 3 discusses our own dataset, and section 4 the econometric approach. Section 5 presents the results. In the Conclusion, we discuss the implications of these results for policy on teacher effectiveness, teacher selection, and for the incentivisation of teachers.

## 2. Evidence

As we have noted, the data required to estimate the effectiveness of teachers are complex. Early studies, surveyed by Hanushek (2002), had to work with data that did not allow complete controls for the characteristics of students and the allocation of students to teachers. Recent analysis has been hugely helped by the use of administrative data, and a small set of recent papers have pushed the field forward a
great deal. Rothstein (2008), however, sounds a cautionary note, arguing that there is strong non-random sorting within schools, and that in some cases the estimated teacher effects do not have persistent effects on attainment. Recent research includes notably Aaronson, Barrow and Sander (2007) (ABS), Kane, Rockoff and Staiger (2007) (KRS), Rivkin, Hanushek and Kain (2005) RHK and Rockoff (2004). Whilst Clotfelter et al $(2006,2007)$ follow a different methodology, they also use state-wide administrative data from North Carolina. The analysis presented here builds on these foundations and provides new evidence from a dataset that in some ways offers better features than those currently available.

Rockoff (2004) estimates teacher effectiveness using data from two school districts in New Jersey over the years 1989/90 to 2000/01 covering grades 2 to 6 . The data allow individual teachers to be matched with their pupils for each year of the study. A drawback of using elementary (primary) school data is that typically students are only taught by one teacher. This means that it is not possible to estimate the effects of multiple teachers on the same student in different subjects at the same time. Rockoff finds that a one standard deviation increase in teacher quality results in a 0.11 standard deviation increase in reading and writing test results. Teacher experience is found to a have a significant positive effect on maths and reading exam results, but no other observable teacher characteristics are found to have significant effects.
RHK use a large dataset that spans grades 3 to 7 , for three cohorts of a total of half a million students across 3000 schools in Texas. Their data does not match individual students to individual teachers, only to a set of teachers in a grade within a school. This is likely to attenuate estimated teacher effects. Their lower bound estimate implies a one standard deviation increase in teacher quality is associated with 0.11 and 0.095 standard deviation increases annual growth in achievement in maths and English respectively in grade 4. They find a significant negative effect of inexperience in maths teachers, and a smaller negative effect for English teachers. However the qualifications of teachers were found to have no significant effect.

The context studied by Aaronson et al (2007) is ninth-grade maths scores in one school district in Chicago over a three year period. Key advantages of their data are the ability to link students with the actual teacher that taught them, and the availability of prior attainment data, which they assume absorbs student heterogeneity. They find that an increase in teacher quality of one standard deviation above the mean is associated with 0.15 standard deviation increase in the maths test score.

Clotfelter et al $(2006,2007)$ take a different approach and directly regress student outcomes on teacher characteristics including teacher credentials, following the educational production function approach. They have longitudinal data across grades 3 to 5 from North Carolina data and use student fixed effects to deal with potential non-random matching of students and teachers. They find that teacher certification matters and has an important effect on test scores.

In comparison to RHK, we can match students to actual teachers. In comparison to ABS: our data matches students and their actual teachers like theirs, relates to high school education like theirs, and also contains prior attainment data, and, like theirs, is not nationally representative. There are three important differences. First, they make it clear that their ninth-grade maths scores are not high stakes tests, whereas the exams that we study matter a great deal, both for student and school. This makes it more relevant for policy discussions. While in principle it also raises the worry of cheating, the exams are nationally set and marked outside the school by national bodies, leaving little scope for systematic manipulation. Second, we observe the same student taking exams in three different subjects contemporaneously. We therefore do not need to rely on over-time student "fixed effects" being actually fixed over a period of time when student abilities can change rapidly. Relative to R , in our data the multiple subjects are taught by different teachers, so allowing us to compare the same student paired with different teachers. As mentioned, we use subject-specific prior attainment as well, so we believe that this approach deals quite thoroughly with variations in student ability and non-random allocation. On the other hand, we do have to make assumptions about the correlation of student abilities in different subjects. We detail the approaches we take to this below. Third, ABS carry out their own teacher-student matching, and achieve a $75 \%$ match. For us, the match was done in the school, and by the school, typically by the school secretary or administrative computing team.

## 3. Data

The data contains the exam results for 7,305 pupils and 740 teachers across 33 schools in England. ${ }^{3}$ These are state secondary schools in England over 1999 to 2002. Schools were asked to provide the GCSE and Keystage 3 (KS3) results in Maths,

[^1]Science and English. The GCSE exams (also known as Keystage 4) are taken at age 16 in a number of different subjects. They are the key gateway exams into higher education as well as being important in the labour market. It is compulsory to take GCSEs in English, Maths and Science. Keystage 3 exams are taken at age 14 just prior to the start of the GCSE programme and are also compulsorily taken in English, maths and science. The Keystage 3 test scores are widely used as a measure of prior attainment when studying GCSE scores, and we follow that practice here. These are all nationally set and marked exams.

We requested two tranches of this data. First, test scores of pupils who took their GCSEs in 1999, along with the pupil's date of birth, gender and postcode (zip code). The schools were asked again in 2002/3 for the same information on the tranche of pupils who took their GCSEs in 2002. Schools were also asked to provide details of students' classes, including a teacher id, the teacher's age, gender, length of tenure, salary, and spine point (a point on a nationwide teacher pay scale). Given the demanding data requirements, only a small sample of schools responded and provided full data. Whilst not very different to the overall set of schools, there are some differences and there is no presumption that the sample is representative of all English secondary schools. ${ }^{4}$

The data linking pupils to teachers are class lists, provided by schools. Classes typically differ by subject - that is, a pupil will have different peers and different teachers for each subject. Each pupil may have more than one teacher per subject over the two years of the course. The mean number of teachers per pupil is 4.13 over these three subjects, and the modal number is 5 . Essentially, an observation is a pupilteacher match, or equivalently a pupil-subject-teacher match as each teacher only teaches one subject. But there is some variety of practice across schools in terms of the number of teachers a pupil has, particularly in science. Because of this, the individual pupil-teacher observations are weighted so that each exam result has equal weight regardless of the number of teachers that contributed. That is, if a student has $n$ teachers, each pupil-teacher observation is weighted by $1 / n$. Each of a student's teachers for a single subject is assumed to contribute equally. In summary, the data used in the initial regression contain 25,770 unique exam results, 30,149 pupil-teacher matches and 52,613 unweighted observations. The mean number of observations per pupil is 7.20 , with $95 \%$ of pupils having at least 6 observations. In the subsequent

[^2]tables we calculate the sum of the regression weights for each teacher and use this total to calculate the weighted variance.

The pupil and teacher data were matched at teacher level by and in the school. We also match in school level variables from the National Pupil Database (NPD). Finally, data from the Database of Teacher Records were later matched in to provide information on teachers' education.

Some brief descriptive statistics are given for the key variables in Table 1. Note the different metrics that GCSE points and KS3 exams are measured in. There are a number of missing values, most importantly for some of the teacher characteristics. Teacher characteristics are generally well measured, other than salary and education history for which we have a large number of missing values. We deal with these by retaining the observation in the analysis, replacing the missing by an appropriate value and including an indicator for each missing variable. At pupil level, we omit pupils with missing KS3 or GCSE score; there are no missing school variables.

## 4. Method

## a. Measuring the variation in teacher effectiveness

We start from a simple and standard assumption about the factors involved in generating a particular test score outcome for each pupil in each subject. This follows Aaronson et al (2007), and is standard if rather complex in terms of the number of levels of variation in the data. Let $G_{i t z j s}$ denote the GCSE score of pupil $i$ in cohort $t$ in subject $z$, taught by teacher $j$, in school $s$; let $K_{\text {itzs }}$ denote the corresponding prior attainment (KS3) score of that pupil in that cohort in that subject and school ${ }^{5}$. We assume that test scores are generated as follows:

$$
\begin{equation*}
G_{i t z j s}=\lambda K_{i t z s}+\alpha_{i}+\phi_{j}+\psi_{s}+\delta Z+\beta t+\varepsilon_{i t z j s} \tag{1}
\end{equation*}
$$

There are a number of issues and assumptions involved here. We include dummy variables to allow for differences in mean scores by subject, $\delta Z$, and over the two

[^3]cohort/time periods, $\beta t$. As the residual error term, $\varepsilon_{i t r j s}$ is likely to be correlated across each pupils' three exam results, we cluster standard deviations at individual level.

The inclusion of prior attainment means that we are focussing here on the impact of the teacher on pupil progress or value-added. Prior attainment captures some of the school effect, the effect of previous teachers' inputs and also the pupil's own ability and prior effort.

We can identify pupil fixed effects, $\alpha$, as we observe each pupil across three subjects at the same point in time. This subsumes the influence on progress of unobserved pupil ability and effort, and family background. The issue here is whether it is appropriate to assume that this has the same impact across all three subjects; whether, in other words, able pupils are good at everything, and less able ones score low at everything. We can use national data from the pupil census (PLASC/NPD) data to get a view of the appropriateness of these two approaches. Pairwise correlations between GCSE points on these three subjects are as follows: English and Maths, 0.768, English and Science 0.793, and Maths and Science 0.848. These high values suggest that there is a high level of commonality in achievement in GCSEs and that therefore the way we use the pupil fixed effects may not be unreasonable. Any common subject level differences are swept up into the teacher effects and purged in the second stage regression.

An alternative is to not include pupil fixed effects, but to include our two observed pupil characteristics, gender and within-year age. It means that we do not control for unobserved pupil differences (for example, effort) and therefore implicitly assumes that these are conditionally randomly distributed across teachers, conditional on KS3, gender and age. Denoting the vector of pupil observables as $\mathbf{X}$, this involves estimating:

$$
\begin{equation*}
G_{i z j s t}=\lambda K_{i t z s}+\mathbf{a} \mathbf{X}_{i}+\phi_{j}+\psi_{s}+\delta Z+\beta t+\varepsilon_{i z j s t} \tag{2}
\end{equation*}
$$

The focus of our analysis is on the role of teacher fixed effects, $\phi$, and school fixed effects, $\psi$. The former captures in a very general way the influence of a specific teacher on pupil progress, relative to other teachers in the sample. Note that this formulation assumes that a given teacher is equally effective for all pupils, which may
or may not be the case. We provide some indirect evidence on this potential heterogeneity below. The latter captures factors common across the school that might influence progress. For example, the school ethos, resources and facilities, disciplinary policy and selection policy may all influence student outcomes.

We observe teachers linked to multiple pupils. For a subset of teachers, we also observe them in both cohorts, three years apart. However, by construction in our sample, all teachers remain in the same school over the two periods. This means that it is impossible to separately identify a pure teacher effect and a school effect. This problem is also faced in different ways by some of the other papers mentioned above. What we observe is the sum of the two: $\tau_{j}=\left(\phi_{j}+\psi_{s(j)}\right)$. We pursue two strategies to isolate the variation in true teacher effectiveness. First, we report the within-school variation in the estimated values of $\tau_{j}$, that is, the variance of $\left(\tau_{j}-\bar{\tau}_{s(j)}\right)$. This nets out all school level factors, and provides a lower bound to the degree of variation. For example, if schools hired teachers randomly then this measure would reflect the true overall variation in teacher effectiveness. But if, as seems more likely, good teachers cluster together and less able teachers cluster together, then the within-school variance will be lower than the true overall variation.

Second, we use a subsidiary regression to purge observable school effects from the measure. That is, we regress $\tau_{j}$ on $\mathbf{W}_{\mathbf{s}}$, a set of school level variables, take the residual as the estimate of teacher effectiveness, $v_{j}=\tau_{j}-\mathbf{b} \mathbf{W}_{s(j)}$, and examine the variation in that.

These two approaches give us two estimates of the variability in teacher effectiveness. Comparing them, the within-school measure will be lower than the residual variance, both because we do not observe all relevant school factors (so some are left in the error term), and because there is likely to be between-school variation as well.

## b. Explaining the variation in teacher effectiveness

One of the interesting results emerging in this literature is that teacher effectiveness is not closely related to observable teacher characteristics such as teaching qualifications. Our data include information on age, experience and gender, whether
the teacher has a degree, and what class and subject that degree was taken in. We will test whether these variables have any explanatory power of teacher effectiveness.

## 5. Results

## a. Estimating Teacher Effects

We present the results of the initial estimation in Table 2; these are the empirical counterparts of equations (1) and (2). Column (1) includes pupil fixed effects and the subject-specific prior attainment, whereas column (2) has observable pupil characteristics (gender and within-year age) rather than the fixed effect. The results are as expected - subject-specific prior attainment matters very significantly, the role of prior attainment is reduced with the inclusion of pupil fixed effects, and female pupils and older pupils score more highly.

In terms of variability, the standard deviation of GCSE scores is 1.722 GCSE points ${ }^{6}$, and the standard deviation of the residuals is 0.493 points in the pupil fixed effects estimation and 0.934 points with the observable characteristics. We also present the inter-quartile range (IQR) as a measure of variability. The IQR is 2 GCSE points for the dependent variable and 0.570 points and 1.113 points for the residuals respectively.

## b. Variability in Teacher Effects, 1

Table 3 focusses on the estimated teacher effects from these regressions. Note that these are in fact estimates of $\tau_{j}=\left(\phi_{j}+\psi_{s(j)}\right)$; that is, they also include school factors which we deal with shortly and we postpone the detailed interpretation of our estimates of teacher effectiveness variability until after that. This brief discussion deals with the results from specification (1), the pupil fixed effects regression, but most of the comments apply equally to both pupil-level models.

In column (1) of the Table, the standard deviation of teacher effects is 0.534 GCSE points, and the IQR is 0.710 points. We argued above that a lower bound on variability is the variation within schools of teacher effectiveness. Table 3 shows that

[^4]this is 0.354 GCSE points, in column (1), 0.541 in column (2). This estimate is one of our key findings. We can also express this relative to the variation in pupil effects. In fact, within-school teacher effectiveness is about a third as variable as pupil effectiveness, 0.354 relative to 1.088 .

We also present an adjusted standard deviation. As Kane and Staiger (2002), Rockoff (2004) and Aaronson et al (2007) all argue, the variance of the estimated teacher effects includes sampling variation as well as the true variation in teacher effectiveness. This can be particularly the case for teacher effects estimated from small numbers of pupils. In our case, most teachers are estimated from reasonably large numbers: 572 teachers with at least 40 observations, and only 30 teachers with fewer than 20.

Nevertheless, we follow the approach used by Aaronson et al (2007, p. 111) to deal with the issue. We assume that the estimated teacher effect is the sum of the true underlying effectiveness and a sampling error, uncorrelated with the true value. The variance of the true effectiveness is then simply the estimated variance minus the average sampling variance. Again following ABS, we use the mean of the square of the standard error estimates of the teacher fixed effects as the estimate of the average sampling error variance and subtract this from the observed variance to yield the adjusted variance, and then present the adjusted standard deviation.

We see from Table 3, column (1) that the adjusted variance is 0.395 , a reduction of $26 \%$ from the unadjusted value. In column (2), the adjusted variance is 0.730 , a fall of $12 \%$. The teacher effects are more precisely estimated in column (2) as we are not estimating the 7305 pupil fixed effects, so correcting for sampling error has less effect.

There is no obvious way of separately adjusting the within-school variance. It is useful to have an estimate of the adjusted within-school variance to compare below. To generate a rough estimate, we simply split the adjustment factor of 0.139 proportionately between the within and between variances, and subtract these. This gives a value of 0.288 in column (1) ( $0.354-0.139^{*}(0.354 /(0.354+0.388))$ and 0.496 in column (2).

## c. Removing School Factors

Our second strategy to isolate teacher effectiveness from $\tau_{j}$ is to remove the effects of observable school factors through regression. The regression results in Table 4 are largely as one would expect, and we do not dwell on them here. In order to deal with the sampling variability problem, we adjust the estimated teacher effects prior to this regression. We multiplied each estimated teacher effect by the ratio of the estimated overall variance and the adjusted variance as described in section 5 b above. We then used that as the dependent variable in the regression, and analyse the residual standard deviation below. It is important to note that the individual effect of, say, being a pupil eligible for free school meals is already captured by the pupil fixed effect, and the coefficient on the school percentage of FSM pupils is therefore picking up more general factors correlated with the school's location, intake and teacher mix. Second, the standard errors reported here for the estimated coefficients have not been corrected for the fact that the dependent variable is estimated. Thus, inference using these will not be secure, but this is not our main purpose here.

## d. Variability in Teacher Effects, 2

We now present our main results in Table 5. These are corrected for sampling variability and purged of observable school factors. The standard deviation of teacher effectiveness is 0.326 GCSE points in column (1), 0.514 in column (2). These can be compared to the adjusted within-school variation estimated in section b above at 0.288 (column 1), and 0.496 (column 2). We would expect the within-school calculation to be lower for two reasons: it eliminates all school factors, whereas the regression approach deals with the measured factors in our data; and there is very likely to be between-school variation reflecting clustering of teachers in schools by ability. Nevertheless, it is reassuring that the different ways of dealing with pupil ability and the different methods of removing school factors lead to estimates that are roughly similar.

We can interpret the size of these in a number of different ways. First, take the IQR as a measure of the gain per pupil per subject from having a 'good' teacher (defined as being at the $75^{\text {th }}$ percentile) relative to a 'poor' teacher (defined as being at the $25^{\text {th }}$
percentile). This is 0.425 GCSE points in column 1 and 0.649 in column 2. These are not trivial numbers: a pupil taking 8 GCSEs and taught by 8 'good' teachers will score 3.4 more GCSE points than the same pupil in the same school taught by 8 'poor' teachers. The IQR is $24.7 \%$ of the standard deviation of GCSE scores. Obviously, the gain per pupil per subject is greater still looking at the extreme range: comparing a teacher at the $95^{\text {th }}$ percentile with one at the $5^{\text {th }}$ percentile, this is 1.070 or 1.766 .

Second, we can view the variation in teacher effectiveness relative to the variation in pupil 'effectiveness', the latter measured as the pupil fixed effect. The Table shows that this is 0.254 comparing the standard deviations and 0.262 comparing the IQRs. Teacher effectiveness is one quarter as variable as pupil effectiveness. This seems reasonable and is in line with other findings that the single most important influence on the test outcome is the pupil's own characteristics. However, a teacher's effectiveness influences the GCSE outcomes of more pupils - around 30 per class. Hence there is greater leverage for the teacher's effectiveness to matter.

Third, we can compare the within-school and between-school variability in effectiveness. As we would expect, the within-school variation having purged schoollevel effects is essentially the same as in the raw teacher effects, 0.249 . We can also express this as a proportion of the within-school variation in pupil effectiveness, 1.088. So again, variability in teacher effectiveness is a quarter of the variability in pupil effectiveness. Equally as we would expect, while the between-school variation is considerably reduced from 0.315 in table $3^{7}$ to 0.213 in Table 5 , the purging of a wide range of observable school factors has not reduced the between-school variability to zero. It is not possible to identify in this data whether this is because there are important remaining differences between schools, or that average teacher effectiveness differs between the schools in our sample. Both are likely to be true, but we cannot say in what proportion.

We have also explored a number of dimensions of heterogeneity. Tables are not reported here but are available from the authors. First, we split the pupils into thirds of initial ability, and re-run the analysis separately for these groups, including both the first stage regression on pupils and the analysis of teacher effectiveness variability. The results show that teachers are marginally more important for the top third and the lowest third of the ability distribution, though the differences are not large. The key

[^5]numbers for Table 5, column 1 are standard deviations of 0.423 for the highest ability third, 0.327 for the middle and 0.475 for the lowest third. Note that Aaronson et al also find variations in teacher quality to be more important for low ability students.

## e. Explaining Teacher Effectiveness

We now finally explore whether any of the few observable teacher characteristics that we have are correlated with estimated teaching effectiveness: gender, age, experience, and education. We include these variables alongside the school factors in a regression on the estimated teacher effects from table 2. The results are in Table 6. In fact, none of these variables play any statistically significant role in explaining teacher effectiveness, other than very low levels of experience showing a negative effect.

Finally, for the sub-sample of teachers that we see in both cohorts, we can test directly for the influence of class composition on outcomes and on our estimates of teacher effectiveness. Our use of prior attainment in the pupil-level regression means that we are estimating teacher impact on pupil progress, and this removes the first-order effect of class 'quality' on the outcome. Also, by controlling for pupil fixed effects, we are taking out pupil heterogeneity completely. Nevertheless, it could be that there are class-level effects on progress. In tables available from the authors, we include class mean prior attainment in the analysis of Table 4 and Table 5. In the regressions in Table 4, mean prior attainment is significant but small. Consequently, the impact on measured teacher effectiveness is also minor, changing the estimated variability in the specification of column 1, Table 5 from 0.326 to 0.315 .

## 6. Conclusion

Do schools matter? Do teachers matter? Or are education outcomes largely driven by family and home? We have focussed on the second question here, on the impact on test scores of being taught by high or low quality ${ }^{8}$ teachers. We have shown that teachers matter a great deal: having a one-standard deviation better teacher raises the test score by (at least) $25 \%$ of a standard deviation. Having a good teacher as opposed

[^6]to a mediocre or poor teacher makes a big difference. Raising average teacher quality does seem a promising direction for public policy. Of course, it does not necessarily follow that schools matter. If teacher quality is randomly distributed across schools ${ }^{9}$, then school assignment is unimportant, and teacher assignment within school is crucial. But this seems most unlikely: it seems much more likely that teachers will tend to cluster by quality to some degree. This might arise through schools' hiring policies or through teacher job acceptance decisions. We cannot answer this question definitively in this dataset as we cannot distinguish mean teacher effects within a school from unmeasured school factors ${ }^{10}$.

Nevertheless, showing the importance of teacher quality for the high-stakes GCSE outcomes means that family background is not everything. The same student, bringing to bear the skills derived from her home and family, can systematically score significantly different marks in different subjects given different teacher quality. Rivkin et al (2005) relate the teacher quality measure to the socioeconomic gap in outcomes, and that comparison is informative here too. The gap in GCSE points between a poor and non-poor student is 6.08 GCSE points. Suppose this gap arises over 8 subjects that they both take. If the poor student had good $\left(75^{\text {th }}\right.$ percentile teachers) for all 8 subjects and the non-poor student had poor ( $25^{\text {th }}$ percentile teachers) for all 8 , this would make up 3.4 points. This is a powerful effect, and not one typically addressed in explanations of the socioeconomic education gap. School and teacher assignment could in principle have a strong role to play in alleviating unequal outcomes.

By the same token, the assignment of pupils to teachers of varying quality may be an important part in generating the socio-economic attainment gaps in the first place. We can test this idea, correlating within-school differences in teacher quality with withinschool differences in class mean prior attainment (we do not have pupil level poverty status). Taking out school means of both teacher quality and class mean initial score, we find a correlation of +0.23 between the average ability of the class that a teacher is assigned and that teacher's quality ${ }^{11}$. This will map quite closely on to a correlation between teacher quality and the pupil's socio-economic status. Schools face quite complex incentives for teacher allocation, with the key public quality measure being

[^7]the fraction of pupils getting at least 5 C grades. It would therefore be valuable to allocate the best teachers to those pupils close to the C/D borderline. The implication of this for the allocation of teacher quality and the evolution of the socio-economic test score gap is an issue for future research.

We have shown that the observed characteristics of teachers in our data do not predict our measure of their quality well. Whilst we have relatively few characteristics, some other authors with much richer datasets in that regard confirm this finding (see in particular Kane, Rockoff and Staiger, 2007). By contrast, Clotfelter et al $(2006,2007)$ find that teacher qualifications do have a significant effect. In the 2007 paper, they argue that teacher credentials exhibit a large effect compared to the effect of changing class size or of parental education, particularly in maths. This debate has important implications for improving average teacher quality that previous authors have also drawn out. The findings show that it may be hard to identify good teachers ex ante, but that administrative data can be used to identify them ex post. This suggests a greater role for performance management and personnel policies in schools. This might include a stronger role for pupil progress analysis in probationary periods, mentoring, more stringent hiring procedures or sharper performance pay using such data. However, the cautions of Kane and Staiger (2002) on the folly of basing important decisions on the small samples of such data in a single school need always to be borne in mind.

Clearly, further research with richer data may well uncover some important elements of a teacher's training or personality that do help to predict quality better. The data required to carry out the present study were very extensive, complex and difficult to obtain. Nevertheless, repeating or extending the exercise would appear to be of great value.

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Table 1: Descriptive statistics


## Table 2 - Pupil-level regression

| Dep. Var: GCSE Points score | Pupil Fixed <br> effects <br> $(1)$ | Pupil <br> Characteristics <br> $(2)$ |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
| Prior attainment (subject | 0.07 | $0.16^{* * *}$ |
| specific) | $(34.8)$ | $(83.9)$ |
| Female |  | $0.12^{* * *}$ |
|  | No | $(5.9)$ |
| Month of birth dummies? |  | Yes |
|  |  |  |
| Pupil effects? | Yes | No |
| Subject effects? | Yes | Yes |
| Teacher effects? | No | Yes |
| School effects? | No | Yes |
| Year effects? | 52,613 | Yes |
| Observations | 0.918 | 52,613 |
| $R^{2}$ | 7,305 | 0.706 |
| Number of pupils | 740 | 7,305 |
| Number of teachers | 1.722 | 740 |
| Std. dev. GCSE points | 2.000 | 1.722 |
| IQR GCSE points | 0.493 | 2.000 |
| Std. dev. Residuals | 0.570 | 0.934 |
| IQR residuals | 9.916 | 1.113 |
| Chi2 H ${ }_{0}$ : all Teacher effects=0 |  | 7.789 |
|  |  |  |

Notes:

1) Robust t-statistics clustered at individual pupil level in parentheses.
2) $\mathrm{p}<0.05,{ }^{* *} \mathrm{p}<0.01, * * * \mathrm{p}<0.001$
3) Each observation is weighted by $g_{k} / N_{k}$, where $N_{k}$ is the number of observations for grade in subject $k$, and $g_{k}$ is the number of exam results for that subject. (1 for Maths and English, 1-3 for science.)

## Table 3: Variability in teacher effectiveness, 1

| Units: GCSE points | (1) <br> Pupil fixed <br> effects | $(2)$ <br> Pupil <br> characteristics |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
| Teacher plus school effects: | 0.534 | 0.825 |
| Standard deviation | 0.395 | 0.730 |
| Adjusted standard deviation <br> Interquartile range (P75 - P25) <br> Extreme range (P95 - P5) | 0.710 | 1.248 |
| Relative variation: | 1.707 | 2.792 |
| Std dev of teacher effects relative to std dev of |  |  |
| residuals from Table 2 regression |  |  |
| IQR of teacher effects relative to IQR of <br> residuals from Table 2 regression | 1.083 | 0.883 |
|  | 1.247 | 1.121 |
| Std dev of teacher effects relative to std dev of <br> pupil effects from Table 2 regression |  |  |
| IQR of teacher effects relative to IQR of pupil <br> effects from Table 2 regression | 0.416 |  |
| Within- and between-school variation | 0.438 |  |
| Within school std dev <br> Between school std dev <br> Pupil within school std dev <br> Pupil between school std dev | 0.354 | 0.541 |
| Notes: |  |  |
| 1) Unadjusted for sampling variation, other than the specified row. |  |  |
| 2) Weighted by the teacher specific sum of weights from table 2. |  |  |
| 3) Based on the estimated teacher effects from Table 2. |  |  |

Table 4: Removing school factors

| Dep. Var.: Adjusted teacher effects from Table 2 | Pupil fixed effects <br> (1) | Pupil Characteristics <br> (2) |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Catholic school | $-0.264^{* * *}$ | $0.271^{* * *}$ |
|  | (0.040) | (0.062) |
| Church of England school | -0.082 | -0.352** |
|  | (0.045) | (0.127) |
| Selective school | -0.266** | -0.280* |
|  | (0.082) | (0.116) |
| Girls school | -0.128 | 0.058 |
|  | (0.109) | (0.156) |
| Urban school | $0.122^{* *}$ | $0.494 * *$ |
|  | (0.041) | (0.068) |
| \% Pupils with special | -0.006* | $0.014^{* * *}$ |
| educational needs | (0.003) | (0.004) |
| \% Pupils eligible for free | -0.014** | 0.023* |
| school meals | (0.005) | (0.010) |
| \% Chinese pupils | -0.120 | -0.084 |
|  | (0.065) | (0.101) |
| \% Bangladeshi pupils | -0.158 | -0.143 |
|  | (0.112) | (0.182) |
| \% Pakistani pupils | 0.010 | -0.159** |
|  | (0.054) | (0.061) |
| \% Indian pupils | 0.002 | $0.039^{*}$ |
|  | (0.009) | (0.016) |
| \% Black African pupils | 0.049 | -0.305*** |
|  | (0.038) | (0.052) |
| \% Black Caribbean pupils | -0.054*** | -0.023 |
|  | (0.013) | (0.019) |
| \% Other Black pupils | $0.104 *$ | $0.184^{* *}$ |
|  | (0.047) | (0.064) |
| \% Other ethnicity pupils | 0.049 | 0.021 |
|  | (0.034) | (0.054) |
| First tranche | 0.085 | 0.084 |
|  | (0.065) | (0.112) |
| Subject $=$ English | $0.233 * * *$ | $-0.600^{* * *}$ |
|  | (0.032) | (0.050) |
| Subject $=$ Maths | 0.006 | 0.131* |
|  | (0.033) | (0.053) |
| Size of school/10 | 0.000 | -0.003*** |
|  | (0.000) | (0.000) |
| Observations | 740 | 740 |
| R-Squared | 0.318 | 0.504 |

Notes:

1) Robust standard errors in parentheses
2) ${ }^{*} p<0.05,{ }^{* *} p<0.01,{ }^{* * *} p<0.001$
3) Regression weighted by the sum of the weights from the regression in table 2.
4) Ex ante adjustment, [teacher effect * (adjusted variance/unadjusted variance)]

## Table 5: Variability in teacher effectiveness, 2

| Units: GCSE points | Pupil fixed <br> effects <br> $(1)$ | Pupil <br> characteristics <br> $(2)$ |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
| Teacher effects: | 0.326 | 0.514 |
| Standard deviation | 0.425 | 0.649 |
| Interquartile range (P75 - P25) | 1.070 | 1.766 |
| Extreme range (P95 - P5) |  |  |
| Relative variation: | 0.662 | 0.550 |
| Std dev of teacher effects relative to std dev of <br> residuals from Table 2 regression | 0.746 | 0.583 |
| IQR of teacher effects relative to IQR of <br> residuals from Table 2 regression | 0.254 |  |
| Std dev of teacher effects relative to std dev of <br> pupil effects from Table 2 regression | 0.262 |  |
| IQR of teacher effects relative to IQR of pupil <br> effects from Table 2 regression | 0.249 | 0.379 |
| Within- and between-school variation | 0.213 | 0.351 |
| Within school std dev <br> Between school std dev |  |  |

Notes:

1) Ex ante variance adjustment, [teacher effect * (adjusted variance/unadjusted variance)]
2) Weighted by the sum of the weights from the regression in table 2.
3) Conditional on school characteristics, ie. based on the residuals from Table 4, columns 1, 2.

## Table 6: Explaining teacher fixed effects

Dependent Variable: adjusted teacher fixed effects from Table 2

|  | Pupil fixed effects <br> (1) | Pupil characteristics <br> (2) |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Teacher female | 0.019 | 0.031 |
|  | (0.031) | (0.051) |
| Age | 0.001 | -0.006 |
|  | (0.007) | (0.011) |
| Age squared | -0.000 | -0.000 |
|  | (0.000) | (0.000) |
| One years experience | $-0.190^{* * *}$ | -0.014 |
|  | (0.050) | (0.090) |
| 2-4 years experience | -0.038 | -0.013 |
|  | (0.045) | (0.081) |
| 5-10 years experience | 0.023 | 0.019 |
|  | (0.060) | (0.079) |
| 10-15 years experience | 0.014 | 0.075 |
|  | (0.070) | (0.102) |
| Experience squared | -0.000 | -0.000 |
|  | (0.000) | (0.001) |
| Experience cubed | $0.000$ | $0.000$ |
|  | (0.000) | (0.000) |
| Subject $=$ Maths | 0.091 | 0.053 |
|  | (0.083) | (0.132) |
| Subject $=$ English | 0.073 | 0.150 |
|  | (0.091) | (0.137) |
| Degree class: $0.185^{*}$ |  |  |
| First class | $0.185^{*}$ | 0.250 |
|  | (0.089) | (0.149) |
| Second class | 0.030 | 0.054 |
|  | (0.037) | (0.062) |
| Science Degree | 0.026 | 0.053 |
|  | (0.050) | (0.078) |
| Social Sci Degree | 0.001 | -0.025 |
|  | (0.103) | (0.131) |
| Language Degree | 0.073 | -0.188 |
|  | (0.059) | (0.102) |
| Salary band | 0.000 | 0.000 |
|  | (0.000) | (0.000) |
| School factors | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 740 | 740 |
| R-Squared | 0.368 | 0.539 |

## Notes:

1) Robust standard errors in parentheses
2) ${ }^{*} p<0.05,{ }^{* *} p<0.01,{ }^{* * *} p<0.001$
3) School factors also included as in Table 4
4) Regression weighted by the sum of the weights from the regression in table 2.
5) Ex ante variance adjustment, [teacher effect * (adjusted variance/unadjusted variance)]

## Appendix Table 1: Data Requested

| Information | Level |
| :--- | :--- |
| Class lists for year 10 in 1997/8 and year 11 in 1998/9, <br> with pupil identifiers and teacher identifiers | pupil |
| Class lists for year 10 in 2000/1 and year 11 in 2001/2, <br> with pupil identifiers and teacher identifiers | pupil |
| Pupil test/exam scores for Key Stage 3 in 1996/7 and <br> GCSE 1998/9, for all English, maths and science subjects, <br> with pupil identifiers | pupil |
| Pupil test/exam scores for Key Stage 3 in 1999/00 and <br> GCSE 2001/02, for all English, maths and science <br> subjects, with pupil identifiers | pupil |
| Supplementary information for each pupil: date of birth, <br> gender, postcode. With pupil identifier | pupil |
| Teachers characteristics at 1 September 1999: age, gender, <br> salary, experience, spine point, whether applied for <br> Performance Threshold. With teacher identifier | teacher |


[^0]:    ${ }^{1}$ Particularly since the Coleman report (1966).
    ${ }^{2}$ Throughout this paper we use teacher "quality" as shorthand for the impact on test scores, and we are clear that it says nothing about a teacher's wider contributions to the school.

[^1]:    ${ }^{3}$ This bespoke dataset was collected by CMPO for a project evaluating the introduction of performance pay (the "Performance Threshold") for teachers. This project is described in Atkinson et al (2009).

[^2]:    ${ }^{4}$ Atkinson et al (2004) compares the achieved sample to all state secondary schools.

[^3]:    ${ }^{5}$ We could write K as G from the prior grade level as that is what it is, but adding a further subscript seems unnecessary.

[^4]:    ${ }^{6}$ In all the results presented, the metric is GCSE points: an increase from one grade to the next, say a B to an A, is one point.

[^5]:    ${ }^{7}$ The value in the table of 0.388 has been adjusted for sampling variation as described in section 5 b.

[^6]:    ${ }^{8}$ Throughout, we use teacher "quality" to mean the impact on test scores, and we are clear that it says nothing about a wider contribution to the school.

[^7]:    ${ }^{9}$ And if schools add little on top of teacher quality.
    ${ }^{10}$ The fact that we show the between-school variance is larger than the within-school is driven by both unmeasured school-level factors and differences in the average quality of teachers across schools.
    ${ }^{11}$ Using the pupil fixed-effects specification; it is 0.49 in the alternative specification.

