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When Military Restrain the Rule: Philosophy and Indications

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ABSTRACT

It was concluded in the literature that military is merely a symptom of underlying political difficulties, a neutral force, which mechanically moves into the political area when a vacuum is created. Armed forces took control over the political management only in those economies where magnitude of military power was greater in relation with the size of economy: a higher defense expenditure to GDP ratio lead the control of political management by armed forces.

I: Evaluation of Coupology

The study of the causes of military rule has become an important topic in the academic research and literature during the last forty years. Academic research in this field developed a new science – Coupology – for study of the rule, consequences and causes of military regimes in scientific manners. Academic scholars have different views about military take over. Guillermo O'Donnell (1978) has argued that large-scale heavy industrialization and economic development may, in fact, be associated with military take-over, rather than the emerging of representative institutions. Scholars such as Talcott Parsons, Gabriel Almond and David Easton held that military activity should be understood as the result of basic societal imbalances, which could only be corrected by changes in the underlying system (McAlister: 1966).

The literature on military intervention assumes that the basic explanatory variables, the military and the domestic political process, are located within the boundaries of national societies. Such a formulation leaves little room for a conception of the considerable importance to the role of outside elements. The military is assumed to be neutral, unless provoked by a breakdown in societal equilibrium.

According to Huntington (1968), military intervention in politics, or political disorder, is the direct result of the inability of a country's political institutions to cope with the rising demands motivated by political participation resulting from economic and social change. This view assumed that the military is merely a symptom of underlying political difficulties, a neutral force, which mechanically moves into the political area when a vacuum is created. In Huntington's view, "the institutions created in Pakistan after 1958 were in large part the result of conscious political planning".

It was observed that military never intervened in the political management if safety valve was available in other form like power to dissolve the government. For instance, in Pakistan military never intervened in the political process and management in presence of the presidential power to dissolve the government in case of illegal and unconstitutional activities. Armed forces had intervened in Turkey for three times. They changed the constitution and regularized the system. Now there is no need of a military intervention and the system is running smoothly, because, now a safety valve and control mechanism is available in the system.

II: Theoretical Progress

The fact that the armed forces are powerful political factors with interests and stakes of their own, operating either individually, or in demonstration with other actors in society. Sometimes. Forces work even at cross purposes with each other. According to Geoffrey Barraclough (1985), the armed forces are the military arm of the civilian government. However, in most of the world and for most of the World's history, it would be nearer the truth to say that the government was the civilian arm of the military (Valenzuela: 1985). Finer (1982) addressed two important questions: first, what are the conditions that lead to surrender; and second, what are those that lead the military to intervene again at a subsequent date? Finer (1982) analyzed military intervention in terms of the interplay of two factors: the disposition of the military towards intervention and the social conditions, which invite or, conversely, prohibit military intervention. This obviously, permits a two-by-two matrix of the Yes-Yes, No-No, Yes-No, No-Yes variety, and Finer proceeded by filling the cells of this matrix with the various components of the two summary variables, 'dispositions' and 'societal conditions', what applies to military intervention into politics can be 'played-back' to explicate its extrusion. Sundhausen (1988) pointed out and derived the matrix of the factors of the political rule of military.

**Figure: I
Cofactor of the Military Rule**

| | Disposition | Societal Conditions |
|-----------------------------|--|---|
| Motivations | 1. Belief in civilian supremacy 2. Threat to cohesiveness 3. Lack of self-confidence | 1. Internal challenges 2. External factors |
| Necessary Conditions | 1. Internal consensus to withdraw 2. Adequate protection of corporate interests | Civilian organization to hand over. |

Geo-security is considered as a part of national security. Economic, political and social securities are parts of the national security. Moreover, a country can be automatically collapsed without any military action if it loses the ideology. It is important that military and paramilitary forces and the

intelligence agencies work for entire national security. Historical evidences on military surrenders confirm the validity of hypothesis that power of militancy is not sufficient without consideration of political, economic and social securities. Fall of the former Soviet Union, East Germany, Yugoslavia, and separation of East Pakistan from its West wing, down fall of Roman and Mughal empires accepted this hypothesis. Now it is not a secret that opponent forces weaken the economic, political and social infrastructures before a militancy action. So, armed forces cannot keep themselves isolate with the other parts of national security.

It is also a common observation that armed forces took control over the political management only in those economies where magnitude of military power was greater in relation with the size of economy: a higher defense expenditure to GDP ratio lead the control of political management by armed forces. The control over government by armed forces in Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nigeria, Cuba, Iraq, Libya, Korea, Vietnam, Philippines and Sudan confirm this corollary. It has been happening regardless of the continent, religion, economic ideology and political system of the countries. A higher 'Defense expenditure to GDP ratio is the only common factor in all those countries where military forces controlled over the government.

Figure: II
Political Governance in South Asia

| Country | Military Rule as a % of independent existence | Constitutional Amendments | | Cabinet size as a % of national assembly (Latest) |
|------------|---|------------------------------|-------------------|---|
| | | Present Constitution adopted | No. of Amendments | |
| Bangladesh | 60 | 1972/ 86 | 15 | 14 |
| India | 00 | 1950 | 78 | 07 |
| Pakistan | 50 | 1973/85 | 14 | 11 |
| Sri Lanka | 00 | 1978 | 16 | 13 |

Normally no one objects to the Calling in of the armed forces to the help of civilian authority in emergencies like earthquakes, floods, cyclone, and widespread civil disturbance. Even in developed countries where civilian state apparatus is better organized and experienced and more efficient armed forces are called out to help in emergencies to handle promptly and efficiently enough. The difference of opinions is due to transfer of the political governance from democratic institutions to the armed forces. This difference is based on the assumption that democracy is the only desirable system of government.

In fact, the apprehension from military rule is a creation of the cold war era, when communism was on its peak. In a large number of cases communism have been imposed through military revolution. This was the reason that democracy has been emphasized to provoke the forceful implementation of left wings' thought. Democracy has been being considered a desirable system

to oppose the communism. While, democracy is not important itself, it is important because of human welfare, economic development, personal freedom and the sense of protection. If a system (either democracy or military rule) provides those desirable properties, it would be acceptable by the peoples. If a government is promoting investment activities, providing economic welfare, protecting personal freedom, honoring intellectual property rights, providing good governance, it would be recognized by the society.

The armed forces usually enter politics when civilian political groups fail to legitimize themselves. When civilian institutions lack legitimacy, electoral support, and effective executive power, the militarization of civil affairs often occurs. The research in Defense Economics in the international context shows that there is no clear relation between political administration by the military and defense expenditure (West: 1992). It has also been observed that the political administration by the military has no harm for investment and stock market. Investment is directly concerned with economic and political stability. Military administration may provide a long-term stability. It is being emphasized in the economic and political debates in all over the world that democracy is one of the major factors of economic development. But, the history of democracy in Pakistan shows a dark picture of the economic development. The negative correlation between the democracy and economic development in the context of Pakistan implies that at least one of the following two corollaries should be accepted:

- 1) There is no significant relation between the democracy and economic development; or
- 2) Democracy has not been implemented in its real spirit.

III: Governance by Military in Pakistan

In Pakistan, rule by the military establishment has prevailed for almost half of the history. So, far as the present change in Pakistan is concerned, it matches the theoretical background of military interventions. Extraordinary steps are required to control extraordinary evils. In the light of the above mentioned scholarly contributions it can be mentioned that the change is a logical consequence of the political and social conditions in the country. It is quite logical and based on historical trends. The application of the "Theory of Necessity" is considered a valid option if a significant majority of the people accept it. According to a survey, 75 percent Pakistani favored the dismissal of Nawaz government.

Majority of the people believes that law and order situation will improve, but they do not hope that economic conditions would improve. There are two major causes behind this apprehension: (1) Peoples give importance to the opinions, evaluations and economic assistance by the international donor agencies. Their importance has been created in the people's minds, in fact more than 90 percent of the National Income of Pakistan depends on

domestic resources; (2) In past, peoples have been being assured that the economy would be improved, but it has been further deteriorated.

Social, political and judicial reforms are considered the catalyst for the economic development. It is important to note that an extreme black picture was observed on those catalytic fronts before the military takeover in 1999. More than seven lakh cases were pending in the courts. About 200 peoples had been killed in sectarian violence in a year. (Those were not Hindu-Muslim or Christian-Muslim violence). Thirty-six prisoners were died in the police custody during a year. Since 1985, five elections had been conducted and six assemblies were dissolved before the military takeover.

The laws legislated through the presidential ordinances were 300 percent of the laws enacted after the proceedings in the parliaments. While in a real democratic system parliament is the only law making body. Various standing committees on parliament are formed to scrutinize the bills for law making. The committees are seldom allowed to properly scrutinize bills, as they are debated in the parliament. Committee members themselves can be ill-qualified as they are selected on the basis of their standing in the party, factional backing, and personal links with the party leader and not on the basis of their educational background, professional experience, commitment to democratic principles or technocratic expertise.

Bureaucrats are the other major element of the political system of Pakistan. In fact, they should be policy executors and not policy makers. But, in Pakistan the extent of bureaucratic involvement in politics is exceptionally high. For instance in Pakistan, eight heads of state, four of which were generals and four senior bureaucrats, had dismissed eleven Prime Ministers.

Figure: III
Cabinets' Structure in Pakistan

| Period | As a % of cabinet size | |
|---------|------------------------|-------------|
| | Feudal | Businessmen |
| 1985-88 | 44 | 10 |
| 1988-90 | 34 | 04 |
| 1990-93 | 32 | 20 |
| 1993-96 | 45 | 07 |
| 1997-99 | 32 | 20 |
| 2002-03 | 16 | 18 |

Figure: IV
Level of education of the parliamentarians (%)

| Level of Education | India | Pakistan | |
|---------------------|-------|----------|------|
| | | 1998 | 2003 |
| Metric or Less than | 16 | 21 | 00 |
| Bachelor Degree | 42 | 35 | 74 |
| Master Degree | 27 | 24 | 25 |
| Doctoral Degree | 06 | 00 | 01 |

The Mahbub-ul-Haq Human Development Centre (2000) conducted a survey. According to the survey results 63 percent peoples in Pakistan do not have faith in the present political system; 64 percent do not think that legal system can protect their rights. 88 percent believe that political leaders are corrupt; 33 percent are compelled to give a bribe.

It is interesting to note that most of the macroeconomic variables performed better during the Martial law regimes in Pakistan than the democratic governments. Armed forces have been performing such diversified duties as the running of the terminally sick WAPDA, the discovering of ghost schools, the maintenance of public order and the dispensing of justice, the overseeing of water and sewerage system and the supply of electricity.

Figure: V
What do People think about system?

| Survey Question / Responses | India | | Pakistan | |
|--|-------|----|----------|----|
| | Yes | No | Yes | No |
| Do you have faith in the political system of your country? | 65 | 29 | 37 | 63 |
| Is the legal framework just and protective of people's rights? | 46 | 36 | 30 | 64 |
| Have you ever given a bribe? | 15 | 81 | 33 | 67 |
| Do you think that your political leaders are corrupt? | 65 | 17 | 88 | 03 |
| Do you feel that the political leaders have become even more corrupt in the past five years? | 80 | 14 | 88 | 09 |
| Do you think that judges are corrupt? | 30 | 35 | 67 | 13 |
| Do you think that police officers are corrupt? | 67 | 16 | 94 | 03 |

Source: The Mahbub-ul-Haq Human Development Centre

Figure: VI
Comparison of Economic Performance

| Macroeconomic Indicators | Bhutto (72-77) | Zia (77-85) | Junejo (85-88) | Benazir (88-90) | Nawaz (90-93) | Benazir (93-96) | Nawaz (93-99) | Musharaf (00-03) |
|--------------------------|----------------|-------------|----------------|-----------------|---------------|-----------------|---------------|------------------|
| GDP Growth (%) | 4.9 | 6.6 | 6.2 | 4.7 | 5.2 | 5.0 | 3.4 | 6.1 |
| Inflation (%) | 18.0 | 8.3 | 4.8 | 8.2 | 10.7 | 11.7 | 10.1 | 5.3 |
| As % of GDP | | | | | | | | |
| Investment | 16.0 | 18.1 | 18.6 | 18.8 | 19.9 | 18.8 | 17.3 | 16.3 |
| Budget Deficit | 7.3 | 6.8 | 8.3 | 7.0 | 8.1 | 5.9 | 5.8 | 3.3 |
| External Debt | 47.4 | 33.6 | 34.9 | 36.6 | 35.5 | 37.6 | 39.7 | 35.0 |
| Domestic Debt | 22.8 | 26.1 | 41.7 | 43.6 | 44.2 | 43.0 | 41.3 | 35.0 |
| National Debt | 70.2 | 59.7 | 76.5 | 80.2 | 79.7 | 80.6 | 81.0 | 70.0 |
| Current A/C Balance | -6.4 | -4.1 | -3.5 | -4.8 | -4.7 | -5.0 | -4.8 | +1.4 |
| Reserves (No. of Weeks) | 13.2 | 10.6 | 6.8 | 4.5 | 4.2 | 12.2 | 5.2 | 52 |

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