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Political Economic Pressures in Financial Crisis Resolution

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Abstract

The free flow of global capital has been accompanied by destabilizing financial crises, coupled with significant redistributive effects. However, the existing literature has not adequately addressed the channels for this redistribution, nor the different factors that influence the formation of post-crisis redistributive policy. This paper develops a theoretical model that captures the influence of domestic special interest lobbying and international bilateral bargaining on the formation of equilibrium lending, bailout, and reallocation decisions. The paper then takes the theoretical model to the data, testing two key predictions of the model using both micro- and macro-level datasets. Finally, implications for international financial reform are examined in light of the model's findings.

KEYWORDS: Financial crisis, redistribution, special interest politics, IMF
JEL CLASSIFICATION: D72, F34, F41

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Will much impeach the justice of his state;
Since that the trade and profit of the city
Consisteth of all nations. Therefore, go:
These griefs and losses have so bated me,
That I shall hardly spare a pound of flesh
To-morrow to my bloody creditor.

The Merchant of Venice III. iii. 32–37 (William Shakespeare)

1 Introduction

The banking and financial crises in emerging markets at the end of the 1990s and early 21st century are a potent reminder of the complications that accompany global capital flows. On one hand, this free flow of capital is generally considered a desirable goal, since it ensures that the best investment opportunities are supported. Such flows can foster greater economic growth and living standards in developing countries—where domestic capital is often in short supply—while providing attractive investment vehicles for developed countries. On the other, capital flows may have destabilizing effects, especially when their sudden outflow manifest financial crises, which in turn lead to economic hardship, especially among the poor. These deleterious effects appear to be the *prima facie* justification for the existence of international financial institutions.

The resolution of financial crises present their own unique set of problems, and are a reminder of the fragile relationship between international bank lending, developing country borrowing, and IMF intermediation. First, financial crises typically lead to significant redistributive effects, both at macroeconomic (Baldacci, de Mello Jr. & Inchauste Comboni 2002; Halac & Schmukler 2004) as well as microeconomic levels (Frankenberg, Smith & Thomas 2003; McKenzie 2003). However, the channels for this redistribution are usually not articulated: If there is redistribution within the developing country, does this occur purely within the developing country, or from developing country taxpayers to developed country banks? Is there redistribution as well from developed country taxpayers to the banking system in the developing and developed world?

Second, the dynamics of global capital flows are also complicated by the presence of international financial institutions, such as the IMF. To begin with, the IMF is an indisputably politically-charged institution: It is “managed by politically appointed individuals from member nations, and the political interests of its members influence its decisions” (Smith, Jr. 1984). This sets the scene for conflicting perceptions regarding the true role of the IMF, and disputes over how Fund programs—being subject to international politicking—may exact unnecessary hardship on borrowing nations, while favoring bankers and elites (Vreeland 2003; Woods 2003). The result is a transfer of wealth from developing to developed countries, implicitly sponsored by the IMF. Moreover, there is also reason to believe that developed-country taxpayers may end up footing part of the bill. The proportionality of country quota subscriptions effectively imply that one

of the bearers of the low-cost IMF bailouts is the developed country taxpayer (Stiglitz 2002).

Third, special interest lobbying may play an important role in domestic redistributive politics within both developed and developing countries. This special interest activity muddies any analysis of post-crisis redistribution, since it becomes difficult to disentangle the implications of domestic political positioning from international arm-twisting. Given the redistributive effects, then, what are the factors that come into play in the formation of post-crisis resolution policy? Who are the players that matter, and how do they interact with one another?

The objective of this paper is to clarify the different channels and factors that constitute the formation of post-crisis resolution policy. In particular, it will develop and test a model that incorporates the influence of domestic special interest lobbying and international bilateral bargaining on the formation of equilibrium lending, bailout, and reallocation decisions, taking the crisis event as exogenous.

We introduce a two-country open-economy model with *ex ante* heterogeneous groups in each country. The process of post-crisis resolution is modeled as a sequential game. After the crisis occurs, borrowing and lending countries gather—under the auspices of the IMF—to negotiate post-crisis Fund assistance. The equilibrium amount of official lending is determined by this bargaining process. Bargaining is treated as a timing game, where governments of both creditor and debtor nations make decisions on whether to concede first in negotiations by weighing the welfare loss from waiting another period to concede, versus the expected welfare gain of waiting for this additional period.

However, in determining the relative costs and benefits, both nations take into account the *ex post* heterogeneous redistribution that will result under each plausible scenario. This redistribution is in turn dependent on a menu auction, where special interests such as international banks and politically-connected firms offer contributions to policymakers to influence their allocation choices. In a developed country, these may be treated as campaign contributions; in developing countries, these are more likely to be in the form of bribes and other nonpecuniary benefits to politicians. The redistribution is then effected in the final stage according to policymakers maximizing a weighted average of general welfare and special-interest contributions.

Our theoretical model predicts that the post-crisis consumption of groups in the economy is dependent on, *inter alia*, whether the group was politically organized: The crisis changes the power structure of groups in the country and allows certain ones to take advantage of their relationship with policymakers to extract a larger part of the bailout pie. We also predict that, in equilibrium, lending decisions by developed countries—through the medium of the IMF—take into consideration both the likely post-crisis redistribution outcomes, as well as any political capital accruing to policymakers for not giving in to the other country. Taking the model to the data, we find support for these hypotheses. In particular, using household-level data, we find that political organization exerts a statistically significant impact on changes in consumption after a financial crisis. Similarly, IMF lending patterns suggest that political

economy considerations may be important in the determination of actual loan packages disbursed.

The idea that international banks take collective action to secure international interests is not novel. De Grauwe & Fratianni (1984, p. 168) argued after the 1982 Latin debt crisis that U.S. banks had strong incentives to “engage in collective action aimed at shifting their losses onto the rest of society.” In a more recent vein, Tirole (2003) applies a dual- and common-agency framework that captures how political economy considerations in redistributive politics may influence the exchange rate, debt holdings, and capital account liberalization. However, the paper is not primarily concerned with post-crisis resolution and redistribution. A paper by Jeanne & Zettlemeyer (2001) also tries to capture the dynamics underlying the domestic politics of bailouts, but the motivation underlying a bailout is assumed rather than modeled, and the international dimension is not captured at all.

The heterogeneity of interests has also been a feature in studies of optimal delay in policy formation (Alesina & Drazen 1991; Perraudin & Sibert 2000). However, the former paper leaves the international dimension largely unexplored, while the latter model does not place negotiations in the domestic context—both of which are achieved in this paper. Finally, the impact of institutional arrangements on international lending has also been considered in the literature; for example, Plaut & Melnik (2003) consider the complexities inherent in the institutional features that characterize IMF lending; however, their paper is focused on different forms of IMF financing, rather than its role in crisis management.

The contribution of this research is threefold. First, the theoretical model brings together two hitherto disparate strands of the literature: The new political economy literature, and the new open economy macroeconomics literature. It therefore places arguments on the political economy of financial crisis resolution (Haggard 2000) and IMF lending decisions (Bird & Rolands 2003) on firm methodological footing. The payoff to this approach is that it allows us to address some of the existing puzzles in the literature, such as how political risk may help explain the Lucas (1990) paradox and home market bias, as well as reconciling two competing explanations of the Tullock (1972) puzzle of apparent underinvestment in rent-seeking activity.

Second, the empirical analyses extend the frontiers of the existing empirical literature, by incorporating political-economic factors as explanatory variables in examining the heterogeneous outcomes of financial crises and IMF lending. In contrast to existing work, we motivate our economic and political factors directly from a theoretical model. Third, the model also provides guidance on how international institutions may be reformed in the light of financial globalization, in response to challenges by, *inter alia*, Calomiris (2003), Grant & Keohane (2005), and Stiglitz (2002). As such, it informs the policy debate over the role of such institutions in the globalization process.

The organization of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we detail some features of post-financial crisis resolution. This is followed by an exposition of the formal model (Section 3). Section 4 will take a look at the empirical evidence.

Two final sections conclude with some reflections on potential international policy reform, and areas for future research.

2 Features of Post-Crisis Resolution

This section will present some features that characterize the process of post-crisis resolution. In particular, it focuses on the influence of global banks in lending nations, corporate conglomerates and domestic banks in debtor nations, and the intermediation role of the IMF. We wish to present four important features: The involvement of international financial institutions, political-economic pressures that undergird the bargaining process with respect to official loan packages, the strong private-public sector relationships in debtor and creditor countries, and the heterogeneous redistributive outcome of these crises.¹

First, international financial institutions, especially the IMF, were often actively and intimately involved in post-crisis management, which included official lending as well as technical assistance with associated conditionalities. In the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis of 1997/98, the Fund disbursed, altogether, USD \$36 billion during the period to the crisis-hit countries of Indonesia, Korea, and Thailand, through its Emergency Financing Mechanism and the newly-created Supplemental Reserve Facility. While the Fund does not reveal the specific source of stand-by credit for each instance of lending, these are generally drawn from quota subscriptions, the bulk of which are from developed countries—with the United States, Japan, and Germany contributing slightly over 30% of total quotas. Furthermore, the IMF also convened meetings for interested (developed) countries to assist in filling the financing gap. For example, the IMF received pledges of bilateral lending from Japan (USD \$4 billion) and Australia (USD \$1 billion) to Thailand (International Monetary Fund 1997). The final bill for these three countries eventually came up to USD \$95 billion. The IMF was thus very much an active conduit for official capital flows from developed countries to the crisis-hit developing economies.

Second, the bargaining process, as well as the agreed loan packages, often reflected not just economic bases, but political-economy considerations as well. Bargaining occurred between governments and was often in the context of the larger concerns of their constituents, with the Fund serving more as a forum for these workouts, as opposed to an involved actor. For the Argentine crisis in 2001/02, it was clear that official debt negotiations under the IMF, as well as actual Fund disbursements, were subject to the complicity and support of the U.S. Treasury. The factor was certainly strong enough to have potentially overruled prudence as the crisis deepened, leading two Directors of the Executive Board to abstain from voting for the September 2001 package (De Beaufort Wijnholds 2003). As a matter of fact, then-Economy Minister Cavallo goes as far as to claim that “what Argentina needed and expected from the US government was

¹In a separate document—available on the author’s website—we argue these features in much fuller detail in the context of two case studies: The Asian financial crisis of 1997/98, and the Argentinean crisis of 2001/02.

political support for an orderly process of debt restructuring” (Cavallo 2004, p. 143), and that the failure of the second Bush administration in providing this support eventually led to the suspension of disbursements by the IMF in December 2001.

Packages also often demonstrated the reality of political pressures inherent in accepting IMF money. In the aftermath of the Asian crisis in 1997/98, the Korean national press described the act as a “national shame.” Kim Dae-Jung—then the opposition presidential candidate—went as far as to call December 3, 1997, the day the IMF and Korean government finalized negotiations over a USD \$57 billion loan, “National Economic Humiliation Day” (JoongAng Ilbo 1997). Similarly, Indonesia’s then-president Suharto engaged in several confrontations with the IMF and the Clinton Administration (South China Morning Post 1998). Indeed, Malaysia’s explicit rejection of any IMF assistance was premised in part on a view that the political costs of doing so would be too great, conspiracy theories involving Soros aside (Woo 1999).² During the Bulgarian twin crises of 1996/97, democratic elements in the form of “strikes, mass demonstrations, and round-the-clock student protests” led to the removal of the former communist government, and ushered in the eventual closure of negotiations (Genev 1997, p. 126). And Brazil’s acquiescence to the IMF’s policy recommendations during its crisis in 1999 was made not so much as to placate the Fund, but mainly because its then-President Cardoso was responding to wider political pressures from the populace (Economist 1999). Overall, official loan negotiations appear to be tightly constrained by governments needing to take into account the preferred positions of their constituents, more so than any IMF stance *per se* (Blustein 2001, 2005). In crisis economies, the widely-held view was that IMF plans were “replays of policies that [developed countries had] been trying to get [developing countries] to adopt,” which was “an abuse of IMF power... at a time of weakness” (Feldstein 1998, p. 32).

Third, cozy relationships typically existed between the private and public sector in crisis countries. Indeed, the pervasiveness of special interest politicking in these countries often gave rise to the charge of “crony capitalism.” Even with ostensible changes in the post-crisis power structure, private economic power remained relatively concentrated—often in a few family-owned business groups (La Porta, Lopez-de Silanes & Shleifer 1999)—which made the economic environment well suited for political rent-seeking.³ Thus, when combined with

²In particular, given the power struggle at the time between prime minister Mahathir Mohammed and his designated successor, Anwar Ibrahim, unilaterally imposing capital controls ensured that the political support that Mahathir enjoyed from powerful groups within UMNO would remain intact in the event of Anwar’s expulsion from the cabinet. Indeed, capital controls were implemented on the eve of Anwar’s firing; had Mahathir not done so, the ensuing capital flight would meant recourse to the IMF for support, a position that would have been highly unpopular.

³While there is no direct linkage from oligarchic family control to political rent-seeking, there are good reasons to believe that rent-seeking is easier in such economic environments. Since controlling shareholders can exercise a disproportionate amount of power in firm decisionmaking processes, political favors—such as bribes—may be easier to effect, and cooperative rent-seeking behavior becomes easier to sustain. As Morck & Yeung (2004, p. 403) assert, “oligarchic families plausibly have an innate advantage as political rent seekers... [they

the potentially corrupt bureaucracies in most crisis countries, special interests were often easily served. The crisis in Russia “shifted the balance of power within the executive branch, weakening the oligarchs and strengthening the ‘power ministries’ . . . [but the] three postcrisis prime ministers did not reverse the course of economic and domestic policy pursued by their predecessors” (Rutland 2001, p. 257). Overall, Russian oligarchs have fared exceedingly well in the aftermath of the ruble crisis of 1998, in no small part due to their political connections. This, perhaps, should come as no surprise, given Russia’s firm ownership structure and its generally rampant corruption.⁴

This notion of policymaker responsiveness to private sector persuasion was by no means limited to the debtor countries. Global banks with a large exposure to emerging markets could have influenced their respective governments in the post-crisis episode as well. European, especially German, and Japanese banks had high exposures to the crisis countries of East Asia, and U.S. banks were deeply involved in those in Latin America. The threat of a wider emerging market meltdown could have prompted these banks to seek political intervention in the crisis. Congressional voting for international financial rescues in Mexico in 1994 and East Asia in 1997/98 appear to have been influenced by special interest pressures (Broz 2005).

Last, the redistribution of the loan package was typically heterogeneous. Arguably, part of this was by design: Government authorities in the crisis-struck countries had to guarantee the viability of their financial sectors to prevent panic-induced bank runs and financial collapse. However, part of this was due to the preexisting relationships between the governments of these countries with private sector banks. While the ostensible objective of IMF bailout funds—according to countries’ Letters of Intent—were for the purposes of comprehensively restructuring the corporate and financial sectors through the closure of failed firms, the reality of expeditiously doing so was complicated by the existing relationships between government and business interests. In Indonesia, Suharto quickly took action to protect favored individuals and firms, and by January 1998 it became evident that the administration was seeking to return to business-as-usual: Big-ticket economic projects for connected firms were quietly passed, and “crony banks consumed the bulk of the emergency liquidity credit” (Haggard 2000, p. 67). Following the Mexican peso crisis in 1994, the Zedillo administration continued the Salinas administration’s policy of protecting the banking sector, in part because “the groups most harmed by the policy either were politically marginal or could not readily perceive the distributional consequences” (Kessler 1998, p. 52); the result was a bailout that “rewarded the guilty and the rich, ensuring repayment to wealthy foreign investors who had gambled in the risky Mexican securities market at the expense of U.S. and Mexican taxpayers” (Kessler 1999, p. 121). Post-crisis redistribution often favored

possess] characteristics [that] make them better able to establish and sustain the relationships of trust with public officials that raise the returns to political rent seeking. Moreover, it is hard to conceive of others who share these advantages.”

⁴Transparency International’s corruption perception index for Russia was 2.3—out of a possible 10—for the period between 1998 and 2001.

special interests over the general population, regardless of *ex ante* promises and statements to the contrary by governments (Faccio, Masulis & McConnell 2005).

The danger of IMF bailouts acting as a wealth transfer from both developing and developed country taxpayers to international commercial banks was thus very real. Since both private bank debt (Klingen, Weder & Zettelmeyer 2004) as well as official loans from the IMF (Rogoff 2003) were often repaid in full—and sometimes ahead of schedule—there seems to be little doubt that, at least for Asia, the major burden of financing these bailouts was ultimately borne by taxpayers (Sacks & Thiel 1998).⁵ This reality of redistribution was best summarized by the former president of the Banco Central de la República Argentina, who claimed that the crisis “transferred about 40% of private debt to workers, who are seeing their salaries cut in half... [w]e are experiencing a mega-redistribution of wealth and income unprecedented in the history of the capitalist world” (Gaudin 2002, p. 9).

3 Analytical Framework

3.1 Consumers

Consider a world comprising two countries, a (rich) developed ($h = R$) and (poor) developing ($h = P$) nation, each possessing I_h distinct groups of citizens, each with mass N_h^i , such that $\sum_i N_h^i = N_h$. Each group consists of identical members, and is assumed to possess lifetime utility given by

$$U(c_h^i) = E_t \sum_{s=t}^{\infty} \beta^{s-t} u(c_{h,s}^i), \quad h = R, P, \quad (1)$$

where c_s^i is consumption of goods by group i at time s , and β is the subjective discount rate.

Each group is able to borrow freely from international capital markets; hence, the flow budget for each group is

$$b_{h,s+1}^i = (1+r)b_{h,s}^i + y_{h,s} - q_{h,s} - c_{h,s}^i + g_{h,s}^i, \quad h = R, P, \quad (2)$$

where b_s^i is private international borrowing (when negative) or lending (when positive) by group i at time s , g_s^i is the (nonmonetary) government disbursement (or tax) for group i at time s , y_s and q_s are, respectively, the levels of (random) output and investment (assumed not to differ between groups), and c_s^i is consumption. Debt is repaid at the (fixed) international real interest rate r . Government disbursements are assumed to be one-time; hence, $g_s^i \neq 0$ for a particular $s = t$ and $g_s^i = 0$ thereafter.⁶

⁵It would be an oversimplification, however, to suggest that creditor-country banks were completely unaffected by the crisis. Sturzenegger & Zettlemeyer (2005) estimate that haircuts due to sovereign debt restructurings between 1998 and 2005 ranged between 13% and 73%.

⁶The natural limitation of this assumption is that we lose any fiscal dynamics from the analysis. However, we nonetheless adopt this strategy to focus on the political-economic

Maximization of (1) with respect to (2) yields a version of the standard stochastic intertemporal consumption Euler:

$$u'(c_{h,t}^i) = \beta(1+r)E_t u'(c_{h,t+1}^i), \quad \forall i \in I_h \text{ \& } h = R, P. \quad (3)$$

By imposing the solvency condition

$$\lim_{T \rightarrow \infty} \left(\frac{1}{1+r} \right)^T b_{h,t+T+1}^i = 0, \quad (4)$$

and assuming a specific functional form for utility, it is possible to derive the optimal consumption path. For simplicity of exposition, let the utility function in (1) simply be the linear quadratic $u(c) = c - \frac{\kappa c^2}{2}$. Optimal consumption is then

$$\tilde{c}_{h,t}^i = \frac{r}{1+r} E_t X_{h,t}^i (g_{h,t}^i, b_{h,t}^i; y_{h,s}), \quad h = R, P, \quad (5)$$

where we have assumed that $\beta = 1/(1+r)$ and

$$X_{h,t}^i (g_{h,t}^i, b_{h,t}^i; y_{h,s}) \equiv \left[(1+r)b_{h,t}^i + g_{h,t}^i + \sum_{s=t}^{\infty} \left(\frac{1}{1+r} \right)^{s-t} E_t (y_{h,s} - q_{h,s}) \right].$$

Equation (5) implies that the optimal consumption of group i is dependent on the initial level of private borrowing and the amount of government transfers to the group, as well as the discounted stream of expected output net of investment.

3.2 Producers

The law of motion for capital, k , evolves according to

$$k_{h,s+1} = k_{h,s} + q_{h,s}, \quad h = P, R, \quad (6)$$

where we have assumed depreciation away, and have constrained investment to purely domestic vehicles. Production technology is a function of invested capital and (by assumption) does not differ between groups:⁷

$$y_{h,s} = a_{h,s} f(k_{h,s}), \quad h = R, P, \quad (7)$$

where a_s is a measure of productivity, and $f'(\cdot) > 0 > f''(\cdot)$. Productivity for each country is governed by an AR(1) process,

$$a_{h,s+1} = (1 + \rho_h)^{1-\alpha} a_{h,s} + \epsilon_{h,s+1}, \quad h = R, P, \quad (8)$$

dimensions, which would be invariably complicated by these dynamics. Moreover, we would argue in general that the government budget position is more relevant in an explanation of pre-crisis phenomena (Krugman 1979), rather than post-crisis events.

⁷The implicit assumptions here are that labor is supplied inelastically by the individual producer, and that the Inada conditions, $f(0) = 0$, $\lim_{k \rightarrow 0} f'(k) = \infty$, and $\lim_{k \rightarrow \infty} f'(k) = 0$, hold.

where $0 \leq \alpha \leq 1$, ρ is a persistence parameter, and ϵ_s is an economy-wide Gaussian shock experienced at time s , with $E_t \epsilon_{t+1} = 0$ and distributed according to the density function $\varphi(\epsilon)$ with support $[-\bar{\epsilon}, \bar{\epsilon}]$. Aggregate production in each country is then simply the sum of each group's production, or $Y_{h,s} = I_h y_{h,s}$, and aggregate investment is $Q_{h,s} = I_h q_{h,s}$.

To provide some structure to the international economy, we make some assumptions concerning the developed and developing country production structures.

Assumption 1 (Production structures). (a) $\rho_R = 0$ and $\rho_P > 0$; (b) $\forall s : \{a_{R,s} = 1 > a_{P,s} \text{ and } k_{P,s} \ll k_{R,s} \text{ such that } a_{R,s} f'(k_{P,s}) < a_{P,s} f'(k_{R,s})\}$.

The first part of the assumption suggests that production is generally more volatile in the developing country, and shocks to this economy are amplified: A positive shock will lead to higher output in the developing country vis-à-vis the developed, but negative shocks have a greater impact as well. This specification is also for more than just analytical convenience: There is evidence that there are important nonlinearities in the impact of volatility on growth, and that this impact is more pronounced for developing countries (Aizenman & Pinto 2004). Therefore, (8), with the assumption $\rho > 0$, attempts to capture a limited aspect of this empirical phenomenon.

The second part of the assumption ensures that, while productivity is higher in the developed country, the capital stock in the developing country is sufficiently small such that the marginal product of capital will always be higher in the developing country. This allows the model to capture the empirical observation that developing country returns are typically higher than developed country returns, even in the absence of an explicit risk premium. Note that this assumption also renders expected output stable in the developed country.

To avoid problems of global indeterminacy, we make an additional assumption concerning international capital flows.

Assumption 2 (Net aggregate capital flows). $\forall s < t : (a) \epsilon_{R,s} = \epsilon_R > 0$; (b) $Y_{R,s} - E_s \check{Y}_{R,s} > Q_{R,s} - E_s \check{Q}_{R,s}$, where $\check{Z}_{R,t} \equiv \frac{r}{1+r} \sum_{s=t}^{\infty} E_t Z_s$ is the permanent level of variable Z .

The first part of the assumption imposes a constant, positive value to the actual *realization* of the shock in the developed country,⁸ while the second part guarantees that, given part (a), the developed country has a current account surplus. Taken together, this assumption ensures that, in the absence of a financial crisis, aggregate net capital flows from the developed country to the developing one.⁹ Note that the specification that we have chosen is flexible enough to allow for individual groups in each country to be either net borrowers

⁸This assumption, which is to ensure a nondegenerate current account, is actually stronger than necessary. A weaker (but sufficient) condition is to assume that $\forall s < t : \{\epsilon_{R,s} \neq 0 \text{ and } \sum_s \epsilon_{R,s} > 0\}$. We have chosen the specification above to impose more structure on the problem and hence simplify the algebra.

⁹To see this, note that the current account identity is given by $CA_{R,t} \equiv B_{R,t+1} - B_{R,t} = rB_{R,t} + Y_{R,t} - \sum_i c_{R,t}^i - Q_{R,t} - G_{R,t}$, where $G_{R,t}$ is the fiscal budget constraint. Substituting

or net lenders; all that we require is that, in the aggregate, the current account of the developing country be in deficit, and *vice versa* for the developed country. Hence, rich elite groups in the developing country, for example, may choose to park their wealth in foreign assets (Tornell & Velasco 1992).

The (inverse) demand for capital by each group sets the expected marginal product of capital to the cost of capital. This cost is the world interest rate, corrected for the conditional covariance of the marginal product of capital and the marginal rate of substitution:

$$E_t [a_{h,t+1} f'(k_{h,t+1})] = r - \text{cov}_t \left[a_{h,t+1} f'(k_{h,t+1}), \frac{c_{h,t+1}^i}{c_{h,t}^i} \right], \quad h = R, P, \quad (9)$$

where we have once again used the assumption that $\beta = 1/(1+r)$. This can be further simplified by assuming that investment is determined by the certainty equivalence principle, such that the covariance term is constant:¹⁰

$$E_t [a_{h,t+1} f'(k_{h,t+1})] = r_h^*, \quad h = R, P, \quad (10)$$

where $r_h^* \equiv r - \text{cov} \left[a_{h,t+1} f'(k_{h,t+1}), \frac{c_{h,t+1}^i}{c_{h,t}^i} \right]$. Since all capital is held only by domestic residents, the covariance term is likely to be negative, and hence this equation also implies that $r_P^* > r_R^* = r$.

Again appealing to the ease of exposition, let the production function in (7) be a simple AK-type $f(k) = ak^\alpha$, where $0 < \alpha < 1$. These specific functional forms and simplifying assumptions allow us to rewrite (after some algebra) (5) for each country as

$$\tilde{c}_h^i = \frac{r}{1+r} X_h^i (g_h^i, b_h^i; y_h), \quad h = R, P, \quad (11)$$

where

$$\begin{aligned} X_R^i (g_R^i, b_R^i; y_R) &\equiv \left[(1+r) b_R^i + g_R^i + \left(\frac{1+r}{r} \right) y_R \right], \\ X_P^i (g_P^i, b_P^i; y_P) &\equiv \left[(1+r) b_P^i + g_P^i + \frac{(1+r)}{(r-\rho)} \cdot \frac{(r_P^* - \alpha\rho)}{r_P^*} y_P \right], \end{aligned}$$

and $r_P^* \equiv r - \text{cov} \left[\alpha a_{P,t+1} k_{P,t+1}^{\alpha-1}, \frac{c_{P,t+1}^i}{c_{P,t}^i} \right]$.

the fiscal budget constraint (13) and optimal consumption (5) into the above and using Assumption 2(a) will then simplify the expression to $CA_{R,t} = (Y_{R,s} - \check{Y}_{R,s}) - (Q_{R,s} - \check{Q}_{R,s})$.

For the developed country to be a net lender in the aggregate, we require $(Y_{R,s} - \check{Y}_{R,s}) > (Q_{R,s} - \check{Q}_{R,s})$, which is Assumption 2(b). Finally, since this is a two-country world, $CA_{R,t} = -CA_{P,t}$ and so this assumption also guarantees that the developing country will be a net borrower, in the aggregate.

¹⁰While this loses some of the dynamics of the determinants of the investment decision, changes in the covariance term in (9) are likely to be empirically small as compared to expected changes in the marginal product of capital. This assumption is also milder than assuming that the marginal product of capital and the marginal rate of substitution are independent, which would then yield a similar nonstochastic term on the right hand side of (10).

To economize on notation, we have dropped time subscripts, since optimal consumption is completely determined at time t . Post-tax welfare of a group is then just optimal consumption net of taxes:

$$W_h^i(\mathbf{g}_h) = \tilde{c}_h^i - \tau_h, \quad h = R, P. \quad (12)$$

3.3 Government

In each country, government transfers are funded by a common, lump-sum tax, τ , for each group. With no government investment, the fiscal budget constraint for each country is given by

$$N_h \tau_h = \sum_{i=1}^{I_h} N_h^i g_h^i + N_h D_h(\mathbf{g}_h, T), \quad h = R, P, \quad (13)$$

where $D_h(\mathbf{g}_h, T)$ is an intergovernmental debt function (expressed in per capita terms) representing official lending (or borrowing); this is conducted at a risk-free rate, which is normalized to unity. Since the actual official loan function is not of primary interest here, in this formulation we will refrain from fully characterizing the structural form of the package, but merely assume that this function is dependent on the vector of transfers \mathbf{g} and the amount of time spent in bargaining over the official loan package, T .

Government policymakers possess objective functions that that are given by

$$W_h^G(\mathbf{W}_h, \mathbf{L}_h, \iota_h) = E_t \sum_{s=t}^{\infty} \delta^{s-t} w[\mathbf{W}(\mathbf{g}_{h,s}), \mathbf{L}(\mathbf{g}_{h,s}), \iota_h], \quad h = R, P, \quad (14)$$

where $\mathbf{W}(\mathbf{g}_s)$ and $\mathbf{L}(\mathbf{g}_s)$ are the vectors that correspond to the welfare of all groups in the country and contributions received at time s , respectively, ι is political capital accrued, and δ is government's subjective discount rate. Note that we have entered the redistributive policy vector, \mathbf{g} , indirectly into the government objective function; thus, governments are—in the terminology of Dixit, Grossman & Helpman (1997)—partially benevolent, insofar as policymakers do not impose personal preferences about this policy outcome. We will clarify the specific form that (14) takes as we solve the model, below.

3.4 Special Interests

In each country, there are J_h organized lobbying groups, which constitute a subset of the population, such that for a particular lobbying group $i \in J_h \subseteq I_h$.¹¹ These groups offer contributions according to a schedule, $L_h^i(\mathbf{g}_h)$, with the aim of influencing the policymaker's allocation of government transfers. Given these

¹¹Our characterization of special interests is fairly broad: Most commonly, these may be sectoral groups, but the specification is flexible enough to accommodate interest groups in either broad coalitions, such as class-based or tradable-nontradable distinctions, or regional interests, such as provinces or states.

contributions, the net welfare of a group is then post-tax welfare, minus any contributions:

$$V_h^i(\mathbf{g}_h) = W_h^i(\mathbf{g}_h) - L_h^i(\mathbf{g}_h). \quad (15)$$

The contribution schedule itself is assumed to be globally truthful,¹² and thus satisfies

$$L_h^i(\mathbf{g}_h; \eta_h^i) = \min \{ \bar{L}_h^i(\mathbf{g}_h), \max [0, W_h^i(\mathbf{g}) - \eta_h^i] \}, \quad h = R, P, \quad (16)$$

where $\bar{L}_h^i(\mathbf{g}_h) \equiv \sup \{ L_h^i(\mathbf{g}_h) \mid V_h^i(\mathbf{g}_h) \geq 0 \}$ is the upper limit of feasible contributions that group i is willing to undertake, and η^i is a constant, set optimally, that may be regarded as the reservation utility of the i th lobbying group.

Rewriting (12) in terms of the redistributive policy instrument g , and the definition in (11) now yields

$$W_h^i(\mathbf{g}_h) = \frac{r}{1+r} X_h^i(g_h^i, b_h^i; y_h) - \left[\sum_{i=1}^{I_h} \frac{N_h^i}{N_h} \cdot g_h^i + D_h(\mathbf{g}_h, T) \right], \quad h = R, P.$$

3.5 Debt Markets

To close the model, we need to specify global equilibrium conditions for the debt market. Since there are only two countries in the model, market clearing requires that

$$\sum_{i=1}^{I_R} N_R^i b_R^i + \sum_{i=1}^{I_P} N_P^i b_P^i = B_R + B_P = 0 \quad (17)$$

for private debt markets, and

$$N_R D_R(\mathbf{g}_R, T) + N_P D_P(\mathbf{g}_P, T) = 0 \quad (18)$$

for official borrowing and lending.

3.6 Sequence of Events

The timing of the model is as follows: (a) an (exogenous) crisis occurs in the developing country; (b) policymakers from each country gather under the auspices of the IMF to formulate a proposal for a loan package (with attendant transfer to the developing country), taking into account the interests of their respective constituents; (c) special interests in both the developed country (banks) and developing country (banks and firms) offer their contributions to attain a desired redistribution/repayment handout; (d) developed and developing country policymakers engage in post-crisis redistribution through government transfers—which may be regarded as bailout funds for beleaguered banks and/or favors for connected firms—and effect repayment decisions. This is summarized as Figure 1.

¹²Since both the special interest and policymaker welfare functions are quasilinear, the local truthfulness property holds, and is sufficient to characterize the political dynamics. This stronger assumption is essentially an equilibrium selection device, and we discuss this in detail below.




Figure 1: Sequence of events.

3.7 Financial Crisis

Let the financial crisis occur at time t in the developing country. The crisis leads to monetary, real, and political effects in the respective economies.

First, there is a forced termination of international credit relationships; one may envision this as a typical “sudden stop” (Dornbusch, Goldfajn & Valdés 1995) where there is a rapid reversal of (usually short-term, though not exclusively so) capital flows. Most commonly, this occurs due to a deterioration in the debtor country’s terms of trade; however, it may also occur for other reasons such as financial contagion. We take this event as given, and seek to examine the solution of the model by treating this as an exogenous shock. At this point, the solvency condition is modified to

$$b_s^i = (1+r)^{s+1-t} b_t, \quad \forall s \in [t, T] \ \& \ h = R, P. \quad (4')$$

This cessation of international financial flows is the primary monetary effect of the financial crisis, and persists for all periods $s > t$, until the economy graduates from the crisis at time T , after which international capital flows resume, and the solvency condition returns to (4).¹³ This, in effect, suggests the following assumption about repayments.

Assumption 3 (Repayment schedule). (a) $b_{h,T+1}^i = (1+r)^{T+1-t} b_{h,t}^i, h = R, P$; (b) $\exists \bar{T} \gg T$ such that $D_{h,\bar{T}}(\mathbf{g}_h, T) = 0$.

We have thus assumed, in turn, that each group i effects repayment of the pre-crisis borrowing amount—with interest—immediately after the crisis (with no private borrowing allowed within that period); and that sovereign debt repayment is effected outside the model (we can thus accommodate partial repudiation of sovereign debt). Clearly, the case where private repayments are always effected in full at time $T+1$ need not necessarily hold, absent a means of

¹³Hence, the international real rate r is assumed to be unaffected by the crisis.

international private debt enforcement. Here, we abstract from repudiation issues and assume that a form of gunboat diplomacy ensures that the assumption holds.

In spite of the apparent strength of this assumption, however, remaining in crisis is not costless. Note that, following Obstfeld & Rogoff (1996), we have treated the international real interest rate, r , as exogenously given. The loss of access to international private debt markets thus removes one instrument for the purposes of consumption smoothing as well as consumption augmenting.¹⁴ To the extent that welfare is lower due to this, there is an implicit penalty to both creditors and debtors for remaining in financial autarky, and the post-crisis aftermath is functionally equivalent to modeling an explicit haircut faced by creditors.

The financial crisis also induces real effects in the developing economy.¹⁵ In particular, we treat this as a negative shock, $\epsilon_{P,t} < 0$, such that the productivity change at time t will be

$$\Delta a_{P,t} < 0. \quad (19)$$

For simplicity, we assume that once this crisis shock is realized, the value of the shock remains at the initial realization; that is, $\epsilon_{P,s} = \epsilon_{P,t} \forall s \in [t, T]$. As in the case of nominal effects, the real effect captured by (19) will continue until the crisis is resolved at time T . After this point, productivity growth returns to positive territory. Taken together, (4') and (19) are consistent with the stylized fact documented in Kaminsky, Reinhart & Végh (2005), that net capital inflows are procyclical in most developing economies.

The crisis, then, prompts fiscal redistribution. Since we have set disbursements to one-time events, we assume that this occurs after the time of graduation:

$$g_{h,T+1}^i \neq 0, \quad h = R, P. \quad (20)$$

Third, the financial crisis also has political effects. In particular, the crisis leads to a decline in the reservation utility for some groups, such that

$$\Delta \eta_{P,t}^i < 0. \quad (21)$$

This leads to a change in the power structure of developing country special interests, such that $I_P \supseteq J'_P \supseteq J_P$,¹⁶ where J'_P is the post-crisis set of lobbying groups. Intuitively, this could occur for several reasons. First, for larger

¹⁴Recognizing consumption augmenting for the developing country is straightforward. For the developed country, note that in the absence of international lending, marginal returns to capital would likely be driven down due to the assumption of diminishing returns to capital, $f''(\cdot) < 0$, and hence lending can serve an augmentation motive there as well.

¹⁵This is in line with the so-called third-generation models—such as Aghion, Bacchetta & Banerjee (2001) and Chang & Velasco (2001)—that stress, *inter alia*, the potential for real spillovers in the event of a financial crisis. Note that our specification is also flexible enough to accommodate the possibility that these real shocks have nominal origins, such as liquidity constraints that arise from currency and maturity mismatches, as was the case in the Asian financial crisis.

¹⁶We demonstrate this result, and the technical apparatus underlying it, more fully in the appendix.

groups, Olson-style (positive) selective incentives arise more strongly in a crisis climate.¹⁷ Second, a crisis may lead to the breakup of large groups into smaller ones that face less resistance to collective action in general. Taken together, both of these factors help overcome collective-action problems that are more pervasive in a non-crisis environment.

3.8 Solution of Model

We employ the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium concept and solve the sequential game by backward induction.

Definition 1 (Equilibrium outcome). The subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is a tuple $\{\{L_P^{i*}\}_{i \in J_P}, \{L_R^{i*}\}_{i \in J_R}, D_R^*(\mathbf{g}_R, T^*), D_P^*(\mathbf{g}_P, T^*), \mathbf{g}_R^*, \mathbf{g}_P^*\}$ such that: (a) L_h^{i*} is feasible $\forall i \in J_h, h = R, P$; (b) $\forall i \in I_R: \{ \nexists g_R^i \in \mathcal{G} \text{ and } g_R^i \neq g_R^{i*} \text{ such that } V^i(g_R^{i*}) \leq V^i(g_R^i) \}$; (c) $\forall i \in I_P: \{ \nexists g_P^i \in \mathcal{G} \text{ and } g_P^i \neq g_P^{i*} \text{ such that } V^i(g_P^{i*}) \leq V^i(g_P^i) \}$; (d) $\nexists \mathbf{g}_h \in \mathcal{G} \text{ and } \mathbf{g}_h \neq \mathbf{g}_h^* \text{ such that } W_h^G(\mathbf{g}_h^*) \leq W_h^G(\mathbf{g}_h), h = R, P$; (e) $\nexists D_h(\mathbf{g}_h, T) \in \mathcal{D} \text{ and } D_h(\mathbf{g}_h, T) \neq D_h^*(\mathbf{g}_h^*, T^*) \text{ such that } W_h^G(\mathbf{g}_h^*, T_h^*) \leq W_h^G(\mathbf{g}_h, T_h), h = R, P$, in pure strategies.

In the final stage, the crisis is resolved, and group welfare will return to the pre-crisis *status quo* given by (12), adjusted by the repayment term. The policymaker in the developing country takes the intergovernmental debt function, $D_P(\mathbf{g}, T)$, as given and solves a Grossman-Helpman style menu auction that maximizes a weighted sum of contributions and general (post-tax gross) welfare:¹⁸

$$W_P^G(\mathbf{g}_P, \mathbf{L}_P) = (1 - \omega_P) \sum_{i \in I_P} N_P^i W_P^i(\mathbf{g}_P) + \omega_P \sum_{i \in J'_P} N_P^i L_P^i(\mathbf{g}_P),$$

where ω_P is the weight placed on special interest contributions by policymakers in the developing country. Given the contribution schedule (16), this is then functionally equivalent to maximizing a weighted sum of special interest and general welfare:

$$W_P^G(\mathbf{g}_P) = \sum_{i \in J'_P} N_P^i W_P^i(\mathbf{g}_P) + (1 - \omega_P) \sum_{i \notin J'_P} N_P^i W_P^i(\mathbf{g}_P). \quad (22)$$

These special interests may be regarded as domestic banks, or as domestic firms run by the country's elite. One nice feature of casting the problem in terms of (22) is that it also accommodates the possibility that the policymaker may be completely benevolent, but the groups $i \in J'_P$ are sectors that need to be

¹⁷For example, lobbying contributions may be regarded as a form of cooperative insurance premium paid to participate in joint lobbying efforts for bailout funds; similarly, since handouts received are club benefits that only accrue to group members, there is a stronger inducement for participation to ensure group success.

¹⁸Note that this is equivalent to maximizing subject to *net* welfare, given an appropriate normalization, and a minor restriction on the weights. We follow the literature here and, accordingly, utilize welfare gross of contributions and repayments.

supported in order for the economy to fully recover from the crisis. For example, these groups may be the banking system, or certain high-productivity industries for which the economy has a comparative advantage. Providing transfers to these groups are then critical to ensure the continued viability of the post-crisis economy, and hence policymakers accordingly place a higher weight (up to unity) on the welfare of these groups.¹⁹

The equilibrium allocation of government transfers will satisfy the first order necessary conditions:

$$D_{P_g} (g_P^i) = \begin{cases} \frac{r}{1+r} - 1 + \omega_P (1 - \lambda_P), & \forall i \in J'_P, \\ \frac{r}{1+r} - 1 - \frac{\omega_P \lambda_P}{(1 - \omega_P)}, & \forall i \notin J'_P, \end{cases} \quad (23)$$

where $0 \leq \lambda_P \equiv \sum_{i \in J'_P} \frac{N_P^i}{N_P} \leq 1$ is the share of the population organized as lobbies, and the term D_{P_g} indicates the derivative of D_P taken with respect to g_P^i . It will be useful to re-express the above in the form:

$$g_P^{i*} = D_{P_g}^{-1} \left[\frac{\omega_P \lambda_P}{\omega_P - 1} + \phi_P^i \cdot \frac{\omega_P [1 + \omega_P (\lambda_P - 1)]}{1 - \omega_P} - \frac{1}{1 + r} \right], \quad (24)$$

where ϕ_P^i takes on unity if a group has lobbying power, and zero otherwise.

Equation (23) presents several notable features. First, the resulting allocation is typically not equivalent to the utilitarian outcome. The utilitarian optimum, which is a useful benchmark case, can be obtained by maximizing $\sum_{i \in I_P} \frac{N_P^i}{N_P} W_P^i(\mathbf{g}_P)$ subject to a resource constraint given by $\sum_{i \in I_P} N_P^i \tilde{c}_P^i = N_P [y_P + D(\cdot)] + \sum_{i \in I_P} N_P^i g_P^i$. The solution for this is $D_{P_g} (g_P^i) = \frac{r}{1+r} - 1$.

Second, the resulting allocations between organized lobby and non-lobby groups are asymmetric—in the sense that they are not egalitarian—except in the special case where the weight placed by the policymaker on special interest welfare is zero ($\omega_P = 0$), when all groups are organized as lobbies ($\lambda_P = 1$), or when no groups are organized as lobbies ($\lambda_P = 0$). In these cases, the solution reduces to $g_P^i = D_{P_g}^{-1} \left(-\frac{1}{1+r} \right)$, which is the utilitarian outcome.

Third, notice also that since government disbursements to groups with lobbying power are funded by taxpayers—in accordance with (13)—the policy variable g may also be viewed as bailout funds. Moreover, these funds may involve indirect transfers across borders. To see this, note that with the assumption of no repudiation, the post-crisis optimal consumption path (which is (11) corrected by Assumption 3 above) implies that groups will make private debt repayments in equilibrium. Taken together with the debt market clearing conditions (17) and (18) suggests that *developed* country lending may well be paid for by *developing* country taxpayers, or *vice versa*. More formally, $b_R = b [g_P (\tau_P)]$.

¹⁹In this case, the game outlined in Figure 1 will collapse to a lesser game, without the contributions stage. The structure of the game itself remains unchanged. Whether certain groups receive a higher weight in the optimization problem because of their inherent importance to the economy in a time of crisis, or because they offer contributions through political connections, is, ultimately, an empirical issue.

Finally, the misallocation (relative to the utilitarian optimum) of the bailout funds are such that groups with (without) lobbying power obtain more (less) than the optimal amount. To see this, note that the difference between (23) and the utilitarian optimum is $\omega_P(1 - \lambda_P) \geq 0$ for an organized group, and $-\frac{\lambda_P \omega_P}{(1 - \omega_P)} \leq 0$ for an unorganized group.

It is possible to specify an analogous policymaker problem for the developed country. The problem in this case is

$$W_R^G(\mathbf{g}_R, \mathbf{L}_R) = (1 - \omega_R) \sum_{i \in I_R} N_R^i W_R^i(\mathbf{g}_R) + \omega_R \sum_{i \in J_R} N_R^i L_R^i(\mathbf{g}_R), \quad (25)$$

where ω_R is the weight placed on special interest welfare in the developed country. Special interests in the developed country may be regarded as global banks with significant emerging market loan portfolios. The first order conditions are analogous to (23), and the equilibrium allocation for a group i is

$$g_R^{i*} = D_{R_g}^{-1} \left[\frac{\omega_R \lambda_R}{\omega_R - 1} + \phi_R^i \cdot \frac{\omega_R [1 + \omega_R (\lambda_R - 1)]}{1 - \omega_R} - \frac{1}{1 + r} \right], \quad (26)$$

where $0 \leq \lambda_R \equiv \sum_{i \in J_R} \frac{N_R^i}{N_R} \leq 1$, and ϕ_R^i takes on unity if a group has lobbying power, and zero otherwise.

We can now draw a distinction between pre- and post-crisis group consumption. For tractability, we let the per capita debt function be given simply by the linear quadratic, $D_h = \nu \frac{g_h^2}{2} + \Pi(T)$ for $h = R, P$, where ν is an exogenous multiplicative constant, and Π is a function. We then obtain the following result on changes in consumption patterns.

Proposition 1 (Consumption change). *The change in optimal consumption for group i in country h due to the crisis is given by*

$$\Delta c_h^i = r \Delta B_h^i + H \Delta y_h^i + \frac{r}{\nu(1+r)} \cdot \left[\frac{\omega_h \lambda_h}{\omega_h - 1} - \frac{1}{1+r} + \frac{\omega_h [1 + \omega_h (\lambda_h - 1)]}{1 - \omega_h} \cdot \phi_h^i \right], \quad (27)$$

where $B_h^i \equiv [(1+r)^{T-t} - 1] b_{h,t}^i$, and $H \equiv 1$ if $h = R$ and $H \equiv \frac{r}{(r-\rho)} \cdot \frac{(r_P^* - \alpha\rho)}{r_P^*}$ if $h = P$.

Proof. See appendix. □

One implication of the foregoing analysis is that, since the crisis changes the power structure such that post-crisis special interest representation intensifies due to (21), we might expect contributions in tranquil times to be relatively small. This finding may provide some mileage in explaining the Tullock puzzle of apparent underinvestment in special interest politics. As in Grossman & Helpman (1994, 2001), it is competition among lobbies for the same policy vector that allows the policymaker to capture all the surplus from its relationship with various interest groups. Therefore, equilibrium contributions may be much lower than one might expect, given the stakes. Moreover, the consumption change to being organized may also be small, if policymaker weight

contributions lightly ($\omega \rightarrow 0$). In addition, our general equilibrium setup is also consistent with the observation by Ansolabere, de Figueiredo & Snyder (2003) that it is individuals that are most active in campaign contributions. Since political organization directly affects the post-crisis bailout vector, and hence consumption, this provides individuals within groups an incentive to contribute. In contrast to their paper, however, this does not stem from contributions providing consumption benefits through utility from participation in the political process, but from the benefits of higher expected post-crisis consumption.²⁰

In the penultimate stage, groups offer their truthful contributions. As argued by Bernheim & Whinston (1986), truthful strategies are played in equilibrium, since these constitute best responses to other players' strategy sets (as long as their sets include a truthful strategy as well), and are coalition proof. For these reasons, we follow the literature and treat the equilibria given by each $L_h^{i*}, i \in J_h$ and $h = R, P$, as focal. This is the basis for our global truthfulness assumption, made earlier.

Now consider the foregoing stage. Here, the IMF Executive Board acts as an intermediary that provides a forum for representatives from both countries to bargain over the amount of official lending (Dooley & Verma 2003; Gould 2003).²¹ In particular, by using the policy vector \mathbf{g}^* from (24) and (26), and the feasible set $\{L^{i*}\}_{i \in J}$, we proceed to model a bargaining situation for the official loan function involving the developed and developing country, under the auspices of the IMF.

We operationalize this bargaining process as a war-of-attrition timing game between the governments of the developed and developing country. Governments solve for the optimal concession time based on total aggregate payoffs that result from being the leader versus being a follower; for the developing country, then, the payoffs to leadership are

$$W_P^L(\mathbf{g}_P^*, T_P) = \sum_{S=t}^{T_P} \delta^{S-t} \hat{W}_{P,S} + \sum_{S=T_P+1}^{\infty} \delta^{S-(T_P+1)} W_P, \quad (28)$$

where $\hat{W}_P \equiv \sum_{i \in I_P} \hat{W}_P^i$, which is the simple aggregation of groups' welfare in crisis, and $W_P \equiv \sum_{i \in I_P} (W_P^i - b_P^i)$ is the analogous aggregate of non-crisis

²⁰This holds so long as we are willing to allow group members' contribution schedules to be approximated by the group's contribution schedule, and for policymakers to be aware of the sector(s) from which the majority of their supporters are based.

²¹According to this school of thought, the IMF is typically couched as responsive to political pressures from major donor countries, such that any IMF package is essentially a compromise between these developed countries—especially the United States—and the developing economy seeking the package. The second school treats the IMF as a *bureaucracy*, with preferences that are maximized subject to various constraints; in this case, the IMF is an active participant in structuring the official loan (Vaubel 1991). In our treatment we limit the discussion to the former view, which we believe is a more plausible model of most episodes of IMF lending in crisis periods.

welfare, adjusted by Assumption 3. In contrast, payoffs to being a follower are

$$\begin{aligned} W_P^F(\mathbf{g}_P^*, T_P) &= \sum_{S=t}^{T_P} \delta^{S-t} \hat{W}_{P,S} + \sum_{S=T_P+1}^{\infty} \delta^{S-(T_P+1)} W_P + \delta^{T_P-t} \iota_P \\ &= W_P^L(\mathbf{g}_P^*, T_P) + \delta^{T_P-t} \iota_P, \end{aligned} \quad (29)$$

where $\iota > 0$ is the political capital gained from not giving in to foreign (creditor) country pressure, whether actual or perceived. The returns to political capital decrease over time, since any such capital gained from not being the first to concede is gradually eroded by the worsening economic conditions that result from financial autarky, as well as by natural discounting. There is some empirical evidence that such inverse audience costs are of salience to post-crisis negotiations involving the IMF (Bird 1996); here, we have chosen to model the idea of audience salience and its impact on the size of the win-set (Putnam 1988) somewhat abstractly as political capital. Note, also, that this measure is not necessarily restricted to the general populace. Indeed, it could just as well accrue from the support that the current regime in power receives from its patrons.²²

In equilibrium, then, there exists an optimal concession time; we assume that the probability of concession by country h is captured by the distribution function, $\Xi_h(T_h)$, with the associated density, $\xi_h(T_h)$. Expected welfare in that case is

$$EW_P^G(\mathbf{g}_P^*, T_P) = [1 - \Xi_R(T_P)] W_P^L(\mathbf{g}_P^*, T_P) + \sum_{S=t}^{T_P} \xi_R(S) W_P^F(\mathbf{g}_P^*, S). \quad (30)$$

This equation captures the fact that the expected welfare of the policymaker in the developing country over the bargaining process is the sum of two terms: The welfare when the policymaker concedes first, multiplied by the likelihood that he or she concedes; and the welfare from being a follower, multiplied by the likelihood that the developed country policymaker concedes first. The optimal concession time for the developing country policymaker is then characterized by

$$T_P^* = \arg \max_{T_P} EW_P^G(\mathbf{g}_P^*, T_P).$$

The analogous equations for payoffs in the developed country are straightforward, and are

$$W_R^L(\mathbf{g}_R^*, T_R) = \sum_{S=t}^{T_R} \delta^{S-t} \hat{W}_{R,S} + \sum_{S=T_R+1}^{\infty} \delta^{S-(T_R+1)} W_R, \quad \text{and} \quad (31)$$

²²It is fairly straightforward to endogenize this term as a function of special and general interests. Let $\iota(\omega_P)$ be the political capital term, with $\frac{\partial \iota}{\partial \omega} > 0$. In this case, an increase in the weight placed by policymakers on special interests will lead to an increase in their political capital gained.

$$W_R^F(\mathbf{g}_R, T_R) = \sum_{S=t}^{T_R} \delta^{S-t} \hat{W}_{R,S} + \sum_{S=T_R+1}^{\infty} \delta^{S-(T_R+1)} W_R + \delta^{T_R-t} \iota_R; \quad (32)$$

these equations will yield an optimal concession time for the developed country policymaker:

$$T_R^* = \arg \max_{T_R} EW_R^G(\mathbf{g}_R^*, T_R).$$

Unless we are willing to make some additional assumptions, there is no closed-form solution for the optimal concession time, since time is a discrete variable.²³ Hence, we make several parameter and distributional assumptions that assist us in obtaining a closed form solution, which in turn provides us with a notion of the equilibrium.

Assumption 4 (Parameterization). (a) $T = t + 1$; (b) $\forall s \in [t, T] : g_{h,s}^i = \tau_{h,s} = D_{h,s}(g_h, T) = 0, h = R, P$; (c) $\epsilon_R = E(\epsilon_R) = 0$; (d) $\int_{-\epsilon}^{\epsilon_P^*} \varphi(\epsilon_P | a_P < 0) d\epsilon = \int_{\epsilon_P^*}^0 \varphi(\epsilon_P | \Delta a_P < 0) d\epsilon = 0.25$; (e) $\forall S \in [t, T] : \xi_h(S) = 0.25, h = R, P$.

Taken together, the assumptions above confine the crisis to two periods, constrain several variables of the model to zero, and impose uniform distributions on shocks as well as concession probabilities. With Assumption 4, we can show that the optimal concession time is determined by a country taking into account its aggregate autarkic welfare, post-crisis welfare, and the discounted expected value of political capital. More generally, the solution will be such that each country will evaluate, at the margin, the expected cost of being the first to concede versus the expected gain of waiting another period before doing so. This expected cost simply the persistent welfare losses due to financial autarky, while the gain is given by the probability that the other country concedes first, conditional on the present country having not yet conceded at this point, multiplied by the benefits to her of not conceding and thereby reaping the political capital gains from standing firm.²⁴

In equilibrium, the intergovernmental debt function is given by

$$N_P D_P(\mathbf{g}_P^*, T^*) = -N_R D_R(\mathbf{g}_R^*, T^*), \quad (33)$$

where $T^* = \min\{T_P^*, T_R^*\}$. Intergovernmental debt, then, is a function of the equilibrium redistribution vector and concession time. These, in turn, are a function of primitives that include, *inter alia*, the vector of political organization, political capital, debt, output, and the world and domestic interest rates. These are captured in the following proposition.

²³In the appendix, we recast the model in continuous time and solve, implicitly, for the function that characterizes the optimal time in that case.

²⁴Note that our assumption of full repayment, while used in the proof, is not critical for generating our results, so long as there is some political capital at stake, and autarky welfare is dominated by post-crisis welfare. Fully enforced partial repayment will simply shorten the optimal concession time, since welfare with the resumption of capital flows will now be higher. In the limit where there is full repudiation, the optimal concession time will then depend on the relative size of political capital vis-à-vis (12) without adjusting for repayment.

Proposition 2 (Equilibrium lending). *In equilibrium, the intergovernmental debt function for a country h is a function of the optimal post-crisis redistribution vector, \mathbf{g}_h^* , and the optimal concession time, T_h^* , of the country h' that yields first in the negotiation process. These, in turn, are a function of economic and political primitives. That is,*

$$N_h D_h(\mathbf{g}^*, T^*) = N_h \left[\nu \frac{\mathbf{g}_h^{*2}}{2} + \Pi(\min\{T_P^*, T_R^*\}) \right], \quad (34)$$

where $\mathbf{g}_h^* = g(\phi_h, r; \omega_h, \lambda_h)$, and $T_h^* = T(\phi_h, t_h, r, \bar{r}_h^*, b_h, y_h, \tau_h; \omega_h, \lambda_h, \rho_h, \alpha)$.

Proof. See appendix. □

One feature of the analysis above is that it provides the theoretical underpinnings for precisely how political risk may help explain the Lucas paradox, an argument that has been advanced previously by others (Reinhart & Rogoff 2004; Tornell & Velasco 1992). In contrast to these authors, however, political risk in our model is specifically defined in terms of the expected welfare costs embedded in politically-motivated post-crisis bargaining (as opposed to default and appropriation risk, respectively). Thus, even without the risk of default or appropriation, fears over a lengthy bargaining process may lead to the paucity of capital flows, *ex ante*. As a result, lenders may then be less inclined to take advantage of the marginal productivity differences set out in Assumption 1. This sort of political risk may be sufficient to keep capital at home, attenuating home market bias.²⁵ Note also that the risk of appropriation, *per se*, is not necessary for this outcome. While our model accommodates this possibility very nicely, the explanation we forward is driven by *ex ante* lending restraint due to anticipated welfare losses from financial autarky, not offsetting capital flows due to concerns over forced redistribution.

One other nice feature of our model is that it captures the notion that output losses due to financial autarky may act as an enforcement mechanism for debt repayment, an idea developed in Dooley & Verma (2003). In contrast to their model, which allows for partial repayment, we have proceeded with an (admittedly extreme) assumption that there is full repayment of the debt overhang after the resumption of capital flows. Nonetheless, policymakers continue to have an incentive to extricate themselves from financial autarky, since they will continue to pay welfare losses if the war of attrition drags on. The *extent* to which they are willing to tarry, then, will in part be determined by the discounted stream of welfare losses from remaining in financial autarky, versus the the discounted stream of welfare should they resume capital flows and be required to return to pre-crisis debt levels. The fact that certain highly-indebted countries have been more willing to prolong debt renegotiations than otherwise may be reflective of this calculus.

²⁵To see this, define \bar{W}_s^i as the autarky welfare of a group i at time s . A group in the developed country will then choose a value of $b_{R,s}$ such that $E_0 \sum_{s=0}^{t-1} W_{R,s} + E_0 \sum_{s=t}^T \hat{W}_{R,s} + E_0 \sum_{s=T+1}^{\infty} W_{R,s} = E_0 \sum_{s=0}^{\infty} \bar{W}_{R,s}$. There could then exist values of $b_{R,s}^i$ such that $b_{R,s}^i < \bar{b}_{R,s}^i$, where $\bar{b}_{R,s}^i$ is the value of $b_{R,s}^i$ that would result in the absence of political risk.

4 Empirical Evidence

4.1 The Differential Impact of Crises

In this subsection, we seek to test the idea that post-crisis redistribution typically occurs in an asymmetric manner, especially in certain sectors of the economy (stage 4 of the game). In particular, we seek to test the implications of Proposition 1 by estimating (27) for the case of crisis countries. We operationalize this into an econometric model given by

$$\frac{\Delta \tilde{C}_{h,i,n}}{R\nu} = \gamma_\omega + \gamma_B \Delta B_{h,i,n} + \gamma_y \Delta y_{h,i,n} + \gamma_\phi \phi_{h,i} + \mathbf{X}_{h,i,n} \mathbf{\Gamma} + \varepsilon_{h,i,n}, \quad (35)$$

where $\gamma_\omega \equiv \frac{\omega_h \lambda_h}{\omega_h - 1} + R - 1$, $\gamma_B \equiv r$, $\gamma_y \equiv \frac{r}{(r-\rho)} \cdot \frac{(r_h^* - \alpha\rho)}{r_h^*}$, $\gamma_\phi \equiv \frac{\omega_h [1 + \omega_h (\lambda_h - 1)]}{1 - \omega_h}$, and $\mathbf{\Gamma} = [\gamma_1 \cdots \gamma_o]'$ is a $(o \times 1)$ vector of coefficients; $R \equiv \frac{r}{1+r}$ is the annuity rate, $\phi_{h,i}$ is an indicator variable that takes on unity when the household n in country h belongs to a sector i that is politically organized, and zero otherwise, $\mathbf{X}_{h,i,n}$ is a $(n \times o)$ matrix of household-specific controls, and $\varepsilon_{h,i,n} \sim N(0, \sigma_\varepsilon^2)$ is an i.i.d. disturbance term.

The household-specific controls that are included in the matrix, $\mathbf{X}_{h,i,n}$, which includes demographic variables such as initial consumption, average years of education in the household, household size, household health, ethnicity, and dummies for the age and gender for the head of household. In addition, we include dummies for employment sector and geographic district. Finally, we capture the change in household debt, $\Delta B_{h,i,n}$, with asset variables for ownership of household durables, agricultural, and business assets (since asset sales may provide necessary liquidity in the event of a crisis).²⁶

We draw on two sets of data to investigate (35):

- The Indonesia Family Life Survey (IFLS) dataset, part of the Family Life Surveys database, conducted and maintained by the RAND Corporation. We use longitudinal data from the 1997 IFLS2 and 2000 IFLS3 datasets, with supplementary data from the 1993 IFLS1, for approximately 2,600 households, covering 13 (out of 26) provinces of Indonesia.
- The Bulgarian Integrated Household Survey (IHS) dataset, part of the broader Living Standards Measurement Study (LSMS) household surveys database, commissioned by the development economics group of the World Bank. We use longitudinal data from the 1995 and 1997 IHS for approximately 2,000 households, covering all regions and provinces of Bulgaria.

The advantages of both datasets are that they are highly representative of the population in general, with a remarkably low attrition rate between the two time

²⁶We do not have debt data at household level; even if and these were available, they would be less meaningful in the empirical model since the correspondence of debt from group to household level is likely to be more opaque. These asset variables thus provide a crude measure of the impact of debt, which is in our theoretical model, on household consumption.

periods. They also possess the distinct advantage that the household interviews were conducted both just prior to and right after the crisis, thus providing us with an ideal “natural experiment” setting for testing our theory.

The core and constructed variables used for the estimates are described in detail in the data appendix. Here, we limit ourselves to a discussion of two variables: The construction of the key independent variable of interest—the political organization variable, ϕ —and the dependent variable.

Since no data exists for sectoral political organization *per se*, these were constructed based on proxies. For Bulgaria, we utilized the membership roster of the Bulgarian Chamber of Commerce and Industry (BCCI), together with that of *Podkrepa CL*, the most politically-active labor union in Bulgaria, which boasts 30 affiliate unions and represents some 150,000 workers. Sectors were coded as politically organized when sectoral organization membership numbers exceeded a certain threshold (relative to the other sectors). For the case of Bulgaria, this included the manufacturing, agriculture, and science sectors, *inter alia*. For Indonesia, we employed the Suharto Dependence Index, developed by the Castle Group and discussed in Fisman (2001), and coded sectors as politically organized when sectoral representation for politically-connected corporations exceeded a certain threshold (relative to other sectors). In addition, since the Indonesian military is widely regarded as politically-connected in both the Suharto and Habibie administrations (Rabasa & Haseman 2002), we coded this sector as politically organized as well.

Because optimal consumption for households is not observable, we proxy this with real household consumption expenditures. The main disadvantage of doing so is that realized expenditures are more likely to reflect consumption net of taxes and other expenditures not captured by our theoretical model of optimal consumption. To account for these other unmodeled factors, we deploy the controls in (35) to improve the fit and generalizability of the empirical model.

Figure 2 graphs, by employment sector, average household real per capita consumption expenditures pre- and post-crisis for Bulgaria and Indonesia. The crisis exerts a heterogeneous impact on household consumption. Furthermore, while consumption fell uniformly across the board in Bulgaria, in some sectors in Indonesia—notably, in the politically-organized chemicals, military, and communications sectors—there was actually an *increase* in post-crisis consumption.

We summarize our main findings for both countries in Table 1. Four alternative models were considered, as follows: (*C1*) OLS regression with demographic variables, durable asset ownership, and employment sector as controls; (*C2*) Specification (*C1*) with agricultural assets included; (*C3*) Specification (*C1*) with business assets included; (*C4*) IV regression with real per capita expenditure instrumented by real per capita income, together with controls.²⁷

²⁷Instrumenting for consumption takes into account two potential econometric issues. First, real per capita consumption expenditures may be endogenous to changes in consumption expenditures, since some households may have anticipated future income changes independent of the crisis, and adjusted 1995 consumption accordingly. Second, and more importantly, there might be measurement error in the data, either due to misreporting of consumption expenditures, or due to measurement error correlation on each side of the regression equation.

Table 1: Regressions for change in consumption expenditure[†]

	Bulgaria				Indonesia			
	(C1)	(C2)	(C3)	(C4)	(C1)	(C2)	(C3)	(C4)
Political Organization	0.161 (0.10)*	0.134 (0.10)	0.154 (0.10)	0.234 (0.11)**	0.273 (0.17)	0.101 (0.22)	0.548 (0.31)*	0.370 (0.26)
Change in Income	0.048 (0.01)***	0.046 (0.01)***	0.049 (0.01)***	0.044 (0.01)***	0.088 (0.01)***	0.112 (0.02)***	0.092 (0.02)***	0.112 (0.02)***
Initial Consumption	-0.856 (0.04)***	-0.866 (0.04)***	-0.860 (0.04)***	-0.334 (0.24)***	-0.689 (0.03)***	-0.719 (0.04)***	-0.767 (0.04)***	0.170 (0.10)***
Average HH Education	0.112 (0.05)**	0.113 (0.05)**	0.107 (0.05)**	-0.018 (0.07)	0.201 (0.04)***	0.261 (0.06)***	0.201 (0.06)***	-0.102 (0.06)*
HH size	-0.082* (0.05)*	-0.075 (0.05)	-0.064 (0.05)	0.000 (0.06)	-0.374 (0.04)***	-0.494 (0.07)***	-0.384 (0.07)***	0.037 (0.07)
Health shock	-0.004 (0.00)	-0.003 (0.00)	-0.003 (0.00)	-0.003 (0.00)	0.052 (0.04)	-0.066 (0.07)	-0.006 (0.07)	0.010 (0.05)
Natural disaster	-	-	-	-	0.280 (0.12)**	0.380 (0.13)***	0.264 (0.30)	0.116 (0.13)
Ethnicity 1	-0.067 (0.07)	-0.070 (0.07)	-0.073 (0.07)	0.019 (0.09)	0.056 (0.04)	-0.012 (0.07)	0.062 (0.06)	-0.055 (0.05)
Ethnicity 2	-0.530 (0.13)***	-0.553 (0.13)***	-0.543 (0.13)***	-0.208 (0.21)	-0.014 (0.06)	-0.137 (0.11)	0.016 (0.08)	-0.031 (0.07)
Employment Sector 3	-0.173 (0.09)	-0.131 (0.09)	-0.149 (0.09)	-0.235 (0.09)*	0.274 (0.08)***	0.302 (0.13)**	0.388 (0.15)***	0.041 (0.11)
Employment Sector 8	-0.144 (0.15)	-0.108 (0.15)	-0.145 (0.15)	-0.175 (0.16)	-0.045 (0.05)	0.050 (0.08)	-0.109 (0.12)	0.025 (0.06)
Employment Sector 10	-0.146 (0.10)	-0.115 (0.11)	-0.150 (0.10)	-0.203 (0.12)*	-0.133 (0.04)***	-0.213 (0.07)***	-0.148 (0.09)*	-0.150 (0.06)
Employment Sector 12	-0.181 (0.010)*	-0.198 (0.10)**	-0.194 (0.10)**	-0.223 (0.11)	0.042 (0.62)***	2.525 (0.28)	-	-0.324 (0.49)
Employment Sector 14	-0.069 (0.14)	-0.040 (0.14)	-0.062 (0.14)	-0.090 (0.18)	-0.389 (0.17)**	-0.315 (0.18)*	-0.518 (0.28)*	-0.460 (0.25)
Durable Asset 7	-0.484 (0.15)***	-0.547 (0.13)***	-0.486 (0.15)***	-0.677 (0.24)	0.156 (0.04)***	0.080 (0.06)	0.042 (0.06)	-0.012 (0.05)
Durable Asset 8	-	-	-	-	0.070 (0.04)	-0.013 (0.06)	0.038 (0.07)	-0.117 (0.06)**
Durable Asset 9	0.004 (0.03)	-0.001 (0.03)	0.004 (0.03)	-0.012 (0.04)	0.067 (0.03)**	0.107 (0.05)**	0.029 (0.05)	-0.010 (0.04)
Durable Asset 10	0.156 (0.06)***	0.150 (0.06)***	0.159 (0.06)***	0.143 (0.06)**	0.113 (0.09)	0.287* (0.17)	0.041 (0.14)	0.202 (0.12)
Durable Asset 13	-0.392 (0.10)***	-0.404 (0.10)***	-0.379 (0.11)***	-0.416 (0.11)***	-	-	-	-
Business Asset 3	-	-0.014 (0.20)	-	-	0.290 (0.10)***	-	-	-
Business Asset 6	-	-0.669 (0.33)**	-	-	0.064 (0.05)	-	-	-
Business Asset 7	-	-0.116 (0.42)	-	-	0.105 (0.08)	-	-	-
Business Asset 16	-	0.254 (0.09)***	-	-	-	-	-	-
Agricultural Asset 1	-	-	0.392 (0.12)***	-	-	-	-0.072 (0.06)	-
Agricultural Asset 2	-	-	-0.275 (0.16)*	-	-	-	0.041 (0.05)	-
Agricultural Asset 9	-	-	0.453 (0.22)**	-	-	-	-0.515 (0.14)***	-
R ²	0.380	0.388	0.388	0.278	0.377	0.440	0.460	-
N	1325	1325	1325	1325	2383	906	931	2383

[†] Notes: A constant term was included in the regressions, but not reported. Standard errors are in parentheses. * indicates significance at 10 percent level, ** indicates significance at 5 percent level, and *** indicates significance at 1 percent level. Only selected control variables are reported, although all variables discussed in the data appendix were included.




Figure 2: Mean household real per capita consumption expenditures by sector.

Our findings are broadly supportive of the idea that sectors that were politically organized experienced a relatively smaller consumption decline vis-à-vis the other sectors in the economy. For Bulgaria, the coefficient for ϕ is positive and at least marginally significant in two of the four specifications, and—after instrumenting for initial consumption—significant at 5% level ($C4$). Similarly, the coefficient for ϕ is positive in all specifications for Indonesia. While it was only statistically significant at 10% in one specification ($C2$), it was approaching statistical significance in two other specifications: ($C1$) and ($C4$) (with $p = 0.116$ and $p = 0.148$, respectively).²⁸ Given the level of disaggregation in the data, we feel that these results provide some limited validation for our theoretical model, at least for the two countries considered. We suspect that a wider pattern may hold for other countries as well.

4.2 The Determinants of IMF Lending

In this subsection, we go on to test the the role that both domestic redistributive politics and international bargaining have on IMF lending decisions (stage 2 of the game). In particular, we seek to test the implications of Proposition 2 by estimating (34). We treat the determinants as linear, and seek to estimate an econometric model given by

$$N_{h,t}D_{h,t} = \Theta_{\phi}\Phi_t + \Theta_{\iota}I_t + \mathbf{Y}_{h,t}\Theta_Y + \mathbf{Z}_{h,t}\Theta_Z + v_{h,t}, \quad (36)$$

where Θ_{ϕ} , Θ_{ι} , Θ_Y and Θ_Z are (2×1) , (2×1) , (5×1) and $(o' \times 1)$ vectors of coefficients, respectively, $\Phi_t = [\phi_{h,t} \ \phi_{-h,t}]'$ is (2×1) vector of the respective aggregate measures of the extent of political organization in a developed and developing country at time t , $I_{h,t} = [\iota_{h,t} \ \iota_{-h,t}]'$ is a measure of how much political capital policymakers in each country accrue at time t for not giving in to the other country, $\mathbf{Y}_{h,t}$ is a $(h \times 5)$ matrix comprised of r, \bar{r}^*, b, y, τ , $\mathbf{Z}_{h,t}$ is a $(h \times o')$ matrix of other (economic, political, and technocratic) determinants of lending, and $v_{h,t} \sim N(0, \sigma_v^2)$ is an i.i.d. disturbance term.

²⁸Tests on the instruments were conducted, but not reported; in summary, for both countries, the Anderson canonical correlation LR test rejects the null of underidentification, while the Hansen-J test fails to reject the null that the instruments are valid.

The other determinants that are included in the matrix, $\mathbf{Z}_{h,t}$, are other technocratic factors that have been identified as important in IMF lending decisions, including the country’s debt burden and past credit history (Knight & Santaella 2002), as well as political influences such as political proximity to lending countries and indices for rule of law (Barro & Lee 2005).

Our dataset draws on IMF lending patterns. In particular, we use, as our measure of IMF lending, Stand-By Arrangements (SBA) and Extended Fund Facility (EFF) arrangements.²⁹ This was merged with data on international financial and political factors, for a sample of 122 observations spanning 49 countries over the period 1971 through 2004.

We will limit our discussion here to the two political-economic variables of interest, ϕ and ι , and leave the other variables for the data appendix.

The variable ϕ is an aggregate measure of special interest group (SIG) pressure. Any such measure would need to incorporate two key considerations. First, the measure, while necessarily indirect, should not be too far removed from policymaker decisionmaking; otherwise, it may be contaminated by other determinants that are not reflective of the pressures faced by the government actor. Actual government expenditures are ideal for this purpose: Not only is this not directly affected by private actors (as would be the case for a variable such as export flows), it also captures realized pressures, since government expenditures are zero-sum (and hence are removed from the problem of pressures by groups in different sectors with opposing objectives, as would be the case for tariff rates). Admittedly, there is the potential for observational equivalence between special interest pressure and actual government preferences.

Second, since the measure also needs to be an aggregate representation of the *relative* power of special interests in the economy, we require a measure that takes into account the special (polar) cases where special interests are either completely unorganized ($\lambda = 0$), or completely organized ($\lambda = 1$)—and provide equivalent results in either case. Thus, ϕ needs to capture the *deviation*, or distribution, of special interest power in the economy, by sector, with an appropriate proxy for direct pressure.

We construct this measure for *developing* countries by placing sectors on the abscissa, and government expenditure in a sector (as a share of GDP) on the ordinate. The index of the distribution of special interest pressure in country h is then a type of Gini index:³⁰

$$\phi_{h,t} = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{I_h} \sum_{-i=1}^{I_h} |G_i - G_{-i}|}{2I_h^2 \bar{G}_h}, \quad (37)$$

²⁹In addition to the SBA and the EFF, the IMF also manages two other lending programs, aimed primarily at very low-income countries: The Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF) and the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF). To remain consistent with our theoretical model, we exclude these arrangements from our measure of lending, since these are representative of more long-term development lending, as opposed to the short-term balance-of-payments assistance that the SBA and EFF were designed to provide.

³⁰One key advantage, for our purposes, of employing a Gini-type index is that such a measure satisfies anonymity, scale and population independence, and the transfer principle, all of which are desirable for a measure of special interest pressure.

where G_i is the government expenditure (as share of total expenditures) in sector i , \bar{G} is mean government expenditure shares, and the subscript, $-i$, indicates all groups other than i . Thus, special interest pressure in the developing country ranges from 0 to 1, with higher values indicating greater distortion.

For *developed* countries, we require a more direct measure of special interest pressure, since the distribution of government expenditures may be noisy relative to the impact that certain groups have on influencing Fund lending behavior. Accordingly, we calculate an index of country lending exposure using the Consolidated Banking Statistics compiled by the BIS. This involved taking the ratio of foreign claims of reporting country banks on an individual country to total foreign claims of these reporting banks, such that special interest pressure from country $-h$ is:

$$\phi_{-h,t} = \frac{B_{h,-h,t}}{\sum_{h=1}^H B_{h,-h,t}}, \quad (38)$$

where $B_{h,-h,t}$ are the foreign claims on country h by country $-h$ at time t , and total foreign claims are calculated across all countries, H .

We limit our selection of developed countries to the five largest lending nations: The United States, Japan, Germany, France, and the United Kingdom. These five countries correspond to the top five quota subscribers, as well as the nations with the top five credit contributions among participating nations in the General Arrangements to Borrow (GAB) and New Arrangements to Borrow (NAB) plans.³¹ For tractability, we further reduce the variable set by taking a simple average of lending exposure for Germany, France, and the United Kingdom, so that we have a single ϕ representing the European Union. Equation (38) is thus analytically congruous to measures of developed-country special interest pressure that have been employed by other authors (Oatley & Yackee 2004), although its expression here is in a more general form.

The idea of political capital that ι seeks to capture is harder to measure quantitatively. This variable should exhibit the feature of being an accumulative, valued political “prize” that is common to both the developing and developed nation. Unfortunately, proxy measures for this is likely to vary by context: One can certainly conceive of how political capital acquired in financial crisis negotiations may differ significantly from that obtained in a run-up to armed conflict. For want of a more direct measure, we resort to using an index of democracy as our proxy for such audience costs. In particular, we make use of the measure of democracy developed by Freedom House (2004).³² We construct a simple measure that averages the country’s ratings for both civil liberties and

³¹While the limitation to five lending nations may seem somewhat arbitrary, it is helpful to note that with regard to all three arrangements, these nations contribute by far the largest amounts to the IMF. For example, these five nations are the only ones to have supplementary resource maximums of above \$2.5 billion SDRs under the NAB. The next closest nation, Saudi Arabia, has a maximum of \$1.7 billion SDRs.

³²Our use of this measure is motivated by both theoretical and empirical considerations. We shy away from certain measures—such as the Henisz political constraint index—since these place a heavy weight on the legislature, which is not explicitly addressed by our model. Moreover, the Freedom House indices provide the greatest coverage over countries and across

political rights, for an index that ranges between 0 (greatest political capital at stake) and 7 (least political capital at stake).

The estimation of (36) presents its own set of problems. Data for IMF lending is likely to exhibit both censorship as well as incidental truncation. The former arises because the dependent variable will be censored at zero (one cannot lend to the IMF), as well as potentially censored at the other tail (due to access limits in accordance to country quota subscriptions).³³ The latter problem is fairly established in the empirical IMF lending literature: Since countries seeking IMF aid are typically in crisis, their macroeconomic and political-economic fundamentals are likely to display a systematic selection bias. To address the first issue, we estimate a Tobit of the following form:

$$\begin{aligned} N_{h,t}D'_{h,t} &= \Theta'_\phi \Phi_t + \Theta'_t \mathbf{I}_t + \mathbf{Y}_{h,t} \Theta'_Y + \mathbf{Z}_{h,t} \Theta'_Z + v'_{h,t}, \\ N_{h,t}D'_{h,t} &= \max [0, N_{h,t}D'_{h,t}]. \end{aligned} \quad (39)$$

We address the second issue by employing the selection model of Heckman (1979). Our specification considers the following latent dependent variable model:³⁴

$$\begin{aligned} N_{h,t}D''_{h,t} &= \Theta''_\phi \Phi_t + \Theta''_t \mathbf{I}_t + \mathbf{Y}_{h,t} \Theta''_Y + \mathbf{Z}_{h,t} \Theta''_Z + v''_{h,t}, \\ N_{h,t}D''_{h,t} &= \vartheta_\phi \phi_{h,t} + \vartheta_t \iota_{h,t} + \mathbf{X}_{h,t} \Theta_X + \zeta''_{h,t}, \end{aligned} \quad (40)$$

where the latter is the selection equation, \mathbf{X} is a vector of additional controls for the selection equation, $v''_{h,t} \sim N(0, \sigma_{v''}^2)$ and $\zeta''_{h,t} \sim N(0, 1)$ are disturbance terms with $E(v''_{h,t} \zeta''_{h,t}) = \sigma_{v''} \zeta''$, and

$$N_{h,t}D''_{h,t} = \begin{cases} N_{h,t}D''_{h,t} & \text{if } N_{h,t}D''_{h,t} > 0, \\ \text{missing} & \text{if } N_{h,t}D''_{h,t} \leq 0. \end{cases}$$

The findings for these benchmark regressions are reported in Table 2. The various specifications are: (*L1*) OLS regression with controls implied by the theoretical model; (*C2*) Specification (*L1*) with additional economic and technocratic controls; (*L3*) Tobit regression of (*L1*) with censoring at zero; (*L4*) Tobit regression of (*L2*) with censoring at zero; (*L5*) Heckman maximum-likelihood estimates of (*L1*); (*L6*) Heckman maximum-likelihood estimates of (*L2*).

The results provide general support for the idea that special interest pressure as well as political capital matter in post-crisis resolution outcomes involving the IMF. For most of the specifications, the amount of IMF lending is positively

time. In our robustness checks, we substitute our measure with the Polity index developed by Marshall & Jaggers (2003).

³³Censoring at this end is likely to be less of an issue in practice, since the access limit constraint is seldom binding. Moreover, with the introduction of the Compensatory and Contingency Financing Facility in 1988 and the Supplemental Reserve Facility in 1997, borrowing countries actually have a fair degree of flexibility in exceeding their quota-established limits. Accordingly, we do not control for this form of censoring.

³⁴Note that estimates obtained from (40) will also account for censoring at zero, by construction.

Table 2: Benchmark regressions for IMF lending[†]

	(L1)	(L2)	(L3)	(L4)	(L5)	(L6)
Developed SIG Pressure	65.544 (10.49)***	16.152 (5.53)***	63.239 (7.59)***	16.152 (5.57)***	50.808 (10.08)***	16.230 (5.46)***
Developing SIG Pressure	0.555 (0.47)	0.698 (0.32)**	0.561 (0.47)	0.698 (0.27)***	0.538 (0.45)	0.742 (0.27)***
Developed Pol Capital	0.807 (1.14)	-1.092 (0.70)	0.815 (1.07)	-1.092 (0.62)*	1.062 (1.05)	-1.208 (0.61)**
Developing Pol Capital	0.306 (0.26)	0.291 (0.16)*	0.308 (0.21)	0.291 (0.15)*	-0.655 (0.28)**	0.441 (0.17)**
Domestic Interest	0.093 (0.11)	-0.011 (0.06)	0.093 (0.12)	-0.011 (0.07)	-0.011 (0.10)	-0.003 (0.07)
International Interest	-0.639 (0.22)***	0.029 (0.13)	-0.639 (0.21)***	0.029 (0.13)	-0.366 (0.21)*	0.040 (0.12)
Foreign Assets	-0.024 (0.05)	-0.085 (0.04)**	-0.024 (0.05)	-0.085 (0.03)***	-0.065 (0.05)	-0.092 (0.03)***
Real GDP	0.150 (0.06)**	-0.108 (0.12)	0.150 (0.08)*	-0.108 (0.11)	0.091 (0.07)	-0.125 (0.11)
Revenue	0.026 (0.06)	0.087 (0.05)*	0.026 (0.08)	0.087 (0.05)*	0.071 (0.07)	0.102 (0.05)*
Real GDP/ Capita		0.117 (0.11)		0.117 (0.10)		0.117 (0.10)
Reserves		0.030 (0.05)		0.030 (0.06)		-0.074 (0.09)
Quota		1.246 (0.13)***		1.246 (0.12)***		1.449 (0.17)***
Constant	1.773 (1.06)	-17.730 (1.52)***	1.773 (1.10)	-17.730 (1.36)***	8.156 (1.40)***	-20.964 (2.03)***
	<i>Selection Equation</i>					
Reserves					-0.064 (0.04)*	-0.143 (0.04)***
Quota					0.320 (0.05)***	0.280 (0.05)***
Developing SIG Pressure					-0.004 (0.05)	-0.004 (0.05)
Developing Pol Capital					0.395 (0.08)***	0.259 (0.08)***
Constant					-6.731 (0.66)***	-4.171 (0.65)***
R^2	0.620	0.880				
Pseudo- R^2			0.246	0.539		
χ^2					80.030	660.405
N	122	121	122	121	1629	1629

[†] Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. * indicates significance at 10 percent level, ** indicates significance at 5 percent level, and *** indicates significance at 1 percent level.

and significantly related to our measure of developed, ϕ_R , and developing, ϕ_P , special interest pressure, as well as developing political capital, ι_P . Furthermore, developed political capital, ι_R , is also negative (and significant) in two specifications. In our preferred specification, (*L6*), all of these political-economic variables are both statistically and economically significant.

Special interest pressure from developed countries accounts is, by far, the strongest determinant of IMF lending, *ceteris paribus*. This relationship, which is clearly evident at the bivariate level (Figure 3), is also reflected in the regression analyses. In addition, the distribution of special interest pressures in a developing country also makes a difference in the loan amounts: The greater the inequality in SIG pressure, the larger the loan package. Overall, the empirical evidence points to significant positive relationship between IMF lending and special interest pressure in both developed and developing countries.




Figure 3: IMF crisis lending in terms of developed country special interest pressure.

Political capital in the developing country also appears to play an important role in the the agreed amount disbursed. A borrowing country with lesser political capital at stake (recall, political capital is decreasing in this measure) is able to secure a larger loan from the IMF; alternatively, with greater audience costs to backing down, delay results in a smaller loan. Moreover, this effect is relatively large, influencing about 44 percent of the increase in IMF lending in our preferred specification.³⁵ The sign of the developed political capital vari-

³⁵Note, also, that this is also a more appealing interpretation of the democracy index, since the result would otherwise require us to explain why *less* democratic nations receive *more* IMF assistance.

able is not stable, alternating between positive and negative, depending on the specification employed. It does, however, enter with a negative coefficient when it is statistically significant. For the lending nation, therefore, smaller audience costs from backing down result in smaller loans.

Note that the direction of the other economic variables, when statistically significant, all enter with economically logical signs. For example, higher international interest rates imply that the costs of borrowing are greater, which then leads to a smaller amount lent. Similarly, larger economies—as measured by GDP—tend to borrow more. Finally, other technocratic variables, such as a country’s quota share, also appear to be important in explaining the size of a loan package.

To test the robustness of our results, we make several perturbations to our benchmark specifications. In addition, we also employ alternative measures of some of our key regressors. In general, we regard these results as less insightful, since these alternative specifications typically involve further decreasing the size of our (already small) sample. Nonetheless, the majority of our benchmark findings continue to hold, although some of the variables fall out of significance, depending on the particular specification. These robustness results are summarized in Table 3.

The various specifications are:³⁶ (*R1*) Specification (*L6*) with special interest pressure from only the United States; (*R2*) (*L6*) with special interest pressure only from the European Union; (*R3*) (*L6*) with the change in real GDP in the selection equation; (*R4*) (*L6*) with previous IMF borrowing history in the selection equation; (*R5*) (*L6*) with the square of real GDP as an additional control; (*R6*) (*L6*) with political proximity to the United States as an additional control; (*R7*) (*L4*) with developing country political capital measured with the Polity dataset; (*R8*) (*L4*) with developing special interest pressure measured with corruption data; (*R9*) (*L4*) with the dataset limited to only episodes of financial crises; and (*R10*) Probit specification with a binary dependent variable for whether a country had a borrowing relationship with the IMF, using the controls in (*L2*).^{37,38} On the whole, our findings underscore the importance of political economy variables in IMF lending, and are complementary to the

³⁶Our preferred baseline regression is (*L6*), for the reasons stated above. However, due to small sample sizes when we include some of the additional controls, we resorted to the Tobit specification (*L4*) to obtain convergence on some results.

³⁷We also explored specifications including open-economy variables (such as the real exchange rate, terms of trade, and balance of payments) and additional government variables (such as government expenditures and deficits). In general, these did not qualitatively change the flavor of our results.

³⁸Our findings for the final Probit specification deserves a little more comment. Here, in contrast to the majority of the literature (and to our own results on the amount of disbursement), we find that developed-country special interest pressure significantly *lowers* the probability of securing an IMF loan. We conjecture that this counterintuitive result is due to collinearity issues between the ϕ_R variable and the level of reserves ($corr = 0.422$, significant at 1%), which also enters the regression with a negative and significant coefficient. This was not an issue for our earlier calculations since reserves were an insignificant determinant of lending amounts. In this regard, the fact that economic variables appear to be more important in the conclusion of IMF disbursements is consistent with work of Sturm, Berger & de Haan (2005).

Table 3: Robustness checks for IMF lending[†]

	(R1)	(R2)	(R3)	(R4)	(R5)
Developed	8.387	11.994	16.771	16.152	16.230
SIG Pressure	(3.27)**	(7.87)	(5.58)***	(5.26)***	(5.46)***
Developing	0.850	0.775	0.729	0.698	0.742
SIG Pressure	(0.40)**	(0.27)***	(0.27)***	(0.27)**	(0.27)***
Developed	-2.037	-1.253	-1.128	-1.092	-1.208
Pol Capital	(1.05)*	(0.62)**	(0.62)*	(0.62)*	(0.61)**
Developing	0.751	0.473	0.159	0.291	0.441
Pol Capital	(4.59)	(0.18)***	(0.19)	(0.15)*	(0.17)**
χ^2	678.313	615.992	704.755	886.483	660.405
N	1628	1628	1435	1629	1629
	(R6)	(R7)	(R8)	(R9)	(R10)
Developed	16.634	93.683	15.067	11.574	-11.414
SIG Pressure	(8.05)**	(12.10)***	(7.02)**	(5.68)**	(5.53)**
Developing	0.851	0.215	0.136	0.026	0.107
SIG Pressure	(0.39)**	(0.53)	(0.21)	(0.49)	(0.28)
Developed	-2.038	0.185	-1.453	-0.767	-0.743
Pol Capital	(1.04)*	(1.40)	(1.10)	(0.88)	(0.59)
Developing	0.749	-0.405	-0.260	0.455	-0.103
Pol Capital	(4.57)	(0.28)	(0.24)	(0.21)**	(0.14)
pseudo- R^2	231.844	0.276	0.489	0.697	0.089
χ^2	1629				58.22
N		73	78	46	617

[†] Notes: Other controls from the benchmark models were included, but not reported. Standard errors are in parentheses. * indicates significance at 10 percent level, ** indicates significance at 5 percent level, and *** indicates significance at 1 percent level.

existing literature (Faccio *et al.* 2005; Oatley & Yackee 2004).

5 Interpretation and Policy Implications

There are important caveats that underlie our empirical findings in the previous section. Due to the specific functional forms assumed for the structural econometric equations, as well the other simplifying assumptions made, the preceding tests qualify as necessary, but not sufficient, investigations of the theoretical model.

To illustrate this, consider the micro-level tests of how the financial crisis impacted sectors of the economy differently. While the empirical evidence suggests that politically-organized sectors performed better in the crisis, which may well be due to special interest politicking, political organization in a sector may also be driven by more fundamental determinants, such as higher levels of productivity. Since more productive sectors are also more likely to be organized, these sectors would then be more likely to recover quickly in the event of a crisis.

Moreover, as alluded to in the theoretical model, it may be possible that certain productive sectors necessary for the economy’s continued viability and recovery end up being supported by government policy, irrespective of lobbying contributions. In that case, we might also observe that these sectors perform better in a crisis. Thus, political organization is merely a reflection of these sectors’ comparative advantages, rather than a proof that special interest politics are the *raison d’être* for their superior performance.³⁹

Moreover, while it is certainly implied by the general equilibrium nature of our theoretical model, the connection between organized sectors and organized *workers* cannot automatically be assumed in reality. If workers are not organized, then even if the industry is politically organized, workers in that industry will not collect rents. The empirical evidence, however, suggests that there appears to be a statistically significant effect of spillovers for workers in industries protected from the crisis by political rents, either through direct transfers or—more likely—indirectly via relatively higher levels of employment and hours worked. Moreover, the consistency of our findings with the existing empirical literature on the microeconomic impact of crises suggests that special interest politics may be an important mechanism that drives post-crisis redistribution. Indeed, our findings provide further corroboration of the recent work of Faccio *et al.* (2005), which finds that government bailouts—especially IMF or World Bank-financed ones—tend to be more likely for politically connected firms.

Similarly, the tests of IMF lending primarily make the point that, in addition to economic factors, both special interest as well as domestic constituent pressure are potentially important determinants of crisis lending decisions by the IMF. While the reported coefficients are intuitively appealing, we should be careful not to draw excessively strong conclusions about the exact magnitude (and even the direction) of each point estimate. This is primarily because our theoretical model maps the optimal concession time of each country to lending amounts in a relatively loose manner. As before, the aim is to demonstrate the importance, not the primacy, of political-economic factors in IMF lending. Ultimately, we view our findings as a complement to the existing literature, which tends to find that IMF lending *decisions* are influenced by special interest politics as well as political bargaining.⁴⁰

Given these caveats, it is nonetheless interesting to consider our findings in a wider context. Subsection 4.1 suggests that special interests are potential ben-

³⁹Note that the more direct suggestion that certain sectors, such as exporters, could perform better in the crisis due to the devaluation is insufficient to drive our results. For this to be the case, export industries need to be *exactly the same* as politically-organized sectors. This is clearly not the case, since in both datasets organized sectors include nontradable service sectors. Indeed, it is difficult to construe, *ex ante*, any other way in which these sectors may be somehow related. A related argument, that certain sectors may simply be more productive or face smaller income fluctuations in general (and hence perform better irrespective of the crisis), is also inadequate, since we have included sectoral dummies.

⁴⁰Moreover, the recent work by Sturm *et al.* (2005), which finds that politics affects the conclusion of IMF agreements—but not the disbursement of IMF credits—can be seen in this light. Since the lending amounts used in our empirical study reflects agreed, as opposed to disbursed amounts, our findings offer additional justification for how politics are important in the conclusion of negotiations involving the IMF.

eficiaries in a financial crisis. This places the finding of post-crisis rich-to-poor transfers (Baldacci *et al.* 2002; Halac & Schmukler 2004) within a specific political framework: The rich are getting richer *because* they are politically organized. Observed post-crisis income distributions are therefore a result of domestic (special interest) politics, rather than a phenomenon unique to financial crises. As in the case of redistribution in more tranquil periods, post-crisis redistribution is the outcome of domestic groups wrangling over a fixed economic pie.

In addition, the critics who argue that the IMF is an instrument of developed country special interests (Perkins 2004; Stiglitz 2002) may indeed have a case. Subsection 4.2 implies that IMF lending is contingent on these special interest pressures. More precisely, lending amounts appear to be influenced by the extent to which a borrowing country's special interests have asymmetric political power. Moreover, with lending amounts increasing with greater asymmetry of developing special interest pressures, one could credibly argue that one purpose of IMF bailouts is to rescue beleaguered banks and favored industries in borrowing countries, who in turn pay off loans extended to them previously by global banks. While developing country taxpayers are certainly one loser in this system of redistribution accompanied by international transfers, one cannot, *ex ante*, rule out welfare losses by developed country taxpayers either.

However, this is only part of the picture. The responsiveness of policymakers to political pressures from domestic constituents means that, in a financial crisis, borrowing countries tend to borrow less, while lending countries tend to extend larger loans. While the specific reasons for this result remain unmodeled, what is clear from the empirical analysis is that governments do not have free rein over major foreign economic policy decisions. As first argued by Putnam (1988), general domestic political support *does* matter in the calculus of bargaining.

Should, then, the IMF be abolished, as some of its critics suggest? This, surely, is a drastic measure. The IMF serves potentially useful functions in smoothing the wheels of international finance. Just as most economies would not consider completely abolishing their central bank, the lender of last resort function of the IMF is, arguably, a reasonable one. Other more tempered criticisms of the IMF, however, may deserve consideration.

One criticism is that the IMF merely exercises a "one size fits all" policy. More specifically, its policy recommendations are said to not adequately consider their impact on the poor. For example, one view holds that the IMF's policy recommendations are too rigid, and its policies bring about undue hardship on economies already in crisis (Stiglitz 2002). The solution to this would then be to relax conditionality. However, the other—opposing—view is that the IMF should maintain a tighter leash on borrowing governments to ensure that disbursements are properly allocated to those most affected by the crisis—that is, it should *strengthen* country selectivity and conditionality (Calomiris 2003). Our research is agnostic on this point. We have chosen to model conditionality and program participation as empirical realities. Given these assumptions, our finding that post-crisis redistribution tends to favor certain politically-organized groups may imply that greater attention needs to be paid to the actual recipients of IMF funds. However, to the extent that these disbursements may have

been authorized by donor governments responding to their own special interests, the problem would have deeper structural roots that are not easily resolved by a mere change in conditionality requirements. In any case—as has often been claimed by the Fund itself—beyond its advisory capacity, the IMF has no power to formulate economic policy for a client country. Still, to curb the likelihood of asymmetric bargaining power between governments, the recent calls for expanding participation in democratic processes within international institutions (Grant & Keohane 2005) seem like a step in the right direction.

Another common critique is that the IMF has lost its way, straying from its original mandate of maintaining global financial stability. In one camp, it has been accused of being ignorant of its role as an organization that enables despots and dictators in developing countries to sustain their regimes (Smith, Jr. 1984; Vreeland 2003); thus, it is too poorly managed, and is in need of refocusing. On the other, it has also been charged with being a tool of the United States and other developed nations, bent on oppressing poor countries (Perkins 2004) and, inadvertently, fostering conditions that encourage speculation and moral hazard against these countries (Calomiris 2003). In this case, the IMF has become, in a sense, too “well” managed, to a point where it is now a cog in the global “corporatocracy.” Our work here reiterates the political environment in which the IMF operates, and how it is a forum that merely represents the ultimate interests of its shareholders. To their credit, staffers at the Fund seem to be aware of this fundamental constraint (Blustein 2001). It would appear that the best way forward would be to limit as far as possible the aims and scope of the Fund to its core functions—of surveillance and financial and technical assistance—and hence avoid the most flagrant abuses that would arise when it becomes involved in matters of trade, growth, and poverty. Just as national central banks require independence from political pressures to enhance their credibility, international financial institutions such as the IMF can do the same by insulating themselves—as far as possible—from functions that compromise their integrity as independent actors. This could narrow the possibility that international institutions are created and maintained for the purpose of maximizing domestic political support while effecting wealth transfers from other states.

6 Conclusion

In this paper, we have explored the impact of political-economic pressures in post-financial crisis resolution. To this end, we have marshaled both theory and empirical evidence to demonstrate that such influences are both real and significant. In the theoretical model that underlies our analysis, we have sought to clarify the key economic (levels of borrowing, interest rates, production outcomes) as well as political-economic (taxes, special interest organization, political capital) determinants that are important in the formation of post-crisis resolution policy. Moreover, our framework has also allowed us to explore how post-crisis redistribution may be influenced by different channels: Between politically-unorganized

taxpayers in both developed and developing countries, and other organized, special interest groups—all demanding their pound of flesh.

The empirical evidence that we present is also consistent with the key hypotheses of our theory. Using household consumption data for two countries that were gathered before and after financial crises, we find—after controlling for other relevant household-specific characteristics—that politically-organized groups tend to face smaller consumption declines (or even consumption increases) after a crisis. In our examination of IMF crisis lending patterns, we find that both the asymmetry of special interest pressures, as well as political capital in the form of audience costs, are relevant as explanatory variables in regressions of Fund lending amounts. This is so even after we account for econometric issues, such as censoring, selection, and omitted variables.

We are careful not to cast our results as conclusive evidence that political economy is the final word. The present study does have several shortcomings, which naturally point to areas for future research. In our theoretical model, we have neglected the impact of election processes and post-crisis election dynamics on our results. In addition, our assumption concerning the absence of imperfections in international capital markets is perhaps extreme. While we believe that our general findings will withstand such extensions, a more deliberate consideration of such issues may be warranted. For example, access to international capital markets appears to be important in at least some crisis episodes, such as that of Argentina. Explicitly accounting for such distinctions may allow us to peek into the relative power among politically-organized groups. Similarly, adding specific electoral mechanisms to lobbying processes may dilute (although it will not eliminate) some of the leverage that special interest groups currently hold in our model (Grossman & Helpman 2001). Empirically, looking at post-crisis redistribution outcomes using other samples—for example, by repeating the exercise with the Townsend Thai dataset between 1997 and 1998/99, or by conducting pseudo-panel regressions on Mexico’s ENIGH survey data between the years 1994 and 1996—may help further corroborate some of our findings.

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Appendix

A.1 Proofs

Proof of Proposition 1. The pre-crisis level of optimal consumption for each group is given by (11). With the specific timing of the redistribution given by (20), pre-crisis consumption reduces to an expression without a government transfer. For the developed nation, this is $\tilde{c}_R^i = \frac{r}{1+r} [(1+r)b_R^i + (\frac{1+r}{r})y_R]$. Post-crisis consumption will be (11), but adjusted by pre-crisis net borrowing $(1+r)^{T+1-t}b_R^i$ (recall Assumption 3). Taking the difference in these two terms, keeping in mind the difference in base times, yields $r\Delta B_R^i + (1+r)\Delta y_R^i + \frac{r}{\nu(1+r)}g_R^{i*}$, where $B_R^i \equiv [(1+r)^{T-t} - 1]b_{h,t}^i$. Substituting (26) and the specific functional form for the debt function assumed earlier, and rearranging, we then

obtain the expression on the right side of the equality (for the developed country). A similar calculation for the developing country then yields the assertion of the proposition. \square

Proof of Proposition 2. To prove the proposition, we need to establish two lemmata.

Lemma 1 (Consumption during crisis). *Optimal consumption for a group i in country $h = P, R$ in the absence of international borrowing at a time $S \in [t, T]$ is characterized by*

$$\begin{aligned}\hat{c}_{R,S}^i(g_R^i; y_R) &= \frac{1}{\Psi_{R,S}} \hat{X}_{R,S}^i(g_R^i; y_R), \\ \hat{c}_{P,S}^i(g_P^i; y_P) &= \int_{-\bar{\epsilon}}^{\epsilon_P^*} \varphi(\epsilon_P | a_P < 0) \cdot \frac{1}{\Psi_{P_0,S}} \hat{X}_{P,S}^i(g_P^i; y_P = 0) d\epsilon + \\ &\quad \int_{\epsilon_P^*}^0 \varphi(\epsilon_P | \Delta a_P < 0) \cdot \frac{1}{\Psi_{P_1,S}} \hat{X}_{P,S}^i(g_P^i; y_P > 0) d\epsilon,\end{aligned}\quad (\text{A.1})$$

where $\varphi(\epsilon)$ is the distribution function of the productivity shock, ϵ^* is the critical value of the shock that renders the level of productivity negative, and

$$\begin{aligned}\Psi_{R,S} &\equiv \sum_{s=S}^T \prod_{v=S+1}^s \left[\frac{(1 + \bar{r}_R^*)^{v-S}}{1 + \alpha a_{R,S} k_{R,v}^{\alpha-1}} \right], \\ \Psi_{P_0,S} &\equiv \sum_{s=S}^T \prod_{v=S+1}^s (1 + \bar{r}_P^*)^{v-S}, \\ \Psi_{P_1,S} &\equiv \sum_{s=S}^T \prod_{v=S+1}^s \left[\frac{a_{P,t}^\alpha (1 + \bar{r}_P^*)^{v-S}}{1 + \alpha (1 + \rho_P)^{(v-S)(1-\alpha)}} \right], \\ \hat{X}_{R,S}^i(g_R^i; y_R) &\equiv g_{R,t}^i + (T - S) \cdot \left(\frac{\alpha}{\bar{r}_R^*} \right)^{\frac{1}{\alpha}} \cdot y_{R,t}, \\ \hat{X}_{P,S}^i(g_P^i | y_P = 0) &\equiv g_{P,t}^i, \\ \hat{X}_{P,S}^i(g_P^i | y_P > 0) &\equiv y_{P,t}^{(\alpha-1)/\alpha} [g_{P,t}^i + (T - S) \cdot \Lambda_{P,S} \cdot y_{P,t}], \\ \Lambda_{P,S} &\equiv \frac{1 - (1 + \rho_P)^{(T-S)(1-\alpha)}}{1 - (1 + \rho_h)^{(1-\alpha)}}.\end{aligned}$$

Proof. With the loss of international private borrowing as an intertemporal smoothing technology, each group will resort to capital accumulation as the only method of consumption smoothing. The optimization problem therefore reduces to maximizing utility with respect to domestic capital only. The Lagrangian for this case is:

$$\mathcal{L} = E_t \sum_{s=t}^T \beta^{s-t} \left\{ \begin{array}{l} u \left[g_{h,t}^i + y_{h,s} - k_{h,s+1} + k_{h,s} \right] \\ - \zeta_{h,s} [a_{h,s} f(k_{h,s}) - y_{h,s}] \end{array} \right\}, \quad h = R, P. \quad (\text{A.2})$$

In this case, (5) does not obtain, since we cannot substitute (3) to simplify. Instead, the Kuhn-Tucker first order conditions in this case are:

$$\begin{aligned} \left[1 + \alpha E_t \left(a_{h,t+1} k_{h,t+1}^{\alpha-1} \right)\right] \cdot \left[\frac{E_t c_{h,t+1}^i}{c_{h,t}^i} \right] &= 1 + \bar{r}_h^*, \quad h = R, P, \\ y_{h,t} \left(1 + c_{h,t}^i + \zeta_{h,t} \right) &= 0, \quad h = R, P, \\ \zeta_{h,t} \left(y_{h,t} - a_{h,t} k_{h,t}^\alpha \right) &= 0, \quad h = R, P, \end{aligned} \quad (\text{A.3})$$

where \bar{r}^* is the domestic (financial autarky) interest rate corrected for conditional covariance, analogous to r^* , and the second and third lines list complementary slackness conditions. The Euler then implies

$$E_t \hat{c}_{h,s}^i = \Omega_{h,s|t} \hat{c}_{h,t}^i, \quad h = R, P, \quad (\text{A.4})$$

where $\Omega_{h,s|t} \equiv \prod_{v=t+1}^s \left[\frac{(1+\bar{r}_h^*)^{v-t}}{1+\alpha a_{h,t} [(1+\rho_h)^{v-t}/k_{h,v}]^{1-\alpha}} \right]$ is the discount factor for date s consumption at date $t \leq s$. Iterative substitution yields optimal consumption in the absence of international borrowing at time $S \in [t, T]$ given by

$$\hat{c}_{h,S}^i = \frac{g_{h,t}^i + \sum_{s=S}^T y_{h,s}}{\sum_{s=S}^T \Omega_{h,s|S}}, \quad h = R, P. \quad (\text{A.5})$$

We now consider each country in turn. For the developing country, we have assumed $\epsilon_{P,s} = \epsilon_{P,t} \forall s \in [S, T]$. In accord with (19), then, there are two possible cases: (a) The shock is large enough that it crosses a threshold level ϵ^* such that productivity becomes negative; (b) The shock is negative, but only the *change* in productivity is negative. For case (a), this violates the nonnegativity constraint in (A.3), and so we have a corner solution where $a_{P,s} = y_{P,s} = 0 \forall s \in [S, T]$. For case (b), $a_{P,s} k_{P,s}^\alpha = y_{P,t} > 0 \forall s \in [S, T]$. Given the distributional assumptions, we then have

$$\hat{c}_{P,S}^i (g_P^i) = \int_{-\bar{\epsilon}}^{\epsilon_P^*} \varphi(\epsilon_P | a_P < 0) \cdot \hat{C}_{P,S}^i (g_P^i | y_P = 0) + \int_{\epsilon_P^*}^0 \varphi(\epsilon_P | \Delta a_P < 0) \cdot \hat{C}_{P,S}^i (g_P^i | y_P > 0) \quad (\text{A.6})$$

where $\varphi(\epsilon)$ is the distribution function of the shock (with support $[-\epsilon, \epsilon]$); and define $\hat{C}_{P,S}^i (g_P^i, b_P^i | y_P = 0) \equiv \frac{(1+r)b_{P,t}^i + g_{P,t}^i}{\sum_{s=S}^T \prod_{v=s+1}^s (1+\bar{r}_P^*)^{v-s}}$, $\hat{C}_{P,S}^i (g_P^i, b_P^i | y_P > 0) \equiv \frac{(1+r)b_{P,t}^i + g_{P,t}^i + a_{P,t} \Lambda_{P,S} \sum_{s=S}^T k_{P,s}^\alpha}{\sum_{s=t}^S \Omega_{P,s|S}}$, with $\Lambda_{P,S} \equiv \frac{1-(1+\rho_P)^{(T-S)(1-\alpha)}}{1-(1+\rho_P)^{(1-\alpha)}}$. To proceed, we make an additional assumption.

Assumption 5 (Restructuring Constraint). $q_{P,s} = 0 \forall s \in [t, T]$.

In particular, this restriction on domestic investment may be rationalized as an externally-imposed IMF conditionality during the crisis period (through the impact of prohibitively high interest rates); alternatively, it can be regarded as domestically-induced constraints that arise due to the inability to pin down

proper investment vehicles during the restructuring period. This assumption then implies that $k_{P,s+1} = k_{P,s} \forall s \in [t, T]$, and hence rewrite

$$\hat{C}_{P,S}^i (g_P^i | y_P > 0) = \frac{g_{P,t}^i + (T - S) \cdot \Lambda_{P,S} \cdot y_{P,t}}{\sum_{s=S}^T \prod_{v=S+1}^s \left[\frac{(1 + \bar{r}_P^*)^{v-S}}{1 + \alpha (y_{P,S} / k_{P,S}) (1 + \rho_P)^{(v-S)(1-\alpha)}} \right]}.$$

For the developed country, productivity continues to follow the process stipulated in Assumption 1. Thus,

$$\hat{c}_{R,S}^i (g_R^i) = \frac{g_{R,t}^i + [a_{R,t} + \frac{\epsilon_R}{2} \cdot (T - S) (T - S + 1)] \cdot \sum_{s=S}^T k_{R,s}^\alpha}{\sum_{s=S}^T \prod_{v=S+1}^s \left[\frac{(1 + \bar{r}_R^*)^{v-S}}{1 + \alpha a_{R,S} k_{R,v}^{\alpha-1}} \right]}, \quad (\text{A.7})$$

However, we have assumed that $\epsilon_{R,s} = 0 \forall [S, T]$, and so this can be re-expressed (after some algebra) as

$$\hat{c}_{R,S}^i (g_R^i) = \frac{g_{R,t}^i + (T - S) \cdot \left(\frac{\alpha}{\bar{r}_R^*} \right)^{\frac{1}{\alpha}} \cdot y_{R,t}}{\sum_{s=S}^T \prod_{v=S+1}^s \left[\frac{(1 + \bar{r}_R^*)^{v-S}}{1 + \alpha a_{R,S} k_{R,v}^{\alpha-1}} \right]}.$$

Gathering these results then give us the crisis-period optimal consumption group i in each country at time $S \in [t, T]$ as

$$\begin{aligned} \hat{c}_{R,S}^i (g_R^i; y_R) &= \frac{1}{\Psi_{R,S}} \hat{X}_{R,S}^i (g_R^i; y_R), \\ \hat{c}_{P,S}^i (g_P^i; y_P) &= \int_{-\bar{\epsilon}}^{\epsilon_P^*} \varphi(\epsilon_P | a_P < 0) \cdot \frac{1}{\Psi_{P_0,S}} \hat{X}_{P,S}^i (g_P^i; y_P = 0) d\epsilon + \\ &\quad \int_{\epsilon_P^*}^0 \varphi(\epsilon_P | \Delta a_P < 0) \cdot \frac{1}{\Psi_{P_1,S}} \hat{X}_{P,S}^i (g_P^i; y_P > 0) d\epsilon, \end{aligned} \quad (\text{A.8})$$

where

$$\begin{aligned} \Psi_{R,S} &\equiv \sum_{s=S}^T \prod_{v=S+1}^s \left[\frac{(1 + \bar{r}_R^*)^{v-S}}{1 + \alpha a_{R,S} k_{R,v}^{\alpha-1}} \right], \\ \Psi_{P_0,S} &\equiv \sum_{s=S}^T \prod_{v=S+1}^s (1 + \bar{r}_P^*)^{v-S}, \\ \Psi_{P_1,S} &\equiv \sum_{s=S}^T \prod_{v=S+1}^s \left[\frac{a_{P,t}^\alpha (1 + \bar{r}_P^*)^{v-S}}{1 + \alpha (1 + \rho_P)^{(v-S)(1-\alpha)}} \right], \\ \hat{X}_{R,S}^i (g_R^i; y_R) &\equiv g_{R,t}^i + (T - S) \cdot \left(\frac{\alpha}{\bar{r}_R^*} \right)^{\frac{1}{\alpha}} \cdot y_{R,t}, \\ \hat{X}_{P,S}^i (g_P^i | y_P = 0) &\equiv g_{P,t}^i, \\ \hat{X}_{P,S}^i (g_P^i | y_P > 0) &\equiv y_{P,t}^{(\alpha-1)/\alpha} [g_{P,t}^i + (T - S) \cdot \Lambda_{P,S} \cdot y_{P,t}]. \end{aligned}$$

Note that these are all completely determined at time S . \square

This equation says that the optimal level of consumption for each group at a point $S \in [t, T]$ during the financial crisis is dependent on the present discounted value of its private level of borrowing just before the crisis, the government disbursement received, and the stream of crisis-level income. Note, in particular, that if there is any government transfer to a particular group i , it will be used for the purposes of consumption smoothing.

Corollary 1 (Welfare during crisis). *Gross welfare for a group i in the absence of international borrowing at a time $S \in [t, T]$ is given by*

$$\begin{aligned}\hat{W}_{R,S}^i(g_R^i; y_R) &= \hat{c}_{R,S}^i(g_R^i; y_R) - \hat{\tau}_R, \\ \hat{W}_{P,S}^i(g_P^i; y_P) &= \hat{c}_{P,S}^i(g_P^i; y_P) - \hat{\tau}_P,\end{aligned}\tag{A.9}$$

where $\hat{\tau}_h$ is given by $N_h \hat{\tau}_h = \sum_{i=1}^{I_h} N_h^i g_h^i$ for $h = R, P$.

We now use the corollary of Lemma 1 to derive the following lemma.

Lemma 2 (Optimal expected welfare). *Under the conditions given by Assumption 4, the optimal consumption time yields the optimal expected welfare for each country given by*

$$\begin{aligned}EW_R^{G^*}(g_P^*, T_P^*) &= \frac{3}{4} \sum_{i=1}^{I_R} \left\{ a_R \cdot \left[\delta + \frac{1 + \alpha a_R}{2 + \alpha a_R + \bar{r}_R^*} \right] \right\} \\ &\quad + \frac{1}{1 - \delta} \sum_{i=1}^{I_R} \left\{ \frac{1}{\nu} \left[\frac{\omega_R \lambda_R}{\omega_R - 1} + \phi_R^i \frac{\omega_R [1 + \omega_R (\lambda_R - 1)]}{1 - \omega_R} \right] - \frac{1}{1+r} \right\} \\ &\quad + \frac{1}{4} (1 + \delta) \iota_R, \\ EW_P^{G^*}(g_P^*, T_P^*) &= \frac{3}{16} \sum_{i=1}^{I_P} \left\{ y_P^{\frac{2\alpha-1}{\alpha}} \cdot \left[\delta + \frac{1 + \alpha (1 + \rho)^{1-\alpha}}{1 + \alpha (1 + \rho)^{1-\alpha} + a_P^\alpha (1 + \bar{r}_P^*)} \right] \right\} \\ &\quad + \frac{1}{1 - \delta} \sum_{i=1}^{I_P} \left\{ \frac{r}{\nu(1+r)} \left[\frac{\omega_P \lambda_P}{\omega_P - 1} + \phi_P^i \frac{\omega_P [1 + \omega_P (\lambda_P - 1)]}{1 - \omega_P} \right] - \frac{1}{1+r} \right\} \\ &\quad + \frac{1}{4} (1 + \delta) \iota_P.\end{aligned}\tag{A.10}$$

Proof. By the conditions listed in Assumption 4, we are effectively setting the number of periods of the crisis to two; this implies either $T_P^* = t+1$ or $T_R^* = t+1$, with this optimal concession time depending on the values of the other primitives in the model. The two possible cases are when the developing country concedes first, and when the developed country concedes first. We consider these in turn.

Substituting the values in Assumption 4 into (A.1), we obtain (after some

algebra)

$$\begin{aligned}\hat{c}_{P,t}^i &= \frac{1 + \alpha(1 + \rho)^{1-\alpha} \cdot y_{P,t}^{\frac{\alpha-1}{\alpha}+1}}{4 + 4\alpha(1 + \rho)^{1-\alpha} + 4a_{P,t}^\alpha (1 + \bar{r}_{P,t}^*)}, \\ \hat{c}_{P,t+1}^i &= \frac{1}{4} y_{P,t}^{\frac{\alpha-1}{\alpha}+1}.\end{aligned}\tag{A.11}$$

From Assumption 4(a) and (b), we also have $\hat{\tau}_s = 0 \forall s \in [t, t+1]$, and hence $\hat{c}_{P,t}^i = \hat{W}_{P,t}^i$ and $\hat{c}_{P,t+1}^i = \hat{W}_{P,t+1}^i$. Substituting these values into (28) and (29), followed by (24) and (24), and finally recalling the functional form of D_R and D_P , yields the equations

$$\begin{aligned}W_{P,t}^L &= \sum_{i=1}^{I_P} \left\{ \frac{[1 + \alpha(1 + \rho)^{1-\alpha}] \cdot y_{P,t}^{\frac{2\alpha-1}{\alpha}}}{4 + 4\alpha(1 + \rho)^{1-\alpha} + 4a_{P,t}^\alpha (1 + \bar{r}_{P,t}^*)} \right\} + \delta \sum_{i=1}^{I_P} \frac{y_{P,t}^{\frac{2\alpha-1}{\alpha}}}{4} \\ &\quad + \sum_{s=t+2}^{\infty} \delta^{s-(t+2)} \sum_{i=1}^{I_P} \left\{ \frac{\frac{r}{1+r} \frac{1}{\nu} \left[\frac{\omega_P \lambda_P}{\omega_P - 1} + \phi_P^i \frac{\omega_P [1 + \omega_P (\lambda_P - 1)]}{1 - \omega_P} - \frac{1}{1+r} \right]}{+ \frac{r}{r-\rho} \frac{(r_{P,t}^* - \alpha\rho)}{r_{P,t}^*} y_{P,t} + (1+r)^2 b_{P,t}^i} \right\} \\ W_{P,t}^F &= \sum_{i=1}^{I_P} \left\{ \frac{[1 + \alpha(1 + \rho)^{1-\alpha}] \cdot y_{P,t}^{\frac{2\alpha-1}{\alpha}}}{4 + 4\alpha(1 + \rho)^{1-\alpha} + 4a_{P,t}^\alpha (1 + \bar{r}_{P,t}^*)} \right\} + \delta \sum_{i=1}^{I_P} \frac{y_{P,t}^{\frac{2\alpha-1}{\alpha}}}{4} + \iota_P \\ &\quad + \sum_{s=t+2}^{\infty} \delta^{s-(t+2)} \sum_{i=1}^{I_P} \left\{ \frac{\frac{r}{\nu(1+r)} \left[\frac{\omega_P \lambda_P}{\omega_P - 1} + \phi_P^i \frac{\omega_P [1 + \omega_P (\lambda_P - 1)]}{1 - \omega_P} - \frac{1}{1+r} \right]}{+ \frac{r}{r-\rho} \frac{(r_{P,t}^* - \alpha\rho)}{r_{P,t}^*} y_{P,t} + (1+r)^2 b_{P,t}^i} \right\} \\ W_{P,t+1}^F &= \sum_{i=1}^{I_P} \frac{y_{P,t}^{\frac{2\alpha-1}{\alpha}}}{4} + \delta \iota_P \\ &\quad + \sum_{s=t+2}^{\infty} \delta^{s-(t+2)} \sum_{i=1}^{I_P} \left\{ \frac{\frac{r}{\nu(1+r)} \left[\frac{\omega_P \lambda_P}{\omega_P - 1} + \phi_P^i \frac{\omega_P [1 + \omega_P (\lambda_P - 1)]}{1 - \omega_P} - \frac{1}{1+r} \right]}{+ \frac{r}{r-\rho} \frac{(r_{P,t}^* - \alpha\rho)}{r_{P,t}^*} y_{P,t} + (1+r)^2 b_{P,t}^i} \right\}\end{aligned}\tag{A.12}$$

Substituting the values in (A.12) into (30), simplifying, and dropping time subscripts (since these are all determined at time t) gives us the second part of the lemma. Now, consider the case for the developed country. The values in Assumption 4 give

$$\begin{aligned}\hat{c}_{R,t}^i &= \frac{a_{R,t} [1 + \alpha a_{R,t}]}{2 + \alpha a_{R,t} + \bar{r}_{R,t}^*}, \\ \hat{c}_{R,t+1}^i &= a_{R,t}.\end{aligned}\tag{A.13}$$

From Assumption 4(a) and (b), we also have $\hat{\tau}_s = 0 \forall s \in [t, t+1]$, and hence $\hat{c}_{R,t}^i = \hat{W}_{R,t}^i$ and $\hat{c}_{R,t+1}^i = \hat{W}_{R,t+1}^i$. Repeating the steps as outlined above gives us the first part of the lemma. \square

The proof for the proposition follows from Lemma 2 and (33), and the specific functional form of the debt function assumed earlier. \square

A.2 Extensions

A.2.1 Changes in Post-Crisis Group Power Structure

This addendum extends the common agency model of Bernheim & Whinston (1986) and Dixit *et al.* (1997) and derives, from first principles, the way that an exogenous shock impacts the equilibrium contribution schedule. We begin by establishing the results for the general case, before applying it to the context of the model developed in Section 3.

Consider a policymaker with welfare $W^G(\mathbf{g}, \mathbf{L})$, where \mathbf{g} and \mathbf{L} are vectors that correspond to policies and contributions, respectively. There are a total of I groups, which possess welfare given by $W^i(\mathbf{g}, l^i)$, where l^i is the contribution level that has a schedule given by the (assumed) globally truthful

$$L^i(\mathbf{g}; \eta^i) = \min \{ \bar{L}^i(\mathbf{g}), \max [0, W^i(\mathbf{g}) - \eta^i(y^i)] \}, \quad (\text{A.14})$$

where $\bar{L}_h^i(\mathbf{g}) \equiv \sup \{ L^i(\mathbf{g}) \}$ is the upper limit of feasible contributions that group i is willing to undertake, subject to its net welfare remaining positive, and $\eta^i(y^i)$ is its reservation utility, which is dependent on its income y^i . We assume that $\partial G / \partial l_i \geq 0$ and $\partial W^i / \partial l_i \leq 0$ for every i , and $\partial \eta^i / \partial y^i > 0$.⁴¹

Let there be a subset $J \subseteq I$ of groups that are organized and hence engage in positive contributions. For a political equilibrium, we require: (a) \mathbf{g}^i to belong to the policymaker's best-response set to the list of contribution schedules $L(\mathbf{g})$; (b) There does not exist a contribution amount $\hat{l}^i \geq 0$ and a policy vector $\hat{\mathbf{g}}^i$ such that $W^i(\hat{\mathbf{g}}^i, \hat{l}^i) > W^i(\mathbf{g}^i, L^i(\mathbf{g}^i))$ as well as $W^G[\mathbf{g}^i, L_1(\hat{\mathbf{g}}^i), \dots, \hat{l}^i, \dots, L_K(\hat{\mathbf{g}}^i)] \geq W^G[\mathbf{g}^{-i}, \mathbf{L}^{-i}(\mathbf{g}^{-i})]$, where K is the total number of organized groups, and the superscript $-i$ indicates the absence of element i . We denote the equilibrium policy and contribution vectors by \mathbf{g}° and \mathbf{l}° .

Now, consider an exogenous negative shock, $\epsilon < 0$, to the income (and hence welfare) of group i . For simplicity, let income be constant such that $y^i = y \quad \forall i$. This then implies that $\eta^{i'} - \eta^i = \Delta \eta^i < 0$, which in turn implies that

$$L^i(\mathbf{g}; \eta^{i'}) \geq L^i(\mathbf{g}; \eta^i).$$

For a given constant level of welfare, therefore, there are now potentially groups for which the upper limit of feasible contributions—the term on the left of (A.14)—is now higher than the group's welfare net of its reservation utility

⁴¹This assumption may be rationalized as follows: Defining reservation utility as the base utility that corresponds to income gross of borrowing and government taxes/transfers, a negative (positive) shock to output then reduces (increases) this base level. Intuitively, an increase (reduction) in income raises (lowers) the opportunity cost of pursuing outside options, which implies a positive relationship between income and reservation utility.

(which is the group’s welfare if it participates in the political game—the term on the right). This is illustrated in Figure A.1. The indifference curve $W^G W^G$ is drawn such that it corresponds to the case where there are zero contributions from group i (which would pass through the point g_j^{-i} , which is the policy that would result in the absence of contributions from group i). Now, let there be a group for which, prior to the shock, the upper limit of feasible contributions dominates the welfare gain from being able to influence policy, but, post-shock, will now participate in the political contribution game. The indifference curves that correspond to these are the dashed line $W^i W^i$ and the solid $W^{i'} W^{i'}$ (with the corresponding critical values of positive welfare-inducing policy being g_j and g'_j , respectively).⁴² Therefore, after the shock, groups that formerly did not participate in the lobbying process now have an incentive to do so. This implies that $I_P \supseteq J'_P \supseteq J_P$. For one such group i , this leads to contributions that are equivalent to the equilibrium level $c^{i\circ}$, thus yielding the equilibrium policy g_j° .




Figure A.1: Changes in compensating contribution schedules.

Note that, since the basic structure of the game remains unchanged (save for a different number of politically-organized groups), all the key findings that have been established for to the original Bernheim & Whinston (1986) model continue to hold. In particular, the truthful political equilibria will continue to have both joint efficiency and coalition proofness properties.

We now contextualize the ideas developed above to our model, for the developing country. Let group welfare be given by (15), and policymaker welfare by (14). Substituting the shock $\epsilon_t < 0$ into (8), we obtain (19). Define reservation utility for group i as

$$\eta_{P,t}^i \equiv W_{P,t}^i (y_{P,t} \mid b_P^i = 0, g_P^i = 0, \tau_P^i = 0),$$

which then yields

$$\eta_{P,t}^i = \frac{r}{r - \rho} \cdot \frac{r - \alpha_P}{r_P^*} a_{P,t} k_{P,t}^\alpha. \quad (\text{A.15})$$

⁴²Note that we have chosen to illustrate the function $\bar{L}^i(\mathbf{g})$ as a curve, although this could well be linear.

Due to the crisis, therefore, (A.15) implies that

$$\Delta\eta_{P,t}^i = \frac{r}{r-\rho} \cdot \frac{r-\alpha_P}{r_P^*} [a_{P,t}k_{P,t}^\alpha - a_{P,t-1}k_{P,t-1}^\alpha] \leq 0. \quad (\text{A.16})$$

Taking the time difference of (16) and substituting (A.16) then gives us

$$\Delta L_{P,t}^i(\mathbf{g}; \eta^i) \geq 0. \quad (\text{A.17})$$

Thus, for a given welfare level, the shock decreases the reservation utility η^i and may lead to an increase in net welfare such that compensating contributions for group i are now positive. If this falls within the feasible set, the group will have an incentive to participate in the contributions game. We can thus expect, for ϵ_t sufficiently large, that there will be more groups that engage in political contributions, and so $J_{P,t} \subset J_{P,t-1}$.

Essentially, in this simple extension of the model, the shock leads to a change in the power structure of developing country special interests. Intuitively, this could occur for several reasons, as elaborated upon in the text. The crisis lowers the opportunity cost for groups to participate in collective action, since there are stronger positive selective incentives to do so. In addition, there are now a greater number of smaller groups, that face less free-riding problems in general. The political power structure is altered as a result.

A.2.2 Closed Form Solution in Continuous Time

This addendum recasts the model in continuous time and solves for the parameters and variables that determine optimal concession. For tractability, we leave some of the variables in implicit form, since re-expressing them does not lend much more insight into the solution. In particular, define

$$\begin{aligned} \Psi_R &\equiv \Psi(\bar{r}_R^*, a_R, k_R; \alpha); \Psi_{P_0} \equiv \Psi(\bar{r}_P^*); \Psi_{P_1} \equiv \Psi(\bar{r}_P^*, a_P, k_P; \alpha, \rho_P); \\ X_R^i &\equiv X(g_R^i, b_R^i, r, y_R); X_P^i \equiv X(g_P^i, b_P^i, r, \bar{r}_P^*, y_P; \rho_P, \alpha); \\ \hat{X}_R^i &\equiv \hat{X}(g_R^i, b_R^i, r, y_R); \hat{X}_P^i(y_P = 0) \equiv \hat{X}(g_R^i, b_R^i, r); \\ \hat{X}_P^i(y_P > 0) &\equiv \hat{X}(g_P^i, b_P^i, r, y_P; \rho_P). \end{aligned}$$

Consider first the developing country. In continuous time, the payoffs to leadership are

$$W_P^L(\mathbf{g}_P^*, T_P) = \int_{s=t}^{T_P} e^{-\delta(s-t)} \hat{W}_P ds + e^{-\delta(T_P-t)} \int_{s=T_P}^{\infty} e^{-\delta(s-T_P)} W_P ds, \quad (\text{A.18})$$

where $\hat{W}_P \equiv \sum_{i \in I_P} \hat{W}_P^i$, $W_P \equiv \sum_{i \in I_P} W_P^i$, and δ is the governments' discount

factor. Payoffs to being a follower are

$$\begin{aligned}
W_P^F(\mathbf{g}_P^*, T_P) &= \int_{s=t}^{T_P} e^{-\delta(s-t)} \hat{W}_P ds + e^{-\delta(T_P-t)} \int_{s=T_P}^{\infty} e^{-\delta(s-T_P)} W_P ds \\
&\quad + e^{-\delta(T_P-t)} \iota_P \\
&= W_P^L(\mathbf{g}_P^*, T_P) + e^{-\delta(T_P-t)} \iota_P,
\end{aligned} \tag{A.19}$$

where ι is political capital. Let the probability of concession by country h is captured by the (smooth) distribution function $\Xi_h(T_h)$, with the associated density $\xi_h(T_h)$. Expected welfare is then

$$EW_P^G(\mathbf{g}_P^*, T_P) = [1 - \Xi_R(T_P)] W_P^L(\mathbf{g}_P^*, T_P) + \int_{s=t}^{T_P} \xi_R(s) W_P^F(\mathbf{g}_P^*, s) ds. \tag{A.20}$$

Differentiating with respect to optimal concession time T_P yields the expression

$$[1 - \Xi_R(T_P)] \cdot W_{P_T}^L - \xi_R(T_P) W_P^L(\mathbf{g}_P^*, T_P) + \xi_R(T_P) [W_P^L(\mathbf{g}_P^*, T_P) + \iota_P] = 0, \tag{A.21}$$

where

$$\begin{aligned}
W_{P_T}^L &= \sum_{i \in I_P} \left\{ e^{-\delta(T_P-t)} \left[\int_{-\bar{\epsilon}}^{\epsilon_P^*} \varphi(\epsilon_P | a_P < 0) e^{-\Psi_{P_0, T_P}} \hat{X}_{P, T_P}^i(y_P = 0) d\epsilon \right] \right. \\
&\quad + e^{-\delta(T_P-t)} \left[\int_{\epsilon_P^*}^0 \varphi(\epsilon_P | \Delta a_P < 0) e^{-\Psi_{P_1, T_P}} \hat{X}_{P, T_P}^i(y_P > 0) d\epsilon \right] \\
&\quad + \int_{s=t}^{T_P} e^{-\delta(s-t)} \int_{\epsilon_P^*}^0 \varphi(\epsilon_P | \Delta a_P < 0) e^{-\Psi_{P_1, s}} y_{P, T_P} d\epsilon ds \\
&\quad + \int_{s=t}^{T_P} e^{-\delta(s-t)} \int_{\epsilon_P^*}^0 \varphi(\epsilon_P | \Delta a_P < 0) \hat{X}_{P, T_P}^i(y_P > 0) \Psi_{P_1, T_P} e^{-\Psi_{P_1, s}} d\epsilon ds \\
&\quad - \delta e^{-\delta(T_P-t)} \int_{s=T_P}^{\infty} e^{-\delta(s-T_P)} (X_{P, s}^i - \tau_{P, s}) ds \\
&\quad \left. - e^{-\delta(T_P-t)} \left[(X_{P, T_P} - \tau_{P, T_P}) - \int_{s=T_P}^{\infty} \delta e^{-\delta(s-T_P)} (X_{P, s} - \tau_{P, s}) ds \right] \right\},
\end{aligned}$$

which is quite impenetrable. To gain some intuition, it is therefore useful to examine (A.21). Rearranging, obtain

$$W_{P_T}^L = \frac{\xi_R(T_P)}{1 - \Xi_R(T_P)} \cdot \iota_P.$$

At the margin, the expected cost to the developing country of conceding—which is the instantaneous probability that the developed country concedes at time T_P , conditional on the developing country not having yet conceded at

this time (or the hazard rate, which is the first term on the right hand side) multiplied by the benefits to the developing country not conceding but reaping the gains from political capital (the second term)—must equal to the expected gain to her of waiting another instant before conceding. Hence, this expression equates the cost of waiting to concede, to the benefits of doing so.

Without knowing the specific distribution $\Xi_R(T_P)$, it is not possible to directly use (A.21) to derive an equilibrium concession time T_P^* . We will therefore assume that both countries concede according to the same function, $T(\iota_h)$. This then suggests that, for a particular time \hat{T} , the probability that country h concedes before this time is the probability that the political capital is less than the associated $\hat{\iota}$, a function given by $F(\hat{\iota})$. This allows us to write $\Xi_h(\hat{T}) = \Xi_h(T(\hat{\iota})) = F(\hat{\iota})$. Differentiating this yields $\xi_h(T) \cdot T'(\iota) = f(\iota) \forall T$. Plug this into (A.21) to obtain the differential equation

$$T'(\iota_P) = \frac{f_P(T_P)}{1 - F_P(T_P)} \cdot \frac{\iota_P}{W_{P_T}^L}. \quad (\text{A.22})$$

Together with the boundary condition $T(0) = 0$, we can then proceed to solve for the optimal concession time for the developing country. This will be a function of primitives given by

$$T_P^* = T(\phi_P, \iota_P, r, \bar{r}_P^*, b_P, y_P, \tau_P; \omega_P, \lambda_P, \rho_P, \alpha).$$

A similar process will also result in the optimal concession time for the developed country, given by

$$T_R^* = T(\phi_R, \iota_R, r, \bar{r}_R^*, b_R, y_R, \tau_R; \omega_R, \lambda_R, \rho_R, \alpha).$$

Equilibrium time of bargaining will be that of the first country to concede, $T^* = \min\{T_P^*, T_R^*\}$, and the equilibrium debt function will be

$$N_P D_P(\mathbf{g}^*, T^*) = -N_R D_R(\mathbf{g}^*, T^*), \quad (\text{A.23})$$

which in turn is a function of the primitives

$$N_h D_h(\mathbf{g}^*, T^*) = N_h D_h(\phi_P, \phi_R, \iota_h, r, \bar{r}_h^*, b_h, y_h, \tau_h; \omega_P, \omega_R, \lambda_P, \lambda_R, \rho_P, \alpha).$$

A.3 Data

This appendix details the data used for the empirical section of the paper.

A.3.1 Bulgarian Household Data

With regard to core variables, the dummy variables for *durable asset ownership* comprise 19 different household durable goods that constitute household assets, which can potentially be bought or sold for consumption smoothing. These include, among other things, a gas stove (DA1), a manual washing machine (DA6), a dryer (DA7), a dishwasher (DA8), and a color television (DA11).

Likewise, the dummies for *business asset ownership* and *agricultural asset ownership* comprise, respectively, 14 and 18 different assets owned by a particular household. Examples of these in each category include office equipment (BA3), medical supplies (BA7), and tools (BA16), and a tractor (AA1), a plow (AA3), and a cart (AA13). The dummy variables for *household composition* involve dummies for whether the head of household was: A male (female) up to age 34; a male (female) aged between 35 and 54, and a male (female) between the ages of 55 and 99. In addition, dummies included whether there were children in the household under 4 years of age; and children between the ages of 5 and 14. The *health* dummy took on a value of unity if there was any chronic disease in the household in the past 12 months, and null otherwise. *Population group* comprised two dummies, one for Bulgars (ETH1) and another for Roma (gypsies) (ETH2). The *geographical district* control added dummies to each of the following regions: Sofia City (DIST1), Bourgas (DIST2), Varna (DIST3), Lovech (DIST4), Montana (DIST5), Plovdiv (DIST6), Russe (DIST7), Sofia Region (DIST8), and Haskovo (DIST9). Finally, household size is a discrete measure of the number of resident household members.

There were also several constructed variables. The *average years of household education* was constructed by, first, dropping individuals that were still schooling at the time of the survey, as well as children under schooling age, and averaging these years over these remaining household members. *Employment sector* was constructed as an dummy variable that took on a value of unity if one of the first two household members (usually the father and/or mother) worked in a particular sector of the economy in 1995, and null otherwise. These sectors were: Manufacturing (ES1); construction (ES2); agriculture (ES3); forestry (ES4); transportation (ES5); communications (ES6); trade (ES7); commercial services (ES8); other production (ES9); science and education (ES10); arts and culture (ES11); healthcare (ES12); sport and tourism (ES13); finance and credit (ES14); management and administration (ES15); army and police (ES16); and other non material activities (ES17). As discussed in the text, *political organization* was constructed with the membership rosters of the Bulgarian Chamber of Commerce and Industry (BCCI) and *Confederation of Labor Podkrepa*. The indicator took on unity when sectoral organization membership numbers exceeded 4 (out of 84) and 3 (out of 30), respectively, and zero otherwise (these seemingly arbitrary values belie the significant natural break in the data that determined the cutoff choices). *Household consumption expenditures* were constructed in three steps. First, monthly expenditures on 13 different categories of food and nonfood consumption goods were collated (these included food items such as cereal, fruits and vegetables, and meat and dairy). Second, these were converted to per capita terms, and then adjusted for seasonality as well as deflated for regional price differences. Third, since monthly inflation was rapidly changing over the time period, we converted the values to real terms using monthly CPI data with January 1995 as the base month. *Household total income* the sum of net agricultural income, wage and self employment income, social benefit income (this includes income from sources such as child allowance and unemployment insurance), net remittances, other revenue (such as returns from financial assets,

lottery earnings, and debts), and rents from real estate assets, converted into real terms.

A.3.2 Indonesian Household Data

In general, we sought to maintain analogous control variables for the Indonesian data as was employed for the Bulgarian data. However, due to differences in the two datasets, some of these variables are necessarily different. For the core variables, the dummy variables for *durable asset ownership* comprise 11 different household assets, which include, among other things, livestock (DA4), household appliances (DA6), jewelry (DA9), and household furniture (DA10). Likewise, the dummies for *agricultural asset ownership* and *business asset ownership* each comprise 9 different assets that include a tractor (AA1), a plow (AA3), and a cart (AA13), and motor vehicles (BA3), nonfarm equipment (BA6), and office equipment (BA7). The dummy variables for *household composition* were specified in the same manner as for the Bulgarian data; however, controls for children were not included. Instead of a measurement for health, we incorporated dummies for 6 different types of income shocks. These included sickness (S2), crop loss (S3), and natural disasters (S4), and took on a value of unity if the shock was experienced by the household in the past 12 months, and null otherwise. Since data on ethnicity were not available for Indonesia, we substituted this with *language*: The two dummies corresponded with Bahasa Indonesia (ETH1) and Javanese (ETH2). The *geographical district* control added dummies to each of the following regions: North Sumatra (DIST1), West Sumatra (DIST2), South Sumatra (DIST3), Lampung (DIST4), Jakarta (DIST5), West Java (DIST6), Central Java (DIST7), Yogyakarta (DIST8), East Java (DIST9), Bali (DIST10), W. Nusa Tenggara (DIST11), South Kalimantan (DIST12), and South Sulawesi (DIST13). Finally, household size is a discrete measure of the number of resident household members.

For the constructed variables, we constructed *average highest level of household education* in a similar manner to the average household education variable for Bulgaria, but in this case the data are ordinal. *Employment sector* was constructed as an dummy variable that took on a value of unity if one of the first two household members (usually the father and/or mother) worked in a particular sector of the economy in 1993, and null otherwise.⁴³ These sectors were: Science and technology (ES1); healthcare (ES2); professionals (ES3); sport (ES4); administration/management (ES5); clerical (ES6); sales (ES7); service (ES8); agriculture (ES9); production/manufacturing (ES10); forestry (ES11); chemical (ES12); food and beverages (ES13); construction (ES14); transport (ES15); and military (ES16). As discussed in the text, *political organization* was constructed using the Castle Group’s Suharto Dependence Index (SDI); this index ranges

⁴³Data for 1997 sectors were not available. According to the IFLS documentation, data for adult individuals were only collected if they differed from the first IFLS wave. Since these were not provided for neither IFLS2 nor IFLS3, we worked with IFLS1 data, maintaining the assumption that any employment sector changes for household members were sufficiently infrequent.

from -2 to 5, with corporations more closely affiliated with Suharto being ranked higher. We considered firms with positive SDI values and allowed the indicator to take on unity when the sectoral representation exceeded 4 (out of 72), and zero otherwise (as before, the choice of a cutoff was made based on the natural break in the data). In addition, for the reason discussed in the text, we also included the military as a politically-connected group. *Household consumption expenditures* were calculated in a similar manner to the Bulgarian data, while *household total income* was calculated from the reported annual salaries of the first 10 individuals in the household, averaged over household size and taken on a monthly basis, and converted into real terms, accordingly.

A.3.3 International Financial Data

Most of the data were sourced from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics (IFS) database. The variables specifically implied by the model that we used are gross domestic product (99B..ZF), government revenue (81...ZF) as a proxy for taxation, population (99Z..ZF), foreign assets held by banks (21...ZF) as a proxy for net borrowing, and interest rates. Domestic rates were taken to be the lending rates (60P..ZF) for the country in question, unless no such data were available, in which case deposit rates (60L..ZF) were used as a substitute. International (risk-free) rates were calculated as the simple average of lending rates in France, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Additional technocratic controls include international reserves (.1..SZF) and quota subscriptions (.2F.SZF). The World Bank’s Global Development Finance (GDF) database provided data for external debt (DT.DOD.DECT.GN.ZS), current account balance (BN.CAB.XOKA.CD), and debt service as a share of exports of goods and services (DT.TDS.DECT.EX.ZS).

We relied on the IMF Annual Reports from 1971 through 2004 for data on IMF lending via Stand-By (SBA) and Extended Fund Facility (EFF) arrangements. Supplemental Reserve Facility (SRF) lending was drawn from IMF Staff Reports. For all these arrangements, we obtained effective and expiration dates for arrangements, and amounts approved in the financial year corresponding to the annual report. Crises were classified based on two sources: (a) Caprio, Gerard & Daniela Klingebiel (2003), “Episodes of Systemic and Borderline Financial Crises”. Mimeograph: The World Bank; and (b) Kaminsky, Graciela L. (2003), “Varieties of Currency Crises”. Mimeograph: George Washington University. An arrangement was considered to be extended in a crisis period when it was approved either in the same year t as the crisis, or in the year $t + 1$ following (from either source). However, crises that have their roots in the public sector (either due to fiscal excess or sovereign debt) were *not* coded as crises, since these do not fall into the definition of financial crisis that we have explored in the theoretical model.

A.3.4 International Political Data

The construction of the country-level *special interest pressure* measure was dependent on whether the measure was for a developing or developed country. For a developing country, we utilized the IMF's Government Finance Statistics (GFS) database and obtained government expenditure by the following functions: Defense (82B), Education (82C), Health (82D), Recreational, Cultural, and Religious (82G), Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing, and Hunting (82HB), Mining, Manufacturing, and Construction (82HC), Fuel and Energy (82HD), and Transportation and Communication (82HI). A Gini index for the distribution of government expenditure was then calculated, following the equation:

$$\phi_{h,t} = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{I_h} \sum_{-i=1}^{I_h} |G_i - G_{-i}|}{2I_h^2 \bar{G}_h}.$$

For computational purposes, this was calculated using the formula in Glasser (1962):

$$\phi_{h,t} = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{I_h} (2i - I_h - 1) G_i}{I_h^2 \bar{G}_h},$$

for G arrayed in ascending order, such that i is the rank of G_i in the sample. This ranged from 0 (least inequality in special interest pressure) to 1. For developed countries, we used the Consolidated Banking Statistics compiled by the BIS to calculate the index of (developed) country lending exposure, which is the ratio of foreign claims of reporting country banks on an individual country to the total foreign claims of these reporting banks:

$$\phi_{-h,t} = \frac{B_{h,-h,t}}{\sum_{h=1}^H B_{h,-h,t}}.$$

As discussed in the text, the developed countries were limited to the United States, Japan, Germany, France, and the United Kingdom. The calculation of ϕ for the European Union countries of Germany, France, and the United Kingdom was then calculated as a simple average of countries with available data. The calculation of ϕ for all developed countries was calculated in an analogous fashion.

For *political capital*, we constructed our measure by taking a simple average of the Freedom House indices of political freedoms and civil liberties, for an index that ranges between 0 (greatest political capital at stake) and 7 (least political capital at stake). Although this measure was limited in only capturing two dimensions, we felt that this was outweighed by the large coverage across time and countries. We also employed the *Polity2* variable in the Polity IV dataset (Marshall & Jaggers 2003), although the project's coverage of only countries with population sizes greater than 500,000 eliminates a sizable number of observations, since small nations constitute a fairly large subset of participants in IMF lending programs. We obtained the other control variables from various sources. Political proximity to the U.S. was obtained from

two sources: The United Nations Roll Call Data, 1946–1985, from the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research, and supplemented by the Dag Hammarskjöld Library Voting Records Database of the United Nations Bibliographic Information System for the years thereafter. Alternative measures of special interest pressure were taken from Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index, from the Internet Center for Corruption Research.

A.4 Notation

α	Coefficient of productivity	N_h^i (N_h)	Mass of group i (country h)
β	Consumer subjective discount rate	a	Productivity
δ	Government discount rate	b	Private borrowing
ϵ	Exogenous productivity shock	c	Consumption
ϕ	Organized lobbying indicator	D	Government borrowing
φ	Distribution of productivity shock	$f(\cdot)$	Production function
η	Reservation utility of lobbying group	g	Government disbursement
ι	Political capital	J	Set of lobbying groups
κ	Multiplicative constant (cons)	k	Capital
λ	Population organized as lobbies	L	Lobbying contributions
ν	Multiplicative constant (debt)	Q (q)	(Aggregate) investment
ρ	Shock persistence	r	Interest rate
τ	Lump sum tax	T	Crisis resolution time
ω	Weight on lobbying contributions	U	Lifetime utility
Ξ (ξ)	Probability (density) of concession	W (V)	Gross (net) group welfare
ζ	Lagrangian multiplier	Y (y)	(Aggregate) output
γ, Γ	Regression coefficients (consumption)	G	Government expenditure
θ, Θ	Regression coefficients (lending)	B	Foreign claims
ϑ	Regression coefficients (selection)	\mathbf{X}	HH controls (consumption)
ε	Disturbance term (consumption)	\mathbf{Y}	Macro variables (lending)
v, ζ	Disturbance terms (lending)	\mathbf{Z}	Country controls (lending)